the political representation of ethnic minorities in …...not only study ethnic minority...
TRANSCRIPT
The political representation of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands: nominated and elected ethnic minority candidates
Roos van der Zwan & Marcel Lubbers Radboud University Nijmegen
First draft – please do not cite without author’s permission
Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions in Pisa 24-28 April 2016
Roos van der Zwan Department of Sociology Radboud University Nijmegen [email protected] Marcel Lubbers Department of Sociology Radboud University Nijmegen [email protected]
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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on the political representation of minority groups by
examining the representation of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. Considering that the
composition of candidate lists is likely to affect the composition of the House of Representatives, we
not only study ethnic minority representation among the in 2012 elected Members of Parliament but
also the representativeness of political parties’ candidate lists. Additionally, it is tested to what
extent the level of representation can be explained by political party characteristics. The results show
that most ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands are underrepresented, except for ethnic
minorities of Turkish and Moroccan origin. Moreover, party characteristics partly explain the
representativeness of candidate lists. More specifically, it is the party’s standpoints on integration
and migration that affects the share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list and the relative
position of ethnic minorities on the list.
Keywords: political representation, candidate lists, ethnic minorities, the Netherlands
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Introduction
In many Western countries political institutions are not a representative reflection of society.
Minority groups are usually underrepresented (Bloemraad, 2013). Recently, Canada has become a
remarkable exception as its most diverse parliament so far has been installed in 2015, including
women, Muslims and indigenous members (Woolf, 2015). This could be a response to the call for
more diversity in political institutions which emerges in Canada as well as in other countries (Syal &
Segdhi, 2014; Singh, 2015; Jongejan & van Soest, 2012). The scientific attention for the political
underrepresentation of ethnic minorities increases too (Bloemraad, 2013; Togeby, 2008; Bird, 2005;
Ruedin, 2013; Dancygier, Lindgren, Oskarsson & Vernby, 2015). Previous research mainly focuses on
elected Members of Parliament (MPs) not paying attention to the nominated candidates. However,
who is on the candidate list and in which order influences the choices that voters have and therefore
the composition of parliament (Hazan & Rahat, 2006; Gallagher & Marsh, 1988). That makes the
representativeness of the candidate list another factor that may affect the number of ethnic minority
MPs. For that reason, we address ethnic minority representation not only by looking at elected MPs,
but also by studying the composition and ordering of the entire candidate lists.
The ethnic composition of Dutch society is changing with an increasingly diverse population.
One of the challenges coming forth out of these changes is the integration of ethnic minorities as
active citizens of society (Fukuyama, 2006). When ethnic minorities are not present in political
institutions this sends a message of exclusion to both majority and minority groups. Hence, the
proportional representation of ethnic minorities – also called descriptive representation – has an
important symbolic meaning (Phillips, 1995). Descriptive representation refers to an equal share of
ethnic minority groups in political institutions as compared to society. The extensive attention and
quotas for the political representation of women, shows the relevance of descriptive representation
regardless of whether the interests of minority groups are represented by majority group members.
Few people today would accept to be represented by men only, which was the case in many
countries only a few decades ago (Wängerud, 2009; IPU, 2015).
The Netherlands is an interesting case to study; firstly, because the proportional distribution
of seats is as close as possible to the proportion of the vote that the parties received, it is seen as one
of the most proportional systems in the world (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009). Secondly, in contrast to
other countries non-Western ethnic minorities seem relatively well represented in the Netherlands
(Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016). Earlier studies have found that factors such as electoral systems
and the cultural context are related to the level of minority representation in political institutions
(Ruedin, 2013; Togeby, 2008; Dancygier et al., 2015; Sobolewska, 2013). However, those studies have
often neglected what precedes the representativeness of the House of Representatives: the
representativeness of the candidate lists. Since parties decide on who is nominated for the candidate
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list, we concentrate on party characteristics. Mügge (2016) for instance finds that women’s and
ethnic minority networks within Dutch parties have been beneficial for female ethnic minority
candidates. Apart from Mügge (2016), there is a lack of research on the representation of ethnic
minorities on candidate lists and its explanations. This paper contributes to the existing literature by
testing for party level explanations.
In this study we focus on the most recent elections of 2012 in the Netherlands by examining
and explaining the share of ethnic minorities on candidate lists and the representativeness of the
House of Representatives. We collected data for all parties and candidates on the candidate lists for
the 2012 national elections. With these data we can examine to what extent not only non-Western
ethnic groups but also Western ethnic minority groups are present and test whether the House of
Representatives is as ethnically diverse as Dutch society. Our aim is to answer the following research
question: ‘To what extent have different ethnic groups in the Netherlands been represented on
national candidate lists and in the House of Representatives in 2012 and to what extent can variance
in representativeness be explained by party characteristics?’
Theoretical framework
The Dutch electoral system and political context
The Netherlands has a list system of proportional representation (PR). PR systems, other than
majoritarian systems, are said to be more proportional and in which it is easier to increase the
descriptive representation of minority groups (Htun, 2004). In the Netherlands a candidate list is
presented to voters on which all candidates are listed in a column under the name of the party. All
political parties who want to participate in the elections have to submit a candidate list. Voters can
cast a vote for a party by choosing one candidate on the list. These votes determine how the 150
seats in the House of Representatives are distributed between the parties.
There are two important and distinctive characteristics of the Dutch system. Firstly, in
contrast to most other countries, the Netherlands is seen as one single electoral district on which the
distribution of the seats is based (although there are 20 districts due to administrative reasons).
Secondly, other than an electoral quotient, there is no national threshold for political parties. The
amount of votes necessary for a seat is determined by dividing the number of votes for a party by the
number of seats in Parliament (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009). These characteristics make the proportional
distribution of seats as close as possible to the proportion of the vote that the parties received.
In 2012 the native Dutch made up 79.1 per cent of the population in the Netherlands. From
the citizens with an ethnic minority background, 11.6 per cent originate from non-Western countries
whereas 9.3 per cent come from Western countries (Statistics Netherlands, 2016). These numbers
demonstrate that even though most of the ethnic minorities originate from non-Western countries,
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ethnic minorities from Western countries also form an important part of the ethnic minority
population. For migrants, the Dutch nationality can be gained after five years of legal residence in the
Netherlands (Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap, 1984). Children of migrants without the Dutch
nationality can acquire Dutch citizenship from the age of 18 when they are born in the Netherlands
and are legal residents (IND, 2015). Only migrants with Dutch citizenship can vote or stand for
national elections.
In April of 2012, the Cabinet was dissolved after only two years in office because of
disagreements on the budget cuts for 2013. This resulted in new elections that took place on the 12th
of September 2012. Voters could vote for candidates of 21 political parties, of which eleven parties
are now represented in the House of Representatives (Parlement & Politiek, 2016). The majority of
the votes went to the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD, 27%) and the Labour party
(PvdA, 25%). These parties together formed the new government as usually more than one party is
needed for a majority in the Netherlands.
From candidate selection to Member of Parliament
A long process precedes the final composition of Parliament. In this study we examine two moments
within this process that we think are important for ethnic minority party members. Firstly, ethnic
minorities have to be nominated by political parties before they can stand for election. Secondly, if
they are nominated for the candidate list, they still have to be elected to become an MP (Kunovich &
Paxton, 2005).1 We expect that political party characteristics can partly explain the variation between
the representativeness of the different candidate lists. We therefore start by examining different
party characteristics to find out which factors are important in determining who is nominated for the
candidate list and who is not. Once the candidate list is determined, the voters decide who gets
elected. The last step is to examine to what extent the representativeness of the candidate lists is
related to the representativeness of the House of Representatives.
Who gets selected?
To start with, it is examined to what extent party characteristics are related to the share of ethnic
minorities on the candidate lists. The first characteristic that varies between parties is their views on
migration and integration. Studies show that standpoints of parties matter for women; left-wing
ideology is related to a higher number of elected women (Caul, 1999; Wängerud, 2009). Whereas the
importance of ideology may be declining for women (Wängerud, 2009) it may be even more 1 Another step in this process is the supply of candidates. However, it is difficult to determine how many party members aspired candidacy let alone how many non-party members. It is therefore beyond the scope of this paper.
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important for ethnic minorities considering the strong political debate about ethnic minorities and
their integration in the Netherlands. We examine the extent to which the standpoints of parties are
restrictive on migration and integration issues rather than looking at general party ideology (left-right
division). Most parties are quite explicit in their views on this topic during political debates and have
included their positions in the party program. We argue that less restrictive views on migration and
integration are likely to be related to a higher number of ethnic minorities on candidate lists. The
parties that have less restrictive views can be expected to be more willing to place ethnic minorities
on the candidate list. Therefore, our first hypothesis reads: ‘The less restrictive political parties’ views
on migration and integration, the higher the share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list (H1a).’
What also differs between political parties is the extent to which they support ethnic
minority members. Examples are quotas, targets and intra-party ethnic minority networks. Quotas
are a popular and often used method to increase the share of underrepresented minorities in
political institutions (Wängerud, 2009; Htun, 2004). For women quotas have been successful in
various countries (Wängerud, 2009). It can differ per country whether there are quota or reserved
seats at the national level, quotas set by political parties (party quotas), or both (Htun, 2004). Htun
(2004) does find that quotas are more often used to increase the underrepresentation of women and
that reserved seats in the legislature are more often used for ethnic minority groups. In the
Netherlands, there are no quotas or reserved seats for ethnic minorities at the national level, but
there are some parties require or strive for a certain percentage of ethnic minorities on the
candidate list (Htun, 2004; Mügge, 2016). We expect that quotas or targets at the party level, similar
as for women, are likely to increase the number of ethnic minorities on candidate lists. Other ways
used by Dutch parties to support ethnic minorities are intra-party ethnic minority networks. In these
networks, minority issues are discussed but they can also bring possible ethnic minority candidates to
the attention of the selectorate (Mügge, 2016). We expect that parties with more support for ethnic
minority members have a stronger tendency to place ethnic minorities on the list. Therefore, we
formulate the following hypothesis: ‘The more ethnic minorities are supported within the party, the
higher share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list (H1b).’
Aside from party ideology and quotas, we examine whether candidate selection methods are
related to the representativeness of the candidate list. How parties select their candidates is one of
the most important functions of political parties (Scarrow, Webb & Farell, 2000) as it determines on
who voters can cast their vote and therefore also the composition of parliament. Because this is so
influential, it is also important to know who decides about the candidates (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988).
The body that selects the candidates is called the selectorate (Hazan & Rahat, 2006). In the
Netherlands there are no legal rules on how candidates should be selected (Hazan & Voerman,
2006). Political parties can therefore decide how they choose their candidates.
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Generally, when the candidate lists have to be created, candidates can submit their
candidacy or local parties can make candidate suggestions. The selectorate examines all the
candidates and, depending on the party, advises the executive board of the party on the ordering of
the candidates on the list or decides about the ordering of the candidates (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009;
Hazan & Voerman, 2006). Important differences between parties relate to who makes the final
decision about the candidate list and at which level the decision is made (national, local); that is, the
extent to which the selectorate is inclusive (Hazan & Voerman, 2006). Selectorates are the most
inclusive when voters in general can vote for who gets selected and the most exclusive where a
single leader decides about the candidate selection (Rahat & Hazan, 2001). In the Netherlands, and
many other European countries, party members are at the most inclusive end of the continuum
rather than the entire electorate. The level of inclusiveness can influence representativeness because
a more exclusive selectorate (e.g. the party leader) has more influence on the candidate list than a
more inclusive candidate list (e.g. all party members). What kind of candidate list composition is
strived for also depends on the party ideology, but in general it would be easier for a small and
exclusive selectorate to set up a balanced and diverse candidate list (Hazan & Rahat, 2006). With a
more inclusive selectorate the majority group may be placed in the highest positions. Since ethnic
minorities are a minority group, they are likely to be better represented when there is a more
exclusive selectorate. Our hypothesis is therefore that ‘The less inclusive the selectorate of a party,
the higher the share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list (H1c)’.
Relative list position
Even if parties include ethnic minorities on their candidate list, this does not necessarily mean that
ethnic minorities have a large chance to get elected. The relative position of candidates on the list is
therefore also a factor to consider. For that reason we expect that party characteristics are related to
the relative position of ethnic minorities on the candidate list. Firstly, we expect that parties that are
more positive about migration and integration are not only more likely to place ethnic minorities on
the list, but also more likely to place them on higher positions. Hence, we expect that: ‘The less
restrictive political parties’ views on migration and integration, the higher the relative list position of
ethnic minority candidates (H2a).’
Again, we expect that not only the share of ethnic minorities is affected by ethnic minority
support, but the relative position on the list as well. A quota or target, for example, can be
interpreted as striving for a sufficient representation of ethnic minorities in political positions. Such
parties may not only want ethnic minorities on their candidate list, but also in positions in which they
can be elected. We anticipate that ‘The more ethnic minorities are supported within the party, the
higher the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates (H2b).’
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In addition, the selectorate may affect the relative positions of candidates on the list. The
selectorate does not only have influence on the composition but also on the ordering of the list. We
expect that if exclusive selectorates are able to create a balanced candidate list and indeed strive for
one, they will not only place ethnic minority candidates in low list positions. Hence, the next
hypothesis is ‘The less inclusive the selectorate of a party, the higher the relative list position of
ethnic minority candidates (H2c).’
Who gets elected?
When the selections are made and the candidate lists are determined, the voters decide who
eventually gets elected and becomes an MP. Nevertheless, the candidates between who they can
choose depend on the candidate lists provided by the parties. Apart from other factors as
determined in previous studies, like the electoral system (Ruedin, 2013), we therefore expect that
the number of ethnic minority candidates that are elected is related to the share of ethnic minority
candidates on the candidate lists. We anticipate that ‘The higher the share of ethnic minorities on
the candidate list, the higher the share of ethnic minorities in the house of representatives (H4).’
Data and measurements
The political parties taken into account in this study are all parties that won at least one seat in the
parliamentary elections of 2012. These parties are: 50Plus, Christen Democratic Appeal (CDA),
Christian Union (CU), Democrats 66 (D66), GreenLeft (GL), Labour Party (PvdA), Party for the Animals
(PvDD), Party for Freedom (PVV), Reformed Political Party (SGP), Socialist Party (SP) and the People’s
Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Table 1 shows the number of seats each party won in the
elections of 2012.
Table 1. Distribution of seats in the House of Representatives, 2012 Party Seats People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) 41 Labour Party (PvdA) 38 Party for Freedom (PVV) 15 Socialist Party (SP) 15 Christen Democratic Appeal (CDA) 13 Democrats 66 (D66) 12 Christian Union (CU) 5 Green Left (GL) 4 Reformed Political Party (SGP) 3 50Plus 2 Party for the Animals (PvDD) 2 Source: Parlement & Politiek, 2016
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Data collection
The data include all candidates on the candidate lists of the eleven parties who received at least one
seat in the elections of 2012. For all 647 candidates information about their country of birth and the
country of birth of their parents was collected. In addition, information about gender, age and place
on the candidate list was obtained. Data was gathered online; for most of the elected candidates,
information is made available by the Parlementair Documentatie Centrum which provides small
online biographies about MPs (PDC, 2015). Other online resources were used to complement this
information, such as newspaper articles, social media and personal websites. For 510 candidates
information about the country of birth was found online. Information about the country of birth of
the parents was more difficult to find. Therefore, if no information about the country of birth of the
parents was found, a country of birth was assigned to them based on the name and country of birth
of the candidate and any other relevant information available.
There were 137 candidates of which no information about their place of birth could be found
or of which the country of birth of the parents was unclear. Those candidates were contacted if
contact information was available. In total, 85 candidates responded. This reduced the number of
candidates of which country of birth and/or the country of birth of their parents was unknown to 52.
For these last candidates the country of birth and the country of birth of the parents were coded by
three coders. This coding was based on the names of the candidates and any relevant information
available. In 94% of the cases the same country of birth of the candidate was coded. The candidates’
father’s country of birth matched in 88% of the cases and the country of birth of the mother in 87%
of the cases. In case the three coders did not all code the same country of birth, the most mentioned
country of birth was chosen (coded by two out of the three coders).
Dependent variables
The first dependent variable is the share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list. This is calculated
as the proportion of ethnic minorities of all candidates on the candidate list of each party. The
second dependent variable is the relative position of candidates on the list. This is calculated as
follows: 𝑇−𝑃𝑇−1
where T stands for the total number of positions available on a candidate list and P for
the position of a candidate on the list. This variable ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 is the last position on
the candidate list and 1 the highest position on the list (party leader). The higher the value, the
higher and better the relative list position of the candidate. The PvdA and SP also included regional
candidates and therefore did not submit the same candidate list in each of the districts. This means
that more than one candidate are on the last positions of these candidate lists. Moreover, within
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these parties some candidates are included more than once. For these candidates a mean score of
their list positions is calculated.
Individual characteristics
Ethnic background
The ethnic background of the candidates is determined by their country of birth and the country of
birth of their parents. We consider a candidate to be of Dutch origin when he or she is born in the
Netherlands and both parents are born in the Netherlands as well. Candidates who are born abroad
and of whom at least one of the parents is born abroad as well belong to the first generation.
Candidates that are born in the Netherlands but at least one of the parents is born abroad are
considered as second generation. Two variables are constructed. The first measures whether a
candidate belongs to an ethnic minority group or not. The second variable measures the ethnic
background of the candidates and is used for the descriptive statistics. The following categories are
distinguished: Dutch, Western, Turkish, Moroccan, former colonies (Aruba, Curacao, Indonesia,
Suriname), and other non-Western. The non-Dutch categories include both the first and second
generation ethnic minorities.
Individual level control variables
At the individual level gender and age are included as control variables. Regarding gender, men are
used the reference category (0). Age ranges from 21 to 77. For some for some of the candidates, no
information about their year of birth was available. The mean age was assigned to these candidates.
Party characteristics
Restrictiveness views on migration and integration
To measure the standpoints of parties on migration and integration, an expert survey is used. These
data are derived from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015). Experts were asked to rate
the position of political parties on several topics; three variables from this survey are used. Firstly,
the position of parties on immigration policy (from fully opposed to a restrictive policy on
immigration (0) to fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration (10); secondly, the position on
the integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (from strongly favouring multiculturalism (0) to
strongly favouring assimilation (10); and lastly, the position towards ethnic minorities (from strongly
supporting more ethnic minority rights (0) to strongly opposing more ethnic minority rights (10)).
Experts were consulted in 2010 and 2014, for the election of 2012 we therefore decided to use the
mean score of these two years. The 50PLUS party was established in 2011, hence, only the data for
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2014 could be used for this party. A scale was created by taking the average score on these three
variables where a higher score indicates more restrictive views.
Ethnic minority support
Information on ethnic minorities support was collected from the websites, statutes, internal
regulations of the political parties and other party documents. No explicit references to quota were
found. If a striving for the participation of ethnic minorities (or similar terminology) in party positions
was mentioned in party documents, the party gets a score of 1 for quota/targets. Parties that have
an ethnic minority network also get a score of 1. Only the Labour Party was given a score of 0.5
because they have a network for diversity, which does not only focus on ethnic minorities but on
diversity in general. Parties with no quota, targets or ethnic minority network get a score of 0. To
measure to what extent political parties have means to support ethnic minorities, the sum of scores
on quota/targets and ethnic minority networks is calculated. A higher value indicates more mores to
support ethnic minorities.
Inclusiveness selectorate
To measure the inclusiveness of the selectorate, a scale as suggested by Rahat and Hazan (2001) is
used. The categories of the scale are slightly adjusted in a way fitting for the Dutch case. Selectorates
are most exclusive when only one person decides about the list and most inclusive when all party
members can decide about the list. We coded for each party who decides about the final version of
the candidate list. The coding is based on the information in a report of Lucardie and Voerman (2004)
checked and complemented with information from the statutes and internal rules and regulations of
the parties. A higher score on this variable indicates a more inclusive selectorate. Descriptive
statistics can be found in Table 2. More specific scores of the party characteristics for each party can
be found in Table 1 in Appendix A.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
N % Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. Individual characteristics Relative list position 647 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.32 Ethnic minority background
• No 570 88.1 • Yes 77 11.9
Gender • Male 426 65.8 • Female 221 34.2
Age 647 21.00 77.00 44.77 10.84 Elected in 2012
• No 497 76.8 • Yes 150 23.2
Party characteristics Restrictiveness migration & integration 647 1.96 9.87 5.69 2.03 Ethnic minority support 647 0.00 2.00 0.68 0.74 Inclusiveness selectorate 647 1.00 4.00 2.42 0.94
Source: Own data; Bakker et al., 2015; Lucardie & Voerman, 2004; internal rules and regulations parties.
Analyses and results
Analytic strategy
Different steps are taken to examine all hypotheses. We start with an examination of the
composition of the candidate lists and the MPs elected for the House of Representatives. In the
second part it is analysed to what extent party characteristics are related to the share of ethnic
minorities on each party’s candidate list. Third, a multivariate linear regression analysis is performed
to test the effects of party characteristics on the list position of individual candidates. Lastly, the
possible association between the share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list and among MPs is
investigated.
Descriptive results
In total, 11.9% of the candidates have an ethnic minority background and 12% of the MPs. Figure 1
shows that also in the Netherlands, ethnic minorities are underrepresented on the candidate list and
in the House of Representatives. However, if we look at indices to measure the political
representation of ethnic groups, the Netherlands scores quite high. An ethnic representation score
can be calculated by taking the difference between the proportion of an ethnic minority group in the
population and the proportion of this ethnic minority group in a political institution (Ruedin, 2013).
This representation score ranges from 0 to 1 where a higher score indicates better representation. If
this is calculated for the representation of ethnic minorities on the candidate list, the representation
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score is 0.917 (Ruedin, 2013). This score seems to indicate that ethnic minority groups are well
represented in the Netherlands. By looking at the different ethnic minority groups, however, it
becomes clear that the level of representation differs per group. Except for ethnic minorities with a
Turkish or Moroccan background, all ethnic minority groups are underrepresented. Western ethnic
minorities make up more than seven percent of the population, but only two percent of the
candidates are ethnic minorities with a Western background and 2.7 percent of the MPs.
Nonetheless, this may not be very problematic if the interests of Western migrants closely resemble
those of the native population. It may be more problematic for the ethnic minorities with a non-
Western background. We find a large difference between the share of ethnic minorities that belong
to the other non-Western group of the population (3.7%) and among politicians. Only 0.7 percent of
the MPs have another non-Western background. There is also a large difference between ethnic
minorities from former colonies in the population (5.5%) and on the candidate lists and in the House
of Representatives (2.8% and 2%). An interesting finding is that Turkish ethnic minorities are well
represented whereas Moroccan ethnic minorities are even overrepresented. It appears that the most
prominent ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands, the ones with a Turkish or Moroccan ethnic
background, are politically well represented.
Figure 1. Share of ethnic minority groups in society¹, among candidates and MPs
¹This refers to the share of ethnic minority groups that are 18 years or older Source: Statistics Netherlands, 2016; own data.
If a distinction is made between the first and second generation, Table 3 shows that it differs per
ethnic minority group which generation is better represented. A majority of the ethnic minority
candidates and MPs with a Turkish and another non-Western background belong to the first
20.2
7.2
2.1 1.8
5.5 3.7
11.9
2 2.8 3.1 2.8 1.2
12
2.7 2
4.7
2 0.7
0
5
10
15
20
Total Western Turkey Morocco Former colonies Other non-Western
% population (>18y) % candidates % MPs
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generation. Most of the ethnic minorities with a Western, Moroccan background or from former
colonies are from the second generation. Overall, more than half of the ethnic minority candidates
belong to the second generation (51.9%).
Women are another minority group that are often underrepresented in political institutions.
Table 4 shows that among both candidates and MPs women are underrepresented in the
Netherlands. As has also been shown by Mügge (2016), female ethnic minorities do better than
women of Dutch origin. Among the native Dutch, about a third of the candidates are women and
almost 40 percent of the MPs. By contrast, more than 40 percent of the ethnic minority candidates
are women and 44.4 percent of the MPs.
Table 3. Ethnic minority candidates and MPs by generation
Candidates MPs First generation Second generation First generation Second generation Western 46.2 53.8 50.0 50.0 Turkish 55.6 44.4 66.7 33.3 Moroccan 45.0 55.0 28.6 71.4 Former colonies 33.3 66.7 0.0 100.0 Other non-Western 75.0 25.0 100.0 0.0 Source: Own data. Table 4. Ethnic background candidates and MPs by gender
Candidates MPs Male Female Male Female Dutch origin 66.8 33.2 61.4 38.6 Ethnic minority 58.4 41.6 55.6 44.4 Total 65.8 34.2 60.7 39.3 Source: Own data. Share of ethnic minority candidates
The shares of ethnic minorities by political party are presented in Table 5. The left-wing parties have
the highest proportion of ethnic minorities on their list; Green Left has the highest share with 21.4%,
followed by the Labour party (20.2%). There is only one party with no ethnic minority candidates on
the list, the Reformed Political Party. First, we want to test whether party characteristics are related
to the share of ethnic minorities on the candidate lists. Table 5 also shows the three party
characteristics under study.
The parties that have the most restrictive views on migration and integration (PVV, SGP and
VVD), apart from the VVD, also have lower shares of ethnic minority candidates. Moreover, the least
restrictive party (Green Left) is the party with the highest share of ethnic minority candidates. There
is a correlation of -0.652; meaning that the less restrictive the party is on migration and integration,
15
the higher the share of ethnic minority candidates. These results support the hypothesis that less
restrictive political parties’ views on migration and integration are related to higher shares of ethnic
minorities on the candidate lists (H1a).
The second party characteristic is the support for ethnic minorities within parties. There are
more parties with no means to support ethnic minorities than parties who do have such means. The
parties which are the most supportive for ethnic minorities are also the parties with the highest
share of ethnic minorities. Only the CU has a low share of ethnic minority candidates. However, this
party is less explicit about supporting ethnic minority candidates; there is no ethnic minority network
or explicit target in the internal rules and regulations of the party. The target as set by the CU is that
at least one Christian migrant should be in the top seven of the candidate list, but this target is a
result of a resolution on a party congress. This may explain the lower share of ethnic minority
candidates as compared to parties who are more explicit about the representation of different
minority groups. Lastly, we find a high and significant correlation between ethnic minority support
within parties and the share of ethnic minority candidates. Therefore, the hypothesis that more
ethnic minority support is related to a higher the share of ethnic minority candidates (H1b) is
supported.
The third expectation relates to the inclusiveness of the selectorate. We expect that the less
inclusive the selectorate of a party, the higher the share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list
(H1c). A score of 1 indicates the least inclusive selectorates and a score of 4 the most inclusive
selectorates. There is no clear association between the inclusiveness of the selectorate and the share
of ethnic minority candidates. This is also confirmed by the rather weak correlation (0.086) between
the inclusiveness of the selectorate and the share of ethnic minorities. Moreover, this correlation is
positive, where a negative correlation was expected. Hypothesis 1c cannot be confirmed based on
these results.
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Table 5. Party characteristics Party % ethnic minority
candidates Restrictiveness Support ethnic
minorities Inclusiveness
SGP 0 8.23 0 1 CU 4 5.22 1 2 PvDD 4 3.54 0 3 PVV 4.1 9.87 0 1 50PLUS 5.9 5.33 0 3 VVD 6.7 7.34 0 4 SP 9 5.04 0 2 CDA 14 6.52 1 2 D66 16 2.71 0 4 PvdA 20.2 4.47 1.5 2 GL 21.4 1.96 2 3 Pearson correlation with the % of ethnic minority candidates
-0,652*** 0,780*** 0,086**
Source: Own data; Bakker et al., 2015; Lucardie & Voerman, 2004; internal rules and regulations parties.
Relative list position candidates
The following analyses show whether party characteristics are related to the position of ethnic
minority candidates on the list. In the null model in Table 6 only ethnic minority background is
included; this shows that having an ethnic minority background in itself is not related to the relative
list position of candidates. In Model 1 the interaction variable of the restrictiveness scale and ethnic
minority background is added. This shows that when a party is less restrictive on migration and
integration, ethnic minority candidates have a higher position on the candidate list (b=-0.050). This
confirms hypothesis 2a: the less restrictive political parties’ views on migration and integration, the
higher the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates.
Model 2 shows the interaction effect of ethnic minority support and an ethnic minority
background. However, there is no significant interaction effect (b=0.004). Hence, there is no overall
support for the hypothesis that the more ethnic minorities are supported within the party, the higher
the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates (H2b).
The last party characteristic is the inclusiveness of the selectorate. The interaction between
the inclusiveness of the selectorate and ethnic minority background is added in Model 3. We find a
significant interaction effect (b=0.080), however, not in the expected direction. This effect indicates
that when selectorates are more inclusive, the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates is
higher. Therefore, hypothesis 2c is not supported: less inclusive selectorates are not related to higher
list positions for ethnic minority candidates.
Lastly, in Model 4 all interaction effects are included. In this model only the interaction effect
of restrictiveness and ethnic minority background remains significant (b=-0.59). The interaction effect
17
of inclusiveness and ethnic minority background is not significant anymore and still in the opposite
direction than expected. This does not change the results of our hypotheses. The analyses have
shown that especially views on integration and migration affect the share of ethnic minorities on the
candidate list and the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates.
18
Table 6. Linear regression models (N=647)
***p<0.001; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 Source: Own data; Bakker et al., 2015; Lucardie & Voerman, 2004; internal rules and regulations parties.
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. Intercept 0.421*** 0.013 0.484*** 0.068 0.635*** 0.055 0.538*** 0.065 0.412*** 0.105 Gender (male=ref) 0.038 0.027 0.044* 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.044* 0.026 Age -0.004*** 0.001 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.004*** 0.001 Ethnic background candidate (Dutch=ref) 0.007 0.039 0.238** 0.112 0.018 0.064 -0.209* 0.123 0.334 0.335 Restrictiveness scale 0.021** 0.007 0.019** 0.009 Restrictiveness *ethnic background -0.050** 0.022 -0.059* 0.031 Ethnic minority support -0.084*** 0.018 -0.048** 0.024 Support * ethnic background 0.004 0.052 -0.050 0.074 Inclusiveness selectorate 0.028** 0.014 0.036** 0.017 Inclusiveness *ethnic background 0.080* 0.047 0.006 0.065 R² adjusted -0.01 0.035 0.052 0.031 0.076
19
Share of ethnic minority candidates and MPs
The last step is to examine whether the share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list is related to
the share of ethnic minorities in the House of Representatives. Table 7 shows the percentage of
ethnic minority candidates and MPs for all parties. It is evident that the parties with the lowest share
of ethnic minority candidates also have less ethnic minority MPs (SGP, CU, PvDD) and that the parties
with the highest share of ethnic minority candidates also have a higher share of ethnic minority MPs
(D66, PvdA, GL). Some parties do stand out, 50PLUS and CDA both have ethnic minority candidates
on the list but there are no ethnic minorities with a seat in the House of Representatives of these
parties. For the 50PLUS party the low number of seats (2) is an explanation. For the CDA this seems
an indication that ethnic minorities have lower list position than native Dutch candidates. An
explanation may be that, in the 2012 elections CDA won the lowest amount of seats ever (13 as
compared to 21 in the 2010 elections). Overall, the percentages indicate that a higher share of ethnic
minority candidates is related to a higher share of ethnic minority MPs. This is supported by the
significant and high correlation of 0.779 between these two variables. Based on these data we find
support for hypothesis 4.
In addition to examining the association between the share of ethnic minority candidates and
ethnic minority MPs it can be informative to look at safe list positions. Ethnic minorities may be
present on the candidate list, but in order to have a chance at election they have to be placed in
winnable positions (safe list positions). We calculated the share of ethnic minority candidates in safe
list positions for each party which is shown by the Index of Representativeness (IR) in Table 72 (Hazan
& Rahat, 2006). The SGP, CU, PvDD and 50PLUS party do not have any ethnic minority candidates in
safe list positions. The party leader of the PVV (Geert Wilders) has Indonesian roots, which explains
the IR-value for this party. For the remaining parties it becomes clear that especially the SP, D66,
PvdA and GL have placed ethnic minorities in safe list positions. Table 7 also shows that the SP have
placed a relatively high number of ethnic minorities in safe list positions, of all the ethnic minority
candidates, twenty percent is placed in a safe list position. The opposite is found for the CDA,
although 14 percent of the candidates have an ethnic minority background, only about 5 percent
have been placed in a safe list position.
2 Calculated as the share of ethnic minorities in safe list positions by counting the number of ethnic minorities in safe list positions (the number of seats the party won in the previous elections) divided by the number of safe list positions of that party, multiplied by 100 (Hazan & Rahat, 2006).
20
Table 7. Share of ethnic minority candidates, MPs and the Index of Representativeness, by party Party % candidates % MPs Index of Representativeness (IR) SGP 0.0 0.0 0.0 CU 4.0 0.0 0.0 PvDD 4.0 0.0 0.0 PVV 4.1 6.7 4.2 50PLUS 5.9 0.0 0.0 VVD 6.7 4.9 6.5 SP 9.0 20.0 20.0 CDA 14.0 0.0 4.8 D66 16.0 25.0 20.0 PvdA 20.2 21.1 23.3 GL 21.4 25.0 30.0 Pearson correlation % candidates and & MPs
0.779***
Source: Own data
Conclusion and discussion
Previous studies focused on elected candidates to research the political representativeness of ethnic
minorities. In this study we extended the research to the question to what extent different ethnic
minority groups have been represented on national candidate lists as well, as a necessary first
condition to be able to get elected. Moreover, we answered which party characteristics affect both
ethnic minority nomination and list positioning. We find that the ethnic minority groups that are
most often the subject of (critical) debate in the Netherlands, those of Turkish and Moroccan origin,
are well represented. However, other minority groups are underrepresented, including Western
ethnic minorities and people from the former Dutch colonies.
The results of the analyses indicate that party characteristics are a valuable addition to
existing explanations of ethnic minority representation. Party positions on migration and integration
in particular are related to ethnic minority representation on candidate lists: parties that have more
restrictive views on migration and integration not only have a lower share of ethnic minority
candidates but also place the ethnic minority candidates that are on the list, in lower list positions.
That might seem a straightforward finding, but it underlines that parties with a more positive view on
migration and integration not only express that substantively but also descriptively, sending out a
more direct signal of inclusion. There is less clear support for the other two party characteristics
under study. Firstly, we do not find any association of ethnic minority support within parties with a
higher relative list position of ethnic minority candidates. This contradicts the finding of Mügge
(2016) that “ethnic minority women’s networks have placed ethnic diversity on the radar of party
gatekeepers” (p. 16). Nevertheless, the study of Mügge (2016) focus on female ethnic minority
21
candidates in particular and covers a longer time period; maybe an effect would have been found if
more elections were included in our analyses. On the other hand, previous research has also shown
that minority support such as targets or quota do not always work similarly for different minority
groups. National level quotas have been successful for the political representation of women, but are
not related to higher levels of ethnic representation (Ruedin, 2013). In line with this finding, our
results show that also at the party level quota or targets are not necessarily beneficial for ethnic
minority candidates.
A last party characteristic in this is study is how candidates are selected. Following the
conceptual framework of Hazan and Rahat (2006), we argued that parties with less inclusive
selectorates are more likely to create a balanced candidate list and thus will have more
representative candidate lists. However, we do not find any evidence that more inclusive
selectorates have a better balanced candidate list in terms of ethnicity. An explanation for our
findings may be that the differences in selection methods between Dutch political parties are not
substantial enough to show an effect. Cross-national research on the representation of ethnic
minorities on candidate lists could give more clarity on this issue.
Our last step was to examine to what extent the representativeness of the candidate list is
related to the representativeness of ethnic minorities in the House of Representatives. With the data
available for this study we can conclude that a higher share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list
relates to a higher share of ethnic minorities in the House of Representatives. This may seem evident,
but it would also have been possible that political parties include ethnic minorities on their candidate
list but place them in unsafe list positions.
This study focused on descriptive representation rather than on to what extent the interests
of ethnic minorities – substantive representation – are represented. Moreover, we have not
accounted for third generation migrants, who may still identify with their non-Dutch roots. More
generally, candidates with a non-Dutch background may vary in their identification with that non-
Dutch background, which we were (unfortunately) unable to address, but which is an interesting
outlook for future research. This contribution has highlighted the relevance of looking not only at the
representation of elected MPs, but also at the composition of candidate lists and the role political
parties play.
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Appendix A Table 1. Party characteristics by party
Party Restrictiveness immigration
and integration
Ethnic minority support Inclusiveness selectorate
Quota/ target
Ethnic minority network
Sum Party leadership (Most exclusive)
Party agency (delegates etc.)
Party members present on a party congress
All party members (Most inclusive)
50PLUS 5.33 0 0 0 3 CDA 6.52 0 1 1 2 CU 5.22 1 0 1 2 D66 2.71 0 0 0 4 GL 1.96 1 1 2 3 PvdA 4.47 1 0.5 1.5 2 PvdD 3.54 0 0 0 3 PVV 9.87 0 0 0 1 SGP 8.23 0 0 0 1 SP 5.04 0 0 0 2 VVD 7.34 0 0 0 4
Source: Bakker et al., 2015; Lucardie & Voerman, 2004; internal rules and regulations parties.