the noble art of catching nuclear rowdies – today and in ... · the noble art of catching nuclear...
TRANSCRIPT
The noble art of catching nuclear rowdies
– today and in the future
Ane Håkansson Uppsala University
Needs Objectives
Advanced high explosives Knowledge Engineering skills
E.g. 235U or 239Pu
What do I need to build a NED?
Export control & other measures
Safeguards &
Physical Protection
Politics Countermeasures
Nuclear Safeguards IAEA Safeguards - Objectives: “…timely detection of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devises or for purposes unknown, and the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.”
Nuclear Safeguards IAEA Safeguards - Means: Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA)
Inspection & Verification, Process
Monitoring Containment & Surveillance (C/S)
None of these measures alone can fulfill the objectives
Safeguarding the Nuclear Fuel Chain
Type of material 1 SQ
Pu, 233U 8 kg HEU 25 kg LEU 75 kg
Nat U 10 t Depleted U & Th 20 t
Significant Quantity Approximate amount nuclear material (NM) for one NED
Safeguarding the Nuclear Fuel Chain
Type of material Time
Direct use material (fresh Pu or HEU)
1 month (1 week)
Irradiated direct use material
3 months (3 Weeks)
Indirect use material (LEU, natural U or Th)
1 year (2 months)
Timely detection Criteria: Time within which a diversion of 1 SQ should be detected
Approx. time needed for conversion into weapon-grade
material
F.P. + Minor Actinides + Pu + U
The Nuclear Fuel Chain today
Mining Tailings
3-5% 235U
0.7% 235U
F.P. + Minor Actinides
Pu
MOX
Depleted U
Vitrification
Reprocessing
Depleted U
Storage
Fuel fabrication
Enrichment
Conversion to UF6
Reactors
Disposal
Nuclear Safeguards
Fundamental - Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA)
Receipt of NM Shipment of NM Nuclear Production Loss of NM
Material unaccounted for (MUF)
Nuclear Safeguards
Inspection & Verification Item counting Volume determination Weighing Non-destructive analysis Gamma-spectrometry Passive and active neutron counting Calorimetry
Destructive analysis Mass spectrometry Concentration measurement
Containment & Surveillance (C/S) Cameras Seals
Nuclear Safeguards
Gen IV Nuclear Fuel Chain Fuel
fabrication Fast reactors
Vitrification Disposal
Storage
Recycling
Pu + U + Minor Actinides Extracted in one stream
F.P. (+ traces of M.A.)
Depleted U
Nuclear Waste
Issues: Recycling
Transports
Disadvantages with Gen IV (from safeguards point of view)
Local recycling facilities?
Development of new technologies that extract Pu + U + M.A. in one group imperative
Advantages with Gen IV (from safeguards point of view)
Much simpler system to survey and inspect
Includes no enrichment
Using adequate technique: no free Pu streams
The waste is not feasible for NED:s
It’s the only viable option for destruction of weapons plutonium and today´s nuclear waste.
Pro and cons of technology – a philosophical reflection
Cons Pro
Example -Fire Technical solution
Countermeasure Redundancy
Example -Medicine Technical solution Pro Cons
Biological weapons of mass destruction
Countermeasure ! No redundancy
Example – Energy supply Pro One technical solution Cons
Countermeasure Nuclear safeguards
Lots of redundancy
A smarter and more efficient safeguards through
”Safeguards-by-Design” will be required
Present nuclear utilisation not optimized as regards nuclear safeguards Nuclear safeguards hitherto reasonably successful New nuclear facilities can be made more secure through safeguards-by-design Generation IV systems are inherently more secure but an efficient safeguards will still be needed.
Some final notes
Thank you!