“the muslim brotherhood in egypt: a preliminary assessment of its positions on religious freedom,...

8/6/2019 The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: A Preliminary Assessment of its Positions on Religious Freedom, Women and Re

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The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: A Preliminary Assessment of its Positions onReligious Freedom, Women and Religious Minorities

By: Alejandro J. BeutelMinaret Freedom Institute

www.minaret.orgAbstract

This paper is an attempt to provide a preliminary assessment of the Muslim Brotherhoods(MB) positions on freedom of religion and belief and their implications for US policy. I usetheir public statements on six key issues to measure the MBs commitment to religiousfreedom. They are: 1) the role of Sharia in society; 2) the status of Coptic Orthodox andother Christians; 3) attitudes toward Jews; 4) the public role of women in society and withinthe Muslim Brotherhood; 5) citizenship and public identity of Bahais; and 6) attitudestowards Shias, non-conforming Muslims and followers other faiths. Overall, the MB hasundergone a significant evolution in its thinking, but it seems to not yet have acceptedinternational human rights standards. The organization continues to show a strong trendtoward greater acceptance of political pluralism and the democratic process. This includessome issues of religious freedom, women and religious minorities, but not all. A patternseems to exist where the clearer the public statement is on a particular issue, the morepragmatic or liberal leaning its tends to be, while unclear/contradictory statements includeintolerant statements from some individual members. However, in some instances theBrotherhood unambiguously takes intolerant positions. Finally I find that religious freedomis not mentioned in any policy statements directly connected to the Brotherhood.

I wish to thank Dr. Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad of the Minaret of Freedom Institute (MFI) for his patience andvaluable comments and insights on the paper. I also wish to thank Dr. Dwight N. Bashir and AngelaStephens of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and BrianKatulis of the Center for American Progress (CAP) for their guidance and support. This paper is theopinion of the author alone and does not necessarily reflect the official positions of MFI, USCIRF or CAPor any of their employees.


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Section I. Background Information

Brief History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

The Muslim Brotherhood (known asAl-Ikhwan Al-Muslimn, in Arabic) was founded

in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949). Its motto is God is our objective. The Prophet isour leader. The Quran is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of God is our hope. The Brotherhood began as a religious society focused on educating Muslims on Islam,reading, and writing while constructing a sense of solidarity and altruism within and societyas a whole. In the early 1930s it expanded into a religious welfare organization, engaging insmall-scale social work among the poor, building and repairing mosques, and establishing anumber of Muslim religious schools.1

As the organizations social welfare activities increased so did its involvement inpolitics. The Brotherhoods first political activities were taking anti-colonial positions: againstBritish control of Egypt and the Brotherhoods perceived colonization of Palestine by theZionist movement (supporting the 1936-39 Arab rebellion with money anddemonstrations).2

The ideology of the Brotherhood was initially based on a liberal Salafiyyacreed thatbelieved that, Muslims ought to return to the original textual sources of the Quran andthe Sunnah(precedent) of the Prophet [Muhammad]. By returning to these original sourcesearlySalafisfelt, Muslims ought to re-interpret the original sources in light of modern needsand demands without being slavishly bound to the interpretational precedents of earlierMuslim generations.3

Over time, the MBs growth also led to splits within the organization over themethods of achieving the groups ultimate objective establishing an Islamic state. Thesesplits were largely centered on whether or not an armed wing should be formed, what thepurpose of the armed wing was and what types of violence, if any, should be directed at which particular types of targets.4 Due to a variety of factors, cleavages within the

organization grew and the Brotherhoods liberal orientation shifted to become moreconservative, radical, and militant. The primary factors include: 1) a combination of corrupt,undemocratic and violently repressive policies of colonial and post-colonial governments; 2)the rejection of juristic precedent and apologetic approach of the liberal Salafiyya; and 3) co-optation by ultraconservative Saudi-based Wahhabis.5 The fate of liberal Salafiyyawas sealedfirst with the assassination of Hassan Al-Banna in 1949 and then with the execution ofSayyid Qutb in 1966.6

The MB was officially barred from politics in 1954 when President Gamal Abdel-Nasser accused the organization of attempting to assassinate him. Since then it has existed asa banned-but-tolerated organization. Cooperation, toleration, and confrontation with theEgyptian state have fluctuated some periods being extremely repressive, other periods

more tolerant and occasionally cooperative. Fluctuations were mostly dependent upon thedomestic and international interests of the state at a particular time. 7 In the 1970s, the MBbegan to evolve away from its conservative, and at times, radical militant rhetoric of the1960s and moved toward ideological moderation, or at least a solidly non-violentpragmatism.8

Although the rhetoric of the MB demonstrates it politically supports HAMAS andHizbullahs opposition to Israel,9 the Muslim Brotherhood definitively renounced the use ofviolence within Egypt in the early 1970s.10 Since this time it has progressively increased its


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involvement in civil society, winning control of several student unions, professionalsyndicates, and parliamentary seats.11 In the most recent November 2005 Parliamentaryelections, the MB won 88 out of a total of 454 seats, up almost six-fold from only 15 seats.12As a result, many regional experts and commentators regard the Brotherhood as the mostviable and powerful opposition group in Egypt.

Overview of US Policy on Religious Freedom and Egypt

Official American policy on international religious freedom centers on TheInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998. It is a piece of federal legislation that,among other things, intends To express United States foreign policy with respect to, andstrengthen United States advocacy on behalf of, individuals persecuted in foreign countrieson account of religion, to authorize United States actions in response to violations ofreligious freedom in foreign countries13 IRFA is extremely important in shaping American religious freedom foreign policy because it has established the basic policyguidelines and bureaucratic structures for promoting the numerous international legalframeworks supporting religious freedom.14

However Federal legislation is not the only variable affecting American religiousfreedom policy. Other competing interests such as regional stability, the war on terrorismand economic factors can, and have led to, an inconsistent and/or inadequate advocacy ofreligious freedom enshrined in international legal documents. This has certainly been thecase in Egypt, where in spite (or because) of $490 million in economic aid and $1.3 billion inmilitary assistance granted in 2006,15 as one U.S. government analyst flatly stated, The U.S.Embassy in Cairo appears to raise some of the less visible religious freedom concerns withEgyptian government officials, rather than address some of the deeply entrenched systematicproblems, such as the interference of the state security services in the affairs of all religiouscommunities.16

SECTION II.ASSESSING THE BROTHERHOODS COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM OFRELIGION AND BELIEF

The Measurements

The central objective of this paper is to assess the extent to which the MuslimBrotherhood respects and values freedom of religion and belief in Egyptian society. Below Ihave come up with six issues that will help gauge the MBs commitment to freedom ofreligion and belief. Although the MBs ideology has significantly evolved on certain issues,other areas have not changed, which has troubling implications for religious freedom.

The following findings were based on research and analysis from a variety of Englishand Arabic language media sources.*

* Arabic language sources used in this document were primarily taken from and translated by the OpenSource Center(www.opensource.gov) andNexis (www.nexis.com). Other Middle East-based mediasources such asAl-Jazeera,Al-AhramWeekly,Ikhwanweb andAsharq Al-Awsatwere directly used, butonly their English sections were accessed. Arabic sections of the aforementioned sources were also used,but translated by the Open Source CenterandNexis. English languages sources include The Daily Star


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1) Role of Sharià in society. What is their definition of Sharià? Do theyadvocate an Islamic state or a civil society? What is the nature of an Islamic state orcivil society? How does this government impact issues such as apostasy and freedomto proselytize? How would the Brotherhood govern if it came to power?

Publicly, the MB advocates for the establishment of an Islamic state based on a civilsociety governed by the rule of law and reject and type of a theocratic state. 17 When askedabout how the two seemingly contradictory concepts are reconcilable, members say that anIslamic state is a civil society, or a democracy within a religious framework (marjaiyya).18

The MB advocates for Sharià, or divine law.** One of the central questionsconcerning the MBs notion of an Islamic state is what defines Sharià? Although this hasnever been clearly defined by MB members, based on some of their positions and paststatements, it can be inferred that they use: 1) the Quran, 2) hadith, and 3) an occasional andselective referencing from the large corpus of juristic literature built up over 1400 years ofIslamic history. Yet this still does not provide a clearer answer, because these religious texts,like many in other religions are subjected to a wide degree of interpretation. The MBs

official website reports that Deputy Supreme Guide Muhammad Habib publicly rejected thenotion of any amendment to Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution which establishes Islamas the religion of the state and Sharià as themain source of legislation.19 In an interview withEgypt Today, the leader of the MB, Supreme Guide Mahdi Akef asserted that he wouldimplement huddpunishments, but also cautioned his statement by noting that its applicationis virtually impossible in practice.20 A similar statement was echoed by Muhammad Habib.21For example, the MB attempted in the past to pass legislation publicly banning the sale andconsumption of alcohol; however, Akef recently stated that tourists could now drink alcoholinside private hotels.22

Different members directly involved or affiliated with the MB hold different viewson apostasy. Apostasy itself has been a hotly contested issue in modern Islamic law that

reignited intense debate among jurists and intellectuals in light of the Abdul Rahman case.23

In a case involving the legal recognition of Bahais in Egypt, one MB parliamentarian,Gamal Akl, denounced members of the religion as infidels, who should be killed on the groundsthat they had changed their religion.24 Taking what appears to be the exact opposite view, whenasked whether or not a Muslim could choose another religion, or no religion at all, Mahdi Akef responded of course.25 Straddling between these two positions is the prominentMuslim jurist Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who, although not a member of the MB, is highlyrespected and influential within the organization.26 Qaradawi recently published an articleopining that only major apostasy, as opposed to minor apostasy warrants capitalpunishment:

Major apostasy, which the apostate proclaims and openly calls for in

speech or writing, is to be, with all the more reason, severely punished by

Egypt, The British Broadcasting Corporation, Washington Post, New York Times, and many others.Admittedly, by not directly accessing the Arabic sources this is my methodological weakness, but I haveattempted to compensate for it by using reputable translation services and corroborating the translations andreporting of English language Middle East-based media publications with experts.** With certain exceptions, for the remainder of this paper, sharia will be replaced with fiqh orjurisprudence. In classical Islamic discourse, sharia is the ideal, and only attainable by God, whereas fiqhis the human (and therefore imperfect) intellectual struggle to work towards achieving this ideal.


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the death penalty [] Apostates who call for apostasy from Islam havenot only become disbelievers in Islam but have also become enemies ofIslam and the Muslim nation. They, by doing so, fall under the category ofthose who wage war against Almighty Allah and His Messenger andspread mischief in the land.27

The one thing that the seems to be consistently held by the organization, which also

distinguishes them from more politically radical (and violent) Islamist organizations is thatthey have explicitly rejected the practice of takfr, or declaring a Muslim to be a non-believer.28

Related to the issue of conversion and apostasy is proselytization by other faiths.Based on the limited information found in this study, it appears the Brotherhood is very coolto the idea. According to an article in the Islamist outlet Al-Shab, Sayyid Tantawi, head of Al-Azhar University, reportedly signed a document that permitted limited, but mutual,proselytization between Muslims and Christians.29 This ignited controversy among MBparliamentarians as well as other members of Al-Azhar.30 Furthermore, in an interview withIslamonline.net, when asked whether evangelical Christians would be permitted to preach ina government ruled by the Brotherhood, he unequivocal[ly] rejected the notion.31 Serious

questions about the MBs position on proselytization by non-Muslim faiths, especially in anIslamic state need clarification.

It is unclear how the Muslim Brotherhood would govern if in power. There areseveral variables to consider which would prevent hard-line legislation of Sharià beingpassed: 1) the MB is not a monolithic organization, rather it has strong divisions based onage and interpretation of ideology and as such the definitions and implementation methodsof Sharià may significantly differ; 2) it lacks experience in running a government and passinglegislation; 3) the future strength of other secular opposition groups is unclear this canchange with a change in their approaches to politics (grassroots, as opposed to elitist) as wellas the success of the MB in competently running a government; 4) economic factors such asrevenues from tourism would be negatively affected should hard-line interpretations of

Sharià be passed and implemented.

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2) Views toward Coptic Orthodox and other Christians.33 Are they to beviewed as citizens with full civil and political rights, including the right to run for allpolitical positions? Or are they considered as dhimmiyya, which would relegate themto a second-class political status? What is the MB position concerning the right tobuild and repair churches?

The MB has explicitly rejected the idea ofdhimmiyya. The recent increase of theBrotherhoods power within parliament has caused fears and concerns among someprominent Coptic public figures,34 which the organization has sought to soothe.35 Forexample, they have explicitly rejected the notion of categorizing Coptic Christians asdhimmiyya,36 and have repeatedly made non-discriminatory and vague statements about Coptsas full citizens, and equal partners.37 Until recently the MB made contradictory publicstatements over whether or not a Christian could theoretically run and become head of state. These statements appeared to split along age differences, with older activists such asMuhammad Habib, not in favor of the notion of a theoretical Coptic head of state (or silenton the issue) and younger activists like First Deputy Supreme Guide Abdel-Moneim Abul-Futuh taking the opposite view.38


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Another issue that affects Christians is their ability to repair and build Churches.39Thus far little has been mentioned, but what has been said thus far is concerning from theperspective of international legal frameworks. The MBs official Arabic website reported thatMuhammad Habib announced the organization was conducting a study of the number ofmosques and churches in Egypt as part of the proposed law for the unification of the

construction of the houses of worship. The story ends noting, that the final result afterthis study could be that the number of the churches that currently exist in Egypt is muchmore than the real need.40

3) Views toward Jews. Does the MB view Jews as productive citizens ofEgyptian society? Is a connection made between Egyptian Jews, global Jewry andthe events of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Some members statements and literature of the MB blur the distinction betweenpolicies of the State of Israel and all Jews. Without a doubt, the Brotherhoods politicalplatform posits itself against Israel and its existence as an ethnic majority Jewish state.41

Furthermore, some MB members have reportedly made several anti-Jewish remarks thathave had little or nothing directly to do with political developments between Israelis andPalestinians. For example, MB members recently spoke out against selling pharmaceutical42companies to Jews,43 as opposed to rallying support for a more nuanced position like aneconomic boycott with Israel due to the MBs sharp opposition to Israeli policies towardPalestinians and/or other Arabs. Some recent media reports have alleged that Mahdi Akefhas made statements denying the Holocaust. Although Akef immediately denied theseallegations, he still disputes the total number of Jews killed during the Holocaust. 44

However other members and other pieces of literature make more nuancedobservations, distinguishing between Jews and the policies of the State of Israel. Accordingto the findings of analysts from the Nixon Center,45 the MB has made both types of

statements and possesses both types of literature. Furthermore in a recent interview withHelena Cobban, Abdel-Moneim Abul-Futuh stated, We as the Muslim Brotherhood knowthat the Jews in Israel are human beings and we know they should live, and should not bekilled [] The Jewish people can go or stay, but whatever they do, the Palestinians shouldwin their rights.46 Later in the same interview he strongly implied that he was open to theidea of a two-state solution, but he strongly preferred a single secular, democratic state.47

Based on the limited information at hand, this paper makes the emphatically provisionaland tentative observation that nuanced distinctions tend to be taken by members of thereformist wing, such as Abul-Futuh, and appear to be more recently published. Incontradistinction, blanket anti-Semitic remarks and literature that conflate Judaism andZionism appear to be older and coming from the older, more conservative figures like Akef.

At the time this paper was written nothing could be found concerning the MBs positions or attitudesspecifically toward Jewish citizens of Egypt. However this absence of information is perhaps due toat least one of two problems: 1) I simply did not find the necessary information and/or 2)they do not have a position. If the latter case were true, then this would be extremelyproblematic. One must remember that the MBs violence against the Egyptian Jewish waspart of the reason for its mass exodus to Israel, in spite the communitys lack of interest andsupport for Zionist movements.48 With the Jewish community only a sliver of what it wasbefore the creation of Israel, it could be that the Brotherhood may not see the small


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presence of Jews in their country as an issue. However due to the lack of solid informationand the evolving nature of the Brotherhood, this observation is highly speculative.

4) Views toward women. Does the MB believe wearing the hijab is a personalchoice, or do they believe in public legislation mandating women to wear it in public? Are women allowed for all political positions, including as head of theorganization the Supreme Guide? What is the level of female political involvement(as opposed to involvement in its social services) within the organization?

The notion of a woman serving as head of state is a highly contested issue.According to a widely disseminated document allegedly published by the MB, women: 1) arespiritual equals of men; 2) are religiously exhorted to cover all parts of their bodies exceptfor the face and hands; 3) can elect and hold any office,49 although there is debate on whether or not women can be judges and they are barred from becoming head of state.Concerning this, it appears that the Brotherhoods position is evolving, from not allowingwomen to hold high office50 to a highly debated subject.51

In addition, the hijab (veil) is seen as a religious obligation, but cannot be legallyimposed on women. Akef reportedly directly remarked to a female Arab journalist that shewas naked because she was not wearing the hijab.52 Nevertheless, he, along with other MBmembers, feel that the Hijab is an Islamic obligation but we as human beings cannotimpose anything on women. We have the duty, however, to advise that it is a religiousobligation.53

Furthermore, there is a lack of overall female political involvement and leadership within the MBs organizational structure. Although the MB unsuccessfully ran a femalecandidate in the parliamentary elections, Maykarm Al-Deiri, she is their only femalecandidate. When putting this in comparative perspective, it should be noted that that womens political participation is poor in most political parties. For instance, the secular

Nasserist Party, also only fielded one female candidate.54

There is much speculation over theintentions of her candidacy whether or not it was a tactical move, or whether the group issincere in attempting to open its leadership positions up to more women.55 Furthermore, inspite of assurances from Al-Deiri that women may occupy any position within theorganization, including that of Supreme Guide,56 Most female Muslim Brotherhoodmembers contribute in social areaswhile few have real representation in political and legalareas within the group.57 Furthermore, Al-Deiri and Muhammad Habib and Abdel-MonemAbul-Futuh claim that the MB tried to field 25 female candidates, however they cited fear ofharassment from security forces and social pressures as the main reason for the lack offemale candidates and other political leadership positions within the Brotherhood.58

Finally, Al-Deiri has received strong criticism for some of her more intolerant views

about womens public participation and rights, including her opposition to Egyptianwomens right to divorce without consent of the husband (khul).59 However again, when putin comparative perspective, it is worthwhile to note that even the liberal secular oppositionleader, Ayman Nour was against the current divorce law because he felt it will, instigatewomen to be corrupt.60


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5) Views toward Bahais. Do they support the legal recognition of the Bahaicommunity? What is their overall social/religious attitude toward the religion? How

would Section 98(f)*** of the Egyptian Penal Code apply?

MB parliamentarians do not recognize the Bahai faith as a heavenly religion. On

April 4, 2006 a lower Administrative Court decision granted Bahais to identify themselves asa separate religion on national identification cards.61 However on May 15, the SupremeAdministrative Court struck down the lower courts decision a move that was hailed bymembers of the Brotherhood. Supporting the Supreme Administrative Courts decisionAbdel Monem Abul-Futuh, who spoke in reference to the Bahai case, commented, Wehave no issue with people describing themselves as followers of beliefs not recognized byIslamHowever, what must be appealed is the ruling that allows followers of unrecognizedfaiths to describe themselves as followers of a religion in official documents when its nottechnically a religion.62Furthermore, one MB Parliamentarian implied that Bahais were aninstrument of Israeli policy designed to undermine Egypt by claiming they are moved byIsraeli fingers. In addition, as already noted, other MB parliamentarians have labeled themas apostates who must be killed.63 The Bahai community made an immediate appeal of the

Supreme Administrative Courts decision, but lost their case.64

6) Views toward Shias, non-conforming Muslims and other faiths. How would Section 98(f) apply? Would the MB support the legal recognition of otherfaiths?

While very little has been mentioned on the subject, it is extremely worrisome. Inpast years the Egyptian government has restricted the rights of non-conforming Muslims,such as the Quranite sect,65 and Shias to openly practice their beliefs. Concerning Shias inEgypt, the MB thus far has mentioned nothing. Little has been mentioned of the Shiasoutside of Egypt. Some ignorant views about Shias in Iraq have been made66 however it

appears that MB members emphatically try to minimize sectarian differences (perhaps due toideology), but also based on mutual opposition to Israeli policy.67 There currently is noinformation about the MBs opinion on non-conforming Muslims or other faith communities outside of Islam,Christianity, Judaism and Bahaism.

SECTION III.ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS

This section attempts to distill some key observations from the findings already presented.

The MBs reform agenda differs from one issue to another, from clear to vague. The

differences between clarity and vagueness tend to correlate with how tolerant or intoleranttheir statements on various issues are.

*** Is an ordinance prohibiting that criminalizes, Any person who exploits religion in order to promote oradvocate extremist ideologies by word of mouth, in writing or in any other manner with a view to stirringup sedition, disparaging or belittling any divinely-revealed religion or its adherents, or prejudicing nationalunity or social harmony. Source: Yasser Mohamed Salah et al. v. Egypt, Working Group on ArbitraryDetention. University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, (2002), Available online at:http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/wgad/7-2002.html.


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The positions the MB is most specific on are also the ones most conducive to aliberal democracy. Brotherhood members have taken specific positions on greater separationof powers and stronger checks and balances, as well as a more overall liberalized politicalsystem that strengthens long-term changes. Its members have pushed for specific reformsand supported groups such as the Judges Club that are attempting to limit executive

authority, allow for fairer and freer elections, and establish stronger checks and balances.

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Furthermore, they formed the bulk of the failed parliamentary opposition attempting to votedown an extension of the state of emergency that legally allows civil liberties to be curtailedwith Parliamentary approval.69

Yet, other aspects of the MBs reform agenda remain couched in vague and/orcontradictory positions.70 When this is the case, various members on different issues makemany intolerant statements. Regarding religious freedom, the Brotherhood remains vagueand contradictory, thus it not surprising some of its members have made highly intolerantstatements.

However finding a correlation between clarity and liberality of positions is only partof what needs to be understood when analyzing the Brotherhoods statements. It is alsoimportant to know why the Brotherhood is clear on some issues and less clear on others,

including religious freedom. A recent study by the Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace (CEIP) on the vagueness of Arab Islamist movements sheds some light:

The existence of such gray zones [vagueness and contradictions] couldbe construed as the result of duplicity, a deliberate refusal by mainstreamIslamist movements to declare what they really think about key sensitiveissues in order to not alarm the West and lose their reputation asmoderates. But the existence of gray zones can also be explained by theongoing development in the thinking and strategies of Islamists as well ason going contests within each group over the proper direction of themovement.71

The findings of this paper point toward the latter analysis given. Reasons for this areas follows:First, the Brotherhood is not an ideological monolith significant differences and

disagreements exist within the organization.72 The differences are not solely based onideology per se, but also on age gaps that affect ideological outlook. Several studies of theMB show younger generations of activists tend to be more flexible and liberal leaning intheir political outlook.73Based on the findings of this paper, that also includes issues of religious freedom.

This split is best personified by two main figures of the organization: 1) The 78 year-old and current Supreme Guide, Mahdi Akef who is considered a member of the oldguard and described by one Egyptian columnist as someone who has no control overhis words and his ideas are superficial74 and; 2) Abdel-Moneim Abul-Futuh, 55, who istypically regarded as representative of the MBs reformist or dovish wing. 75Asharq Al-

Awsat reports that age differences are gradually working themselves out as older activistsretiring from important party positions, with the expectation that they will be filled bymiddle-aged (and more flexible) activists.76 (It should also be noted that the support forfemale candidates and the MBs past and present female candidates themselves are from thismiddle-aged generation.)77

Second, the dual religious and political nature of the MB creates internal tensions. The tension stems from the desire to satisfy religio-political dogmatism of some veryconservative party members and the need for political pragmatism, espoused by other


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ideologically flexible party members and conflicting ideologies and policies from rivalpolitical organizations. Ambiguity is an attempt to publicly mask internal party divisions.However, the party may solve this conundrum over time as calls made by prominentyounger, reformist activists such as Essam Al-Arian to separate the groups religiousactivities from its political activities and accede ultimate religious authority within Egypt to

Al-Azhar, are creating internal debate.

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Third, its religious and political duality is affected by the current religious nationalsocial context. As a religious and political movement the Brotherhood must also pander to acore constituency within a current national social context that is increasingly religious andsocially conservative.79 If it advocates positions thought to be too soft, the Brotherhood mayalienate its core voter constituency. However, it still has to deal with other political partiesand other factors that must force it to adopt a certain amount of pragmatism. Vagueness andoccasional intolerant statements are also a means of escaping conflicting internal andexternal dynamics.80

Fourth, not all intolerant statements necessarily correlate with vagueness andcontradiction. In some cases the Brotherhood is quite clear about its positions. This isbecause its fused religious and political capacities affect the current national religious

discourse by competing with Al-Azhar as the dominant authority on Islamic issues in Egypt.Due to severe government restrictions Azhari scholars transformed ijtihad, or religiouscritical thinking, from an act of worshipping God whose purpose was to benefit people, intoa method of giving Divine sanction to government policies. This has led to the erosion oftrust between the clerical establishment and the Egyptian Muslim laity, creating a vacuum ofauthority. As a result conservative mainstream Islamists like the Brotherhood and radicalmilitant Islamists (like Gamaa Islamiyyaand Al-Jihad) have the ideological space to grow andcompete with Al-Azhar for the position as the dominant authority on Islamic issues. Inorder for Al-Azhar to successfully compete with these groups and maintain their credibility,it has responded by issuing socially conservative fatwas. This forces the Islamic intellectualtrajectory toward narrow-mindedness and intolerancewhich would not happen in a

democratic society where opposing viewpoints are freely expressed and debated andreligious freedom is respected. Religious minorities and Muslim reform discourses inevitablybear a large portion of the brunt of the increased intolerance in society toward the religiousother.81 The ban against the Bahai community, the controversy over Shaykh Tantawissignature of a document permitting open proselytization between Muslims and Christians, violence and discriminatory attitudes toward other religious minorities and the persecutionof Muslim reformers can at least be partly explained as symptoms of the religio-politicalcompetition between Al-Azhar and the MB.

As this example and its consequences illustrate, advances in religious freedom areintimately linked with larger liberalizing political reforms. Egypts authoritarian politicalsystem is structured in such a way that it disallows moderate, reformist voices to freely and

credibly articulate themselves and helps to empower radicals instead. (This is true not only of Al-Azhar, but also of the MB. See Section V. Assessing the Brotherhoods PoliticalTrajectory.)

SECTION IV.U.S.GOVERNMENTVIEWS OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

This section examines the U.S. governments position toward the MuslimBrotherhood. The measurement was based on a compilation and analysis of all public


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statements directly concerning the MB made by State Department officials (20 total)between June 2005 and March 20, 2007.**** For key excerpts of some of the statementscompiled, please refer to Appendix: Excepts of State Department Officials Statements.The following are the key findings:

First, the American government will have official dialogue with independentcandidates, not members of the MB. This has been a consistent message publicly conveyedby officials, based on three justifications: 1) a need to respect Egyptian law; 2) the MBsnon-recognition of Israel and political support for HAMAS and 3) concern over allegationsfrom the Egyptian government about the MBs violent past.82 It has consistently affirmed itsacceptance of any Islamist group entering into the political process as long as it respects thedemocratic process and plays by the rules of the game. Officials have repeatedly declaredthey will recognize any group that abides by the democratic process and respects politicalpluralism.83

Nevertheless the governments public vocal support for opposition movements andfigures in Egypt is highly inconsistent. State Department officials have not explicitlydenounced of mass detentions and physical violence against peaceful MB supporters, but

they have been extremely vocal for support of secular activists like Ayman Nour. 84 This maybe due to a belief in certain government circles that the Muslim Brotherhood is not reallycommitted to promoting democracy and the rule of law, as was implied in one publicstatement by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.85

In light of that finding, it also important to note that the American government hasmentioned nothing about freedom of religion and belief in relation to the MB. Simply put,issue of their religious freedom, much less other violations of their freedoms (such asfreedom of assembly, speech, and freedom from arbitrary detention) have not been publiclyraised thus far. On those rare occasions when the issue of religious freedom is Egypt ismentioned, the State Department statements concerned themselves with particular religiousminority groups,86 as opposed to the rights ofallof Egypts religious communities.87

SECTIONV.ASSESSING THE BROTHERHOODS POLITICAL TRAJECTORY

Although the Brotherhoods positions on democracy and religious freedom haveevolved towards a more pragmatic and liberal-leaning trend, their evolution is not automaticand could be reversed. In fact this papers assessment of the MBs political trajectory sees areversal as a very likely possibility, based on three important events.

The first is not a single event per se, but rather a series of them. Since protesting insupport of two electoral judges who were tried for exposing vote rigging in the 2005parliamentary elections, the Egyptian State has engaging a massive crackdown on the

Brotherhood. Six prominent members Essam El-Arian, Rashad Bayoumi and MohammadMursi, Ibrahim El-Zaarafani, Hassan El-Hawayan and Helmi El-Gazzar (all of reformistwing) are among the 645 people detained between May and July 2006. Although most ofthose people including the six leaders have been released, as of March 27, 2007, 234people remain detainedincluding Second Deputy Chairman Khairat Al-Shater (also areformist) and thirty-one others who face military tribunals.88

**** Statements include daily press briefings, and recorded remarks from State Department officials atvarious events.


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The second important event is the Al-Azhar martial arts demonstration itself. Inearly December 2006 a group of 50 student members of the MB acted on their own accordto perform a martial arts demonstration and called themselves part of a militia. Althoughthe non-violent demonstration which was protest[ing] the Egyptian dictatorshipsexpulsion of Brotherhood students from their dorms and its intervention in student council

elections

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was denounced by Brotherhood leaders,

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state-controlled anti-Islamist mediaimmediately took advantage of the incident and raised peoples fears and questions of theIslamist group.91 Putting aside exaggerated images of the MBs past use of violence, theincident is important because it may be evidence of another split within the groupbetweenmiddle-aged reformists and some radical younger members. It is also important because itmay be evidence that the MBs leadership find some of these more radical younger membersare becoming harder to control.92 This would no surprise, given that the MB has had broadmembership boundaries, containing small numbers of very-loosely affiliated radical activistswho reject their non-violent message, are either ejected or voluntarily leave the group andend up joining the ranks of militant organizations.93

Finally, the recent changes to the national constitution could exacerbate these othertwo factors. The constitutional amendments are clearly structured to effectively choke off

the MB from a peaceful political outlet because it forbids any political activity within areligious framework (marjaiyya).94 Doing so prevents reformists from openly articulating theirevolutionary political vision further and only empowers conservative hardliners within theorganization.

The combination of crackdowns against the organization (particularly its emergingreformist leadership), increased legal restrictions that deny a peaceful political outlet forreformist vision and the existence of some angry and younger members is a very dangerousmix. This process could either radicalize the rest of the organization over time or makeothers splinter off into new and violent groups like Gamaa Islamiyya and Al-Jihaddid in the1970s. Either way, such a trend does not bode well for the consolidation of reformistspower within the MB and for the future of religious or other political freedoms in Egypt.

SECTIONVI.CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In spite of the pessimistic assessment of the Brotherhoods political trajectory, thereis hope that things could turn around. However, the United States must undertake drasticpolicy changes for that to occur. Given the current administrations political posturing andprioritization in other parts of the Middle East this is highly unlikely. Nevertheless, I putforth the following preliminary recommendations in the hope that another administrationwill give them some consideration.

First, analysts from the United States Commission on Religious Freedomshould conduct a fact-finding mission to learn more about the Brotherhoodsviews. The purpose of the mission would be to inform policymakers as much aspossible about the organizations political directions and what its views are on issuesof political and religious freedom. I specific emphasize that its professional analystsand not its Commissioners should be engaged in this fact-finding mission becauseunlike the Commissioners, they are not political appointees with overt ideologicalleanings. The professional analysts, given their academic credentials, are better poisedto provide a more objective and nuanced analysis of the facts. Should such a mission


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be undertaken, it is highly advised that as many MB leaders from different agegroups should be probed on their positions of various issues. Again, as reiterated in thisstudy, significant ideological cleavages are present along age lines and therefore it would be best toconduct more research based on this premise. Although the findings from the present paperare far from conclusive, it, along with others works, can be used as a preliminary

basis for a larger report. Second, the United States government must formulate a smarter and more

consistent democracy promotion strategy. It means finding a middle groundbetween the shortsighted recklessness of military interventionism and support forthe authoritarian status quo. Americas shyness to condemn these authoritarianchanges to the Egyptian Constitution send a message to democracy activists in Egyptand the rest of the world that it does not really care about democracy promotion.The same goes for its unequal condemnation of opposition activists detention andissues of religious freedom. Consistency requires condemnation of both peacefulsecular and Islamist opposition activists, as opposed to only the former. It requiresnot only condemning attacks against Christian churches and identity discriminationagainst Bahais, but also the states financial and political stranglehold over mosquesand Islamic centers of learning. It should also come out and definitively denouncethe authoritarian nature of the recent constitutional amendments.

Third, reduce and change the structure of the next foreign aid appropriationsbill to Egypt. Tough and consistent rhetoric is extremely important, but it is notenough. In order to literally put its money where its mouth is, the United Statesshould show its seriousness about democracy promotion by adding provisions in thenext foreign aid bill that stipulate Egypt will receive American aid when it meetscertain clear political benchmarks that support democracy, the rule of law andhuman rights. The reduction and eventual elimination of state security services interference in theadministrative affairs of all religious communities is one suggested preliminary benchmark.Furthermore, regardless of the level military aid to Egypt, a certain part of any such

aid should be dedicated to Expanded International Military Education and Training(E-IMET) and International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program(ICITAP) training for Egyptian army and police officerstraining that teachessoldiers and police officers how to effectively do their jobs while respecting the ruleof law and human rights. Currently no such programs to Egypt exist.95


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Appendix: Selected Excerpts of State Department Officials Statements

Remarks During Press Roundtable in Sharm el-Sheikh, EgyptRobert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State

Sharm el-Sheikh, EgyptMay 21, 2006

DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK: Well, I think ultimately this will again be aquestion of where I thought about sort of the direction of political Islam. Youve gotdifferent movements, here, the government obviously has great anxiety about whether theyare committed to the democratic process. [] it will also be important for the MuslimBrotherhood to clarify are they committed to a democratic process. Are they committedtotally to nonviolent solutions? Are they committed to the process of democracy?

Daily Press BriefingSean McCormack, SpokesmanWashington, DCMay 11, 2006

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, if you're referring to the Muslim Brotherhood, Barry, it isunder the Egyptian Constitution that is a group that is not allowed to be. The EgyptianConstitution says that any -- there should not be any political parties that are based onreligion. That's the Egyptian Constitution. Now in terms of how the Egyptian peopleorganize themselves politically, that is for them to decide and for them to look at their laws

and their constitution to decide whether or not they have it right.

Opening Remarks and Q&A Session at Chicago Council on Foreign RelationsSecretary Condoleezza RiceChicago HiltonChicago, IllinoisApril 19, 2006

SEC. RICE: [] And we have not -- we don't have contact with the Muslim brotherhood atthis point. It's complicated because, of course, this is a growing force in Egypt, but our viewis that the organizations that are really committed to democracy ought to be the ones thatare supported by contact with the United States


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The U.S. and the United Arab EmiratesC. David Welch, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern AffairsPress Roundtable With WAM, Al Ittihad, Al Bayan, Gulf News, Khaleej Times, Al Sharq AlAwsat, Al HayatAbu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

March 29, 2006

AMBASSADOR WELCH: On the Muslim Brotherhood, the Al-Ikhwn Al-Muslimn, inEgypt in the parliamentary election there were a variety of independents elected to the majlis.If those independents wish contact with the United States, we have no objection. We do nothave any relationship or contact with the Muslim Brotherhood, which is not an establishedpolitical party under the laws in Egypt, and that is presently our policy.

Interview on Egyptian Television With Mervat Mohsen

Secretary Condoleezza RiceCairo, EgyptFebruary 22, 2006

SECRETARY RICE: Now, once people are elected to power, they have a responsibilitythen to those who elected them to rule democratically, not to rule by fiat or not to ruleundemocratically. They also have a responsibility to give up and to renounce violence andterrorism, because you can't on the one hand be in the political process and on the otherhand continue to pursue violence.

Interview With Osman Mirghani of Al Sharq al AwsatSecretary Condoleezza RiceLondon, United KingdomJanuary 30, 2006

QUESTION: Right. Are you going to start some kind of dialogue or talks with someIslamic movements, like the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, say?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think that this is an evolutionary period. Certainly we aren't

going to talk with terrorist organizations. We're not going to talk with organizations thatespouse violence. We're not going to talk with organizations that refuse to recognize wholestates within the international system, like Israel.

We do not have contacts with Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt because of Egyptian laws, butwe are, I think, in many places opening up dialogue with Islamist groups who are democraticin their orientation. For instance, in both Iraq and Afghanistan we have a full range ofcontacts with groups that are some quite -- not violent extremists, but some who I think you


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would view as being very conservative Islamist groups. They have a place in the politicalsystem as long as they recognize the right of others to have a place in the political system.

And so this is a time of evolution in the Middle East. It is a time when I think MiddleEastern states are going to have to come to terms with how Islam relates to open political

systems. And that's much healthier than not having that debate.

Briefing En Route Cairo, EgyptKaren Hughes, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public AffairsEn Route Cairo, EgyptSeptember 25, 2005

QUESTION: Id like to be very specific, are you going to meet with anybody from theMuslim Brotherhood?

UNDER SECRETARY HUGHES: I do not believe wereI dont believe so.

QUESTION: And, the Muslim Brotherhood is the largest opposition group in Egypt -- sothey represent a large constituency --

UNDER SECRETARY HUGHES: Well, we are, as the Secretary has said in the past,Jonathan, I know youve had extended conversations with her about this, were respectful ofEgypts laws, and a, were respectful of Egypts laws

Daily Press BriefingAdam Ereli, Deputy SpokesmanWashington, DCDecember 8, 2005

QUESTION: Egypt. The results of the elections are in now and the Muslim Brotherhoodhas won about a fifth of the seats in parliament. Previously, you hadn't been willing tocomment on the Muslim Brotherhood, saying that the elections aren't over yet. Now theyare, so can we have a comment? And specifically, the last time when the Secretary was in

Egypt, she did not -- conspicuously did not meet with the Muslim Brotherhood or anybodythere.

MR. ERELI: Right.

QUESTION: Now that they are becoming a very important political force in Egypt, arethere plans for U.S. officials to do some sort of reach-out?


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MR. ERELI: I don't want to speak to the final numeric results because I'll leave it to theEgyptians to speak to that. What I think is clear is that an unprecedented number ofrepresentatives not affiliated with the government party have been elected to Egypt'sparliament, and this really is historic. Why? Because it represents a broadening of therepresentation, of representation of opposition and independent candidates in the Egyptian

parliament and we think that that's going to have a substantial impact on political life inEgypt. And that's positive. That's a sign that pluralism and democracy has taken a stepforward in Egypt. []

QUESTION: Can I just follow up on that? Since you managed -- my question was aboutthe Muslim Brotherhood and you managed not to mention the words "MuslimBrotherhood" in your response. I was wondering if I can rephrase the question and refocusit and get a specific -- because this is an Islamic organization. They do have ties to violencein the past. The U.S. has shunned them. They are now a force in Egypt and I think it is just amatter of reality what is the United States going to do?

MR. ERELI: The fact is and the best person to answer this would be an Egyptian

government official, but the fact is that as the Muslim Brotherhood is outlawed as a politicalparty, pursuant to Egyptian law that outlaws any party based on religious affiliation, andthose candidates that you refer to as Muslim Brothers are elected as independent candidates,not affiliated with a party.

QUESTION: Okay. So does that mean the U.S. will deal with them?

MR. ERELI: They're independent candidates. There's no injunction against --

QUESTION: Does that mean the U.S. will deal with them?

MR. ERELI: There's no injunction that I'm aware of that prevents -- that would preventthat.

QUESTION: Just to again refocus just one more time. Are there any plans or anypossibility of the United States reaching out to the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization,as a result of this?

MR. ERELI: The United States will respect Egyptian law.

Also see:

November 28, 2005:

November 22, 2005:

November 21, 2005:


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November 16, 2005:

September 14, 2005:

July 14, 2005:

June 23, 2005:

June 21, 2005:

June 20, 2005:

June 20: 2005:

June 20, 2005:

June 20, 2005:


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Endnotes

1 Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942. (Reading, UK: Garnet, 1998), P. 109-11.2 Lia, The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt, P. 236-44; Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim

Brothers. (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), P. 15-6.3 Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. (San Francisco:HarperSanFrancisco, 2005), P. 75-6.4 Lia, The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt, P. 172-81, 270-1; Mitchell, The Society of the MuslimBrothers, P. 33, 62, 67-71, 82-91, 116-25; Robert S. Leiken, To Talk or Not To Talk? That is TheQuestion. The National Interest, (April 25, 2007), http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=14150.5 Amira Howeidy, Politics in Gods Name.Al-Ahram Weekly, (November 16, 1995),http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/archives/parties/muslimb/polgod.htm; Juan Cole, Foreign Occupation HasProduced Radical Muslim Terrorism.Informed Comment: Thoughts on the Middle East, History andReligion, (March 7, 2005), http://www.juancole.com/2005/03/foreign-occupation-has-produced.html;Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, The Other Face of the Islamist Movement. Carnegie Endowment for Peace,(January 2003), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp33.pdf, P. 8-9; Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft,P. 75-81; Mustafa El-Feki, Past and present of political Islam.Al-Ahram Weekly, (January 10, 2006),

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/777/op2.htm.6 The death of Al-Banna marked the beginning of the end for the old leadership of liberal Salafis. SayyidQutb is arguably the perfect embodiment of this ideological shift, who started his life off as a moderateMuslim, and ended his life executed as a radical. He has, and will continue to be remembered as a martyrby many because he executed for his ideas which were radicalized during his temporary escape to SaudiArabia and while being tortured in prison not his actions. For more on a brief synopsis of Qutbs life andthe Wahhabi contributions to the mutation of Salafism, see: Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft, P. 81-5.7 Howeidy, Politics in Gods Name.; Esposito, Unholy War, P. 87-9, 93-4; Robert S. Leiken and StevenBrooke, Strategic Thinking about the Muslim Brotherhood. The National Interest, (March 23, 2007),http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=13894.8 On the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, see: Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Islam CanVote, If We Let It.New York Times, (May 23, 2005),http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/23/opinion/edibrahim.php; John Walsh, Egypts MuslimBrotherhood: Understanding Centrist Islam.Harvard International Review, Vol. 24, (4), (Winter 2003),http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1048; Amr Hamzawy, The West and moderate Islamism.Bitterlemons-International, (June 2, 2005), http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=86#351; Mona El-Ghobashy, The Metamorphosis of theEgyptian Muslim Brothers. The International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 37, (June 2005), P.373-395.9 For examples of its support in the most recent escalations, see: Muslim Scholars: Backing Resistance Is aReligious Duty.Ikhwanweb.com, (July 22, 2006),http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=4793; Fights on fringes of big Cairo protest.Reuters, (July 21, 2006),http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L21773787.htm; Middle East: Muslim Brotherhood and TVCleric Back Hezbollah.Adnkronos International, (July 27, 2006),http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Politics&loid=8.0.325385458&par; Egypt:Muslim Brotherhood Calls for Jihad.Asharq Al-Awsat, (August 3, 2006),

http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=5865; Egyptian Islamist leader ready to send fightersto Lebanon.Agence France Presse, (August 4, 2006),http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/Display_news.asp?section=World_News&subsection=Gulf%2C+Middle+East+%26+Africa&month=August2006&file=World_News2006080434528.xml; Dania Saadi andMaher Chmaytelli, U.S. Aims to Bolster Arab States Condemning Hezbollah.Bloomberg News, (July 24,2006), http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070&sid=adWntUowKH6o; Hamas, MuslimBrotherhood hails Hezbollah capture of Israeli soldiers.Agence France Presse, (July 12, 2006),http://www.religionnewsblog.com/15247; Michael Slackman, Voices of Peace Muffled by Rising MideastStrife.New York Times, (July 15, 2006), http://www.miftah.org/PrinterF.cfm?DocId=10807; HAMAS


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(Islamic Resistance Movement). Globalsecurity.org, (July 16, 2006),http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas.htm.10 Howeidy, Politics in Gods Name.; Social programmes bolster appeal of Muslim Brotherhood.IRINNews, (February 22, 2006), http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=51850; Mariam Fam, MuslimBrotherhood Influences Egypt Vote.Associated Press, (September 1, 2005),

http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:mfaF-27QaNcJ:news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl%3Fpage%3D/ap/i/631/09-02-2005/f223003266d3f172.html; Mary Crane, Does the Muslim Brotherhood Have Ties to Terrorism?Council on Foreign Relations, (April 5, 2005),http://www.cfr.org/publication/9248/does_the_muslim_brotherhood_have_ties_to_terrorism.html.11 Howiedy, Politics in Gods Name.; Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, The Muslim Brothers and PoliticalReform in Egypt.Arab Reform Bulletin, Vol. 2, (2), (February 2004),http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1458#egypt.12 Elections in Egypt.; Daniel Williams, Egypts Muslim Brotherhood May Be Model for IslamsPolitical Adaptation. Washington Post, (February 3, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/02/AR2006020202368_pf.html.13 The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. Available at:http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/2297.pdf, P. 1.14 Ibid., P. 2-23.15 Jeremy M. Sharp, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service, (July 26,2006), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/73956.pdf, P. 29.16 Dwight N. Bashir, Policy Focus: Egypt. The United States Commission on International ReligiousFreedom,http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/policyfocus/EgyptPolicyBrief.pdf, P. 6.17 Mary Fitzgerald, The Brotherhood in limbo. The Irish Times, (June 16, 2006),http://www.ireland.com/focus/gageby/brotherhood.htm; Gamal Nassar, Dr. Habib explains the MuslimBrotherhoods Political Program.Al-Mujtamaa Magazine (March 8, 2006),http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=4032; Noha El-Hennawy, Around the bloc.Egypt Today, (January 2006),http://www.egypttoday.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=6252.; Cecile Hennion, Banned for 50 years, theIslamist group is now Egypts second-biggest political force. Guardian Weekly, (March 3, 2006).Accessed June 19, 2006 throughNexis.; Amira Howeidy, We take nobodys permission.Al-AhramWeekly, (December 15, 2005), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/773/eg5.htm; Abdel Monem Abul Fotouh,

Crackdown by a clique. The Guardian, (March 16, 2007),http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,2035428,00.html.18 Howeidy, We take nobodys permission.; Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy and Marina S. Ottoway,What Islamists Need to Be Clear About: The Case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, (February 2007),http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ottaway_brown_hamzawy_islamists_final.pdf, P.1.19 Munir Adib, Habib says we reject the amendment of Article Two of the Constitution and the Copts arebrothers of the homeland.Ikhwanonline.com, (July 2, 2006). Accessed July 11, 2006 through the OpenSource Center. Also see: Nassar, Dr. Habib explains the Muslim Brotherhoods Political Program.20 El-Hennawy, Around the bloc. For further analysis on Islamists and the notion of implementing theShari`a, see: Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy and Marina S. Ottoway, Islamist Movements and theDemocratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones. Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace andHerbert-Quandt-Stiftung, (March 2006),

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP67.Brown.FINAL.pdf, P. 8-1021 Azizuddin El-Kaissouni and Dina Abdel-Mageed, Waiting in the Wings: Egypts Muslim Brotherhood.Islamonline.net, (October 30, 2005),http://www.islamonline.net/English/Views/2005/10/article03a.SHTML.22 Egypts Muslim Brotherhood says tourists can drink.Reuters, (June 12, 2006),http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2006/June/middleeast_June256.xml&section=middleeast.23 For a recent debate among contemporary Islamic jurists, see: Apostasy and the Freedom of Religion.Islamonline.net, (April 13, 2006),http://www.islamonline.net/English/contemporary/2006/04/article01.shtml; For other opinions against


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punishment for apostasy, see: Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid, Extremism Isnt Islamic Law. WashingtonPost, (May 23, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/22/AR2006052201152.html; Jay Tolson, Why Afghanistan should not havedismissed the apostasy case. US News and World Report, (March 30, 2006),http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060330/30rahman.htm; Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed,

Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam.(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004).24 (Emphasis added.) Joseph Mayton, Government Continues Appeal of Bahai Recognition.Daily StarEgypt, (May 9, 2006), http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=1434; State to appeal rulingthat favours Egypts Bahais.Reuters, (May 3, 2006),http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2006/May/middleeast_May69.xml&section=middleeast&col; Bahais struggle to win full rights as Egyptians.Middle East Times, (May 11,2006), http://www.wwrn.org/article.php?idd=21497&sec=59&cont=3.25 Dan Murphy, Egypt keeps Muslim Brotherhood boxed in. Christian Science Monitor, (June 7, 2005),http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0607/p01s04-wome.html.26 Mary Fitzgerald, Muslims divided on clerics teachings. The Irish Times, (May 5, 2006),http://www.ireland.com/focus/gageby/teaching.htm; Al-Qardawi Turns Down Offer to AssumeLeadership of the Muslim Brotherhood.Al-Jazeera, (January 12, 2004),http://www.cesnur.org/2004/qaradawi.htm.27 Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Apostasy: Major and Minor.Islamonline.net, (April 13, 2006),http://www.islamonline.net/English/contemporary/2006/04/article01c.shtml.28 Abdu Zenah, Muslim Brotherhoods Supreme Guide: We do not pose a threat to anybody.Asharq Al-Awsat, (January 17, 2007), http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=7693; Robert S. Leiken andSteven Brooke, The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood. Foreign Affairs, (March/April 2007),http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/LeikenBrookeMB.pdf. P. 110, 112-3.29 "Shaykh Tantawi stabs Islam and Muslims."Al-Shab, (April 7, 2006). Accessed June 20, 2006 throughthe Open Source Center.30 Ibid.31 El-Kaissouni and Abdel-Mageed, Waiting in the Wings.32 Brown et al., Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process P. 8-10. On the fourth point it isimportant to note that Egypts tourism industry provides over one-third of the national revenue at $7.6bnout $21bn in total revenues. See: Egypt Sees 2007 Tourism Revenue Surging 18 PCT.Reuters, (April 12,2007), http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=6576; Egypt. CIA World Factbook, (Last

updated April 17, 2007), https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/eg.html#Econ.33 For an overview of discrimination faced by Coptic Orthodox Christians, see: Issandr El Amrani, TheEmergence of a Coptic Question in Egypt.Middle East Report, (April 28, 2006),http://www.merip.org/mero/mero042806.html.34 Samir Morcos, Citizens of one state.Al-Ahram Weekly, (April 27, 2006),http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/792/op63.htm; Ali Abd-al-Al, Egypt: Coptic Leader says demandingrights of Copts does not mean sectarian sedition.Ikhwanonline.com, (March 8, 2006). Accessed June 19,2006 through the Open Source Center.; Sameh Fawzi, Brothers and others.Al-Ahram Weekly, (December8, 2005), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/772/op8.htm; Abdul Baqi Khalifa, Egypt Christian CommunityFears the Muslim Brotherhods Recent Political Success.Asharq Al-Awsat, (November 28, 2005),http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=2860; Coptic Researcher Explains CoptsConcerns to MB Political Rise.Ikhwanweb.com, (May 3, 2006). Accessed July 7, 2006 through the OpenSource Center.35

Khalifa, Egypt Christian Community Fears,; Muslim Brotherhood Seeks to Allay Copts Concerns.Nahdat Misr, (December 2, 2005). Accessed June 20, 2006 through the Open Source Center.; Essam El-Arian, Comments on the Sidelines of the Alexandria Events.London Al-Hayah, (April 25, 2006).Accessed June 19, 2006 through the Open Source Center.36 Abd-al-Rahim Ali, Egypts Muslim Brotherhood deputy guide: We are preparing a comprehensivepolitical programme, paper recognizing full equality between Copts, Muslims.Asharq Al-Awsat, (July 5,2005). Accessed on June 21, 2006 throughNexis, taken fromBBC Worldwide Monitoring.37 Ahmad Ramadan, Abu-al-Futuh says the MB rejects foreign intervention in the affairs of states.Ikhwanonline.com, (March 28, 2006). Accessed June 19, 2006 through the Open Source Center.; MuslimBrotherhood Seeks to Allay Copts Concerns.; Muhammad Habib, What if the MB acceded to power?


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Ikhwanonline.com, (February 7, 2006). Accessed June 20, 2006 through the Open Source Center.; Nassar,Dr. Habib explains the Muslim Brotherhoods Political Program.; Doha Al Zohairy, MuslimBrotherhood: We are a power in Egypt.Al-Jazeera, (June 22, 2005),http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/52642A0D-2FC0-4616-8308-19972B99E70F.htm.38 Amr Hamzawy and Nathan J. Brown, Can Egypts Troubled Elections Produce a More Democratic

Future? Carnegie Endowment for Peace, (December 2005),http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO24.brown.hamzawy.FINAL1.pdf, P. 7. Lately it appears theyounger activists have upper hand in the debate as older activists like First Deputy Guide Habib have beenpublicly stating that, they [Copts] have full right in assuming public offices including that of the head ofthe state. [sic.] See: Muhammad Habib, The Brotherhood are Unlikely to Form Government, However,this is how We Envisage It.Asharq Al-Awsat, (November 28, 2005),http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=2858.39 For a background on restrictions building and repairing Coptic Churches, see: Church BuildingRegulations Eased. Compass, (December 13, 2005),http://www.wwrn.org/article.php?idd=19813&sec=36&cont=3.40 Abd-al-Muizz Muhammad, Habib says the Muslim Brotherhood Group in Egypt will issue adocument on the relations between the Muslims and Copts.Ikhwanonline.com, (January 26, 2006).Accessed June 20, 2006 through the Open Source Center.41 For instance, see: Accessed June 19, 2006 through the Open Source Center. Muhammad Izzat, Akefdemands confrontation of the US hegemony and boycott of the imperialist countries.Ikhwanonline.com,(March 4, 2006).; Hamdi Salim, Egypts Muslim Brotherhood Guide Mahdi Akef: We Have the LargestOrganization in the World.Asharq Al-Awsat, (December 11, 2005). Accessed June 20, 2006 through theOpen Source Center.42 For instance, see: Masad Al-Hufi, The drive of the one-million signatures against the US medicinalcompanies.Afaq Arabiyah, (March 17, 2005). Accessed August 4, 2006 through the Open Source Center.43 Salih Shalabi, Khalifah warns against jewish control of Egyptian medicinal companies.Ikhwanonline.com, (April 4, 2006). Accessed August 4, 2006 through the Open Source Center;Abd-al-Muizz Muhammad, A question tabled warning against the sale of medicinal companies to theJews.Ikhwanonline.com, (January 2, 2006). Accessed June 20, 2006 through the Open Source Center.Only very recently had the Brotherhood decided to distinguish between Jews and Israelis, warning againstthe sale of pharmaceutical companies to Zionists. See: Salih Shahabi, the MB tables a question on theZionist scheme to buy the medicinal companies.Ikhwanonline.com, (June 25, 2006). Accessed August 4,

2006 through the Open Source Center.44 For instance, see: Hazim Sagiyah, Denying the Holocaust: The Disease Grips Our Authorities.LondonAl-Hayah, (December 24, 2005). Accessed July 10, 2006 through the Open Source Center.; Ahmed Fathy,Egypts Brotherhood Says No Holocaust Denial.IslamOnline.net, (December 23, 2005),http://islamonline.net/English/News/2005-12/23/article07.shtml.45 Leiken and Brooke, The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood. P. 116-7; Robert S. Leiken and StevenBrooke, Response to Patrick Pooles Mainstreaming the Muslim Brotherhood. FrontPage Magazine,(April 11, 2007),http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:LDm_F5s0icoJ:www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp%3FID%3D27800+Frontpage+response+to+Patrick+Poole&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us&client=firefox-a.46 Helena Cobban, Interview with Dr. Abdel Monem Abul-Futouh.Just World News, (February 23,2007), http://justworldnews.org/archives/002404.html.47 Ibid. With respect to the secular, democratic state comment, Helena Cobban gives the following

commentary on it: I certainly had not been expecting the support he expressed for a single, seculardemocratic state within all the area of Mandate Palestine. That had, of course, been the position the PLOespoused between 1968 and 1974 (before it moved over into supporting the idea of two states living side-by-side there.) And back then as I recall it, the MB opposed the idea, mainly because of its opposition tosecular rule anywhere within the historic lands of Islam.48 Joel Beinin, The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, and the Formation of a ModernDiaspora. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998). Online edition.http://content.cdlib.org/view?docId=ft2290045n&chunk.id=ch3.


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49 The Role of Muslim Women in an Islamic Society.Ikhwanweb.com, (January 30, 2006),http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=3787.50 Ibid.51 Mary Fitzgerald, I raised six children and had an academic career: the lone voice of the sisters. The

Irish Times, (June 16, 2006), http://www.ireland.com/focus/gageby/voice.htm; Noha El-Hennawy, AbdelMonem Abou El-Fotuh.Egypt Today, (March 2006),http://www.egypttoday.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=6462.52 Mona Eltahawy, The Muslim Brotherhood and Women.Asharq Al-Awsat, (December 5, 2005),http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=2941.53 Fitzgerald, I raised six children and had an academic career,. Also see: Daniel Williams, EgyptsMuslim Brotherhood May Be Model for Islams Political Adaptation. Washington Post, (February 3,2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/02/AR2006020202368.html.54 Joseph Krauss, Egypts election indifference: Women find few doors open to elective office. SanFrancisco Chronice, (April 23, 2006), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2006/04/23/ING47ICR7G1.DTL&type=printable.55 Chinoy, A veil of uncertainty.; El-Eltahawy, The Muslim Brotherhood and Women.56 Abduh Zinah abd Issam Fadl, A Woman Could Assume the Leadership of the Muslim Brotherhoodsays the Groups Female Parliamentary Candidate.Asharq Al-Awsat, (December 25, 2005),http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=2362.57 Pakinam Amer, Muslim Brotherhood Initiative Controversial. The Daily Star Egypt, (June 5, 2006),http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=1780.58 Shahnaz Taplin Chinoy, A veil of uncertainty. Salon.com, (June 13, 2006),http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/06/13/arab_women/print.html.Amira Howiedy, Taking theirchance.Al-Ahram Weekly, (November 2, 2005), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/767/eg5.htm; Chinoy,A veil of uncertainty.; Ahmed Aboul-Wafa and Issandr El Amrani, Sister doing it for herself. CairoMagazine, (October 27, 2005),http://www.cairomagazine.com/?module=displaystory&story_id=1527&format=html; Issam Fadl, AWoman Could Assume,; Cobban, Interview with Dr. Abdel Monem Abul-Futouh.59 For instance, see: Eltahawy, The Muslim Brotherhood and Women,; Aboul-Wafa and El Amrani,Sister doing it for herself.; Fitzgerald, I raised six children and had an academic career.60 Bahira Sherif and Hussein Ghanem, Egypt. The Continuum Complete International Encyclopedia of

Sexuality, (2004), P. 352-3. Citing Susan Sachs, Egypt Makes it Easier for Women to Divorce Husbands.New York Times, (January 28, 2000), P. A8.61 Rights activists welcome ruling recognizing Bahai rights.IRIN News, (April 4, 2006),http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=52652&SelectRegion=Middle_East&SelectCountry=EGYPT.62 Interior ministry resists recognition of Bahai faith.IRIN News, (May 8, 2006),http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=53201&SelectRegion=Middle_East&SelectCountry=EGYPT.63 Mayton, Government Continues Appeal of Bahai Recognition.; Also see: Mariam Fam, EgyptSuppresses Bahai Faith.Associated Press, (June 22, 2006),http://www.religionnewsblog.com/15096/egypt-suppresses-bahai-faith.64 Alexandra Sandels and Abdel-Rahman Hussein,Daily Star Egypt, (December 18, 2006),http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=4506.65

Bashir, Egypt: Policy Focus. P. 3.66 Mona Eltahawy, The Politics of the Muslim Brotherhood.Asharq Al-Awsat, (August 7, 2005),http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=1128.67 Brotherhood Rejects Saudi Fatwas on Hezbollah Support.Reuters, (July 28, 2006),http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=2423.68 On support for reforming Amendments 76 and 77 to limit Executive powers, see: Amira Howeidy,Muslim Brotherhood flexes muscles.Al-Jazeera, (December 5, 2005),http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C72F8EF6-FBBB-451D-AC76-C40319A66F8C.htm; El-Hennawy,Around the bloc.


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69 Ursula Lindsey, Egypt extends emergency rule. Christian Science Monitor, (May 2, 2006),http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0502/p10s01-wome.html?s=widep; Egypt extends emergency law fortwo years.Reuters, (May 1, 2006), http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=84253&version=1&template_id=37&parent_id=17;Egypt detains Muslim Brothers.BBC News, (May 4, 2006),

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4973856.stm.70 For an example of its vagueness, see: The Vision of MB concerning reform and development.Ikhwanweb, (July 6, 2006),http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=4710.71 Brown, et al., Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process, P. 4.72 For more on splits within the Brotherhood, see: Abdel Rahim Ali, Interview with the Leader of theMuslim Brotherhood in Egypt.Asharq Al-Awsat, (July 29, 2005),http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=1575; Manal Lufti, The Brotherhood and America Part Four.Asharq Al-Awsat, (March 15, 2006),http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=8324.73 Brown, et al., Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process, P. 7-8. Islamism in North Africa:Egypts Opportunity.International Crisis Group, (April 20, 2004),http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/egypt_north_africa/200404_islamism_in_north_africa_ii.pdf, P. 16; Israel Elad Altman, The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood after the 2005elections. Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 4, (July 16, 2006),http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/pubID.48/pub_detail.asp.74 Original source: Karam Jabr, The Guides Tounge: The Best Anti-Brothers Weapon.Rose al-Yusuf,(May 27, 2006). Accessed June 20, 2006 through the Open Source Center. Also see: A New Leader forthe Muslim Brotherhood.Arab Reform Bulletin, Vol. 2, (2), (February 2004),http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1458#new; Shadi Hamid,Muslim Brotherhood to Form New Political Party.Democracy Arsenal, (January 19, 2007),http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2007/01/the_muslim_brot.html; Leiken and Brooke, Response toPatrick Pooles Mainstreaming the Muslim Brotherhood.75 For instance, see: Omayma Abdel-Latif, Abdel-Moneim Abul-Futuh: A different kind of syndicalism.Al-Ahram Weekly, (May 2005), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/743/profile.htm; El-El-Hennawy, AbdelMonem Abou El-Fotouh.Egypt Today, (March 2006),

http://www.egypttoday.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=6462.76 Accessed June 21, 2006 throughNexis. Original source: BBC Monitoring, translating, Egyptian MuslimBrotherhood Leader Not to Seek Second Term.Asharq Al-Awsat, (February 24, 2006).77 El-Ghobashy, The Metamorphosis, P. 373, 383; Chinoy, A veil of uncertainty.78 Sharon Otterman, Muslim Brotherhood and Egypts Parliamentary Elections. Council on ForeignRelations, (December 1, 2005), http://www.cfr.org/publication/9319/; Muslim Brotherhood Official UrgesSetting Up Political, Religious Wings. Safwa TV, (November 20, 2005) Accessed June 21, 2006 throughthe Open Source Center. ; Hamdy Al Husseini, Egypts MB Weighs Conservative Political Party.Islamonline.net, (December 27, 2005), http://islamonline.net/English/News/2005-12/27/article04.shtml;Essam El-Erian, Towards the Renaissance.Al-Ahram Weekly, (December 1, 2005),http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/771/op71.htm. Also see: El-Hennawy, Abdel Monem Abou El-Fotouh.;Yasmine Saleh, Muslim Brotherhood in Final Preparations to Establish a Political Party.Daily StarEgypt, (January 14, 2007), http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=4972.79

Lisa Anderson, Egypts cultural shift reflects Islams pull. Chicago Tribune, (March 21, 2004),http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-0403210513mar21,1,6736381,print.story?ctrack=2&cset=true; Aida Akl, Muslim Youth: Between TwoWorlds. Voice of America, (April 6, 2007), http://www.voanews.com/english/NewsAnalysis/2007-04-12-voa69.cfm. Muslim Believe US Seeks to Undermine Islam. Program on International Public Attitudes,(April 26, 2007),http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/346.php?nid=&id=&pnt=346&lb=hmpg1.80 Brown, et al., Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process, P. 8.81 F. Shazene Hussein, The Ulama of Egypt: A Moderate and Progressive Religious Authority? PaperPresented at the Annual Conference of The Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, (May 6, 2006),


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http://www.csidonline.org/images/stories/pdfiles/shaznene_hussain[1].pdf, P. 10-6; Malika Zeghal,Religion and Politics in Egypt: the Ulema of Al-Azhar, Radical Islam and the State.InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 31, (3), (August 1999), P. 380, 81, 82-3; Steven Barraclough, Al-Azhar Between the Government and the Islamists. The Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, (2), (Spring 1998),P. 236-49; Rachel Scott, An official Islamic response to the Egyptian al-jihad movement.Journal of

Political Ideologies, Vol. 8, (1), (2003) P. 40-1; Gihan Shahine, A Government Mouthpiece?Al-AhramWeekly, (September 1-7, 2005), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/758/fo1.htm; Abdulwahab Salah Babeair,The Role of The Ulama in Modern Islamic Society: An Historical Perspective. Seasons Journal,(Spring/Summer 2003), P. 51; Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, P. 168-9; Dan Murphy, Can Islamsleaders teach its radicals? Christian Science Monitor, (July 14, 2005),http://csmonitor.com/2005/0714/p01s01-wome.html; Charles Levinson, Call to Change: Reformers takeon traditionalists over future of the faith. Cairo Magazine, (April 27, 2005),http://www.cairomagazine.com/?module=displaystory&story_id=850&format=html.

This dynamic is largely the same in many other parts of the Middle East and Muslim World. See:Richard W. Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization. (New York: Columbia University Press,2004), P. 73; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change.(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), P. 60-2; Aziz Enhaili and Oumelkheir Adda, State andIslamism in the Maghreb.MERIA Journal, 7, no. 4, (March 2003), P. 66-7, 68-70, 75 fns. 4, 8; DouglasJehl, Moderate Muslims Fear Their Message is Being Ignored.New York Times, (October 21, 2001);Richard W. Bulliet, The Crisis Within Islam. Policy, (18), no. 4, (Summer 2003), P. 34-40; DavidSmock, Ijtihad: Reinterpreting Principles for the Twenty-First Century. United States Institute of Peace,(August 2004), http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr125.pdf, P. 4-5; Alejandro J. Beutel, Recallingthe Historic Adversial Relation Between Islamic Scholars and the State.Minaret of Freedom Weblog,(February 26, 2007), http://blog.minaret.org/?p=225.

On June 21, 2006, the House of Representatives subcommittee on Central Asia and MiddleEastern Affairs held a hearing on the strategic relationship between the United States and Egypt. During thequestion and answer session, one of the panelists, Michele Dunne, noted that acts of violence anddiscrimination against minorities are mostly socially based. She went on to mention government complicityby not aggressively prosecuting these acts. While her observation shows a clear need for a non-discriminatory enforcement of the law, it also highlights the need to drain the swamp of religious tensionand intolerance in Egyptian society. In my opinion, this swamp of tension and intolerance has been largelycreated by the competition between Al-Azhar and conservative Islamists to out Islam each other by

taking more conservative positions.This dynamic can be contrasted with the situations in Syria and Indonesia where the mainstream

Islamic clerical establishments, to differing degrees, enjoy more political and financial autonomy than Al-Azhar. As a result, the reputation of the mainstream clergies in Indonesia and Syria are far better than theircounterparts in most other Muslim-majority countries, making them important forces for political andsocial change. See: Anthony Shadid, Syrias Unpredictable Force: The State-Sanctioned Clergy.Washington Post, (May 27, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/26/AR2005052601549_pf.html; Douglas E. Ramage, Islam in Asia. U.S.House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, (July 14, 2004),http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa94835.000/hfa94835_0.HTM#38.

It is also useful to compare Al-Azhar to the Coptic Church, which, according to the EncyclopediaCoptica, has never been controlled or allowed itself to control the governments in Egypt. According tothis memorandums analysis the Patriarchates independence allows it to maintain its credibility among its

followers rather than look like a government stooge, especially during times of violent crisis like the WafaConstantine incident. See: Encylopedia Coptica. The Christian Coptic Orthodox Church of Egypt,(2001), http://www.coptic.net/EncyclopediaCoptica/; Egyptian Pope Goes into Seclusion.BBC News,(December 20, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4110861.stm; Good Copts, Sad Copts.Economist, (December 29, 2004),http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3524939.82 Also see: Manal Lutfi, The Brotherhood and American Part Two.Asharq Al-Awsat, (March 13, 2007),http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=8297. For a non-Islamist criticism of thesegovernment allegations, see: Al-Sayyid, The Other Face of the Islamist Movement. P. 8-12.


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83 For instance, see: Robert B. Zoellick, Remarks During Press Roundtable in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt.United States Department of State, (May 21, 2006),http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/2006/66540.htm; Condoleezza Rice, Open Remarks andQ&A Session at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. United States Department of State, (April 19,2006), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/64797.htm; Condoleezza Rice, Interview with Osman

Mirghani of Asharq Al Awsat. United States Department of State, (January 30, 2006),http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/60034.htm.84 In fact Al-Arabiyya journalist Randa Abu Alawmy makes this exact point in an interview with SecretaryRice. See: Interview on Al Arabiya With Randa Abu Alawmy. United States Department of State, (June20, 2005), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48350.htm.85 Opening Remarks and Q&A Session at Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. United StatesDepartment of State, (April 19, 2006), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/64797.htm.86 Daily Press Briefing. United States Department of State, (December 18, 2006),http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2006/77924.htm.87 For an excellent overview of the religious freedom challenges facing Egypt, see: Bashir, Policy Focus:Egypt. P. 1-6.88 The last systematic count of detained Muslim Brothers was conducted by Human Rights Watch, puttingthe number at 226. Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood Detainees Face Military Tribunals.Human RightsWatch, (February 15, 2007), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/02/15/egypt15329.htm. The next day another56 were detained. See: Yasmine Saleh, Egypt Holds 56 Brotherhood Islamists After Clampdown.DailyStar Egypt, (February 16, 2007), http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=5657. However 5days later, on February 20, media reported 48 students were released, bring the total down to 234. See:Yasmine Saleh, Release of 48 Al-Azhar Students.Daily Star Egypt, (February 20, 2007),http://www.dailystaregypt.com

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