AROUND THE WORLD

The More Things Change...Patterns of Power in Haiti

Cyclesof political violence andinstability stretchback to Haiti’s independencein 1804. Asdeposed President Aristide andhis successor,GeneralCedras,confront eachother in thelatestact on this stage, boththe Haitian population andthe rest of the world have beenleftwondering whatthey cando to end thebloodshed.

by Brian Coutain

E ighteen hundredand four was a glorious year in Caribbeanhistory.For the first time in the history of the world, a suc

cessfulslaverebellion had takenplace. That rebellion-arevolution contemporaneous withthe American and theFrench-wasin Haiti.

Up to the revolution, Haiti had beenone of the world’srichestcolonies,andby far themostprosperousFrenchcolony.The future looked promising for the new nation after its independence,and many hoped that Haiti would becomean affluent black democracyin the New World. So how did a countrywith suchencouragingbeginningsbecomethe poorestnationin theWesternHemisphere?What went wrong alongthe way?

The answer,paradoxically, lies in the successof theHaitian revolution itself. Haitians did not secureindependencethrough diplomatic negotiationswith the French, but ratherthrough armed resistance. Therevolutionariesset aside littletime for constitutional engineeringor thecodification of democratic principles in a formal constitution. Consequently,political intrigue, violenceand power strugglessoon becamehallmarksof the Haitian political structure.

One leaderof the revolution-JeanJacquesDessalines-proclaimedhimself emperorin 1804 and was assassinatedwithin two years,beginning a long line of presidentialpowerstruggles.Added to the nation’s woes was the increasingroleplayed by outsiders. Abraham Lincoln’srecognitionof Haiti’sindependencein 1862 was a sourceof pride for Haitians,butthe increasing commercialand political interferencein itsaffairs by the United States, Spain,England, and Francewereless welcomeadvances.

Over the courseof the nineteenthand twentieth centuriesboth of thesechronicproblems-theconstantthreat of foreigninterventionand the country’s weak internal political structure-strengthenedand enlargedthe Haitian military. Powerstruggleswithin Haiti involved the military both as an instrument of political terror and as a sourceof political poweritself.The military was essentiallythe power broker and "kingmaker" in Haitian affairs. Furthermore,the threat of externalinvolvement ensureda privilegedplace for the military as abulwark against theprospectof recolonization. However,much like the political systemitself, Haiti’s military was rifewith internal feuds and divisions-factionalismwhich furtherfuelled the country’s politicalinstability.

At the sametime, the Haitian state, its resources,and its

Brian Coutain is a Grenadianstudent pursuing hisdoctoratein International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania.

economywere oftenmercilesslyexploited. In 1925, some 120yearsafter independence,Haiti won official Frenchrecognitionby promisinga largeindemnity to former Frenchplanters.Therequiredmoney was borrowed of necessityfrom France,but atusuriousrates.The "double indemnity"further weakenedtheeconomy,alreadyunder severestrains due to the maintenanceof largearmies.Moreover,severalHaitian presidentswere alltoo willing to embrace foreign economicagendasif theseconsolidatedtheir ownpowerwithin the country.

American Intervention

After more than a century of precarious independence,Haitiabruptly lost its freedomwhen U.S. Marines seizedthe capital,Port-au-Prince,on July 28, 1914, occupyingthe country until1934.The assassinationof PresidentJeanV.G. Sam-thesixthHaitian presidentsince 1911 to meetviolent deathat the handsof local opposition-andthe massacre of politicalprisonersinthe PresidentialPalace,combinedto provide PresidentWoodrow Wilson witha humanitarianjustification for intervention. However,Wilson also had a strongstakein protectingAmerican investmentsin Haiti, as well as in safeguardingthegeopoliticalvalue ofa friendly governmentin the Caribbean.

During the years following occupation,movementstowardsHaitian insurrectiongrew in size andintensity, butwere crushedby U.S. armedforces in the early l920s.Thereafter, the United Statessponsoreda seriesof puppetpresidencies, ruled the nation through a military high commissioner,

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and left Haitians minimalvoice in their government.In 1922, a largeU.S. bank loan to Haiti was arranged,pro

viding for generousinterest paymentsto foreign bond holdersmostly Americans. However, little of theprincipal was invested in public works projectsor productiveenterprisesto enhanceHaiti’s infrastructure.The cost of redeemingthe balanceof theloandrainedthe Haitian economyfor a quarterof a century.

However, Americanpolicy in Haiti changedin 1930. ThelegislatureelectedStenio Vincent, one of themost ardentopponentsof Americanoccupation,to the presidency.Thoughthe U.S. refused toabandonits sway over Haiti’s economyuntil 1947, it did promise to end the armed occupation oftherepublic, and the last American Marineswere withdrawn inAugust of1934.

By June 1935, PresidentVincent, consideringhimself"indispensable,"had the constitution amended to extend histerm in office for five years,and refusedto stepdown afterhisterm expired. In the face oftheseactions,a triumvirate of military leadersforcibly announced hisresignation.It is worthnoting that only two presidentsin Haiti’s history have everrelinquishedpowervoluntarily. The seconddid so in 1879,andby that time Haiti had sustained69 "revolutions."

This patternof successionthrough violence, assassinations, and coupsbecamethe institutionalizedmeansof politicalchangein Haitian politics, and exemplifiesthe structuralproblems that Haiti continuesto face. The military, with itsmonopoly on violence, increasinglybecameHaiti’s onlysourceof power and legitimacy, a developmentthat has hadprofoundconsequences.

The Duvalier EraIn 1957, Dr. François"Papa Doc"Duvalier, a medical doctortrainedin Haiti who had studiedpublic healthat the Universityof Michigan, was elected presidentof Haiti. Like so manybeforehim, he too refusedto leaveoffice when the time came,declaringhimself "President for life"in thenew constitutionof1964. Thoughhe was more successfulthan his predecessorsinmaintaining power,his successcame at a high price for theHaitian people.

Duvalier’s first hurdle was to come to terms with the pivotal role of the military. By organizingloyalists into a paramilitary guard known as the"TontonsMacoute", bolsteringthe secretpolice, and laterestablishingthe Leopards,aU.S.-trainedcounterinsurgencyforce, Duvalier was able tocounterbalance traditionalmilitary strength.In the process,however,he further complicatedthe powerstructureby playingthe military and theTontonsMacouteagainst one anotherwhile keeping bothunderhiscontrol. At the same time,hegained the military’s direct support througha combination ofcarrot and stick. He controlledthe appointmentof high militaryofficials, grantedprivileges toarmy supporters,condonedthemilitary’s long-standingcontrolof political terror, and dealt

severelywith potential oppositionists.Duvalier also maintainedcontrol through institutionalized

nation-wideintimidation, widespreadespionage,strict censorship, allegationsof internal communistplots and invasion,murders, torture,imprisonmentwithout trial, and enforcedexile of potential presidentialrivals. To balancethe army’spower, Duvalierassigneda shareof the task of terrorizing thepopulationbetweenthe threeexisting branchesof militaryforce. Complicating the picture were the constantpublicreminders ofthe mystical powersthat Duvalier tookon as thehigh priest of Haiti’s Voodoo religion.

No tyrant can live forever, and in 1971 Duvalierdied, butperpetuatedhis authoritarianregime by bequeathingthe stateto his son. Only 19 at the time, Jean-Claude"Baby Doc"Duvalier survived for 15 years, but not withoutthe help of apowerful internal security apparatusbehind him. Jean-Claudewas not the shrewdand calculatingmanipulatorthat his fatherwas and, in the end, could not survivea popular uprisingin1986. With Jean-ClaudeDuvalier deposedand in exile, thepredictablecycle of coups and counter-coupsreturned.A suc

cession ofsix military-backedregimes governedthe countryin the four year period leadingup to the election of FatherJean-BertrandAristide in 1990.

The Aristide YearsFather Aristide,born in 1954,was the sonof an educatedanddevoutly Roman CatholicHaitian family. He joined theSalesianteachingorder andpursuedadvanced studiesinthe Dominican Republic,Israel, and Canada.More influenced by radical LiberationTheology than by traditionalCatholicism, Aristide wasknown for citing the Gospel ofSt. Luke, where Christis quoted as saying: "And he that hasno sword, let him sell his gar

Francois PapaDoc’ Duvalier, self-declaredPresident ForLife.[ColumbusMemorial Library, OAS,]

Businessas usual: downtownPort-au-Princeduring theDui’alierera. [ColumbusMemorial Library, O,4S.]

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ment andbuy one."This encouragementof rebellionthrough biblicalpassages

antagonizedthe establishedchurch hierarchy, who eventuallyexpelledAristide from the Salesianorder for inciting violenceand class struggle ButAristide continued preachingin theslums of Haiti, becomingincreasinglypopular among thenation’s poor. Even so, he surprisedeveryone when hedeclaredhis candidacy forthe presidency.On December16,1990, in the first free election in the nation’s history,he waschosenPresidentof Haiti, garnering almost70 percentof thepopularvote. Yet, even beforehis inauguration,he survivedthreeassassinationattemptsand an attemptedcoup.

While in power, Aristide dismisseda number ofthe seniorarmy officers in the hopesof reducingthe military’s influence,and appointedBrigadier GeneralRaoul Cedrasas Commander-in-Chief of the army. He beganto work on the legacy left tohim by 29 years ofDuvalier tyranny, which included andincludeshigh unemployment,an averageyearlywageof aboutUS$350,a 70 percent illiteracyrate,and an infant mortality ratethat runs well over 100 per 1,000births-doublethat of theneighboringDominican Republic. Under Aristide, the economy improved and humanrights abusesdeclined.His social reformprograms-inparticular minimumwage laws and highertaxes on the rich-earnedhim the enmityof Haiti’s elite.

In September, 1991, after eightmonthsin power, the Aristide governmentwas overthrown by General Cedras.Though the coup is largely explainedbythe power aspirationsof the military, andCedrasin particular,support for Aristidewas particularly weak among the businesscommunity, whosepolitical interestshavehistorically allied them with the military.

Ultimately, the rebels decided toletAristide live in order to avoid unwelcomeinternationalattention.According to anindependentradio station, 250 peoplediedduring the coup whensoldiers fired intocrowds ofAristide supporters.The international reaction was swift andunanimous: thecoup was condemnedin every capital. The UnitedStates, Canada, France,and other countriesimmediately suspendedeconomicaid to Haiti, and many otherleaders,including Venezuela’sPresidentPerez,declaredtheir willingness totake part in "the severestaction" to reestablish democracyinHaiti.

The U.S. ReactionThe overthrow of Aristide confronted America’sBush

administrationwith a foreign policy dilemma: wheredid Haitifit into the "New World Order?"The initial responsewas moderate-primarily,critics argue,becauseHaiti did not havethestrategic importanceof Kuwait. The administration ruled outmilitary intervention almostimmediately,opting instead forthe tradesanctionsproposedby the Organizationof AmericanStatesOAS. America’s tepid responseonly emboldenedHaiti’s new military leaders.

Back in the United States,Haiti quickly becamean issuein the 1992 presidential campaign,and Bill Clinton promisedthat if electedhe would end1theBush policy of returningfleeing refugeesto Haiti. But t1e potential for a massivewave of

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illiterate immigrants,many of whom might die before theyeven reached Americanshores-coupledwith the stereotypesof Haitians as AIDS carriers-provedmore than the Clintonadministrationcould shoulder.After the election, PresidentClinton announcedthat he would continue the Bush policy ofeconomicsanctions.

In June 1993, the Clinton Administration pushed forUnited Nations UN sponsoredoil embargoesto complementthesanctionsalready in place-amove that some argue wasdesignedto placatethe CongressionalBlack Caucusafter hisreversal on the refugeeissue.The sanctionsand oil embargohad devastating effectson Haiti’s already fragile economy.Though they failed to stop the flow of goodsthrough Haiti’sporous borderwith the Dominican Republic, they did succeedin doublingprices, which mostlyhurt the nation’s poor. But asunemploymentneared50 percent,the businesscommunitybeganto feelthe pinch and pressuredthe military to negotiate.

The military capitulatedand took part in a seriesof meetings with representatives ofAristide’s governmenton Governors Island in New York. The meetingsculminated in theGovernorsIsland Accords,which called fora four-monthtran

sition period, beginningno later thanOctober 30, 1993, during which Aristidewould return to power to serve out histerm. In return forlifting the embargoandan amnestyclause,the military high commandagreedto resign.Aristide wasforcedto sign the accordby U.S. and UN mediators, despitewhat he consideredto be itsflawed nature.The Haitian military wasconfident that the U.S.would not intervenewith force, and left the meeting feeling that they maintainedthe upper hand.Aristide was left with few options.

Analysts have beenquick to uncoverthe flaws in the GovernorsIsland Accordsand point to five problem spots. First, theaccordslifted the UN/OAS embargoandresumedeconomicaid before Aristidereturnedto Haiti. Second,they left General Cedrasin chargeof the military duringthe transition period. Third, they left

ambiguousthe future role of the Chief of Port-au-PrincePolice, Michel François,one of the most brutal supportersofthe coup. Fourth, they gave far reachingamnestyfor the military and its supportersfor the crimes committedduring Aristide’s exile. Finally, the accordssimply requiredthe retirementwith pensionof Cedras, althoughaccording toHaitian andinternationalhuman rights groups,more than 3,000peopledied during his reign of terror.

Despite the exceedinglygenerousnature of the GovernorsIsland Agreement,the military leadersrefusedto honor theaccordand renegedon eachpromise. Instead,theyunleashedtheZinglando-aparamilitaryforce of armedsupporterscontrolledby Police Chief François.The Zinglando terrorizedthe population into submission,and also succeededin shuttingoutUN andOAS humanrights observersby murderingthe Minister of Justice as well asone of Aristide’s major financial supporters

When the Zinglando began broadcastingstrongly antiAmerican rhetoricand challengingAmerican motives,the U.S.becameincreasinglywary of direct involvement.For example,the navy vesselHolland County turned backon its assignmentto help professionalizethe Haitian military. Recently, Secretary

Jean-BertrandAristide: democraticallyelectedthen overthrown, [Embassy ofHaiti]

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of State WarrenChristopherhas acknowledgedthat Americanpolicy in Haiti hasfailed, and manyare skepticalnotonly of theHaitian military, but of Aristide’s chancesfor successas well.

Reports coming out of Haiti suggestthat the military isconsolidatingits power by systematicallymurderingAristidesupporters. Withno on-site observersto count the bodies,noone knows for sure howmany peopleare being killed. What iscertain is that General Cedrasand his 7,000man army havedefied the world and emerged victorious,just as the Haitianmilitary hasdonefor years.

Options for the International Community

Debate ragesover the appropriateresponseto the crisis inHaiti-and especiallyover the issue of foreign intervention.Arguments againstoutside interferencecome frombothHaitians and Americans,and are all premisedon concepts ofnational sovereignty.Someopponentspoint to the bitter legacyof US, involvement in Haiti and the region. They argue thatthe end of the Cold War should signala time to end America’sdirect presencein the Caribbean.Theseopponentsclaim thatneitherHaitians nor thepeople ofthe Caribbeanare politicalchildren incapableof resolving their internal affairs.Theypoint out that the U.S. itself has historically had periods oftremendousinstability, such as the Civil War, Shay’s Rebellion, and innumerablemomentsof internalconflict. Even GreatBritain, some argue, hada military dictatorship during hertransitionto parliamentary democracy.

Foesof direct involvementalso point to hopesfor a Haitianfuture that is more distinctly their own. They claimthat thetime is ripe for Haiti to recreatethe polity accordingto Haitiannational interests. Allowingthe United Statesto interveneonceagain would only result in a modern precedentand furtherinhibit theability of Haitiansto solve their own disputes.Americans havetheir ownreasons foropposition.Many are gun-shyfrom recent mishapsin Somaliaand Bosnia. Others,such asSenatorJesse Helms,are wary of Aristide’s anti-Americanrhetoric, his tacit approval of violenceagainstpolitical opponents,and warningsabouthis anti-democratictendencies.

Thosewho support intervention in Haiti, by the U.S. orothernations, generally invoke Haiti’s long and troubleddemocratization movement.The military, they argue,has been

used by a tiny elite to veto the will of the people.Given theinternal political dynamics,the distribution of power, and thepolitical culture of fear and mutual distrust,no group will giveup powersinceits very survival is at stake. Military dominanceand quicksand-like politics,they argue, havean inertia thatinternal forceswill not be able to dislodge.Any agreementinvolving the military will inevitably leave themwith substantial power. It would then be only a matter oftime before theabuseof powerandprivilege would return.

Also, an agreementwith the military would essentiallycondone theiractions in the brutal coup by failing to punishthoseinvolved. This would set a damagingprecedent,not onlyexcusingthe individual military leadersresponsiblefor killingthousandsof Haitians,but also ensuringtheir earlyretirementand pension. Other proponents of foreigninterventionpoint tothe end of the Cold War. Theremoval of the geopoliticalstakesfrom the region has freed the only remainingsuperpower, the United States,to interveneconstructivelyand multilaterally with the United Nations.

Many in the Caribbean, however, remaincautious aboutunilateral Americanintervention.GrenadianAmbassadorto theUN, EugeneM. Pursoo, is a good example ofthis wariness.Whenasked whattheCaribbeanleadershipwas doing abouttheHaitian crisis, he replied: "The Caribbeanleadershaveclearlyexpressedtheir abhorrenceat the behavior ofthe Haitian military andtheir determinationto see theduly electedGovernmentof FatherAristide restored.The question is whetherthey havethe military might to effectuatesuch desires."When asked,given the lack of military capability in the Caribbean,whetherthere would be supportfor a US invasionof Haiti, headded:"AUN or OAS military force with contributions from theCaribbeanand US would be the ideal situation."

Some of those favoring interventionstand firmly unconcernedabout the nationalityof any possible militaryforce. OneHaitian studentsummedup this sentimentwhen he statedthat"I don’t care if the devil himself goes in and takescare ofthearmy. I’ll support him." Commentslike this suggestthat theonly way to break the cycle of violencein Haiti will be if themilitary is dealt with severelyand seriously.

Critics fear that any pactinvolving the military wouldleave Aristide greatlyconstrained,allowing them simply towait out his term, get rid of him, and return to military rule.They pointout that it hashappenedbeforeand it could happenagain.Of course,thereis equal precedentthat Aristide, shouldhe return, may be reluctant to relinquish power. His pastacceptanceof violenceas a viable political option reflects hisdeeproots in Haiti’s turbulentpast.

A family home,typical oflife in rural Haiti 1970.[ColumbusMemorial Library, O.A.S.]

Suggestions forFurther Reading

Jean-BertrandAristide, with ChristopheWargny. Arisride:an autobiography Maryknoll, 1993.

Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: the BreachedCitadelWestviewPress,1990.

Anne ChristineD’Adesky, Under theBone. Farrar-Strauss& Giroux, 1993.

James Ferguson,PapaDoc, Baby Doc: Haiti and theDuvahers. BasilBlackwell 1987.

Robert Debs Heinl, Written in Blood’ the Story of theHaitian People,1492-1971 HoughtonMifflin, 1978

David Nicholls, Haiti in the Caribbean Contest.St. Martin’s Press,1985.

Amy Wilentz, The Rainy Season: Haiti sinceDuvalier,Simonand Schuster,1989.

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