the mindanao peace process

Autonomyand

Peace Review

INSTITUTE FOR AUTONOMY AND GOVERNANCE • KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG

Editorial

Q and A: The Mindanao Peace ProcessBenedicto R. Bacani

Identity, Self-Empowerment, Ancestral DomainGrace Jimeno-Rebollos

Ancestral Domain, Identity and Right of Self-Determination: A Moro PerspectiveJose Iribani Lorena

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao(ARMM) and the Peace Process: Imperatives,Challenges and ProspectsRufa Cagoco-Guiam

Charter Change and the Mindanao Peace ProcessChallenges and ProspectsZainudin Malang

Democratic Track to Resolve theBangsamoro IssueAbhoud Syed M. Lingga

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EDITORIAL

This issue of the Autonomy and Peace Journal focuses on theMindanao peace process. While the ongoing peace talks between theGovernment of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MoroIslamic Liberation Front (MILF) currently define the peace process inthe southern Philippines, they could not be viewed in isolation with otherinitiatives for achieving durablepeace and development in theregion. The 1996 peace agreementbetween the GRP and the MoroNational Liberation Front (MNLF)is once again taking the center stagedue to the ongoing review of itsimplementation by the Organizationof Islamic Conference (OIC).Although employing a differenttack, the negotiations with theMILF are focusing on the sameissues, territories and people asthose in the 1996 GRP-MNLFFinal Peace Agreement. TheMindanao peace process can befully understood by looking at thesetwo peace processes. The peopleto people peace processes takingplace in grassroots communitieswhich resulted in the establishmentof sanctuaries/spaces/zones ofpeace complete the picture ofpeace initiatives in the region.

Autonomy (as a broad conceptless than an independent state) isone that is evolving in the southern

Editorial Board

Benedicto R. BacaniExecutive Director

Institute for Autonomy andGovernance

Eliseo R. Mercado Jr., OMISenior Policy Adviser

IAG

Suharto AmbolodtoExecutive Director

Institute for Strategic Initiatives

Zen MalangExecutive Director

Moro Law and Policy Center

Amina RasulConvenor

Philippine Council for Islam andDemocracy

Klaus PreschleCountry Representative

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

Philippines. The future of the existing autonomous region is shaped bythe ongoing GRP-MILF peace process and the changes that may takeplace as a result of the ongoing review of the implementation of the 1996GRP-MNLF peace pact. The current initiatives to amend or revise theconstitution provide an opening to revisit the constitutional provisions onthe autonomous region.

The challenge is to harness these diverse peace initiatives forsustainable peace and development. This is not an easy task where twoparties (GRP and the MILF) are talking about matters that will greatlyaffect those outside their circles (MNLF, ARMM, local political andtraditional leaders and their constituents). The key is to find themes thatresonate with all stakeholders and to channel energies into pursuing acommon agenda for peace and development. The Institute for Autonomyand Governance (IAG) promotes one such common theme: evolving aneffective and accountable political institution for Bangsamoro self-determination.

The papers in this journal explore the different issues in the GRP-MILF talks. Benedicto Bacani provides an overview of the Mindanaopeace process. There are two articles on the issue of ancestral domainwhich is the core of the Moro problem. Grace Jimeno- Rebollos looksat the issue from a general standpoint while Jose Iribani Lorena gives theMoro perspective. Rufa Cagoco-Guiam explores the imperatives,challenges and prospects in the peace process as it relates to the existingautonomous region. Zainudin Malang points to the links between charterchange and the peace negotiations while Abhoud Syed Lingga suggestsa democratic track to resolve the Bangsamoro issue. These papers makereference to views of participants to the policy discussions that IAGregularly convenes, some of which were conducted with support fromthe United States Institute of Peace (USIP). IAG acknowledges thecontinuing support of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in fulfilling itsmandate to promote public policy for peace and development.

1. What is the Mindanao conflict all about?It refers to the struggle of the country’s Muslims or Moros

to assert their distinct identity, history and way of life. Beforethe Philippines was colonized by the Spaniards and later by theAmericans, the Muslims had their own political institutions andeconomic structures in the Sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao,and the Pat a Pongampong ko Ranao. They consider themselvesa free nation assimilated to the Philippines against their will,thereby becoming a minority in their own land. They are fightingagainst what they consider as discrimination by the nationalgovernment and the majority population.

In 1961, Congressman Ombra Amilbangsa filed a bill in theHouse of Representatives seeking recognition of theindependence of the Muslim province of Sulu. In 1968, the MoroIndependence Movement demanded the establishment of anIslamic state in the Muslim areas of Cotabato, Davao,Zamboanga, Zamboanga City, Basilan, Lanao, Sulu andPalawan. In 1972, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)waged an armed struggle to establish a Bangsamoro Republicin Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. In 1984, the Moro IslamicLiberation Front (MILF) was formed and it demanded theestablishment of an independent Islamic state. The MILF wagedan armed campaign against the Armed Forces of the Philippines

Q and A: The Mindanao Peace Process*Benedicto R. Bacani

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* Views expressed in this article are solely of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the opinion or endorsed by any personality, group,party or instrumentality involved in the Mindanao peace process.

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from 1997 until 2003, when it renewed negotiations with theGovernment of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP).

2. What are the specific issues raised by the MNLF and theMILF?

The Bangsamoro right to self-determination is the naturalright of every people and this is recognized by the United Nations.

The right to self-determination includes the right to a nameor a people’s own identity, the right to a territory, the right tothe resources of this territory, and the right to self-governance.

3. Did the resort to arms by the MNLF, MILF and the GRPbring us closer to the resolution of the Mindanao conflict?

No. On the contrary, the use of force by all sides has madethe conflict more difficult to resolve as it never addressed theroot causes of the problem. The cost of the war for theinhabitants of the region is staggering. Consider this: in 1971alone, 1,000 people died. From 1972 to 1976, 100,00 to 120,000people were killed, 50% from the MNLF, 30% from the AFPand 20% from the civilian population. It is estimated that thecost of the war in the 70’s ran up to 73 billion pesos. The 2005UN Philippine Human Development Report states that, since1975, the conflict in Mindanao has cost between PHP5-10 billionyearly.

Civilians have suffered tremendously from repeateddisplacement . In battles between the MILF and the AFP, 30,000internally displaced people (IDP) were recorded in 1997;1,014,645 in 2000; 24,000 in 2001; and 75,419 in 2003. Thehuge physical, social and economic costs of the war have infact deepened the animosity and distrust among the contendingparties as well as divisions among peoples along religious lines.Instead of resolving the conflict, the use of force has in factbrought about conditions that have made the dispute moredifficult to resolve.

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4. So if war has not solved this conflict, do peace talks have abetter chance to resolve this problem?

While peace talks have not yet fully resolved the conflict,they have slowly but significantly de-escalated the intensity ofthe fighting as the parties in the talks try to address the rootcauses of the problem. In 1975-1976, the Tripoli Agreementbetween the GRP and the MNLF called for autonomy in 13provinces and cities in the southern Philippines, but the area ofautonomy has been reduced to five provinces and one citycomposing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao(ARMM) today. In 1996, the GRP and the MNLF signed theFinal Peace Agreement to implement the Tripoli Agreement.While the MNLF ended its 25-year armed struggle for Mindanaoindependence, the MILF continued to fight. It signed a ceasefirethe next year, in 1997. The current peace talks seek to finallybring peace to Mindanao by convincing the MILF and GRPthat grievances can be resolved peacefully without violence .

5. What are the issues being talked about in the GRP-MILFnegotiations?

There are three major issues in the talks: 1) security, 2)humanitarian, rehabilitation and development, and 3) ancestraldomain. When resolved, these issues would address problems ofinstability and violence in the region, foster respect for humanrights and promote economic development of conflict-affectedareas. Ancestral domain is the most critical issue in thenegotiations as it refers to Bangsamoro identity, culture,traditional lands, governance and control over economicresources.

6. How sure are we that there will be no more war if the MILFand GRP agree to peace?

There is no guarantee that a GRP-MILF peace agreementwill end the war forever. But developments in the past five yearsof negotiations raise hopes that this peace agreement will bemore meaningful than previous ones and that a working pactwill be implemented to the advantage of the Bangsamoro andother peoples in Mindanao.

Q and A: The Mindanao Peace Process


First, the ceasefire agreed upon by the GRP and the MILFis holding and armed encounters have been drastically reduced.Second, the parties are making headway in joint programs suchas interdicting criminal and terrorist elements in MILF areasand in delivering economic development in conflict-affectedareas. Third, there is a strong presence of civil society groupsespecially in facilitating people-to-people peace processes in thegrassroots level. Fourth, there is strong international supportfor the peace process. Fifth, unlike previous peace talks thatwere centered on institutions, the ongoing negotiations addresshead-on basic Moro grievances such as Moro ancestral domain,land and natural resources issues. Sixth, the global war on terrorhas encouraged the Philippine government into acting moredecisively to bring lasting peace and economic progress toMindanao.

7. What prevents the MILF and even the MNLF and other futureinsurgent groups from taking up arms once again?

That is always a possibility especially when implementationof peace agreements is wanting, as shown by the failed uprisingin 2001 and 2005, allegedly by MNLF elements in Sulu. This iswhy everyone, not only government officials but also ordinaryFilipinos, should work for peace. War is never the solution, aswe in Mindanao should know. More than 120,000 soldiers andcivilians died from 1972 to 1976, the height of the MNLFinsurgency, with an estimated 1 million people displaced fromtheir homes and livelihoods.

The scars of war remain to this day. Look at the poor andhungry people around you. According to the World Bank, 62.9%of the residents of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanaoare poor, compared with 34% for the Philippines as a whole.Infant mortality is 72 per 1,000 live births compared to only 42per 1,000 live births nationally. Men here die at 55.5 years ofage, compared with 66.3 years nationwide, while women live to59.3 years, compared with 71.6 years in the rest of the country.And only 39.2% of youths in the autonomous region are enrolledin high school, versus 72.2% in the Philippines as a whole.

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Among the nation’s 16 regions, the Autonomous Region inMuslim Mindanao consistently ranks at or near the bottom onindicators of human development.

8. What brought about this terrible state of affairs?The vicious cycle of poverty and displacement in Muslim

Mindanao is a result of a complicated history that dates back toSpanish times. Before the Spaniards came in 1565, Islamiccommunities were already thriving in Sulu, where the first sultancame to power around 1450, and in what is now Maguindanao,which was founded by Sharif Kabunsuan around 1515. For threecenturies, the Moros, as the Spaniards called the inhabitants ofMindanao and Sulu, successfully fought off incursions by theforeign colonizers, and kept their religion, lands and way of lifeintact.

All that changed when the Americans defeated the Spaniardsin 1898. By 1914, the United States had largely succeeded insubjugating the Moros. The Americans encouraged entirepopulations in Luzon and the Visayas, mostly landless andambitious Christians, to migrate to Mindanao. The policycontinued after the Philippines regained independence. Duringthe Spanish times, Moros made up 98% of the Mindanaopopulation. Today, Christian migrants account for 80% of theinhabitants and own 93% of the land. Eight out of ten Morosare landless in their own homeland.

9. We are Christian migrants from Iloilo. Does this mean wehave to give up our land to the Moros and go back to theVisayas?

No, of course not. But it is important for you to acknowledgethat the Moros have been systematically discriminated andalienated from the lands they had lived in for centuries. Injusticehas clearly been done to the Bangsamoro, but there is nothingto be gained by pointing fingers. The people involved have longbeen dead. The best thing that we, their descendants, can do isto move forward and correct the injustices of colonizationwithout, however, creating new injustices. This means finding a



formula under which Muslims, Christians and other indigenousgroups can live in peace and harmony in Mindanao.

10. Is such a formula possible? Neither the two provisionalautonomous regions established by Ferdinand Marcos in the1970s nor the present ARMM promulgated during FidelRamos’s presidency in the 1990s has been effective.

This is why the current negotiations between the governmentand the MILF are so important. They represent the third attemptat a lasting solution to the Mindanao problem. The externalclimate looks exceptionally promising. For example, Malaysia,which used to turn a blind eye to the use of Sabah as a trainingground and supply and communications center by Moro fighters,is now an active broker in the peace talks with the MILF.

The internal dynamics look positive too. With prodding andsupport from the international community, the Philippinegovernment appears strongly determined this time to forge agood agreement and, even more important, to implement iteffectively. As for the MILF, it has already shown some flexibilityby agreeing, for example, to give other indigenous groups theright to decide whether they want to be part of a Bangsamorojuridical entity in the future.

11. What will happen to the rights of the Lumad communities totheir ancestral domain/lands?

The MILF acknowledges the right of the Lumad to freechoice. They are free to join or not join the Bangsamoro. Theirright to their domains/lands will also be respected.

12. What has been accomplished by the GRP-MILF peace talksso far?

This can be seen in the three aspects in the agenda of thenegotiations, namely,

♦ Security, the main component of which is a ceasefire♦ Humanitarian aid, rehabilitation and development♦ Ancestral domain

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A ceasefire agreement has been signed and has been holding.After the all-out war of 2000, the situation has rapidly improved.There were 698 armed encounters in 2002, which fell to 559incidents in 2003, and only 15 in 2004. Just ten (10) skirmisheswere reported from January to March 2005, and none at allfrom April 2005 to the present. This has been the work of theJoint GRP-MILF Ceasefire Committee. They are working handin hand with several local monitoring teams all over the 13conflict-affected provinces and with the InternationalMonitoring Team, consisting of 60 military and civiliancontingents from Malaysia, Brunei and Libya. An Ad Hoc JointAction Group (AHJAG) has been created to go after criminalelements in the conflict-affected areas, like the kidnap for ransomgroups. The AHJAG has solved more than ten cases ofkidnapping.

A Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) has been createdto determine, lead and manage development activities inBangsamoro areas. A Joint Needs Assessment for MindanaoTrust Fund completed as early as September 2004 has set asideUS$150 million to be released after the signing of a peaceagreement between the GRP and the MILF. There is an ongoingcapacity-building program for Bangsamoro DevelopmentAgency (BDA) personnel. There is also a GRP inter-agencyTechnical Working Group to partner with BDA for projects inMILF communities. And the mechanism for the BangsamoroLeadership and Management Institute is being put in place asthe main instrument for capacity building of leaders andprofessionals.

13. OK, so what will an agreement with the MILF look like?The agreement will surely acknowledge the unique history

and identity of the Bangsamoro people, recognize and protectBangsamoro rights to their land and natural resources, ensurethe Bangsamoro’s direct participation in socio-economicdevelopment efforts within their ancestral domain, and willinclude a workable formula for genuine Bangsamoro self-governance.



The boundaries of the Bangsamoro Ancestral Domain shallbe jointly determined by the GRP and the MILF. There will bemeasures agreed upon to address legitimate grievances arisingfrom unjust dispossession and/or marginalization.

14. How will Cha-Cha – the proposed changes in the PhilippineConstitution – affect the talks with the MILF?

The proposed changes to the Constitution will take a longtime to be acted on, and there is no guarantee that they will bepassed or that Filipinos will ratify the changes in a plebiscite. Ifthe peace agreement with the MILF is signed before Cha-Cha,then it is expected that its provisions would be taken into accountin the Cha-Cha deliberations, along with the issue of the ARMM.If no peace agreement with the MILF is signed before the finaldraft of the new constitution is finalized, the expectation is thatthe Cha-Cha will be formulated in such a way that would flexiblycover the future outcome of the peace process.

15. What can we do to support the peace process?It is important especially for the Christian majority to

acknowledge that everyone is part of the problem and the onlyway we can resolve this conflict is for the whole nation to supportthe formula agreed upon in the peace talks. The formula willcall for sacrifices from all sides, and we should be able to acceptour share in making compromises for the sake of peace.

One of the immediate things we can do is to stop and thinkbefore uttering anything derogatory about an institution or aperson, based on religion. We should set aside religious andcultural prejudices in our everyday lives. Christians and Muslimsalike should not speak negatively about each other, especiallyin front of their children, because this perpetuates themisunderstanding and hostility that have led us to our presentproblems.

This is not easy to do. The slurs we utter against each otherdo not sound bad after a while because we have grown used tothem, because these are things that we heard our parents and

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grandparents say and which we, in turn, transmit to our ownchildren and grandchildren, whether we mean to or not. “Morosare treacherous.” “Christians are thieves.” Stated enough times,these dubious opinions become stereotypes that we sadly acceptas true.

16. What can social institutions do for the peace process?Schools, churches, mosques and the media have a role to

play in reinforcing positive, rather than negative, images ofMuslims and Christians in Mindanao. In the classroom and fromthe pulpit, teachers and religious leaders can reinforce the valuesof tolerance for diversity and differences. The media can beextra careful in reporting Christian-Muslim conflicts to avoidinflaming passions. Politicians should resist the temptation touse the religion card to win elections.

And everyone should step away from the extremists on bothsides – the hardliners in government who preach that only forcecan keep Muslim Mindanao part of the Philippines, and theIslamic militants who would burn everything to the ground toexact revenge for the sins of colonialism and to create theirown narrow and insular state.

17. Should we not be actively part of the talks as its outcome willdirectly affect us?

The issues in the negotiations are complex and difficult.Negotiators should be given the opportunity to freely exploreoptions, which would be extremely difficult if the conflictingpositions of all stakeholders are brought to bear on the talks.However, the two parties periodically conduct briefings andconsultations. When they finally forge an agreement, both sideswill fully disclose all its provisions, explain them to the public,and strongly campaign to persuade everyone to support the pact.

In time, the citizens of Muslim Mindanao will be asked tovote on the accord in a plebiscite. We should vote one way orthe other only after a thorough and objective study. We shouldalways remember that the real issue here is the long term. Will



voting yes or voting no ensure a peaceful and prosperous futurefor our children and grandchildren without repeating theinjustices of the past and without creating new problems? Theanswer is in our own hands.

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Grace Jimeno Rebollos*

Identity, Self-Empowerment,Ancestral Domain

Introduction

Questions on the identity, ancestral domain, and self-empowerment of Mindanao’s peoples continue to be at the heart of theirquest for peace. Within the socio-political dynamics characterizing theirrelationships, a focus has been placed especially on the indigenouspeoples and the Bangsa Moro communities in their struggle to nametheir respective spaces in ways that assert recognition and respect forthe integrity of their cultures, historical experiences, and aspirations.

The discourse for this has brought to the fore many notions whichare crucial to an understanding of the social constructions defining andbeing defined by local realities, including the potential for peace andviolence. These realities, among others, include the sense and expressionof the collective self, majority-minority interaction, the pursuit of rightsthat may overlap with those of others, and criteria for asserting variousclaims, from territory to the use of natural resources. They also give fleshto an array of conventions and laws such as the Indigenous PeoplesRights Act (IPRA) that now need to be reviewed and interpreted in lightof emerging developments. Many of these applications have been longoverdue.

*Grace Jimeno-Rebollos is Vice President for Research, Extensionand Development, Western Mindanao State University, ZamboangaCity.


These concerns inform the deliberations by the negotiating panelsof the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and theMoro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). But as they craft the features ofa new peace agreement, it continues to be the conviction of the MindanaoStudy Group (MSG) that, in the final analysis, the agenda should beowned by the communities that will live with the critical local arrangements.Questions about governance, territoriality and resources, for example,cannot simply constitute questions of pro and con, or good versusevil. Instead, they may encompass two or more starkly contrasting andeven competing interpretations of the very same concepts, including theirobjectives, their elements, and their actual and potential impact.

It has thus become imperative to locate these constructs withinthe general framework of human beings in the community, and thencesituate them within the often intersecting social milieus of the BangsaMoro and indigenous peoples. For this purpose, the MSG has requestedProfessor Ponciano Bennagen of the Department of Anthropology,University of the Philippines, and a member of the 1987 ConstitutionalConvention, to provide beginning insights.

Identity and Self-Empowerment

Human Universals

Drawing from his Mindanao experience, albeit his Ilocano-Kankaney origins, Prof. Bennagen set his presentation within the contextof shifting identities and the human evolutionary framework. He citedDonald Brown’s compilation of some 200 “human universals,” so calledbecause they are found in all societies. He also termed them “surfaceuniversals” in the sense that they are external, and include, among others,the tendency to make classifications especially between the out-groupand the in-group, choice-making, collective identities, classification ofspace, territoriality, conflict, cooperation, inequality, and so on. Theseare some characterizations:

• While found in all societies, even those based on simplehunting and gathering, universals can become problematic,especially when they threaten the entire fabric of social life.Yet they may also contain some hope in that they may behuman traits that are the exact opposites of those that are

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negative. Consider the Irish Republican Armydecommissioning itself, or the GRP and MILF deciding totalk.

• The surface expressions of universals also differ dependingon a constellation of social and even biological forces. Thisprocess is being speeded up by the rapid flow of goods andservices, technology, and, in a significant way, byinformation. Within the present knowledge-based society,one bit of information can alter social dynamics. Carried tothe public domain, amendments in information can affect thesocial dynamics of the current GRP-MILF negotiations.

• In all cases, the human universal of identifying oneself is rootedin places, localities, communities. All identities are local buteventually may be regionalized, nationalized, and eveninternationalized. For instance, the “Bangsa Moro” and“Filipino” started with local identities.

• Identity is obvious in the way individuals and communitiesname themselves. There is a propensity to publicly claim anidentity based on place of origin. One notes, for instance, theuse of prefixes “-i”, “-ti”, “-on”, and then the geographicspace, whether sea, hill, mountain or river. In a way, thislinks the issue of identity to territory, ancestral domains, andthe right of self-determination.

• Thus, the human trait of individually or collectively identifyingoneself, the determination of where one should be or howone should behave, and one’s claim to a certain piece of thesurface of the earth, i.e., “ancestral territory” or “ancestraldomain”, all somehow fall into place within the humanevolutionary framework.

The Rights-Based Context of Universals

Human universals expressed in the context of rights are nowpartly the arena of struggle in all sorts of stakeholders’ rights – indigenouspeoples’ rights, Bangsa Moro rights, minority rights. They may be referredto as natural human rights. Over time, during the course of human historyand as recently within the 18th century, these became political rights asexercised by disadvantaged and oppressed groups against establishedgovernments. The most popular example would be the overthrow of theFrench Ancien Regime and the Declaration of the Rights of Man by the

Identity, Self-Empowerment, Ancestral Domain


French National Assembly in 1789.

Basic human rights eventually became part of the UN Charterwith its approval in 1945. In its preamble, as well as in a series of otherinternational covenants, reference is made to “peoples.”

In the Philippine case, with the 1973 Constitution and thefacilitation of Atty. Michael Mastura and Bishop Francisco Claver, theso-called Marcos Constitution took notice of the rights of culturalcommunities. Those rights included those of the indigenous peoples1,though the term “Moro” was evidently not yet acceptable.

With the declaration of martial law and the increasing push towarddevelopmentalism of the Marcos type (which tried to extract as much asit could from the rich natural resources of the country), great pressurewas exerted on indigenous communities and even the Bangsa Morocommunities, which incidentally occupied most of the areas that wererichly endowed with natural resources. This gave rise to the struggles atChico Dam, Agus River, and all other struggles against the developmentaggression of market forces organized by the state, including the use ofthe military.

All these efforts – of the indigenous peoples, the Bangsa Moropeoples - came to be within the ambit of the international human rightsmovement. These became an entry point for the campaign against thosewho threatened marginalized communities, and support for the local andnational struggles for the protection of their human rights. Contact wasmade with advocates of human rights elsewhere, all over the world, sothe struggle for local rights became nationalized and then internationalized.

A third generation of human rights has emerged. These are“collective rights” that include the right to the environment and the rightto self-determination. But with so many rights being pushed for inclusionin the rubric of human rights, there has been a call for some kind of“quality control.” And to do that, there is a need to return to the UNCharter and the UN Bill of Rights, which incidentally are premised on atleast two things: equality and non-discrimination.

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Self-determination and Self-Governance

Prof. Bennagen cited Erica-Irene Daes (Chair-Rapporteur ofthe International Working Group on Indigenous Populations) who hasenumerated the various nuances of the collective right to “self-determination,” thus:

• The right of an entity to determine its international status (or“external self-determination,” which begins with the communityof nations);

• The right of a state population to determine the form ofgovernment and to participate in the government, sometimesextended to include democratization, or majority rule (“internalself-determination”);

• The right of a state to maintain national unity and territorialintegrity and to govern its affairs without external interferenceand without violation of its boundaries (e.g. the GRP);

• The right of a state and of a state population to cultural, social,and economic development (especially claimed by lessdeveloped countries and is embodied in the Bill of Rights);

• The right of a minority or an indigenous group or nation, mainlywithin state boundaries, to special rights related not only toprotection and non-discrimination, but also to the right tocultural, educational, social, and economic autonomy, for thepreservation of group identity (identity, territory, self-governance are relevant here).

Bennagen further framed the questions of identity, territory, self-governance, and rights of minority peoples within the possibilities thatare now being offered to various communities in some of our laws, thosederived from our practical experiences in the Philippines and theexperiences from others. He also referred to Richard Falk’s paper onthe Evolving Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which discusses a wholerange of options for self governance short of secession. Among others,the options include:

• the case of the Greenland Home Rule Government, whichinvolves a state of partnership that is subject to a treaty withDenmark. The treaty provides for a sharing of resources ,including strategic natural resources like uranium, gold, oil,



and other sub-surface resources. • the case of Canada, in which smaller units like councils

operate within a federal structure, states within the federation,and an aboriginal government.

• self-management of the type that is more sociological thanterritorial, where one does not have to have a specificterritory with specific boundaries. This may be the case formany indigenous persons who have migrated into the urbanareas and can no longer claim a form of territory. They gointo some kind of self-management which, in effect, workslike a cooperative. This may be exemplified by Muslimcommunities which evolve into a kind of self-managing entitywithin the urban milieu.

• tribal barangays as provided in the IPRA.

Harnessing Positive Universals and Multiple Stakeholders forConflict Management

There continues to be an effort to operationalize other possibilitiesof self-governance following the IPRA, recognizing that this lawassimilated many of the provisions embodied in the UN Bill of Rights,including the Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Populations(DDRP).

To provide closure to the discussion on human universals, Prof.Bennagen revisited the concepts of self-determination, territory, andidentity including the human “othering” potential2. He identified otherentries in the list of universals, such as choice making, cooperation andconflict management, as part of a broad range of positive universals thatmay be harnessed for affirmative action to address key issues andconcerns affecting the Bangsa Moro and indigenous peoples of Mindanao.

He also recalled the Computational Theory of Social Action,which draws on an understanding of the computer. This theory likensthe mind to the computer (but is more than a computer), and posits thatthe whole process of thinking and acting, proceeds from a system ofcollecting information, making the computation, i.e., influential processing,and - depending on the information and programming –feedbacking. Thetheory also says that there are different modules, and depending on howyou program the modules, then you would have different outputs. In

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political terms, some would call it a kind of “dialectic.” In computerese,this is “garbage in, garbage out”.

The theory also argues for smooth tracking and a multi-agentsystem that allows local efforts to be carried out on all fronts. Taken tosocial terms, this applies the Stakeholder’s Theory of ConflictManagement and Negotiations and implies questions on the ownershipof the GRP-MILF process by the multi-stakeholders of Mindanao. Withstakeholder analysis, one is able to generate a listing ofstakeholders, identify those who are key or primary, or those who arenot as immediate or are far away (but who nonetheless play a role) likethe Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). All of these are informationthat would be critical for planners and decision-makers who must addresspolicy, program, and project questions.

On the other hand, one must be sensitive to informationalchanges. With the volatility of the social situation, predictability has almostgone out of the window. Social Science does not cope with the idea ofmaking probability statements, and one cannot make predictions on limitedparameters, especially if one were looking at a long term. For example,with respect to charter change (cha-cha), there are no guarantees that:(a) cha-cha proceeds, or (b) if cha-cha proceeds and if one considersamendments, that so called pro-social justice, pro-poor, pro-marginalized, pro-democracy provisions will be incorporated. The cha-cha-related developments will depend on the dynamics that will beinfluenced, among others, by: (a) whoever is elected, if a constitutionalconvention were to be called, (b) the numbers, if decision-making willstill be majoritarian. Thus, it will be difficult to predict. Yet, this doesnot mean to negate any efforts to plan. In fact, it is all the more reason toplan.

In summary, Prof. Bennagen stressed the importance ofaddressing questions of identity (including shifting identity) and territorialityas emanating from the “local.” All knowledge and information have localroots, and they only become globalized depending on the forces thatbring them out. Terms have also shifted. What is now considered“indigenous knowledge” used to be regarded as “superstitiousbelief.” Because of the UNCED - Rio de Janeiro Process3, there is nowappreciation for the significant contribution of indigenous knowledge(which is local knowledge) to sustainable development. Indigenous



knowledge is knowledge that has been developed over long periods bylocal peoples in almost marginal environments. If these indigenousknowledge systems (e.g., of property, including notions of social justice)survived in spite of all the assaults on local communities, then they havea message for all peoples. They have much to contribute for thesustainability not only of the human species, but also of planet earth.

On a wistful note, Prof. Bennagen ended with the vista of planetearth as the ancestral domain of homo sapiens. In pursuing relationshipsamong the species and even with the possibility of outer space/interstellar/interplanetary travel, earthlings must take care of planet earth as theirancestral domain. They can confront those who pose threats to it withthe knowledge preserved and carried through by the local people,especially the indigenous people. Hence, his exhortation: “Let us globalizethe earth from below.”

The Discussion

The distinction between the Bangsa Moro peoples and theindigenous peoples’ identities and claims to ancestral domains and self-determination constituted the specific theme for discussion. Further probeswere made on the application of core or shifting identities, including themisuse and abuse of said identities for certain purposes. The group drewfrom the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act and the correspondinginterpretation as gleaned from the congressional deliberations, theExpanded Organic Act of 2001 Implementing the Final Peace Agreement(Republic Act 9054), and even the Philippine Constitution.

Evolving Identities and Problems of Hybridization andDifferentiation

The initial question had to do with whether there are interlocking/overlapping rights among minority groups. Prof. Bennagen confirmedthe existence of tensions arising from one’s identity, with this being mademore conflictive because of the process of hybridization of identities.He observed that problems emerged in the case of some groups that,after denying their identity, restored their indigenous status (“everybodybecomes a katutubo”) - with the coming of the IPRA and its materialincentives. Hence, they would return to do some kind of tribaldealership as opposed to tribal leadership, and are even able to get

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titles.

Conflicts would often arise as people assert their differences.These misunderstandings result from placed-based identities, or fromaffiliation with particular clan organizations. Among the Manobos, forexample, the Manobo identity becomes a unifying identity. However,differences are expressed as one goes down the grassroots. Given thelimitations of their experience, the grassroots limit their movements tothe boundaries of their territory. These conflicts have further becomecomplicated by the problems that have had to do with labor issues at thebanana plantations in Davao or with land tenure, which are residues ofthe Ilaga problem in the 1970s.

Bennagen also introduced the distinction between “identity-in-itself” and “identity-for-itself.” Identity-in-itself is one’s name, notsomething one is willing to fight for like land rights. There are peoplewho go willy-nilly through life and are not willing to put up a fight in casethey are threatened. However, once they have that consciousness inrelation to others and that relationship is characterized by domination oraccommodation, then they make a stand. Bennagen pointed to thepossibility that collective identities can either be red flags of aggression,white flags of peace, or no flags at all. The question is what turns thecolor from red to white, from white to red. It is interesting to know whothe people are, what their stakes are, the stakeholders at work, theinterests they represent, and the values they hold. These are importantfor the emotional loading that goes into the concept.

Cohesion, the Collective Consciousness, and Self-Ascription

As observed by Atty. Benedicto Bacani, identity has served asa point of cohesion for individuals rallying around a common affinity withMindanao. The “One Mindanao” and “One People Mindanao” movementindicate this evolving construct. Prof. Bennagen likened this developmentto the use of the term “Filipino” or “Bangsa Moro.” Whereas in thepast there was aversion to the latter, now it is like a badge of courage.On the other hand some groups would rather be identified by their ethnicappellation.

Atty. Jose Lorena also added the Social Construct Theory tohelp make sense of how identities are formed. When a person embraces



the ways of a group of people, and is willing to sacrifice and die withthem, his identity evolves into being of that group. The bottom line is aconsciousness, said Prof. Rufa Guiam - the collective consciousness ofa people belonging to one group. It is not a matter of others ascribing toyou an imposed identity. It is a matter of self-ascription.

Prof. Abhoud Lingga noted the application of self-ascription inthe 2000 census, observing that there were separate categories of Tirurayand Teduray. This was similarly seen by Prof. Rodil, who had learnedearlier that raw responses to the census-taking were taken verbatim,and not classified according to preset categories. Hence, the difference.He felt that the work of making the necessary combinations andinterpretations lay on the social scientist. According to Bennagen, thisdifference in self-ascription is because some persons usually absorb thename that is imposed on them by outsiders and thus identify themselvesthe way others identify them.

In analyzing the organization of the Mindanao One movement,Guiam said that these developments are usually spurred by the presenceof a challenge on identity. For example, the Mindanao One identity maybe attributed to the widespread perception of the many peoples inMindanao that the national government has not given fair treatment toMindanao, especially with respect to central development funds.Mindanao contributes 75% of the national revenue, but gets back only aminiscule portion of it. The continuous negligence of the Manila-centricnational government to accord Mindanao its proper place in the wholenational body politic has become the challenge for the consciousness tounite, to express a common aspiration, and to take pride in one’sMindanao origins.

Bangsa Moro and Indigenous Peoples: Identity Dilemmas

Prof. Rudy Rodil presented maps showing the distribution ofthe 12 Moro ethnic groups across the current political boundaries ofMindanao, based on the 2000 census and a minimum population of 100per area. He explained that these had been originally 13 tribes, due tothe mistake of considering the Palawanen and the Molbog as two separateethnic groups. The number was reduced to 12 when it was learned thatthe two were one and the same.

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He drew attention to the Bangsa Moro identity and attributed itto two elements - the ethnic element and the element of the politicalstruggle. He referred to the latter in terms of a political situationcorresponding to the existence of a state which the Moro NationalLiberation Front (MNLF) transformed into the Bangsa Moro. This, ineffect, was a claim for political territory. Thus he noted the premise ofMoro cohesiveness to be political dominance, rather than the existenceof ethnic identity.

Are the Bangsa Moro considered indigenous people? Are theindigenous people parts of the Bangsa Moro? In the Mindanao StudyGroup’s search for the basis for defining the Bangsa Moro identity,ARMM Deputy Governor Fatima Kanakan cited key officials who hadmade public pronouncements considering the Bangsa Moro as indigenouspeople. On the other hand, Lorena added that in the MNLF Manual ofPolitical Cadres, the Moro is identified to include Lumad. There wereeven Lumad representatives in the council of the MNLF. The ExpandedARMM Law (R.A. 9054) separately cites the Bangsa Moro peopleand the tribal (indigenous) people.

In determining the identity of the Bangsa Moro vis-a-vis theindigenous people, reference was made to Republic Act No. 8371 orthe Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) which defines IndigenousPeoples (also Indigenous Cultural Communities) as:

“a group of people or homogeneous societies identifiedby self-ascription and ascription by others, who havecontinuously lived as organized community oncommunally bounded and defined territory, and whohave, under claims of ownership since time immemorial,occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharingcommon bonds of language, through resistance topolitical, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historicallydifferentiated from the majority of Filipinos”.

A suggestion was made to verify the definition from the transcriptof proceedings within the course of deliberations to pass the law. Insum, various inputs led to the interpretation that the Bangsa Moro arenot included among the indigenous people. On the other hand, a position



was expressed by Santos Unsad, a Teduray leader, relative to the BangsaMoro. They have declared their affiliation with the Bangsa Moro state,but wish to assert their identity, ancestral domain, and system ofgovernance as Teduray.

Lorena, thus, revisited Rodil’s early thoughts on the Bangsa Moroand Lumad identities, placing them in the context of ancestral domainsclaims and suggested the ethnic or socio-cultural element as appropriateto the Lumad. On the other hand, he extended the political element tothe perspective of self-determination as claimed by the Sultanate andwhich has also been invoked by the Moro rebels. This perspective ofself-determination emphasizes the point of sovereignty. To a certainextent, it holds that there must be a continuity of sovereignty because theSultanate had acquired sovereignty over specific areas, even beforePhilippine independence.

Rodil, however, pointed out that in the sphere of the politicaldomain, many changes have happened. There had been a movementfrom the sultanate to the Moro province, and with practically each majorchange, there was a loss of sovereignty.

Even as these changes were going on, the Lumads haveawakened and begun to assert their own identity and right to self-determination separate from the Bangsa Moro. Some have even goneon to question why they were included in the Bangsa Moro.

Recalling the time immemorial criterion, Lingga further expressedthe opinion that that the Bangsa Moro people – as Bangsa Moro - cannotclaim it as a basis for their identity and their ancestral domain claims. Heclarified that this criterion should be used only as a reference in the GRP-MILF talks so that the negotiators can make the adjustments. Hence,they cannot be rigid in its use. Still, the Bangsa Moro people may applyas specific tribal groups.

Malang focused on the treatment of the concept of self-determination in the IPRA, declaring that “the state recognizes the inherentright of the indigenous peoples to self-government and self-determination,and respects the integrity of the valid subjects and institutions.” ButLorena, recalling lapses in the implementation of the GRP-MNLF peaceagreement and the pursuit of autonomy for the Bangsa Moro, pointed

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out that even in the constitution, there are provisions that have militatedagainst the full implementation of the agreement. For example, provisionslike Article XII, National Economy and Patrimony, particularly, Sec. 2,Sec 5, to Sec 20-21, need to be reviewed, including the transcript ofdiscussions that transpired in Congress and the Senate.

Echoing this, Rodil’s impression was that the full satisfaction ofthe right to self-determination is not possible under the Constitution.However, it does not mean that the possibility of other options cannotbe explored to the fullest extent possible under the law. A key factoralready being seen as contributing to the success of the peace agreementis that it must be crafted by those who will implement it.

The Rights-based Context of Identity and Recognition for theMinority

Given the rights-based context, Bennagen again made referenceto the guiding principles of non-discrimination, equality, and themaintenance of group identity. Whatever the institution in place, if theseare addressed, the solution of the problems is automatic. The institutionsthemselves deal with the core issues.

There are likewise the ironies of globalization. When there wasrecognition of rapid globalization, there was fear that some kind ofhomogenization would take place. But the reverse has been taking place,with the locals asserting their identity. One then sees identity politics atplay. As the variances that come out of these concerns translate toclaims over specific territories, ground quarrels can happen. Lingganoted that conflicts often arising from these overlapping claims orinterlocking rights at all times require judiciousness and sensitivity in theuse of terms or in matters of reporting. Yet Bennagen pointed to thereality of ground level reports about particular groups that – whetheraccurate or not – are circulated as factual. These are indications of howit can happen on the ground. He further asserted the entitlement ofstakeholders to correct information that could be factored into decisionsbeing made at various fronts affecting peace and sustainable developmentin Mindanao, including the GRP-MILF negotiations.

How then is identity maintained? Bennagen asked. He situatedthese concerns within the context of the evolving notion of human rights,



while posing the caveat that these rights have become so numerous thatsome sectors have called for some form of “quality control.” Expressionsof identity are interpretations of all those rights that have emerged. Amongthem is also the right of a community with a distinct character to have thischaracter reflected in the institution of government under which it lives –whether IP, Moro, or whatever group. However, it becomes morecomplicated and problematic in communities where hybridization is strongand, Prof. Guiam adds, in communities that are able to leverage morebenefits from existing policies. Still arguing from the human rightsframework, Bennagen recalled that the UN Charter has always been forpeace and equality and non-discrimination.

Invoking the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA), Atty. ZenMalang introduced the question of majority-minority relations and theregard for the minority. How much recognition is the majority willing toconfer on the minority? Bennagen pointed to three sources of recognition:(a) the state (as defined in the IPRA), (b) civil society , and (c) theindigenous people themselves. Apparently, there is a need to do a lot oftriangulation in establishing the notion of indigenous peoples. Usually,the notion of peoples is defined by international instruments wherelanguage, race religion, and collective psychology are considered. In theIPRA, the modifiers include ethnolinguistic grouping, primary language,and other cultural attributes that are expressed in external markers.

Nevertheless, if there were a Bangsa Moro Juridical Entity, askedMalang, do the Moros become the majority and indigenous peoples theminority? Bennagen admitted that at the ground level there is the realitythat the Bangsa Moro are the majority. This is realpolitik. But within thehuman rights context, indigenous rights must also apply. The point,according to Lingga, is that it is not a majority-minority question. Thebottom line is the rights and welfare of the people. One might be aminority, but one might be a privileged minority. For example, in Tanzania,the Christians are a minority but they are in the ruling class. What isimportant are the laws and institutions and their provision of equalopportunity.

Responses to the Bangsa Moro Identity

There was consensus in the impression that, for the Bangsa Moro,the assertion of their identity is problematic. The term “Bangsa Moro” is

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still not that popular. The accepted terms are “Muslim” and, if at all,“Moro.” Simply listening to the radio, one realizes that the discriminationagainst Muslims is intense. Guiam traced this back to the SPCPD. Shecited various cases of Christian leaders – religious and local government- who had been publicly censured for their pro-Muslim stance. One ofthese was Rosalita Nunez, former mayor of General Santos City, whoseresearch revealed that while Christians did not approve of and wereunimpressed with Muslim leaders, Muslims, on the other hand, did notmind the religion of their leaders. Guiam recalled the anti-Muslim lobbyin Congress led by three women leaders of Mindanao, a parish priestwho used the pulpit to campaign against Mayor Nunez, and the hometowncrusade of local politicians against the candidacy of the same mayor.Apparently, these gestures were effective.

Relevant to the discussion of anti-Muslim bias is a UNDP studythat showed Christians in Mindanao having stronger biases againstMuslims, compared to their counterparts in Luzon. This attitude wastraceable not only to differences in religion but also to the sense ofcompetition over opportunities to exercise power and use resources.

On the other hand, there is a sense of wonder at how Muslimsare able to penetrate uncharted territory. Prof. Bennagen found them,for example, in Kalinga in the persons of Maranaw traders who did notseem to have any political affinities. An indication of possibilities, theseobservations led him to also wonder why at that level of dealing withhard realities of everyday life - like commodity exchanges and trading -there seems to be no problem with majority-minority relations and thesituation is relatively peaceful.

This finding was affirmed by Lorena who also saw growingMuslim communities in Baguio, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales. Asidefrom the traders, these places were influenced by overseas contractworkers who had gone to Muslim states like Saudi Arabia, Brunei, andMalaysia, and converted to Islam. They themselves became agents ofhybridization, professing their new faith and influencing their relatives.Some Muslims were also noted to rise to prominence like a Maranawcouncilor in the City of Tagbilaran or the Maranaw Regional Director ofthe NCIP in Region 3.



Education and the Advocacy for Cultural Sensitivity, Peace andDevelopment

By way of conclusion, the discussions shifted to the issues andconcerns of action appropriate to the role of the participants as a studygroup. With the realities of Mindanao and the country, education andadvocacy were seen as ways of engendering inter-cultural sensitivity,respect, and dialogue. The issues of content, material, and processes ofinter-agency collaboration and peace championing by strategic communitymembers and institutions suggest a multi-pronged approach.

The Curriculum. The group referred to curriculum offerings inMindanao universities, noting that it is only the MSU system that offers acourse on Mindanao history. They found this lacking in Catholic-ownedinstitutions. The advantage of said course would have been the exposureof students to the existence of the Moro people and Moro culture.Popularizing the issues and expanding levels of social discourse on themanner will create a civic consciousness in the young.

Textbooks. Gross inaccuracies are often found in textbooksthat, in effect, give rise to discrimination of Muslims by the Christianmajority. The use of “Muslim” as a label for the cultural artifacts andpractices of Moro tribal groups is flawed. It is questionable to say“Muslim dance,” “Muslim boat” (referring to the vinta), “Muslim dress,”“Muslim food.” There has also been a consistent observation of beingexcluded from the core definition of what is being Filipino, e.g., thereference to “lechong baboy” as the national food when that is proscribedfor a segment of the Philippine body politic.

Mention was made of the chance given by the Department ofEducation for ARMM to write their own books, i.e., materials that weremeant to be culture-friendly. Yet the editors only changed the characters’names to Muslim-sounding names, e.g., Abdul. Apparently, the changesmade by the editors showed inadequate capacity to present andappreciate Mindanao culture and history. The books were then returnedto Manila.

Concern was expressed for the dilemma of certain Manila-basedwriters and media persons dealing with the educational needs of schoolchildren. While they wish to contribute to the improvement of educationfor ARMM and Mindanao, they are unfamiliar with the local setting for

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which they mean to produce multi-level packages of learning materials.

Strategic Personalities in Media, Local Government,Church, and Community. More targeted approaches are suggestedfor strategic media stations and persons. There are strong, vocalopponents of the peace process in the media, LGUs, the church, andthe community. There is dire need for champions who can influence thetide of public opinion. The problem is that those who are for the peaceprocess are not strategically positioned. Bacani observed that even inthe Catholic Church, peacebuilding is not mainstreamed. Even amongthe ranks of church organizations, there are many who are anti-Muslim.

Among media practitioners there are attempts to inculcate moreresponsibility in reportage. Yet the problem is the publishers, editors,owners and managers of the print and broadcast who dictate thesubstance of news that is released from their outlets. Unfortunately, anynews that sells, even if sensational, inaccurate or divisive, will be preferred.

Endnotes

1 Irene Erika Daes, Rapporteur of the International Working Groupon Indigenous Persons stresses the distinction between “indigenousrights” and “minority rights”. She defines “indigenous persons” as“the dependents of a people which have lived in the region prior tothe invasion of colonizers or foreign settlers who in many cases havesince become the dominant population. In this respect, the numberof the indigenous peoples does not constitute substantive criteria.”

2 The capacity of human beings to consider others as “other”; indicatedby the propensity to name “I, us, and them.”

3 UN Conference on Environment and Development, also called TheEarth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 1992


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Ancestral Domain, Identity and Right ofSelf-Determination: A Moro Perspective

Jose Iribani Lorena*

Introduction

From the Moro perspective, understanding the concepts ofancestral domain, identity and the right to self-determination is crucial infinding a just, lasting and comprehensive solution to the age-old Mindanaoproblem. After all, these issues have invariably been the core and criticalagenda in all the negotiations between the Government of the Republicof the Philippines and the Moro rebel movements, first with the MoroNational Liberation Front (MNLF) and now with the Moro IslamicLiberation Front (MILF).

In particular, self-determination as an attendant right and inwhatever degree (autonomy, federalism and outright independence) hasalways been the primary negotiating interest articulated by the Mororebel movements. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the last round ofthe GRP-MILF talks in Malaysia, the technical working groups of bothpanel worked exhaustively on this issue.

The Mindanao Study Group held a roundtable discussion onancestral domain, identity, and self-determination on February 21-22,2006 at the Renaissance Hotel in Makati City. The forum was part ofthe group’s initiatives to assist in building a wider constituency to supportthe ongoing GRP-MILF peace process.

*Jose Iribani Lorena is former Solicitor-General of the ARMM.


General Concepts

In introducing the subject “Ancestral Domain, Identity and theRight to Self-Determination of the Bangsa Moro People,” ProfessorAbhoud Syed Lingga underscored one truism: “Many of the armedconflicts that have raged in the world this century, and the vast majorityof those that have taken place since the end of the cold war and continuetoday center around peoples drive to self-determination.”

Professor Lingga noted that international law is unclear withrespect to the nature and scope of the right to self-determination. Thereis common acceptance, however, of the idea of self-determination as“the collective right of peoples to determine their own future free of anyoutside interference or coercion, and participate in decision making thataffects them.” Self determination, he stressed, includes “the right todetermine political status and to freely pursue economic, social, spiritualand cultural development.”

Significantly, the United Nations has, in no uncertain terms,recognized the right to self-determination. The United NationsInternational Covenant on Civil and Political rights as well as theInternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights arecategorical in stating that “all peoples have the right to self-determination.By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freelypursue their economic, social and cultural development.”

On ancestral domain, Professor Lingga ventured to say that“control and management of land and other natural resources within theterritorial space claimed by the people is integral to the right of self-determination.” In concluding his presentation, he cited historical basesand precedent covenants such as the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of2001 and the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement of 1996 to declare that“the Bangsa Moro as a people have a right to self-determination.”

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Discussion

The discussion on ancestral domain, as anchored on presentrealities grounded on conflicting claims, led the panel to analyze issuesas the ancestral domain of indigenous people enshrined and reorganizedunder existing law (The Indigenous Peoples Act), and its implication onthe of the Bangsa Moro over ancestral domains.

Right of Indigenous People to Ancestral Domain vis-a-visBangsa Moro Right to Political Territory

From the discussion, it became clear that the Bangsa Moro claimfor their ancestral domain with the attendant right to self-determination isdistinct and separate from the claim of the indigenous people to theirancestral domain.

As articulated by Fatima Kanakan, the Deputy Governor forthe Indigenous People (IP) in the Autonomous Region of MuslimMindanao, and by other IP representatives, the claim of the IP to theirancestral domain is now enshrined and well recognized under theIndigenous People’s Right Act (IPRA). This pertains particularly to IP’sland tenural rights, which are based on the concept of “time immemorial”possession of certain lands by the IPs. Title to land under this theorydraws authority from the maxim “prior in time, prior in rights.”

Ancestral domain under IPRA must not be equated with theBangsa Moro people’s claim to political territory, as the two conceptsare distinct and separate, although not exclusive of one another. Aspassionately emphasized by Bangsa Moro representatives in theroundtable, including this writer, the Bangsa Moro claim to ancestraldomain or what the Moro call their “political territory,” is not at allanchored on the “time immemorial doctrine.” Rather, it is based on thetruism that the Bangsa Moro people have historically exercisedsovereignty over this portion of a territory they call their homeland orancestral domain. Bangsa Moro sovereignty over the areas whichoriginally comprised the “Moro province” during the American period isnot only a reality, but is recognized by other people of the world. This isaptly captured in many international agreements, among them the Kiram-

Ancestral Domain, Identity and Right of Self-Determination


Bates Treaty. What can perhaps be equated in parallel with the IPsancestral domain, with respect to the Moro people, are the rights of thevarious ethno-linguistic Moro tribes to their ancestral domain.

The Regalian Doctrine: Its Implication

There is, however, a congruence in opinion among the participantsthat the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia) enshrined in the 1987 PhilippineConstitution and particularly defined in Section 2, Article XII, is onemajor obstacle to the full recognition and even enforcement ofGovernment’s commitment to faithfully observe the right to ancestraldomain be that of the Indigenous People more so, the Bangsa Moroclaim to political territory or homeland. (Sec. 2, Article XII, states: “Alllands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and othermineral oils, all forces of energy, fisheries, forest or timber, wildlife, floraand fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state.”)

For a full realization of the people’s right to the control,management and utilization of their ancestral domain, the RegalianDoctrine, a thesis which originated from the “universal feudal theory thatall lands were held from the crown” (Carino vs. Insular Government,1909) must be relaxed or even removed from the constitution.

ARMM Power on Ancestral Domain

Other related issues, such as the power of the AutonomousRegion in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) to formulate its own IPRA, werealso discussed. The participants were all of the view that the provision inSection 1, Article X, of Republic Act No. 9054 (Organic Act for theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) is ambiguous with respect tothe delineation of the concept of the ancestral domain of indigenous peopleand the ancestral domain of the Bangsa Moro people. Section 1 grantsthe autonomous regional government the power “to protect the ancestraldomain and ancestral lands of indigenous cultural communities.”

This power has yet to be exercised. According to CommissionerLingatin of the National Commission on the Indigenous People (NCIP),the ARMM’s Regional Legislative Assembly has not yet passed any

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regional IPRA. While there is still no such regional law, the NCIP isexercising concurrent jurisdiction with the ARMM with regard to ancestraldomain claims of IPs in the autonomous region, in accordance with aresolution passed by the regional legislative assembly.

One Mindanao Identity

In the midst of the talks on ancestral domain, identity and theright to self-determination, both informal and formal, there is an emergingconsensus for a Mindanaoan identity. There is groundswell of inter-peopledialogue in Mindanao going beyond the rhetoric to collectively assert aOne Mindanao identity.

Conclusion and Recommendation

The participants in the February 21-22, 2006 Mindanao StudyGroup roundtable discussion reached some consensus, although withsome reservations. One key point is that, in order to accommodate anyagreement on ancestral domain both for the indigenous people and theBangsa Moro people, inclusive of the grant of self-determination, theconstitutional framework must necessarily be revised.

The current move for constitutional change, if it succeeds, is awindow of opportunity. The proponents of constitutional change mustrecognize the fact that the Philippines is a multi-ethnic and multi-nationstate. Any change in the Constitution must, therefore, move towards theaccommodation of all interests. In particular, it must provide for a systemof political governance that enhances the exercise of self-determinationby all peoples of the country, but without breaking the unity and solidarityof the Philippine state. The norm on the Regalian Doctrine in theConstitution must be relaxed and liberalized to address long standingdiscrimination, especially in ownership, control and management of theancestral domain resource.

Specifically, the roundtable discussants recommended acontinuing discourse on ancestral domain, identity and self-determinationas a means of clearly defining their limits and provide a clear understandingof the concepts of identity, ancestral domain and self-determination fromthe perspectives of the various stakeholders. The panelists also

Ancestral Domain, Identity and Right of Self-Determination


recommended transparency in the negotiations, and urge the negotiatingpanels (both GRP and MILF) to engage with multi-sectoral organizations,including the Mindanao Study Group.

The Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao (ARMM) and the Peace Process:Imperatives, Challenges and Prospects

Rufa Cagoco-Guiam*

Introduction

No other region in the Philippines is mired in lowest levels ofpoverty as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Its fiveprovinces and one city have consistently occupied the bottom ranks ofthe country’s Human Development Index (HDI). No less than a WorldBank report confirmed the state of abject poverty in the region in its2003 report, Human Development for Peace and Prosperity in theARMM. World Bank analysts stressed that the “…ARMM has thepoorest human development outcomes compared to other regions in thecountry…” (World Bank, 2003).

Aside from having higher incidence of poverty, many communitiesin the region are also ravaged by internecine armed conflict for morethan three decades, further aggravating the deterioration of quality of lifeof many of the region’s residents. For many in the ARMM, evacuationhas become an intermittent experience. Some of them have become“permanently” displaced as they refuse to return home for fear that armedconflict will recur and they will again be caught in a war not of their ownmaking.

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*Rufa Cagoco-Guiam is Associate Professor in Public Administrationand Coordinator of the Graduate Program in Public Administrationat the Mindanao State University-General Santos City.


This briefing paper on governance and institution-building in theARMM is basically a synthesis of the discussions in the 13-14 Januarymeeting of the Mindanao Study Group in Cotabato City. It is augmentedby the writer’s notes and insights culled from her experiences as a socialdevelopment worker and professional researcher in the region for thelast two-and-a-half decades.

Regional autonomy in the ARMM from a historical perspective

The ARMM is a creation of the Organic Act (Republic Act 6734of 1987) that was intended to address grievances of the Bangsamoroagainst the national government. These grievances had fueled an armedrevolutionary movement among young Moro intellectuals andprofessionals belonging mainly to three (Maranaw, Maguindanawon andTausug) of the 12 Moro ethno-linguistic groups. This was the MoroNational Liberation Front (MNLF), a movement that became a popularrallying symbol of the Moro struggle for self-determination by 1975.Two years earlier, in 1973, the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) was formallyorganized to lead the MNLF’s military engagements with the ArmedForces of the Philippines (AFP).

Prior to the creation of the ARMM, the Philippine nationalgovernment had already started a process of laying the foundation of anautonomous government in the areas identified by the MNLF as part ofthe Bangsamoro homeland. This process was the result of a series ofnegotiations between the GRP and the MNLF that culminated in thesigning of the very first Peace Agreement – the Tripoli Agreement of1976.

The Tripoli Agreement of 1976 provided for the establishmentof autonomy in southern Philippines “within the realm of Philippinesovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines…”Consequently, then president Ferdinand Marcos signed PresidentialDecree 1618 that formally created two autonomous regions in Mindanao– Region IX, based in Zamboanga City, and Region XII, based inCotabato City. As provided for in the Tripoli Agreement, 13 provincesin southern Philippines were identified as the areas of autonomy, namely:

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• Basilan• Sulu• Tawi-tawi• Zamboanga del Sur• Zamboanga del Norte• North Cotabato• Maguindanao• Sultan Kudarat• Lanao del Norte• Lanao del Sur• Davao del Sur• South Cotabato and• Palawan

In these specified areas of autonomy, Muslims were to be giventhe right to set up their own courts that will implement the Islamic Shari’ahlaws. Muslims were to be represented in all courts, including the SupremeCourt. Moreover, authorities in the areas of autonomy shall have theright to set up schools, colleges and universities as well as their ownadministrative system in compliance with the objectives of autonomyand its institutions (Articles 4 and 5). In other words, the Agreementprovided for an autonomous arrangement with its own administrative,economic and financial systems.

The Tripoli Agreement was quite significant in its provisions fora political settlement between the Bangsamoro nation and the Philippinestate. More importantly, it also provided for the compensation to thewidows and orphans of martyred mujahideen and to communities whichhave been displaced and impoverished as a consequence of the armedstruggle.

However, as it turned out, this provision along with others werenot implemented by the national government. Presidential Decree 1618fell short of MNLF expectations of genuine autonomy. Instead, RegionsIX and XII became mere additional bureaucratic layers in theadministration of the 13 provinces, part of a strategy to window-dressMarcos’s repressive and dictatorial military rule.

The ARMM & the Peace Process: Imperatives, Challenges & Prospects


After President Marcos was ousted from office through abloodless “People Power” coup in 1986, Cory Aquino, widow of thelate Sen. Benigno Aquino, assumed the presidency. Early in her term,Aquino immediately arranged for a meeting with MNLF chairman NurMisuari and the MNLF in Sulu. This meeting paved the way for a seriesof negotiations with the MNLF during the Aquino administration.However, it took another ten years to forge an agreement. On September2, 1996, under the presidency of Fidel V. Ramos, the Final PeaceAgreement (FPA) was signed.

In 1987, a landmark change in Philippine governance took placewith the signing of a new Philippine Constitution. This major change inthe national charter provided for the creation of a Regional Commissionthat formulated the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao (ARMM). This is Republic Act 6734.

Voters in four of the 13 provinces covered by the two formerautonomous regions (IX and XII) chose to be included in the ARMM ina plebiscite held in 1989 to ratify RA 6734. These provinces wereMaguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Tawi-tawi and Sulu. As stipulated in RA6734, the seat of government of the fledgling autonomous region wasCotabato City. Ironically, the voters in this city did not vote for inclusionin the ARMM.

While the national government viewed RA 6734 as a blueprintfor peace in Mindanao, the MNLF rejected it. The MNLF leadershipand members were totally excluded from the process of formulating theautonomy law. To make matters worse, the ARMM had negligiblepowers – there were far more restrictions rather than actual powersdevolved to it.

The ARMM was also hostage to the power-brokers in Manila.Since it was created, the ARMM had been led by local politicians“anointed” by whoever sat in the presidential palace. The first regionalgovernor was the local stalwart of Pres. Aquino’s Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino (LDP). The second one was a Maranaw protégéof Pres. The FPA with the MNLF had just been signed when the thirdARMM elections were held. MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari was

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persuaded by Pres. Ramos to run for ARMM governor. Virtuallyunopposed, Misuari won the race in 1998.

By then Ramos’s term had ended and the country had a newpresident in Joseph Estrada. But his term was cut short by another “PeoplePower” mass action at EDSA in 2001 as a result of a popular perceptionthat Estrada plundered and committed other crimes against the Filipinonation. Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took over the reins.

Like her predecessors, Arroyo lost no time in directing whobecomes the new ARMM governor. Along with her power-brokers,she made possible the (in)famous break-up of the MNLF CentralCommittee, easing out Misuari as its chairman. A so-called “Council of15” was organized, with Dr. Parouk Hussin as its leader. Eventually, thepresidential palace also anointed Hussin to be the new ARMM governor.

In elections last year, a new face in regional politics surfaced asthe winner in the contest for the ARMM governor’s post – Gov. DatuRizaldy “Puti” Ampatuan. Despite the declaration of the ARMM as a“free zone” in terms of the most likely to be elected regional governor,the belief is that the new ARMM governor is also a presidential bet – heis the son of Maguindanao governor Andal Ampatuan, widely known asPres. Arroyo’s favorite local political ally.

The Final Peace Agreement of 1996 was considered abreakthrough in the protracted peace process between the MNLF andthe Philippine government. The FPA provided for a transition phase(Phase I) and an expanded autonomous region (Phase II). In Phase I,the ARMM, together with 10 other provinces and nine cities weredesignated the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). Anew structure, the Southern Philippines Council for Peace andDevelopment (SPCPD) was established to oversee peace anddevelopment efforts within the SZOPAD. In addition to SPCPD, aConsultative Assembly of 81 members was mandated to be “a forumfor consultation and ventilation of issues and concerns.” (Muslim, 1999).It was tasked to conduct public hearings, recommend policies to thePresident through the SPCPD chairman, and make rules and regulationsfor the effective and efficient administration of the SZOPAD.



All the efforts of these newly created bodies and administrativestructures were designed to create some kind of an enabling environmentfor a New Regional Autonomous Government (NRAG), envisioned tobe an expanded ARMM that would cover clusters of contiguouscommunities with predominantly Muslim populations. For this purpose,the Philippine Congress was tasked to formulate a law to create theNRAG and amend the Organic Act for the existing ARMM.

The enabling environment was not attained as envisioned. Eventhe time frame for the formulation of the Expanded ARMM law did nottake place as scheduled. The bill creating an Expanded ARMM passedin Congress only in the latter part of 2001 and was not signed into lawby President Arroyo. It became a law after the period for the presidentialimprimatur lapsed after 30 days, thus becoming Republic Act 9054 orthe Expanded ARMM Law. A plebiscite was scheduled toward the endof 2002. Despite government campaigning for a yes vote in manyprovinces in the former SZOPAD, only one more province (Basilan)and an additional city (Marawi) voted to be included in the expandedARMM.

Current realities in the ARMM – issues and challenges raisedin the MSG discussion

In 2000, the five provinces and one city in the ARMM had apopulation of 2,876,077. (Please refer to Table 1 for a breakdownof the total population by component province and city). As the

Component Province Population as of May, 2000 Maguindanao 801,102 Lanao del Sur 669,072 Sulu 619,668 Tawi-tawi 322,317 Basilan 332,828 Total 2,876,077 Total Philippine Population 76,498,735

Table 1: ARMM population by component province and city,NSO, 2000

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name of the region suggests, the ARMM population is predominantlyMuslim of various ethno-linguistic groups. There are 12 such groups.The most populous include the Maranaw (of the two Lanao provinces);the Maguindanawon from the Cotabato provinces, includingMaguindanao; and the Tausug of the Sulu archipelago. The other groupsare the following: Sama (Tawi-tawi); Yakan (Basilan); Sangil (Sarangani);Iranun/Illanun (between Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur); the Palawani(Palawan); Kalibugan (Zamboanga peninsula); Kalagan (Davaoprovinces); Jama Mapun (Cagayan de Sulu island); and Badjaw of Suluarchipelago.

Since its creation in 1986, the ARMM has been beset withmyriad problems as it struggled to address long-standing grievancesamong the minority Muslim population. Such grievances include theclamor of Muslims to be considered as a distinct “nation,” and as such,entitled to the right to self-determination. According to MNLF and MILFleaders, armed struggle has been waged to achieve this right, which haslong been denied by the central government.

Protracted armed conflict between Philippine government forcesand those of the MNLF (from 1970s to early 1990s) have compoundedthe already negative impact of long years of government neglect of andsocially exclusive policies in the predominantly Muslim communities inthe region. Many of these communities have known nothing else butpoverty, sporadic armed conflict and a life of misery in various evacuationcenters.

A number of initiatives have been put in place in the ARMM toaddress the massive needs of its impoverished communities. The signingof the Final Peace Agreement on September 2, 1996 ended more thantwo decades of armed conflict in various parts of Central and WesternMindanao, including the Sulu archipelago. This landmark event pavedthe way for various assistance programs to the region, especially fromthe international donor community.

Despite almost a decade of mainly externally-fundeddevelopment assistance regime, the ARMM still has to exhibitimprovements in over-all human development indices. A participant in


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Mindanao Study Group estimated that development funds from the centralgovernment and external donors roughly total PhP 23 billion every year.But the ARMM has not shown any improvement; instead, it has beenpushed further into dismal levels of poverty. It used to be the 4th poorestregion in the country, but now it holds the distinction of being no. 1 interms of the poverty rate! From 1994 to 2000, the region’s grossdomestic product (GDP) increased by 27%, but poverty levels withinthat period also went up by 40%.

Table 2 below shows the levels of poverty in the ARMMcompared with the averages in the country. This is what Atty. Ambolodtorefers to as the “unbroken thread of impoverishment” in the region. From1997 to 2003, basic human development indicators in the region, asshown in the performance of its component provinces, have steadilydeteriorated. Throughout a span of almost ten years, the ARMM’spoverty levels have shown that the grant of “meaningful” autonomy, fromthe perception of the Philippine national leadership, has not translated tohigher per capita income levels to the constituents of the region.

The ARMM has the worst human development indicators amongthe 16 regions in the country. In a 2003 World Bank report, the ARMMfalls behind the rest of the country in terms of the Millennium DevelopmentGoals (MDGs) introduced by the United Nations in 2000. These goalsrelate to addressing challenges of poverty, low literacy levels, poormaternal health, gender inequality, and so on. Table 3 (on the next page)shows how the ARMM measures up.

Poverty Incidence HDI Rank Per capita income Life Expectancy Region/Province 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003

Philippines 25.1 27.5 25.7 26,881 27,442 68 69.3 67/72 Basilan 30.2 63.0 65.6 69 74 74 13,026 13,265 59.8 60.2 60.6 Lanao del Sur 40.8 48.1 38.8 73 72 68 15,211 20,016 56 56.9 57.9 Maguindanao 24 36.2 55.8 72 75 76 15,508 14,198 53.2 52.6 52 Sulu 87.5 92.0 88.8 77 77 77 7,675 8,430 51.9 52.3 52.8 Tawi-tawi 52.1 75.3 69.9 75 76 75 11,121 10,780 50.4 50.8 51.2

Table 2: Poverty incidence, HDI ranks, and other selected socio-economic indi-cators in ARMM provinces (culled from Philippine Human Development Re-port, 2005)

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Issues related to land continue to haunt the ARMM. Land is asubstantive item on the agenda of the current peace talks since the 1996Final Peace Agreement did not address this issue. For example, how dowe deal with military settlements like Awang and Camp Abubakar inMaguindanao? As one participant opined, it seems that every time thereis a peace accord, it leads to the loss of Moro lands or lands the Moropeoples have traditionally occupied or settled.

Another issue has to deal with the perception widely held byBangsamoro intellectuals on whether the creation of the ARMM is“legitimate.” Since the creation of the ARMM is attributed largely to thenational government, many Bangsamoro think of it as an “imposition” byan “alien” government, or what is being referred to in the Maguindanawonvernacular as “gubilnu a sarewang a tau,” (a government of strangepeople). Corollary to this is another perception that the Bangsamorowill not work in such a way to make the ARMM fully functional, evenfor their own ends. After all, the creation of the region is not the handiworkof the Bangsamoro, but of the national government. Let the nationalgovernment make it work then.

MDG or other indicator ARMM Whole country Rank among 16 regions

Poverty incidence, 2000 62.9 34.0 16 Average household income, 2000 (PhP)

81,519 144,039 15

Life expectancy among women (years) 59.3 71.6 15 Life expectancy among men (years) 55.5 66.3 15 Infant mortality, 1995 (per 1000 live births

63 49 14

Maternal mortality, 1995 (per 100,000 live births)

320 180 15

Net enrolment rate in primary education, 2001 (%)

82.0 96.4 15

Net enrolment rate in secondary education, 2001 (%)

39.2 72.2 15

Note: A rank of 1 is the most desirable outcome. Data come from 16 regions;there is no data yet for Region XIII (Caraga).

Table 3. MDG and other indicators of human development in the ARMM (fromHuman Development for Peace and Prosperity in the ARMM, World Bank, 2003.)



The Organic Act that created the ARMM in 1987 (RA 6734)listed or enumerated the region’s powers. In the latter RA 9054 thatexpanded the areas covered by the ARMM, the powers not entitled tothe autonomous region are specified. This implies that residual powersare with the region and NOT with the national government in Manila.

Moreover, there is a question about the proper interpretation ofRA 9054. Does the Act provide for a mere decentralization or is itdevolution? RA 9054 also clearly stipulates renunciation of armedstruggle as a political option.

Despite its shortcomings, RA 9054 deserves to be given morecareful study since it seems that both Regional Legislative Assembly (RLA)members and other key ARMM officials have failed to maximize whateverbenefits or opportunities were made available by this law.

Imperatives and Prospects

It is widely recognized that the ARMM needs all the help it canget to put its act together and showcase the benefits of decentralizationand strengthening of local government institutions toward sustainabledevelopment. There is an urgent need to forge a better system ofgovernance for the Bangsamoro. As one participant stressed, there isnot much room for repeating the mistakes of the past.

What forms of outside pressure could be used to improvegovernance in the ARMM? One participant answered with anotherquestion: Should national government and aid agencies threaten to turnoff the spigot of assistance? This is because the control of funds iscritical in making sure the funds are used for genuine value-added projectsand other concerns that redound to the welfare of the region’simpoverished constituents.

For the Mindanao Study Group, there is a need to synthesizeideas and previous studies on the ARMM, especially those that look atthe experience of autonomy over the years. This project could look atwhat has worked and not worked, lessons learned and best practices, ifever there are, in running an autonomous region.

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Despite the dark clouds, so to speak, there is still a lot of silverlining for the ARMM. Basically, we can look at two “windows ofopportunities” in improving governance in the region. First is theoverwhelming victory of Datu Zaldy “Puti” Ampatuan as the new regionalgovernor. Atty. Ambolodto argues that Datu Puti’s victory was amanifestation of consensus among the highest echelon of local governmentunits, i.e. the provincial levels.

Whatever the means by which this consensus was forged, eitherby “preponderance” of the forces of Datu Puti’s powerful political familyor by gentle persuasion from the presidential palace, is no longer anissue. What is important is that this consensus can be a building blockfor some positive developments in the beleaguered region. For instance,Datu Puti is said to be the only regional governor to have required thatthe Regional Legislative Assembly members draft a specific and“responsive” legislative agenda. Because of the enormous support givento him by the RLA it is most likely he will get the RLA members movingquickly to accede to his “request.”

Still, there are some misgivings. Some observers question whetherDatu Puti’s election as governor is a real opportunity for reforms. Oneparticipant argued that it might be that everyone is afraid of Datu Puti orthe political clan he represents. There is a need to know what his realintentions are, what skills and abilities he has and whether on the whole,he will deliver the “goods” for ARMM’s improvement.

The current peace process between the MILF and the GRP isthe second window of opportunity for ARMM’s “deliverance.” Such aprocess, which is touted to be a much improved version of the first onewith the MNLF, could create a stronger structure of autonomy and couldpossibly bring greater honesty and competence. However, we need tolook at the track record of MILF in governance.

Dr. Jose Abueva has defined good governance as “the sustainedcapacity of the government and related political institutions to make andcarry out timely policies and decisions that effectively respond to ourproblems, challenges and goals as a nation.” In this context, can weapply the concept of good governance to the MILF? What has been its



track record at Camp Abubakar and other areas under its influence?How does it govern the territories under its control? Will it governdifferently than the previous leadership in the ARMM? If the MILFfails, will the discontentment created by failure in governance find newchannels among lawless elements like the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and theAbu Sayyaf Group (ASG)?

The MILF does have a governance structure and even a systemof justice. Still, when the group talks about the corruption of the “moralfiber” as one of the serious problems besetting the Bangsamoro people,its meaning is not quite clear.

In taking a deeper look at governance, we need to examineother factors or indicators. What has been the role, for example, ofreligion in promoting good governance? Among the Ulama (Council ofLearned Men in Islam), secular issues like politics and governance arenot given emphasis in the khutbah (sermons during Friday congregationalprayers). The Ulama in general are not politicized. Political Islam is nota problem in southern Philippines. The great scholar Cesar Adib Majulonce remarked that “Islam is primitive in the Philippines.” Islamicgovernance is a notion that is not quite clear to many Muslims.

Moreover, there are existing clan-related issues like rido thatthe Ulama have to take into consideration; they tend to shun criticism ofclan members who are known to be “stealing” government funds. Inmany cases, they might even justify stealing government funds because itis money from an “alien government.” However, some Ulama membersdid play a big role during the last elections. They reminded people abouthonesty and integrity of their votes in their khutbah before the elections.They exhorted the faithful to vote and guard their votes for any possibilityof cheating.

This point led the discussion to a point raised about the possibilityof engaging the religious sector among the Bangsamoro to get involvedand advocate for temporal issues like good governance and politicalreforms. One experience that can be used as a point of reference is thefatwa (decree) issued by some members of the Ulama on the advocacyfor reproductive health. It was packaged not so much as a reproductive

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health advocacy but as promoting “maternal health” to be moreacceptable. In Islam, mothers are given a very prominent position interms of respect and honor from family members. As expected, someulama were not quite happy about the fatwa. However, this experienceshowed it is possible to engage the Ulama with advocacies of highlytemporal or secular issues. But a caveat must be observed in engagingthem. We must consider the hierarchy of the Ulama (from the GrandMufti down) and the messages for the advocacies must be packagedappropriately, taking into account cultural and religious sensitivities.

There is also a need to look at all these issues in relation to theproposed Charter Change. For example, the 1987 Philippine Constitutionstipulates the separation of Church and State. In Islam, there is no suchseparation. Moreover, tensions that have arisen from the provisionsincluded in the proposed Charter Change – especially those that createfriction among Muslims – must be addressed.

If and when the MILF is given the chance to govern theautonomous region under a new set-up, there is a need for its membersto guard against a “club mentality” and to be conscious of the principlesof inclusion, i.e. the inclusion of other groups in the new governancestructure. Such a structure could be a possible Bangsamoro JuridicalEntity – but as of now, this is still a concept that needs to have a formand essence. But this concept is worth considering in the light of apossible final peace agreement to be signed between the MILF and theGRP. Increasing the levels of public discourse on this concept can leadto a possible fleshing out of the basic elements of this proposedgovernance modality.

The participants in the MSG discussion arrived at the followingconsensus points to make the ARMM move forward to improvegovernance and achieve a more politically and economically stable region:

• Maximize the opportunities provided by RA 9054. Assertall rights of the Bangsamoro under this organic law. Thepowers granted to ARMM in RA 9054 are so much betterthan those proposed under a future federal law.

• There is a serious need to consider generating more revenue



for the region. Regional officials cannot talk about reformsif they are not assured they have enough money of their own.They cannot be begging for development funds all the time.They should come up with mechanisms for economic self-reliance. To start with, the ARMM has resource-rich landand water, and has enormous human resources, but thesehave not been tapped to their full potential. Agriculture andfisheries should be among the priority areas for development.

• There is also a need for all the external support in terms ofdevelopment aid to succeed. Along this line, a study couldbe made on the best practices and lessons learned indevelopment assistance.

• The region has a good mid-level bureaucrat profile, whosetalents and energies need to be fully tapped. These mid-level bureaucrats are quite idealistic, have deep commitmentand eager for real work. Some of them have undergone allsorts of training, even with elite institutions like the AsianInstitute of Management in Makati. Thus there is a need tomaximize the full potentials of these middle level managersto push the region to attain sustainable peace anddevelopment. One problem: their bosses tend to spend mostof their time doing a lot of “politicking” in the corridors ofpower in Metro Manila, instead of development work athome.

Toward a framework for good governance in the ARMM

The ARMM, both in its original and expanded forms, manifeststhe envisioned decentralization of local or regional units of the Philippinenational bureaucracy. As such, it holds much promise for improvingregional governance as well as developing the only autonomous regionalgovernment structure in the country. However, such a special position isalso fraught with myriad problems.

Many bureaucracies in newly democratizing Third Worldcountries are currently experiencing crisis after crisis attributable mainlyto weak governance and the lack of political will as well as massiveallegations of graft and corruption among leaders of these countries. In

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a paper on the role of civil society in democratic countries, John Clark(2003) refers to these negative phenomena as “democracy deficits.”Clark argues that it is these so-called democracy deficits that have madecivil society organizations popular – these organizations are the onesperforming functions that are otherwise the mandate of line agencieswithin the government bureaucracy.

To address such deficits, Clark posits the “four pillars” of goodgovernance in any bureaucracy. These are: transparency, accountability;a sound judicial system, and people participation. The first two pillarsrelate to the extent to which those in power must justify, substantiate andmake known their actions and decisions. It also includes governmentmechanisms that promote devolution, following the principle of subsidiarityand the responsiveness of socio-political structures that elicit and promotecommunity involvement in the affairs of the local government structure –whether it is a barangay, municipality, province or a regional government,as in the case of the ARMM.

The third pillar relates to the creation of structures that promotesocial justice and equity, and provision of sanctions for both governmentfunctionaries and constituents alike who violate the rules and regulationsof these structures.

People participation in governance is both a means and an endin creating a sense of ownership among constituents, thereby leading toa healthy relationship between the governed and those who govern. Itredounds to improved governance since maximum participation of thegoverned means that they are willing to commit to make governmentwork efficiently and effectively. It is also a fulfillment of the rights of thepeople to participate in political processes that will contribute to theirown welfare.

Participation supports the criteria of transparency andaccountability since it allows citizens to make their own decisions at thevillage, municipality, province or regional levels. In this sense, makingpeople participate in the processes of governance will lead to theirempowerment. According to Friedman (in Gardner and Lewis, 1996:117-118) “empowerment is fundamental to an alternative development



that places…emphasis on autonomy in the decision-making of territoriallyorganized communities, local self-reliance (but not autarky), direct(participatory) democracy, and experiential social learning. Its startingpoint is the locality, because civil society is most readily mobilized aroundlocal issues.”

For the ARMM, there is a need to use a framework that capturesthe unique situation of the region vis-à-vis the Philippine nationalgovernment. The ARMM was created not only to distribute powerfrom a highly centralized national government but more importantly toaddress centuries-old grievances among the marginalized Muslims andother indigenous groups in the region. These populations have long beenexcluded from the mainstream through various policies of exclusion anddiscriminatory legislations that go way back to the two colonialadministrations of Spain and the US. There is a need to recognize theserealities in framing good governance for the ARMM.

A more appropriate framework for good governance in theARMM needs to consider two important additional points – first, theregion’s rich cultural diversity and second, gender issues and concerns.The former is an imperative in a region that has seen so much conflictand divisiveness. Armed non-state actors among the Bangsamoro havechallenged the highly centralized Philippine nation-state since the unilateralinclusion of the Bangsamoro homeland by the colonial masters. Failureto understand the root causes of the Bangsamoro resistance that continuesto the present will lead to unresponsive regional governance.

The issues associated with gender in the bureaucracy are quitecontroversial, as far as the predominantly male bureaucrats in the regionare concerned. This, however, is not unique to the ARMM; thePhilippines as a country has not been known to give prominence towomen’s issues and concerns despite the fact that a special body hasbeen organized at the national level to look into these concerns – theNational Commission on the Role of Filipino Women. The country hasproduced a good number of female bureaucrats. And it is one of onlytwo countries in Southeast Asia that have had a woman leader, two ofthem, in fact. Interestingly, both women assumed the presidential postafter the ouster of their discredited male predecessors.

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Despite this rather impressive record, the Philippines’ genderempowerment indicators still tip the balance in favor of the males of itspopulation. It was only in 1937 that Filipino women were granted theright to vote (Pongsapich, 2005). The present Philippine House ofRepresentatives (Lower House) is predominantly male – only 12.5%are women, out of more than 200 members. The 23-member Senate(Upper House) has only four women senators.

In the ARMM, a regional counterpart of NCRFW has beenestablished – the Regional Commission on Bangsamoro Women(RCBW). Both bodies aim to increase women’s participation ingovernance and to mainstream gender concerns in the bureaucracy.Sadly, up to this writing, such aims still remain elusive dreams for half ofthe population of the region. The regional public administration, like thatof the national government, is still pervaded by a culture that reflects andpromotes the interests of men rather than women.

Structurally and ideally, the ARMM is a good example of adecentralized mechanism toward the broad distribution of political power,enabling the regional government to be more responsive to the needs ofthe poor and the disadvantaged in the region. Local representatives andadministrators are in the best position to know the exact nature of theneeds of local people, including most especially the needs of marginalizedand impoverished indigenous cultural communities and how these needscan be met in the most cost-effective way (see Turner and Hulme, 1997).These attributes could have paved the way for ARMM to develop morerapidly and thus become politically stable.

As it turned out, past ARMM administrations fell short of thegoals of democratic decentralization. Using Clark’s framework for goodgovernance, the ARMM, both in its original and expanded forms, isreplete with the so-called democracy deficits – weak governance hasled to abject poverty of its peoples and very low levels of humandevelopment indicators like literacy, access to basic social and healthservices, and opportunities to catch up with the majority Filipinopopulation (see World Bank report, 2003). Its lack of political will haspaved the way for a “mendicancy mode” prevailing among regionalbureaucrats, whose behavior appears to be aimed more at pleasing the



powers-that-be in Manila rather than their constituencies at home. Totop it all, allegations of widespread graft and corruptin among regionalofficials have led to “massive cynicism” (Ambolodto, 2006), both amonglocal and national opinion makers.

In terms of practicing cultural diversity, the ARMM has madestrides in recognizing the important role of indigenous peoples and thelowland Christians of different ethnicities who have made the region theirhomeland too. Thus the ARMM has offices for the deputy governor forindigenous peoples (IPs) and another deputy governor for the Christians.However, appointing persons to these positions is not enough. There isa need to provide financial, administrative and over-all logistical andtechnical support to the offices of these deputy governors if they are tocarry out programs to improve governance among their respectivesectors.

It can be argued that as a decentralized structure, the ARMM isonly as good as the national government bureaucracy that engenderedit. When assessed using Clarke’s criteria and using the additionalrequirements of cultural diversity and gender, the national governmentclearly falls short of all these. Transparency, accountability, stringentand sound judicial systems and procedures and people participation ingovernance are practiced more in the breach than in performance. Thereis wide public outcry on the lack of all these things in the nationalgovernment and a massive pessimism pervades among the majority andminority populations.

The MILF-GRP Peace process is proceeding in earnest, despitesome setbacks and allegations of ceasefire violations on both sides. Justrecently, some armed encounters took place in at least four municipalitiesin Maguindanao, and the MILF had been singled out to be one of theprotagonists in this new round of hostilities. Even so, the signing of aPeace Agreement between the two parties is now considered highlyimminent.

Prof. Aboud Syed Lingga has noted that the peace process isan opportunity to negotiate with the national government for things thatthe ARMM can do, rather than being given a listing of restrictions. In

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this way, the ARMM can negotiate for other possible areas of practicinggenuine autonomy.

This optimism is quite laudable – still, it remains to be seenwhether the things touted to be quite innovative in the administration ofDatu Puti will translate into over-all good governance in the region. Thereare too many “intervening variables” that might scuttle these two windowsof opportunities for better governance in the ARMM. At this stage, it isstill too early to tell.

In addition, there is a bright prospect for a more rationalizedgovernance structure that can be forged out of the floated concept of aBangsamoro Juridical Entity. However, this is contingent on the signingof an MILF-GRP Final Peace Agreement.

References Cited

Ambolodto, Suharto (2006). “Politics and Governance in MuslimMindanao,” a paper presentation at the January 13 meeting of theMindanao Study Group, Estosan Hotel, Cotabato City.

Clark, John (2003). “Governance and Civil Society in a GlobalizedWorld.” Paper delivered at the International Conference on PublicAdministration Plus Governance. 21-23 October, Manila Hotel,Philippines.

Gardner, Katy and David Lewis. Anthropology, Development and thePost-Modern Challenge. London: Pluto Press, 1996.

Muslim, Macapado and Rufa Cagoco-Guiam (1999). “Mindanao Landof Promise” inCompromising on Autonomy – Mindanao in Transition in Accord –An International Review of Peace Initiatives. London: ConciliationResources.

Pongsapich, Amara (2005). “Gender Scorecard and HumanDevelopment in Southeast Asia,” a paper presented at the Fourth ASEANPeople’s Assembly. 11-13 May, EDSA Shangri-La Hotel, Mandaluyong



City, Philippines. .

The World Bank Human Development Sector Unit. East Asia and PacificRegion (2003). Human Development for Peace and Prosperity inthe ARMM.

Turner, Mark and David Hulme (1997). Governance, Administrationand Development.Making the State Work. Connecticut, USA: The Kumarian Press.

United Nations Development Programme (2005). The PhilippineHuman Development Report. Manila, Philippines: UNDP.

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Charter Change and the MindanaoPeace Process

Zainudin Malang*

Introduction

The past year has seen important, even dramatic, developmentson two processes of utmost national importance. One process seeks torevise the fundamental law of the land, the form of government, and thestructure of the republic. The other process seeks to resolve the longestrunning armed conflict in the country.

On December 16, 2005, after three months of deliberations andconsultations and almost four months after it was created, the 55-memberConCom1 submitted to President Gloria Macapacal-Arroyo (PGMA)its proposed revisions to the 1987 Constitution.2 Thereafter, PGMAwas supposed to transmit the revisions to Congress for the latter’sconsideration3 since she has manifested her preference for a ConstituentAssembly as the mechanism for Cha-Cha.4 Supporters of Cha-Chaare seeking to have a revised constitution already in effect before thescheduled 2007 elections, notwithstanding the many opponents of Cha-Cha, including those in the upper house of Congress or Senate.

Amidst all the developments over the past half-year relating toCha-Cha initiatives, the Mindanao Peace Process has likewise seendramatic developments, particularly the negotiations between therespective panels of the government (GRP) and the Moro IslamicLiberation Front (MILF). As early as April of 2005, both panels had

*Zainudin Malang is Executive Director, Moro Law and Policy Center.


announced a “breakthrough” in their negotiations.5 In October, a leakedagreement or “consensus points” gave the public an idea of how muchheadway the parties had achieved and how close they were to a peaceagreement, particularly on the single most contentious substantive itemin their negotiations - ancestral domain and its four strands (concept,territory, resources, and governance). In statements to the press andpublic, both panels predicted the signing of a peace agreement as earlyas mid-2006.

These two processes, which will undeniably have a direct impacton the lives of the peoples of Mindanao, actually overlap with regard tothe issues and policy areas they seek to resolve.6 The proposedconstitutional provisions on federalism, autonomy, parliamentary formof government, and natural resources contain concepts that are closelyrelated to the issues of self-determination, ancestral domain, andresources, which are subject of GRP-MILF negotiations. The MindanaoStudy Group (MSG) has therefore seen fit to discuss Cha-Cha with thefollowing questions in mind:

• Cha-Cha and its impact on the Mindanao Peace Process,and vice-versa

• Cha-Cha and its impact on the present autonomous set-upin the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

• Cha-Cha and its impact on the resources of the Bangsamoro

To provide the group with insights on the ConCom’sdeliberations, dynamics, and final report, the MSG requested Dr. JoseAbueva, who chaired the ConCom, to be its resource speaker. SolimanSantos was asked to give the reaction.

Concom’s Proposed Changes in the Charter

Concom Chair Jose Abueva focused on the provisions of theProposed Revisions to the 1987 Constitution pertaining to autonomyand the shift to a federal structure of the republic.

As envisioned under the ConCom’s Proposed Constitution, theestablishment of a federal republic would be the result of a long-process.

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The first stage involves an exercise of “self-determination”, wherecontiguous provinces petition the parliament to declare them anautonomous territory. Thereafter, parliament will enact an organic actdevolving powers to that territory. Parliament has no discretion on whatshape to give the autonomous territories.

The Proposed Constitution would mandate that parliament grantprimary legislative powers to the autonomous territories over the followingpolicy areas:

1. administrative organization, planning, budget andmanagement;

2. creation of sources of revenues and finance;3. agriculture and fisheries;4. natural resources, energy, environment, indigenous

appropriate technologies and inventions;5. trade, industry, and tourism;6. labor and employment;7. public works, transportation, except railways, shipping

and aviation;8. health and social welfare;9. education and the development of language, culture and

the arts as part of the cultural heritage;10. ancestral domain and natural resources;11. housing, land use and development;12. urban and rural planning and development; and,13. such other matters as may be authorized by law for the

promotion of the general welfare of the people of theautonomous territory.

When 60% of the countries’ provinces, and highly urbanizedand component cities have been “autonomized”, parliament is mandatedto enact a federal law whereby such autonomous territories will becomefederal states.7

The process which the Philippines will have to go through toset-up a federal republic is unconventional. Under the conventionalprocess, several states establish themselves or have established

Charter Change and the Mindanao Peace Process


themselves first before they decide to federate (or confederate) andestablish a federal republic. The unconventional process involves acountry already existing as a unitary republic to transform by splittingitself up into several states, and then coming together again as a federation.

Since the Philippines already exists as a unitary state, itstransformation into a federal republic will not be direct, but will bepreceded by a decision of the regions of this unitary state to becomeautonomous. Only when 60% of the country has become autonomouscan it transform itself into a federal republic. Absent this requirement,the original proposal was to provide for a ten-year transition periodafter the ratification of the Proposed Constitution for the formation of afederal republic. But the members of the ConCom eventually decidedto make the transformation conditional rather than time-bound.

The proposal for a federal set-up was not without obstaclesduring the deliberations and consultations of the ConCom. First, althoughthe President created the body to support her agenda for a shift to aparliamentary federal form of government, the members she appointedto the ConCom were not necessarily in favor of federalism. When theymade a head-count, there were more anti-federalism members than thosewho favored it. The two-tiered shift to a federal republic under theProposed Constitution was a concession to the anti-feds.

Second, the ConCom encountered a lot of opposition from localgovernment units (LGUs) while it was conducting its consultations. LGUsfeared that regional power centers—either autonomous territories orfederal states—will dilute their powers and add another layer betweenthem and the national government. They were unsure as to how theregional powers were to be constituted and how it will affect their ownpowers. The federalists offered the clarification that the purpose of eitherautonomous or federal set-up was to enhance local autonomy anddevolution of powers. Parliament would not have any discretion onwhat shape to give to either the autonomous territory or the federal state.The Proposed Constitution enumerates the powers which parliament ismandated to give to the territories under its organic act.

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Soliman Santos focused on the provisions of the ProposedConstitution pertaining to the shift from unitary to federal structure of therepublic8 , looking at these provisions from the perspective of theMindanao Peace Process9 . By asking “how do the proposed changesin the ‘Structure of the Republic’ relate – positively or negatively – to theMindanao Peace Process,” he offered the following insights:

Federalism

Bearing in mind that the shift to federalism is mainly a question ofcentral-regional relations encompassing the whole country and onlyaddresses only secondarily the question of Republic-Bangsamororelations, advocates of federalism as a possible solution to the Mindanaoconflict must not readily assume that a federal shift per se will help settlethe conflict. Granted, there is a need to dovetail Cha-Cha and the peaceprocess, but whether or not federalism under the Cha-Cha will actuallyreinforce the peace process depends on the specific constitutionalarrangements of a federal set-up.

New constitutional arrangements are required to restructure therelationship between the Republic and the Bangsamoro. However, theProposed Constitution does not go into the specific arrangements offederalism, leaving it to be determined by a basic law to be enacted byparliament. In fact, the center of gravity for shaping the federal set-up isparliament, not the constitution. In effect, the federal states, includingthe Bangsamoro, will be at the mercy of parliament because it can amendthat law anytime.

On the other hand, prescribing federalism as a new constitutionalarrangement to restructure the relationship between the Republic andthe Bangsamoro even while the GRP-MILF negotiations are ongoing isa cause of concern. It implies unilateralism on the side of the GRP thatmay actually preempt agreements between the GRP-MILF panels orprejudice the political solutions which they have yet to agree upon.



Autonomy

Although envisioned as a stepping stone to federalism, autonomymay have other merits. It is good that autonomy is being considered forother regions, not just to the Bangsamoro and the Cordilleras. However,autonomy and federalism can be combined not just sequentially but alsospatially. The former can be a sub-set of the latter or vice-versa, e.g.federalism for the whole country and autonomy for a unique region likeMuslim Mindanao.

With regards to the ARMM, of utmost concern is the risk ofdiminution of its powers under the Proposed Constitution since theAutonomous Territories (AT) contemplated will enjoy less powers thanthose currently enjoyed by the ARMM. Since the ARMM already existsas an autonomous region with its own Organic Act, the provisions on ATof the Proposed Constitution should not apply to it. Further, given thatthe GRP and MNLF did not contemplate federalism, what will happento the 1996 peace agreement under Cha-Cha?

Although the ongoing GRP-MILF negotiations and the forgingof a new constitutional arrangement may or may not lead to federalism,the evident failures and inadequacies of the peace agreement and theARMM as instruments of peace and development should be studiedand its lessons identified. And should the shift to federalism advance,there should be an in-depth assessment of the ARMM experience toinform the first phase of that shift, i.e., the formation of autonomousterritories for other regions of the country.

Other Cha-Cha Concerns

The whole proposed revised constitution will have to be viewedand the best possible proposals for Cha-Cha will have to be made fromthe perspective of the Mindanao Peace Process, especially since theclash between Islamic concepts and existing constitutional principles hasyet to be resolved. Alternative constitutional approaches should beexplored. Adopting the concepts of “one country, two systems” (as inHong Kong and China) and “treaty constitutionalism”, which gives peaceagreements a constitutional status, are some of the proposals.

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There are three sets of best possible proposals for Cha-Chafrom the Mindanao Peace Process: new constitutional policies that conferimportance to peace processes and cultural diversity, e.g. separation ofchurch and state; new provisions for special arrangements, e.g. affirmativeaction; political-electoral reforms that have a bearing on the MPP, e.g.referenda or plebiscites.

The different dynamics, key actors, and time frames of three paralleland converging tracks – the MPP (both with the MILF and the MNLF),Cha-Cha, and the political crisis besetting President Macapagal-Arroyo- will have to be resolved. For instance, if the GRP-MILF negotiationscannot be completed before the final draft of the new constitution isprepared, perhaps Cha-Cha can be formulated in a way that wouldflexibly cover future outcome of the peace process.

Discussion

Cha-Cha and its Impact on the Mindanao Peace Process, and Vice-Versa

Echoing Santos’ comment, Astrid Tuminez and Abhoud Linggaopined that moves towards federalism might pre-empt the Bangsamoro’sexercise of the right to self-determination. Lingga said that instead ofrushing Cha-Cha, we should follow the Bougainville formula of waitingfor the peace pact first and then incorporating it in the charter change.Santos added that if the Cha-Cha is not informed by the peace process,the resulting constitution may contain provisions inconsistent with, andtherefore problematic to, the peace pact. Suharto Ambolodto notedthat the GRP-MILF panels have yet to agree on what shape to give tothe Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) that is mentioned in their interimagreements. He suggested a generally worded provision providing foreither incorporation or recognition of a future peace pact in the newconstitution.

Amina Rasul-Bernardo recalled that in consultations sheconducted in the ARMM, the consensus was that there must be furtherconsultations on Cha-Cha with the two liberation fronts, the MILF andMNLF. Abueva replied that the MILF did not want to “show their



hand” in the negotiations; hence, they did not provide the ConCom withguidance that the latter could have factored in its work.

Elaborating on his earlier comments about the need to redefineor restructure relations between the Republic and the Bangsamoro,Santos suggested that the Cha-Cha should be seized as a forum to confrontthe majority with the concept of “two-nations, one country”. ZainudinMalang added that past and existing constitutions suffered from ademocratic deficit because of the failure to adopt this concept. Theone-nation country concept adopted by past constitutions made theminority peoples subservient to the political decisions of the majority.This prevented the formulation of a viable constitutional framework thatdefined the relations of the Bangsamoro as a distinct nation not only withthe Philippine state but also with the Christian majority. However, Tuminezthought that it’s a losing strategy to concentrate on the fight for aconstitutional provision denoting the Bangsamoro as a nation distinctand separate from other Filipinos. Although this is a worthy goal, it willlikely whip up further prejudice and anger among the majority and hurtMoro chances of advancing their concrete interests. To this, Abuevaadded that even within the ConCom, the shift to federalism itself wasopposed by those who feared that it would fragment the country andencourage secession.

On the issue of a forging a multicultural constitution, Rufa Guiamand Abueva suggested that maybe the Philippines needs to adopt theexample of China, where the plurality of nations within the country isrecognized. Guiam, observed during her trips to China that leaders therehad the political will to recognize social and cultural diversity. Along thatline, Abueva wondered if the definition of Indigenous Peoples (IP) in thePhilippines includes the Bangsamoro; if so, the Proposed Constitutionprovides for a certain degree of flexibility in recognizing the rights of IPs.Ambolodto clarified that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, ConConDelegate Michael Mastura tried to introduce a provision that would haverecognized Islamic traditions and beliefs, but this was voted down. FatimaKanakan added that acceptance of the Bangsamoro as a distinct nationand identity among Filipinos still has a long way to go. She recalled thatin one forum in Thailand that she attended, the delegates from Luzonwere shocked when she identified herself as a Moro.

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Procedural or methodology issues also elicited some comments.Rasul-Bernardo opined that a Constitutional Convention (ConCon) isbetter than a constituent assembly that is likely to be dominated bybusiness interests and big landowners. In addition, the ConCom as wellas the Constituent Assembly (ConAss) to be convened are, and will bemired in the existing political crisis besetting PGMA. Abueva repliedthat it will not make any difference even if the Cha-Cha methodology isthrough a ConCon because it is still the local power structures and theirrelatives that will get elected as delegates to the convention. In fact, theentire country is ruled by an oligarchy and Cha-Cha, though not a panacea,is the first step in redistributing power.

On the shift to federalism, Santos was concerned that it’s theparliament, rather than the constitution, that will define the federal set-up, thereby reducing federalism to a mere legislative enactment ratherthan organic to the polity10 If the federal set-up cannot be enshrined inthe Constitution itself, Bacani and Ambolodto suggested that a bottom-up shift to federalism be adopted, i.e., let the legislatures of the autonomousterritories draft the federal design or charter. Abueva replied that giventhe fear within ConCom and Congress that federalism will lead tofragmentation, demanding that the federal set-up be enshrined in theconstitution or a bottom-up process be adopted would be tantamountto asking for the moon. In any case, the presence of local representativesor members in parliament will ensure that local sentiments will inform thedrafting of a future federal structure.

Cha-Cha and its impact on the present autonomous set-up in theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

After pointing out that the enumeration of powers under theProposed Constitution11 essentially copies that of Batas Pambansa Blg.20,12 Ambolodto raised his concern that the Proposed Constitution mayunintentionally reduce the powers already enjoyed by the ARMM. TheARMM presently enjoys plenary legislative powers under its OrganicAct.13 Further, although there is an enumeration of excepted powers,14

this is qualified by a phrase which says that “notwithstanding the limitationon the powers of the Regional Assembly…it may enact laws that promotethe general welfare of the people of the autonomous region”.15 On the



other hand, the ConCom adopted the reverse approach by enumeratingthe powers that will be enjoyed by the ATs. Outside of that enumeration,the ATs have no power to legislate. Echoing this observation, Santosadded that it would have been better if the Proposed Constitutioncontained a general recognition of autonomy with a bill of exceptions.

Abueva replied that the whole spirit behind federalism is toenhance regional or local autonomy, not to diminish it. So the ARMMwill continue to enjoy the powers it presently possesses. In fact, there isa provision in the Proposed Constitution to that effect.16 In addition, theConCom made sure that the ATs would be powerful vis-à-vis the nationalgovernment. The enumeration of legislative powers of ATs is basically adraft of the organic act of the ATs that parliament cannot derogate.However, the ConCom refrained from proposing details about thestructure of the governments of the AT’s. Abueva mentioned that therewas a panel of ARMM representatives in the consultation they held inDavao City.

Lingga noted that under the Proposed Constitution, the creationof ATs is initiated through a petition filed with parliament by contiguousLGUs.17 He preferred the use of the term “negotiate” rather than“petition” to which Abueva agreed. The former term connotes paritybetween those who aspire to be ATs and parliament because when younegotiate, you negotiate as equals.

Cha-Cha and its impact on the resources of the Bangsamoro

Expressing her concerns about economic liberalization, Guiamasked Abueva to confirm if there are any changes to the 1987 Constitutionon economic liberalization under the ConCom’s Proposed Constitution.He replied that public utilities, land ownership, higher learning, advertisingand mass media, and natural resources would be opened up to foreigners.

Although the ARMM gets a share in the proceeds of exploitationof natural resources within its domain, Rasul-Bernardo pointed out thatthe ARMM still lacks ownership over its strategic natural resources.Thus, she is concerned that the ARMM would lose out in the proposedconstitutional change to open up ownership of natural resources and

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land to foreigners. Tuminez, however, suggested that the country shouldnot be too reluctant to take in foreign capital because ARMM and thePhilippines as a whole are capital-starved. Assets lay dormant andinvestment is needed to pu these assets to use. The key is for government,including the ARMM, to tax the productivity resulting from foreigninvestment and use the proceeds honestly and effectively to improve thelives of common citizens.

Bacani asked the body to consider the possible impact of theseeconomic provisions on the peace process and the ARMM. Given thatthe displacement of the Bangsamoro from their lands is one of the maincauses of the conflict, he asked what impact these provisions might haveon resolving the GRP-MILF the conflict. Malang pointed out that thereis a clash between the Regalian doctrine and the Bangsamoro’s indigenousconcepts of land ownership and utilization. That doctrine has been usedas a basis for the government’s resettlement program. Thus, he isconcerned that this concept has been retained without qualification underthe Proposed Constitution.18 Continued adherence to the Regaliandoctrine would preclude the Bangsamoro from controlling the naturalresources within their ancestral domain.

Tuminez wondered if the present laws on ancestral domain aresufficient to address the grievances of the Bangsamoro over their landclaims. Kanakan replied that the government itself is an instrument ofland divestment against indigenous peoples. Even the system ofrecognizing ancestral domain is not sensitive to the limited capabilities ofIPs to meet the requirements for the issuance of titles and imposes anundue burden on them. She also cited instances of abusing the systemthrough the bribery of IP communities. Tuminez opined that theseproblems may be due to the heavy reliance of the titling procedure ondocumentation. That may in turn be due to the legalistic mentality of thebureaucracy, Abueva added.

Consensus Points

1. Dovetailing Cha-Cha and the Mindanao Peace Process

To prevent the Cha-Cha from pre-empting the Peace Process,



the group adopted a two-pronged approach in their advocacy. The firstapproach is to advocate for a catch-all provision that would allow theincorporation or accommodation of a future peace agreement in theProposed Constitution. Santos’ proposed provision is worded as follows:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of this constitution andnational laws, there should be accommodated andimplemented the comprehensive peace agreementsbetween the Government of the Philippines and therecognized representatives of the Bangsamoro people,which peace agreement shall have constitutional statusas defining, among others, the relations of constitutionalassociation between the Republic and the Filipinopeople, on one hand, and the Bangsamoro people, onthe other hand.”

The second approach, assuming the catch-all provision is notadopted, is to strengthen the provisions of the Proposed Constitution tofavor the ATs, even if it means examining each and every provision thathas an impact on the peace process. For instance:

• replace the word “petition” with “negotiate” as theoperative act that will initiate the establishment of ATs;

• replace the enumeration of powers of the ATs with a billof excepted powers;

• qualify the constitutional separation of church and stateto accommodate Islamic principles on church/staterelations.

2. Method of Engaging the Cha-Cha and Peace Process

Given that the members of Congress, sitting as a ConstituentAssembly, will most likely be the ones to prepare a final draft of theProposed Constitution, and given their role in the implementation of afuture GRP-MILF peace agreement, the group agreed that it would beimportant to mobilize Mindanao legislators and elicit their support.

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3. The MSG as a study group and not a lobby group.

In mobilizing Mindanao legislators, the Mindanao Study Groupdoes not intend to form a lobby. Instead, its purpose is to conductserious research and analysis, and seek to inform legislators and thepublic at large of findings and recommendation relevant to theconstitutional debate in the Philippines. The members of the group maynonetheless advocate for specific positions in their capacity as individuals.

Endnotes

1 Presidential Consultative Commission to Propose the Revision of the1987 Constitution (ConCom).

2 The CONCOM was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 453,signed by the President on August 19, 2005, with an express mandateto “conduct consultations and studies and propose amendments andrevisions to the 1987 Constitution”.

3 See Sec. 8, E.O. 453. The Committee on Constitutional Amendmentsof the House of Representatives seems to have started its deliberationson Cha-Cha but in preparing its working draft of the proposedConstitution, it did not limit itself to the proposals of the ConCom whichit treated as mere “reference material” but utilized other sources as well.

4 The House of Representatives had earlier echoed this preference in aresolution passed on November 29, 2005. The 1987 Constitution allowsCongress to convene itself as a Constitutent Assembly by a vote of threefourths of its members. The other mechanisms to propose constitutionalchanges to the people are Constitutional Convention and People’sInitiative although the latter still requires an enabling law which theSupreme Court declared has yet to be enacted. See Secs. 1 & 2,Article XVII, 1987 Constitution.

5 Joint Statement of the Peace Panels on the 7th Round of GRP-MILFExploratory Talks in Malaysia, April 20, 2005, Port Dickson, Malaysia.


[74] Autonomy and Peace Review6 Principally, the Concom was to look at the following proposals: (a)“the shift from the presidential-unitary system to a parliamentary-federalsystem of government”; (b) “to refocus economic policies in theConstitution to match the country’s vision for global competitiveness”;(c) “to review economic policies which tend to hinder the country’sglobal competitiveness and adversely affect the people’s welfare”. SeeSec. 1, E.0. 453.

7 Sec. 15, Article XX, Proposed Constitution.

8 As contained in Articles X and XX of the Proposed Constitution. Atty.Santos offered the caveat that these provisions “have yet to be processed”either by Congress sitting as a Constituent Assembly or by a ConstitutionalConvention and may therefore still go through some modifications.

9 Atty. Santos uses the phrase Mindanao Peace Process to referspecifically, but not exclusively, to the ongoing GRP-MILF negotiationsand the implementation of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement.

10 Santos prefers the draft constitution prepared by the CitizensMovement for a Federal Philippines (CMFP) and wonders why itsprovisions were not incorporated in the ConCom’s ProposedConstitution notwithstanding the presence of many CMFP members inthe ConCom.

11 See Sec. 16, Art. XII, Proposed Constitution.

12 B.P. 20 provided for the creation of the Sangguniang Pampook forRegions IX and XII, which was part of a series of steps taken by theGRP in its unilateral implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. TheSangguniang Pampook was the putative regional legislature. All of thepresent ARMM provinces were part of then-Region IX and XII.

13 Republic Act No. 9054.

14 Sec. 3, Art. IV, R.A. 9054.

15 Sec. 4, Art. IV, R.A. 9054.

[75]16 Sec. 14, Art. XX of the Proposed Constitution provides that the“Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall exercise the powersand shall be entitled to benefits given to autonomous territories”.

17 See Sec. 12, Art. XII, Proposed Constitution.

18 All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, andother mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by theState. (Sec. 1, Art. XIV, Proposed Constitution)

Discussion References:

1987 Constitution.

Executive Order No. 453, August 19, 2005.

Presidential Consultative Commission to Propose the Revision of the1987 Constitution, Proposed Revision of the 1987 Constitution.

Committee on the Form of Government, Presidential ConsultativeCommission to Propose the Revision of the 1987 Constitution,Highlights on the Proposed Amendments to Article VI (TheLegislative Department) and Article VII (Executive Department)of the 1987 Constitution.

Committee on the Structure of the Republic, Presidential ConsultativeCommission to Propose the Revision of the 1987 Constitution,Highlights on the Proposed Amendments to Article X (LocalGovernment) of the 1987 Constitution.

Committee on National Patrimony and Economic Reforms, PresidentialConsultative Commission to Propose the Revision of the 1987Constitution, Highlights on the Proposed Amendments to Articles II,XII, XIV, and XVI of the 1987 Constitution.

Sub-Committee on Transitory Provisions, Presidential Consultative



Commission to Propose the Revision of the 1987 Constitution,Highlights on the Proposed Amendments to Article XVIII TransitoryProvisions of the 1987 Constitution.

Soliman M. Santos, Charter Change Proposals of the ConstitutionalCommission: A Comment from the Perspective of the MindanaoPeace Process.

Rudy Rodil, Updates on the GRP-MILF Peace Process.

The Bangsamoro, as a people with a distinct identity and commonculture, and with a long history of political independence in the sameterritory they presently occupy, continuously assert their right to freedomand independence as an expression of their right to self-determination.For more than three decades the Moro National Liberation Front(MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have wagedan armed struggle against the Philippine government as a means to liberatethe Bangsamoro people and their homeland from Philippine colonialism.The repressive reactions of the government have resulted in a series ofwars that have caused the death of thousands, displacement of millionsof people, and destruction of properties.

This paper explores the democratic track to find an alternativeto war to address that deep-seated sentiment for freedom andindependence.

Right of Self-determination

The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights expressly provide that “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their politicalstatus and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.

Democratic Track to Resolve theBangsamoro IssueAbhoud Syed M. Lingga *

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*Abhoud Syed M. Lingga is Executive Director, Institute ofBangsamoro Studies based in Cotabato City.


In the exercise of that right, people who are entitled to right ofself-determination have wide latitude of choice. At one end, they candemand and pursue within the nation state more political power, activeparticipation in the decision making and administration of governmentaffairs, equitable redistribution of economic benefits, and appropriateways of preserving and protecting their culture and way of life. On theother end, they have also the right to organize their own sovereign andindependent government, or reclaim their lost freedom and independence.

In pursuing that right to self-determination the Bangsamoropeople are opting, as manifested both by the liberation movements andcivil society, for the restoration of their freedom and independence thatthey have enjoyed for more than six centuries.

History of Independence

The historical experience of the Bangsamoro people in statehoodand governance started as early as the middle of the 15th century whenSultan Sharif ul-Hashim established the Sulu Sultanate. This was followedby the establishment of the Magindanaw Sultanate in the early part ofthe 16th century by Sharif Muhammad Kabungsuwan. The Sultanate ofBuayan and the Pat a Pangampong ko Ranao (Confederation of theFour Lake-based Emirates) and other political subdivisions wereorganized later.

By the time the Spanish colonialists arrived in the Philippines theMuslims of Mindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi archipelago and the islandsof Basilan and Palawan had already established their own states andgovernments with diplomatic and trade relations with other countriesincluding China. Administrative and political systems based on the realitiesof the time existed in those states. In fact it was the existence of the well-organized administrative and political systems that the Bangsamoro peoplemanaged to survive the military campaign against them by Western colonialpowers for several centuries and preserve their identity as a political andsocial organization.

For centuries the Spanish colonial government attempted toconquer the Muslim states and add the territory to the Spanish colonies

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in the Philippine Islands but history tells us that it never succeeded. TheBangsamoro states with their organized maritime forces and armiessucceeded in defending the Bangsamoro territories, thus preserving theirindependence.

That is why Bangsamoro nationalists always argue that theBangsamoro territories are not part of what were ceded by Spain to theUnited States in the Treaty of Paris of 1898 because Spain had neverexercised effective sovereignty over these areas.

The Bangsamoro resistance continued even when US forcesoccupied some areas in Mindanao and Sulu. Though the resistance wasnot as fierce as during the Moro-Spanish wars, group-organized guerrillaattacks against American forces and installations reinforced whatremained of the sultanates’ military power. Even Bangsamoro individualsshowed defiance against American occupation of their homeland byattacking American forces in operations called prang sabil (martyrdomoperation).

Opposition to Annexation

When the United States government promised to grantindependence to the Philippine Islands, the Bangsamoro leadersregistered their strong objection to be part of the Philippine republic. Ina petition to the President of the United States dated June 9, 1921, thepeople of Sulu archipelago said that they would prefer being part of theUnited States rather than be included in an independent Philippine nation.

In their Declaration of Rights and Purposes, the Bangsamoroleaders meeting in Zamboanga on February 1, 1924, proposed that the“Islands of Mindanao and Sulu, and the Island of Palawan be made anunorganized territory of the United States of America” in anticipationthat in the event the US would decolorize its colonies and other non-selfgoverning territories the Bangsamoro homeland would be grantedseparate independence. Had it happened, the Bangsamoro people wouldhave regained by now their independence under the UN declaration ondecolonization. Their other proposal was that if independence to begranted would include the Bangsamoro territories, a plebiscite would be

Democratic Track to Resolve the Bangsamoro Issue


held in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan 50 years after the grant ofindependence to the Philippines to decide by vote whether the territoryincorporated by the government of the Islands of Luzon and Visayas,would be a territory of the United States, or become independent. The50-year period ended in 1996, the same year the MNLF and thePhilippine government signed the Final Agreement on the Implementationof the Tripoli Agreement. The leaders warned that if no provision ofretention under the United States would be made, they would declarean independent constitutional sultanate to be known as Moro Nation(Bangsamoro).

In Lanao, the leaders who were gathered in Dansalan (nowMarawi City) on March 18, 1935 appealed to the United Statesgovernment and the American people not to include Mindanao and Suluin the grant of independence to the Filipinos.

Continuing Assertion for Independence

Even after their territories were made part of the Philippinerepublic in 1946, the Bangsamoro people have continued to assert theirright to independence. They consider the annexation of their homelandas illegal and immoral since it was done without their plebiscitary consent.Their assertions manifest in many forms.

The armed resistance of Kamlon, Jikiri and Tawan-Tawan wereprotests against the usurpation of their sovereign right as a people. Thosewho joined the Philippine government used the new political system topursue the vision of regaining independence. Congressman OmbraAmilbangsa filed House Bill No. 5682 during the fourth session of theFourth Congress. The bill sought the granting and recognition of theindependence of Sulu. As expected, the bill found its way into the archivesof Congress since there were few Muslim members of Congress. Thenon May 1, 1968, the then provincial governor of Cotabato, Datu UdtogMatalam, made a dramatic move. He issued the Mindanao IndependenceMovement (MIM) manifesto calling for the independence of Mindanaoand Sulu to be known and referred to as the Republic of Mindanao andSulu.

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When it became evident that it would not be possible to regainindependence within the framework of the Philippine nation state system,the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was organized to wage anarmed struggle to regain independence. When the MNLF acceptedautonomy within the framework of Philippine sovereignty a faction ofthe MNLF separated and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front tocontinue the armed struggle for independence. The MILF is still fightingthe government forces.

The clamor for independence is not only among the liberationfronts but also among other sectors of the Bangsamoro society. The1,070,697 delegates to the First Bangsamoro People’s ConsultativeAssembly (BPCA) held on December 3-5, 1996 in Sultan Kudarat,Maguindanao were unanimous in calling for reestablishment of theBangsamoro state and government.

The hundreds of thousands of Bangsamoro who participated inthe Rally for Peace and Justice held in Cotabato City and Davao City onOctober 23, 1999, in Marawi City on October 24, 1999 and in Isabela,Basilan on December 7, 1999 issued a manifesto stating, “we believethat the only just, viable and lasting solution to the problem of our turbulentrelationship with the Philippine government is the restoration of ourfreedom, liberty and independence which were illegally and immorallyusurped from us, and that we be given a chance to establish a governmentin accordance with our political culture, religious beliefs and social norms.”

Bangsamoro leaders headed by Sultan Abdul Aziz GuiwanMastura Kudarat IV of the Sultanate of Magindanaw meeting in CotabatoCity on January 28, 2001 expressed their strong desire to regain theBangsamoro independence. Their Declaration of Intent and Manifestationof Direct Political Act they assert for an OIC-sponsored or UN-supervised referendum to decide once and for all whether the Bangsamoroterritory shall remain as autonomous region, shall form a state of federatedunion with the Philippines, or to become an independent state.

The Second Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly heldon June 1-3, 2001 at the same place, this time attended by 2,627,345delegates from all over the Bangsamoro homeland, including



representatives of non-Muslim indigenous communities, unanimouslydeclared that “the only just, meaningful, and permanent solution to theMindanao Problem is the complete independence of the Bangsamoropeople and the territories they now actually occupy from the Republic ofthe Philippines.”

Repression

When the Bangsamoro revolutionary leaders went for armedstruggle to pursue their right for freedom and independence, the Philippinegovernment responded with repression. The military suppression of thelegitimate struggle of the Bangsamoro people resulted in the off and onwar that has caused tens of thousands of deaths, displacement of millionsof people (hundreds of thousands are still in the neighboring Malaysianstate of Sabah), and destruction of properties worth billions of dollars.In addition, military spending to wage the war has reached billions ofdollars, a huge amount that would have been better spent for basicinfrastructure like farm-to-market roads, school buildings, hospitals, andother social services badly needed by the people.

The military solution did not work and will not put an end to theBangsamoro struggle. The government may succeed in suppressing onegeneration of fighters, but a new generation will succeed them.

Even autonomy, which was a product of the negotiations betweenthe MNLF and the government, fails to address the aspiration of theBangsamoro people for freedom and independence, thus the strugglecontinues.

Referendum

To address the political issue of the problem without resorting towar is to give the Bangsamoro people a chance to choose their politicalstatus with respect to their relation with the Philippine government througha referendum. They shall choose whether they want to remain part of thePhilippines or to be free and independent. To accommodate otherproposals, questions whether to retain the existing autonomous region,or to be changed to a federated relationship, or free association with the

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Philippines can also be included.

Referendum would give the Bangsamoro people the opportunityto make the decision on their political status, not just their leaders. It isthe democratic and peaceful way of resolving political conflicts. It hasbeen used in many countries, like Czechoslovakia, the Canadian provinceof Quebec, and East Timor. Countries that refuse to use this internationallyaccepted democratic mechanism suffer the consequences of war, likethe former Yugoslavia, the Philippines, and others.

The proposed referendum shall be held in areas where theBangsamoro people presently occupy. This includes the provinces ofMaguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, and thecities of Cotabato, Marawi and Isabela. There are also towns in theprovinces of Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, Sarangani,Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur,Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga Sibugay and Palawan that shouldbe included, subject for discussion with the people in the areas.

The referendum has to be supervised by the United Nations inorder that the result will be acceptable to all parties. Common sensedictates that a party to a conflict, like the Philippine government, wouldnot have the credibility to conduct or supervise such political exercise.The UN is the best body to oversee the referendum to ensure that whateverwill be the result will be respected by all parties and implemented. Ifthere are groups that would not respect the result of the referendum, theUN can organize its forces to disarm them.

Conclusion

If we have to resolve peacefully the violent conflict between theGovernment and the Bangsamoro liberation fronts, and to avoid futureviolent conflict, referendum is the best political option. The Philippinegovernment and the Bangsamoro liberation fronts have to agree to areferendum if their leaders are indeed statesmen. Statesmanship of leadersis not measured by how much blood is shed and how long they cansuppress the people’s right to self-determination but how they can ensurethat the people enjoy this fundamental human right. History has never



been kind to leaders who do not hesitate to use military might to suppressthe people’s aspiration to be free.

the mindanao peace process

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