the political economy of tourism in north africa: comparative perspectives

T393

The Political Economy of Tourismin North Africa: ComparativePerspectives

Matthew Gray

Executive Summary

Tourism has become a salient sector in the economic-development strategies of NorthAfrica, despite the fact that the states of the region have met with varying degrees of suc-cess in their attempts to expand and develop their tourism sectors. This article adopts apolitical-economy approach to the analysis of tourism in North Africa. Its aims are tohighlight the main aspects of the region’s political economy that have influenced outcomesin the tourism sector of each country, and then to explain the political dynamics thatunderlie the tourism sectors of the region. This article asserts that all North African statesnow have embraced tourism—albeit with varying amounts of enthusiasm—as a key eco-nomic industry. It examines the relationship between tourism and economic reform in theregion, followed by the political dynamics of the sector, arguing that tourism is a very polit-ical affair, but for reasons different than in other sectors of the economy. It concludes withsome observations on the strategic and developmental challenges that confront the devel-opment of tourism in North Africa. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

INTRODUCTION

he states of North Africa—Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco—all haveenormous tourism potential, and yet receive only a fraction of the tourists thatother Mediterranean states, such as those to the north, receive. All five NorthAfrican states possess all the assets and attractions necessary for tourism to flour-ish: a pleasant Mediterranean climate; attractive beaches and coastlines; diversedesert landscapes; friendly populations; impressive archaeological sites; and an

Matthew Gray holds a B.A. and M.A. from Macquerie University in Sydney, Australia, and hasrecently completed a doctorate at the Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra, Australia,on the relationship between economic liberalization and tourism in the Middle East. He has taughtMiddle East politics at the ANU and his publications have included articles in the journals MiddleEastern Studies, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, and Arab Studies Quarterly.

Thunderbird International Business Review, Vol. 42(4) 393–408 • July–August 2000

© 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

The author would like to thank Ghassan Zarifeh for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and for his insights intothe Algerian political economy and its tourism sector. The usual disclaimer applies.

image elsewhere in the world, especially in European and Westernimagination, of being exotic and mysterious. Yet, in 1995, the entireNorth Africa region hosted only 7.3 million visitors, a small figure incomparison to France’s 60.5 million, or Spain’s 45 million, andsmaller even than Hong Kong’s 9.6 million or Malaysia’s 7.9 million.

Nonetheless, tourism has emerged as a priority sector in the economic-development strategies of the region, and all governments of the regionhave chosen to promote their states as tourism destinations, albeit in dif-ferent ways. They have met with varying degrees of success, dependingon a number of factors: the way potential tourists view the region, theinfrastructure (or lack of it) available for tourism, the relationshipbetween state and society and the manifestation of this in the formula-tion and execution of economic policy, and the political-economyframeworks of these states more generally and their receptiveness to theeconomic change and reform necessary to develop genuinely tourism.

This article adopts a political-economy approach to the analysis of theprospects and challenges facing the tourism sector in North Africa, andfocuses on the main aspects of political economy that have influencedtourism policies and strategies in the region. The argument of the paperis that the region has begun to move towards an economic structure andpolicy framework that will enhance its ability to develop tourism as aneconomic sector, although states such as Algeria and Libya, in the shortterm at least, face greater obstacles to achieving this than states such asEgypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, which are further advanced in the pro-cess. Nevertheless, all the states of North Africa face serious problems inintegrating into the world economy, and tourism often has been used tocushion the affects of economic crisis and to resist the need for a moreradical response to economic development. In such cases, tourism doesnot provide a long-term answer. Although tourism growth can con-tribute greatly to income and employment creation, it cannot offsetindefinitely economic problems. The preconditions for tourism devel-opment include an encompassing strategic plan for the sector, whichguides a tourism development structure based on a combination of statecommitment to tourism, clever marketing, and economic reform.

THE EVOLUTION OF NORTH AFRICAN TOURISM AND ITSPOLITICAL-ECONOMY CONTEXT: AN OVERVIEW ANDBACKGROUND

Since North Africa constitutes at least the five states mentionedabove, and by some definitions Mauritania, Western Sahara, and

Matthew Gray

394 Thunderbird International Business Review • July–August 2000

The preconditionsfor tourism devel-opment includean encompassingstrategic plan forthe sector…

Sudan as well, it is not surprising that the region is quite diverse. Allstates of the region share some basic similarities, such as anArab–Islamic culture and Arabic as an official language, but theirpolitical, economic, and, to some extent, social structures are signifi-cantly different. The historical experiences of the region, and in par-ticular the evolution of nation states, account in large part for suchdifferences.

The forms of government adopted after independence, especially inthe 1950s and 1960s, were essentially—with the exception, perhaps,of Boumediene’s Algeria—of the “soft authoritarianism” variety,whether under a monarch or military leadership. Attendant to thiswas an economic policy based on state-led development (SLD) andimport-substitution industrialization (ISI), common at the time inthe Middle East and, for that matter, throughout much of the world.State-led development and ISI dictated an emphasis on heavy manu-facturing, land reform, and various elements and degrees of socialistorthodoxies of development. The cases of Egypt, Libya, and Algeria,where revolutions of one type or another brought to power leader-ships committed to major political–economic change, differed slight-ly from the experiences of Tunisia and Morocco, although these lattertwo states also implemented, albeit to a lesser extent, policies of SLDand ISI. In most cases, the modernizing influences of a politicallydominant military, and attempts to curtail the power of the ancienrégime (including the landed classes, the trader merchants, and oth-ers linked to the colonial era), furthered the implementation of SLDand support for other policies of a leftist orientation.

Tourism during this period was of low priority. Egypt, and to someextent Morocco, received passenger and cruise ships in their ports,and gained some tourism income from the visits to shore that thetravelers would make. Egypt, by virtue of its historical sites and itsimage abroad, always received some tourists, as it had since beforethe Thomas Cook Company’s first tour there in the 1860s (Pudney,1953, pp. 181–213). In Morocco as well, there was a strong tradi-tion of European tourism, which was neither encouraged nor dis-couraged during the 1950s and 1960s. Algeria and Libya paid verylittle attention to tourism during this time, viewing it as an undesir-able foreign influence, and as unnecessary for economic develop-ment (Apostolopoulos et al., in press, pp. 2–3). Tunisia also initiallypaid little attention to tourism, although it embraced tourism as anaspect of economic development in the early 1960s, much earlierthan its neighbors (Poirier, 1995, p. 158). In general, therefore, inthe 1950s, 1960s, and into the 1970s, the governments of North

Political Economy of Tourism in North Africa

395Thunderbird International Business Review • July–August 2000

Africa were neither in favor of tourism, nor against it, but simplypaid no attention to it. It was neither a priority sector, nor was itseen to be an area of comparative advantage, and therefore a path toeconomic development.

In the 1980s, this view changed, and the governments of the regionembraced tourism. As a general statement, the new focus on tourismlargely found its source as both a response to financial crisis or dra-matic economic change, and partly also as an acknowledgment that,to maintain economic growth, the development strategies of the statehad to change. The earlier development orthodoxy based on heavyindustry, as well as agrarian transformation and development, provedinadequate; agricultural prices were falling, and heavy industryrequired more investment than was available simply to maintain itscompetitiveness. In the case of oil exporters such as Algeria, Libya,and Egypt, oil price fluctuations and a decline in prices in the mid1980s created foreign-exchange and budgetary problems, as well as ashortage of hard currency.

In Egypt, tourism formed an important aspect of al-infitah al-iqtisa-di (“the economic opening”), begun by then-president Anwar Sadatin 1974 and continued under his successor Hosni Mubarak afterSadat’s assassination in 1981. Infitah has become a generic termthroughout the region for economic liberalization and reform,although it was Egypt and Tunisia that first embraced it as a salienteconomic policy. Sadat’s infitah moved Egypt closer toward theworld economy, and also included a realignment away from theSoviet Union, and towards the United States and the West. Withininfitah, tourism played an important role as a sector that would cre-ate employment, offset some of the economic hardships caused byeconomic restructuring, and earn valuable hard currency. It also wasviewed as a new sector of particular potential: an untapped resource.For tourism to realize its full potential, the necessary infrastructurehad to be developed and modernized, the labor force trained to ahigh standard in tourism and related areas, and international-tradeand economic links expanded. This diverse range of requirementsformed the profile of infitah, which, in theory at least, enhancedinternational trade, foreign investment in Egypt, and the freedomsavailable to the private sector. However, because of infitah being firstand foremost a response to economic crisis and a diplomatic reorien-tation, it was not implemented fully or completely. This “dilatory”(Richards, 1991, pp. 1721–1730) reform continued under Mubarak,until a greater economic crisis in the early 1990s forced a more sub-stantial response from the government.

Matthew Gray


This is not to say that Egypt did not develop its tourism sector in the1970s and 1980s. In fact, the second half of the 1970s witnessed atourism “boom,” and the 1980s, while turbulent for the region, andtherefore providing for significant fluctuations in tourist numbers andincome, nonetheless showed an overall growth trend. Infitah did suc-ceed in creating some tourism investment, especially in tour compa-nies and hotel and accommodation infrastructure, to the point wheretourist numbers reached tourism capacity in the late 1970s. In the1980s, the main challenge for Egypt was regional political instabilityand the negative images of the Middle East that this created in theminds of potential Western tourists. The Iranian Revolution andHostage Crisis of 1979 through 1981, the Israeli invasion ofLebanon in 1982, incidents of terrorism in the mid-1980s, and theU.S. bombing of Libya in 1986 did not involve Egypt directly, butnonetheless created a perception of the Middle East as unstable anddangerous. Despite this image, Egypt expanded its tourism sectorduring this period, and most importantly, diversified into new areasof tourism. Instead of the traditional focus on archaeological and cul-tural tourism, Egypt became known for other types of tourism: the“sun, sand, and surf” of the Sinai and Red Sea coast, the deserts (withtheir romantic and adventurous image), and even for religious sitessuch as those of the Sinai.

At the same time, Tunisia was taking a different approach to tourism.Although Tunisia, like Egypt, had embraced tourism as an area fordevelopment earlier than many neighboring states, Tunisia insteadchose to focus more on mass leisure tourism. Unlike Egypt andMorocco, which stressed the diversity of their states, Tunisia focusedalmost exclusively on beach and relaxation. Tunisia deliberately tar-geted European tourists for their wealth and vicinity to North Africa,and sold itself as a competitor to Spain, Portugal, Greece, and south-ern Italy. From the 1960s onwards, and in the 1980s especially,Tunisia purposely built its resorts and hotels to cater for theEuropean market, and focused on one- or two-week-packagetourists. That Jerba and Monastir airports have direct flights to themajor cities of Europe, mostly charter flights, indicates the emphasison the European leisure market. This approach has worked well forTunisia. Tourists from Europe, in general, stay longer than touristsfrom Africa or the Middle East, and spend more money per personper day.

Morocco’s emphasis on diversity, and the broad types of tourists thatit receives, has proven to have both positive and negative influenceson the development of its tourism sector. Its long relationship with



Instead of thetraditional focuson archaeologi-cal and culturaltourism, Egypt

became knownfor other types of

tourism; the“sun, sand, and

surf” of the Sinaiand Red-Sea

coast, thedeserts…

Matthew Gray


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Europe, and especially its colonial past and its links with France, alsohas been an important factor in its approach to tourism.

Morocco, even more so than Egypt, has opened itself to a diverserange of tourists and has not focused on attracting a particular typeof tourist. It has marketed itself as a romantic and exotic destinationto wealthy European and North American tourists, with varying suc-cess, while also developing its coastal regions, especially aroundAgadir, for package tourists looking for relaxation. It has allowedindependent travelers to roam the country as they wish, and hasattracted large numbers of tourists from other parts of Africa and theMiddle East. This has given it an impressive-sized tourism sector ifmeasured in numbers alone, but on average, tourists to Moroccospend less than in, say, Tunisia or Egypt. The sector also has beenallowed to develop without a great deal of government regulation,which has created problems such as tourists being harassed by“touts” at the major sites and in the large cities. Many locals havebeen unimpressed by tourists roaming about as they wish, especiallyafter Morocco gained a reputation as a destination for “hippies” inthe 1970s.

As with Egypt and Tunisia, Morocco’s reliance on the Europeanmarket also is an issue. Although Europe provides a large number oftourists, the propensity of Europeans to travel varies greatly from yearto year depending on the economic situation in Europe and theimpressions that potential travelers have of a region or state. Moroccohas suffered all the ups and downs of the tourism cycle, often proneto events outside its borders and beyond its control. The most recentexample was the Gulf War of 1990 through 1991, when tourism toMorocco fell dramatically because of a war that was happening almost3000 miles away. This is a good example of the down side to being“exotic”; although Morocco is home to cities such as Casablanca,Fez, and Marrakesh, and these cities and their names conjure upstrong romantic fantasies in Western imagination, “exotic” and“unknown” also can translate into “dangerous” or “frightening” if aculture and its relationship with other cultures are not understoodwell by potential tourists.

Morocco, nonetheless, has developed its tourism sector and has cre-ated a positive economic environment for tourism. In line with itsbroad tourism policy, it has a variety of tourism infrastructuresthroughout the country, and tourists are more inclined than in, say,Tunisia, to travel around the country and spend their money in dif-ferent places and on different things. Since the mid-1980s, Morocco



Morocco is hometo cities such asCasablanca, Fez,and Marrakesh,and these citiesand their names

conjure up strongromantic fan-

tasies in Westernimagination…

also has liberalized its economy and its tourism sector, allowinggreater private-sector and foreign involvement in tourism and relatedindustries. Tourism also is seen as an economic savior because ofMorocco’s high unemployment and population growth and itsinability to provide full education or other social services to its grow-ing population. Morocco’s labor force is expected to grow by 3.1%per annum in the period 1985 through 2000 (see Table A6 inKarshenas, 1994), and unemployment is currently at least 17%(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998, p. 17).

Algeria and Libya have been the last states in North Africa to attemptto develop tourism, and have done so reluctantly and only recently.The Algerian government’s revolutionary orientation meant thatafter the revolution, and up to the 1980s, it opposed tourism. Thenature of tourism services implied servitude towards foreigners,including Algeria’s former colonizers, which the government viewedas unacceptable both to national pride and to Algeria’s image abroad.Not that tourism would have proven simple to develop, even if themotivation to do so had existed. As Zoubir (Apostolopoulos et al., inpress) pointed out, “successive governments in Algeria saw tourismnot only as a threat to Algerian society’s cultural and nationalist iden-tity...but also lacked the means and the experience to developtourism.” Policies of SLD and ISI, with little focus on tourism, or theservices sector in general, relegated tourism to a minor sector, andthe tourism that did occur was largely internal tourism, encouragingworkers from urban areas to visit the countryside and vice versa.

Again, as with elsewhere in North Africa, what finally motivated thegovernment to pay greater attention to tourism was the need for foreigncurrency, employment creation, and the distribution of income anddemand across the state and beyond the major urban centers. In the1980s, this met with very limited success—the Algerian currency wasartificially high, the infrastructure was inadequate for the developmentof international tourism, and the promotion of Algeria abroad was sim-ply not as effective or professional as was that of Morocco, Tunisia, orEgypt (Apostolopoulos et al., in press). Furthermore, Algeria found itdifficult to move away from SLD. There were a number of major hotelsand resorts constructed in the late 1980s, but such sites were stateowned and constructed. While quality proved only a minor problem,these sites did not compare well, or gain as much attention as, the pri-vate-sector developments that were under way in Egypt or Tunisia.

Libya’s recent efforts at increasing tourism have suffered because ofits international image, as well as the structural and other problems it

Matthew Gray


has faced. The image of Libya was damaged badly, first by the U.S.attack in 1986 after allegations that the Libyan government spon-sored international terrorism, and then by the Lockerbie bombing in1989 and the U.N. sanctions against Libya that followed. The sanc-tions, which were eased in 1999 after the Libyan government hand-ed over two suspects in the Lockerbie bombing, had a particularlystrong affect on tourism as, among other things, they placed a ban onall international air travel to and from Libya.

ECONOMIC REFORM AND TOURISM IN NORTH AFRICA INTHE 1990S

The development of tourism and tourism policy in the 1990s has beencharacterized by reform of the sector, and of the laws that guide andinfluence tourism development. Economic liberalization has been a fea-ture of most states of the Middle East, and much of Africa as well, andNorth Africa has not escaped this trend. Liberalization has included ageneric reform across most parts of the economy in the states of NorthAfrica, although as with elsewhere, tourism has played a prominentposition in the process. The role of tourism in liberalization is partly theresult of the ease with which tourism reform can be implemented, butalso is indicative of the ways that tourism is used to soften the impactof liberalization. Egypt provides an interesting case study of the rela-tionship between economic liberalization and tourism.

It is important to stress that tourism always has been a strong sectorin Egypt. The comparative advantage that Egypt enjoys is obvious; itcontains the last of the Ancient Seven Wonders of the World stillstanding—the Pyramids at Giza—as well as innumerable other sitesfrom ancient Egypt along the Nile River and in the deserts and theSinai peninsula. Egypt’s beaches and climate are spectacular, and theRed Sea is one of best scuba-diving sites in the world. It has a vibrantcontemporary culture, whether in terms of its foods, its architecture,or its friendly, open people. When all of these attractions are com-bined with a skilled, inexpensive labor force with a long history ofcatering for tourism, it is of little surprise that the Egyptian govern-ment views tourism as an area of almost limitless potential.

Even during the 1950s and 1960s, under President Nasser, whenEgypt’s reputation was that of a radical Arab state, tourism was animportant sector of the economy. It is important to note that,although liberalization has been most rapid and obvious in the peri-od since infitah was promulgated, even in the 1950s the sector was



comparatively open and liberal, certainly when measured againstother parts of the economy. When the Nile Hilton hotel was openedin 1958, for example, the land and property was held by the govern-ment, but the private sector operated the hotel and provided all man-agement services. In this sense, liberalization is comparative. In the1980s, a number of important reforms occurred under the then-Minister for Tourism Fuad Sultan, including the liberalization of air-transport regulations, the contracting of hotel-management services,and an emphasis on attracting foreign investment to the tourism sec-tor (Al-Sayyid, 1990, pp. 28–30).

Egypt’s period of dilatory reform came to an end in the early 1990s,when the economic hardships stemming from the Gulf War(1990–1991) forced Egypt to reach agreement with theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) on a program of support andeconomic reform (Bromley & Bush, 1994; Lofgren, 1993). The keyaspects of the 1991 Standby Agreement with the IMF included pri-vatization of state-owned assets, currency and taxation reform, andthe enhancement of foreign and private-sector investment. Of these,privatization and the attraction of private sector investment were vis-ible particularly in the tourism sector.

Egypt’s privatization program, which is still under way, involves thepartial or complete sale of 28 hotels and 9 ships, with a total roomcapacity of 5,738 (Gray, 1998, p. 102). An important reason for theprominence of tourism in the privatization program is the fact thattourism assets are sold easily, generally are profitable, and thereforeare popular with potential investors. From the government’s per-spective, the fact that tourism assets easily are sold increases the like-lihood of successful sales and good prices, and therefore enhances theimage of the privatization program. Since it is largely the assets oftourism—hotel infrastructure, buildings, and land—that are beingdivested, and the private sector already is established as the managersof these assets, there are few political dangers in selling them. This isin strong contrast with, say, the sales of overstaffed, unprofitable fac-tories or manufacturing enterprises, where powerful opposition tothe sales has been mounted by labor, and there subsequently has beenless interest from potential investors.

Tourism also has been a major sector for private-sector investment.Between the periods of 1982 to 1983 and 1992 to 1993, the pub-lic-sector share in total tourism investment fell from 66% to zero,and since 1993, all tourism investment has come from the privatesector (al-Iqtisad wa al-A’amal, March 1995, p. 68). Again, tourism

Matthew Gray


is a popular sector with private enterprise for the reasons mentionedabove, and because entering the sector is relatively simple:Establishing and managing a tourism business does not require alarge amount of expertise or specialist skills when compared withmany other sectors.

Egypt also has introduced other reform policies with tourism inmind. Taxation laws have been simplified, with taxes in the tourismsector kept low compared with other Middle East states. Import reg-ulations have been simplified, making it easier for firms in the tourismsector to import the luxury and consumer goods necessary fortourism establishments.

Combined, the reforms that have taken place in the tourism sector inEgypt appear to have had a positive affect. Investment in tourism issubstantial, and much higher than in the past. The state has been ableto sell many of its tourism assets without great loss of employment orincome and without needing to invest large amounts of state moniesin the tourism sector. Tourism numbers are large and growing, as isthe national income earned from tourism. However, there are prob-lems, both current and potential, with the development of tourism inEgypt, and these issues are the same or similar in other North Africanstates as well.

The most serious issue is the extent to which tourism is being man-aged, or more appropriately, the extent to which it is not being man-aged. There is no overall strategic plan for tourism, no plan for howmany tourists can be accommodated, where they will come from, andwhat areas of the country they will focus on. The government hasspoken only in very broad terms of aiming for 10 million tourists ayear to Egypt without addressing any of the structural, strategic, eco-nomic, or environmental questions that such a figure—almost threetimes the current number—raises. The risk is, of course, that withouta plan for the sector, Egypt will overcater for tourism, overdevelop itsnatural environment, and train too many people for tourism careersthat may not materialize. This necessarily is not going to lead to eco-nomic development.

Another potential problem with the tourism sector in Egypt, andNorth Africa more generally, is the overreliance on visitors fromEurope. Geographic proximity has assisted North Africa to develop alarger tourism sector than other parts of the Middle East or Africa,but Europe does not provide a steady stream of visitors to the region.In times of economic hardship in Europe, or regional instability in



Taxation lawshave been sim-

plified, withtaxes in the

tourism sectorkept low com-

pared with otherMiddle-East

states.

Africa or the Middle East, tourists tend to stay at home. Tunisia,Morocco, and Egypt have all experienced this problem, especiallyduring periods of high oil prices and regional turmoil in the early1980s, during and after the Gulf War, and during times of domesticinstability such as in Egypt in 1993 through 1994 and late 1997,when Islamic groups targeted tourists in their conflict with the gov-ernment (Poirier, 1995, pp. 160–161; Gray, 1998, pp. 95, 98, 109;Lewis, 1998, pp. 65–66).

THE POLITICS OF TOURISM IN NORTH AFRICA

The expanding role of tourism in the political economies and devel-opment strategies of the states of North Africa, most prominent inthe 1990s, is largely a trend set by the state, but also is embraced bykey sections of society, particularly the private sector.

To some extent, an expansion in the size and wealth—and thereforethe political influence—of the private sector has forced the state toreappraise its economic policies. In Egypt, for example, there wasalways a strong, if relatively small, private sector, even during thepeak of Nasserism and the SLD and ISI policies of the period. Thisindigenous private sector quickly re-established itself and expandedand diversified its business interests after infitah began in the mid1970s. Its rapid growth, in turn, increased its political influence,which, in turn, enabled it to push for further economic liberaliza-tion. Ultimately, however, it was the political elites and their stateactors, especially the bureaucracy, that decided on the pace andextent of liberalization; the state, acting with a larger constituencyand significant opposition to infitah, chose a more gradualapproach to economic change.

The state’s gradual and often-hesitant implementation of policies ofeconomic reform have less to do with broader concerns among thepopulation about such policies than simply the structure of the stateapparatus itself. State-led development created state structuresthroughout North Africa that were heavily bureaucratic, militarized,and often centered on a single, strong political party. Many elementsof these state structures thought little of tourism, and were opposedideologically to the economic changes that were needed for tourismto expand and flourish. The increasing prominence of tourism in the1990s, and the economic changes that have allowed this to occur, hastaken place only as the traditional power bases of the past havechanged. This has happened, typically, in one of three ways. First, the

Matthew Gray


bureaucracy, military, and party elites may have been co-opted orlinked into the private sector. Second, these groups may have hadtheir dominance over the political, and therefore economic, decision-making process eroded by an expansion of new classes or the emer-gence of new elites. And third, an economic crisis may have forced adramatic economic response, including greater penetration by theinternational economy, leading to changes to the structure of thepolitical economy. As a generalization, all three of these changes haveoccurred to some extent in each state in North Africa, although theorder and prominence of each has varied. In much of the region, aneconomic crisis has led to a state response that has included, oftenhesitantly and to varying degrees, economic reforms. The ways inwhich various groups within the political economy have reacted tothis, and the extent to which their political positions have changed asa result, have determined the extent to which tourism has emerged asa major sector in the political economies of the region.

Another aspect of the expansion of tourism across North Africa hasbeen the political, or rather the apolitical, nature of tourism itself.Although tourism can pose longer-term threats to traditional socialstructures in the host state, one of the reasons that it has been cho-sen as a path to economic growth and development is because it isnot threatening to the political elites that implement or support it.Members of the political elite rarely have any vested interests intourism, or any vested interests against it, in contrast to other sec-tors, such as agriculture or industry. Also, tourists themselves poselittle threat to a regime; although they may have some influence onthe host society, they have very little impact, if any, on politicalpower structures. Tourists often are kept separated from much ofthe host society to minimize the impact that they do have, and mostof their contact with locals is on an orchestrated, commercial basis(a visit to a “traditional” marketplace, for example), rather thanbeing political in nature. In fact, tourism often supports areas of theeconomy where existing elites have interests. A booming tourismsector usually increases demand for construction, foods and bever-ages, imports, and transportation—areas traditionally dominated,or at least controlled, by the state elites that emerged during theSLD and ISI period.

The broader political forces in society, while initially not having vest-ed interests in or against tourism, often will benefit from it. The factthat tourism creates employment, and that tourists’ spending usuallyis spread throughout the country, makes its financial impact widelyvisible. The employment generated by tourism is not only in special-



A boomingtourism sector

usually increasesdemand for con-

struction, foodsand beverages,

imports, andtransportation…

ized fields, but in unskilled areas as well. The attacks by Islamicextremists against tourists in some states, most notably Egypt, is notso much opposition to tourism or tourists, but rather opposition tothe government aimed where the most damage can be done—totourism, and therefore to the economy and to the reputation of thegovernment. Nevertheless, such attacks do have a negative impact onthe reputation of the region, and, if only for a short while, do have avisible negative impact on the number of tourist arrivals.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to summarize the tourism policies, experiences, andpotential of the five states of North Africa as a group, given the vasteconomic, political, and social differences between them, and varyingways in which they each have approached tourism planning and pol-icy making.

In general terms, Tunisia and, to some extent, Egypt often are cate-gorized as regional “success stories.” To be sure, these two stateshave large tourism sectors, have created comparatively liberal eco-nomic and business environments in which tourism can operate, andhave come closest to establishing the infrastructure required for alarge tourism sector. In part, this may relate to the fact that Egypt andTunisia both have implemented quite extensive economic liberaliza-tion programs, with tourism featuring prominently within these pro-grams. The strengths of each state—the historical and naturalattractions of Egypt, and the “sun, surf, and sand” image ofTunisia—also may account for the strengths of their tourism sectorsand their ability to attract reasonably large numbers of visitors.

The other states of North Africa have not been considered as suc-cessful, although Morocco certainly has a large tourism sector andthe potential for further expansion. Morocco’s tourism numbers haveremained fairly static during the 1990s, and the country has anextremely low rate (only 6%) of returning tourists (Lewis, 1998, p.66). Both these trends—potential visitors are more inclined to goelsewhere in North Africa or the Mediterranean, and few visitors arereturning—indicate that Morocco faces some problems in furtherdeveloping tourism. Indeed, Morocco does have problems withtourist touts and with small-scale fraud against tourists, and despiteefforts at greater policing of the major sites, this problem remains acriticism from visitors. However, one of Morocco’s strengths is thediversity of tourists that it attracts. This is less a strength of Tunisia,

Matthew Gray


which concentrates on mid-priced-resort tourists, and even less so inAlgeria and Libya, which receive large numbers of comparatively low-spending Arab visitors and only a very small number of adventurousWestern tourists.

The lack of direction and strategic planning in North Africa is one ofthe problems with further developing the sector. Although the attrac-tions of all the North African states are extensive and impressive,greater articulation of where they want to go would assist in findingthe tourists they are looking for, and in attracting the investment andattention that the sector needs to thrive. Not all the problems withdeveloping tourism in the region are the fault of the governments ofthe region; the region still is viewed, often unfairly, as dangerous,unstable, or economically stagnate. Overcoming these imagesremains important. The potential for all the states of the region isenormous and far greater than presently is being realized.

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sector.

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Matthew Gray


the political economy of tourism in north africa: comparative perspectives

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