The political Economy of WaterManagement in an Emergent State -

Social Contract Reestablished?

Julia Ismar

October 13, 2012

Contents

1 Water Management in South Sudan 61.1 Rationale of the case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71.2 Background information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2 Methodology 142.1 Case Study Approach & Research Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2.1.1 Social Network Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152.1.2 Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162.1.3 Documents & Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2.2 The cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172.2.1 Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172.2.2 Yei County, Central Equatoria State . . . . . . . . . . . . 172.2.3 Raja County, Western Bahr el Ghazal State . . . . . . . . 18

2.3 Note on Field Research in South Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3 Preliminary findings 203.1 Access to drinking water in rural areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203.2 Water for productive use: ’If this is what the policy says, this is

what we will probably want to do’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223.3 Political networks and decision-making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3.3.1 The weakness of the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253.3.2 Alternative networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

3.4 Water and the social contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

4 Appendix 324.1 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

4.1.1 Quoted literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324.1.2 Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

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Summary

The present case study was conducted on behalf of the Institute for Social

and Development Studies (IGP) as part of the research project Sustain-

able water management in a globalized world. The IGP is engaging inthis interdisciplinary project by offering ethical evaluations of current challengesfaced in water management and the solutions offered by agricultural, economic,and academic experts. The starting point of our considerations is the notion ofjustice and equity - between different groups of users, standards and require-ments. The research work that was conducted highlighted that these complexquestions cannot be answered satisfactorily without taking the human dimen-sion of water management into account, the impact of different strategies onthe everyday lives of the people and communities affected. Only by testing ourconceptual considerations in real life situations one can hope to make a germanecontribution to the discourse.Against this background, the current case study was planned and conducted byJulia Ismar, researcher at the IGP. South Sudan was chosen as an interestingcase as the current state building and reconstruction activities are in many waysimpacted by decisions on water management. This relates to the provision ofwater to poor rural communities, social conflict between farmers and pastoral-ists, as well as to the current discussion on the ’untapped’ agricultural potentialof the South that is likely to heavily impact land use and farming methods inthe emergent country. At the same time, South Sudan represented a uniqueopportunity to discuss and assess the process of water policy making from thebeginning. We decided to use the water sector as the key hole through which tolook at state-society relations in the new state, inspired by questions of equity,sustainability and justice.An intensive desk study served as the preparation for the field study, as didseveral consultations with the Catholic University of South Sudan, apartner of the IGP Jesuit network. From May until July 2012, Julia Ismartravelled to South Sudan for the field work. As laid out in chapter 2, the work onsite included a social network analysis, expert interviews and group discussions.The areas covered were Juba (Central Equatoria State), Yei (CES), Wau andRaja (both Western Bahr el Ghazal). The report summarizes the preliminaryfindings of the field work, which will serve as the base for an academic articleas part of the research project.The emergence of the water sector in South Sudan is faced by a plethora ofchallenges. After decades of civil war, displacement and intertribal hostilities,both institutions and infrastructure have to be created from scratch in orderto make the rich resource base of the newborn state accessible and availablefor the population throughout the vast country. In this endeavor, the nationdepends on the help of the international community in terms of funding andexpertise. Inspired by a political economy perspective and the belief that localcommunities have the biggest stake in resource governance, the research aimed tograsp the relationships between the different actors in the sector, to understand

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how decisions are made, information is gathered and disseminated.The focus of the study is rural water. Given the strong link between watermanagement and the lives of the population, this research was very illuminat-ing concerning the relationship between the international community, the emer-gent state and the society of South Sudan. This relationship will ultimatelydetermine whether the nation of South Sudan will prosper in peace and secu-rity in the future, or whether the manifold mechanisms of marginalisation anddomination that have caused much suffering in the past will further curb thedevelopment of the world’s newest state. As the research has shown, the cur-rent relationships and links between different actors differ greatly from what isproposed in the manifold policy papers and draft strategies on the issue. Expec-tations have to be reconciled with the complex situation on the ground, hencethis assessment did not come as a surprise. However, the interviews have shownthat the system established by the state officials, (traditional) local leaders, andthe international community have taken on a very particular momentum that iscurrently undermining sustainable and equitable practices and developments.

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Sustainable Water Management in a GlobalizedWorld

Many developing countries as well as those with emerging markets depend on theagricultural sector to secure the livelihoods of their population and to generateeconomic revenues. Given this dependence, these countries are particularlyvulnerable to water-related problems - not only due to an increasing demandfor water but also due to changed rainfall patterns triggered by climate change.Even if water scarcity was to increase only regionally, international trade politicsinextricably link regional availability and needs for production and consumptionto global dynamics.Reasons for water scarcity are often not only the physical shortage of waterbut also inadequate institutional and legal frameworks, insufficient economicincentives, as well as the absence of technological capacities for sustainable watermanagement. Hence, the reason for the present water crisis in many regions ismainly a failure of water management or water governance. This failure couldbe remedied by useful combinations of different regional arrangements includingagricultural trade with the goal of improvements in water productivity, wateravailability, and water access.Water usage is closely connected to ethical aspects: particularly the question offair allocation of water to different user groups (intra- and inter-generational),taking especially ecological concerns into account. The project Sustainable

Water Management in a Globalized World uses an interdisciplinaryapproach to integrate economic, legal, technological, and ethical aspects of watermanagement in global and regional studies.Our scientific and application-oriented goals include:• Quantitative analysis of future water scarcity considering climate and socio-economic changes (on a global scale and in specific regions)• Analysis of different potential water management strategies (increase of wateruse efficiency in agriculture, expansion of arable land, virtual water trade) tominimize regional water stress• Survey about the present debate of water-ethics as well as a consolidatedanalysis of different water management strategies from an ethical point of view• Development of policy strategies for effective, efficient, and just regulations ofwater resources (on a global scale and in specific regions)• Development of approaches to reduce over-utilization of water as a commongood.The institutions involved are the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact

Research and the Institute for Social and Development Studies inMunich.The present case study evolved from the overall strategy of the research projectto ethically and politically assess the implications of different water managementoptions. Given the pragmatist ethical framework employed by the IGP for its

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philosophical consideration, there is a strong emphasis on actual policy outcomesand implications on the local level. The case study will hence look at the localdynamics and challenges within the context of rural water management, lookat the consequences of different priorities and assess political institutions andapproaches.The case study was conducted in cooperation with the Catholic University

of South Sudan, Juba and Wau.

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Chapter 1

Water Management in SouthSudan

As the dust settles after the euphoric celebrations of the independence of ‘Africa’syoungest state’ on 9 July 2011, a sober assessment reveals a fragile nation facedwith a flood of challenges. Decades of civil war and violence have brought fortha state struggling with severe deficits in infrastructure, development and goodpractices of governance. The question of how to provide the nation with anadequate supply of water for the wellbeing and the livelihoods of its people willprove crucial for the development of the newborn state. In the past, water poli-cies and management approaches have affected traditional consumption patternsand created structural problems for various groups that impacted existing faultlines in the Sudanese society. At the same time, water management on behalf ofKhartoum has been shaped by the very dynamics and considerations that havedriven the centre-periphery conflict for decades (Shepherd & Norris 1987).The new Ministry for Water Resources and Irrigation in South Sudanhopes that water in the new state of South Sudan ‘will be a lever for peace, nota source of conflict’ (2009). Especially in the light of the current (and increas-ing) international assistance to (re)build the water sector in terms of policiesand infrastructure, a critical assessment of the current distribution patterns, thenature of varying uses of water resources, the underlying power structures andthe potential sources for conflict is crucial in order to avoid reinforcing exist-ing structural problems or covering them up with blue-print solutions to watersector development.At the same time, South Sudan represents an interesting field of study for theNaWaMa Project due to its vast, untapped agricultural potential, the richresource base and the current process of water policy making, which brings upseveral of the considerations dealt with in the research project and applies themto a current context.

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1.1 Rationale of the case study

The case of South Sudan is undeniably a very special case: decades of civil war,political crises, strong international support and interference in policy makinghave impacted all realms of politics, including water issues. Hence, results de-rived from a study of political and social challenges and effects of water manage-ment in South Sudan can only to a negligible extent be applied to other countriesor regions. However, the fact that water and agricultural policies, strategies ofrural water provision and considerations of sustainability are currently being dis-cussed, necessarily always with reference to the development, responsibility andscope of the newly emerging state, do provide a unique window of opportunityto look into a limited sphere of the new state, and to study the considerationsand predicaments that shape the water sector of the emerging nation. Giventhe interest of the IGP in the ethical aspects of water management, the projectwill include these factors when addressing the research questions below. Look-ing at the case from the perspective of state-society relations will provide theframework to include this dimension in the academic paper that will emergefrom the research.How do local, national and international actors shape water governance practices

in the emergent state of South Sudan? How do these practices relate to the

current state-building activities?

In order to approach this overarching question, the following aspects shall beaddressed, based on case study research in Central Equatoria and Western BahrelGhazal States:- How is rural water policy made?

Water management and governance takes place at local, state, national andinternational level – which actors and institutions are involved in South Sudan?How do these actors and their policies relate to each other, i.e. do the differentlevels overlap, compete or influence each other? (Internal and external drivers)- How does the new water policy play out on the local level? How is water

allocated?

How does the new policy relate to traditional institutions that govern access toand use of water? Is it implemented at the local level? Which institutions areinvolved?- How does the new water policy relate to the overall post-conflict reconstruction

agenda in South Sudan?

Which problems remain, or arise, as a result of the actions described above? Willthe new policy lead to more stability at the local level? What do local watermanagement practices tell us about the role of the state for its population?A look at the water policy and actual allocation practices in South Sudan willnot only reveal potential sources of conflict and discrimination as proposed byinternational actors and researchers. Questions of improved water manage-ment/governance and the institutions involved in South Sudan are questionsabout social relations, power relationships and the ideological basis of the new

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state. Ultimately, an analysis of water management policies and practices, itsdetermining forces, political economy and local repercussions provides a snap-shot of a limited but important sphere of the political set-up of the ‘project’that is the development of South Sudan.The definition of natural resource governance used for this report is borrowedfrom Abiodun Alao (2007): ‘All the internal and external considerationsthat come to play in the management of natural resources. These includedomestic laws, constitutional provisions, cultural practices, customary laws,neo-patrimonial practices and all the international treaties and obligations thatgovern issues such as the ownership, management, extraction, revenue sharing,enforcement capacity and the procedures for addressing concerns and grievancesover natural resources’.The report will focus on rural water governance, and will look at both drinkingwater and water for agriculture. This focus matches to the research interestsand the overall setup of the wider research agenda of NAWAMA. Water forlivestock has been the object of manifold studies and will hence not be dealtwith at this point. The most prominent example of violent conflicts over waterare the incidental clashes between pastoralists around water points. Expandingthe study to water for cattle would extent the scope of the research and hasalso been covered by various studies in the past. When relevant, references toconcomitant research will be provided. The present study works with a vast def-inition of conflict, which expands beyond physical violence exchanged betweenindividuals/groups and covers also structural conflicts such as discriminationand marginalisation.

1.2 Background information

It was mostly the rich pasture and fertile lands of the South that inspired the’Breadbasket’ strategy, that created havoc in Sudan’s agricultural sector in the1970ies: vast, scarcely populated land, cut across by many (seasonal) rivers,regaled with two rainy seasons. The rich resource base, of which only the oilis currently being exploited, includes wide swathes of prime agricultural landand bountiful water resources. In line with the past discourse on the agricul-tural potential of the South, the current government is promoting the use ofthe agricultural assets as a main pillar of their strategy for national growth.Nevertheless, reliable supply of water for drinking, hygiene and productive use(agriculture, cattle raising etc) is still lacking and considered as one of the mainhinderances to development (UNEP 2007). The reasons why the vision of theGovernment of South Sudan (GOSS) has not yet moved from rhetoric to real-ity are manyfold, many of which are related to the key interests of the presentstudy.El Khazin (2002: 3-4) lists 16 different terms used throughout the Sudan torefer to water sources: bir (well), rahad (lake), bahr (river), birka (pool), buta(pool), dahal, plural dugul, (pool), fula (water hole), hafir (depression or man-

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made waterhole), idd (well), khor (dry water course), mayaa (shallow lagoon),qelti, plural qulut, (water holes in rocks), ragaba (stream filled from a river andrunning inland), rigl (small stream), saraf (running stream), shaqq (large holein cotton soil holding water), tumud (water hole), and wadi (dry waterhole,generally wider than a khor). These can be roughly divided into three groups,relating to groundwater, pools (filled with rainwater), and flows of water suchas rivers. No community relied on one source of water only, and wells werethe most common means to complement other sources. The linguistic diversitysuggests that conception of water of the people of (South) Sudan is not oneinspired by scarcity. But even an abundant resource needs to be allocated andmanaged to serve the people dependent on it. Given the importance of waterto the livelihoods of the (mainly agro-pastoralist) Sudanese population, accessto water is a highly sensitive issue.According to the GOSS (2007), rainfall ranges from 400mm in the northernparts to 1600mm in the southern parts1, some of which enjoy two rainy seasonsthat can be used for agricultural production. The country hosts three riverbasins: the Nile, the Sobat and the Bahr-el-Ghazel.2Roughly 90% of southernSudan falls in the Nile Basin, and about 20% of the Nile Basin is located insouthern Sudan, which amounts to ’about one third of the size of the Nile Basinin all the Sudan before secession of the south’ (Salman 2011: 157). The WhiteNile is regarded the most fertile region in Africa. Hence, water resources - bothblue and green - are considered ‘abundant’ (GOSS 2011), an impression that isvividly emphasized by a look at the vast green land of the south during the rainyseason. Until this day, only a very negligible part of these resources has been putto productive use. Although there has not been any scientific assessment sincethe middle of the last century, groundwater resources are the dominant sourceof drinking water for urban and rural areas alike. Despite the ample supply ofwater, the history of the South is a strong example of highly politicized andcontentious policies regarding the ’blue gold’, which have strongly impacted thedevelopment of the region that, despite its many natural riches, today hosts oneof the poorest and least developed nations in the world.

Historical dimension

Traditionally, pastoralists, farmers and nomadic tribes have shared water re-sources based on customary practices. El Zain (2008) maps out how Sudanese

1Also see FAO Aquastat: www.fao.org/nr/aquatstat2Southern Sudan is where three major tributaries meet and flow into the White Nile,

namely: Bahr el-Ghazal (comprising three sub-basins of Kiir, Loll and Jur); Bahr el-Jebel(comprising numerous tributaries such as Yei, Aswa and Kiit; in addition to branches suchas Bahr el-Zeraf); and River Sobat (comprising three sub-basins of Pibor, Akobo-Baro; inaddition to branches and Khors such as Machar and Adar River Systems and Khor Nyanding).Also, there are seasonal rivers and streams that originate and flow inside Southern Sudan,namely the Drainage of Eastern Equatoria Plateau (Kurun, Hoss and Keneti), system ofrivers flowing out of Western Equatoria (Tonj, Naam and Gel). Finally, the main stem of theWhite Nile (from Lake No to Wun-Thou, north of Renk) receives large volumes of water fromsystems of Khors and Wadis (Fulus, Atar, Lolleand Yabus). (GOSS 2007)

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communities in different ecological zones developed specific codes of behaviorthat amounted to sustainable management of natural resources (for further de-tails see El Moghraby 2003: 27; Shaaeldin 1981: 97; Umbadda 1981:107), and sustained the people during the seasonal variations of water availabil-ity. Arising disputes used to be settled by traditional mechanisms of conflictresolution (Wassara 2007), against the backdrop of intra- and intertribal re-lations, linked to seasonal changes in need and availability as well as migrationpatterns.The early advances to water management, i.e. to regulate the use of water, werecarried out by foreign actors, arguably seldom with the interests or the socialand economic development of the South in mind: ’At the beginning of the twen-tieth century, the British administration had engaged in the provision of waterto rural communities, particularly in West Sudan, with the view of achievingsedentarisation and villagisation, both for strategic and economic reasons.’ (El

Zain 2008: 123) The control of the water resources was equivalent to the con-trol of the movement and activities of the highly water-dependent society inthe South. ’Water points were also opened and closed to regulate movement,in a period that represents a flourishing of pastoral development in the centralrangelands of the Sudan.’ (Manger 2008: 105)While under Egyptian administration, development of the waters was mainlyaimed at maximizing the water available for the powerful downstream neigh-bor - it was the expropriation of primary products from the South (Berhanu

2011) that shaped water management during Egypt’s reign over the Sudan. Af-ter independence, water management on behalf of Khartoum has been shapedby the dynamics and considerations that have driven the centre-periphery con-flict for decades (Shepherd & Norris 1987). An exemplary case of the hy-dropolitics of Khartoum is the Jonglei Canal: planned to divert water fromBahr el-Jebel in the South to facilitate commercial farming in the North – andalso in Egypt - sparked fighting with the South when construction started in1974. The destroyed building site and material still serve as a reminder of thetentious interdependence of the riparians of the Nile basin, that overrules hy-drological rationalities and overshadows current considerations in Juba on howto make the best productive use of the area. The two only attempts to estab-lish large scale irrigated farming were the schemes in Renk (Upper Nile State)and Aweil (Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, flood irrigation to cultivate rice). Thetwo schemes are currently being reconstructed by the international community,but are not expected to provide (economic) outputs that can be used for bestpractice records.Apart from the instrumental provision of drinking water to the villages, onlyduring the civil war did rural water supply expand. The international com-munity, often in cooperation with the SPLA supplied boreholes to the ruralpopulation in the areas held by the ’rebels’. The areas controlled by Khartoumwere - albeit insufficiently - supplied by the North. Also today, most of the bore-holes are financed by donors and aid agencies, and the practices have remainedlargely similar, only slowly involving local institutions in the process.

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In 2005, the CPA (the Common Peace Agreement that ended the fighting be-tween the north and the South, and gave the South limited administrative au-thority over their territory) ruled that ’Jurisdiction over the Nile and othertransboundary waters was placed exclusively with the national government inKhartoum, while local water-resources management was devolved to the gov-ernment of southern Sudan’ (Salman 2011: 160) - which it could only fulfillwith massive international support. With the independence of the South in2011, this agreement needed to be revised. However, until this day, the use ofthe Nile waters remains one of the pending issues that are still to be resolvedby Juba and Khartoum, but has taken a back seat in the current (interrupted)negotiations between the two regimes. Irrespective of the outcome, the Southfaces a grave challenge as to develop both policies and the implementation ca-pability of how to make use of its water in the future. The government is awareof the historic dimension: ’Historically water resources development in South-ern Sudan has often been carried out without due consideration of needs andpriorities of different stakeholders. Mechanisms for involving water users andstakeholders from other sectors in planning water development remain undevel-oped. The result is inadequate planning frequently leading to poorly designedprojects which are inefficient or unsustainable and often have unintended neg-ative impacts on people and environment’. (GOSS 2007: 11) Aggravating thiscrucial and difficult task is the absence of reliable data on rainfall, river flows,groundwater, so that water resources management is severely lagging behind,putting a further strain on the theoretical potential.

Political dimension

Infrastructure development in the south has been neglected since the colonialera (Jok 2011), and the civil war in conjunct with the internal conflicts havefurther curbed development of the water sector (Johnston 1994: 128). Theinstitutional challenges mirror the complex history of water management in thepast: ’Institutional arrangements under the former governments were generallyinadequate to meet the complex challenges of water resources management inSouthern Sudan and institutional functions were not always clearly defined’(GOSS 2007: 12). Water management was mainly of extractive nature, withvery meager attempts to develop or sustain the resource base encountered. Thechallenge to change this setup is immense and cannot be met by the RSS on itsown.The main actor at national level is the Ministry of Water Resources and

Irrigation - MWRI. A presidential decree from 2008 gave MWRI also a reg-ulatory mandate, which means that the national ministry is both policy makerand regulator.

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At government level, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF)is another potential bulk user/administrator, in case irrigated agriculture isto pick off. However, until now MAF has not played a crucial part in theconsiderations that will determine the water resource base of the South. TheMinistry of Electricity and Dams has also not impacted policy due toa lack of funds (consultation). Consequently, water issues are predominantlyhandled by MWRI, the administrative and consultative links to other Ministriesonly being inadequately identified or established.The Local Government Act of 2009 captures water supply and managementof local water resources as part of concurrent powers shared between differentlevels of government. South Sudan consists of ten States, each governed bya state governor and a state council of ministers. The County is the admin-istrative unity between the state and the payam as described in the InterimConstitution of Southern Sudan, 2005. Each county is subdivided into variousPayams, which are governed by a paramount chief. Payam-boundaries are stillcontested by several communities, which makes them politically sensitive. Bysome (international) actors, payams are considered ’the most artificial’ scale,which makes cooperation difficult. The Boma constitutes the lowest adminis-trative unit in the local government structure, and represents a conglomerateof small villages or settlements. The Local Government act of 2009 clarifiescompetencies across these scales: water management is hence a responsibilityof the state, with the implementation to be carried out at the lowest possiblelevel. However, the hierarchical structure of the system, the unresolved chal-lenge of harmonizing traditional and modern forms of administration, and thedelay in the creation of viable political representation, especially on the locallevel, represent serious obstacles to effective water management: Feiden et al.(2009: 7) lament that there is little agreement on who is to be responsible for

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water services and pertaining infrastructure3. Given the lack of experience, re-sources and capacity, the Ministry is lagging behind even modest expectations,and many of the challenges highlighted above have yet to be addressed.Water is one of the key elements of the multi donor funds and the developmentpartners. Especially in the light of various water borne diseases, the provi-sion of safe drinking water has been taken up by many (international) NGOs.Part 3.2 will deal in detail with water being used for agricultural production -which can be summed up as negligible up to this point despite the national andinternational praise and hope for the agricultural potential of the new nation.The failure to work towards an integrated approach to water management ishence rooted in the institutions involved, and the field work was not able to pro-duce much evidence to inspire optimism concerning the introduction of IWRMin the future. Provision with water is not only important on humanitarian oreconomic grounds. Among the manifold dynamics that have been scrutinizedfor their potential influence on the fighting and suffering in Sudan, (water) re-sources are increasingly shifting into the focus of analysis (Suliman 1997, 2000;Manger 2005; UNEP 2007; De Wit 2008, 2009; Baldin 2011; Bromwich

2009), which can partly be attributed to a lack of integration between differentusers. De Wit (2008, 2) argues that ‘chronic structural conflicts over land andnatural resources have persisted for a long time’. Water, land, and oil and theunequal access to or the distribution of the benefits derived from these resourcesare frequently highlighted as the stumbling block to peaceful development in(South) Sudan (Gullick 2009). Water issues pertain mainly to contestationsover the use of water for livestock and agriculture, the access to water points(Baldin 2011), the social effects of the construction of dams and the overallneglect of certain regions in terms of water provision as part of the politics ofmarginalization that have shaped the development of the country for decades(ibid.). Against this background, the Ministry for Water Resources and

Irrigation hopes that water in the new state of South Sudan ‘will be a leverfor peace, not a source of conflict’ (2009). The notion of water as a lever forpeace was scrutinized by many actors during the field work, and current prac-tices suggest that the sources for tensions between the state and the people andbetween different segments of the society can also be found in the water sector.

3USAID (2009)

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Chapter 2

Methodology

The following section is to briefly sketch the methodology applied for the study.A case study approach was selected as the most appropriate tool to fit theregulations of the NaWaMa Project as outlined above and the interests andstrategic plans of the Institute for Social and Development Studies.The research methods were developed in cooperation with PIK and the CatholicUniversity of South Sudan.

2.1 Case Study Approach & Research Methods

A case study looks at a chosen phenomenon through various lenses to fully graspthe issue at stake. A case study is not a methodology as such, but an approachof the interpretative paradigm, of qualitative empirical research (Lamnek 1995:5). By looking at a social phenomenon in its natural setting we do not try tofind ’correlations, but to understand the causal mechanisms’ (Gerring 2007:44) that lead to a certain phenomenon, in this case the political, ethical andsocial constraints that lead to the current unsatisfactory governance of ruralwater and the resulting implications.Case study research allows for and fosters the use of various methods and mul-tiple sources of data (Lamnek 1995: 5), which facilitates the validation of datathrough triangulation (of methods and of data) to provide more support forthe point (Denscombe 2007: 45). To present a full picture of the manyfoldchallenges of water governance in South Sudan, a Social Network Analysis

(SNA) of the important actors of the water sector in South Sudan was con-ducted. The SNA was complemented by qualitative interviews with key infor-mants and focus groups on site as well as an extensive literature and documentreview before and after the study.

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2.1.1 Social Network Analysis

SNA is a common tool to understand inter-organisational relations. Given theplethora of actors involved, the many different levels and modes of implemen-tation, the copious amount of strategy and policy papers, and analysis of therelationships of the actors involved was considered a crucial first step to under-stand the chosen case. SNA has to be understood as a perspective (Marina

& Wellman 2010): a way of looking at a problem, with the goal of ’detectingand interpreting social ties’ (de Nooy et al. 2011: 5).According to our understanding of water governance, the various policy networksinvolved are just as important as the institutionalized system in which theyoperate. Policy networks are understood as ‘problem-specific entities, organizinga policy area by different forms of collective action’ (Carlsson 2000: 508).Given the cross-scale nature of many societal problems, especially concerningresource management, top-down approaches are not likely to offer a promisingsolution. Given the various uses of water resources, the ’blue gold’ is arguablya case in point. Stein et al. (2011: 1085) argue that ’the governance di-mension of water resources management is just as complex and interconnectedas the hydrological processes it aims to influence. There is an increasing need(i) to understand the multi-stake-holder governance arrangements that emergefrom the cross-scale nature and multifunctional role of water; and (ii) to developappropriate research tools to analyze them’. An awareness of the complex gov-ernance system in place is a necessary (but not in itself sufficient) condition toimprove water governance systems (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007).Based on a discussion with academics involved in SNA research, this tool hasbeen adapted to serve the research interests of the present case study. In manyanalyses, there is a focus on official institutions, the ones that are laid out inlegal frameworks and policy papers, with a neglect on informal and local insti-tutions, which play an equally important role, especially on the local level. Inour case, an analysis of the formal structures would not yield significant results,as most institutions and organizations (on behalf of the state) are still in theplanning or construction phase. Especially against this background, an analysisof the existing networks in the sector can provide interesting information thatcan help to better base the new state-based and internationally run institutionson local networks and to hence increase their acceptance and viability. The toolof a social network analysis caters to our conception of governance, which is lessfocused on the state, but more on the different processes that includes several ac-tors: ’governance is understood as a process by which policy is produced withinmulti-actor structures beyond a formal hierarchy (cf. Rhodes 1996; Pierre

and Peters 2000). Thus, the state is considered one possible, but not neces-sarily the most important, actor in this process of governance. The concepts ofco-management and governance incorporate an implicit assumption about theestablishment of social networks, based upon a different logic than political-administrative hierarchy’ (Carlsson & Sandström 2008: 34). Developmentpartners play a crucial role in affecting the relationship of the different actors in

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the setting. The focus on governance frameworks entails ’an implicit assump-tion that social networks matter for the management and governance of naturalresources (Carlsson & Sandström 2008), at times the social structure canbe more decisive than the individual institutions and persons involved.The SNA was carried out in two states of South Sudan, tracing the relationshipof ’water actors’ from the national to the local level. Even though the datais not fully comprehensive, the analysis does offer invaluable insights into therelationships and structures that determine water allocation and governance.The questionnaires were mostly filled out in presence of the researcher, and insome cases sent via EMail. The insufficient data can partly be attributed to thepoor return of electronically supplied questionnaires.The full analysis of all data derived from the SNA will be presented in the articlethat is to follow this report.

2.1.2 Interviews

The SNA was guided and supplemented by key informant interviews, qualitativeinterviews and focus group discussions. The qualitative research covered mostactors in the SNA, as well as academics and consultants dealing with waterand/or resource governance. The aim was to put in perspective the data derivedfrom the SNA and also to double-check the comprehensiveness of the actorsincluded. The interviews revealed one of the weaknesses of a paper-based SNA,as they explained alternative paths of information exchange and reasons forcooperation/non-cooperation. Further, interviewees were more frank and openabout the gaps in the system when talked to directly - even when on record - asopposed to putting criticism and shortcomings (often also on their behalf) onpaper and signing it.Interviews were mostly conducted in English. South Sudan is working to es-tablish and spread the use of English as the primary working language, hencemost officials were sufficiently fluent. In rural areas, people speak their region-ally/tribally determined. In these cases, project assistants from local NGOs wereable to assist with the translation. The recordings were then double checkedwith other locals to make sure the translation is correct.

2.1.3 Documents & Literature review

Policy papers, donor reports and academic literature on the issue have beenreviewed in preparation as well as during the research process and served as thebasis for the fieldwork. The policy documents provided important informationon the actors and strategies involved, but have to be regarded rather as a vision,with the steps between the current situation and this very vision yet to bedetermined. Academic work was included but mainly served as backgroundinformation as the developments of interest are too recent to be captured inacademic work yet.

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2.2 The cases

In the present study, Central Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazalhave been selected as the units of analysis, as two of ten possible cases (i.e. theten states of South Sudan) of which the study will investigate the institutionallinks between different actors and scales of water management and place them inthe context of the political state building agenda. The discussion about the unitof analysis concerning water resources (political boundaries, watershed, problemshed (also see Merrey et al. 2007; Lourenco et al. 2004)) shall not bedelved into at this point: given the interest and the rationale of the presentstudy in institutions and the functioning of the emergent state, political entitiesand their governance structures were considered most useful and appropriate.

2.2.1 Selection

The selection of the case has a fundamental impact on the validity of a casestudy and represents a crucial stage in the research process. Given the time-frame and the funding possibilities of the project, a scoping mission could notbe conducted. Due to the constraints in funds, time and accessibility, the selec-tion of cases followed a rather pragmatic rationale after discussion with severalcounty representatives and NGOs as being ’typical’ communities in the area.The plan was to look at two states that offer two different perspectives on thestructures and challenges involved. The compromises concerning rigor in theselection process will be taken into account during the analysis of the cases andduring the presentation of possible implications for other cases.Given that the Republic of South Sudan is currently being created from scratch,only few states would offer sufficient information for the underlying researchagenda. Equatoria has for long been one of the most developed regions in SouthSudan (Tvedt 1994: 86). Central Equatoria, despite being the home of thecurrent capital, Juba, has maintained and developed its state institutions, de-termined to evolve from the ’hinterland’ of the capital to a veritable state. Thestate is hence not representative of South Sudan, but rather an extreme case.Western Bahr El Ghazal on the other hand, is more remote from the adminis-trative center, and is governed by a different rationale; the social structures andthe understanding of statehood are strongly affected by the arabic influence thatwas exerted on behalf of Khartoum during its control of the region during thecivil war. As highlighted above, the special nature of the political situation ofthe South Sudan, the two cases selected do not aspire to be representative, butcan only help to create contingent generalizations and to shed light on severalconsiderations that may or may not be as clearly recognizable in other cases.

2.2.2 Yei County, Central Equatoria State

Before the CPA, the South was divided into three provinces: Equatoria, GreaterBahr el Ghazal, and Upper Nile. Equatoria, being the home of the capital city

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Juba has for long been among the more developed regions in South Sudan, asthe British Administration has also been located in Juba during colonial times.Today, the state ’enjoys a spillover effect from the investments, infrastructuraland economic developments of Juba’ (UNMIS 2010: 3), but particularly themore remote areas of the state are in need of support for local development totake place. The first SNA was conducted in Yei county. Yei county has greatagricultural potential, as it is still part of the ’Green Belt’, the area that receivestwo rainy seasons. Even though Yei enjoys greater agricultural activity thanJuba, the area has come to suffer from the erratic and increasingly unreliablerainfalls, and there is no initiative to improve productivity or reliability byinvesting in irrigation.What has been highlighted as special by various key informants, is the fact thatthe people of Yei have not fled the area during the war, but merely retreatedto the villages around the city when fighting was heaviest. The county hencesuffers from less mistrust between returnees and people who remained during thewar, and can also draw on more intact community structures as other countiesdo. The expectation was thus to find a well established system across differentscales and sufficient community involvement.In 2008, Schomerus reported that there were only 352 water points in CES,which indicates a relative shortage. The map in 3.2 shows a high concentrationof water points in Yei county/city/urban area, as well as along the main roads.This experience was repeated in Western Bahr el-Ghazal (see below), and hintsat the fact that coordination is not sufficient to avoid doubling of services andthe subsequent exclusion of other areas.

2.2.3 Raja County, Western Bahr el Ghazal State

Western Bahr el-Ghazal state covers vast areas but is scarcely populated. Themajority of people live along the main road running from Wau via Raja tothe North, which is also where the majority of services (including WASH) areoffered. This creates a strong pull-effect for communities in more remote areas,as these are mainly excluded from development assistance. Western Bahr elGhazal is experiencing a dryer climate than Central Equatoria and hence facesharsher conditions for farming. The county that was selected for the SNA isRaja, which used to feed the whole state before climatic conditions changedfor the worse in the area. The county is now suffering from a lack of waterfor drinking and productive use, as only very few development partners areoperating in the area.

2.3 Note on Field Research in South Sudan

The Catholic University of South Sudan provided invaluable support in terms ofgeneral orientation, contacts and local knowledge. By approaching institutionson behalf of the University, the interviewer was able to keep up a certain notion

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of neutrality. However, moving further from the urban centers, the more she wasconsidered as one of the donor representatives. This impacted the conversationand information shared during the interviews. When traveling in rural areasin NGO vehicles, this problem became even more apparent. The dilemma ofcooperating with aid and development agencies on the ground was expectedfrom the outset. Given the difficult logistical situation in South Sudan and thelimited amount of both time and funds, it was considered the only possibilityof leaving the major cities and acquiring access to the local communities andadministration structures. The lack of roads, transport networks and reliablecommunication made it impossible to carry out the research of the presentbreadth without heavily investing in transportation and planning. It was abalancing act that at times failed, but the predicaments were kept in mind andtaken into account during the analysis.Linking with development agencies opened many doors to public officials, butalso gave rise to the problem that the interviewer was considered either asa potential donor or a consultant for evaluation, both of which compromisedthe quality of the answers, and an overstatement concerning lack of funds, in-volvement in projects, and lack of support from other institutions. By cross-referencing the results, and enriching them with key-informant interviews, aca-demic reports and literature, the impact of this impediment shall be limited.

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Chapter 3

Preliminary findings

Water is hoped to function as a lever for peace, with water services being framedas the so-called ’peace dividend’ that the people are to expect after hostilitieshave seized. This instrumental use of water places the resource squarely in thediscourse on state formation and state-society relations - with the particularitythat donors and NGOs play a decisive role in this relationship. The managementof water and the setting of priorities - whether willingly or unwillingly - will beanalyzed from a political economy perspective once the SNA has been finalized.Water management at this point has taken an extractive nature, correspondingto past practices under outside actors. The lack of sustainable information willkeep the country in an emergency mode and further decrease the ability of thegovernment to govern its precious asset anytime soon. The development part-ners are the only reliable link of the state to the local level, but the informationis not passed through the established and slowly evolving administrative system,but is rather used to build a parallel system of information and knowledge ex-change, which the government is not always part of. While more efficient in theshort term, this system deprives the government of the slight chance to enhanceits own strength. In terms of state-society relations, this system undermines therole of the state as service provider, and conveys a weak image - if any imageat all - to the population.

3.1 Access to drinking water in rural areas

The map of water points shows the stark differences in distribution of waterpoints. It has to be noted that the population in South Sudan is increasinglyconcentrating along the main roads, and else widely scattered in areas that arehard to reach by the government or aid agencies. However, the map and inter-views support the speculation that need/current level of services is not the maindetermining factor for new projects. The high concentration of boreholes fitsthe pattern of several development contexts that NGOs follow the money/other

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projects.Whereas the coverage of some rural areas with boreholes is not far from reach-ing MDG1 standards, it is the maintenance of the facilities (roughly 50% donot work properly) that is most worrisome and gives rise to several interestingassumptions concerning community involvement, ownership, and the politicaleconomy of water services. Many boreholes are financed by emergency funds,and projects are being implemented in an correspondingly short time frame.Due to the long rainy season during which many parts of the country are notaccessible and the short time frame of the funds, there are only few months inwhich allocation, drilling and training can take place.The maintenance of the projects is expected to be sustainable, community-led,controlled by local government institutions, and follows more of a developmentrationale. The uneasy link between humanitarian and development funds andprograms leaves a gap in actual provision and renders the approach rather un-sustainable - hence the high rate of broken/unusable pumps. Abandoned wellsalong the main roads are a striking, omnipresent proof of these statistics. Whilepart of the problem is rooted in the high cost for spare parts and the lack ofestablished value chains, another aspect is the policy of NGOs and MWRI thatpeople should contribute to the maintenance of their borehole, mostly collectedand administered by a water committee, that should then organize technicalassistance and spare parts; ideally from the state/payam administration. Sincewater was supplied for free for a long time, without the demand of financialcontribution of the communities, many people feel that there is actually a dete-rioration of supply - especially since the envisaged community structures onlywork in a very limited number of cases. The idea of contributing/being taxedto receive a service in return is not known in many areas, and currently onlyabout 20% contribute to the operation and maintenance of the water systemsand infrastructure. This crucial link, which would help the state to take root inrural areas is hence truncated as NGOs are more often the more likely actor tochip in.As will also be emphasized by the analysis of the research on social networks, theanswer can be found in the way different actors and institutions relate to eachother. Rural water supply is basically - exceptions do exist in a limited number -in NGO/donor control as the Ministry and its local representations do not havethe funds, capacity, or infrastructure to drill, dig, or fix the necessary facilities.NGOs are also more likely to be informed of problems on site as the informationchains are much shorter and less hierarchical. The institutional disarray leadsto unclear information on needs and projects between the different levels ofgovernance, so that decisions taken at the national level do only insufficientlyrepresent the situation on the ground, and can only provide limited guidance tothe actors involved at the local level. As highlighted below, the MWRI policiesare only insufficiently disseminated, which leads to legal confusion concerningrights and responsibilities.

1Millennium Development Goals

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The question of equity is crucial as well: word has been going around thatNGOs provide wells/water for free, so representatives at all levels try to ’makesure you get yours’ (A. Lukoji). As highlighted below, most communities couldrely on an ’initiator’ to bring the NGO to a community, providing this personwith political clout. This highlights how access to water becomes enmeshedwith politics - politics that the Ministry or the state administration do not havecontrol over as NGOs are basically running the game in rural areas. At the sametime, the current system is creating and shaping demand of the communitiesaccording to what the respective round of donor funding has to offer.If donors would offer to drill boreholes for water for irrigation purposes, wouldmore people irrigate their crops? In the North, as encountered exemplarily inWestern Bahr elGhazal, people have resorted to manual irrigation when the rainfails. Agricultural areas, however, are in most cases very remote, not coveredby the rural water supply net which is - naturally - concentrated in residentialareas. FAO has supplied tradle pumps in various northern areas, but these alsoneed to be fed with river water - out of sources whose water availability is highlyseasonal, and unlikely to provide water when most needed. Further, these pumpswere not integrated in a wider project on irrigation/farming and hence did nothave a very strong impact, as reported by FAO officials. Several NGOs are bynow targeting areas used for production, trying to allocate boreholes close by,but in the light of many underserved communities in terms of drinking water,this policy will need a good framework and backup in order to be equitablyimplemented.

3.2 Water for productive use: ’If this is whatthe policy says, this is what we will proba-bly want to do’2

According to the national government, 50% of the state territory is arable fer-tile land. Farming in South Sudan is mostly rainfed, with limited amountsof small scale traditional and modern irrigation schemes (See GOSS 2007: 3).Traditionally, the heavy rains in South Sudan have provided just enough waterfor the limited amount of subsistence agriculture (Salman 2011). In the pastyears, however, people have reported unreliable, more erratic rains that makeagricultural production increasingly challenging. ’Agriculture is in these areasmuch more story on local livelihood, vulnerability and conflict than a story ondedicated economic production’ (Heun & Letitre 2011: 9). This aspect hasto be taken into account when debating the agricultural potential of the newnation, and the need to provide the rural committees with water to reach foodsecurity. The research on water for productive use has revealed many aspectsto be taken into account in our ethical assessment, that were not clear before.

2Quote from MWRI Official. Policy in this context related to the MWRI Strategic Planand other key documents in the Water sector published by MWRI

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Irrespective of the changing rainfall patterns, the green water-based agriculturecould never more than barely feed the population of South Sudan. Today, theheavy influx of returnees and changing diets raise the demand for agriculturalproducts even further. South Sudan in 2012 is highly food insecure (FAO 2012),and most experts and government officials agree that traditional rainfed agri-culture is not sufficient to attain both sufficiency in output and reliability ofagricultural production (Wojah, Interview 2012) that would be adequate tofeed the nation: ’In as much as South Sudan’s economy is assumed to be largelyagriculture-based, the agricultural sector is still rudimentary with practices ofrain-based subsistence farming. This is neither sufficient to meet local needsnor diversified enough to ensure food security. The potential of irrigation-basedagriculture is great and it will put an increasing demand on the available waterresources in South Sudan.’ (GOSS 2011: 6) The MAF advocates for a simi-lar policy: ’South Sudan is endowed with vast areas of swamplands that couldbe developed into large scale irrigated agriculture in cash crops such as rice,sesame, oil palm (sic!), vegetables, fruit trees, cotton, etc.’ (MAF 2007) Thecurrent oil crisis has triggered economic hardship and political instability, butarguably holds great potential to move the development of the agricultural sec-tor, one of the ’life vains’ (MAF 2007) of the economy, up on the agenda: thecrisis has emphasized the absolute necessity to diversify the economy in orderto reduce vulnerability and dependency from international imports. Especiallysince the loss of oil revenues has gravely affected the South Sudanese Pound(SSP), imported food has become prohibitively expensive.The low productivity rates undoubtedly have several reasons, most of which shallnot be dealt with at this point. However, the long and increasingly unpredictabledry seasons in which agricultural activity grinds to a halt in the whole of SouthSudan are undeniably one of the impediments.Because of the war, private sector engagement and irrigated agriculture havebecome insignificant (MAF 2007). Irrigated farmland is only 32,100 ha, whichaccounts for 7.1% of cultivated land. Most of the irrigated land belongs tonational/state irrigation schemes managed by the government; thus, almost allsmall scale farmers are producing their products under rain-fed conditions. Theirrigation schemes in Aweil and Rank are the only large scale irrigated projects- and productivity rates render economic sustainability in the short term ratherunlikely, as heavy need for capital investment and the high cost of operationand maintenance costs are far from being recovered by the output.The total lack of scientific research and reliable data on water availability,groundwater reservoirs and river basins will provide an unreliable basis for anysubsequent irrigation plan. Water Resources Management and data collectionis neither the focus of either the Ministry nor of the various donors engagedin the water sector, even though all current and envisaged programs are to benegatively affected by the lack of information. MWRI officials openly admitthat they have no clear understanding of the resource base they are currentlyworking with and striving to develop. The Ministry for Agriculture is respon-sible for large scale irrigation projects, with MWRI in charge of delivering the

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needed amounts of water to the site, whereas large scale irrigation and waterinfrastructure projects would fall under the mandate of MWRI alone. The strat-egy for irrigation for food production is also driven by MAF - i.e. falls underthe mandate of the MAF but has not yet produced any outputs. Bonded by anextreme lack of funds, government bodies have negligible potential to create mo-mentum concerning water demand or water provision. The absence of concreteprojects, however, does not excuse the lack of coordination between the twoministries, beginning with an unclear delineation of responsibilities concerninguse and management of water. WASH (2011) has not succeeded in providing acomprehensive irrigation plan/policy to operationalize the 2007 strategic frame-work. The reluctance/inability of the government and the donor community toimprove the database - also in terms of generating new hydrological data - isconstantly leading to high levels of frustration on both sides.As in rural water supply (see above), it seems like donors and development agen-cies are the main link between MAF and MWRI (or Ministry of Dams, Fisheriesetc) - Jica is working on the South Sudan Irrigation Master Plan and mappingagricultural potential, and USAID is also looking at potential projects utilizingwater to scale up agricultural production. It is these donor undertakings thatcollect, analyze and disseminate information between and on behalf the respon-sible ministries. At state level, the disconnect between the two Ministries iseven more apparent, especially since low-level representations of MAF considerany project involving water infrastructure as out of their reach/mandate. MAFis currently working towards food security, addressing smallholders and the gen-eral population to turn to farming and making use of the natural assets of thecountry. Introducing irrigated farming would be highly cost intensive and thusdemand to concentrate the strained funds to changing the production system- but would leave issues such as lack of transportation, lack of markets, skillsand man power unaddressed based on the limited funds available. Nevertheless,irrigation is considered ’paramount’ in reducing food insecurity in South Sudan(I. Liabwell, Undersecretary MWRI).Up to now, donor projects have not addressed irrigation issues yet and havefocused on supporting and training smallholders instead. Concerning watersupply, development partners are active in delivering to rural communities, buthave shied away from any larger projects concerning water infrastructure. TheGovernment is strongly criticizing this stance, emphasizing its own lack of fundsand scant capacity to take on this challenge.As of now, all water management/policy/intervention is of extractive nature,without taking sustainability or the state of the resource base into account.Subsequent sections will come back to the political economy of water manage-ment that inspires unsustainable, extractive solutions, rather than a holisticmanagement approach. By focusing funds on emergency interventions only, thecurrent situation of dependency on aid will not diminish.

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3.3 Political networks and decision-making

3.3.1 The weakness of the State

MWRI has to deal with a budget capped at 33 Million SSP for next year due tothe current austerity budget. For political reasons, the laying off of staff and thereduction of salaries is highly sensitive, hence the capping of funds will result inMWRI not being able to initiate any projects or to support its representativesat lower levels of governance. The lack of funds is complemented by a lackof capacity and strategic planning. Given the history and the current state ofSouth Sudan, this situation does not come as a surprise. As noted above, allinstitutions have to be created from scratch, aiming to serve a nation that hasyet to take shape.During this transitional period, as during the civil war, NGOs and donors aresupporting the new government to improve the status quo and to help the stateto build its own ’capacity’. Concerning NGO engagement before the CPA, Riehlhas stated in 2001 that popular INGOs have ’captured the “communal memory”as personifying best practice for public service provision. State efforts have beenconstantly tarnished as an ‘obstacle to development’. This judgement led to an‘attitude of bitterness’ towards state bureaucracy and a general ‘free-ticket ofapproval’ towards INGO- activities which they, in many cases, did not deserve,at least not without reflection’ (Riehl 2001: 12). The challenge for the newstate is to bundle these activities, coordinate them, and thus take responsibilityand ownership of what is going on in order to establish itself as an/the decisiveactor. This process, however, has proven to be all but simple.The financial side is one important aspect: the ’GoSS is clear in its belief thataid not passing through government systems does not build government capac-ity.’ (OECD 2011: 47). Given the disequilibrium in financial capacity betweengovernment bodies and international organizations, this stance seems logical.On the other hand, the bloated administrative apparatus and the surfeit of staffat central level backs the claims of many established NGOs in the WASH sec-tor, that implementation has become more difficult and more expensive sinceMWRI/state structures have become involved. The funds, scarce and insuffi-cient in the first place, seem to ’evaporate’ in Juba - as emphasized by severalNGO representatives, leaving ever smaller amounts for much needed projectsand long term support for the states.The other problem is the sharing and dissemination of information, and theefficient sharing of responsibility. The Local Government Act of 2009 clarifiescompetencies across different scales, but many (Feiden et al. 2009: 7) lamentthat there is little agreement on who is to be responsible for water services andpertaining infrastructure (USAID 2009). The lack of job descriptions withinMWRI make administrative processes awkward and time consuming. Some ad-visors to MWRI postulate that sometimes they cannot understand themselves,how and why things mostly work out in the end. The internal anarchy makesrelationships with the subordinate bodies and development partners ever more

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difficult. Many interviewees voiced frustration about the high number of reportsrequested, confusion about whom to report to and why, and how this informa-tion will then be processed. On the other hand, MWRI creates ’standards thatshould be observed, but not communicated/disseminated: at county level peo-ple do as they have done for centuries. There is a lack of funds and strategyhow to disseminate information’3 Additionally, the fact that water issues aremanaged by different Ministries depending on the level (MWRI, MOPI, RuralDevelopment) adds further confusion to the system.The relations between the various development partners create a separate net-work of information exchange and collaboration, that only marginally involvesstate structures (see 3.3.2). According to the OECD (2011: 28), Governmentpartners have expressed a wish to develop strategic communication tools to as-sist with engaging in dialogue with the public, to gain their trust and fostermutual accountability. As these have not been successful yet, ’the GOSS lacksthe resources to enhance its own strength’ (Berhanu 2011: 350). As one repre-sentative put it at a workshop on rural water in Juba: ‘out of our own weakness,we do not check for registration or competency of the NGOs, but only wait forbenefits’ (government official at WASH Workshop Juba).

3.3.2 Alternative networks

In many cases, the interviews on the different levels revealed a detachment andlack of trust between the actors in water governance on different scales anddifferent domains. The proposed channels of information exchange have proveninsufficient in many cases and do not correspond either to the institutions inplace or to the needs encountered at the local level. In the face of the stronginternational engagement in the water sector, international donors and develop-ment partners take an important role in settling this issue - not only in providingfunds and expertise, but also in passing information - or withholding it. Ac-cording to a donor representative, NGOS can make or break communication.The data will be displayed in the final article.The understanding of governance as networks is very helpful in this regard:’Instead of considering the State as one coherent actor, the multifaceted char-acter of the government is recognized. While State authority ranges vertically(from the central governmental level to the local level) and horizontally (throughdifferent policy sectors), it has many faces’ (Carlsson & Sandström 2008:36). This is also true for the political economy of water management and watersupply.An increasing number of development partners feel that it is too awkward andtoo expensive to work through government structures, and some chose to ad-dress and select the beneficiary communities directly. The local state or countyrepresentatives can still make suggestions as to where exactly a project will beimplemented, but the scope, the initial idea, the function often seem to be rather

3Interview with NGO representative

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determined by donor regulations, the respective availability of funds, and thenetwork of the implementing agency than by an informed assessment of localneeds. Even when preaching ’ownership’ of the projects, and involving statestructures in the process, only those branches of government/representationthat are needed will be propped up. Irrigation and WRM are poorly developeddespite the emphasis of the government and consultants to include these aspectsbecause they are not currently part of the donor packages that can make thingshappen. Chapter 3.3.3 will also shed light on the instances, in which local offi-cials made use of NGOs and their services to strengthen their own power base,creating pockets of power by offering development partners a base to work from:Where wells are drilled depends on a ‘godfather’, advocacy on behalf of a power-ful representative who knows the system and the various channels of informationand distribution of funds, on someone who campaigns for the community (A.Lukoji). This process is both a consequence and a trigger for an unresponsiveand inefficient administrative structure that at some point is supposed to secureequitable supply of water: local officials address state representatives, leavingthe county administration in the dark about what is going on in the rural areas.The rigid and inefficient structure was highlighted by the situation of a villagein Raja county: the boma chief/Sultan tried to address the issue of lackingwater supply through the official channels, but ultimately, after 3 years, had toconsult with the governor at state level directly for action to be taken.The Government of South Sudan feels that parallel information and projectimplementation systems ultimately undermine its systems. NGOs on the otherhand feel they have no partner in the official institutions, many of which havelittle to contribute to the projects, but are perceived to make administrationmore difficult. The lack of transportation curtails the ability of the officials tofollow up in the projects without the help of the development partners. Thissituation leads to a huge amount of frustration and mutual blaming betweenboth sides, a highly inequitable distribution as networks don’t overlap, anda mismatch of the situation on the ground and the centrally/internationallyproposed solutions 4. The county governments are supposed to coordinate andprovide guidance for the international partners, but are often not strong enoughcapacity wise or simply insufficiently informed to fill that role. This has resultedin a doubling of services in certain areas, as encountered around Yei and reportedby several county representatives. Local staff is suspected to report to whoevergives out money for projects (MWRI official), or simply do not know the officialcommunication channels (which are highly hierarchical and not very conduciveto cover the vast area of South Sudan) or responsibilities. The NGO networksoperate more efficiently and have more resources on their hands than the stateinstitutions. Hence they are more likely to be addressed by local actors aboutneeds and the development of projects.As a response, ’clusters’ have been established to share information and toalign strategies between the different actors involved. These ’WASH clusters’

4This mismatch is further aggravated by the uneasy interface between emergency anddevelopment projects.

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are administered by UNICEF at national level, while each state is supposed toorganize its own cluster to provide for coordinated responses in emergencies,led by a development partner. The common wisdom is, however, that ’mostco-ordination mechanisms in place only serve for information exchange amonginternational partners, not for dialogue and harmonization with GoSS’ (OECD2011: 52), or even as the forum to allocate funds from projects for the donors5.State representatives complain about not being included in the proceedings. Inthe case of CES, the person in charge of rural water supply claims to have notbeen invited to any meeting so far - whereas the cluster meetings for WBeG takeplace at the Department premises. Still, many development partners experiencethe meetings as little useful and rather frustrating, and state and county leveldepartments voice constraints in their work because of insufficient mechanismsof communications with their partners.’While Sudan currently has over 150 Acts, Orders and related regulations gov-erning environmental issues, the inability of the government to implement thepolicies renders them ineffective and there is a need to formulate and enforceenvironmental policies based on best-known practices (indigenous and modern)in the utilization and management of natural resources. The majority of therespondents in 2008-2009 research by Lazim Sulimen are of the opinion thatlocal leaders (elders, traditional leaders, chiefs, and kujurs) were best placed tomanage resources and mitigate in resource-based conflicts.’ (Large, El-Basha

2010: 10) However, there needs to be an overarching policy or plan to guide theseprocesses, as the current practice of linking local actors through internationalnetworks undermines the capacity of the government to at one point take overgoverning its resources and create sustainable solutions. And since decisions forfunding are made at the national level, the local networks need to be linkedto the official network that is merging at MWRI at the national level in orderto avoid the current mismatch between problems and solutions. The currentpractice of working directly with local actors and dodging the state structuresincreases the perceived gap between traditional and modern ’officical’, post-CPAinstitutions and hence prevents the state from taking root efficiently at the locallevel.JICA (2012) criticize that MWRI has put little emphasis on spelling out itspolicy on water for irrigation. The huge potential of the agricultural sector inSouth Sudan is now slowly drawing development partners to look into that issue,creating links between the departments involved where there used to be none: atnational level, MWRI and MAF/Dept for irrigation are not in close contact dueto the absence of clear mandates and (funds for) concrete projects. At statelevel, there is no link between irrigation and rural water supply even thoughthey are organized in the same Ministry (Physical Infrastructure) (MWRI of-

ficial). The further down we trace the institutions, the less likely cooperationwill be as the capacity to actually implement projects on irrigation decreasestowards the local level due to an absence of funding and capacity. Hence, a

5Priority is explicitly given to international actors, because they know and understand thereporting structure. National NGOs often do not get the funds.

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stronger institutionalized coordination mechanism at central level would be im-portant in order to work towards an integrated approach in water management -which ultimately raises the question of whether, and under which preconditions,IWRM is compatible with high levels of local participation.

3.4 Water and the social contract

The research was inspired by the assumption that water services and watermanagement is about more than the actual provision of the resource, but that itoffers an important lens through which to look at social relations in a politicalenvironment. Considering the activities and strategies of the state and thedevelopment partners offers an interesting snapshot of a limited sphere of theprocess of state-society relations in the newborn state.As noted above, the notion of ’water as a lever for peace’ is not understood asthe solution for the randomly erupting fights between farmers and pastoralists,but rather as the provision of equitable and safe services, participation anddevelopment as envisaged by a ’positive peace’. From a conceptual perspective,the provision of services, and the reconstruction of the governance mechanimsinvolved serve as a powerful lever to give legitimacy to a state administrationafter conflicts. The improvement in services is also expected to minimize thewillingness of the people to resort to violence lest risking the improvement ofliving conditions. In a recent OECD report however, Bennett (2010: xv)concludes that the ’benefits of peace’ theory does not work in Sudan: conflict willnot resume in case of failure of the government of the international communityto deliver peace dividends, the lack of development is not a cause for conflict.However, the way the state handles its water resources and caters to the waterrelated needs of its population will determine whether the Republic of SouthSudan will overcome the legacy of marginalisation, instrumentalization of ruralcommunities and tribalism that has provided the ground for years of conflictwithin the South.The WASH cluster is currently shifting back and forth between the emergencyand development mode, being subject to different funding mechanisms, differentdynamics and different program regulations. In this state, long term projectsinvolving investments in infrastructure, information management or agricultureare unlikely to receive the attention they deserve. These are the great bot-tlenecks in the funding. Development partners see their engagement as purelyhumanitarian; some blame local politicians bringing in sensitive politics by usingthe system of distribution for their own power base that makes it more politi-cal. But providing water to communities is not an apolitical endeavor, especiallywhen there is no reliable mechanism to ensure that all people get the same ben-efits. Right now it is the government and the international community whodecide on the amount and location of water points supplied, the internationalcommunity has the power to jump-start the agricultural sector, and interna-tional agencies do take over the responsibilities of the state in administering

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this process. The research has come to the conclusion that the developmentpartners have helped to construct this very system which may be conducive topolitical exploitation. Despite its agenda and rhetoric of ownership, NGOs fitneatly into the cycle of conflict. Focusing on extracting water for humanitarianprojects while neglecting the water management dimension and the quality andquantity of the resource base limits the future capacity of the government tosustainably manage its resources.Policy papers and donor strategies highlight the importance of community con-sultation, subsidiarity, and local participation for a successful and equitablyapproach to water management. ’According to the CPA, the Southern SudanInterim Constitution and the new legislation, community consultation is not achoice but a legal requirement. This is not to say that the process isn’t long andcomplicated, or that there is any guarantee that natural resources will be bet-ter managed or managed in a more sustainable way.’ (Gullick 2009: 39) Sheholds that the emphasis on decentralization ‘has in many areas become instru-mental in entrenching ‘tribal’ lines over competition of resources’ (Schomerus

& Allen 2010: 39), such as water and land, rather aggravating the destabi-lizing potential of contested resource use. The current system of developmentpartners willing to hand out funds and implement projects, often frustrated bycomplicated and inefficient official mechanisms, serving communities that havenot been chosen due to transparent and universal criteria is unlikely to producea sustainable and equitable practice. Based on an expansive study on resourcegovernance (excluding water) in Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei, including inter-views and community mapping, she concludes that the local community is oftennot involved in resource governance. She does not blame top-down approaches,however, but rather hierarchical local structures and the fact that people adhereto their tribal chiefs instead of becoming involved themselves. The field work re-vealed similar structures of lacking accountability and an expectation on behalfof the communities to receive services just as they did during the years of con-flict. The government further stirs these expectations with its ’peace dividend’approach, without being able to deliver.With the new state of South Sudan being unable to reach its rural communities,the traditional forms of government remain decisive as they are the only mecha-nisms that still work (A. Lukoji). Given the strong influence of tribal chiefs andthe insufficient level of information from the grassroots being passed on to Juba,policies and funding mechanisms are created at national level, which are unlikelyto combat the mechanisms of marginalisation that have evolved over decades ofconflict. Equitable access is crucial for rural water supply which is by and largecharacterized by traditional relations, providing priority to people with powerin the communities, putting weaker members, usually women and children, atrisk. The ’water committees’ that are being set up and trained in conjunct withthe provision of the borehole are supposed to resolve these conflicts and ensurethe contribution of the community to the maintenance of the projects lack theinfluence to fulfill their task and are also insufficiently integrated in the officialnetworks that are supposed to administer the project - hence uncovering the

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disconnect of grassroot representation and official structures.Ever since Wittfogels account of the hydraulic civilizations (1957), thenotion that power of a state is constituted and reflected by its system of wa-ter management in rural areas, WRM is not considered as an agricultural oreconomic endeavor, but also highly political. The idea that irrigation systemsthat require a lot of centralized control and labour would drive social devel-opment towards more monopolized state power and ultimately an absolutiststate has been debated and ultimately been rejected, but the situation in SouthSudan does highlight how strongly WRM/irrigation and state power are inter-connected. The state of South Sudan does not have the clout or the power toinitiate or implement any irrigation or infrastructure projects. Of course thisconstraint can be mainly attributed to the negligible funds in the face of theimmensity of the challenge. On the other hand, investing these funds in govern-ment salaries rather than in projects that will strengthen the representation ofthe state outside of Juba will only prolong the dependency on external donors.The current policy (or lack thereof) concerning outside agricultural investorsand the insufficient, exploitable regulations on land and water use further un-dermine the ability of the state to take control its own resource base in thefuture.In this regard the conceptual vacuum around ‘statehood’ (Bennett at al.

2010: xviii), the lack of a clear agreement on the responsibilities of the stateand its relationship with its people, that currently impacts all attempts to buildthis very state, becomes problematic. Most development partners are still oper-ating with a rather state-centric mindset. The population, apart from the smallnumber of (foreign) educated citizens in Juba, could not hold a more differentmindset, shaped by generations of local political culture. Communities are re-ported to ask: what is government? We get no services from them, why arethey there? The very concept of taxes, or generally contributing to services toan instance other than the tribe is unknown. The notion of boreholes as a ’po-litical gift’ to the administration on behalf of the international community hasto be turned into that of a token of responsibility to secure the water needs ofthe pertaining community. The inability of the government to provide services,in conjunct with its policy of demanding contributions from the communitiesfor the services they are receiving does not bolster the reputation of the newlycreated administrative elite of South Sudan, or convey an image of responsibil-ity. The vast amounts of money that simply ’evaporate’ in Juba strengthen thisimage. The central state should not be in charge of water provision, it shouldonly create an institutional environment in which the states, counties and localadministrations can be in charge - in the future also in conjunction with theprivate sector. Nevertheless, the government needs to become more visible inthe services currently being delivered. GOSS and the donor community havea common vision of how to make best use of the resources of South Sudan,however, the actions undertaken to link this institutional dream with the cur-rent state are not considered appropriate or conducive, which is true for varioussectors (A. Lukoji).

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Chapter 4

Appendix

4.1 Bibliography

4.1.1 Quoted literature

- Bennett, J., S. Pantuliano, W. Fenton, A. Vaux, C. Barnett, E. Brusset(2010) Aiding the Peace: A Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to ConflictPrevention and Peacebuildig Activities in South Sudan 2005-2010. ITAD Ltd.,UK.- Bromwich, Brandan (2009) Analysing Resource Constraints as One Dimen-sion of the Conflict in Darfur, in: Leroy, Marcel (ed) Environment and Conflictin Africa. University for Peace Africa Program. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.- Carlsson, Lars, Sandström, Annica (2008) Network Governance of the Com-mons, International Journal of the Commons Vol 2, no 1 January, pp. 33-54.- Carlsson, Lars (2000) Policy Networks as Collective Action. Policy StudiesJournal 28(3), p. 502–520.- De Wit, Paul (2008) Land Policy Development in Post Conflict Sudan: Deal-ing with Delicate Balances in a Fluid Environment . Draft: World Bank Con-ference on New Challenges for Land Policy and Administration, Washington.- De Wit, Paul; Tanner, Christopher; Norfolk, Simon (2009) Land Policy De-velopment in an African context. Land Tenure Working Paper 14, Food andAgricultural Organisation.- Denscombe, M. (2007) The Good Research Guide, Berkshire, UK: Open Uni-versity Press.- El Khazin, T. (2002). Analysis: Tribal Conflicts in West Sudanand Northern Parts of Southern Sudan (Darfur I). Sub-Sahara Centre, Ottawa,August 2002. Available Online at: http://www.subsaharacentre.ca/778.html- El-Ashry, Mohamed; Saab, Najib, Zeitoon, Bashar (2010) Arab Environment– Water, Arab Forum for Environment and Development, Beirut.- FAO, WFP (2012) Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to SouthSudan: http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/121612/icode/

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- Feiden, Peter, Dr. Mom Arou, Sam Taddesse, and Jaime Arteaga. SudanLocal Governance Assessment: South Sudan and in the Three Areas Draft.USAID/Management Systems International, 2009.- Gerring, J. (2007) Case Study Research, New York: CUP. - Gerring, J.(2004) What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for? American PoliticalScience Review, 98(02), pp.341-354.Available at: http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055404001182.- Harir, S. (1994) Arab Belt Versus African Belt in Darfur. In Harir, S. andTvedt, T. (Eds), Sudan: Short-Cut to Decay, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainsti-tutet. Sweden.- Heun, Jetze, Letitre, Peter (2011) Report Planning for Implementation Mis-sion South Sudan, November 2011, Delft.- Lamnek, Siegfried (1995) Qualitative Sozialforschung, Weinheim.- Manger, Leif (2005) Understanding Resource Management in Western Su-dan. A Critical Look at New Institutional Economics. In Quentin Gausset andTorben Birch Thomsen (eds) Beyond Territory and Scarcity: social, culturaland political aspects of conflicts on natural resource management. Uppsala:The Nordic Institute of African Studies.- Merrey, D.J.; Meinzen-Dick, R.; Mollinga, P.P. and Karar, E. (2007) Policyand institutional reform: The art of the possible. In Molden, D. (Ed), Waterfor food - Water for life, chapter 5, pp. 193-232. Comprehensive Assessment ofWater Management in Agriculture. London: Earthscan.- OECD (2011) 2011 Report on International Engagement in Fragile States:Republic of South Sudan, OECD Publishing.- Pierre, J.B. and G. Peters, eds. (2000) Governance, Politics and the State.Bas- ingstoke, UK: Macmillan.- Rhodes, R.A.W. (1996) The New Governance: Governing without Govern-ment. Political Studies 44, p. 652-667.- Riehl, Volker (2001) Who is ruling South Sudan? The role of NGOs inrebuilding socio-political order, Studies on Emergencies and Disaster Relief,Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala.- Salman M.A. Salman (2011) The new state of South Sudan and the hydro-politics of the Nile Basin Water International Vol. 36, Iss. 2. 154-166.- Schomerus, Mareike; Allen, Tim (2010) Southern Sudan at odds with itself:dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace, London.www2.lse.ac.uk/businessAndConsultancy/LSEConsulting/recentReports.aspx- Shepherd, Andrew; Norris, Malcom et. Al. (1987) Water Planning in AridSudan, London: Ithaca Press.- Suliman, Mohamed (1997) Civil War in Sudan. The impact of ecologicaldegradation, Centre for Security Studies and Conflict Research, ETH Zürich.- UNEP (2007) Sudan. Post-Conflict Environmental assessment, Nairobi.

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www.unep.org/conflictsanddisasters/UNEPintheRegions/CurrentActivities/Sudan/tabid/294/Default.aspx (assessed July 2011)- UNMIS (2010) Central Equatoria State Profile,www.unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Referendum/Central%20Equatoria.pdf- Wassara, Samson (2007) Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution inSouth Sudan, Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, Berlin.- Yin, Robert K. (2009) Case Study Research, Thousand Oaks, CA.

4.1.2 Documents

MWRI Strategy Papers

- Ministry for Water Resources and Irrigation (2009) Medium Term Perfor-mance Report (2006-2008), Juba. www.rwssp-mwrigoss.org/reports (assessedSeptember 2011)- MWRI (2011) WASH Sector Stretegic Plan, Juba.

Local Government Act

http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/Independant-Commissions-and-Chambers/Local-Government-Board-

MAF Stretegy 2007-11

- Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2007) Strategic Plan 2007-2011, Juba.

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