TITLE : TAJIKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITHIRAN AND AFGHANISTAN

AUTHOR : Muriel AtkinGeorge Washington Universit y

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Muriel Atkin

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DATE :

November 9, 1992

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Executive Summary :

Tajikistan's Relations with Iran and Afghanistan

Today, many Tajiks living in the former Soviet Union ar e

keenly aware that they are part of a larger Persian cultura l

world . Those who are active in politics in Tajikistan, whethe r

the Communist old guard still trying to preserve its dominance o r

the various opposition groups, think that connections with tha t

wider Persian world, especially in Iran and Afghanistan, can b e

useful to them . However, the kinds of links they emphasize and

their purposes in doing so vary considerably .

The facet of this cross-border connection which is mos t

discussed in the news media is religious, specifically that Ta-

jiks in Tajikistan want to establish an Islamic state modeled o n

Iran with aid both from that country and from Afghanistan's muja-

hidin . However, that view relies excessively on garbled informa-

tion and a certain amount of hostile propaganda . There is a

certain amount of respect for Iran as a state which has, accord-

ing to its own propaganda, gone from subordination to a foreign

power to full independence and full freedom to live according t o

Islamic teachings . At the same time, most Tajiks, even advocate s

of Islamicizing politics, do not consider Iran's kind of Islami c

state an appropriate example for Tajikistan to emulate . Stories

that the current political turmoil in Tajikistan is the result o f

a plot to establish an Islamic "fundamentalist" state there fo-

mented by Afghanistan's radical Islamicizers, the Hizb-i Islami ,

and supported by Hizb guerrillas fighting in Tajikistan are wild -

ly exaggerated . These stories owe much to the propaganda of the

Communist hard-liners, which tries to deny any legitimate domes -

tic basis for opposition to the old order .

Much of what interests Tajiks about the Persian-speakin g

world beyond their borders involves economics : investment, trade ,

and development projects for the poorest of the former Sovie t

republics . Another important part of the attraction is cultural .

After decades of having their heritage reinterpreted and deni-

grated under the Soviet system and still fearful of dominance b y

their Turkic neighbors, Tajiks seek help from abroad in reinvig-

orating their language, literature, history, and arts .

In the context of a domestic political power struggle, whic h

the hard-line government's own actions did much to turn violent ,

various condending groups have armed themselves, including b y

obtaining weapons from Afghanistan . This is true for supporters

of the Communist old guard as well as some of the opposition .

Their contacts in Afghanistan are not simply or even primaril y

members of the Hizb-i Islami but any one who has weapons to sel l

or barter ; that applies to most of the adult males in a countr y

bristling with weapons .

Tajikistan now faces immense problems . To deal with them ,

it is seeking cooperation and aid not only from Iran and Afghani-

stan but from as many countries as possible . Therefore, an im-

portant factor in determining which countries Tajikistan wil l

deal with the most will be which countries give it the most as-

sistance in deed, not just in lectures on what to do differentl y

and unfulfilled promises . After prolonged domination by others ,

the Tajiks are not eager now to be dominated by a new foreig n

master .

The cultural similarities among Tajikistan, Iran, and

Afghanistan do not foreordain that Tajikistan must become a pup -

pet or even an integral part of the other two . The competing

political groups in Tajikistan would prefer to diversify thei r

foreign relations . That is feasible, as long as other countrie s

do not mishandle their dealings with or simply ignore Tajikistan .

Tajikistan's Relations with Iran and Afghanista n

by Muriel Atki n

Tajikistan and Iran have shown increased interest in eac h

other since the last years of the Soviet Union's existence .

However, that does not mean that the reasons for this interest ar e

the same in both countries or that either sees the other as th e

linchpin of its foreign policy . Culture, economics, religion, an d

politics all play a role in relations between these two countries .

Tajikistan's interest in Iran has broad support but is tempered b y

wariness of subordination to Iran . Iranian interest in Tajikista n

has a narrower base of support, being largely a function o f

government ambitions, but is broader ranging in its objectives .

Some of the same factors which link Tajikistan to Iran link i t

to Afghanistan as well . However, this relationship is complicate d

by the fact that one virtually has to speak of "Afghanistans "

rather than a single entity, since the country is divided on many

lines, including the political gulf between the supporters of th e

now-defunct Communist government in Kabul and the opposition to it ,

which is itself divided along ideological, religious, and ethni c

lines . Ethnicity divides not only the mujahedin but also th e

population as a whole between the traditionally dominant Pashtuns

and all others, who are divided among themselves and include Tajik s

and other Persian-speakers .

The Tajiks of the former Soviet Union and the dominan t

nationality in Iran, the Persians, as well as the various Persian -

speakers in Afghanistan, are similar--though not identical--in

1

language and other aspects of culture . That fact has bee n

important to educated Tajiks in Central Asia as they maneuvered fo r

advantage in the context of Soviet nationality relations and bega n

the process of building a viable independent state in the post -

Soviet period .

Although the term "Tajik" has a centuries-long tradition o f

use, not only in Central Asia, to differentiate Persian-speaker s

from Turkic peoples, the use of that name to designate a nationali -

ty in a political sense is a twentieth-century creation of the

Soviet regime . The subdivision of Soviet Central Asia during th e

1920s and 1930s into republics defined in terms of nationality gav e

ethnicity greater weight in the politics as well as the social ,

cultural, and economic concerns of the region than it had had i n

the past .

Elites of all the major Central Asian nationalities had t o

deal with the way the Soviets defined their national identity fo r

them . This included categorizing all of them as "formerly backwar d

peoples," who owed their progress not only to Communist rule bu t

also to the guidance of the more advanced Russians . In addition ,

the Soviet way of defining nationalities in Central Asia could b e

more inclusive in some cases than what had existed traditionally ,

as in the subsuming of tribal, local, or even ethnic identitie s

into larger national categories, but divisive in others, emphasiz -

ing the separateness of officially-defined nationalities fro m

kindred peoples inside or outside the Soviet Union . At the sam e

time that Central Asian nationalities had to deal with th e

2

3

Kremlin's policy toward them, they also competed among themselve s

on many points, including political power, access to natura l

resources, and educational opportunities . This competition has

persisted and in many ways intensified in the post-Soviet era . In

coping with nationality relations on both all-Union and regiona l

levels, educated Tajiks have made significant political use o f

their kinship to other Persian-speakers since the 1940s .

One of the most important ways many educated Tajiks in genera l

as well as Tajikistan's Communist officials have sought to counte r

denigrating interpretations of their identity by either the centra l

authorities or their Turkic neighbors has been to stress thei r

links to the Persian past and present . 1 As a practical matter ,

before the political reforms of the closing years of the Sovie t

era, they often had to label as Tajik anything Persian from beyon d

Central Asia to avoid provoking Moscow's wrath . 2 Less importan t

than the accuracy of this designation is the way in which it ha s

enabled Tajiks to evade, at least to some extent, Moscow's effort s

to regulate the content of their culture . The crux of thi s

interpretation is that Tajik-Persian culture is not "formerl y

I "Ustav i programma organizatsii 'Rastokhez' (Vozrozhdenie )Tadzhikskoi SSR," Rastokhez, 1990, no . 5, p . 3 ; "Az rui aql isolim," Adabiyot va san"at, August 16, 1990, p . 1 ; "Izhorot iishtirokkunandagoni konferentsiyai ta"sisi sozmoni umumimilli itojikon 'Mehr'," Sogdiana, 1990, no . 3 ., p . 1 ; "Pora obnovleniia, "Sogdiana, 1990, no . 1 (February), p . 1 ; "Obshchestvo v 1989 godu, "Sogdiana, 1990, no . 1, p . 1 ; "Na ruinakh ambitsii," Sogdiana, 1990 ,no . 1, p . 3 .

2 M . Atkin, "Religious, National, and Other Identities i nCentral Asia," in Muslims in Central Asia, J .-A . Gross, ed .(Durham, NC : Duke University Press, 1992), pp . 55-56 .

4

backward" or a mere addendum to the Turkic character of Centra l

Asia but is highly developed and ancient in origin . In 1989 ,

Tajikistan openly recognized the importance of Persian culture t o

its own when it enacted a law making Tajik the state language ; the

wording of the law equated Tajik and Persian . 3 Non-Communist Taji k

organizations have taken the same view of the kinship between the

two . 4 By Tajikistan's first year of independence, it has becom e

commonplace to refer to Persian and Tajik simultaneously, as on e

language, and often to use only the name "Persian" where "Tajik "

would have been used in the past .

During the late Soviet and early post-Soviet periods, i n

Tajikistan as in many republics, nationalism has gained strengt h

while simultaneously people see a need to develop new foreig n

contacts to supplement or replace the old center-periphery

relationship with Moscow . Thus, it is logical for Tajikistanis t o

pay particular attention to Iran since they see a variety of ways

in which Iran might be useful to them .

Much of the interest is cultural . Tajik nationalist s

perceived their people as having been deprived of much of thei r

heritage, linguistic and otherwise, by the Soviet decision in 192 9

to abandon the modified Arabic alphabet in which Persian i s

written . The result has been, as Moscow intended and contemporar y

Tajik nationalists regret, to impede communication between Tajik s

3 "Qonuni zaboni Respublikai Sovetii Sotsialistii Tojikiston, "Tojikistoni soveti, July 30, 1989, p . 1 .

4 "Pora obnovleniia" ; "Na ruinakh ambitsii ;" "Izhoroti" ;"Ustav ."

5

and fellow-Persian speakers outside the Soviet Union . The onl y

Persian-language writings to which Tajiks have subsequently had

access are the few that the Soviets chose to publish in the new

alphabet (briefly Latin, subsequently modified Cyrillic .) This has

been blamed for what is said to be the decline in the state of th e

Tajik language and culture . 5 The solution proposed to end thi sis

artificial isolation/a return to the use of the Arabic alphabet, a s

called for by the 1989 language law and endorsed by non-Communis t

nationalists . 6 Iran has tried to play a major role in this chang e

by providing teachers, printing materials, and publications .

The ultimate effects of the new language policy remain to b e

seen but it will not necessarily provide the solution its propo-

nents seek . Whatever the wisdom of the 1929 alphabet change, i t

occurred at a time when a majority of Tajik-speakers were illiter -

ate ; the current attempt to revive the use of the Arabic alphabe t

is directed at a population that is almost entirely literate--i n

the Cyrillic alphabet . Three years after the enactment of the ne w

language law, a proponent of the use of the Arabic alphabet ha s

estimated that only one per cent of Tajikistan's population i s

5 G . Faizullozoda, "Nohamvorihoi roh," 0muzgor, Aug . 15, 1989 ,p . 5 ; S . Halimsho, "Darakhti jovidonkhirad," Adabiyot va san"at ,August 24, 1989, p . 5 ; A . Istad, "Ba ki ta"na mezanem? " . Tojiki-stoni soveti, July 1, 1989, p . 3 ; "Muzokira az rui ma"ruzai 'Da rborai loihai qonuni zaboni respublikai sovetii sotsialisti iTojikiston', " Tojikistoni soveti, July 26,

1989, p .

1 ; S .Assadulloev, "Zarurati alifboi niyogon," 0muzgor, May 6, 1992, pp .5-6 .

6 "Qonuni zaboni" ; "Pora obnovleniia" ; "Na ruinakh ambitsii" ;"Izhoroti" ; "Ustav ."

6

literate in it . 7 The vast majority of Tajik-language publication s

is still in the Cyrillic alphabet . In the current alphabet refor m

efforts, Tajiks are trying to avoid exclusive dependence on Iran .

For example, Tajikistan has sought Arabic-alphabet printin g

materials from Pakistan . 8

Moreover, the change of alphabet and reliance on aid from Iran

in accomplishing it poses particular problems for Tajik speakers .

Vocabulary change has become a point of controversy as a conse-

quence of the increased emulation of Iranian usage . Tajik

nationalists look forward to dropping Russian loanwords an d

replacing them with words drawn from Persian-speakers in Iran an d

Afghanistan . 9 However, the choice of replacements is not clea r

cut . Some of the vocabulary differences between Tajik and th e

Persian spoken elsewhere are not the consequence of borrowings fro m

Russian but the survival of older Persian terminology and th e

incorporation of words from eastern Iranian or other regiona l

languages . It remains to be seen whether Tajiks will be willing t o

discard these under the influence of Iranian Persian . There was

some controversy over this initially . 1 0

In addition to Iranian-Tajikistani relations in languag e

7 Assadulloev, "Zarurati alifboi niyogon . "

8 Interfax (Moscow), November 11, 1991, FBIS, Daily Report .Soviet Union, November 13, 1991, p . 86 .

9 M . Qurbon and S . Ayub, "Tehron, Kobul, Dushanbe," Adabiyo tva san"at, August 10, 1989, p . 2 ; "Muzokira, " p . 3 .

10 L . Sherali, "Pora kunem yo chora khunem?", Adabiyot vasan"at, May 28, 1992, p . 5 .

7

matters, the two countries have been cooperating in various othe r

cultural spheres since 1989 . For example, the Tajikistan Cultura l

Foundation made agreements in 1990 with several Iranian publisher s

to sell books and magazines in Tajikistan, including literary an d

political works, textbooks, and the Koran (with a Persian transla -

tion .) 11 Such materials have indeed begun to reach Tajikistan .

An Iranian film festival and a book fair were held in Dushanb e

(Tajikistan i s capital) late in 1990 . Iranian officials visite d

Tajikistan in connection with both events . 12 Subsequently, ther e

have been additional visits in both directions by cultural figure s

and athletes as well as exhibits . A few Tajikistanis have been

sent to Iran for specialized education and there are plans to sen d

more .

Iranian programs are broadcast on Tajikistan's stat e

television network . 1 3

Although Iran's religious ideology is reflected in it s

11 M . Olimpur, "Tehronu Dushanbe baradarshahr meshavand, "Adabiyot va san"at, August 30, 1990, p . 12 ; idem, " 'Paivand'," p .12 ; K . Nasrullo, " Muhabbati Eron," ibid ., November 8, 1990, p . 3 ;"Tajikistan, jazirah-yi zaban-i parsi dar miyan-i tork hast, "Kayhan-i hava'i, January 23, 1991 (Bahman 3, 1369), p . 14 . Theauthor wishes to thank Dr . Patrick Clawson for bringing thi sarticle to her attention .

12 "Jashnovorai filmhoi eroni," Adabiyot va san"at, Novembe r22, 1990, p . 6 ; Olimpur, " Namoishi kitobhoi Eron," ibid ., Decembe r13, 1990, p . 11 .

13 A . Nizom, "Panj soli purtalosh," Javononi Tojikiston, March26, 1992, p . 2 ; Chtoby vozrodit' kul'turu," Narodnaia gazeta, Apri l18, 1992 ; Sherali, " Pora kunem yo chora khunem?", p . 4 ; B . Timurov ,"Iz turne po Iranu," Narodnaia gazeta, July 9, 1992, p . 4 ; TIAKhovar, "Za ukreplenie mezhdunarodnykh pozitsii Tadzhikistana, "Narodnaia gazeta, July 18, 1992, p . 1 ; Namoishi nashriyahoi Eroni, "Jumhuriyat, August 19, 1992, p . 1 ; " Tojikiston ba qadom sohi lmebaroyad?", Jumhuriyat, August 19, 1992, p . 1 .

8

publications, not all of those sent to Tajikistan are primaril y

about Islam . For example, two of the magazines sent to an Augus t

1992 press exhibit in Dushanbe were Symbols and Meaning in Cinema

[Nishanehha va ma"na dar sinema] and Photographers andPhotography

['Akasan va 'akasi] . Iran has launched a monthly magazine, Oshno

[acquaintance], aimed at Persian-speakers in Central Asia . The

first issue opened with a discussion of how much Iran has in commo n

with the republics of Central Asia, including language, literature ,

the arts, and history, as well as religion . That issue and the

next contained articles on ancient (and therefore pre-Islamic) and

medieval Persian and Arabic literature and on the writings of 'Al i

Shariati (1933-1977),14whose whose views were echoed in the ideology o f

Iran's Mojahedin-e Khalq, which was defeated in a violent powe r

struggle with the Islamic Republican Party in the early 1980s .

Relations between Tajikistan and Iran involve economic matter s

in addition to cultural ones . The two countries have discusse d

joint ventures, particularly in spinning and weaving cotton ,

Tajikistan's main crop . 15 This is especially significant fo r

Tajikistan because, under the Soviet system, almost all of it s

cotton output was turned into finished goods by other republics o f

the former Union .

14 M . Shakuri, "Payomi oshnoyon," Adabiyot va san"at, June 4 ,1992, p . 14 .

15 Nasrullo, "Muhabbati Eron" ; TadzhikTA, "Mehmoni eroni darTojikiston," Tojikistoni soveti, October 20, 1989, p . 2 ; Dushanbedomestic radio, April 21, 1991, Foreign Broadcast Informatio nService [FBIS], Daily Report . Soviet Union, April 25, 1991, p . 75 ;"Bozargononi Iron dar Tojikiston," Tojikistoni shuravi, August 27 ,1991, p . 3 .

9

With the passage of time and Tajikistan's emergence as a n

independent state, Iran has shown a willingness to increase the

scale of its economic involvement in Tajikistan . It has offered

the Dushanbe government $50 million in credits to buy Iranian-mad e

equipment for use in light industry . Officials of the two

countries have also signed agreements on banking and commercia l

cooperation . 1 6

As Tajikistan grapples with economic reform, at least a fe w

nationalists look to Iran as an alternative economic model, on th e

grounds that it offered a relevant example of a country which ha d

formerly been dependent economically but had achieved self-reliance

and prosperity . 17 However, other Tajikistanis seek economi c

relations with a broader range of countries, including Pakistan ,

Turkey, Saudia Arabia, the United States, Germany, and China, as

well as former Soviet republics . 1 8

The governments in both Dushanbe and Tehran have encourage d

increased political-diplomatic contacts . The turning point came i n

June 1990, when Tajikistan's vice-chairman of the Council o f

16 "Zavershilsia ofitsial'nyi vizit," Narodnaia gazeta, Jul y1, 1992, p . 1 .

17 Nasrullo, "Muhabbati Eron," p . 14 .

18 U . Soleh, "Ham tijorat, ham kori khair," Jumhuriyat, Apri l3, 1992, p . 2 ; N . Asadullo, "Dudi khonaro ravzan dedonad," Adabiyo tva san"at, June 21, 1990, p . 3 ; "Oshkhonai chekhi dar Farkhor, "Tojikistoni Shuravi, August 29, 1991, p . 3 ; Moscow domestic radio ,September 22, 1990, FBIS, Daily Report . Soviet Union, September 24 ,1990,

p .

103 ;

Dushanbe domestic radio, September 23, 1990,

FBIS ,Daily

Report .

Soviet

Union,

September 27,

1990 p . 98 ;

Moscowtelevision, July 16, 1990, FBIS, Daily Report . Soviet Union, Jul y18, 1990, p . 106 .

1 0

Ministers, Otakhon Latifi, headed a delegation from his country t o

the Tehran observances of the first anniversary of Ayatollah

Ruhollah Khomeini's death . Two years later, Tajikistan participat -

ed more emphatically in similar observances by sending a delegatio n

of 150 to Tehran . The occasion was not only ceremonial but was

also used for negotiations with Iranian officials on the expansio n

of relations between the two countries . Iran signaled its desir e

to capitalize on the opportunity by paying the travel expenses o f

the entire delegation . 1 9

An exchange at a still higher level was planned to start o n

August 25, 1991, when Qahhor Mahkamov, simultaneously head of th e

republic's government and first secretary of its Communist Party ,

was scheduled to visit Iran . That trip was canceled because of the

attempted overthrow of Gorbachev a few days earlier and Mahkamov' s

subsequent fall from power . Undeterred by the missed opportunity ,

Iran's foreign minister stopped briefly in Dushanbe in December

1991, as part of his visit to several Soviet republics . He me t

with Tajikistan's new president, Rahmon Nabiev, a member of th e

Communist old guard, as well as various other officials . 20 Th e

presidential visit to Iran finally occurred in mid-1992 (June 28 -

30 .) At that time, the two countries concluded agreements o n

cooperation in the spheres of economics, culture, and scholarship ;

they also planned to establish a governmental commission to promot e

19 MIT Khovar, "Ravobit vus"at meboyad," Jumhuriyat, June 2 ,1992, p . 1 .

20 Dushanbe domestic radio, December 2, 1991, FBIS, DailyReport . Soviet Union, December 4, 1991, p . 83 .

1 1

further cooperation . An important part of the lesson Nabiev wante d

Tajiks to draw from the visit, as he explained after his return ,

was how much they and the Iranians have in common . "We and th e

Iranians," he said, "have a single language, a single faith, w e

have a single science and culture . Moreover, right up to the 15t h

century we and they lived in a single state . "2 1

Despite the enthusiasm for the Iranian connection, Tajikista n

has maintained its practice of trying to maximize its options .

Thus, the Nabiev delegation proceeded directly from Iran t o

Pakistan and there concluded similar agreements .

After the demise of the Soviet Union, Iran became the firs t

country to establish an embassy in Dushanbe, on January 9, 1992 .

On that occasion, the two countries declared their intention t o

establish airplane links between Dushanbe and Tehran, Mashhad, an d

Tabriz . 22 In recognition of Iran's timeliness in opening it s

embassy, the street in Dushanbe on which it is located, formerl y

named for Maxim Gor'kii, was renamed Tehran Street . (In a sense ,

the new name has comparatively neutral connotations, associate d

with Iran in a generic sense rather than the Islamic Republic i n

particular . In contrast, the street on which the Soviet embassy i n

Tehran was located was long known as Stalin Street .) Remarks by

members of the Iranian delegation sent to Tajikistan for th e

occasion reflected some of the Tehran regime's thoughts on th e

21 TIA Khovar, "Za ukreplenie mezhdunarodnykh pozitsi i

Tadzhikistana," Narodnaia gazeta, July 18, 1992, p . 1 .

22 TadzhikTA,

"Iranskaia delegatsiia v Tadzhikistane, "Narodnaia gazeta, January 11, 1992, p . 1 .

1 2

significance of relations between the two countries . Among the

points highlighted by the Iranians were economic benefits an d

cultural cooperation . The latter included joint research project s

on what an official described as their shared language, literature ,

and history as well as Iran's provision of teaching materials t o

Tajikistan for instruction in the Arabic alphabet . A member of th e

Iranian delegation also stated that his country planned to open a

bookstore, to be called al-Huda (the path to salvation), to sel l

Iranian works on literature, history, and culture . 2 3

The second country to establish an embassy in Dushanbe was the

United States . Although many countries recognized Tajikistan' s

independence soon after the break up of the Soviet Union, few sent

their own diplomatic representatives to Dushanbe in the first year

of its independence .

For all Tajikistan's attention to developing its relation s

with Iran, neither its government nor its intelligentsia want the

republic simply to fall into Iran's orbit . It is one thing fo r

Tajiks to try to use contacts with Iran to strengthen their ow n

position and quite another for them, at a time when nationalism i s

strong, to accept subordination to anyone else .

One of the ways educated Tajiks deal with this is by treatin g

their heritage as deriving not only from the western Irania n

Persians but also from the eastern Iranians indigenous to Centra l

Asia .

Initially, this owed much to the Kremlin's objective o f

23 "Saforati Jumhurii Islomii Eron dar Dushanbe," Omuzgor ,January 15, 1992, pp . 1, 4 .

1 3

maximizing the differences between peoples living within the Sovie t

Union and without . However, Tajik nationalists have taken up th e

point for their own reasons . This gives them another type o f

Iranian heritage in which to take pride, especially in its Soghdia n

form . 24 (The Soghdians of ancient Central Asia were active i n

commerce along the silk route and had a highly developed culture . )

When a group of reformist Tajik intellectuals in Moscow bega n

publishing a newspaper in 1990, they called it "Sogdiana ." Taji k

nationalists' use of the eastern Iranian heritage serves three

political aims : to counter the Soviet line about their forme r

backwardness ; refute the arguments of some of their Turki c

neighbors that the Turkic peoples are the original Central Asian s

while the Tajiks arrived only after the Arab conquest ; and counter

the tendency of many Persian-speakers in Iran to regard Tajiks (t o

the extent that they notice them at all) as mere provincials on the

periphery of the Perso-Iranian world . This attention to the

Tajiks' eastern Iranian links extend to recent gestures by th e

government in Dushanbe to allow speakers of eastern Irania n

languages living in contemporary Tajikistan greater latitude to us e

their own languages . 25 (For decades these peoples were allowe d

access to education and the mass media only in Russian or Tajik . )

24 "Tojikon,", Entsiklopediyai Sovetii Tojik, vol . 7 (Dushanbe :Sarredaktsiyai ilmii Entsiklopediyai Sovetii Tojik, 1987), pp . 428 -29 ; S . Aini, "Ma"noi kalimai tojik," Sadoi Sharq, 1986, no . 8, p .85 ; B .Gh . Ghafurov, Tojikon(Dushanbe : Irfon, 1983), vol . I, pp .494-96 .

25 T .K . Varki, "Iazyk--est' ispoved' naroda," Komsomolet sTadzhikistana, June 30, 1989, p . 2 ; "Muzokira," p . 1 ; " Mas " uliyat ibuzurg meboyad," Tojikistoni soveti, July 25, 1989, p . 2 .

1 4

The Tajiks' concern not to be relegated to the margins als o

appears in the way they look at the Persian component of thei r

heritage . The accepted Tajik view of the revival of Persian as a

literary language after the disruption caused by the Arab conques t

is that it took place not in what inhabitants of the contemporar y

Iranian state think of as the Persian heartland--the Irania n

plateau--but was focused in Central Asia and adjoining parts o f

Iran and Afghanistan ; only after this revival was well underway di d

literary Persian spread southwest across the Iranian plateau .26

Some of the ways Tajiks now look at their Persian heritag e

does not coincide with the views of the more militant Islamicizer s

in Iran . One aspect of this is the interest in pre-Islamic Persia n

civilization . For example, Tajik nationalists praise the Zoroas-

trian religion as a Tajik contribution to world civilization an d

praise Zoroastrian texts for a variety of reasons, including as an

embodiment of Tajik civilization and an ethical guide .27 The

Tajiks' attention to their Persian heritage certainly include s

ample discussion of cultural figures who lived in Islamic times bu t

not all of them represent views of which the Tehran governmen t

would approve . Among these figures was Ahmad Kasravi, a historia n

noted for his criticsm of religion in general and Shi'ism i n

particular, who was assassinated by a Shi'ite militant in 1946 .

26 Atkin, "Religious," pp . 56-57 .

27 Halimsho, "Darakhti jovidonkhirad" ; E . Subhon, "Az ajdodchi burda ba avlod chi dodem?", 0muzgor, July 11, 1989, p . 4 ; R .Sharofzoda, "Kitob va farhang," Adabiyot va san"at, June 14, 1990 ,p . 11 .

1 5

(Ayatollah Khomeini also disapproved of Kasravi .) A particularl y

striking example of this Tajik enthusiasm for dissident Persian

voices is the attention paid to Nasir-i Khusrow (1004 - c . 1072) ,

a Persian-speaker from Central Asia who was both an accomplishe d

writer and a major propagandist for Isma'ili Islam, which is quit e

different from the Imami Shi'ism which predominates in the Islami c

Republic of Iran . In addition to the increased public discussion

of his intellectual contributions, the pedagogical institute in th e

city of Qurghonteppa was renamed in his honor in 1992 . 2 8

Even though the majority of Tajikistan's population is Musli m

and aware of its Iranian heritage, that does not guarantee tha t

they will emulate the Islamic politics of Iran . In addition to the

fact that the Tajiks distinguish between Persian cultural pride an d

Iranian hegemony, the Tajiks' de facto reclamation of Persia n

culture and history began roughly half a century ago, long befor e

politically militant Islam came to power in Iran . There is no

reliable evidence about the views of the vast majority of ordinar y

inhabitants of Tajikistan about Islamic politics, whether alon g

Iranian, Afghanistani, Saudi, Pakistani, or other lines . In th e

absense of truly free elections or reliable public opinion surveys ,

or even a successful coup with broad-based support, there can be

only speculation based on select anecdotes and rumors .

Many

Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other indigenous inhabitants of the republi c

28 N . Arabzoda, "Gumanizmi Nosiri Khusrav," Adabiyot va san"at ,September 14, 1989, p . 6 ; Kh . Dodkhudoev, Ismoiliya va ozodandeshi isharq (Dushanbe : Irfon, 1989) ; MIT Khovar, " Dar devoni vaziron ijumhurii Tojikiston," Jumhuriyat, April 3, 1992, p . 1 .

1 6

consider Islam valuable in a cultural or religious sense or both .

However, the tendency of some Western observers to equate being a

Muslim with being an Islamic "fundamentalist" demonstrates only th e

observers' confusion . Similarly, the stories in the Soviet and

post-Soviet media about Islamic conspiracies to establish a n

Islamic state are, by themselves, proof mainly of the fears and

propaganda methods of the authors of those stories .

Some Tajiks think that the fact that Iran's Islamic regime wa s

Shi l l while most Tajiks are Sunni minimizes their susceptibility t o

Iranian religious influence . At least some Tajiks admire Iran i n

a general sense, as a country where Islam is practiced freely (i n

contrast to conditions in Tajikistan until quite recently) withou t

wanting to emulate the specific Islamicizing politics of the

Iranian government . One vocal Tajik nationalist who is als o

something of an Islamicizer has used an Iranian precedent t o

legitimate the form of government he advocates fora post-Communis t

Tajikistan but draws his example from pre-revolutionary Iran . H e

wants the country to be governed by an executive and a majli s

(legislature) but with a president rather than a shah filling the

role of the executive . 29 Tajikistan's most powerful religiou s

figure, Qidi Akbar Turajonzoda, has stated repeatedly that mos t

inhabitants of the republic do not want to emulate Iran's Islami c

republic . For example, in an interview with a German newspaper, h e

contended that Iran could not possibly be a paradigm for Tajiki -

29 A . Istad, "Davlati milli chi guna boyad?" Adabiyotva

san"at, June 4, 1992, p . 6 .

1 7

stan :

The conditions are completely different . In Iran ther e

was never a Communist Party in power . The 70-yea r

predominance of atheism has had an effect on our coun -

try .

. Today the people are afraid of an Islami c

regime, and why should one make the people afraid? .

The people understand religion in their way : They do no t

want the women to wear the chador [veil] again and to si t

at the hearth, they reject polygamy, and they are afrai d

that human rights will be restricted if Islam comes t o

power . This at least is what they have been taught .

Psychologically, they are not ready to support an Islami c

state . 3 0

He has made this point not only for foreign consumption but also t o

a domestic audience of critics of the Nabiev regime, as in hi s

remarks to demonstrators in Dushanbe during the spring 199 2

political crisis there . 3 1

Similarly, one the the leaders of Tajikistan's Islamic Reviva l

Party has asserted that the republic would find its own gradua l

30 Berliner Zeitung, November 22, 1991, FBIS, Daily Report .Soviet Union, November 27, 1991, p . 74 ; he made the same point i ninterviews with a Soviet newspaper and a Western journalist : U .Babakhanov and A . Mursaliev, "Pust' govoriat ob islamskom Tadzhiki -stane . A kazi protiv , " Komsomolskaia Pravda, October 4, 1991, p .

1 ;R . Wright,

"Report from Turkestan," The New Yorker, April 6, 1992,p . 75 .

31 Istad, "Davlati milli . "

1 8

path to an Islamic state rather than follow the Iranian example . 3 2

Although the concern of the United States about the destabilizing

potential of Islamic "fundamentalism" is known in Tajikistan, one

of the founders of the Islamic Rebirth Party there, Davlat Usmon ,

deputy prime minister in the republic's coalition government, ha s

publicly expressed good wishes toward the United States and

advocated the growth of mutually beneficial relations between the

two countries . 3 3

While Islamicizers in Tajikistan have often talked moderation ,

then-President Rahmon Nabiev, who had no intention of letting a n

Islamic state supplant Communist rule, played on religious links t o

Iran for reasons of his own . In the face of growing opposition t o

him among his predominantly Muslim fellow countrymen, Nabiev trie d

to associate himself with Iran's Islamic republic . For example, h e

sought to impress Tajikistanis with the fact that Iran was the

first foreign country he visited as president, that he was received

by high-ranking Iranian officials, that he visited the "blesse d

grave of Imam Khomeini," and that he recognized the existence of a n

Islamic bond between the two countries . 34 On May 10, 1992, whe n

demonstrators in Dushanbe seemed on the verge of toppling hi s

government, Nabiev was the first of the republic's politica l

32 S . Erlanger, "Politics in Central Asia Being Shaped b y

Islam, " New York Times, June 9, 1992, p . AI6 .

33 "Priem v posol'stve , " Narodnaia gazeta, July 7, 1992, p . 1 .

34 "Novyi shag na puti k sotrudnichestvu," Narodnaia gazeta ,

July 7, 1992, p . 1 .

1 9

figures to call Iran's President Rafsanjani to ask for help . 35

In contrast, when officials in Iran look toward Central Asia ,

including Tajikistan, they see a region which they think should no t

only to be oriented toward Iran but also to defer to its leader -

ship . This is not an issue of particular concern to large section s

of the Iranian public but is the policy of the political leader -

ship . Such an approach reflects both ideological ambitions and the

more conventional diplomatic and economic interests of the Irania n

state . On one level, the Islamic Republic of Iran has broadcas t

its message by radio to Central Asia since the early years of th e

republic's existence . On another level, the Tehran regime has als o

increased its efforts to develop relations through state-to-stat e

channels since the late 1980s .

Underlying Tehran's activity in this area is the presumption

of a right to lead expressed in both religious and cultural terms .

The foremost example of the religious justification found expres -

sion in Khomeini's letter (January 1, 1989) to Gorbachev . Khomein i

praised Gorbachev for making reforms and urged him to carry th e

process much further . The Ayatollah's fundamental message was tha t

Islam held the solution to the Soviet Union's problems . Now tha t

the bankruptcy of Marxism had been demonstrated, he argued ,

Gorbachev ought not turn to the West for answers for it coul d

provide none . Instead, he ought to learn about Islam because it s

"sublime and world encompassing values .

. can be a means for the

35 S . Shihab, "Asie centrale : l'Iran se pose en mediateur," L eMonde, May 12, 1992, p . 3 .

2 0

well-being and salvation of all nations ." 36 Khomeini counseled the

Soviet Union to look to Iran for guidance because Iran, "as th e

greatest and most powerful base of the Islamic world, can easil y

help fill-up [sic] the ideological vacuum of your system ." 37 As

regards those citizens of the Soviet Union who are already Muslims ,

Khomeini praised Gorbachev for allowing them religious freedom an d

depicted Iran as the fitting advocate of their interests, for "We

regard the Muslims of the world as the Muslims of our own country ,

and we always regard ourselves as partners in their fate . " 38 Thus ,

Khomeini's message was not only the primacy of Islamic values i n

worldly affairs but also Iran's role as the arbiter of what Islam

is and as the leader of Muslims everywhere . Obviously, this view

of Iran's importance is not shared by all Muslims in all countries ,

including those of the former Soviet Union .

The Iranian leadership has continued to voice similar opinions

since Khomeini's death in June 1989 . For example, President 'Al i

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, when meeting with the Tajikistan i

delegation to the June 1990 memorial for Khomeini, highlighte d

Iran's interest in dealings with Tajikistan and other Sovie t

republics with Muslim populations . 39 He spoke again of the

importance of the Islamic link between such former Soviet republic s

36 Tehran domestic radio in Persian, January 8, 1989, FBIS ,Daily Report . Near East and South Asia, January 9, 1989, pp . 57-59 .

37 Ibid ., p . 59 .

38 Ibid .

39 "Eron--Ittihodi Shuravi--Tojikiston," Adabiyot va san"at ,June 14, 1990, p . 1 .

2 1

and Iran in February 1992, when representatives of the five Centra l

Asian republics and Azerbaijan met in Tehran with officials fro m

Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan to discuss economic cooperation . 4 0

Rafsanjani and Iran's foreign minister, 'Ali Akbar Velayati, hav e

also emphasized the cultural similarities between Iran and th e

republics to the north as grounds for closer relations . 4 1

Iran has openly involved itself in Tajikistan's religiou s

affairs . For example, it funds mosque construction there an d

supported Tajikistanis traveling via Iran to Saudi Arabia to mak e

the hajj in 1992 . Its perennial rival, Saudi Arabia, has provided

similar aid . 42 Iran's ambassador in Dushanbe, 'Ali Ashraf Mujtahid i

Shabistari, has declared that the Tajiks' Iranian culture was onl y

perfected under the influence of Islam and that Tajiks and Iranian s

are linked by the "single title of Muslim Iranian," having th e

"same race, same culture, same history, same language, and same reli -

gion ." 43 The foreword to the first issue of a magazine Iran

recently began publishing for Tajiks in formerly Soviet Centra l

Asia ranked Islam prominently among the things Iran had in common

40 "Muslim Regional Group Welcomes Ex-Soviet Central Asians, "New York Times, February 17, 1992, p . A9 .

41 "Eron ;" Tehran television, December 8, 1991, FBIS, Dail yReport . Near East and South Asia, December 9, 1991, p . 76 .

42 "Yordami Eron," Adabiyot va san"at, June 4, 1992, p . 3 ; M .Olimi, "Oghozi id az namozgoh," ibid ., p . 12 ; "Tojikiston ba qadomsohil mebaroyad?" .

43 A . Shabistari, "Payomi safiri Jumhurii Islomii Eron da rDushanbe ba munosibati barguzorii kungrai bainalmilalii tojikon v ahamzabononi burunmarzi," Jumhuriyat, September 8, 1992, p . 2 .

2 2

with that region . 4 4

For all Iran's use of religious rhetoric, much of its interes t

in Tajikistan and other republics to the north concerns worldl y

matters such as diplomacy and trade . For example, Iran's objec-

tives at the February 1992 meeting in Tehran were to obtain th e

support from other Muslim countries, including the former Sovie t

republics, for Iran's stance on various diplomatic issues and t o

promote economic relations with the Central Asian republics, wit h

an eye to direct competition with Saudi Arabia's activitie s

there . 45 Even when Iranian officials discuss their special interes t

in the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, what they se e

in them is not only co-religionists but also factories, chea p

labor, and railway lines . 4 6

Despite Iran's cultural and economic undertakings in Tajiki -

stan and the speed with which it established an embassy there, muc h

of Tehran's attention north of the border is directed to othe r

republics . In recent years, Iran has sought a modus vivendi wit h

the government in Moscow, whether that of the Soviet Union or th e

Russian Republic . Iranian concerns are related to such issues a s

the pursuit of diplomatic support for Iran's foreign polic y

objectives, especially as regards Iraq and Afghanistan, economi c

cooperation, and the purchase of military hardware . Tehran has

44 Shakuri, "Payomi oshnoyon . "

45 "Muslim Regional Group . "

46 IRNA (Tehran), January 24, 1992, FBIS, Daily Report . Nea rEast and South Asia, January 28, 1992, p . 49 .

2 3

also concluded agreements with some of the successor republics tha t

are not predominantly Muslim . For example, it has made agreement s

with Ukraine and Moldova for the sale of oil and natura l gas.47

Moscow has showed a similar interest in relations wit h Tehran.48

Tajikistan is not Iran's highest priority among the southern -

tier republics . Azerbaijan is particularly important to Tehran .

Turkmenistan, with its long common border with Iran, is also a

special object of Tehran's attentions, especially with regard t o

cross-border trade and the use of Turkmenistan's port facilities by

Iran's Caspian merchant shipping . One ambitious and costly Centra l

Asian undertaking about which Iran is enthusiastic is the construc -

tion of rail links among existing Chinese, Russian, Central Asian ,

and Iranian lines in the hope of establishing a lucrative commer-

cial route across Iran to world markets . Turkmenistan and

Qazaqistan are crucial to the development of this route ; Tajikistan

d7 Izvestiia, June 20, 1990, FBIS, Daily Report . Soviet Union ,July 10, 1990, p . 19 ; Interfax (Moscow), June 11, 1991, ibid ., June13, 1991, p . 12 ; IRNA (Tehran), July 11, 1991, ibid ., July 12 ,1991, p . 12 ; Tehran radio, January 3, 1989, FBIS, Daily Report .NearEastand South Asia, January 4, 1989, p . 51 ; IRNA, July 7 ,1991, FBIS, Daily Report . Near East and South Asia, July 8, 1991 ,p . 36 ; Tehran radio, August 28, 1991, FBIS, Daily Report . Near Eas tand South Asia, August 30, 1991, p . 36 ; Tehran television, Decembe r25, 1991, FBIS, Daily Report . Near East and South Asia, Decembe r27, 1991, p . 27 ; IRNA, January 22, 1992, FBIS, Daily Report . Nea rEast and South Asia, January 24, 1992, p . 51 ; RFE/RL Daily Report ,no . 82 (April 30, 1992), p . 2 ; RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 157 (Augus t18, 1992), p . 3 .

48 Tehran domestic radio, February 26, 1989, FBIS, Dail yReport . Near East and South Asia, February 27, 1989, pp . 54-56 ;Tehran radio, February 12, 1991, ibid ., February 12, 1991, p . 75 ;IRNA, September 18, 1991, ibid ., September 19, 1991, p . 40 ; Tehranradio, December 19, 1991, ibid ., December 19, 1991, p . 38 .

2 4

is peripheral to it . 49 (Furthermore, the feasibility of the entir e

project is questionable since Iran's railroads themselves are no t

built sturdily enough to withstand a heavy volume of cargo . 50 )

The terms in which Iran sees itself as being the natura l

leader for largely Muslim republics north of the border could limi t

those republics' willingness to follow Iran . The Tehran view i s

Iranocentric and risk alienating those who are supposed to heed it s

appeal . For example, the international coalition of Muslim states

which Iran tried to persuade the Central Asian republics an d

Azerbaijan to join at the February 1992 meeting in Tehran wa s

predicated on Tehran's assumption that Iran's interests i n

international affairs were identical to all Muslims' interests . 5 1

Similarly, Foreign Minister Velayati said, regarding the national -

ist upsurge in the Central Asian republics in general, tha t

"illustrious figures of the history of Islam, Iran, and civiliza-

tion are the symbols of the revival of the national identity o f

these republics . " 52 To describe the situation in those particula r

terms sends a message that Iran, as the self-designated spokesma n

for Islam and embodiment of Iranian culture, ought to define th e

content of other people's nationalist movements .

49 Tehran television, December 8, 1991, ibid ., December 9 ,1991, p . 66 .

50 The author is indebted to Dr . Patrick Clawson for thi sinformation .

51 "Muslim Regional Group . "

52 Tehran television, December 8, 1991, FBIS, Daily Report .Near East and SouthAsia, December 9, 1991, p . 76 .

2 5

This is not an isolated slip of the tongue but part of a

habitual attitude toward Central Asia . The same assumption ha s

been manifest on other occasions . For example, when Iran' s

ambassador to Tajikistan said that forty to sixty per cent of th e

vocabulary of the Turkic languages of Central Asia was Persian h e

revealed an impolitic indifference to the strength of nationa l

pride among various Turkic peoples of the region . 53 The issue i s

not what is accurate philologically . After years of being told ho w

much the Turkic peoples of Central Asia were beholden to on e

outside power, they are not now eager to be instructed in thei r

debt to another .

Soviet Tajiks' attitudes toward Afghanistan are similar i n

many ways to their attitudes toward Iran but are complicated by th e

war the Soviet army fought in support of the Communist regime i n

Kabul . During the war years, the proximity of and the cultura l

similarities between Tajikistan and Afghanistan made the forme r

useful to Moscow as it strove to solidify Communist rule in th e

latter . Moscow sent Soviet Tajiks (and other Central Asia n

peoples) to work in Afghanistan's government, educational, an d

scholarly systems . It sent publications from Tajikistan t o

Afghanistan . It used Tajikistan as an example of the benefits o f

Communist rule to show delegations from Afghanistan and as a plac e

to educate young Afghanistanis . Cultural exchanges between thes e

two republics continued throughout the war years .

Tajiks from

Tajikistan served in the Soviet military in Afghanistan from th e

53 Shabistari, "Payomi safirii Jumhurii Islomii Eron ."

2 6

invasion

to the Soviet withdrawal . 5 4

This last point is an extremely sensitive one for some Tajiks .

In the period following the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow ,

when various people in Tajikistan expressed their opinions mor e

openly in public than before, a few Tajiks criticized Taji k

participation in the Soviet war effort for the ethnic, no t

religious, reason that for their people the war amounted t o

fratricide . 55 Political conditions have not yet changed enough i n

Tajikistan, to permit a full and free public discussion of thi s

issue or a reliable sampling of public opinion on the subject .

Tajik nationalists also see Afghanistan as important to the m

culturally, for much the same reason as they do Iran : as a sourc e

of examples of good usage of literary Persian to counterbalance th e

harmful effects of Soviet language policy and as a source o f

literature in the Persian language . 5 6

Since the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan ,

Tajikistan has maintained direct and indirect dealings wit h

Afghanistan's Communist and post-Communist governments on coopera -

tion in various spheres .

In consequence of the increasing

54 TadzhikTA, "Dar safi pesh," Tojikistoni soveti, December 9 ,1989, p . 3 ; Atkin, "Religious," p . 58 .

55 H . Kiromov, A . Ruziev, and S . Iskandarov, "Nadidam mehrubo ndilhoi az insof kholiro," Tojikistoni shuravi, September 14, 1991 ,p . 4 ; M . Shukurzoda, "Haqiqat zahr ham boshad, niyush!", Tojiki-stoni shuravi, September 14, 1991, p . 4 ; J . Said, " Mevae nest behzi ozodi," Javononi Tojikiston, October 12, 1991, p . 2 ; R . Wright ," Report from Turkestan," The New Yorker, April 6, 1992, p . 72 .

56 A . Siyarov, "Sukhane chand be idoma 'Har sukhan . . . ' ,Adabiyot va san"at, January 15, 1987, p . 15 ; Qurbon and Ayub ,"Tehron, Kobul, Dushanbe" ; Faizullozoda, "Nohamvorihoi roh ."

2 7

decentralization of Soviet power in the Gorbachev era and concomi -

tant rise in the importance of the republican governments, the

Communist government in Kabul opened a consulate in Dushanbe .

Tajikistani officials signed economic agreements with representa-

tives of that government and a private Afghanistani company fo r

such things as trade, development projects, and joint ventures . 5 7

Exchanges of students and publications as well as increase d

scholarly contacts were also planned before the fall of th e

Najibullah regime in Kabul . Representatives of one of Afghani-

stan's northern border provinces offered to allow Tajikistanis t o

study in madrasahs there . 58 For years, small numbers of Sovie t

Muslim religious figures were sent abroad to study, with Moscow' s

approval . Opportunities for foreign study became particularl y

important at the end of the Soviet era because the substantia l

increase in religious freedom in Central Asia brought with it a n

increased demand for Islamic instruction, which could not b e

satisfied in full by the madrasahs in the region .

The extent and nature of Afghanistan's disruptive influence o n

Tajikistan, in the form of Islamic "fundamentalist" propaganda ,

arms smuggling, and ethnic ties, are controversial subjects o n

which there is more propaganda than reliable information . Various

Soviet sources, including V .V . Petkel', head of the KGB i n

57 Kh . Qodir, "Mekhohem masdari khidmat ba mardumi du kishva rboshem," Tolikistoni shuravi, August 27, 1991, p . 4 ; FBIS, Dail yReport . Soviet Union, November 1, 1990, p . 106 .

58 Dushanbe domestic radio, May 7, 1991, FBIS, Daily Report .Soviet Union, May 9, 1991, p . 76 .

2 8

Tajikistan from 1985 until 1991, have depicted Islam in wholl y

negative terms and linked it to anti-Soviet subversion from abroad ,

especially via Afghanistan . 59 Such assertions owe so much to the

ideological biases and self-interest of those who make them that i t

is difficult to discern what their basis is in fact .

The KGB and other elements of the old Soviet order have bee n

accustomed to deny that there could be any legitimate domesti c

causes of discontent and to shift the blame to foreign subversion .

Some hard--liners have even resorted to the much-used Sovie t

propaganda line which exploited the trauma of World War II in orde r

to warn against an external threat to newly independent Tajiki-

stan . 60 Another recent example of this hoary tradition of stirrin g

up fears of an external threat could be found in a place where

Afghanistan and Islamic "fundamentalism" cannot possibly be a t

issue--Belarus . The head of the KGB there told the press tha t

hundreds of agents of the CIA, various European countries, and

former Soviet republics have infiltrated Belarus and are trying t o

recruit its inhabitants by offering them hard currency . 61 Even the

border guards in Tajikistan have branded as false a Pravda repor t

of a foray into Tajikistan by Afghanistani mujahidin . 62 In fact ,

59 Kommunist Tadzhikistana, December 5, 1989, FBIS, Dail yReport . Soviet Union, January 3, 1990, p . 34 ; TASS, April 11, 1991 ,ibid .,

April 12, 1991, pp . 74-75 .

60 A . Sekretov, "A pamiat' sviashchenna . . ." Narodnaia gazeta ,Marcy 27, 1992, p . 2 .

61 RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 21 (January 31, 1992), p . 3 .

62 Ibid ., no . 225 (November 27, 1991), p . 1 .

2 9

according to Tajikistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during th e

Najibullah era in Afghanistan (1986-1992), government force s

occasionally dropped bombs on Tajikistani soil when fighting th e

mujahidin but Tajikistan's government portrayed the incidents as

mujahidin attacks . 5 3

Claims by some Afghanistani mujahidin to have supporters in

Soviet Central Asia cannot be confirmed independently . Although

the battle by Afghanistani mujahidin against the Soviet invaders

and the Communist regime in Kabul has won admiration from people i n

Tajikistan and elsewhere in Central Asia, that does not by itsel f

prove that Tajiks feel a particular loyalty to or draw their idea s

from any mujahidingroup . The assumption that mujahidininfluenc e

play a crucial role implies that Tajiks have no perception of thei r

own interests and grievances but are merely passive objects to b e

manipulated by others .

Furthermore, the mujahidin, while agreeing that Islam is a

part of their way of life, disagree among themselves on what kin d

of Islamic country Afghanistan ought to be . There is a bi g

difference between a state which is Islamic, in the sense tha t

Islam is practiced freely in accordance with local traditions, an d

an "Islamic state" which seeks a radical transformation of societ y

to purge it of the injustices, deviations from proper Islami c

practice, and non-Islamic influences--all as defined differently b y

different groups of Islamicizers . Afghanistan's mujahidinorgani -

53 J . Steele, "The Tajiks next door watch Massoud's Kabul," TheGuardian, May 5, 1992, p . 9 .

3 0

zations are divided along these and other lines ; several of the

organizations are also associated predominantly with a particula r

ethnic group . Thus, one of the groups that is more radical in it s

approach to Islam, the Hizb-i Islami, is largely Pushtun and was a t

odds with the Jami'at-i Islami, which sees Islamicization differ-

ently and is predominantly Tajik . 64 These two groups fought eac h

other while also fighting Communist rule in their land and hav e

continued that fight since the accession of a mujahidin coalitio n

government Afghanistan's Tajik population lives primarily in th e

northeast, across the border from the republic of Tajikistan, whil e

the Pashtuns live predominantly in southern and southeaster n

Afghanistan (and across the border in Pakistan . )

During 1992, when the political power struggle in Tajikista n

escalated into civil war, the Najibullah regime in Kabul fell, an d

the groups arrayed against it fought among themselves for power ,

rumors increased of Afghanistani involvement in Tajikistan' s

upheaval . When word reached Tajikistan of the fall of Afghani-

stan's Communist government in April 1992, demonstrators i n

Dushanbe who opposed the Communist government at home welcomed thi s

news and found it encouraging in a general sense . However ,

opposition spokesmen have expressly denied that there was an y

64 O . Roy, "The Mujahidin and the Future of Afghanistan," i n

The Iranian Revolution : Its Global Impact , J .L . Esposito, ed .

(Miami : Florida International University Press, 1990), p . 184 ; M .N .Shahrani, "Introduction : Marxist 'Revolution' and Islamic Resis-tance in Afghanistan," in Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghani-

stan, Research Series no . 57, M .N . Shahrani and R .L . Canfield, eds .(Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University o f

California, 1984), pp . 45-49 .

3 1

specific linkage between the developments in Afghanistan and the

anti-government demonstrations underway in Dushanbe in April and

May 1992 . 6 5

One particularly common rumor about connections between th e

Tajikistani opposition and the Afghanistani mujahidin is that the

Hizb-i Islami, the most worrisome of the Afghanistani groups, wit h

its radical Islamicizing policies and its readiness to use violenc e

against fellow Afghanistanis, whether civilians or members of riva l

organizations, is the principal meddler in Tajikistan's affairs .

The Hizb is alleged to be arming Islamic militants in Tajikistan ,

especially members of the Islamic Rebirth Party . This is the

version of events that the Nabiev regime certainly wanted people t o

believe . 56 The allegation is part of the propaganda Nabiev and hi s

supporters have used for months in the face of mounting opposition .

The message is that they offer the only alternative to rule b y

Islamic extremists ; that line also tries to obscure the extent t o

which Nabiev's own heavy-handed rule has intensified the oppositio n

to him .

The emphasis on the Hizbi-i Islami's role has been denied b y

the head of Tajikistan's legislature (and subsequently acting

president), Akbarshoh Iskandarov, one of the younger generation o f

Communist politicians who is more adaptable to changing condition s

65 Steele, "The Tajiks next door" ; "Peregovory na granitse, "Narodnaia gazeta, May 5, 1992, p . 2 ; RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 8 8(May 8, 1992), p . 1 .

66 "Sarvari mujohidon dastahoi islomii Tojikistonro musalla hmegardonad, " Jumhuriyat, August 19, 1992, p . 1 .

3 2

and willing to cooperate with opposition groups . The presence i n

Tajikistan of Afghanistani mujahidin of any party has also bee n

denied by Lieutenant-Colonel A . Jalilov of the border guards

. There is one way in which the Tajikistani opposition undeni -

ably has looked to Afghanistan for help, for they have done s o

openly . However, this involves no cross-border subversion . In May

1992, as the confrontation between pro- and anti-Nabiev forces i n

Dushanbe threatened to turn into a bloodbath, spokesmen for tw o

opposition parties held a press conference to call for outside

assistance to halt the violence . They asked for such help not onl y

from Afghanistan but also from Iran and the United Nations . The

parties involved were the Islamic Rebirth Party and the Democrati c

Party of Tajikistan, which advocates full religious freedom fo r

Muslims and others but does not endorse the creation of an Islami c

state . 5 8

If the Hizb-i Islami has indeed been an active participant i n

the turmoil in Tajikistan, that would undercut the assumption i n

some quarters that ethnicity is the main basis for cross-border

contacts, given the enmity between the Pushtun-led Hizb-i Islam i

and the Tajik-led Jami'at-i Islami . The Nabiev camp, in its

efforts to magnify the specter of an external threat, has argued

that the Jami'at is emulating the Hizb's involvement in th e

activities Tajikistan's opposition despite the continuing battle s

67 RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 161 (August 24, 1992), p . 3 ; G .Kleinman, "Trevozhnyi budni zastavy," Narodnaia gazeta, July 3 ,1992, p . 1 .

68 Shihab, "Asie centrale ."

3 3

between the two groups because the issue is one of aiding fellow

Muslims in their struggle against Communists.69 A New York Times

reporter filed a story that "several hundred Afghan Tajiks [were ]

slipping across the border to fight for the opposition" in th e

weeks before Nabiev was forced to resign but did not identify th e

source or reliability of this information . 7 0

A different kind of speculation about the political implica -

tions of the presence of Tajiks on both sides of the border focuse s

on whether a new state might be created to unite them . At the time

of the May 1992 crisis in Dushanbe, that prospect was discounted b y

political figures there . The perception in Dushanbe was that Ahma d

Shah Mas'ud, the guerrilla leader of the Jami'at-i Islami wh o

became a hero during the war in Afghanistan and Minister of Defens e

in its first post-Communist government, is not interested because

the power struggle within Afghanistan is a far higher priority .

In the opinion of Tajikistan's, qadi, Akbar Turajonzoda, who i s

associated with the anti-Nabiev camp in the republic's politics ,

Mas'ud's reputation was not widespread in Tajikistan by the time

the mujahidincoalition came to power in Afghanistan and fe w

outside the intelligentsia realized that he was a fellow Tajik . '

(Reportedly he is better known in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, from whic h

" "Sarvari mujohidon . "

7 ° S . Erlanger, "After Week of Turmoil, Tajikistan Chief i sForced Out," New York Times, September 8, 1992, p . A3 .

71 Shihab, "Fausse sortie au Tadjikistan," Le Monde, May 10-11 ,1992, p . 3 ; Steele, "The Tajiks next door . "

72 Steele, "The Tajiks next door ."

3 4

his forebears moved to Afghanistan.)73 Turajonzoda does not see the

creation of a new state uniting Tajikistan with Afghanistan an d

Iran as a necessary consequence of the cultural and religiou s

kinship of the inhabitants of those lands .74

According to an official Tajikistani source, there ar e

Afghanistanis who crossed into Tajikistan in the spring of 1992, o r

attempted to do so, not because they are mujahidin intent o n

fomenting revolt but because they were soldiers who had served th e

Communist regime in Kabul and, after its fall, sought safety fo r

themselves and their families across the border . 75 Similarly ,

unofficial anecdotes indicated that some people (the total numbe r

is unknown), presumably associated in some way with Afghanistan' s

Communist regime, crossed into Tajikistan to escape the upheaval a t

home but then went on to settle in Moscow .

Even if there is no elaborate conspiracy by elements i n

Afghanistan to topple the Nabiev regime, without a doubt the borde r

between Afghanistan and Tajikistan is no longer well patroled i n

1992 and had been only slightly more controlled in the immediatel y

preceding years . For the first five months of 1992, an officia l

source put the known number of border violations above 250, roughl y

73 The author is indebted to Dr . Boris Rumer for this information.

74 Wright, "Report," p . 75 .

75 "Peregovory na granitse," Narodnaia gazeta, May 5, 1992, p .2 .

3 5

twice as many as in the first half of 1991 . 76 Border guards unit s

are severly undermanned, especially in positions that require som e

expertise ; they are also undersupplied ; and inhabitants of the

Tajikistan side of the border are hostile to the guards' efforts .

According to official estimates, the border guards were at 28 to 4 0

per cent of their intended strength by the summer of 1992 . 7 7

However, not all of the border violations are political ;

smuggling and raiding for plunder have also increased . The

significance of these economically motivated border crossings wa s

reflected in the fact that Tajikistan's Cabinet of Ministers listed

smuggling first among the kinds of border violations in it s

declaration on the troubles in that zone . The Cabinet also

promised to try to ease the problem by increasing the means fo r

people who live along the border to conduct legal cross-borde r

trade . 78 The contraband travels in both directions and includes ,

according to Colonel P . I . Kuniakov of the border guards, watches ,

athletic shoes, drugs, gold dust, firewood, currency, and stole n

property . 79 Two incidents reported in the Soviet press in 199 1

76 G . Kleinman, "Snova tuchi khodiat khmuro," Narodnaia qazeta ,May 28, 1992, p . 4 .

77 Cabinet of Ministers, Tajikistan, "Obrashchenie," Narodnai aqazeta, July 4, 1992, p . 1 ; Kleinman, "Snova tuchi khodiat khmuro ; ""Ruzhoi purtashvishi sarhad," Adabiyot va san " at, May 14, 1992, p .3 ; TIA Khovar, "Za ukreplenie," p . 2 .

78 Ibid .

79 Kleinman, "Snova tuchi khodiat khmuro ."

3 6

involved attempted cattle rustling . Along the eastern part o f

the border, in the Badakhshan area, Tajikistan negotiated an

agreement with local Afghanistani leaders in the summer of 199 2

which provides, in part, for the latter to curb the smuggling o f

drugs and arms into Tajikistan ; in return Tajikistan will, among

other things, permit inhabitants of the area to enter Tajikista n

for medica l treatment.81

Some of the border violators do indeed carry weapons . The

border guards have identified a few of these people as Afghani-

stanis . 82 However, other reports, including from the borde r

guards, indicate that many of those trying to bring weapon s

northward are Tajiks from Tajikistan who have gone to Afghanista n

during one of the crisis periods during 1992 and then tried to

return home . 83 It is important to note that not all the weapon s

that have traveled this route are intended for opposition groups .

Former President Nabiev's supporters in the southern province o f

Kulob are also alleged to have obtained arms from Afghanistan ,

80 Krasnaia zvezda, September 6, 1992, in Foreign Broadcas tInformation Service, Daily Report . Soviet Union , Sseptember 13 ,1992, p . 22 .

81 "Peregovory na granitse" ; "Safar anjom yoft," Jumhuriyat ,September 8, 1992, p . 1 .

82 MIT Khovar, "Ruzhoi tashvishovari sarhad," Jumhuriyat ,August 19, 1992, p . 3 ; idem, "Vas"i sarhad , " ibid ., September 8 ,1992, p . 2 .

83 RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 151 (August 10, 1992, p . 3 ; ibid . ,no . 156 (August 17, 1992), p . 3 ; MIT Khovar, "Ruzhoi tashvishovar isarhad" ; Kleinman, "Trevozhnyi budni zastavy ;" Kleinman, "Snovatuchi khodiat khmuro ."

3 7

seemingly without interference from the border guards.84 At leas t

some of the cross-border arms acquisitions are business transac-

tions not based primarily on ideological or ethnic solidarity . Fo r

example, in October 1992, a group of people were alleged to have

stolen a helicopter in southern Tajikistan for an arms-buying tri p

to Afghanistan ; they brought carpets with them to trade for th e

weapons.85 Rumor has it that some of the weapons acquired by

factions in Tajikistan's civil war come not from across the borde r

but from regular army units stationed in the republic .

Not all dealings are acrimonious between Tajikistan under th e

fragile coalition government which took power after the May 199 2

crisis, and Afghanistan under its uneasy coalition government whic h

came to office in April 1992 . In July 1992, the then-head o f

Tajikistan's legislature, Akbarshoh Iskandarov, made an officia l

visit to Afghanistan's new president, Burhanuddin Rabbani, head o f

the Jami'at-i Islami . The two agreed to the establishment o f

diplomatic relations between their countries and Afghanistan

undertook to combat the smuggling of drugs and weapons int o

Tajikistan . 86

Tajikistan is also interested in developing contacts wit h

Persian-speakers abroad, in whatever country they live, not just i n

Afghanistan or Iran . One important means towards this end has bee n

84 J . Krauze, "Démission forcée du president tadjik," Le Mond e

September 9, 1992, p . 5 .

85 RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 205 (October 23, 1992), p . 3 .

86 RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 136 (July 20, 1992), p . 3 .

3 8

to hold international conferences in Dushanbe that are aimed a t

such people . The first of these, in 1990, was devoted to on e

specific, cultural subject : the achievements of the pre-Islami c

Persian poet-musician Barbad (sixth-seventh centuries A .D . )

Participants came from various countries, including Iran and th e

United States . The message of this focus on Barbad was not solel y

the man's artistic achievements but also that this was a Tajikwho

had made this notable contribution to the world of Persian culture

in general ; the fact that the name "Tajik" and the distinction i t

implied did not yet exist in Barbad's time were not part of th e

message . 8 7

A second international conference (September 9-16, 1992) wa s

scheduled for a more dramatic time than the planners intended, no t

only the first anniversary of Tajikistan's declaration of inde-

pendence but also the political confrontation in Dushanbe that le d

to the resignation of President Nabiev . The focus of thi s

gathering was not the achievements of an individual but the commo n

ties among Tajiks wherever they live . The largest contingent o f

invited participants was from Afghanistan (150), the next larges t

was from Iran (60) ; other Central Asian republics and Russia wer e

also to be represented in strength (a total of 100 invited) ;

smaller numbers were also invited from the United States, Saudi

Arabia, and China .

Some of the planned sessions dealt wit h

cultural matters but, significantly, others dealt with economi c

87 A . Abdullo, "Bar sari sarv zanad 'Pardai ushshoq' tazarv, "Adabiyot va san"at, April 19, 1990, p . 5 .

3 9

matters .

Businessmen as well as scholars were among thos e

invited . 8 8

In 1992, Tajikistan faces a host of challenges, both domesti c

and external . Although many advocates of change in the republi c

wanted it to have much more autonomy within the former Sovie t

Union, few of the politically active people at any point on th e

political spectrum expected Tajikistan to become a separate stat e

so soon . They hoped, over-optimistically, that Moscow would hel p

them address a variety of needs, in economic, environmental ,

security, and other spheres . With the collapse of the Sovie t

state, Tajikistan had to look abroad to fill that void .

Political and economic groups in Iran, Afghanistan, and many othe r

countries have their own ambitiions to play a role in Tajikistan .

That does not guarantee that Tajikistanis would respond positivel y

to all such efforts . The kinds of practical assistance, no t

rhetoric, offered them by foreign countries will surely affec t

their orientation . Given the growing polarization caused by th e

conflict between the public's dissatisfaction with the old orde r

left over from the Soviet era and the Communist old guard' s

determination to preserve its power and privileges by any means ,

support may decline for political figures--of various ideologies- -

who advocate moderation and compromise and who therefore are eage r

to develop relations with the widest possible range of foreig n

countries .

Tajikistan's social and economic problems are s o

88 "Barnomai anjuman az 9 to 16 sentiabr," Jumhurivat ,September 8, 1992, p . 1 ; B . Bobomurod, "Nuri dida, toji sar, "ibid ., pp . 1, 3 .

4 0

serious that whoever wins the power struggle will have to seek hel p

from some outside . However, it is an oversimplification to assum e

that Tajikistan must necessarily fall into another country's orbi t

because of the cultural and religious similarities between them .

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