the new kind of war and the military thinking

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LTC Jorge Fernando DuránThe new kind of war and the military thinking

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THE NEW KIND OF WAR AND THE MILITARY THINKING

“And as water has no constant form, there are in warfare no constant conditions”

Sun Zi – V BC

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1. Introduction.

a. The war evolves like the societies, cultures, economics, sciences orwhatever expression of the human life, because the war is a complex socialphenomenon. In this evolution the first casualties seem to be the state andthe traditional military thinking. We don’t need much of scientific knowledgeto sate this. We only should read the newspaper and see, that today, themost important war is a State against a Non State and by worst you couldguess which one is losing.

b. Our aim is to determine wonder the actual military thinking could give a

response to the kind of war that is waged in the world today. This essayexcludes the traditional wars if we find one of them out of history books.

2. Theoretical framework.

a. We can argue about our philosophical point of view in order to discuss thismatter. The culture, the paradigms of our societies and so on could haveinfluenced in our perspective. Some could select the Marxist dialecticalmethod other the Descartes’ positivism, some the idealism of Clausewitzand other the rationalism. We select the way of the Aristotle’s Realismwhich said “The only truth is reality” 2 .

c. In the mentioned way, we could define the war like a “genus” and the newkind of the myriad of species of war as “specie” In the same philosophic waythe definitions are made by a closer genus and specific difference. For thepurposes of this work we could define the war as “a conflict among human groups (closer genus) typified by the violence, the societal disruption and the high mortality (specific difference)” .

d. In order to save time we could have defined the war as “the continuation ofpolitics by other means” or “the war is bloodiness politics” so could themeans or the phenomena define the essence of the thing? From anepistemological perspective the answer is no. Moreover with the laterdefinitions we have another problem which is to define politics.

e. Politics is an analogical word that could have many meanings. Politics is toselect goals and courses of actions, or could be the whole of matters in thestate, or the relations between state and citizens, other state or otherinternational subjects or could be the struggle to seize power in the state. Inour point of view politics is the whole of matters in the state, following the

1 Sun Zi’s Art of War: A Modern Chinese Interpretation – Gen Tao Hantzang – Distal – pp.195 2 This was quoted by San Agustin and General Perón, for three times Argentina’s President.




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realism philosophy and the meaning of the Greek word “polis which meanscity”

f. The State is political community organized under a government. Themodern State begins in the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Thecharacteristics of the modern state are a public power constituting thesupreme political authority, supported by a bureaucracy3, within a definedterritory with a population and monopolizing the use of force.

g. The military thinking is a branch of human knowledge related with thenature of the war, its ends and its means.

3. An overview of the new kind of war.

a. In our era the most important wars are waged by states, non states,soldiers, civilians and militias. The war is no further an issue of states andprofessional armies. The enemy is no clear defined. These days we can see

a new phenomenon that is characterized by the rising of non military militantorganization, like Al Qaida, Hezbollah or Revolutionary Armed Force ofColombia which Not only compete for power to the State if not constituting athreat to several States.

c. The war is no longer waged only for political objectives. The goals of warshift from politics to religious, economical or ethnical ones. After world WarOne Heinz Guderian wrote “The world war was unleashed by turmoil of economic and social circumstances and most advanced nations of the world were plunged into the whirlpool. There were many who looked forward to some kind of improvement in mankind in the nations after the war, but they were disappointed. On the contrary there is good

reason to fear that the ideological, political and religious contradictions has become as acute as economic ones” 4

d. Traditional and technologically advanced armies are defeated byrudimentary and no traditional armies or armed organization, integratedmainly by civilian militants. This is the well know asymmetry, which is notonly a difference in combat power. The asymmetry is the situation that“derives from one force deploying new capabilities that the opposing force does not perceive or understand, conventional capabilities that counter or overmatch the capabilities of the opponent or capabilities that represent totally new methods of attack or defence, or a combination of these attributes” 5 . In as example, is not asymmetric thatthe enemy has night vision devices. That is only a difference in combatpower. However when we neutralise the enemy advantage in night combatwith an imagination and in a unexpected way became the asymmetry likethe Iraqi resistance in Fallujah “We had been told the enemy would try to

3 In this case the term bureaucracy is not of a negative connotation, whether it's administrative apparatus of the State. 4 Achtung Panzer – General Heinz Guderian – Cassell – pp.212 5 Lesson for Asymmetric Conflicts – Ike Skelton – Military Review Set/ Oct 2001 – pp. 23




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counter our thermals (infrared optics) and night vision by setting fires.Gasoline, for instance, do the job just fine” 6 .

e. The crude use of force doesn’t seem to achieve the goals of the war norconflict, and in the new kind of war seems that the weaker side could win,and the stronger one lost.

f. The media.

1) When USA vas involved in the Gulf War in 1991 we can see a newphenomena such us to see the war in real time and from the front line.This war was the last conventional one, the Iraqis play the game withAmerican rules y they was crushed like sitting ducks in a fire range. Theonly dead people that the media could show were Iraqis. However thethings began to change in Somalia in 1993. American people wereshocked when they were able to see the corpse of an American soldierbeing dragged and persecuted through the streets of Mogadishu. The

army rangers and Delta Force lost eighteen men while three thousandSomalis, civilians and militias, were killed. Thus he United Sates had towithdraw his forces from Somalia Due to the impact on public opinionnews of U.S. casualties. Since then the Iraqi and Afghan resistance hasbeen recorded and shared his actions taking in account that the publicopinion and the people’s support are enemy’s centers of gravity too.

2) In the actual battlefields is common to see journalist imbedded with thetroops and is common the clashes between the two organizationalcultures, the former educated to share information and the latter educateto keep the secrecy about the information. The soldiers’ opinion about journalists could be summarized by this quote “Reporters are

everywhere. They have taken over the mess and now huddle around us and gawk. These journalists are spotlessly dressed in designer khakis from Banana Republic. It is hard not to be nauseated” 7.

3) To do more complex the media issue everybody could uploadinformation, opinions or whatever they want. Actually, the informal mediasupported by internet are visited for almost as much people that thetraditional, formal media. These informal means attraction lies in theability of them interact with their readers, i.e. the trend of internet 2.0 anda very useful propaganda tool.

4) This quote could be illustrated about the situation “There is ample evidence that Hezbollah and Al Qaeda are conducting a 4 th generation type of war. They are attempting to erode their foe’s popular support. In this endeavor their principal tool is the media” 8.

6 House to House – David Bellavia– Free Press – pp. 106 7 Ibid 6 – pp. 39 8 Tactics of the Crescent Moon – John Poole – Prosperity Press – pp. 223




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h. Terrorism: Is the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion.The psychological effects of the terrorist action on enemy society are moreimportant than its physical effects. By propaganda goals the terrorism orterrorist is used for guerilla, resistance or militia. However the terrorism is acrime, but if guerrilla, the resistance or militias develop their operationsaccord with international law is legal.

j. The issue of Human Rights and the International Humanitarian Law.

1) Human Rights Human rights and International Humanitarian Law set alimit to violence in war. We could like or dislike them, we could agree ordisagree with them, but we must respect them because moralconsiderations and the punishment to those perpetrators.

2) Human rights are those which are inherent in the human condition. Theyare inalienable, imprescriptibly and must be respected by all meninstitutions and groups of humans.

3) The cores of the International Humanitarian Law are the Geneva and TheHague Agreements. The Geneva Conventions and Related Protocolsprotect people who do not take part in the fighting (civilians, medics, aidworkers) and those who can no longer fight (wounded, sick andshipwrecked troops, prisoners of war). The Hague Conventions andothers agreements are about the protection of people who take part inthe fighting. These agreements are applied in international and noninternational conflicts.

4) Since the Rome’s Agreement all those perpetrators may be judged byinternational tribunals. No state could argue that it didn’t the agreement

because the crimes contained in it are Ius Cogens 9

k. The non lineal battlefield: the non linear battlefield is most than ageographic based concept. Non linear operations are those which aresustained by no adjacency units, with multiple decision points and with nongeographic based line of operations. The linear battlefield is such that theunits have shared boundaries, a line of operation materialized in terrainfeatures and with a decision point constituted by a terrain or an enemyforce.

l. The weakness of the State and the conservatism of the army.

1) The Sate as we have already known is a consequence of the WestphaliaAgreement in 1648. This agreement was signed at the end of the ThirtyYears War. This war was waged mainly for religious and on hegemoniesreasons. Europe, not the whole world, never returned to what it was. The

9Latin expression for “Compelling Law”. It is a fundamental principle of international law which is accepted by the international community of states as a norm from which no derogation is ever permitted. Based on this principle were convicted Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg.




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wars left fighting for religious reasons or anyone else other than strictlypolitical. Feudalism was finally replaced by a system of sovereign states.Before Westphalia the predominant form of political organization werealliances between individuals, religious groups, which has his ownmilitary forces (Combatant Religious Orders like Knights Templar andKnights Hospitaller, Order of Malta, etc), kingdoms whose power was

based on alleged divine designs rather than concrete political reasonsand so on. Until the end of World War II the State was the predominantform of political organization.

6) When those states had differences which could be solved by peacefulmeans they its armies to war in order to fight with another armies sent byanother states. Armies organized with mobilized population and led bystaffs professional and equipped with the latest technology in weapons.

7) This is the world in which Clausewitz developed his theory and could besummarized in his own words “War is, therefore, not only a true chameleon, because it changes its nature in some degree in each particular case, but it is also, as a whole, in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in it, a wonderful trinity,composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason. The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second more the general and his army; the third more the Government” 10. However the Clausewitz’strinity (government, army, people) no longer exists and is being replacedby non-State groups with non-professional armies that make war with

each other or to the same State.

8) Some States have accurately identified these treats to their sovereign,many other no. China calls it as the "Three Evil Forces" for terrorism,separatism and extremism and this menace was subject from someyears ago of field exercises with neighbour countries. However some ofthe countries which have identified this change have not redesign hisarmies to face this new kind of war, the best example is the United Satedwhich seems to have design an army more to be a customer of advancedtechnology than a tool to win wars.

9) The armies and the conservatism.

a) Armies as any authoritarian and hierarchical organization areconservative. During the peace regulations and laws structured life insuch a way that routine removes virtually own war uncertainty, is whymilitary reason those who integrate military organizations rejectchanges, changes cause uncertainty and uncertainty in psychologicalterms produces anxiety. Norman Dixon, a psychologist said “Military

10 On War – Carl von Clausewitz – Book 1, Chapter 1, paragraph 28




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organizations contribute to incompetence military in two ways:directly, forcing its members to act in a manner that does not alwaysleads to military success, indirectly, attracting, selecting and givingpromotion to a minority of people with special shortcomings on hisintellect and his personality”11

c) Some people entering the army precisely to soothe their anguish andparadoxically are that during peace can reach higher positions, butfail to war. For example, Mao Tse Tung revolutionized militarythinking because it was free of military culture's own prejudices.

d) One of these prejudices own military culture mainly in Western afterthe second world war is war is won with higher power of fire andtechnology. That is why we believe that technological dependence ofcertain armies is more a feature of that conservatism.

4. Outline of traditional military thinking.

a. It is out of the limits of this essay a complete review of the military thinking.However we going to study some ideas of military thinkers related with thisissue.

b. Western Military Thinking

1) No book of western ancient military thinking is comparable to Sun Zi’s Artof War And. Neither was written in that scientific way nor in these earlyages of warfare. However, the records of military campaigns have beenwritten from 8th century BC. One of the first military works was Homer’sIliad about the war between a Confederation of Greek City States and the

State City of Troy. The Xenophon’s Anabasis (V BC) about the history often thousand Greeks soldiers who were stand deep on enemy territoryand had to return to their lines. Xenophon's account might have inspiredPhilip of Macedon to believe that Hellene army might be defeat a morepowerful Persian and could have been one of the first strategicintelligence efforts. The Punic War (III BC) witnessed significantprogress in military thinking such as the idea to drain the enemy’s militarypower by guerrillas until achieving balance, a concept developed byFabio or the weakening of the enemy by the destruction of hisalliances, and the indirect approach hitting the enemy’s centre ofgravity, both developed by Scipio Africanus. The western ancient militarythinking had many famous military commanders, but unfortunately, very

few wrote his experiences.

2) From the beginning of the history, some philosophers and militarist wereconcerned about the morality of war. One of the first was Aristotle whosaid that the “point of a just war is to obtain a just peace”. From theseancient days were developed the concepts of “ius ad bellum” which areacceptable justifications to engage in war “ius in bello” which are the

11 On Psychology of Military Incompetence – Norman F. Dixon – Anagrama – pp. 214




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limits to acceptable wartime conduct. Geneva and Le HagueConventions have materialized this process of centuries developed in theWest to set moral limits of the war.

3) With over the years, the western military thought was arrived in twotrends that are maneuver warfare and attrition warfare12.

4) Attrition Warfare.

a) In a few words the idea could be summarized saying “Put steel ontarget”. Therefore this trend is the farthest away from the ideas ofSun Zi, Mao Zedong and the eastern military thinking.

b) The attrition warfare could be defined as an attempt to grind down anopponent through superior numbers, firepower and technology.

c) These theories have many supporters and a good example of this

was during World War I when the Allies wore down the CentralPowers to the point of capitulation. The majority of those who supportthe doctrines relating to the war of attrition have led to limit the ideasof Clausewitz, as it is the case with Luddendorf. The doctrine ofClausewitz, while it cannot be considered purely for attrition, hasmany components that hold the same.

d) Is beyond the limits of this essay analyze all thinking of Clausewitz,by which we will focus on two of his ideas that characterized of thetendency of attrition and other two ideas that we believe are usefulfor the new type of war being waged in the 21st century.

(1) About the means to reach the victory Clausewitz is focused inthe battlefield and in the violence without limits. He said “Now,philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of War. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated…who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, must obtain superiority if his adversary does not act likewise ”.13 This idea seems to justify thecarnages of World War I or in its further consequences theterrorism. Nothing far away of the ideas of Sun Zi about to winwithout fight. We know that Sun Zi’s idea of victory withoutbloodshed is an ideal, so we prefer to keep in mind this idea tothe Clausewitz ideal of limitless violence.

12 For western attrition warfare has not the same mean as Mao Tse Tung. Attrition is related to defeat the enemy by a huge superior combat power instead of defeat it by a better strategy. 13 On War – Carl von Clausewitz – Book I Chapter 1 paragraph 3




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(2) About deception Clausewitz said “The conclusion which we draw, is that a correct and penetrating eye is a more necessary and more useful quality for a general than craftiness…But the weaker the forces become which are under the command of strategy, so much the more they become adapted for stratagem, so that to the quite feeble

and little, for whom no prudence, no sagacity is any longer sufficient at the point where all art seems to forsake him,stratagem offers itself as a last resource” 14. As we can see,the Prussian underestimated the deception or stratagem tocreate favorable conditions and threw away very importantmeans in this new kind of warfare such us counterfeiting,allurement, alienation, psychological attack and seizes whichthe enemy cherishes.

(3) In the issue of the people’s war Clausewitz emphasizes that“still we must admit that armed peasants are not to be

driven before us in the same way as a body of soldiers who keep together like a herd of cattle, and usually follow their noses. Armed peasants, on the contrary, when broken, disperse in all directions…According to our idea of a people's war, it should, like a kind of nebulous vapoury essence, never condense into a solid body; otherwise the enemy sends an adequate force against this core, crushes it, and makes a great many prisoners; their courage sinks…The easiest way for a general to produce this more effective form of a national armament, is to support the movement by small detachments sent from the army. Without the support of a few regular troops as

an encouragement, the inhabitants generally want an impulse and the confidence to take up arms” 15. This ideanot only agree with the XXI century war, furthermore give us anidea about the employment of Special Forces y the conflict.

(4) The last point on Clausewitz it is about the culminating point.Clausewitz stated that “Victory, as a rule, springs from apreponderance of the sum of all the physical and moralpowers combined… In the progress of action in war, thecombatant force is incessantly meeting with elementswhich strengthen it, and others which weaken it. Hence itis a question of superiority on one side or the other. As

every diminution of power on one side is to be regarded asan increase on the opposite”16. In this kind of war when theasymmetry make impossible for one side be physicallystronger than the enemy the moral power became more

14 On War – Carl von Clausewitz – Book III Chapter 10 15 On War – Carl von Clausewitz – Book VI Chapter 26 16 On War – Carl von Clausewitz – Book VII Chapter 21




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important, and should be take in account in order to shift fromstrategic defence to offensive.

(5) In spite of the trend towards the war of attrition demonstratedby Clausewitz we can obtain his doctrine certain useful ideaseither for use or to avoid in the new forms of warfare.

e) Leading to unwanted consequences of Clausewitz’s theories somemodern armies seems to become more dependent of technology(such kind of “technoslavery”) or firepower instead of the training,planning, develop innovative maneuvers. Technology seems shapingdoctrine and definitively it becomes far as Sun Zi ideas.

f) The new paradigm of the attrition warfare is the latest US doctrine asknow as Net Centric Warfare or The Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA). It aims take advantage of superior information throughnetworking of well informed geographically dispersed forces. The

central idea is that the all command and control is digitalized andimproves the quality of information and shared situational awarenessfor the purpose of speed of command and increase missioneffectiveness. So the concept and its implementation could havesome shortcomings, such us:

(1) Freedom or initiative likely to be checked as the tactical controlunder strict supervision. Concept is likely to curb the freedom or liberty of action of the combat leaders on ground. It doesn’ttake account of the human nature and increases the risk ofmicromanagement. One could imagine a general in thePentagon tell to a private in the front “hey guy shot the left

insurgent, not the one on the right”

(2) In the same way of the human nature, the capability of thebrain to process information is limited. The failure in asses asituation cold have got two origins, one the lack of information,the second is the excessive amount of information that cannotbe processed either or prevents separate important data on theredundant

(3) Net Centric Warfare in more susceptible of deception. One ofthe battlefield deception principles is the Jones' Dilemma whichsaid: Deception generally becomes more difficult as the

number of sources available to the target to confirm the "real"increases. However, the greater the number of sources whichcan be deceptively manipulated, the greater the chance thatyou can provide the target "confirming, all-source intelligence."

(4) The implementation of net centric warfare, or the war based intechnology and firepower, is expensive in terms of billiondollars and “the only truth is reality” in the battlefields of Iraq




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and Afghanistan. We believe it is appropriate to illustrate thisreality through this quote “The huge investment in computer networks, drone aircraft, and the other high – technology gadgetry failed to provide situational awareness about the only thing that counted – which Iraqis favored and which opposed the occupation” 17

(5) The last and not least important issue concerns the morality ofthis doctrine. What difference is there between a terrorist killingdefenceless civilian with a bomb and a bureaucrat in thePentagon who fires a missile from a Predator in Afghanistanagainst insurgent also killing innocent civilians who werecasually in the place course? In this quote we could find theanswer “Mainly responsible for America’s tactical stagnation has been its arms manufacturers. Death from afar is less moral than death from close range because of its greater difficulty with target verification. Machines don’t have consciences, people do; and the most logical candidate for doing the right thing in combat is the frontline fighter” 18

5) Maneuver Warfare.

a) Concept: it is not only to move to a favourable position. Moreover is amilitary philosophy which seeks to collapse the enemy through avariety of rapid and unexpected actions aimed at their centers ofgravity with the purpose to keep a situation where the enemy couldn’treact timely.

b) Instead of destroy all the forces indiscriminately it seeks to destroyonly certain enemy targets (command and control centers, logisticalbases, fire support assets, etc.) and to isolate enemy strongpointswhich often results in the collapse which minimal physical damage.(e.g. the Maginot Line).

c) Instead of use fire power only to destroy enemy forces, it could beused to suppress too. To create unbalance in the enemy linesinfiltration tactics, by conventional or special forces, could be used.

d) The centers of gravity are selected more aimed to a criticalvulnerability than to the source of enemy strength.

e) The theory of Maneuver Warfare was developed by many militarists.However the idea to keep an enemy off-balance is by rapidmovement is old as the war. Then we will make a brief summary ofthe authors who made more important contributions to maneuverwarfare.

17 Tactics of the Crescent Moon – John Poole – Posterity Press – pp. 166 18 Tactics of the Crescent Moon – John Poole – Posterity Press – pp. 215




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f) Sir Basil Liddel Hart.

(1) After the experience of World War I Liddell Hart concluded a

theory that he think should have been considered to avoid the

high casualties of this war. He developed the strategy of theindirect approach against the strategy of attrition used in World

War I. He based his theory in Sun Zi ideas and two others

ancient Roman Generals, Scipio Africanus and Fabio. His

theory has two basis, such us:

(a) Direct attacks aimed to the enemy main effort is useless.

The attack should be directed against the Enemy Center of

Gravity, and draw the maneuver avoiding his strong points.

(b) More important than the attack itself, it is the exploitation of

the imbalance caused, essentially in the mind of the enemy

commander. In this way he claimed that “The profoundest

truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in

the minds of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies

of their men”

(2) The ideas of indirect approach and the disruption of the

balance, rather than material destruction will be very useful for

the study of the current war

g) Colonel John Boyd.

(1) John Boyd was a Colonel of the air force which was theprecursor of the modern idea of war maneuvers. He developedthe idea of the cycle of observation, orientation, decision andaction, which is called OODA Loop. The implications of thistheory are:

(a) A shorter OODA loop than the enemy ones you coulddefeat it.

(b) To shorter the OODA loop we need initiative, thecommander’s intend, avoid the surfaces and attack theempties (actually and voids).

(c) The empties (voids) are weak points and destroying themyou could collapse the enemy.

(2) Colonel Boyd’s ideas are in the Sun Zi’s way, in consequenceare useful for us and for a war waged at minimum cost.




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h) Martin Van Cleveld.

(1) His ideas can be divided between those relating to the nature ofthe war and those referring to the conduct of operations.

(2) His ideas brings the nature of the war are bets to thoseexpressed by Clausewitz.

(a) The author’s theory denied the Clausewitz’s “wonderfultrinity” and develops the idea of “non trinitarian warfare”. Inhis view Clausewitz was right for his time but not in ourcentury.

(b) The essence of van Creveld's non trinitarian war theory iswar may be conducted by entities other than states and bymeans other than armies and for ends other than politics.

(c) Van Creveld supports his theory in the most recent conflictswhere technologically sophisticated armies are defeated byprimitive, unsophisticated, or irregular forces.

(d) The Trinitarian idea that wars are fought by professionalarmies to achieve political goals established by the State andsupported by the population not actively involved in the fightis outdated. To have a deep understanding is the war weshould think in by whom war is fought, what is war about,how war is fought, what war is fought for and why war isfought.

(e) By whom war is fought: in the actual world, like in the ancientworld before the Westphalia Agreements the war is wagednot only for professional states armies if not also for other nostate entities.

(f) What is war all about: are the relations between all waractors, those that fought and those that suffered the warconsequences. The non trinitarian and no professionalarmies could commit war crimes or atrocities

(g) How war is fought: this is about how the force is created andapplied. Nothing new at this point.

(h) What war is fought for: the Clausewitz most quoted linedoesn’t explain the war as we know today. Perhaps is bettersay “sometimes, war is continuation of politics”. Actual warcould be political, religious, or for national or ethnicexistence.




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(i) Why war is fought: is the most critical question because isabout the fighting spirit of the army and show the motivationsby each soldier risks his life. In the war against the BritishImperialist to retrieve the Argentina’s Malvinas Island, thecountry was ruled by a Military Dictatorship. However thepeople and the soldiers didn’t want to death for the

government objectives if not for the patriotic sentiment.

(2) His ideas about conduct operations are about Maneuver Warfare.He emphasizes six main elements of this theory:

(a) Tempo: is to have an OODA loop shorter than enemy.

(b) Schwerpunkt (the German word for focal point): The centreof effort where the main effort’s force strikes the enemy atthe right place at the right time. According to Liddel Hart,ideally, a spot that is both vital and weakly defended.

(c) Surprise: it should be based on deception.

(d) Combined arms: the combined arms balances among themadvantages and disadvantages.

(e) Flexibility: the war is chaos. We have two ways to developcommand and control. One is controlling the chaos with hugecommand and control measures which limit the initiative. Thesecond way is to understand and predict the uncertainly.This is the way that van Cleveld choices. Von Moltke saidthat “No plan resists the first contact with the enemy” (he

also created the red and blue system to identified friendlyand enemy troops in wargames).

(f) Decentralized command: rapid changing situations mayoutdate plans and enemy action could interrupt thecommunications. The decision of how to accomplish itsmission should be the soldier in combat rather than generallocated away from the battlefield.

i) William Lind and the 4th Generation Warfare Theory.

(1) This scholar has developed a framework to understand themodern warfare since the Peace of Westphalia. Thisframework is called the fourth generation warfare theory.

(2) This theory has its origin after he developed the theory onmaneuver warfare when the author was looking for an answerto the question of why conventional armies have hugeproblems to crippled unconventional armies, terrorists,separatists or extremists groups, drug dealers or even simple




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bandits. He thought that the answer that the US gave to thiskind of war, which could be summarized in “Put steel on target”leads them to defeat.

(3) The reason of have as point of departure the WestphaliaAgreements is because in these the states kept for first timethe monopoly of force. Before that, many non state entities hadfought wars like families, tribes, religions, cities, businessenterprises and using many different means other than war likeassassination, bribery, mass raping.

(4) Characteristics of the four generations.

(a) First Generation Warfare: it runs roughly from Westphaliato American Civil War. This was the war of lineararrangements, where the engagements were formal andthe battlefield seemed orderly. In times of spark muzzle-

loading rifle, soldiers needed to keep the pace and rowsaligned, loading arms with automated movements to keepthe maneuver and volume of fire. Thus the militaryculture was the culture of the order, because it wasnecessary to win battles. In these days we coulddistinguish civilians from militaries. Salutes, parades,drills, uniforms, ranks are all a consequence of thisorganizational culture. The commander neither hadradios nor a very developed logistic system and theartillery aimed directly to targets almost in the first lineTherefore, the decision in battle was in the front line.

(b) Second Generation Warfare: the mass armies, thebreech-loading rifle, the machineguns break down theorder and made suicidal the linear tactics. New weaponsconsumed more ammunition and produced morecasualties, railways could carry more troops to the front,which should be stocked, and this caused the increase oflogistics. Radio stations allowed that commanders andartillery were away from the front, so the former ceased toperceive the sufferings of the first line. All this, led armiesbegan to take their critical systems not in front if not in therear. However the military culture loves parades, drills,the brilliant uniforms and was unwilling to change eventhough these uniforms completed bathed in blood by theeffects of new weapons. This contradiction between themodern war and the organizational culture was the causeof the second generation warfare. This doctrine wasdeveloped by French in World War I and could besummed as "The artillery conquers, the infantryoccupies”. The battle was conducted like an orchestra, soobedience is the most important value and all initiative




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was rejected. The doctrine was focused on rigid rules andprocedures. The second generation warfare remainsrooted in most countries military culture. The UnitedStates Army in Iraq and Afghanistan has proved to beheirs to the French the First World War because theyhave privileged firepower.

(c) Third Generation Warfare: as the second generationwarfare is the product of the contradiction between amilitary culture and the modern war. However in this casethe culture had been changed instead of “put more andmore steel on target”. It was developed by German Armyand is known as Blitzkrieg or maneuver warfare, which isbased not in destroy enemy by firepower if not collapsingit by speed and surprise knocking out his fire support,logistic and command and control. The culture had tochange; the orders specified the objective and purpose,but never the method. Initiative is more important thanobedience, the command should be decentralized.Generally speaking we could say that while Mao TseTung develop a

(d) Fourth Generation Warfare: this generation born in aworld where the cultures instead the states are in conflict.If the third generation warfare seeks to collapse thecenters of gravity in the battlefield, the fourth generationdoes it in the core of the enemy’s society. The goal iscollapsed the enemy but by a combined means such uspolitical, economic, psychological operations, terrorism,

the media or even the internet.

6) As a summary of western military thinking we develop a comparisonbetween maneuver and attrition warfare.

ComparisonFactor

Attrition Warfare Maneuver Warfare

FocusOn battle: quantity and ratios. On enemy cohesion: quality, mental

moral and psychological stability.

Emphasizes Fire and technological superiority Speed OODA loop.

NatureHierarchy Structure as an array according to the

situationStyle Centralized, prescriptive, standardized Decentralized and adaptive

Ends Destruction of the enemy Collapsing the enemy

MeansFirepower and technology Disrupt the enemy’s capability to react

to new circumstances.

RequirementsMassive firepower, technology,Industrial capability, centralization.

Trust, professionalism, leadership

RisksAsymmetric threats, non combatantscasualties terrorism as a response

Dependent on individual qualities suchus initiative high morale, creativity, “out




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against superiority. of the box” thinking

CharacteristicsWar is a science, quantifiable,systematic

War is an art, qualitative, nonlinear.

Examples

Thermopiles, Western Front in WWI,British side of Battle of Alamein , D-Day, US in Vietnam, Gulf War (1991),Iraq War (2003)

Scipio, von Lettow Vorbeck inTanzania in WWI, TE Lawrence inWWI, Rommel both WWI and II,blitzkrieg in 1940, Viet Cong-NVAagainst US, Iraq and Afghaninsurgencies

b. Eastern Military Thinking: this way of thinking seems to fit better with theactual war than some of Western’s one. Thus we are going to analyze someof the ideas of the more important eastern military thinkers.

1) Sun Zi. j) Like a scholar we can said that“The basic thesis of Sun Zi’s Art of

War consists in defeat the enemy by wisdom instead of the use of force only” 19. This is the cornerstone of all its theoretical system.This system was well developed in the NACC’s bibliography, so, wewill make some remarks only.

k) According Sun Zi, the war is of vital importance to the state, this istrue. However, not only other states threat the State, the mostdangerous blows came from non state entities. The situation today issimilar to the Sun Zi time, when the multi – polar competition was therule. Therefore the risk is no longer being annexed if not destroyedby others non – state entities.

l) Sun Zi emphasized that “a victorious army seeks battle after his plans indicate that victory is possible” 20. In other words, beforethe battle should be created all the condition that lead the victorysuch us keep the people support, Inclusive of ethnic and religiousminorities which can be a hotbed of separatism, terrorism andextremism. Another condition is to prepare the army not only to facea conventional army, if not a non state armed force. About knowingthe enemy, and get to know oneself, the current war imposes meetnot only our enemies, if not the causes which can make ordinarycitizens of our State can transform into enemies. And if we know thecauses by which citizens belonging to ethnic or racial minorities inour State can be transformed into separatists, terrorists andextremists and eliminate them we neutralized the enemy before theycan operate. Furthermore, we believe that the more important lessonfrom Sun Zi for the actual warfare is “To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence” 21

19 Sun Zi’s Art of War: A Modern Chinese Interpretation – Gen Tao Hantzang – Distal – pp. 21 20 Ibid 19 pp. 185 21 Ibid 19 pp. 25




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m) In order to keep the initiative, the Art of War has some guidingprinciples of operations. The first one is about managing victory inaccordance with the situation of the enemy. Here we should add thatnot only is the enemy, if not about the civilians involved in theoperations. Moreover to cripple the enemy efforts to alienate the

population we need apply our combat power With synchronization,and in the form of "indirect approximation". Synchronization in thistype of conflict involves up to lower levels of command to coordinatemilitary action not only but also political, economic and social toeliminate the support of the population to separatists, terrorists andextremists. In the actual environment is difficult to win a quick victory.However, in Mao’s words, if the strategy could be long the operationsshould get a decision as quick as possible. When we detect andidentified terrorist group it must be destroyed without dilation withoutcivilian casualties. To deceive the enemy the most important is toalienate it and the psychological attack. We understand for alienateto divide the enemy, first the terrorist, separatist and extremist fromthe population, second the officers from NCO and privates. Theobjective of the psychological attack should be breaking the enemy’swill of fight. Sun Zi said that is better to capture and regiment orcompany than destroy it, so this should be the aim of PsyOps.Extraordinary and normal forces are referred at center of gravity. Theweak point of the three evils is the peoples support, in consequencewe should use normal forces when we need only firepower, forinstance, to cordon and search, and the extraordinary to operate withthe population and like a surgeon remove terrorism cancer withoutharm to innocent civilians. The actually is our own combat power thatcould alienate the population by collateral damage, the void is to kill

terrorist smooth, silently and at minimal cost for all sides.

2) Sun Bin:

i) It gives us a concept of the utmost importance that is exploiting thevictory with these words “In making preparations for struggle, it is not only necessary to consider how best to prevail, but also how best to handle the aftermath of struggle, how to safeguard the fruits of victory, and how to make the best of further opportunities that arise as a result of success” 22.

j) Is a no sense to shed blood, if after the conflict don’t disappear the

causes that originated it. There are many examples of this. The warsbetween Arabs and Israelis seem to never end, and occur in cyclicform. After American forces conquered Baghdad war became moreviolent.

k) If the people problems are not resolved after of the fighting, againcreated the conditions for the reappearance of the three evils.

22 The Lost Art of War – Sun Tzu II (Sun Bin) – Harper Collins – pp. 102




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3) Mao Tse Tung.

a) Mao thinking is focused in politics and the rise of and just andegalitarian state. However we will develop three ideas of extremeimportance for this new type of war.

b) The terrorist, extremist and separatist shall to alienate people. Thiswill seek to leverage real or alleged abuses against the population. Inthis type of conflict rather than any other have full Mao’s ideas like“The Eighth Route Army put into practice a code known as 'Three Rules and the Eight Remarks', which we list here. Rules: all actions are subject to command; do not steal from the people; be neither selfish nor unjust. Remarks: Replace the door when you leave the house; roll up the bedding on which you have slept; be courteous. be honest in your transactions,return what you borrow, replace what you break, do not bathe in

the presence of women, do not without authority search those you arrest.” 23

c) We could think that the terrorists, separatists and extremists areweak because their lack of training and weapons. This way ofthinking is wrong and leads to defeat. These groups do not get theirpower for the weapons, if not for the support of the population thatachieve either frightening it or abusing their wishes of greaterequality and justice, or of external support for defenders of humanrights groups or media, which have other interests that go beyond thepurely humanitarian and that are generally associated with economicbenefits. Therefore the State is not stronger than this kind of groups

and it isn’t able to quick annihilate this kind of threat, so is necessaryto annihilate the armed terrorist in battles and campaigns to attritethe whole organization at strategy level. In Mao’s words “Hence campaigns of annihilation are the means of attaining the objective of strategic attrition. In this sense war of annihilation is war of attrition” 24.

d) A consequence of that we have written above we need to annihilatethe enemy in short battles and campaigns embedded in a longstrategy. This should be a cycle of isolate the enemy from populationand foreign support, develop PsyOps to alienate them, engage theidentified armed groups (short battles and campaigns). The

execution of this idea is mastery described by Mao “In quick- decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines, as discussed above, the crucial point is the "offensive"; "exterior lines" refers to the sphere of the offensive and "quick-decision" to its duration. Hence the name "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines". It is the best principle for waging a

23 On Guerrilla Warfare – Mao Tse Tung – Chapter VI 24 On Protracted War – Mao Tse Tung – paragraph 98




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protracted war and it is also the principle for what is known as mobile warfare. But it cannot be put into effect without initiative,flexibility and planning. Let us now study these three questions” 25

4) Vo Nguyen Giap.

a) General Giap has developed the ideas on Mao Tse Tung. Like him,his theory is focused in politics; however is useful for us. One of thefirst useful ideas is about the non linear battlefield, “There was noclearly defined front in this war. It was there where the enemy was.The front was nowhere, it was everywhere”.26

b) Another idea is about the nature of this war. If we think this war isonly the engagement of two armies we will defeat. “This fact is that the war in Vietnam was not the opposition of two armies. In provoking hostilities, the aggressive colonialist had alienated

the whole nation ”.

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And if we think this war is waged only byweapons we are giving the victory to the enemy “Our People Resistance War was an all out Resistance War. Not only did we fight in the military field but also in the political, economic and cultural field” .28

c) Again, he remarked the importance of the good relations with thepopulation “In contact with the people, to follow these three considerations: to respect the people, to help the people, to defend people... in order to win their confidence and affection and achieve a perfect understanding between the people and the army” .29

5. Conclusions.

a. Some general conclusions.

1) We can’t find the answer in the traditional military thinking to face thethree evils or the asymmetric warfare, whatever is the origin of it fromEastern to Western.

2) The organizational culture of the armies must change to defeat the threeevil forces or the asymmetric threat.

3) We not try to determine if the Eastern or Western is better doctrine.Better that it is integrating both points of view to find the best possiblesolution.

25 On Protracted War – Mao Tse Tung – paragraph 78 26 People’s war, people’s army – Gen Vo Nguyen Giap – University Press of The Pacific – pp. 21 27 Ibid 26 28 Ibid 26 29 Ibid 26




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4) Never underestimate enemy, which probably have read Sun Zi, Mao,Fourth Generation Warfare Theory, like this example "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. Our troops found copies of it in the caves at Tora Bora, the al Qaeda hideout in Afghanistan” 30

b. Conclusions at strategic level.

1) This level has the responsibility of think what kind of army the countryneed, so in order to building an army we have some ideas such us:

a) Technology is a good thing. However it is neither a “magic pill” nor a“silver bullet”, it is only one meaner to wage wars. For instance“sensors that help locate tanks can’t differentiate between a soldier with a rifle and a mother cooking dinner” 31

b) The armies need tanks, gun and ships, we have no doubt. However,

to face this kind of threats we need light infantry and Special Forces.When we said light infantry and Special Forces we don’t mean asoldier loaded with thirty kilograms of equipment which reduce hismobility. Light Infantry and Special Forces are not matter ofequipment but a matter of mentality. William Lind stated that “To fight such battles we need some true light infantry, infantry that can move farther and faster on its feet than the enemy, has a full tactical repertoire (not just bumping into the enemy and calling for fire) and can fight with its own weapons instead of depending on supporting arms. We estimate that U.S. Marine infantry today has a sustained march rate of only 10-15 kilometers per day; German World War II line, not light, infantry

could sustain 40 kilometers” 32

c) Special Forces must not be trained as killers. Special Forces all welltrained soldiers in weaponry and tactics and with a profoundknowledge of politics, economics, social sciences, psychologicaloperations, negotiation and many skills that are unusual for themilitary’s orthodoxy.

2) As in the traditional war we are concerned to have enough fire support inthe fourth generation warfare or when we fight against the three evils weshould be concerned about the enemy operations in the areas of humanrights, media and internet. We think is not a bad idea to keep in our

military organization some kind of “human Rights Task Force” and a“PsyOps and Media Unit”. The web doesn’t bleed but a picture or a videouploaded could cause an inacceptable loss of legitimacy in the war.

c. Operational Level

30 Understanding the Fourth Generation Warfare – William Lind 31 The Tiger Way – John Poole – Posterity Press – pp. 278 32 Understanding the Fourth Generation Warfare – William Lind




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1) Center of Gravity: in this kind of conflict they are the causes of thepeoples’ unrest on which the enemy get its legitimacy.

2) Preserve our force and destroy the enemy ... only if it is necessary. If weannihilate it we should do in a very quick manner. The better is to

eliminate the causes of the unrest. It is not necessary to use all the forceavailable, only the necessary to defeat enemy, crippling his will to resistwith minimal casualties and without killing civilian.

3) The maneuver should be indirect, aimed not to the armed terrorist if notto the causes of the conflict. The tempo should materialize a shorterOODA Loop than the enemy.

4) Human Right violations could be a tactical advantage. However itsstrategic and long term effects could be harmful.

d. Tactical Level.

1) At this level we should apply almost the same tactics that all guerrillashave been developed along the history. The difference is that now weavoid all collateral damage as we can.

2) A tactical action could have catastrophic strategic consequences.Therefore, Special Forces and Light Infantry should be full of “strategiccorporals” committed about the economic, social and political matters ofhis area of operations and the effects of his own actions.

e. To very summarize all that we have written about how could defeat and

asymmetric threat we can say “non vi, sed arte ”33

References.

1. On Guerrilla Warfare – Mao Tse Tung – http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch06.htm

2. On Protracted War – Mao Tse Tung – http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_09.htm

3. On War – Carl von Clausewitz – http://www.clausewitz.com/index.htm4. People’s War, People’s Army – Gen Vo Nguyen Giap – University Press of the

Pacific5. Sun Tsu’s Art of War. A Modern Chinese Interpretation – Gen Tao Hantzang6. Strategy: Indirect Approach – Sir Basil Liddel Hart7. The Lost Art of War – Sun Tzu II (Sun Bin) – Harper And Collins8. Understanding the Fourth Generation Warfare – William Lind –

http://antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702

33 “Not by strength, but by guile” is the motto of Argentine Special Forces.

the new kind of war and the military thinking

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