the norm of seeking international authorization
TRANSCRIPT
Clayton J. Cleveland
University of Oregon
May 30, 2012
The Norm of Seeking International Authorization: Challenging and Consolidating Practice, 1998-2011
Why do states seek international authorization for the projection of military force more often after 1990?
Why did the U.S. request international authorization for the projection of military force?
The norm of international authorization led the U.S. to make the request.
Research Question
U.S. Decisions to Project Military Force
Year Projection Attempt IO Source 1989 Panama Intervention 1990 Desert Shield UN UN UNSCR 665 1991 Persian Gulf War UN UN UNSCR 687 1992 U.S. in Somalia UN UN UNSCR 794 1993 U.S. in Iraqi No Fly Zone UN UNSCR 661 1993 U.S. in Bosnia UN UN UNSCR 816 1993 Baghdad Raid UN Article 51 1993 U.S. in Macedonia UN UN UNSCR 842 1994 US Intervention in Haiti UN UN UNSCR 940 1995 U.S. in Bosnia UN UN UNSCR 1031 1998 U.S. in Afghanistan/Sudan 1998 U.S./UK Bombing Iraq 1999 NATO Air Campaign UN NATO 1999 U.S. Peacekeeping in Kosovo UN UN UNSCR 1244 2001 U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan UN Article 51 2003 Iraq War UN 2004 Haiti UN UN UNSCR 1529 2011 Libya, No-Fly Zone UN UN UNSCR 1973 2011 Osama Raid UN Article 51
Hypotheses? Year Projection Attempt IO Source 1989 Panama Intervention 1990 Desert Shield UN UN UNSCR 665 1991 Persian Gulf War UN UN UNSCR 687 1992 U.S. in Somalia UN UN UNSCR 794 1993 U.S. in Iraqi No Fly Zone UN UNSCR 661 1993 U.S. in Bosnia UN UN UNSCR 816 1993 Baghdad Raid UN Article 51 1993 U.S. in Macedonia UN UN UNSCR 842 1994 US Intervention in Haiti UN UN UNSCR 940 1995 U.S. in Bosnia UN UN UNSCR 1031 1998 U.S. in Iraqi No Fly Zone UN UNSCR 661 1998 U.S. in Afghanistan/Sudan 1998 U.S./UK Bombing Iraq 1999 NATO Air Campaign UN NATO 1999 U.S. Peacekeeping in Kosovo UN UN UNSCR 1244 2001 U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan UN Article 51 2003 Iraq War UN 2004 Haiti UN UN UNSCR 1529 2011 Libya, No-Fly Zone UN UN UNSCR 1973 2011 Osama Raid UN Article 51
o The insensitivity to constraints imposed by IOs increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization.
o The expectation from other states that the intervenor should request authorization increases the likelihood of requesting international authorization.
Hypotheses
o March 19, 2003-projection of military force
o Decision to Request International Authorization from the UNSC
o Costs of IO route for U.S.
Iraq
o March 19, 2011-projection of military force
o Decision to Request International Authorization from the UNSC
o Costs of IO route for U.S.
Libya
oConstraint
oPolicy Implementation
oGoals
oOrganization
oCosts of transactions
oTiming
oScrutiny
Costs of Using IOs
The Projection of Military Force is the purposeful deployment of regular military forces of a state outside their internationally recognized boundaries which destroys, or prevents an adversary from using, some resource.
Projection of Military Force
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Nu
mb
er
of
Reso
luti
on
s
Years
Cold War
Number of UNSC Resolutions 1946-2007
Active Peacekeeping Missions, 1947-2003
0
5
10
15
20
25
1947
1949
1951
1953
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
Years
Nu
mb
er
Cold War Post-Cold War
US Support for UN Membership
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
Support for US Membership Opposition to US Membership
Descriptive Statistics Use of
International
Force
Percent
of
Cases
Cases of IO
Authorization
Percent
Total 156 100% 27 17.3%
Cold
War 114 74.7% 7 6.4%
Post-
Cold
War
42 25.3% 20 47.6%
U.S. Decisions to Project Military Force, 1946-2011
Year International Force IO 1950 Korean War UN 1950 Taiwan Straits 1958 US Intervention in Lebanon 1961 U.S. deployment in Thailand 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis OAS 1964 Vietnam War 1965 U.S. intervention in the OAS
Dominican Republic 1970 U.S. in Cambodia 1975 Mayaguez Incident 1980 Iran Hostage Rescue 1982 Sinai multinational Force 1982 U.S. intervention in Lebanon UN 1983 U.S. in Grenada 1986 Libyan Airstrikes by the U.S. 1987 Persian Gulf Tanker Reflagging 1989 Panama Intervention
Year International Force IO 1991 Persian Gulf War UN 1992 U.S. in Somalia UN 1993 U.S. in Iraqi No Fly Zone UN 1993 U.S. in Bosnia UN 1993 Baghdad Raid UN 1993 U.S. in Macedonia UN 1994 US Intervention in Haiti UN 1995 U.S. in Bosnia UN/NATO 1998 U.S. in Iraqi No Fly Zone UN 1998 U.S. in Afghanistan/Sudan 1998 U.S./UK Bombing Iraq UN 1999 NATO Air Campaign NATO 1999 U.S. Peacekeeping in Kosovo UN 2001 U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan UN 2003 Iraq War 2011 Libya, No-Fly Zone UN 2011 Osama Raid UN
U.S. Decisions to Project Military Force & IO Authorization
Time Period 1: 1946-1989 Time Period 2: 1990-2011
Auth
oriz
atio
n G
rante
d
1950 Korean War (UN)
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (OAS)
1965 Dominican Republic (OAS)
1982 Lebanon (UN)
1991 Persian Gulf War (UN)
1992 U.S. in Somalia, UNITAF & UNOSOM II (UN)
1993 Iraq, Bush Plot Retaliation (UN)
1993 Enforcement of Iraq No Fly (UN)
1993 Bosnia (UN)
1993 Macedonia (UN)
1994 Haiti (UN)
1995 Bosnia, IFOR/SFOR (UN/NATO)
1998 Iraqi Airstrikes (UN)
1998 U.S./UK in Iraq, Desert Fox (UN)
1999 NATO Kosovo Air Campaign (NATO)
1999 Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation (UN)
2001 Afghanistan (UN)
2011 Libya, No-Fly Zone (UN)
2011 Osama Raid (UN)
Auth
oriz
atio
n N
ot
Gra
nte
d
1950 Taiwan Straits
1958 Lebanon
1961 Thailand
1964 Vietnam War
1970 U.S. in Cambodia
1975 Mayaguez Incident
1980 Iran Hostage Rescue
1982 Sinai Multinational Force
1983 Grenada
1984 Libyan Airstrikes
1987 Persian Gulf Tanker Reflagging
1989 Panama
1998 Afghanistan/Sudan Bombings
2003 Iraq War
U.S. Attempt to Acquire IO Authorization, 1946-2006
Time Period 1: 1946-1989 Time Period 2: 1990-2003
Atte
mpt
1950 Korean War (UN)
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (OAS)
1965 Dominican Republic (OAS)
1982 Lebanon (UN)
1982 Sinai Multinational Force (UN)
1991 Persian Gulf War (UN)
1992 U.S. in Somalia, UNITAF & UNOSOM II (UN)
1993 Enforcement of Iraq No Fly (UN)
1993 Bosnia (UN)
1993 Macedonia (UN)
1994 Haiti (UN)
1995 Bosnia, IFOR/SFOR (UN/NATO) (UN)
1998 Iraqi Airstrikes (UN)
1998 U.S./UK in Iraq, Desert Fox (UN)
1999 NATO Kosovo Air Campaign (UN/NATO)
1999 Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation (UN)
2003 Iraq War
No A
ttem
pt
1950 Taiwan Straits
1958 Lebanon
1961 Thailand
1964 Vietnam War
1970 U.S. in Cambodia
1975 Mayaguez Incident
1980 Iran Hostage Rescue
1983 Grenada
1984 Libyan Airstrikes
1987 Persian Gulf Tanker Reflagging
1989 Panama
1993 Baghdad Raid
1998 Afghanistan/Sudan Bombings
2001 Afghanistan
2011 Osama Raid
International Force Options Option Example
Unilateral France intervention in
Comores (1995)
Ad hoc multilateralism Temporary coalition France, UK, Israel in the Suez
Crisis (1956)
Regional International
Organization
NATO, OAS
Universal International
Organization
UNSC
Removing the U.S. Use of
International
Force
Percent
of cases of
total with
U.S.
IO
Authorization
Percent of
Non-U.S.
cases
Total 119 79% 8 6.7%
Cold
War 96 85.7% 1 1%
Post-
Cold
War
23 60.5% 7 30.4%
U.S. Instances of International Force and UN Authorization, 1946-2006
Time Period 1: 1946-1989 Time Period 2: 1990-2003
Auth
oriz
atio
n
Gra
nte
d
1950 Korean War
1982 Lebanon
1991 Persian Gulf War
1992 U.S. in Somalia, UNITAF & UNOSOM II
1993 Enforcement of Iraq No Fly
1993 Bosnia
1993 Macedonia
1994 Haiti
1995 Bosnia, IFOR/SFOR (UN/NATO)
1998 Iraqi Airstrikes
1998 U.S./UK in Iraq, Desert Fox
1999 Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation
2001 Afghanistan
Auth
oriz
atio
n N
ot
Gra
nte
d
1950 Taiwan Straits
1958 Lebanon
1961 Thailand
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (OAS)
1964 Vietnam War
1965 Dominican Republic (OAS)
1970 U.S. in Cambodia
1975 Mayaguez Incident
1980 Iran Hostage Rescue
1982 Sinai Multinational Force
1983 Grenada
1984 Libyan Airstrikes
1987 Persian Gulf Tanker Reflagging
1989 Panama
1993 Iraq, Bush Plot Retaliation
1998 Afghanistan/Sudan Bombings
1999 NATO Kosovo Air Campaign (NATO)
2003 Iraq War
UN Job Performance
UN Job Performance
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
7/13/19
67
7/13/19
69
7/13/19
71
7/13/19
73
7/13/19
75
7/13/19
77
7/13/19
79
7/13/19
81
7/13/19
83
7/13/19
85
7/13/19
87
7/13/19
89
7/13/19
91
7/13/19
93
7/13/19
95
7/13/19
97
7/13/19
99
7/13/20
01
7/13/20
03
7/13/20
05
Dates
Pe
rc
en
t
Good Job Poor Job No Opinion