the moscow centre and its peripheries. an ideological overview of the soviet union's difficulties as...

8/3/2019 The Moscow Centre and Its Peripheries. an Ideological Overview of the Soviet Union's Difficulties as a Multinational

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Political Science Forum

The Moscow centre1

and its peripheries: an ideological

overview of the Soviet Unions difficulties as a multinational state

2

By

Emanuel Copila

Teaching Assistant, Politics Department

West University Timioara, Romania

Abstract

Taking into account the ideological responses the Soviet Union offered, in its different

phases of existence, to the national question, this study aims to offer a diachronical

perspective of Moscows efforts in order to create a Soviet people. Kenneth Jowitts

concept, the Moscow centre, applies to the whole socialist camp, both the USSR and to

the rest of the communist states loyal to Moscow; however, in the present paper, I havecarried out a risky enterprise, and limited it only to the territory of the former USSR,

more exactly, to the relation between Moscow and the nationalities and/or ethnies of the

Soviet Union, most of them dispersed trough the remote regions of the country and only

a part of them having their own federative republic. Recognizing the imperilous potential

which the nationalities might have with reference to the Soviet Union as a state, the

communists tried both ideologically and politically, to forge a Soviet supranational

identity able to overcame this thorny problem. Officially, the Russians also must have

1The syntagm was borrowed from Jowitt: 1992, p. 159

2This paper was initially presented at the 2008 edition of the Ideologies, values and political behaviors in

Central and Eastern Europe conference, which took place between 5 and 6 of December at the West

University of Timioara. Its previous title was Cohesion or destabilization? Controversial aspectsregarding the influence of the Russian Federation on its near abroad , where I also took into accountthe national problems of the former Soviet Union. Finally, I decided to concentrate on the Soviet Union

exclusively. The research needed to conceive this paper was partially facilitated by an AMPOSDRU

grant which I received from Babe Bolyai University for the whole duration of my doctoral studies.


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renounced their national identity in favor of the Soviet melting pot; in practice, however,

the non-Russians were always oppressed by the dominant nationality, although this fact

was not ideologically and constitutionally visible. This was one of the main causes which,

in combination with others, led to the undermining and finally to the disintegration of the

Soviet Union.

Key words: ideology, nationalism, national tensions, centrifugal tendencies

Introduction

Since its official founding in March 1922 and, until its rather unexpected implosion

which took place in December 1991, the Soviet Union was undoubtedly the worlds

largest multinational state. A census from 1959 listed as many as 109 different ethnic

groups, 22 of which numbered more than 900,000 members each. (Bilinsky: 1967, p.

16). The strong affirmation of the ethnic appartenance in that particular census could be

interpreted as a consequence of Khrushchevs destalinization processes, which surely

amplified the desire of the ethnic groups to delimitate themselves from the Soviet

imposed identity and also, as much as possible, from the Russian oppression which most

of them endured since the XIX-th century or even earlier.

Regardless of the successive metamorphosis the Soviet national policy experimented over

the decades, its ideological aim remained basically unchanged: to integrate and, sooner or

later, assimilate the minorities, in the process of forging a new identity, which in the

Brezhnev era became familiar as the Soviet people concept (Nahaylo: 1987, p. 77). The

next pages will be focused on the successive ideological approaches with the help of

which Lenin and its followers tried to solve, or at least to contain the national problem of

the Soviet Union, giving it an official faade.


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National in form, socialist in content: the Leninist approach

After the demise of the Tsarist Empire and the February 1917 seizure of power, the

Kerensky government witnessed an impressive, one could say explosive development of

the national conscience among the peoples within the boundaries of the former empire.

National councils were forming almost everywhere, led by liberal intellectuals from the

local elites (Jukoff-Eudin: 1943, p. 31). Following the October Revolution, when the

Menshevik faction of the Russian Social Democrat Workers Party was banished and the

Bolshevik faction (renamed in 1918 the Russian Communist Party) took over (Lichtheim:

1970, pp. 252-258), this kind of attitudes were officially tolerated, even encouraged to a

certain level. The memory of the tsarist oppression was still too powerful to be neglected

by the new political elite, which, having more than enough enemies, both internal and

external, could not afford the risk of loosing the peripheries support. Animated by the

possibility of an autonomous, or even an independent future, the revolutionary impetus of

the minorities could easily be channeled towards the new government, if it was careless

enough to manifest itself against this national fervor. But Lenin and its court clique were

not at all willing to permit the secession of the former tsarist provinces. The Revolutions

victory was a precarious one and, with enemies lurking in almost every corner, the

political disintegration of the geopolitical assembly gradually constituted during the

tsarist rule, was the last thing the Bolsheviks wished for.

Two types of issues aroused from this particular situation. One was political. Lenin was

fully aware of the imperiling potential that an improper attitude towards the sensibilities

of the minorities might have upon the construction of a coherent and stable political

entity able to successfully replace the Tsarist Empire. Just a few months before the

consummation of the Bolshevik victory, he clearly stated what kind of behavior the

revolutionary government should manifest in respect to the nationalities living inside the

borders of the previous empire, but also the general aims that the government must

pursue and achieve at any cost. The paragraph is worth quoting, despite of its length:


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If we assumed power we would at once recognize the right [of separation] of Finland, the

Ukraine, Armenia, and of any other nationality which had been oppressed by tsarism (and by the

Great Russian bourgeoisie). But we on our part do not at all wish for this separation. No. We want

the largest possible state, the closest possible union, the largest possible number of nations which

are closely associated with the Great Russians; we desire this in the interest of democracy and

socialism, in the interest of bringing into the struggle of the proletariat the largest possible number

of workers of all nations. We desire revolutionary proletarian unity, and unification, and not the

separation of peoples. We desire a revolutionary unification, and therefore, we do not advance the

slogan of the unification of all and every state in general. The task advanced by the social revolution

is the unification only of the states which have passed over or are passing over to socialism, of the

colonies which are freeing themselves, and so forth. Desiring a free unification, we are duty bound

to recognize the freedom of separation (otherwise free unification would have no meaning).We are

duty bound to recognize this freedom of separation all the more because tsarism and the Great

Russian bourgeoisie with their oppression have left a heritage of great irritation and distrusttoward most Great Russians (my emphasis, C.E.). Only by action and not by words can we conquer

this distrust. But this unification means much to us and this must be stated and emphasized in the

program of the party of such a motley state (Lenin: 1931, apud. Jukoff-Eudin: 1943, p. 33).

The fact that Lenin was not willing to grant political freedom to the nationalities which

have been oppressed by tsarism is undeniable: these peoples must be attracted into a free

union, a revolutionary proletarian unity, but this should be directly proportional to the

progress achieved during the process of constructing socialism. From this point of view,

only the most advanced states are to be integrated; however, even if Lenin does not

specifically mention what will happen with the lazy socialist constructing states, one

can assume that they will be generously sustained in this direction. Here, the inextricable

bound between ideology and politics which occurs in the socialist regimes is highly

visible. As Ken Jowitt accurately observed, as soon as the Soviet Union presented itself

as the concrete incarnation of Leninism, all Soviet political actions and international

relations immediately became, by definition, ideologically principled (Jowitt: 1992, p.

169). Evidently, the argument is extrapolable to all the political regimes which share the

same Marxist-Leninist ideological umbrella.

Being senseless in the absence of the secession right, both the freedom of union, but

especially the freedom of separation appear to be only rhetorical artifices meant to


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temper the worries of the national elites. This delicate matter, which was to be (and, of

course, purely formal) a constitutional concession, must be agreed upon for another

reason: the feelings of irritation and nevertheless, distrust that the tsarist reign induced

upon its non-Russian subjects (this does not mean that large categories of the Russian

natives themselves were not dissatisfied in different degrees regarding their imperial

political organization). On the other hand, Erich Hula may be correct when he writes

about the sincerity with which the Russian socialists opposed the Romanovs national

policies, but one should not forget that the Soviet Union became no less than the prison

of peoples that the Tsarist Empire was. The socialist party violently and sincerely

opposed the () [national] policies of the last Romanovs. From its first days, however,

whether it confessed it openly or not, it was genuinely interested in preserving the

existing political framework of Russia, in all its breadth and width, as the future of the

socialist state (Hula: 1944, p. 170; see also Towster: 1951, p. 439). Worried by the

centrifugal forces which were articulating national movements all over the peripheries of

the former empire, Lenin attempted to win the trust of the local elites by firmly sustaining

that in the new statehood about to be born, the minorities will be treated as equals, and

their interests will not be neglected, but better represented and even more feasible than in

the absence of their incorporation. Julian Towster identifies three main objectives trough

which the Bolsheviks struggled to become attractive for the separatist movements: (1) to

convince the rest of the populace that the Slavs will not be favored over the other

nationalities; (2) to persuade the Slavs in the U.S.S.R. that the Russians had abandoned

the idea of dominating and forcibly Russifying them; and (3) to assure the Russians that

their national heritage was not frittered away (Towster: 1951, p. 440).

The other dimension of the national dilemma was the ideological one. If the democratic

centralism and the need for cohesion necessitated a firm political unity, also the

Marxian concept of the state called for centralization, a unified commonwealth of

workers for whom there existed no national boundaries (Batsell: 1928, p. 922). Marx

believed that nationality is a superficial, yet functional instrument trough which the

capitalist exploiters divide, weaken and obtain huge profits from the workers class. As


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soon as the proletarians will became aware of their class consciousness, all national

cleavages will be transcended, this being the most important condition for the feasibility

of the revolution. Marxs prophecy was invalidated by the historical events at the

beginning of the last century. The First World War painfully proved the vigorousness of

the national sentiment among the members of the socialist parties from Western Europe,

as they took part of their national governments during the conflagration, regarded by

Lenin as the imperialist war which should bring about the political and economical

demise of the colonial-capitalist world order (Lenin: 1945). A reassessment of orthodox

Marxism was needed, and Lenin argued, in What is to be done, the requirement of a

strong vanguard party, able to lead the workers to the revolutionary path. The party

became indispensable for the final victory, because the proletarians could not develop, on

their own, an appropriate political consciousness. Their demands can not exceed the

concessions obtained by the syndicalist movements, thus leaving the corrupt, oppressive

and inequitable capitalist order intact (Lenin: 1946).

To Lenins ambition in maintaining the geopolitical architecture of the Tsarist Empire

was offered another ideological legitimation. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone affirms that,

even if Lenin stated initially that the two share the same political weight, the right of free

unification of the workers is more important than the secession right. In other words, the

progressive unwinding of history towards socialism was strenghtening class cohesiveness

in the prejudice of national seclusions, which were condemned to disappearance and

oblivion.

The Bolsheviks justified their recon-quest of the former imperial dependencies in

theoretical terms by explaining that the right to proletarian unity allegiance to the common

interests of the working class took precedence in the historical progression towards socialism

over the right to national self-determination allegiance to a nation. The supposed desire of the

workers of all former imperial nations to be united in a new socialist state was proclaimed a higher

right than the right to independent statehood (Rakowska-Harmstone: 1992, p. 521)

The national question represented a constant preoccupation of the Russian socialists.

Even from 1913, four years before the Revolution, both the Menshevik and the Bolshevik


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faction, anticipating the imminence of their victory, agreed that the question of the right

of nations to self-determination () cannot be involved with the question of the

practicability of such a separation of a nation. This last question the Social Democratic

Labor Party must decide in every case absolutely independently, from the point of view

of the interests of the entire social movement, as well as from the point of view of the

class struggle for Socialism (Batsell: 1928, p. 922). In the same year, and referring to the

same matter, Stalin advocated in favor of regional instead of national autonomy, the

first one being, in his opinion, susceptible to speed up and simultaneously improve the

process of de-nationalization:

National autonomy does not solve the problem The only real solution is regional

autonomy It [regional autonomy] does not divide people according to nation, it does notstrengthen national partitions; on the contrary, it only serves to break down these partitions and

unites the population in such a manner as to open the way for division of a different kind, division

according to class [Our] aim must be to unite the workers of all nationalities from Russia into

unitedand integral collective bodies in the various localities and to unite these collective bodies

into a single party (Stalin: 1935, apud. Jukoff-Eudin: 1943, p. 32)

However, one must recognize, independently of the Bolshevik will for centralization, the

desideratum of some of the republics themselves to unite with the Russian Soviet

Socialist Federative Republic, as was the case of Ukraine or Byelorussia (Bloembergen:

1967, pp. 27-29; see also Muravchik: 2004, p. 156). Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia3, and

the political entities from Central Asia can also be included into this category. But the

fact that the local communists were infiltrated into the governments of those republics

with the help of the Russian communists and the Red Army, urging an otherwise

uncertain political union, must not be forgotten. Even so, the future soviet republics

succeeded in maintaining their independence for a while, but the presence of the

Bolshevik military forces allowed the Russian government to gradually assume [its]

authority over military and economic matters, transportation, and communications,

facilities which it had enjoyed de facto from the moment the Soviet regime was

3Georgia was somehow a special case, having a Menshevik government until 1921, when Lenin decided

that its centrifugal tendencies could be no longer tolerated. It was the last important republic to be

incorporated into the Soviet Union (Wolton: 2001, p. 324; Muravchick: 2004, p. 157), which begun its

de jure existence in 1922.


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established in the area. To preserve the appearance of their sovereignty, the former

independent republics were granted the right to maintain diplomatic relations with

foreign countries (Szporluk: 1973, p. 26).

Although considering it an obsolete and reactionary force, the first leader of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union understood very well the difficulties arisen from

the thorny national problem. Until the creation of an authentic large centralized state in

which national loyalties will be superseded by an internationalist ethos, Lenin

acknowledged the need to win the trust of the non- Russians with temporary

concessions, such as federation and a degree of cultural autonomy (Nahaylo: 1987, p.

73); a few years before the seizure of power, he disregarded federalism and cultural

autonomy under the accusation of intensifying and perpetuating national distinctions

(Pipes: 1967, p. 127).

In the first years of the Bolshevik regime, it appeared that the concessions were expanded

even further: the Baltic States were granted independence in 1920 (they will lose it in

1939 as a consequence of the Nazi-Soviet pact), and an autonomous Baskhir Republic

came into existence. These measures were taken to prove the so-called respect for

democracy and national self-determination the new regime possessed, along with the

groundless accusations of chauvinism (Batsell: 1928, p. 293). In the case of the Baltic

States, however, it should be clearly stated that from 1918, when they declared their

independence, profiting by the political chaos of the defunct empire, and until 1920,

when they won it on the battlefield fighting against the Soviet invader, Lithuanians,

Estonians and Latvians made colossal, almost supernatural efforts, if we take into account

their countries size and military capacities in comparison with their weakened eastern

neighbor to prevent their reincorporation in Moscows renewed imperial texture

(Vardys: 1967, p. 57). But Polands independence was not part of this particular line of

concessions. Regaining its independence in 1918, with major Western support, the

former tsarist province will experience over several decades the harsh experience of

sovietization, embraced politically and nevertheless ideologically in the form of a

popular democracy. With all that, the measures taken to ensure modernization and


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social mobilization in the peripheral regions of the USSR, aiming to slowly disintegrate

the national identities from those remote territories of the Federation, produced very often

a paradoxical effect: they actually strengthened the national sentiment. (Nahaylo: 1987,

p. 73).

On short, the basic acceptance of Lenin and his loyal comrades of this intriguing and

painful dilemma can be considered an instrumental one, entailing ambivalent political

usages which are conditioned only by the short or medium term interest of the party

(Rakowska-Harmstone: 1992, p. 522; Pipes: 1967, p. 126; Ziegler: 1985, p. 20). Even if

the opinions regarding the nationalities problem were initially divided along the

autonomists/assimilationists line (the first arguing upon the need to loosen the centers

control over the peripheries, while the last ones tried to consolidate it), Lenin managed to

find a compromise solution, summed up in the phrase national in form and socialist in

content. Until their remote, but ideologically necessary fusion (Nahaylo: 1987, p. 82),

this result allowed the recognition of the national principle by providing the nations of

the defunct empire with a formal federal state structure (Rakowska-Harmstone: 1992, p.

522).

Disciples of Marx and Engels developed three main approaches toward nationalism, all

stemming from a basic assumption that it was a transitional phenomenon in the progression of

history. Some refused to recognize its salience altogether. Others came to believe that socialism

would be fully realized only within the framework of a national state. Lenins Bolsheviks took a

middle road. Following their masters lead, they took an instrumental view of the phenomenon:

promoting national sentiment when it furthered the cause, and combating it when it stood in the

way. At the same time, however, they recognized that nationalism was bound to survive in popular

attitudes for some time to come and would have to be carefully managed by the new Soviet state,

even as socialism was being built (Idem, p. 521).


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The recrudescence of intolerance and the intensifying of centralism: the Stalinist

approach

Lenins death, which occurred in January 1924, entailed ravaging political struggles

inside the upper lair of the party elite. However, even since 1922, the Bolshevik icon was

seriously ill and, as a consequence, unable to perform its political duties; Joseph Stalin,

former editor of Pravda and People's Commissar for Nationalities' Affairs during the

October Revolution, begun to construct his tenacious and meandric rise to power

(Radzinsky: 2003, pp. 225-239). In 1922, benefiting from Lenins and Kamenevs

support (the last one held at time the chairmanship of the Partys Politburo), he was

appointed General Secretary of the Central Committee, position which allowed him to

pursue its political goals with renewed impetus. In the same period, Stalins

disagreements with Troki (the architect of the Red Armys famous victories during the

Civil War, 1918-1921), and also with other prominent Bolsheviks had been expanded

(Idem, pp. 241-262). Together with Kamenev and Zinoviev (a powerful member of the

Politburo and leader of the Third International), he gradually removed Troki from its

major political functions and exiled him in 1927 (de Launay: 1993, pp. 36-49); he was

finally assassinated in 1940 in the last country that offered him political exile, Mexico

(Idem, p. 141; Volkogonov: 1996, pp. 432-461). But Stalins accomplices were notspared by the growing political insecurity and paranoia4 of the supreme ruler, and met

their end during the fake, spectacular trials and their afferent purges which convulsed

Moscow and the entire Soviet Union between 1934 and 1938 (de Launay, pp. 70-101).

This short introduction to the extremely tensioned post-Leninist political arena is vital in

order to initiate, as much as possible, a comprehensive understanding of Stalinism in

regard to the Soviet national dilemma. Maintaining the basic ideological approach, the

Partys General Secretary managed to destroy in a few short decades, at least for the

Soviet citizens, the tolerant and permissive public position in respect to the rights of

4The term is not at all exaggerated. Stalins daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva describes, in one of her books,

with remarkable accuracy and attention for details, the astonishing and simultaneously frightening

psychological profile of the one which can be denominated, with all the cynism and bitter irony

contained by the syntagm, the model dictator of the last century (Alliluyeva: 1998, pp. 349-385).


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minorities, which the regime had carefully constructed a long time before its final

victory. Ruled in a great extent by its (in)security obsession and its peremptory care to

discover real or fictive political conspiracies, Stalin exacerbated centralism, extended the

role of the Secret Police (the NKVD), and promptly suppressed any social contestation,

despite of its nature and intensity. Hes Russian nature, (despite the fact that he was

actually from Georgia), understood as the belief in the preponderance of force as being

both the best mean to eliminate threats, and also the most certain way to defeat the

enemies in case that they cannot be discouraged (Hoffman: 1999, p. 204) is highly

recognizable in the manner he comprehended and tried to offer an adequate and

permanent solution to the national problem.

What is the meaning that Stalin ascribes to a nation? To answer this question, a proper

definition of a people is needed at first. For the ruler of the USSR, a people is, as he

wrote in 1913 in Marxism and the National Question, a stable community, historically

formed, of language, of territory, of economic life and psychological formation,

manifested trough a common culture (Stalin: 1913, apud. Roy: 2001, p. 105).

Furthermore, the people

is not defined trough the political contract (a French conception from the XIX-th

century), but trough an assembly of objective and natural features. This is the German legacy (in

which the narodcoincides with Volk). Its transposition in a Marxist type mould involves that the

respective people passes trough different stages of political organization bounded by the

production mode: from tribe (plemia), a stage of the primitive community, to the capitalist stage,

the one of the nation (naiia), defined trough a common market, and therefore a territory (Idem,

pp. 105-106).

The main component of the national identity is the language (Idem). Moreover, taking

into account the peoples degree of economical development prevailing at one time, the

Stalinist typology classified them as nations, autonomous republics or national

territories:

In theory, every people defined trough its language constitutes a nationality

(naionalnost) which receives an administrative status based on its development conditions. The


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peoples who have reached the stage of nations (naiia), because they possess a capitalist mode of

production and a market, find themselves in the situation to be assigned the status of socialist

Soviet republic. The less developed peoples receive in a decreasing order the status of

autonomous republic (oblast) and national territory (okrug). Each of these levels corresponds

to an administrative status (Idem, p. 108).

Needless to say, these categories were highly flexible and responding especially to

political, rather than theoretical demands, as it was the case for the whole theoretical and

historiographic work from Stalins country (Tilett: 1967). Analyzing the particular case

of the Soviet republics from Central Asia, Olivier Roy is convinced that the strategic

logic of the national cutting up operated in the age of Stalinism is, more than

everything, ambiguous. From a certain perspective, its rationality appears to be embedded

in geopolitical purposes: to favor the ethnic groups which can serve as bridgehead for

the USSR beyond its frontiers and, in reverse, to annihilate those which might be acting

in a similar manner for another power (Roy: 2001, p. 111). Furthermore, another reason

of the Stalinist frontiers in Central Asia, perhaps not so evident in the first place, due to

its striking geographical and ethnical irrationality, is that of weakening the new

republics, preventing them from achieving authentic political power and, as a result,

independence (Idem, p. 113). From another point of view, however, this strategy also

proves its lack of logic, because the ethnies from this region were (and still are, to a

great extent) so much interpenetrated among them that, in any case, no frontier at all

would have been rational (Idem). It must be clearly mentioned that, when studying the

social identities overlapping upon the Central Asian space, one must be extremely careful

if it decides to apply analytical categories such as nation (in its modern, westernized

acception) or state, understood between the same conceptual parameters. Even ethnie

might not be appropriate in this case, because the overwhelming majority of the

populations from this geopolitical area are nomads organized in tribal structures, thus

eluding their apprehension inside conceptual and political frames such as nations or

states (Fuller: 1994). The Soviet and, more concretely, the Stalinist political and

ideological approach of the region, in other words, the western ideas adapted to

communist Asian (read forcibly) practices and aims, and paradoxically orientated

towards the rejection of the same Western culture which articulated it (Wallerstein: 1994,


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p. 87) were further complicating the problem, instead of resolving it, and its echoes

reverberate intensely until the present days. The Russian susceptibilities towards Central

Asias Muslims possess deep historical, cultural and religious roots. The Tsars and their

administrations tolerated Islam as a religion, but they were intrigued by the cultural

coherence of these peoples with reference to the Christian people from the empire, which

they perceived it as a potential threat, partially deriving from the memory of the Tatars

domination and also from their spiritual allegiance paid to a foreign ruler, the Sultan of

Turkey(Wheeler: 1967, pp. 72-73).

Furthermore, Stalin advances, in another work, entitled The National Question and

Leninism, the distinction between bourgeois and socialist nations. Defined, as we

ascertained, by four characteristics (territory, economy, culture and a certain

psychological profile), a nation ceases to exist if not all the mentioned characteristics are

gathered (Hodnett: 1967, p. 5). Moreover, Stalin recognized the significant contribution

that bourgeoisie had to the process of forming a nation, but he firmly stated that on the

road of building socialism, the obsolete and superficial bourgeois nations were to be

surpassed by the more advanced socialist nations.

The bourgeoisie played the leading role in the consolidation of nations, and thus it

apparently followed nationalist movements were basically bourgeois in nature. Stalin ()

rejected the addition of possession of national statehood as a fifth characteristic of nationhood,

denied the existence of nations before capitalism and distinguished sharply between bourgeois

and socialist nations. Bourgeois nations were thoroughly dominated by the bourgeoisie and by

nationalist political parties, and were united however artificially by a spirit of expansionism

and xenophobia. Socialist nations, which arose on the ruins of the old, bourgeois nations, were

on the contrary united internally by a firm alliance between working class and peasantry and

externally by deep bonds of friendship () (Idem).

But, despite this ideological analysis, Stalin did not draw the conclusion that this

presumed solidarity of socialist nations within the USSR would lead to their merging.

Nationalism and the forces which draw it will not wither away until the completion of

the Socialist Revolution all around the globe (Idem). Lenins apprentice agreed upon the

right of the minorities to govern themselves, but he disapproved their desideratum


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towards exhaustive cultural autonomy. The latter was perceived as a conservative force

which would surely inhibit the economic and social development. To resolve the

problem, Stalin emphasized the need according to which the stronger cultures should

gradually incorporate the less developed ones. The argument was a simple one:

recovering whenever it matched its political ambitions the Marxist dogma, the

General Secretary sustained that the level of cultural development was determined by the

level of economic modernization, so basically, the solution to the national dilemma

consisted in raising the level of economic development in the less advanced areas

(Ziegler: 1985, p. 21).

Like his predecessor, the Georgian revolutionary recognized the importance and the

inconvenients which nationalism could and did trigger upon the theory and practice of

Soviet communism, so he tried to ideologically integrate it on the socialist stage of

Marxism: nations, although essentially modified by their metamorphosis from

bourgeois to socialist, will still continue to exist until their peaceful and remote

evanescence towards the final aim, a global communist society.

If the ideological attempts were nearly acceptable, the political practice was in a total

dissonance with them. Even if the Stalinist constitutions from 1924 and 1936

emphasized the sovereignty of the Soviet republics, along with their legal right of

secession (Bloemberg: 1967), some emancipated local leaders paid with their lives the

thoughtless act of attempting to transform it into reality. Nonetheless, Leninist principles

like the prevention of a certain nation to dominate the others were progressively taken

aside, as the Russian element begun to be the most favored one (Nahaylo: 1987, p. 74).

This consequence, Hajda argued, had a strong economic cause, the forced

industrialization. This tendency was accompanied by renewed stress on centralism and

uniformity. Increasingly, the Russian language and Russian culture were seen as the

cement that would bind the conglomerate of ethnic populations (Hajda: 1988, p. 326). In

the same time, Russian was made a compulsory subject in all schools. Recently formed

non-Russian alphabets were switched to Cyrillic and histories were rewritten to stress


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the benefits of Russian annexations (Idem), or to identify a common historic march

which reached its destination in the present Soviet state (Tillett: 1967, p. 36).

Stalin condemned and suppressed without hesitation the claims of the minorities

regarding autonomy or worse, independence. But, during World War II, he was forced to

appeal to the nationalist identitary matrix in order to achieve the social cohesion needed

to fight against the German invader. Even if, during that time, he did not directly talk

about nations and nationalism, and its radio messages were channeled towards the

peoples of the USSR, and their common enemy, the subjacent tendentiousness is more

than suggestive. This attitude was semi-officially maintained after 1945, and the

emphasis on Russianness continued. Finally, the deported nationalities, especially from

the Caucasus region, is another dark chapter in Stalins approach toward the Soviet

nationalities problem (Conquest: 1960).

Letting the genie out of the bottle: the Khruschevist approach

When it comes to Stalins successor, Immanuel Wallerstein believes that he can be

considered, in comparison with the former two rulers of the Soviet Union, and only from

certain points of view, nave. This attribute became perceptible when Kruschevs entire

political career was taken in sight; it clearly appeared than, argues the renowned

sociologist, that his naivet in the end was to think that one could control the process of

loosening the reins without reforming the basic political structure (Wallerstein: 1994, p.

93). But, as Khrushchev later realized, once the process of letting [the] genie out of the

bottle (Idem) was started, especially and this is the most important aspect in this regard

for a communist or fascist regime with the shy, but nevertheless authentic political and

ideological approval, the social claims increase and the erosion of totalitarian regimes is

almost unavoidable, as it is irreversible. Having a scarce legitimacy and imposing it in the

first place by force, a totalitarian regime finds it very difficult to renew its ideological

support - in the attempt to win real popular support without estompating the social fear

which actually constitutes the basis of its governance. And once the fear disappears, so


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does the best, and perhaps the only mean to deal adequately with the societys

dissatisfactions. In Wallersteins own words: It has long been a truism of sociological

analysis that is easier for a state to be totally repressive than to offer a small but

inadequate amount of space for political and cultural pluralism (Idem, p. 94).

Perhaps Wallersteins disappointment becomes comprehensive if we take into account his

Marxist scientific formation and, consequently, his socialist orientation, but its a certain

fact that the opinions of the political analysts differ in considerable degrees when it

comes to this topic. Michael Shafir pertinently argued about the perspectives from which

one can analyze the Khrushchevist legacy. If we take into account the intra-systemic

perspective (the USSR in itself), than the conclusion that Khrushchev was the

personification of failure is simply unavoidable (Shafir: 1987, p. 157): striving to replace

the brutal Stalinist measures of direct and, as much as possible, total control, Khruschev

deteriorated the political mechanism which assured the limited cohesion and functionality

of the USSR, and also estropiated Moscows influence upon the satellite countries from

Eastern Europe. But, on the other hand, the inter-systemic perspective helps us

understand that Nikita Khrushchev offered the premises for chang(ing) the face of

Stalinist Eastern Europe (Idem, p. 158), and, one might ad, the change of the Soviet

Unions itself. As I will try to demonstrate, Khrushchevs heritage, an ultimate burden for

its political followers is much more complicated and equivocal than it appears in the first

place.

The new General Secretary accomplished its political apprenticeship in Ukraine, where

Stalin named him in 1938 the leader of the subordinate communist party from this

republic. Before that, during the days of the Great Terror (1934-1938), he proved

himself a fanatical purger quite to the liking of Stalin, a fact which contributed a lot to

the propulsion of his career and to his appointment in the above mentioned position.

Here, he became notorious for the excessive persecution of anybody suspected of

oppositional or nationalistleanings (my emphasis). The fact that many of his victims of

those days were later rehabilitated by him, posthumously or otherwise, must not go

unmentioned (Van Goudoever, Dittrich: 1997, pp. 148-149). Taking these into account,


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the destalinization which ensured his place in the XXth centurys history appeared to be

nothing more than a well calculated political strategy, orientated towards the

marginalization of his opponents, winning the Wests sympathy and gaining popular

trust. At least this is the opinion of Richard Nixon, who knew him and Moscows

political elite well enough at that time to write that

In his secret speech, uttered at the Party Congress from 1956, Khrushchev did not

denounce the terror during Stalins reign because he suddenly discovered that he has moral

scruples. He did this thing within the frame of a well calculated political game. Choosing his

words carefully, Khrushchev did not condemn at any moment Stalins brutality itself. He

admiratively noted that Lenin resorted with out mercy and hesitation to extreme methods () He

denounced only the crimes in which his political rivals were involved. Truly, rewriting the history

of the Stalinist purges, Khrushchev could use them to effectuate its own purges (Nixon: 2000, pp.

235-236).

The same political approach was taken for the USSRs national question. In fact, Stalins

former protge was himself, to a great extent, a Stalinist. First of all, his political

experience was circumscribed within the Stalinist frame (Jowitt: 1992, pp. 180-195); he

stressed, and followed with determination, like his predecessor, the importance of heavy

industry (Brezinski: 1971, p. 158); and, finally, he operated many political shifts, covered

in intriguing dialectical sinuosities, with the basic purpose of strengthening his power and

benefiting from each and every opportunity to pursue and achieve its goals. On the other

hand, Khrushchevs newness cannot be denied. He acted to consolidate the party

apparatus, not to weaken it, like Stalins irrational purges finally resulted into; he allowed

a certain degree of cultural and social freedom, striving to create a socialist

commonwealth united by ideological incentives (Shafir: 1987, p. 157), and he certainly

relaxed the Soviet geopolitics, by introducing the concept of peaceful coexistence.

Posing as a reformer and being one to some extent, Khrushchev showed, at least in its

first years in office, a more concessive attitude towards nationalities, trying somehow to

compensate his predecessors mistakes in this domain. This attitude revitalized the

cultural identities among the non- Russian citizens of the Soviet Union (Hajda: 1988, p.


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326). However, the changes were one of emphasis rather than substance, even if as a

part of the process of measured de-Stalinisation, Khrushchev relaxed control in the areas

of nationalities policy and announced a return to the Leninist principles (Nahaylo: 1987,

p. 74). In the attempt to avoid Stalins error, Russian chauvinism was kept in check, the

party refrained from blatant Russification and non-Russians were assured that their

languages and cultures would be respected (Idem).

The social and cultural liberties introduced by Nikita Khrushchev had, as his successor

Mikhail Gorbachev will have the chance to convince himself after a few decades, quite

an opposite effect when trying to impose his own reformist approach. Instead of

reinforcing the fidelity and attachment toward the party and the official ideology, they

distanced it even further. As a consequence, the revolts from Poland and Ukraine that had

shaken the socialist camp in 1956 (Brezinski: 1971, pp. 239-260 and pp. 210-238;

Taubman: 2005, pp. 270-299) announced an ideological readjustment and a tightening of

the screw. For the minorities, this shift was translated trough cultural and political

oppressions, as the Partys goal was no longer the flourishing of the nationalities, but the

elimination of national distinctions and the creation of a Russian-speaking, socially

homogenous, socialist state (Nahaylo: 1987, p. 75; see also Szporluk: 1973, p. 36). From

the end of the 1950s, the linguistic policy also took a more Stalinist turn, when CPSU

decided, in the education reform of 1958-9 to include provisions designed () to

promote the study of Russian at the expense of the native languages (Nahaylo: 1987, p.

74). Combating any real, but mostly potential peripheral tensions, the party accused more

and more regional officials of localism (mestnichestvo), and there was renewed

concern about nationalist tendencies (Idem). There was also another approach to the

matter. Yaroslav Bilinski supposesed that the new orientation was impulsioned also by

the success Khrushchev obtained in 1957 against his main political opponents, Molotov,

Malenkov, Shepilov and Kaganovich. It is possible that the General Secretary may have

felt that his position was sufficiently consolidated so that he need no longer woo the

support of the non-Russian party organizations (Bilinsky: 1967, p. 17).


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The concept which underlined the new policy towards the nationalities was that of

drawing [them] together until their much expected fusion (Nahaylo: 1987: pp. 74-75).

It was, as we have seen, of Leninist extraction. In this stage of the socialist development,

Khrushchev and the party ideologues argued, the nationalities problem is articulated by

two distinct, yet simultaneous tendencies: on the one hand, individual nations undergo

all-round development and flourish; on the other hand, nations grow even closer together

(Idem, p. 75). At the XXII Party Congress, which took place in October 1961, these

contradictory and rather ambiguous tendencies but dialectical for the Soviets,

therefore perfectly comprehensive and historically unavoidable were clearly stated in

the second section of The New Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

entitled The Tasks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Building a

Communist Society. In the fourth part of the second section The Tasks of the Party in

the Field of National Relations one could read the following:

Under socialism the nations flourish and their sovereignty grows stronger. The

development of nations does not proceed along lines of strengthening national barriers, national

narrowmindedness and egoism, as it does under capitalism, but along lines of their associations,

fraternal mutual assistance and friendship. The appearance of new industrial centers, the

prospecting and developments of mineral deposits, the virgin land development project and the

growth of all modes of transport increase the mobility of the population and promote greaterintercourse between the peoples of the Soviet Union (Mendel: 1961, p. 460).

It appears that, taking into account the new economic developments, the party recognizes

the rights of the minorities to fully benefit them, to flourish and prosper in accordance

to their distinctive cultural and national marks, but firmly opposes national

narrowmindedness an egoism. As these terms remain indefinite, it is not wrong to

presume that they are at the discretion of the ruling elite. Furthermore, when assessing the

present condition of the national question, the party declares its equidistance, stating that

it neither ignores, nor over-accentuates national characteristics (Idem, p. 461).

Another task of the party in the sphere of national relations was


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To continue promoting the free development of the languages of the people of the

U.S.S.R. and the complete freedom of every citizen of the U.S.S.R. to speak, and to bring up and

educate his children in any language, ruling out all privileges, restrictions or compulsions in the

use of this or that language. By virtue of the fraternal friendship and mutual trust of the peoples,

national languages are developing on a basis of equality and mutual enrichment.

The voluntary study of Russian in addition to the native language is of positive

significance, since it facilitates reciprocal exchanges of experience and access of every nation

and nationality to cultural gains of all the other peoples of the U.S.S.R., and to world culture.

The Russian language has, in effect, become the common medium of intercourse and

cooperation between all the peoples of the U.S.S.R. (my emphasis) (Idem, p. 463).

Even if the official position seems to be a very tolerant and democratic one, it is more

than obvious that the Stalinist practices of stressing out the preeminence of the Russian

element are essentially recovered.

As a concluding remark, the observation that Khrushchevs well intensions in respect to

the national policy deepened the confusions and discontents of both the integrationists

and also the autonomists, it is not at all improper. The flourishing of nations, but also

their simultaneous, even if gradual, fusion remained unclear even for the most

ideologues of the party, but nonetheless, for the General Secretarys supporters and,

especially, for his increasingly powerful opponents. Besides the ideological and political

implications, the concept of fusion has remained anathema to the non-Russian

nationalities and to Russian patriots concerned about their implication for their own

nation (Nahaylo: 1987, p. 76).

Recovering Stalinism? Brezhnevs efforts to crystallize the Soviet people

To what extent did Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev attempt and manage to revitalize the practices

of his predecessor, Josef Stalin? The question is a difficult one and itcan be offered many

answers. First of all, the one who overthrow Khrushchev begun its political career as a

rigid apparatchik serving under Stalin and he was certainly impressed by the effective,

yet brutal means with which the Georgian maintained the political architecture of the


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Soviet conglomerate. He tried to restore the glory and the practices of his predecessor.

Centralism, censorship, national and social intolerance, the cult of personality, all of these

were reinforced in comparison to Khrushchevs era. However, Brezhnev pursued, most of

his time in office, a dtente approach over the international arena and the United States in

particular; one cannot affirm the same thing about Stalin. Furthermore, in regard to

Soviet Unions national difficulties, Leonid Ilyich expressed a much more intolerant

ideological position than Stalin: his attention was channeled towards the forging of the

Soviet People, or its crystallization (Idem, p. 77). Ironically, Stalins repressive attitude

towards regional leaders had no or less ideological coverage: the nations developed in the

same extent as their economy, but an eventual cultural dissolution inside a superior

identity, a Soviet melting pot, was, at least for the time being, out of the question.

Reversely, the ideology of the Brezhnev era was strikingly orthodox, but the political

practice was more relaxed than during Stalins reign, even if the emphasis on Russian

language was increased in comparison to the Khrushchev era, and the circulation of the

non-Russian periodicals was gradually restricted (Idem, p. 78). Moscows intolerant

attitude caused, in the last years of Brezhnevs leadership, serious protests among

dissidents in the Baltic republics and also demonstrations in Georgia and Estonia

(Idem).

Ideologically, politically and economically, the Soviet Unions advanced decay between

the 60s and the beginning of the 80s is indisputable. Without being underlied by the

same amount of political and military force as during Stalins regime, and already having

experienced the limited liberties allowed by Khrushchev, the official ideology became

farcical and social tensions in the periphery areas started to gather up. The Helsinki

accords from 1975 impulsioned those tensions even further, but Brezhnev and his

gerontocracy managed, for the moment, to overcome them (Hajda: 1988, p. 327). To

consider this period as the most lusterless from the Soviet Unions history means to apply

it a very truthful judgment.


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The Andropov-Chernenko interregnum

During the short Andropov-Chernenko interregnum (autumn 1982- spring 1985), the

nationalities topic took a more Leninist turn. The former head of KGB, Iuri Andropov,

believed that Russian nationalism had been allowed to get out of hand, and the partys

task was to remedy this state of affairs (Nahaylo: 1987, p. 84). His successor, Konstantin

Chernenko, who became General Secretary in February 1984, simply did not possess the

necessary amount of time to treat the problem of minorities in an adequate manner. The

Soviet Union was confronted with difficulties which proved to be insurmountable in just

a few years. Chernenkos only mentionable statement regarding this issue appeared tow

months later in Pravda, where he affirmed that we do not see the relations between

nationalities which have taken shape in our state as something congealed and inalterable,

and no subject to the influence of new circumstances (Idem, p. 85). With other words, an

ambiguous, but pragmatic position.

Recovering Menshevism? The Gorbachevist approach

The more and harder to elude failures of the communist regime entailed a resurgence of

the national feelings all along the Soviet Union, calked mainly upon the spiritual

coordinates of the each Soviet republic, region or territory. They fortified the social

convulsions and will eventually lead, in combination with other factors, to the

dismembering of the USSR ( Buga: 2007, pp. 54-58; Holmes: 2004, pp. 180-182;

Soulet:1998, pp. 324-325). When analyzing the topic in a more profound way, one can

discover that the regime itself tolerated, to a certain level, this kind of manifestation, as a

safety valve to maintain social and peripheral tensions at the lowest possible limit

(Wolton: 2001, p. 320).

Two main imbricated directions can be distinguished inside the Gorbachevist reformist

program. The external one resided in the decongestion of the international relations arena

from the last years of the Cold War. It encapsulated two main dimensions: a geopolitical


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one (further negotiations to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers see

Claval: 2001, p. 120; the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, and Moscows attempts to

build a common security architecture for the entire European continent the new Soviet

security concept regarding Europe was that of reasonable sufficiency Kolodziej:

2007, p. 142), and an economic one, orientated towards winning the Wests sympathies

for the countrys critical situation and, implicitly, its financial support, or even make it a

partner in the process of reconstructing Soviet communism (Revel: 1995, p. 118;

Besanon: 1992, p. 8). Moscows claims for the military and nuclear relaxation of the

global stage (the new thinking Nye: 2005, p. 123) had deep economical roots, similar

to those of Khrushchevs reformism, when he launched the peaceful coexistence

concept.

The internal direction was constituted by three interconnected levels, the political, the

economical and the social one. In the first place, Gorbachev strove to redesign the

Supreme Soviet (Parliament). It was pretty much dysfunctional and its cripples-ness was

accentuated by the fact that it could no longer cope with the societys demands,

orientated towards transparency, decentralization and a general democratization of the

political life. The same cause led the General Secretary to conclude that a reassessment of

the party itself was necessary, and this decision reverberated especially in the remote

regions of the Federation, where its corruption and stagnation was were higher than

towards the centre. In the first years of Gorbachevs leadership, the measures taken to

revitalize the Unions economical efficiency consisted in a series of coercive measures

orchestrated trough a campaign of enthusiasm, combined with a semi-prohibition of

alcohol, and vague attempts to inject a minimum of market economy (Besanon: 1992,

p. 8). When perestroika, the overall economic strategy to cope with the systems

disfunctionalities, was launched, popular support was generally low, in reverse

proportion with the circumspection with which the new program was received. The tired,

suspicious and uncertain of its rights population preferre(d) to wait than to do something

(Idem). It is not hard to conclude that the society was basically the object of the first two

levels from the internal orientations of the Gorbachevist reformism and also the grave-


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digger of the communist regime. Inside it, centrifugal nationalist forces played a key role

in dismembering the central pole of the Leninist political legacy, the USSR.

In the case of communist regimes, as in the case of fascist ones, ideology can be

considered their most distinctive feature. Both directions identified in Gorbachevs plan

to reform the USSR are underlied by ideological considerations. The external one lies in

the direct continuity of Khrushchevism. If Stalins successor rejected the Leninist thesis

regarding the inevitable military confrontation between capitalism and socialism arguing

that the struggle between them must continue with other means, as a competition

between two models to create order and global welfare, Gorbachev came with a striking

ideological innovation. He abandoned both positions in favor of cooperation with the

West and of adapting the best Western practices (Kolodziej: 2007, pp. 141-142). It was a

total blow for orthodox communists, a pleasant surprise to the United States, but a

powerless struggle in preventing the external factors which contributed to the

disintegration of Soviet communism. Most intriguingly, it came from someone who

pretended to have rediscovered the long forgotten essence of Leninism, and who wanted

to readapt it to the present conditions (Gorbachev: 1988a, p. 62). Of course, he argued,

abundantly quoting Lenin, that Marx and Engels ridiculized, with good reason, the

mechanical learning and the simple repetition of the formulas which, in the best case,

can only trace the general tasks, which are necessarily changing in respect to the

concrete economical and political situation of each distinctive phase of the historical

process (Gorbachev: 1986, pp. 7-8). However, Gorbachev conveniently forgets that the

struggle against imperialism was one of the general tasks Marx and Lenin passed on to

their followers. Perhaps, as the history of the last century shows us therefore using an

empirical methodology, one can conclude that Leninism in itself, meaning its ideological

core, but also its political appliance, cannot be reformed. It can only be implemented or

abandoned5. Gorbachevs philosophical drama consisted in the impossibility to reform

5China does not necessarily contradict the above analysis. Even if it operated major economical

concessions, its target was to legitimize, as much as possible, the Beijing regime, which is, like any

other communist regime, of Leninist extraction. This compromise, along with the prompt and brutal

reprimation of social dissatisfactions, ensured its political survival.


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Leninism, and thus to connect its country to the concrete economical and political

situation of its time.

By stressing the central, even reinforced role of the party in the process of renewing the

Soviet Union, Gorbachev proved once again his indispensable attachment to the Leninist

cause.

We must understand in what lies the role of the party as political vanguard in the actual

stage. We do not renounce the Leninist conception of the party as being the political vanguard of

the society. We consider that in the stage of restructuring, the role of the party will grow even

more in perfecting the socialist society, in the accomplishment of profound transformations. This

claims from the party the elaboration of just politics, scientifically founded, based on correct

appreciations and prognoses. This calls for an ample ideological and organizatorical work.

A task like this is fitted only for a party which possesses Marxist, scientifically methods

of analysis. This is why not only we do not question the ruling and leading role of the party, but,

on the contrary, we consider that it must be treated even more profound. Without doubt, this role

must be more ponder-able, namely in the sense which I refer to in the sense of accomplishing

the functions of political vanguard (my emphasis) (Gorbachev: 1988b, p. 21).

The ideological circumscribing of the internal direction of Gorbachevist reformism is

recognizable trough the glasnost concept. Meaning transparency and sincerity, inorder to make the reform functional, it had the unexpected effect of dismantling the

psychological fear which bonded the systems components altogether. Another effect was

that it intensified the open nationalism against Moscow, by allowing the appearance

of many unregistered, informal groups. Although most of them were not political, they

were the basis of the 500 and more parties which will appear until 1990 (Holmes: 2004,

pp. 181-182; see also Ferrari: 1999, pp. 59-115). Gorbachevs social and political

concessions were immense and he truly believed that a more franc approach of the

political and economical matters would have the effect of winning the societys trust and

cooperation towards continuing the work of constructing socialism. He acknowledged

that the difficulties encountered along the reformist path were much more and deep than

anyone expected. At the January 1987 plenary session of the Central Committee of the

party, he boldly declared: () we can see that the goods are being slowly produced, that


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the restructuring proved to be more difficult, the causes of the problems which

accumulated in the society more deep than they seemed before. The further we advance

in the restructuring work, the clearer the amplitude and its signification, the more other

unsolved problems, inherited from the past, reveal themselves (Gorbachev: 1987, p. 6).

It was almost a shocking declaration for a General Secretary, because it seemed to be

orientated against the wooden language of the party being, however, just a

flexibilization and a readaptation of it, with reference to the societys claims (Thom:

2005, pp. 229-237) - and the institutionalized lie which suffocated public life. But, as

Paul Kennedy wrote when operating a contemporary analysis of the contradictions the

Soviet Union experienced in the second half of the 80s, the mere recognition of ()

problems is not a guarantee that they will be solved (Kennedy: 1987, p. 490). On the

other hand, no one can deny Gorbachev sincere and passionate struggle to revitalize

communism, but its unwillingness and perhaps the impossibility to excel the ideological

identitary matrix of Leninism were translated into an undermining of its efforts.

Gorbachev managed to attract, in the first instance, the reformist wing of the party, but

with the passing of years and the revealing of his program growing difficulties, he

inclined towards the conservatives, among which the powerful group of bureaucrats

occupied a central place. Finally, he ended up rejected by the both faction, the first

accusing him of returning to dogmatic, Stalinist principles, while the second,

understandably circumspect towards their new ally, blamed him for betraying Leninism

and bringing the Soviet Union into the brink of collapse. At a first glimpse of the subject,

it would appear that the conservatives were right and they were, to a great extent - , but

one must not forget that Gorbachev sincerely tried to reconfigure communism,

functionally and ideologically, not to overcome it. The work [of restructuring, of

creating a new profile of socialism] must be realized trough methods imbued with

humanity, with respect, with esteem. () In general we must reborn the authentic,

wonderful sense of the word comrade. To reborn the spirit of comrades-ness in the

party, in the society (Gorbachev: 1988b, p. 10). Only when he was aware of the

inevitable dismantling of the regime, his position with reference to the maintaining of the


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Union seemed to be a bit more concessive and therefore ambiguous (Riassanowski: 2001,

pp. 601-620; Calvocoressi: 2000, pp. 70-73; Johnson: 2005, pp. 739-741)

The new General Secretary, who was elected by party to solve in the first place the

systems economical, not necessarily national dysfunctions (Calvocoressi: 2003, p. 122)

understood very well that his reformist approach, remembered especially for glasnost

and perestroika, would have a reinforcing effect upon the minorities with reference to

their claims for increased cultural and political autonomy. But - to quote the title of a

chapter from David Price-Joness bookThe War that Never Was.The Fall of the Soviet

Empire, 1985-1991, no one was happy, neither the society nor the regime itself (Pryce-

Jones: 1995, p. 29) - so he had to assume this risk in order to proceed to the

reconfiguration of the functional mechanisms of the Union. However, before a further

analysis of Gorbachevs impact upon the Moscow imposed communist regime, we should

emphasize again, like Joseph Nye did, that the last General Secretary wanted to reform

communism, not replace it (my emphasis) (Nye: 2005, p. 123). The collapse of the

Leninist political legacy was - for him and for many others - a tragic accident and the

Kremlin ruler made almost superhuman efforts in order to prevent the occurrence of the

cracks which finally demolished the Soviet Unions scaffolding. Nye offers a pertinent

and concise diagnose of the reform process and of the social, administrative and political

causes that eventually entailed its failure. He argues about how

the reform rapidly transformed into a revolution from below, rather than controlled from

above. In his internal and external politics, Gorbachev started a series of actions which have

accelerated the existent decline of the Soviets and fasten the end of the Cold War. When he came

to power in 1985, he first tried to discipline the soviet people (peoples would be more correct, my

note), as a way to overcome the existent economical stagnation. When discipline was not enough

to resolve the problem, he launched the idea ofperestroika, meaning restructuring, but he could

not restructure from above, because the bureaucrats () sabotaged its dispositions. To scare the

bureaucrats, he used a strategy of glasnost (transparency, t. n.), namely open discussion and

democratization. The fact that he let loose peoples discontents regarding the way the system works

bended the bureaucrats, and perestroika followed its course. But, once transparency and

democratization allow the people to say what they think, and to vote accordingly, many said: We

want out. () This is an imperial dynasty, and our place is not within this empire (Idem).


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In respect to the nationalities problem, it is interesting to observe that the last general

secretary of the Soviet Union manifested, in comparison with its economical and political

openness a strikingly orthodox approach. It was because he was fully aware, as he

was also about to experience - of the tremendous and disruptive force nationalism

possessed and its orientation against the basis of the Soviet communist regime. Speaking

about the partys successes in this matter, he dialectically argued that

our accomplishments must not create an image of some national processes without

problems. The contradictions are characteristic to any development, they are inevitable in this

sphere also. The main thing is to see the aspects and their permanent features, to search and

properly answer to the problems life generates. Especially because here were not liquidated yet,

and are still painfully remarked the tendency towards national seclusion, tendencies to live from

anothers work.

Elaborating, in perspective, the main directions of the national politicy, it is very

important to concern ourselves that the contribution of all republics to the countrywide economic

complex to correspond to their growing economical and spiritual potential. The development of

the cooperation in production, of the collaboration and mutual assistance of the republics

corresponds to the supreme interests of our multinational state and of each republic. The task of

the party organizations, of the Soviets relies in a more complete (sic!) usage, in the general

interest, the existent possibilities, to perseveringly overcome any manifestations of local

patriotism (Gorbachev: 1986, p. 67).

The great emphasis Gorbachev stressed upon the national question clearly transpers from

the following passage: The whole atmosphere of our life and common work, our family

and school, the army, the culture, the literature and art are called to form and educate the

soviet peoples of all nationalities, and in the first place the young people, in the spirit of

the most noble sentiments the sentiment of internationalism and that of soviet

patriotism (Gorbachev: 1987, p. 42). Marxism-Leninisms central concept, that of thenew man, one being a true Soviet, not a national patriot, was not at all abandoned;

instead, it was perceived as one of the central pillars of the new reformist movement.

The Soviet patriotism constitutes our greatest value. Any manifestations of nationalism

and chauvinism are incompatible with it. Nationalism is blind, regardless the shape it embraces it.


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The attempts of self-isolation lead only to spiritual deadlock. The knowing and understanding of

dimensions, the greatness and the humane concreteness of the socialist revolution, of the whole

truth and of the heroism of the fight carried on by the party and the people for socialism, for

defending the socialist Fatherland, fuel the roots of soviet patriotism. Here we are getting close to

a very important matter, the blending, trough the instrumentality of the revolution and of the

Soviet power, of national pride and national patriotism of each people with the internationalism of

the socialist society (my emphasis) (Gorbachev: 1988a, pp. 27-28).

Ironically, although the emphasis on Russianess was officially controlled, Gorbachev

stressed out in his first year in office the leading role of the Great Russian people

during the Second World War, and mistakenly referred to, in a televised appearance, to

the Soviet Union as Russia. These oversights fueled the already growing Russian

chauvinism (Nahaylo: 1987, pp. 86-87). It is more probable that Gorbachev confoundedRussian nationalism with Soviet patriotism, instead of accidentally revealing hes

hypocrisy trough the double role (a desiteratum, but also a coercive mean) that, along

with his predecessors, ascribed to the official ideology. We will probably never receive a

certain answer. And maybe the question is not so important itself in reference to

Gorbachev general policies regarding the nationalities. Even if he adopted, in the last

years of the Union, a more radical approach toward the federative republics, he

proceeded so in order to safeguard the regime itself and not because he would have been

a Russian chauvinist.

Bohdan Nahaylo identified three main dimensions of Gorbachevs national dilemma

(Olcott: 1989, p. 339). The first can be referred to as the federal one and it encompassed

the all-round consolidation and development of the multinational Soviet State,

involving opposition to all manifestations of localism and national-narrowmindedness

(Nahaylo: 1987, p. 88). It was followed by the economical dimension, translated into the

emphasis on the rational use of resources and the contribution of the republics and

autonomous units to the good of the integral countrywide economic complex (Idem),

avoiding some republics to live from the work of another ones (Gorbachev: 1986, p.

67). Finally, the ideological dimension revealed without any doubt Gorbachevs Leninist

Weltanschauung. It pointed out the development of the Soviet Peoples single culture


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socialist in content, diverse in national forms and internationalist in spirit (Nahaylo:

1987, p. 89). All these components of Gorbachevs plan to cope with the serious

challenges of nationalism are, as one can see at the first site, fully intertwined. But, both

separately and also together, they could not put a stop to the national cataclysm which

epicenter was, sadly-ironically, the party itself, and Gorbachev as its emblematic image.

In the end, Jowitts question about the last secretary of the USSR, Bolshevik or

Menshevik? (Jowitt: 1992, p. 220) remains a very difficult - even impossible to answer

one. The analyst inclines towards the second category, composed of the former more

liberal party colleagues of Lenin and its supporters, or minimalists, as Michael Shafir

calls them when referring to the same dichotomization which has splitted the subordinate

Social-Democratic Party of Romania. The difference between minimalists and,

respectively, maximalists, is an essential one: while the first indicated that only a

legalist evolutionism could lead to the victory of the revolution, the last were convinced

that all the possible means, including terrorism and violence, must be used in order to

achieve the revolutionary goal (Shafir: 1985, p. 22).

The main arguments for considering Gorbachev a Bolshevik have already been outlined:

the central, vanguard role of the party in the reform process and the Leninist,

integrationist attitude towards the minorities. Generally, they are of rather ideological

than political or practical nature and find their place within the general frame of what

Gorbachev would call the creative, refreshable, Leninist legacy. Some of the arguments

which draw him near Menshevism have also been mentioned, as there were the sincere

efforts he made to reconstruct the system by injecting it strong doses of legality, morality

and functionality. It is true that Gorbachev regretted to some extent the split between the

Russian socialists, but does that automatically transform him into a Menshevik?

Enumerating further reasons to consider him so, Jowitt writes, when comparing the last

General Secretary to Stalin, that Stalin wanted to strengthen the party as an exclusive

Bolshevik political fortress, but the Menshevik acception of the party resembled a

banquet. This was also, according to Jowitt, Gorbachevs will, that the party [should]

be more a banquet than [a] fortress (Jowitt: 1992, p. 233). Furthermore, in the autumn of


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1987 Gorbachev could say that the party no longer had a monopoly of truth, on the

correct line, because he romantically presumed an identity between a Soviet national

myth and Party ideology (Idem, p. 248). This statement is very non-Leninist at first site,

but, at a closer analysis, could not one identify a strategic disguiseof the visibility and

preeminence of the party, in order to win the societys trust and engage it on the never-

ending, protean path of the socialist construction?

There is no answer to this question, because the question itself is addressing theoretical

and conceptual issues, being more a reflection of the needs of scholarly ()

categorization than of the real, fluid situation (Shafir: 1985, p. 35) the Soviet Union

experienced in those final years. What matters is that over more than seventy years of

rule, the CPSU had failed to create a supra-ethnic Soviet political community. There were

Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, and Lithuanians, but not very many Soviets in the

Soviet Union. It is not the dramatic presentation of ethnic demands per se that has

shocked Gorbachev. The absence of a more powerful countervailing force of civic soviet

identification has done that (Jowitt: 1992, p. 248).

To conclude, Henry Kissingers judgment of Gorbachev and its reformist intentions is a

very powerful and pertinent one. He sustained that Gorbachev did not deserve neither

the exaltation, but neither the disregard which he alternatively experienced. Because

Kissinger further writes - he inherited a set of truly difficult, if not insurmountable,

problems (Kissinger: 2003, p. 685).

Concluding remarks

From Lenin to Gorbachev, one can observe that the ideological approach to the national

dilemma the Soviet Union had to confront during its entire existence was a rather

flexible than a rigid one. Dependent mostly on the Partys social and political goals, but

also on the international context, the national problem was permanently instrumented in

order to reflect the ideological needs of the moment. However, despite the fragile


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concessions that Nikita Khrushchev or its later successor, Michael Gorbachev, made to

the nationalities living inside the borders of the Soviet Union (raising the level of their

cultural autonomy, or ensuring a better representation of the minorities within the central

ruling bodies), the Partys desideratum to create a Soviet patriotism and eventually a

Soviet people never materialized. Even if, theoretically, the minorities were considered as

having equal rights as the Russian population, the Soviet Union was always perceived as

a domination of the Moscow centre oriented towards the peripheries. Constitutionally,

every Soviet republic could proclaim its independence at any time, but politically that

was nothing more than an illusion, and a very dangerous one, nevertheless.

Like his predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev, Michael Gorbachev also believed that a certain

amount of cultural and political liberties would help renew the minorities fidelity toward

the aim of constructing socialism within a post-national society led by the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union. But that fidelity never existed. From the era of the Czarist

Empire, when they were conquered and forcibly included in it, and to the last days of the

Soviet Union, the non-Russians never stopped opposing Moscows imperialism. Due to

this fact, the liberties that the communist regime provided them with from time to time

were perceived as opportunities, usable in their quest for independence and not at all as

concessions that Moscow generously offered them in order to gain their loyalty. Despite

its perseverance to create the perfect society, economically prosperous and free from

ethnic tensions, which were perceived as a characteristic of bourgeois, not socialist

regimes, the Soviet communist project never managed to overcome the national

cleavages which finally led, in combination to other factors, to its demise.

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