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    The Philhellenes, Canning and Greek IndependenceAuthor(s): Allan CunninghamReviewed work(s):Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (May, 1978), pp. 151-181Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282697 .

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    The Philhelienes,Canningand GreekIndependenceAllanCunningham

    IIntheeighteenthcentury,a young gentleman mbarkingon the GrandTourofEurope as the culminating experience of his formal education normallyexpectedhis tutor to devisean itinerarywhich would takethemboththroughplaces of cultural and historical importance in France, the Rhineland,Switzerland, Northern Italy and, less often, Iberia. In the process ofdiscovering that his command of living languages rarely equalled hisgrounding n the classics,a gentleman's our also helpedto fix, for betterorworse, opinions about foreign people and places which might well lastunchanged for the rest of his life, a point of some importancewhen oneremembershow often GrandTouristsbecameBritish egislators.Towardstheend of the century,when the Revolutionaryand Napoleonicwars closed offlargesectorsof the Europeancontinent for yearsat a stretch, hose takingtheGrandTourwere necessarilydeflected rom familiar o less frequented egions,andmoreparticularlyo the landsfringing he Mediterraneanwhich remainedaccessible hroughcourtesyof Britishnavalsupremacy.The remoter andsofthe Levant Turkey,Egypt,the Holy Land,andbeyond- continued o attracta trickleof the hardiesttravellers,as they always had done. It was in theBalkans,however, and most notably in Greece,that the number of visitorsescalatedmost sharplyafter 1809,a year of restoredAnglo-Turkish elations,if we may judge by such criteriaas the numberof books issued on classicaltravel,and the referencessuch works contain to those other travellers heirauthorsencountered n the course of their journeys. One may doubt if thesituationeverproduced he swarmof philhellene ocustswhich Chateaubriandrecollectsin one of the very best books of this genre, a book in which heassertedthat there was no road in the Pelopponesus,however remote, onwhich one could forlong escapethe dusty Englishman,armedwith a bagfulofclassicaltexts. On the other hand, the travellerscame in sufficientnumbers,and wrote enough books, to clear away much earlierignoranceof Balkantopography and society. A review of John Cam Hobhouse's Travels inAlbania, for instance, employed a typical reviewing gambit by drawingattention o the accurate nformationMr. Hobhousehad collectedregardingacountry which the illustrious Mr. Gibbon, only a few years before, hadbelieved as littleknown to the civilisedworld as the wilds of North America'.What might fairly be describedas the rediscoveryof Greece is, therefore,commonlybelieved o have come at a particularlyavourablemomentin timeas the Greekwar for independencecame a mere half-dozenyears after theestablishmentof the universalpeaceof 1815.1ThusSpencer hinks the Balkanversion of the GrandTour inspired'the notion that there existed an earnestmoralobligationfor Europeto restore ibertyto Greeceas a kindof paymentfor the civilisationwhich Hellas had once given the world'.2The periodical iteratureof the periodcertainlytestifies to the growth ofknowledgeabout and interest n Greece,3 ndin the Quarterly,heEdinburgh,Blackwood sMagazine,the EclecticReview,and one or two otherjournalsof

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    152 MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIESlesser fame and circulation,such as the LiteraryPanorama,reviewersgaveincreasingattentionto works on Balkan and oriental travel. In the Eclecticalone, long reviews of 46 books of Eastern ravelappearedbetween 1805and1825, with the reviews of particularlycelebratedbooks, like Chandler'sTravels nAsia Minorand Travels n Greece,runningthroughas many as fiveconsecutive issues. By the end of the Napoleonicera, a reviewerof Leake'sResidencein Greececould declare:

    The exclusion of Englishmenfrom those parts of the continentwhichwere formerly he chiefobjectsof enquiryto the curioushas of lateyearsinducedmanyof our travellers o direct heirattention o a countryhighlyinteresting or the wrecks it contains of ancientgrandeurs,and fromthecontrastbetween itsformerstate of gloryand itspresentdegradationmyitalics].

    Napoleon,then, however indirectly, s to be seen as one of the foundersof themodernGreekstate,thoughthiswas no more his intention hatit was Hitler's,by his bestialityto Jews, to promote the cause of Israel. Besidesdeflectingtravellers to the Balkans, Napoleon was himself very interested in theprospectsof orientalempire,as he showedby his occupationsof EgyptandtheIonian Islands, by his correspondencewith Ali Pasha of Janina and hisresourcefuldiplomacy in Istanbul and beyond. He stirredthe simmering,international ltercationknown as the EasternQuestion,which was formerlyand predominantly a Russian preoccupation, abetted by Austria and,intermittently, esistedby France. In the years immediatelyafter 1815 therewas some hope in Englandthat the EasternQuestionmightgo away, and theforeignminister,Castlereagh, xperimentedwith a 'complyingpolicy' whichwas deferentialto the prior interest of Russia in the fate of the OttomanEmpire.Progressively, his Walpoleanstyle hadto be givenup,and the debateabout the eventual fate of the Sultan's territoriesbegan to tinge the politicalspeculationsof Balkantravellers: 'the presentcircumstancesof the Ottomandominions in general, but particularlyof European Turkey', an Eclecticreviewerobserved in 1806, 'have long excited in an uncommon degree,theattention and expectation of the public'. This was something of anexaggeration,and remainedso, long after the impact on the public of theportentousconspiracyof Napoleon and the Tsar of Russia at Tilsit in 1807.The travellers,and theirreaders,were not yet readyto respond o the appealsof a David Urquhart, who would invite his countrymen within anothergeneration o recognise n the mountaineersof remoteCaucasia, thedefendersof your Indian Empire ... the doorkeepersof Asia ... the champions ofEurope'. But that day would come, and would be acceleratedby Russia'sintervention n the Greekquestionof the 'twenties,most of all by the frightshewas to give Britain n 1829 by her militarycampaignsagainstthe Sultanandthe peaceshe would force him to accept.The statistics of opinion are notoriously hard to collect and harder tointerpret,and Grecophilism meaninghere a sympathy forthe Greeknationalmovement) was no necessaryconsequence of the culturalphilhellenismofBritishtravellers, a circumstancewhich still seems to surpriseand irritatemodern Grecophils. In the first quarterof the nineteenth century, Britishphilhellenes were disposed mainly to enjoy themselves, to indulge their

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    PHILHELLENES, CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE 153classicalenthusiasmswithoutintertwining ntothe booksthey wroteany longdigressionson the encroachmentsof Russia or the interests of Britain n theEast. They were largelycontent to ignore Russian designs, and as for theGreek national movement, few travellers indeed were astute enough torecognise he occasionalglimpsesafforded hem of what was largely,until theoutbreakof 1821, a subterranean urrent. ndeed,one sometimesbeginsto feelthat the literatureof Balkan ravelwas the vehicleof the new snobberyratherthan of any new politicalenlightenment.Threeyears after the Greek revolthad begun, a reviewersighs grandly:

    How times are altered incethe tourof Europe, he grand our,was theneplus ultra of gentlemen ravellers!No one can now pretend o have seenthe world who has not made one of a partyof pleasureup the Nile ortakena ride on camel back across the Syrian desert.As for France,andFlanders,and Switzerland .. to have seen these countries is no longerworth speakingof.

    This too was exaggeration.Camel ridesover the Syriandesertwere still rareand dangerous.Beyondthe Bosphorus,or the Levantcoasts, the visitor waspenetratinga heathen,barbaricrealm,linguisticallyand raciallyalien.By comparison,Greece was familiar errain,even hallowedterrain,at leastfor many classicallyeducatedmen, whose proto-Baedekerswere the classicsthemselves,from which they could often quoteat lengthand verbatim.In thecontractedcircle of Greektravel,the snobberybecame ever more intense.No man is now accounteda travellerwho has not bathed n the Eurotasand tasted the olives of Attica; while, on the other hand, it is anintroduction o the bestcompany,and a passport o literarydistinction, obe a memberof the AthenianClub, and to have scratchedone's nameupon a fragmentof the Parthenon.4

    If one had a name too long to scratch,like Elgin, one could of coursetry totake partsof the Parthenonhome, a practice ndulgedby many, and opposedby few. On the Acropolis,John Cam Hobhouse was taken abackby a freshinscriptionnear the spacein the Erechtheion rom which Elgin removed oneof theCaryatidwomen who support heentablature n theirheads.'QuodnonfeceruntGotihoc feceruntScoti',the inscription an: 'What the Goths failedtodo here, the Scots managed.' At Sunion, the scratchings of Hobhouse'stravellingcompanion,Byron,are still to be seen.5Philhellenismwas a craze, a game, a sentimental ourney, a profoundlymoving act of homage, a state of mind, a fad, an affectation.It was for theeducated and the affluent. With the appropriate lassicaltexts, and possiblycompass,measuringstaffsandnote-booksas well,6one travelled n Greeceandthe islands, identifying, verifying,and measuringsites and ruins, in generalmarvellingat the accuracyof the classicalrecord,or findinggratifyingpointsof detail where it went wrong. Without becoming more enmeshed in theenthusiasms and prejudices of these people and their activities than isnecessary or presentpurposes, he journeyingsof Dr. Walsh, chaplain o theBritishembassyin Istanbul,may be touchedupon as typical.7

    Beingwell-read,Walsh knew before he descended nto the caverns on theislandof Paros that they had been describedby Pliny, Pausaniasand Strabo.

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    154 MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIESBeinga romantic,his prose was quite overwhelmedat times by his exaltedstate of mind, so that, insteadof merelyrecording hat he strolledbackto hislodgingnear the supposedsite of Troyat sunset,he writes, 'I set out to return... about the time thatPriam eftthe cityto proceed o the Greciancampto begthe body of Hector.'8Being gullible, and landing in Corfu 'to gratify myclassical recollections ... I enquired for the gardens of Alcinous': he wasescortedto them promptly.Beinglate in the explorationgame, he knew thebitternessof not being first; findingan altar in the bowels of the earth,hisdiscovery urned out to be covered in initials,some going backto 1672.9Beinggregarious,he spoke to all the tourists he encountered,amongstwhom wasLord CharlesMurray,son of the Duke of Atholl, travellingwith a tutorwhoturned out to be the son of ArthurYoung, the economist.10The reverend Doctor Walsh had one unusual experiencegiven to fewtravellers.His guide to the antiquitiesof Athens:

    made an oration over his fallen countrymen ... he surprisedme bysentimentswhich I thoughtit impossiblehe could entertain.He said thatthe time was near at handwhen his countrymenwould no longercrowdunder the dominion of the Turks,no morethan his ancestorsunder thatof the Persians,and their object was to establish a free constitution,similarto that of the IonianIslands,and if possible,under the protectionof England.... At this time the most distantrumourof suchan event hadnot transpired;I supposed what he said was the chimeraof a heatedimagination,excitedby the placein which we stood, and I littlethoughtthat a few weeks would realise it."

    In fact,Walshwas to be in the Turkishcapitalwhen the news of the Moreanrevolt became known there, and he has left us one of the most graphicaccounts of the Turkishreceptionof that information.'2The hint given himwhile he was still in Athens of the shape of things to come was a raremoment. "A modern writer has claimed, in a rather ill-temperedbeginning to aninteresting book on the philhellenes, that travellers before Byron wereenchantedwith classicalruins,buthardlynoticedthe livingGreeksat all. Thetravellerswere, he claims,'obliviousof anything hat hadhappened here sincethe 4th centuryB.C.',and only beganto mend theirways when the greatestromanticpoet of the age- even the greatestEnglishmanof the century- set abetterexample. Byron, we are told, loved the Mediterranean eople despitetheir faults and foibles,and refusedto be upset becauseGreekpeasantsandvillage school mastersno longer construedGreek as Englishuniversitymenthoughtthey should.14This is not quitethe messageof the travelliteratureofthe period.Numerouswriters,before Byronas well as afterhim, were quitefascinatedby the living Greeks, and went to ratherabsurdlengths to findresemblances,of characteras well as physiognomy,between them and theirancientancestors.Byronhimself,as a youngman,was a quitetypical raveller,filchingskullsfromsarcophagi,carvinghis initialson columns, and sayingofGreekmen, 'all are beautiful,very much resembling he bustsof Alcibiades'.As for the livingGreeks,Byronwas againtypicalof some of his generationofEnglishmen, n thathe hadquitestrongreservations bout theircharacter,andseemsat times to havepreferredTurks.He told his motherquitecategorically,

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    PHILHELLENES, CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE 155that 'theprincipalGreeks .. thoughinferior o the Turks .. are better hantheSpaniards,who, in theirturn, excel the Portuguese'.'5Others were yet moreforcible.Morritt, or instance,says, 'I assureyou the Turksare so much morean honourablerace thatI believeif ever this countrywas in the hands of theGreeks and Russians, it would be hardly livable."6Naturally, this was aminorityview in an age in which the Turkshelda positionresembling hatofthe Devil in Christianmorality.If they had not existed, it would have beennecessaryto invent them. But the opinionsthat the Greekswere honourable,admirable, ensitiveto their greatpast, and deservingof independence,wereheld by a small minority also, and to ascribeadverseopinions of the livingGreekswholly to condescensionand superficiality gnoresthe eagernesswithwhich many philhellenes ookedfor, and were disappointednot to find,nobleand ancestralqualitiesof mind surviving after 25 centuries in a rural andgenerallyimpoverishedpopulation. Such expectationswere naive, no doubt,but it was surelya tribute o the Greeks hat men who would not havethoughtof the possibilityof finding in the Spaniardsor the Dutch the elements ofcharacterwhich once made them resourceful mperialists hould have beenready to acceptthe possibilityof survivingGreekinstinctsfor freedom anddemocracy.And however unfavourable o the living Greeksmany travellersmay have felt, the largeoutpouringof books at leastfamiliarisedmanyreaderswith the debateabout the differencesbetween the ancientGreeks and theirdescendants. This was far more preferableto oblivion, as the Serbs, whofoughtearlierand longerfor theirindependence,argelyunheededby Europe,could have told the Greeks.To conclude, numerousauthors saw - were determined o see - 'all thatsymmetryof features and brilliancyof complexionwhich inspiredthe poetsandheroesof old, stillflourishing n a delightfuldegree'.'7There s no questionbutthat this searchforvisible similarities ometimesranto absurdity,as whenWalsh, becalmed at Mykonos, told some of the local people that Pliny hadwritten that the natives of the island were all bald. A Greek 'repelled thechargewith great ndignation;and when he mentioned t to the crowd,they alltook off their caps, and exhibiteda bush of hair floatingin the breeze'.'8Butthis nostalgicsearching surelycarrieda profoundimplicationfor the future.Evengrudgingmindsacknowledged he distantpossibility,and in enthusiasticminds there was the conviction,that the seemingdegradationof the Greekswas accidentaland temporary,whereas their true nature, their capacity forgreatness,was permanent. n short, philhellenesoftenwanted o believethatahereditarynobilityof mind andfeaturepersisted tubbornlyamong the Greeksin theirpolluted,Ottomanenvironment. n a country ikeEngland, herewas astrongfeelingthat the conditionof political ndependencetself would rekindlethe ancientvirtues.Thismay have been a romanticopinion,but it was heldbyBenthamitesoo, who thoughtof themselvesaspragmatic olk. The removalofthe Turks,followed by the emancipationof the Greeksfromtheirdistressingcondition of ignorance, would produce a renaissance of democracy andprosperity n the immortal and. It was strongly implied that the world justneeded ight,as if ignoranceonly, and notvestedinterestsalso,resistedchange.

    IIThe conversion of the cultural enthusiasm of well-to-do philhellenesinto

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    156 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESactive support or the causeof Greekpolitical ndependencebecamea practicalissue with the outbreakof the Moreanrevolution n the springof 1821.It hasbeensuggested hatthe latterarose 'naturally'out of the former, out of ... theparticularavour in which Greece tself was heldby many persons','9but thisis not what actuallyhappened,and it would have beensurprisingndeed if thegeneralityof GrandTourists,considering heir socialorigins, urnedout also tobe supporters f bloodyrevolution,even againstTurks.In fact,Britishsupportfor the Greekswas hard o mobilise,slow to appear,anddifficult o sustain.Bythe end of 1822, only twelve of the 489 Europeanvolunteerswho have beenidentifiedas fighting n Greecewere British.20 onsequently,here is no Britishname among the Poles, Italians, French, Germans, and Swiss who wereliquidated n the great disaster at Peta on 16 July 1822, though there is aDutchman,a Hungarianand a Mameluke.21n the same period,the vesselscarrying Europeanvolunteersto Greece sailed mostly from Marseilles,andwere financedby Germanand Swiss Greekcommittees.An analysisof pro-Greekpamphletsappearing n French,German and English- admittedlyapointerrather han a proof- shows 31 in French,37 in German,andonly 12in English duringthe firsttwo years of the revolt.22As to Greek committeesthemselves,the firstappeared n, of all places, reactionaryMadrid,and otherssprang up in Paris,Marseilles,Genoa, Munich, Stuttgart,Zurich,Berne andDarmstadtbefore a London GreekCommitteeappearedn the springof 1823.Even then, the London Committee was brought into existence by twodeterminedmen,JohnBowringand EdwardBlaquiere, ather hanby a waveof publicdemand.23The LondonCommitteewas active for just over a year.Attendanceatmeetingswas fallingby the summerof 1824, and theCommitteewitheredaway graduallyafterthat having,in the opinionof many, 'wreckeditselfthrough folly rather hanthrough knavery'.24 here was actuallya goodbit of knavery oo, and no individualcould ever havebeenproudto have beena memberof the London GreekCommittee.The most imaginative hing theCommitteedid was to appointByronas one of its commissioners n Greece,where he was intended o disburse he money raisedfor the Greeks n Britain.In practice,he disbursedno money to the Greeksbut his own. None fromLondon reachedhim.The LondonGreek Committeehad 85 members, ncluding37 members ofparliament,of whom only one was Tory. Only a very few Committeemembers - Byron, LeicesterStanhope, Gaily Knight, Hobhouse, ThomasGordon - knew Greecepersonally and, strange thought it may seem, it isprobable hatmost memberswere not particularlyGrecophil.Virtuallyall, onthe other hand, had recordsor intentionsas reformersof one kindor another,and many had done battle for parliamentaryreform, economical reform,administrativereform,slavery abolition,overhaul of the criminalcode, andothersuchcauses.Thismayhelpto explain he Committee's imitedsuccess onbehalfof Greece.It was allvery well for Blaquiereo say, 'Iventured o assurethe Greeksthat they might safely calculateon the success of an Associationformedwithoutany regard o party distinction.'25heparliamentarymembersof the London Committeewere Whigs, radicals,Benthamites,and thereforeseen by the majoritypartyas men who would forever find causes, if for noother reason than to harass the government with them. They includedBrougham,who defendedQueen Caroline against George IV's intention to

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    PHILHELLENES,CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE 157divorceher; Sir FrancisBurdett,who had fought many a tumultuousdebateand been in the Tower for contemptof parliament; RadicalJack' Lambtonwho, as LordDurham,would advance Canadatoward independence;JohnRussell, a futurepremierwho would push the first measureof parliamentaryreform in 1832;JosephHume,the watchdogof governmentexpenditure;SirJames MacKintosh, the law reformer; Lord Erskine, a former Lord-Chancellor; Byron's friend, Hobhouse, who hated the current foreignsecretary,GeorgeCanningand wrote anonymouspamphletsattackinghim;Hely-Hutchinson, n Irish memberopposedto the Act of Union of 1800.Thefigure-headof the Committeewas the celebratedJeremyBentham who wasremarkably ruditeyet without the leastawarenessof what humanity s reallylike. He and his associatesseemed to the Toryrankand filein parliament,andtheir followers outside, to be too clever and doctrinaire to be trusted,particularlywith money. Additionalsuspiciongrew out of the circumstancethatmanyon the Committeewere Scots or Irish.Byronhimselfwas ironicallyamusedby the Committee's enthusymusy',and irritatedby its inclination osee Greece as potentiallya laboratoryfor social and politicalexperimentsinstead of a distracted and experiencing terribledistress.Nevertheless, heentered the Committee'sservice, and was flatteredand pleased when firstinvited to do so.Before turning to him, we may notice the extent of the Committee'sachievement.It could not easily invite generalsupportfor a revolution. Thechairman, n his openingaddress,guardedly aid Greece had become 'highlyinteresting o the friends of humanity, civilisation and religion'.The publicwould be askedto subscribe undsfor a land'associatedwith manysacredandsublime recollections.26 There was nothing unusual in the Committee'smoney-raising tyle.Throughcircular etters,pamphlets2"ndpublicmeetingsit sought to inform and to enlist a broad response to its appeal for funds.Disappointedn its solicitationof gifts, it turnedto loans. Prominent n all itsactivitieswere Bowring, he Committee ecretary,who hada mostundeservedreputation for understanding money, and that 'radical internationalbusybody',28Edward Blaquiere,who wrote a wildly optimisticbook, TheGreekRevolution,packedwith falsehood,which purportedo show thatit waselementarycommonsense forBritain o support he creationof a strongGreekstate in the Levantat the expense of that 'crazy and unnaturaledifice', theOttomanEmpire.29 he frontispiece-mapo Blaquiere's olumeshows a Greekstatestretchingnorthto the Drina,and east to the Vardar, hough excludingSalonika.In the text, Blaquiere truckout freelyagainstthe calumniatorsofGreece,namely,the 'Europeanmerchants' n the East- meaningchieflythemerchantsof the English LevantCompany- and 'thewhole tribe of Jews', tosay nothingof SirWilliamGell and his 'miserable erbiage'.He alsoreservedaratherwheedling style for his middle-classreaders, and besides mentioning'industry,sobriety and abstemiousness'as the dominant characteristicsofGreekmanhood,he told English womanhoodthat 'those of Greecearemorelikethemselves n all that constitutes emaleexcellence, hanany otherwomenI could name'.30Blaquierewas also very agitatedby the attention revolutions in SouthAmericaseemedto be receiving n governmentcircles o the neglectof Greece.Thismay account for such observationsas, 'Greecewill be foundto possessa

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    158 MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIESfargreaterportionof reallylearnedandwell educatedmen thanthe whole ofthe South Americanrepublicsput together',and, 'I should have no hesitationwhatever in estimating he physicalstrengthof regeneratedGreece o be fullyequal to that of the whole South Americancontinent'.31 As for the safety ofany Britishmoney put into Greece, 'a land flowing with milk and honey',Blaquiere aidthe first oanto be floated n London,for ?800,000, was 'a sumwhich the smallest slandin the Archipelagowould be justified n borrowing,and fully able to repay'.32 t is difficult o establishBlaquiere's uccess as apublic ectureras he stumped he industrial ities likeBirmingham,Manchesterand Liverpooland the county towns like Bath, Salisburyand Winchester.Probablyit was unwise of him to say the favourite authors of thoughtfulGreekswere Vattel,MontesquieuandBentham,with a preferenceor the last's'sublime and benevolent labours' in the fields of jurisprudenceand moralphilosophy.33 or,contrary o what is oftensaid aboutthe Greeksenjoyingasympatheticpress in Britain in these years, an actual examinationof thenewspapersshows an erraticgraphof popularity,with an ominous boredomsettingin by 1824, a year in which the Greeksfell into civil war. But for theTurkishmassacreat Chios, in 1822, of almost 100,000innocents, heremighthave been no London Greek Committeeat all. Up to that event, therewas agrowingtendencyfor Britishobservers o thinkthe Greeks ittle,if any, betterthan the Turks n theirmethodsof wagingwar. Volunteersgoing outto Greecemetothervolunteersreturning, ickenedanddisillusionedby theirexperiences.By the end of 1824, the Greek Committee had raised something over?11,000 in outrightgifts, a small proportionof the total of ?90,000 raisedthroughoutthe Christianworld. As Hobhouseexplainedto Byron, 'We havedispatchedmorethan 2000 letters,which bring in a few driblets,but there isno importantresult,no congregatedmass of efficientsympathy.'The troublewas that, although the Committee'sappealswere politicallynon-partisan, heresponse was not. The establishedChurch,most members of the rulingToryparty,andthe English universitieskepttheirdistance. ronically,afterenlistingByron as a servantof the Committee, he poet's nameoften had to be kept inthe backgroundduringdirectappealsto those 'respectable lasses'which hadbeen riddledwith the grapeshot of his sarcasmand offendedby his ratherpublicprivate ife.Apartfrom 'Athenian'Aberdeen anothername-carver ndcollectorof antiques)and a few others, the fashionablecircles n which Byrontraditionallymoved provideddisappointing ums, and probably less in totalthan the ?1,000 given by the City of London or the subscription of theLiverpool merchant community. Individualsabroad, such as the King ofBavaria,and the Swiss banker,Eynard,raisedmore in gifts than the GreekCommitteemanaged o collectin the world'srichestcity. So didthe SocietyofFriends,which beganoperationsearlier hanthe Committee,raisedmore,andspent what it raised more honestly and wisely. Simultaneouslywith itssolicitationof gifts,the GreekCommittee riedto raise a loan on the LondonExchangewhere,predictably,t metwith a betterresponse.The first oan, for?800,000, was soon all takenup, partlybecause?100 worth of sharescouldbepurchased or ?59, partlybecausethe interestofferedwas a solid fivepercent.This was a higher returnthan any Britishgovernmentbonds offered at thatdate.As thingsturnedout, the shareholdersgot no returnon theirmoney forfifty years, in spite of Blaquiere'sgolden promises.

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    PHILHELLENES,CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE 159The Greeksdid poorly also. There were formidabledeductions from the?800,000; ?64,000 commissionto Messrs.Ricardo,the bankers;two yearsinterestwere held back; a sinkingfund was startedwith some of the money;after other deductions, the amount actually sent to Zante amounted to?298,700. When we addthe paymentof otheroutstandingGreekbills,andthevalue of arms and ammunition sent out, the Greek Committee disbursed?454,700 to and for the Greeks.Two years later, in the springof 1825, asecond Greek loan, for the much greatersum of two million pounds, wasfloated at 55+, and this time the value of specie, armamentsand stores sentdirectlyto Greece reacheda mere ?291,000. The Committee,fading out ofexistence ast,saidithadnothingto do with the sponsoringof this secondloan,and the newspaperscarriedacrimoniouscorrespondence or severalmonths,in which contractors,Greekdeputies,bankersand committeememberswereattackedby name. An Americanshipbuildergot ?155,000 but providednoship in return; ?20,000 were spenton cannon which neverleft England.TheredoubtableadmiralCochrane, nvitedto put himself at the head of the Greeknavy, wanted a lump sum of ?57,000, a retainingfee of ?4,000 a year, aguaranteedpensionof ?2,000 a year,and hisBraziliandebtspaid.'Thepersonsprincipallyresponsible or this waste of money', wrote Finlayin his History,'were Mr. Hobhouse,now LordBroughton;Mr. EdwardEllice; Sir FrancisBurdett,Mr. Hume; Sir John Bowring ... and Messrs. Ricardo.'34He couldhave thrown in the residentGreekrepresentativesn London, OrlandoandLuriotis,who embezzled?40,000, though admitting o only a third of that.When it became known in London in 1826 that a third Greekloan was incontemplation,but to be raised in Switzerland, he MorningPost remarkedthat:

    the reputationof the Greek Committeecannot have reachedGeneva. Sogross has been the mismanagementof the two former oans that not oneshillingmorecould be raised n Englandas long as any of its membersareknown to have a part.35

    Americanand Swiss philhelleneswho visited Britain n 1826 were amazedatthechillinessof popular eelingwith regard o Greece,and the positivehostilityof many formerand activeBritishphilhellenes.When one turnsto diplomacy,therefore, t is to discover that the British oreignsecretary,George Canning,was under negligiblepressureto assist the Greeks at the time he recognisedtheir struggle officially n 1823, and not much swayed by popular feeling in1827,one way or theother,when he initiatedactive intervention n the Turco-Greekstruggle.The romance had gone stale by then.36But Canninghad bythen found other, largerreasons for action, as we shall see.

    IIIThe most famous of all Grand Tourists, and the most illustrious andcontroversialmember of the LondonGreekCommitteewas, of course, LordByron, who first visited the Balkans and the Levant soon after the Anglo-Turkishpeace treatyof 1809.37OtherBritish ravellersn the area at that sametime included J. H. Fazakerly,FrederickNorth, Gally Knight, John Galt,CaptainLeake,F. S. N. Douglas,RichardChurchandC. R. Cockerell,mostofwhom were to support he Greek revolution n some way or anothera dozen

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    160 MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIESyearslater. It is usual, however, to set Byron'sachievement ar above that ofany otherBritishphilhellene,and typical opinionsinform us that he 'lifted he[Greek] ause from the muddiedbyways of party politics,and rendered t atonce an enterprise,a novelty,an excitementand a veryemotionalromance' 38that Byron was, and remains,for the Greeks a poet,a hero,and a god',39hat'the little nations' of Europe, crushed under Metternich'sheel, 'turned toByron',with Greece n particular endinghim 'hersignalof despair'.40HaroldNicolson believed 'LordByronaccomplishednothing at Missolonghi excepthis own suicide;but by thatsingle act of heroismhe securedthe liberationofGreece'.41Rhetoricalas they may seem when assembledhere, these largeclaims, restored o theirpropercontexts,readas the considered udgmentsofauthorswho have writtenat length about the poet. They are also, one maysuppose,common beliefsamong Byron'sadmirers,butthey will bear some re-examinationfor all that.The first opinion, for example, speaks of Byron lifting the revolutionarycause from the byways of partypolitics;now if this meansBritishpolitics henthe real difficultywas to insinuateGreek affairs nto parliamentary iscussionat all, a taskwhich Byron,as an outsider o Britishpoliticalcircles,was boundto leave to others, and with which those others - the Greek Committeemembers hadslightsuccess.If Greekpolitics s meant, Byronfailedheretoo,and he became extremelybitter in his condemnation of the revolutionaryleaderswho were unableto take his adviceandclose ranks, and who seemedto want Britishmoney as a means of purchasingpoliticalvisibilityin Greeceratherthan as a means of financingcampaignsagainstTurks.'Whoevergoesto Greeceat present', Byrondeclaredsoon after landing there again in 1823,

    should do it as Mrs. Fry went into Newgate - not in the expectationofmeeting any especial ndicationof existing probity,but in the hope thattime and better treatment will reclaim the present burglariousandlarcenous tendencieswhich now followed this General Gaol Delivery[i.e., the revolution] ... The worst of it is that ... they are such damnedliars.42

    Sentimentsof this kind, coupledto Byron's tendencyto admonishthe Greekleadersfirmlyyet without heat, therefore ead one to suspect that the secondopinion offeredabove which sees him as heroand god, is verymuch a matterof dates. It is true that his death was a majorevent. In that moving letter toHobhouse,announcing Byron'sdeath the faithful PietroGambawrote, 'Yourfriend,... the light of this country,the boast of your country, the saviour ofGreece, is dead ... I cannot tell you the inconsolable grief of his friends - and ofthe whole of Greece'.43t is also true that the Greekprovisionalgovernmentproclaimedquite specialfuneralhonours which included,besidesthe firingof37 cannons for 20 days,the virtualsuspensionof the Eastercelebrations.Themartyrdomof Byronwas in the making.If one may judgefromthe survivingdiariesand lettersof the Greek eaders,however, they knew neitherhow to usethe living Byron nor how to listen to him. When he baulked at joining thedividedprovisionalgovernment 'I did not come hereto join a faction, but anation'- it was even put aboutthat he was a Turk in disguise,and Hobhousewas probablyright n thinking hat,hadhe lived, Byronwould havegrownnobigger amongthe Greeks n reputationor achievement.44 damantiosKorais,

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    PHILHELLENES,CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE 161theleadingGreek ntellectual f the ageand who thoughtthe whole revolutionwas prematureanyhow, was quiteclearin his own mind; 'thedeathof Byronis not all that greata loss for Greece'.45Quiteright.Byron'sdeathwas a gain, aremarkablepieceof luck, for, contrary o the third in the quartetof quotationsabove,no one in Greecesent Byronany 'signalof despair'.It was the LondonGreek Committee which asked him to go. As to the fourth remark, heaccomplishedboth more and less than Nicolson says, more than 'his ownsuicide',butconsiderablyess than 'the liberationof Greece'.How muchless?When Edward Blaquierevisited Byron at Genoa in the summer of 1823,bringinghim an invitationto join a committeewhich in actuality hardly yetexisted, the latter'simaginationwas fired,and his life given a new, a final,direction.It was only later that Byron discovered hat he had beentrickedbyBlaquiere,whose bland assertion that 'the [Greek]cause is in a flourishingstate' was untrue." But by then, there was no going back, for Bowringwasusing his name in England to rally support for the revolutionaries.UntilBlaquiere'svisit, Byron had not really paid much attention to the Greekrevolution. After penning some of his most resonant lines on Greecein DonJuan in 1819, he followed events there with what Maurois has accuratelycalled 'an intermittent,melancholy interest'.47As he was the first to admithimself, Byronhada way of taking up causeszealouslyonly to lose interest nthem sharply, and after that 'I cannot for my life echauffermy imaginationagain'. In 1823, the Byronmet by Blaquiereat the CasaSaluzzonear Genoawas bored with his mistress, TeresaGuiccioli, and depressedwith himself,very sensitive about his age, his figureand his achievements.He was also ill,dietingand purginghimself againstobesity, measuringhis wrists anxiouslyeach morning, writing lots of letters but verse hardlyat all. In 1817, he hadgiven his life anotherten years to run; in 1823, the expectationwas sharplynarrowed down.48The zest with which, in the past, he had declared hat hewould settle in the Americas,visit Persia and Egypt, or buy the island ofIthaca,now burned ow. He was homesickfor England,andthought often ofthe wife from whom he was estrangedandthe child he would see no more. Hegrieved about dead friends like Shelley, 'about whom the world was ill-naturedly,and ignorantly,and brutally mistaken'.Tom Moore was right inthinking Byron remained very sensitive to the excommunicatingvoice ofEnglish society. Greecesuddenlyoffered a chance of redemption.How elseexplaina remark ike the following?

    If I live ten years longer you will see that it is not over with me. I don'tmean in literature or that is nothing.... Butyou will see that I shall dosomethingthat will puzzle the philosophersof all agtbs'.

    Notice that he wished to do something,not writesomething,and as he wasafraidhis new venture would seem anotherfrivolity,andperhapsdamagetheGreekcause,the officialstatus offeredhim by the GreekCommittee reed him'from fear of censureathome and[gave]him a satisfactory tatus n Greece'. Ihate antiquarian waddle. Do people think I have no lucid intervals, that Iwould revisitGreeceto scribblemore nonsense?I will show them that I cando somethingbetter.'And so he determined o go againto 'the only place Iever was contented in'. The GreekCommittee,by its use of his name in its

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    162 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESpublicity,made it impossiblefor him to retreat o Italy,"9 hough he was toconsider it often.About the tasks ahead, Byron was restrained and modest and serious,leavingit to thatprofessional iar and swashbuckler,EdwardTrelawny,whosailed with him,to boastof 'bucklingon the sword of liberty'andjoining 'theglorious bannerunfurled in Greece'.Trelawny, in fact, desertedthe Greeksquitesoon afterbucklingon his sword. Byronwrotesimply, 'Theyallsay I canbe of use.... I do not know how, nor do they. Butat all events,let'sgo.'5IOneGreekwho watched the poet sail wrote aheadto his friends:

    Do what you can to see that he is pleased,not so much because he canprovidefunds ... but rather,because if he is displeasedhe will do moreharm than you can imagine ... good referencesandgood testimonyfromhim are of essentialimportance.5'

    Byron sailed for Greece n the Herculesbrig,with fivehorses, 50,000 Spanishdollars,medicalsupplies,his dogs, his Venetiangondolier later akenover byDisraeli)and a small retinueof philhellene riendsand doctors.LeavingGenoain July, he reachedArgostoliin Kefalinia n September,crossedto mainlandGreecein January 1824, and was deadby mid-April.InKefalinia,wherehepassedhalf his 'campaign',hepoetwas surprised nddelightedat his receptionby the Britishauthorities,but instantlywary of thecompeting claims made upon him and his money by the leading politicalfactionsof mainlandGreece, by Petrobey n Mani, Kolokotrones n Corinth,and the islandinterest n Hydra.He was very disappointedwith the abundantsigns of Greek disunity, having come to join 'not a faction but a nation'. Headmonished the leaders in Nafplion that their disunity 'refroideral'enthusiasmeet arreteraes efforts des Europeenset mes compatriotes'.52 tfirst, he advised the London Committee to send out more 'pecuniarysuccours',53 dvice he presentlyreversed,but which the Committee gnored.The largesums eventuallysent out after his death were embezzledas freelyasthe amounts kept back in London to pay to various military and navalcontractors. Gamba says correspondence,of all kinds, took up about twohours a day of an otherwise leisurelyexistence,andthe letters o and from themainlanddepressedByrona lot, and explainthe long list of very unflatteringremarksabout the Greek leadership o be found in his letters to EnglandandItaly.Not the Greeksalone,but the few Grecophilsn Greece oo, wantedhimto comeacross,Hastings5"elievinghe would heal the politicaldivisions,whileLeicesterStanhope, drawing upon comparisonsno one else would have everused,advisedByronhe was awaited as 'a Messiah'and a 'sort of Wilberforce,a Saint,whom all partiesare endeavouring o seduce!'Byrontook his time, and was enormouslyinfluencedagainst crossing overto the mainlandprematurelyby a letter from J. B. Theotoky, as we shall see.Finlay, the future historian of Greece, who met Byron at this time, laterrecalledhis 'sagaciousand satiricalcomments on the chiaroscuro'of beggingletters from Nafplion,and when Trelawny suggestedgoing to Greece, Byronrepliedcrossly, 'WhatGreece?'Byronhad had difficulty eavingTeresa: nowhe wrote to her, 'I was a fool to come here',and he promised o rejoin her inItaly in the springof 1824."5He discontinuedhis diary, tellingDr. Muir,56Ifound I could not help abusingthe Greeks n it, so I thoughtit was as well to

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    PHILHELLENES, CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE 163give it up.' To others also, he said he felt forced to change his mind aboutGreeks n general,particularlywhen he found out the full scaleof atrocity nwhich they, as much as the Turks,engaged. Theyare such barbarians hatif Ihad the governmentof them, I would pave the roads with them.'5"These sentiments amazed his entouragein Kefalinia,and when Trelawnywent aheadto the mainland,he wrote belittlinglyof 'the Child'58 e had leftbehind at Argostoli.Yet Byronwas undoubtedlyrightnot to add his voice tothe babelof discordatNafplion, which is not to say he was right again whenhe decided insteadto join Prince Mavrokordatos, he first presidentof theprovisionalgovernment,but by now virtuallya refugeefrom its quarrels, nMissolonghi.Certainly,Stanhope, ikeTrelawny,was disgustedwith Byron'sdecision, and thought he became simply Mavrokordatos' puppet'.59 t isextremelydifficult,on the other hand, to suggest any more effective courseByronmighthave followed. The GreekCommitteen Londonhopedhe wouldgo to the Greekprovisional government'sseat, Nafplion. Only a few Greekleaders,like Mavrokordatosand Trikoupis,doubted that he should. It may,nevertheless,be as well thatByronwas not, as Stanhoperegrettedhe was not,'divisible'.The Greekcause was disunitedenough.Some Greeks still mattered to Byron, and they were the ordinary,anonymous peasants, caught up in the tragi-comedyof the war in westernGreece, far removed from the bickerings of Nafplion and the Turkishdominatedareanorth-eastof Athens. The nearerByronapproached o thesepeople,andthe squelchingmiseriesof the lagoonof Missolonghi, he morehisheart was moved, and the closer he came to the combinationof spirit andactionthroughwhich he soughtpersonalsalvation.Trelawnywas, of course,in one respectright.

    The instinct that enables the vulture to detect carrion from afar issurpassedby the marvellousacutenessof the Greeks n scenting money.The morningafter our arrival[in Argostoli]a flock of ravenousZulioterefugeesalightedon our decks-, ttractedby Byron'sdollars ... night andday they clung to his heels like a packof jackals.60

    But harassingas they were, Byron could laugh at the Suliots,and inwardlyweep for them. We expect him to cover his deepestemotions with a self-protectingsarcasm,as when he says that, should he survivethe war, 'I shallwrite two poems on the subject one an epic,andthe othera burlesque.'Butthe emotionswere there, and his diatribesagainst he political eadershipare ameasure of his concern for the ordinarymen, forgotten by history, whounderwriteall largeand violentcauses with theirblood. In January 1824, hefinallycrossed to join Mavrokordatosn Missolonghi,where he was received,in a borroweduniform,like 'a deliveringangel'.61His practical nfluence wasjust beginningto make a markwhen he died, his death hastenedby fatigue,frustration,and murderously ncompetentdoctors.The decision to join Mavrokordatoswas inspired by three men and amemory. The men were Charles James Napier, the British Resident incommand n Kefalinia,he CorfiotJ. B.Theotoky,andMavrokordatos imself.Afterthirtyyearsof the military ife, Napiercouldsay, 'I never saw menbetterformedfor soldiers' hanthe Greeks.Therevolutionaries lso, he thought,hada great ncentive forfightingon regardless f the odds:they couldnot go back.

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    164 MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIES'If they do not fighthardthe Turks will chopthem into kabobs',a reasonableprediction. t was the Greek eadersNapiercouldnot tolerateand, like Byron,he felt the best way to spend the Greek Committee'smoney would be tomaintaina regularGreekarmy with most of it, and relieve Greekrefugeeswith the rest. If this army could set out againstthe Turks,with incidentalorders to plunderall [Greek] hiefs but not to injurea single poorperson',62omuch the better. As Napierhad beenindulgent o volunteerspassingthroughKefalinia,and even facilitated heirtravel,Byronthoughtthe Residentwouldbe an ideal commander for the new Greek army. He advised the LondonCommittee o send out an artilleryunitalso, mannedby experiencedgunners.J. B. Theotokysent Byronadvice in a letter63romTripolizzan September,addressed o Count Delladecima.The followingpassagesare the criticalones:

    Greecehas never beenin greaterdanger ince the Revolution.How canthe few inhabitantsmaintainso unequala struggle?ThePelopponesehasbeen deafto appealsfor help, not realising hat if the mainland s lost, italso will fall, and the name of Greecewill be foreverextinguished.ThePelopponese s the theatreof two rival factions,each of which aims atself-aggrandisementnd at seizingand misapplying he public revenues.The establishmentof a GeneralAssembly ... has proved a failure, thepublicrevenues have been squandered.The leaders have so completelybetrayed he nation that this year'srevenueshave amounted o under21millionpiastres,when they should have been 12 million,and even theserevenueshave been forciblymisappliedby this monstrousGovernment.As a result a heavier burden has fallen on the people than under theOttomanrule. Much discontenthas resulted .. Thearrivalof LordByronat Cephaloniawith a sufficient um of money caused both factionsto tryto secure his person and his funds.... They should have advised LordByronto make hisway to WesternGreece,where his arrivalwould havesecured the relief and provisioning of Missolonghi and would haveinspiredwith freshcouragethe populationof that part.His fundswouldprovideforthe paymentof 8 or 10armedships.... Three housandarmedtroopsin the Moreawould soon rallyaroundhim, if they were sure theywould not findthemselvesabandoned.... IfMilord ands in theMorea,ashe hasbeenpressed o do, he will accomplish ittleforGreece. .. Patrioticand liberal entimentsareunknown there.... I long with allmy heart hatGreeceshould be saved by the good counsels and benefitsof a Patriot.Greecepossesses all the materialsnecessaryto constitute a state, bravesoldiers, fearless sailors, talents, territorialwealth, sufficientfriends, aquietand moderatepeople. She only needs a motive force behindthesematerialresources.

    PrinceMavrokordatos, FanariotGreek and firstPresidentof the Assembly,had had to fly from the wrath of Kolokotrones,and had nearlybeen lynchedbefore making his way to western Greeceto carry on the war. Articulate,multilingual,patrioticand shrewd, Mavrokordatoshad a mixtureof practicalabilitiesand politicalfinessewhich impressedByron.He also handled Byronwith skill, writing that his appearance n Missolonghiwould 'electrify'therebels. Byron was gratifiedand hoped the prediction might come true.Inevitably, t came to be argued that MavrokordatosdupedByron, but who

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    PHILHELLENES,CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE 165was not anxious to dupe Byron? Byron decided to join Mavrokordatosbecause, as he explained to London, 'as I pay a considerableportion of theclans I may as well see what they are likelyto do for theirmoney - besides,Iam tired of hearing nothing but talk, constitutions,or Sunday Schools, andwhat not'."A memoryof distantdays also beckonedByron.It was fourteenyearssincethe memorablenine-day ourneymade with his friendHobhousefrom Prevezato 'Tepaleen'and the court of Ali Pasha, and now the same cloud-filledmountainsrose beforehim, the mountainsof Albaniawhich, 'indeed,I haveseen more of than any Englishman (except a Mr. Leake)'.65He landed atMissolonghiin uniform,a soldier ratherthan a negotiatorby intention,andwithin a short time his house 'was filledwith soldiers; his receivingroomresembledan arsenal of war.... It walls were decoratedwith swords, pistols,Turkish sabres, dirks, rifles, guns, blunderbusses,bayonets, helmets andtrumpets,fantastically uspended.'66Byronwas unableto realise his ambitionto see active servicealthoughheworked hardto retrievesomethingfrom the misunderstanding y which theGreek provisional government supposed he representeda wealthy andpoliticallyinfluentialCommittee,much as he himself originallywas led byBlaquiere o supposethat the Greek leaders exercisedgeneral control over aroughlyunifiednationalterritory.A 'corpsof one hundredGermans'Napiertold him were in Missolonghi turned out to be 26 strong, though otherstrickledinto the poet's headquarterso enjoy, in St. Clair'sapt phrase, 'thehithertounknown sensation of being paid'.The Byron Brigade,as it came tobe called, had musteredabout fifty Europeanvolunteers in all, few of themBritish,at the time its leader andpaymasterdied. To the end he had hopes ofachieving somethingwith it. 'Forthree hundredpounds I can maintain .. atmore than thefullest pay of the ProvisionalGovernment, ations ncluded,onehundredarmedmen for threemonths.'67 e also paidout his own money forStanhope's artillerytrain, to Greeksea-captains,and to Greek and Turkishrefugees. He was instrumental in startinga dispensary,and he exhortedWilliam Parryand his artificers,without much success, to establisha gunfoundryand ammunitionplantwith equipmentbroughtout from Woolwicharsenal. He financed the journal called Ellinika Kronika68 ne of several,mostly short-lived, newspapers:the Ellenika had around forty subscribers,mostly in London and Europe.At the time of his death,when he was payingout $2000 a week from his own pocket,69Byron was intending to lead anattack on Lepanto,which the Turks held. AU these wearying tasks, whichinvolved much altercation and slow progress, Hobhouse called 'the mostgloriousundertakenby man'.70Byronmerelyhoped such activitiesmight have'at least temporaryutility'. Temporary s the rightword. The Byron Brigadebrokeup soon afterthe poet'sdeath.Some of the volunteersmettheir death nGreece. Some went home. Some joined the Turks.71 t has been proposednevertheless,hatthe importanceof Byronlies in the fact that he was 'the onlypossible link between ... the radicalreformersat home and the romanticcrusadersn the field'."2 n fact,the 'radical eformers'n Englandhad no linkswith the later volunteerswho were inspiredby Byron'sdeath and poetryandwho were, for the greater part, Bonapartists,disappointed professionalrevolutionaries,and mostly Europeans. As is often overlooked also, the

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    166 MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIESsecond, bigger oan raised n Englandforthe Greekswas not the work of theLondon GreekCommitteeat all.Like most of the Grecophilvolunteersin the war of independence,Byronwas not well understoodwhile alive nor greatlyappreciatedn the immediateaftermathof his death. Afterthe noble funeralorationdeliveredby SpiridionTrikoupis,his body was returned o England,less the lungs"3notthe heart),and the generalityof Greekshad to takeit on trust that a greatpoet had beenamong them. Byron's Missolonghi house was destroyedby the Greeks indefending he town in 1826.74TheBrideofAbydosseems to havebeen the firstByron poem done into Greek,in 1837, and in TurkishSmyrnaat that." In1861,the Europeancolony at Athenswas requestedby the Greekgovernmentto select names forspecialcommemorationalong with the Greekswho fell inthe war of independence,and they chose the Swiss Meyer, the FrenchmanFabvier, and Byron. In 1881, Byron's statue was raised in the Zappeiongarden. In Britain, the Byron controversy grew after his death, but hiscontribution o the Greekcause was a negligiblepartof thatcontroversy.Withhis private memoirs destroyed in John Murray's office by the misplacedscruplesof his friends,Byron'senemies were freeto speculateendlesslyandathis expense about his treatmentof his 'princessof parallelograms',LadyByron,and his widow was able in her turn to gratify hem,and to enlargehercase against his memory, cherishing every scabrous detail, gatheringandpressingfantasieswith pious care, like a collectionof rareplants.

    IVOn 15 May 1824,an obituarynotice in TheTimesdeclared hat 'thewhole ofLord Byron's latterdays' had been given to 'the noblest of enterprises, hedeliveranceof Greece'.This was a warmerview of the deceasedandthe causehe served than was customarywith the Britishpress, including The Timesitself, by 1824. It becamegenerallybelieved,nevertheless, hat the poet haddied, if not exactly a hero,76 t least as a man of actionand in the followingyears,the mostpopularportraitof Byronwas undoubtedly he one, paintedbyThomasPhillips,which shows him in Albaniangarb,andwhich today hangsin the Britishembassy in Athens.Thecircumstancesof his death didlittleto mitigateByron's uridreputationat home in England.The corpse which lay in state in GreatGeorge Streetattracted long file of the curious,but few peoplefrom thecircles n which thepoet had once moved. If the poet and critic, Allan Cunningham,reportedaccurately hat news of the deathstruck London 'like an earthquake',"77henthe bestpeople in societycomposedthemselvesagainextraordinarily uickly.Ofthe 47 carriagesdraped n black for the funeralprocession,only threehadoccupants,a tribute,as has been observed, o the socialstatusof the deceasedratherthan to the man himself.In the corridorsof politicalpower, the deathmeant very little. Hobhouse was right. There was no 'congregatedmass ofeffectivesupport'for the Greeksin Britain o which officialsin governmentdepartments r honourablemembersof the House needed to respond.In far-off Greece, the Byron Brigadewas breaking up fast,78 eaving behind anephemeralBritishreputationwhich would be revived'by LordGuilfordandTricoupes,and organised into a party by the Zante Committee of Rama,StephanouandDragona'.79twould never be muchof a party,nor enjoywide

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    PHILHELLENES,CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE 167support among Greeks.The offer of the Greekcrown, dangledin ordertoobtain firmer Britishsupport,would be fastidiouslyrefusedby London.According to Kapodistrias,80he Tsar of Russia's erstwhile adviser onforeign affairs,a grudgingattitudetowards the Greekcause was only to beexpectedof the British. As he reminded LeicesterStanhope,who called onKapodistriasn his Genevanseclusion,strugglingrepublics ouldhardlyexpectkindly support romkings.81Also, Britainhadambitionsandplansof her ownin the easternMediterraneanwhich ran counterto Greekinterests.Had shenot, for instance,seizedpartof the rightful patrimonyof the Greeksby heroccupationof Corfu, Kapodistrias' irthplace, s well as otherIonianIslands?Furthermore, adshe not cynicallysold off Parga, he greatmainland ortresson the coast of Epirus,to the Albanianadventurer,Ali Pasha of Janina,inorderto isolateher new possessionsin the lower Adriaticfrom contactwithpeninsularGreece?Kapodistrias ad a case. 'KingTom' Maitlandruled the IonianIslandsas ifthey were a crown colony. He dismissedhis private secretary or expressingGrecophil sympathiestoo candidly. In London, Castlereagh,who dislikedKapodistriasnd called him 'themongrelminister'of Russia,bluntedOttomanhopesof obtaining he islands,and while he got as faras clarifying,at leasttohis own satisfaction, hat Ionian Greeks could not be regardedas Ottomansubjects,he neverexplained o anybodywhose subjects hey actuallywere. Inthe course of a visit to Londonin 1819, Kapodistrias ad one or two glacialinterviews with the foreign secretary,82nd obviously drew small comfortfrom the Castlereagh ormulathat the Greeksmust await the workings of'Timeandof Providence'. t was when the Tsarspokein a similarvein in 1822that Kapodistriaselt constrainedto resign from Russianservice, feeling hecould no longer serve Greece and Russia simultaneously,as he had oncehoped.In hisMemoirs,he famous Corfiotcomplained hat the Britishwere fartoo ready to see him as an instrument 'for establishingsooner or later theabsolutedominionof Russiain the Orient'.83hisexaggeratesBritishvigilanceat that time, and ignores Castlereagh'sdeclaredreadiness,as we find it in hisinstructions to his ambassadorat Constantinople, o follow a 'complyingpolicy', that is, one of deferenceto Russian leadership n the Levant. Russiacertainly ustified he foreignsecretary'shope that the Greekrevolt should notbe permittedto weaken the system of collective security organised by theconservativecourts of Europe at the peace settlementof 1815.84 Through hiscoolnessforthe enthusiasmsof Kapodistrias,Castlereagh psetpoets as well asliberals,and Shelleywrote of him, 'I met murderon the way, he had a face likeCastlereagh'.And yet, was George Canning, Castlereagh's uccessor at theForeign Office, notably more disposed to assist the Greek rebels? And if so,when?Originally,Castlereaghhopedthe revolution n Greecewould die of neglect.When it survived into a second year, he came round to the possibilityofrecognising the belligerents, declaring, 'it will be difficult, if a de factogovernmentbe establishedn the Morea,to refuse[it] he ordinaryprivilegesofa belligerent'.At the time of his death,in August 1822, he was busy drawingup instructions or his own guidanceat the forthcomingcongressof Verona,and in themhe proposed he possibilityof recognitionof the Greekrevolt 'withcaution and without ostentation, lest it should render the Turks wholly

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    168 MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIESinaccessible'to British advice. With the consent of his cabinet colleagues,Castlereaghbelieved he would be able at Veronato obtainan amnestyfortheGreeks at the very least, and just possibly 'the creationof a qualifiedGreekgovernment'. He meant something like the autonomy of the Danubianprincipalitiesof Moldavia and Wallachia. SucceedingCastlereagh,Canningfound no reasonto alter the Verona instructions or Britain'snew envoy, theDuke of Wellington,simplyaddingthe observation hat 'the Turks now seemto have the upperhand', thus makingit inadvisablefor Britain o 'interferebetween Russiaand the Porteor betweenthe Porte and the Greeks'.85t wasthe 'complyingpolicy' all over again, though with quite a differentmotivebehind it now. Castlereaghwas wary of any issue that might weaken thesolidarity of the main courts of Europe; Canning was an isolationist byinstinct,charyof collective actionon anything,and most of all on behalfof alosing cause.The distancein politicaloutlook between the two foreignsecretariesmustnot, therefore, be exaggerated.As practising statesmen, they differed indiplomatic tyleandtacticalmethod,with Castlereagh referringhe collectiveactionwhich Canningabjured.The differencewas as muchtemperamental sideological, and it is a simplification to treat Castlereaghas the coldreactionary,opposed and, eventually, succeededby Canning, the generousliberal who subvertedthe ultra-conservative ongress system, and presentlybecamethe 'liberator'of South America as well as Greece.This too favourableview of Canninggrew originallyout of the enthusiasticreminiscencesof his loyalsecretary,A. G. Stapleton,as well as fromCanning'sown flair ordevisingpopular ustifications or his diplomaticdecisions.On theother hand, Stapleton'srhetoric has had a formidablemomentum, and hiseulogisms are to be found here and there in the writingsof later historianswhose own researchesactuallyinvalidate,or at the very least moderate, hefaithfulsecretary'sconclusions.Temperley, or instance, who was Canning'sfirst systematic biographer and who recognised Stapleton's inflationaryinfluenceon Canning'sreputation, till felt it possibleto epitomisehis subject'sGreekachievement n a Turkishproverb: Thetwo Canningsgavefreedom oGreece.'86Now there is no such Turkishproverb.Did it exist, it would beinaccurate ven for a proverb.A more recentbiographer s closer to the truthwhere he suggeststhat there is actuallyvery littleevidenceto support he ideathat Canning was ever disposed to sentimentality n diplomacy.87 ndeed,Canningoften took the trouble to abjuresuch an idea for himself,and in thecase of Greecesaidmorethan once thatnothingcould be done 'forthe sake ofEpaminondasand St. Paul',that is, for the sort of motives inspiringculturalphilhellenism.The remarkcould be readas one of Canning's ittleflippancies.In fact, he meant it very seriously. Presumably his is why so many liberalpeoplefeltdisappointedn him when he was alive. He had no correspondencewith Byron,who felthe could not approachhim.88Hobhousedetestedhim as'a sophist, a rhetorician,and a politicaladventurer'.89ohn Bowring,also ofthe GreekCommittee,was disgustedwhen Canningaskedhim what languageBritain could possibly hold out to Russia in support of Greece. EdwardBlaquieregrieved n 1824 thatsome actsof 'conciliationandatonement'wereseriously overdue, and that neglect of Greece,which was 'among the mostpalpableerrorsof a lateminister' i.e.Castlereagh],tillseemed officialpolicy.90

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    PHILHELLENES, CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE 169His particular disappointmentwas that there had been no sequel to therecognition of the Greeks as belligerents, oreshadowed by Castlereaghbutactually carriedout in 1823 by Canning.Canningwas one of the best classicalscholarsof his generation.His verseson the abjectstate of the modern Greeks were poignant enough and knownenough, to be quoted by Kapodistrias ver a Parisdinnertable.91As foreignsecretary,Canningattended he Guildhalldinner for Orlandoand Luriotis, nthe spring of 1823, when the two deputiescame to sign the contract for thefirstGreek oan. There s, as a result,some excuse for the Greeks, houghlessfor historians, n thinkingthat the recognitionof Greek belligerencywas thethin edge of a wedge,the firstpublicexpressionbythe new foreignsecretaryofsympathy for a rebelcause which he intendedshouldtriumph.92Recognitionwas certainlyof practicalvalue to the improvised Greek fleet, which couldhenceforth nterdictquite legallythe tradeof neutralswith the Turkishenemy.Canning, however, told the Londonofficialsof the LevantCompanythat therecognitionhad been providedat their insistenceand for the benefit of theirEastern trade: it was supposedthat if the Greekships swarmingin the sea-lanes of the Aegean were treated as belligerents hen they might behave lesslike pirates. The Ionian Islands administrationhad already recognisedtheGreeks, purely in order to protect Ionian shipping, and merchantsin theLevant ports, like merchants in Liverpool - Canning's parliamentaryconstituency were familiarwith the devastationof AustrianshippingwhichresultedfromMetternich'sobstinaterefusalto recogniseGreekbelligerency.93Recognition, therefore,was a measureproposed by many people who hadlittle reason to like the Greeks. It was, for example, badly wanted by thegenerally pro-TurkishBritishresidentsin the Levant. Canning said it wasrequiredby 'the facts' of the 1823 situation.94Beyondthis, he was quiteunsure of what to do next. Like most incumbentsof the ForeignOffice,he sharedthe bureaucraticnstinct of Britishofficials ohammer policies out of materialssupplied by other countries and foreignstatesmen.This,as is generallyacknowledged,he did with extraordinarykill.But it was not enough for pro-Greeks,who lost confidence n him and, from1824,in thechancesof Greeksurvival.Up to thispoint,the differencebetweenCanningand hispredecessor verGreeceappears o be thatCastlereaghwouldhave beenpleased,butCanningprobablyconcernedandsad, if the Turkshadmanaged o prevail.Like his countrymen n general, he foreignsecretarywasslow to respondto the Greekcause, inconstantin the attention he gave it,frequentlychagrinedby the behaviourof the revolutionarieshemselves, andonly led forwardon theirbehalf when larger nterests han thoseof the Greeksalone seemedto be involved.Another explanationsometimes adduced to explain Canning's tardinessover Greece s to the effectthat he thoughttime was on the sideof the rebels.This, presumably,has to be arguedby observerswho baulk at the idea thatCanning would ever have allowed the Greeks to go under. ProfessorTemperley, or instance,writesof Canningplaying'a lone handin the EasternQuestion,going farther han any Power in his recognitionof the Greeks',andSeton-Watson efers o the foreignminister's skilfulsteering'.DakinspeaksofCanning paying lip-serviceto the Europeanconcert until 'he was ready forsome masterstroke'.95Where does the evidenceactuallypoint? Originally,he

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    170 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESpossibilityof Greekvictoryseemedstrong.Butby 1824, Byronwas dead,theForeignOfficewas receivingdoom-ladenreportsabout civil war among theGreeks,the Sultan'sformidableviceroyof Egypthad seizedCrete,and in thespringof 1825 IbrahimPasha disembarkedhe first roopsof the bestarmyinthe East on the western shores of the Morea. The Britishflag, it should benoted, floatedabove 25 of Egypt'scharteredransport hips,the Austrianflagabove 35.Bythis time, Canninghadbeenat the ForeignOffice or almost threeyears,and had receivedvariouspleasfromthe Greeks o which, we aretold, he wasprivatelysympathetic.This may well be so, but in his officialcapacityhe wasvery cautious,even grudging.96n 1823,Petrobeyof Maina,a prominentrebelleader, appealed o Canningfor aid and protection or the Morea,but got noreply. In 1824, the foreign secretaryrefused an internationalconference onGreece,a refusalwhich advancedhis planto end diplomacy-by-congress,utleft the Greeks n a veryvulnerablesituation.Also in 1824,Canningwithdrewhis close friend, Bagot, from the Petersburgembassy for discussingGreecewithout authorisationfrom London.97Strangford,at Constantinople,wasadmonished for discussing Greek prospects with Maitland of the IonianIslands.The Greekdeputies n Londonhaddifficultyn obtaining nterviewsatthe Foreign Office. In October 1824, the Foreign Enlistment Act waspromulgatedonce more,and this time some volunteers n Greecewere struckoff the Army and Navy lists. The WarOfficerecalledLeicesterStanhope.It isnot clear that Canning was in any position to screen the volunteers fromofficial censure, or that he wished he was. When Trelawny's relative, SirChristopherHawkins, called at the ForeignOfficeto solicit help in gettingTrelawneyout of trouble and out of Greece,Canningwould not do anythingin case his actions 'endangered he lives and the property of other BritishSubjects n the TurkishEmpire'.98Canningalso notified the Greekdeputiesthat there was a likelihoodthat governmentactionagainstvolunteers abroadwould get strongeryet. When the Greeks riedto putthemselvesunder Britishprotectionagain,this timeby the formalAct of Submission n 1825, theywereonce more refused.Some Greeks houghtany furtherappeal o Londonnaive.Others,according o Dakin, thoughtsuch an approach lacking n finesse',anunwise narrowingof options. Help might still come from othercapitals hanLondon. Presently, t did.HadCanningbeenmoving by 'skilfulsteering' owardsa constructive,pro-Greekpolicy,somethingof it would surelyhave peepedout somewhere in hiscorrespondencewith Strangford, he Britishambassadoron the Bosphorus.The correspondence n question is decidedly meagre, yet almost completelyapprovingin its tone. Strangfordwas a mettlesomediplomat and a staunchconservative,with a circle of reactionary friends and correspondentswhoincluded Lord Eldon in Britain and Metternichabroad.Strangford houghtMetternich he ablestman alive; Metternichratheragreed.Now Strangford,who had been in the East since the very startof the Greekrevolt, has gonedown in history as 'the Turk par excellence', as the ambassador who reportedthe execution of Greek Patriarchs with an indecent complacency. It hasalso been supposedthat the tide of Grecophilfeelingwhich swept Canningtowardsrecognitionswept Strangfordn disgrace rom his embassy. Nothingcould be lesstrue.When Strangford ame home in 1824,he was applauded or

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    PHILHELLENES, CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE 171having prevented the Turks and the Russians coming to blows, and it wasCanningwho proposed hat he be rewardedwith the title of BaronPenshurst.Furthermore, Canning, who was not afraid to demote, proposed thatStrangford hould be promotedto St. Petersburg,now the highest post in theBritish diplomaticservice.99The appointmentwould please the Tsar. But asStrangfordwas entitled to some months of leave first, Canning sent his owncousin, Stratford, headof Strangford,o sound out Russianviews on Greece.'I thinkof puttingthe Greek questioninto his [Stratford's] ands and sendinghim on a special mission to St. Petersburg o treat it there', he explainedtoBagot n mid-1824. Stratford nly set out at the very end of the year, a leisurelytempoif diplomaticaction was supposed o savethe Greekspromptly.Andyetit was not beforetime that Canningshould now have decidedto 'talkGreek'with the Tsarof Russia.Canning's leisurely style had worried Bagot, the BritishambassadortoPetersburg,ora longtimepast.BagotbelievedRussiawould not be restrainedforeverfrominterferencen the Greekcrisis,and found evidence of this in theproposal, made by the Tsar in the spring of 1823, to establishthree self-governing Greek principalities n the south Balkans.The proposal causeduproar and indignation among the Greek leadersat the time, and has beenbelittledby historiansever since, but the main point was, as Bagotsaw, thatRussia had at last given notice, after a long silence on the subject,that shewould not allow Greekfortunesto fall below a certain evel,andcertainlynotas far as the annihilationwhich Metternichardently desired, and whichCanningwould not, it seems, have resisted had the Turks been competentenough (they were strong enough) to present him with afait accompli. It wasthe Tsar who would accept no such fait accompli, and Bagot was anxious thatCanningshouldnot fall into the sametrapas Metternichn thinkinghe might;'be assuredthat no man living has him [the Tsar] n hand'. Canningwas noteasily moved. 'I cannot conceal from myself that we as well as France havesomethingto explainand extenuate with the Porte',he declared, hinking ofGrecophilvolunteerswho had gone to Greece.100As over LatinAmerica, soover Greece,LordLiverpooldid more than supportCanning.He pushedhimat times.He pushedhim now. In the summer of 1824, Canninghad 'snubbedand snouched'Bagotfor talkingGreecewith the Tsarwithout authorisationfrom London.The foreignsecretary'sargumentwas that Russiamust resumefirst the diplomaticrelations broken off with Turkey in 1821, before therecould be any international onferenceson the subjectof Greece.Bythe end ofthe same year, pressured by Liverpool and Bagot, he sent StratfordtoPetersburgbecausehe was finallyconvertedto recognitionof the dangers nhis own waiting game. Oncehe hadthoughtthe Greekswould win theirwarwith only informalforeignaid. He now came to see that it was their nearcollapsethat might save them and that if Britainstood aside forever,Russiawould not. 'Everysuccess of the Turkisharmyrendersthe Greeksmore andmore objectsof sympathyand compassion,and every failurecontributes oplace Turkey in the light of a more temptingand easy prey.' He thereforedecided to ask 'with how much less than complete separation andindependenceGreecewould be satisfied'.He addressed he questionnot to theGreeksthemselves, but to the Tsar, and his emissarywas his own cousin,StratfordCanning.

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    172 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESCanningsimplywould notcoerce the Sultan orcibly. Topreserve he peaceof the world is the leading policy of England', he wrote. Most striking n theinstructions to Stratford is the foreign secretary's readiness to consider

    anything between 'unconditional submission' and 'unconditionalindependence'.One presumeshe intendedto exclude each of these extremesfrom consideration but it is hardly warrantable to claim that in theseinstructions Canning is seeking the means of 'giving freedom to Greece'.Rather,he was lookingfor a Russian nitiative o which he might respond.Themost conclusive proofof this lies in his instruction o Stratfordhat, should aformula for solving the Greek question be found in Petersburg,Stratfordshould press on to Constantinopleto urge that formula on the Sultan.Stratford,n fact,came home, and it was after Stratford's eturnfromRussia,with news of the growing estrangementof Metternich rom TsarAlexander,that Canningbeganto see the chance to subvert he HolyAlliancethroughtheGreek issue. For the first time, he glimpsedthat the Greeks might yet dounexpectedly well, and he began to speak of 'adjustingthe balance ofneutrality'.Yet when the Greekdeputiesapproachedhim in 1825fora Britishprotectorate,he refusedthem again.He would not move fasterthan the Tsar.To the Greek deputies,he explainedthat accedingto theirrequestwould beseen as 'territorial ggrandisement' y the otherpowers and would 'breakupthe present system of treaties'.'0'It therefore seems reasonableto concludethat,when the wheel of Greekfortunegotstuckin the mud,it was Alexanderwho got it turning again, by throwing off Metternich's restraintsostentatiously,and by makingit plain to Stratfordduringhis visit to Russiathat the Tsar was readyto work with Britain.The initiativeCanningsoughttogive the Russianswas returned o him,andonly then did he decideto find outwhat the Turks would accept by way of a compromiseon Greece. Totalindependence hardly figured in his expectations or, more significantly,hiswishes.A multiplicity of other duties, so burdensome that they pulled downCanning'shealthrelentlessly,are as importantas his personaluncertaintiesnexplainingthe tardinessof his Greekpolicy. Until the end of 1824, when hecould only discuss Greece with Stratfordin the intervals of a crowdedparliamentary chedule, he was heavily involved, with the prime minister'said, in winning a grudging cabinet over to the recognition of the SouthAmericanrepublics.The problemsof LatinAmerica,which he describedas'out of all proportiongreater' han those of the East, helped, nevertheless, oclarifyhis thinkingwhen he had moretimeto give to the latterarea. For onething, LatinAmericataught him to believe that a country which is powerlessto retainits colonies (in this case, Spain)can hardly expect to have a seriousvoice in their disposal.For another,the promulgationof the Monroe Doctrinewas a reminderof the dangersof fallingbehind in the diplomaticgame. Thatdoctrineshowed Washington's nterest n cuttingaway European oe-holds nthe Americas,but also the creditto be reaped n LatinAmerica from an anti-colonial stance. In the Eastern context, the Sultan's pretensionto dispose ofGreece n his own way sounded as emptyas the promulgations f Madrid; heTsar was as likely to move on Greece as the United States had done in herhemisphereof action; there was even a hint in President Monroe's mostfamousspeechthat hiscountrymenmight move to the aid of the Greekswhile

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    PHILHELLENES, CANNING AND GREEK INDEPENDENCE 173Britainhesitated.'02 o the lessons from Americamay be added some hintsfrom Paris where the SocietePhilanthropique ad just been established,withmore grandioseschemes than those of the London Greek Committee:theSociete'believed that a Frenchprinceshould rule a free Greece.With the recognitionof the new republicsof the New World behindhim,Canningwas able to liquidatehis long-standingquarrelwith George IV -partly by terrifyingthe King with the intimation that he might retire frompolitics,butonly afterexposingthe King'sconspiracywith MetternichandtheLievens to be rid of his foreign secretary- to annihilatethe remnant ofMettemich's nfluenceover the conductof Britishdiplomacy,andto disciplinethe Lievens,who were also ordered romPetersburgo cultivateCanningwiththe same assiduity they had formerly given to subvertinghis position.'03By1825, therefore,Canninghadcome a very long way since the day, two yearspreviously, when George IV told the Austrian envoy, Esterhazy,that hedetestedCanningbut could see no easy way to be rid of him.104Within monthsof the resolution of their estrangement the King of England became achampionof his foreignsecretary,and society was amusedto see DorotheaLieven exerting her considerablecharms, and successfully, over GeorgeCanning.None of this broughtimmediateresults for the Greeks. Stratfordreturnedfrom Russia in the spring of 1825, loiteringin London for months beforesetting out for Constantinoplewith a new wife. Strangford,returned fromConstantinople,was also dilatory n settingout for Petersburg.Oncethere,hefell into Bagot'sold trap, and discussed Greece without permission.For hisrashness,he was silencedby Canningwith a despatchwhich has since becomeknown as the 'padlock'. 05 he intentionwas thatStratford hould actthe partof brokerbetween Greeksand Turksandthat Strangford houldmerely relaythe eventualresultto his hosts.It was too much for the new BaronPenshurst,who resigned his embassy in protest against his treatment. There was,nevertheless,one man in Englandwho could not be snubbed,snouched orpadlocked,and that was the Duke of Wellington. Sent to Petersburgtocongratulatehe new Tsar,Nicholas I, on his accession n 1826,the Duke wasdrawn intosigningthe notoriousProtocolof St. Petersburg, documentwhichset a term to Turkish,butfinally to Canning's,prevarications.The wheel ofGreekfortunewas turningagain,and the issuerestedno longeron Stratford'sbrokerage.It rested on the menacing advocacy of Russia who now sent anultimatum o the Sultan. LordHolland was not far wrong in writingto LordJohn Russell:

    We have somehow or anotherexasperated he two greatPowers on theContinent- the Cabinetof St. Petersburgand the public opinion ofFrance,and we have doneso withoutserving ourselves,or ourpretendedAllies.... NeitherTurks nor Greeks have to thank us.'06The Protocol of St. Petersburg s the first diplomaticdocumentto refer toGreeceas a prospectivepoliticalentity. Withoutproposingany frontiers, heProtocolcommitted tssignatories o the oneroustaskof persuadinghe Sultanof Turkeyto createa vassal stateof Greece.The Greekswould pay an annualsubsidy in return for completecontrol over their own political,religiousandeconomic life.Obviously, his was the longestforwardsteptaken on behalf of

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    174 MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIESthe Greeksafterfive yearsof revolution,and when the detailswere leakedtoThe Times,it became an irreversible tep, committingCanningmore deeplythan he had ever intended.107The foreignsecretaryhad, of course, wanted ameasure of collaborationwith Russia, and most notably after Stratford,writing from Constantinople,assured him that 'the TurkishGovernment sdead to any consideration but that of force'. Furthermore,Canning hadwarned the Turks in return that their obduracy might yet end Britain'sneutralityand oblige her to stop the fightingin Greeceby means of a navalintervention.But his chiefhope in sendingthe Duketo Russia,as he explainedto Granville,had been to restrain he Russianswhile keepingpressureon theTurks 'to save the Greeks hroughthe agencyof the Russiannameuponthefearsof Turkeywithouta war'[myitalics].108nfortunately,an ultimatumwassent to Turkey while the Duke was still in Russia, thus fulfilling Bagot'serstwhilewarningsthat the Tsar would not be restrained orever,and whileBritainherselfwas not a partyto thatultimatum, he Protocolcame so closelyon its heels thatOttomanministersbelieved,not unreasonably, hatthey sawBritainaligned behind Russia. Lookingback throughthe foreignsecretary'smemoranda and despatches,one sees how earnestlyhe had tried to avoidgiving this impression,how much he had wanted an exactly oppositesituationto obtain, one in which Russian power stood restrained behind Britain'sdiplomacy.His instructions o Bagothad played up the idea that, if the Tsarlost patience and proceeded against the Sultan, he would do so alone,abandonedby conservatives ike Metternich,but abandoned oo by Britain,acountrywhich 'would not see the Turkishpower destroyed'.To Stratford,hehad explainedthat the Turks should give their particular rust to the Britishsince 'we areat present ree from allarrangementswith otherPowers', and aslate as October 1825 he was still insisting, 'Things are not yet ripe for'ourinterference.'The Greek situationwas transformed hen, not by the Protocolalone, but by the Protocolseen, as the world saw it, in conjunctionwith theRussian ultimatumto the Sultan.109The Russian ultimatum110 adeno referencewhateverto Greece, a subjectthe Tsar left, as we have seen, to the implementation f the Protocol.By theultimatum, he Sultanwas given six weeks in which to withdrawthe Ottomantroopswhich hadloitered n the Principalities incesuppressing he firstGreekuprising, led by Hypsilantes, in 1821. The Russians took the trouble torecapitulate n great detail the rights and privileges of the peoples of thePrincipalit