the militant threat to hotels · 2014. 1. 14. · analysis of global activities to keep ahead of...

T h e M i l i ta n t T h r e at t o H o t e l s

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A b o u t S t r at f or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i i i

T h e M i l i ta n t T h r e at t o H o t e l s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

T h e S h i f t t o S o f t Ta r g e t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 T h e T h r e a t t o H o t e l s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 B o m b i n g s : T h e P r i m a r y T h r e a t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 K i d n a p p i n g s a n d A s s a s s i n a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 T h e N e w Yo r k C i t y B o m b P l o t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 D e t e r m i n i n g t h e T h r e a t L e v e l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2

S t r at f o r S e r v i c e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4

C o n ta c t S t r at f o r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5

iii© 2005 Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

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I n t r o d u c t i o n

“During these holy days as the lions of al-Tawhid fight against the mighty infidel crusaders and the conniving apostates in the land of Mesopotamia … a group of lions from one of our best and most honored brigade … attacked some of their dens located in the Muslim land of Amman. After study-ing targets and putting them under surveillance, the targets selected were several hotels used by the Jordanian tyrants as a garden for the Jews and Christians — the enemies of Islam. … Despite the security arrangements provided by the traitors in hopes of guarding these dens, the soldiers of al Qaeda were able to reach them.”

- Al Qaeda’s Jihad Committee in Mesopotamia, Nov. 10, 2005

On Nov. 9, 2005, three nearly simultaneous bombings were carried out at well-known hotels — all Western-based chains — in Amman, Jordan. The first strike was a vehicle bombing that went off outside the hotel, after the driver was stopped at a police checkpoint; the other two involved individual suicide bombers who set off their devices within the perimeters of other hotels. In total, nearly 60 people were killed and about 100 were injured. Many of the casualties were wedding guests: Two members of the bombing cell reportedly mixed and mingled with them at a reception in a hotel banquet room before one of them managed to trigger his suicide vest. The attacks were claimed the following day by the leader of al Qaeda’s node in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

At the same time, U.S. authorities were warning of an apparent threat to four- and five-star hotels and other targets in China, where U.S. President George W. Bush was due to visit a few weeks later. Though the Chinese government discredited the warnings, the rumors — which had emerged a few days before the strikes in Amman — played up the fact that the hospitality industry faces very real threats around the world, from terrorist groups of many descriptions.

It is important to place these threats in context.


H i g h l i g h t s : • Tracing Threat Trends: The Shift to Soft Targets • Hotels: A Militant’s Targeting Criteria • Attack Modalities: Bombings • Further Liabilities: Kidnappings and Assassinations • Al Qaeda’s New York Hotel Plots • Threat Assessment Guidance • Recommendations

The trend is part of a continuing shift to “soft” targets that has emerged since the Sept. 11 attacks, as heightened awareness and security made the comparatively more “valuable” or symbolic targets, such as U.S. government or military facilities, harder to strike. It also can be attributed at least in part to changes in the dynamics of jihadist groups around the world: There is evidence that entities such as al Qaeda — which once was considered to be, if not a formal organization, at least a well-structured entity with a central leadership and focused goals –- have become more like hybrids, with a strong grassroots “movement” component emerging. Shifts of this sort have important implications for the kinds of targets terrorists will choose — and the numbers of casualties those strikes might produce — over time. Both of these factors point to a drive toward soft targets that will not dissipate in the foreseeable future.

Soft targets include wide varieties of public venues, including places of worship, sports venues, shopping malls or virtually any other locations that tend to draw large crowds of people and are poorly secured. However, because of the very nature of the hospitality industry and certain widely used practices, hotels stand out as particularly attractive targets within this category. As soft targets, they fulfill many of the same criteria that foreign embassies — which now have much more stringent and overt security — did in the past.

Though the most likely method of attack at a hotel would involve a car or truck bomb or a suicide bombing in a public area, the risk to Westerners of being kidnapped or assassinated by Islamist militants is noteworthy — and hotels are a venue for these crimes as well. Past plots demonstrate that such plans could be highly sophisticated.

These threats present serious considerations for the hotel and hospitality industries. Beyond the obvious necessity of protecting guests and employees, taking pre-emptive security measures is emerging as a corporate legal imperative, with failure to do so opening companies up to the possibility of damaging litigation. There are numerous ways in which hotel operators can mitigate risks and deflect the interest of militant groups. In addition to physical security measures such as vehicle barricades — which could have deterred attacks against some hotels in the recent strikes in Amman — and window film, employee training and protective countersurveillance programs are invaluable assets in securing a property.


T h e S h i f t t o S o f t Ta r g e t sOne of the important outgrowths of the Sept. 11 attacks was the substantial increase in security measures and countersurveillance around U.S. government and military facilities in the United States and overseas. The attacks had a similar impact at U.S. and foreign airports. The effective “hardening” of such facilities — which in the past have topped the list of preferred targets for terrorists — has made it measurably more difficult for militants to carry out large-scale strikes in these areas. As a result, there has been a rise in attacks against lower-profile “soft targets” — defined generally as public or semi-public facilities where large numbers of people congregate under relatively loose security. Soft targets include various forms of public transportation, shopping malls, corporate offices, places of worship, schools and sports venues, to name only a few. Between the first World Trade Center bombing Feb. 26, 1993, and the second attack Sept. 11, al Qaeda focused primarily on hitting hard targets, including:

• A U.S.-Saudi military facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Seven people, including five Americans, were killed when two bombs exploded Nov. 13, 1995.

• A U.S. military base near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: A bomb killed 19 U.S. soldiers and wounded hundreds of Americans and Saudis on June 25, 1996.

• U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: More than 250 people were killed and 5,000 injured in the Aug. 7, 1998, bombings.

• The USS Cole: Seventeen sailors were killed in the Oct. 12, 2000, attack in Yemen.

While there have also been attacks since Sept. 11 — both foiled and successful — against harder targets such as embassies, the trend toward softer targets is unmistakable: • April 11, 2002 — The firebombing of a synagogue in Tunisia kills 19. The Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade, an al Qaeda subgroup, claims responsibility.

• Oct. 12, 2002 — Jemaah Islamiyah stages a pair of bombings at a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, killing 202 people.

• Nov. 28, 2002 — The bombing of the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombassa, Kenya, kills 13. An attempt to shoot down an Israeli charter jet with a surface-to-air missile at Mombassa airport is unsuccessful. Both incidents are believed to be the work of al Qaeda’s operational center in east Africa.


• May 12, 2003 — Suicide bombers attack a housing complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 34 people, including 10 Americans.

• May 16, 2003 — A series of bomb attacks in Casablanca, Morocco — targeting a Jewish community center, a Spanish restaurant and social club, a hotel and the Belgian consulate — kill 41.

• Aug. 5, 2003 — A suicide bomber affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah kills 12 people at the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia.

• Nov. 8, 2003 — Suicide bombers strike a Saudi residential complex in Riyadh, killing 17 people.

• Nov. 15, 2003 — Twenty-six people are killed in bombings of synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey. The Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade claims responsibility.

• March 11, 2004 — Multiple explosions hit the rail system in Madrid, killing nearly 200 people and injuring about 1,800. The Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade claims responsibility.

• May 1, 2004 — A team of four militants attacks a Western corporate office in Yanbu, Saudi Arabia, killing six people.

• May 29, 2004 — A team of four militants attacks several Western corporate offices and housing compounds in al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia, taking hostages and killing 22 people.

• Oct. 7, 2004 — At least 22 people are killed when an apparent suicide bomber rams an explosive-packed vehicle into the lobby of the Hilton Hotel in Taba, Egypt –- a resort town on the Sinai Peninsula — and another suicide bomber detonates explosives in the pool area moments later. Separately, two car bombs also are detonated at campsites near Nuweba. Israelis are targeted in all incidents.

• Oct. 1, 2005 — Three suicide bombers blow themselves up, killing more than 20 people, in nearly simultaneous blasts at restaurants in resort towns on the island of Bali. The attacks were planned and carried out by a faction of Jemaah Islamiyah.

• Nov. 9, 2005 — As many as four suicide bombers, including a husband-wife team, stage nearly simultaneous attacks targeting three Western hotel chains — Day’s Inn, Radisson and Grand Hyatt — in Amman, Jordan, killing 57 people and injuring about 100. The attacks were quickly claimed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, who also discussed his reasons for targeting hotels in the statement of responsibility.


This list does not include references to numerous strikes against hotels in Iraq, which is more akin to an active war zone and not frequented by tourists or corporate executives who have not been well prepared for the dangers.

This trend toward seeking out soft targets will continue as Islamist militant cells become even more autonomous, and with the growth of “freelance” jihadists in various parts of the world. These are al Qaeda sympathizers inspired by Sept. 11, Afghanistan, Iraq or some other event but who lack specific training in camps and likely have no direct connection to the wider jihadist network. Nevertheless, they can be dangerous, particularly if they are attempting to prove their value. In both cases, a lack of resources, planning capabilities and operational experience will necessitate the choice of softer targets. Staging operations against such targets allows militants to maximize the casualty count while limiting the chance of pre-operation interdiction. Whether the targets are hit, however, is a question of access and security countermeasures. Generally speaking, soft targets attract high levels of human traffic and are surrounded by small security perimeters — often limited to gates and poorly trained guards — if perimeters exist at all. They are noteworthy for having a dearth of trained, professional security personnel, a lack of access to actionable intelligence on potential threats and absence of countersurveillance measures. The combination makes for an attractive target in the eyes of a militant.

The downside of hitting soft targets, from the jihadists’ perspective, is that such strikes usually limit the political and ideological mileage of the attack. Islamist militants prefer targets with high symbolic value, but they have proven willing to forego some degree of symbolism in exchange for a higher chance of success. However, attacks against certain soft targets, such as synagogues and large Western hotels, can at times provide the necessary combination of symbolism and a large — primarily Western — body count.

T h e T h r e a t t o H o t e l sHotels are the quintessential “soft target:” They have fixed locations and daily business activity that creates a perfect cover for pre-operative surveillance. Extensive traffic — both humans and vehicles, inside and outside the buildings — goes largely unregulated. This is especially true for larger hotels that incorporate bars, restaurants, clubs, shops and other public facilities. While security workers do monitor and confront suspicious loiterers, one easy work-around for militants is simply to check into the hotel, which gives them full access and guest privileges.

The ingress and egress gives militants ample opportunity to blend into the crowd, both for extensive pre-operational surveillance and actual strikes. In a departure from the security situation in airports and other places, it is not uncommon to see anonymous and unattended baggage.


Outside, hotel perimeters frequently are unsecured, with limited to non-existent standoff distance and easy access for cars and trucks — including buses and taxis that could be used as a Trojan horse for a bombing. Also, it is common for vehicles to be parked and left unattended in front of many hotels. Loading ramps and parking garages offer other opportunities for those seeking to detonate large truck or car bombs.

Source: DigitalGlobe

Source: DigitalGlobe

Day’s Inn Hotel, Amman, Jordan

This satellite image shows the small security perimeter surrounding the Day’s Inn in Amman. A security checkpoint prevented a vehicle bomb from inflicting the maximum possible damage in an attack on Nov. 9, 2005.

Radisson Hotel, Amman, Jordan

This image shows the property boundaries of the Radisson hotel, where suicide bombers set off explosives at a wedding reception that was under way in a banquet hall.


Ultimately, security rests primarily in the hands of hotel workers. Globally, police and other government security forces are stretched thin; their priority is to protect official VIPs and critical infrastructure. Threats to hotels and other private facilities are of secondary concern, at best.

However, many large hotels and hotel chains in the past have been unwilling to incur the direct costs associated with hardening security, such as more numerous and better-trained guards. Though some hotels have expanded the use of video surveillance, many lack the trained professionals and man-hour staffing needed to turn electronic gadgets into intelligence tools. Generally speaking, the technology is most useful after an attack, during the investigative phase, and thus has little preventive value. Similarly, guards and other employees are rarely trained in countersurveillance techniques, which could be the most cost-effective method of preventing an attack.

Even in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, many hotel managers were unwilling to risk alienating their clients by incorporating more cumbersome security measures — such as identity and key checks upon entry, baggage screening and more extensive standoff areas — that guests might view as inconvenient and which thus could directly impact business. Moreover, from a business perspective, it can be difficult to justify the investment of millions of dollars in security precautions when the risk — much less the return — cannot be quantified. Given the highly competitive nature of the industry and guests’ reluctance to accept inconvenient security practices, hotel owners often have been forced to take the calculated risk that their businesses will not be targeted.

However, following the October 2004 attacks at the Hilton hotel on the Sinai Peninsula, there were indications that mentality might be forced to change: An attorney representing some victims has demanded that the Hilton hotel chain accept responsibility for the security and belongings of its guests. Terrorism-related liability considerations, which could be termed a hushed concern among hotel industry insiders since Sept. 11, are becoming a much more prominent issue. And some shifts in practices can be seen: For example, luxury hotels in Indonesia, which has a tourism-based economy, have become virtual fortresses since the Marriott in Jakarta was struck, and there is reason to believe that some Western hotels in Amman were surveilled by al Qaeda but were not attacked, specifically because of the security measures employed.

From a defensive perspective, there are unique methods of countersurveillance that can help to mitigate threats to hotels. That said, the ideological justifications for attacking hotels are, from the jihadist viewpoint, numerous. In many countries where militants have a heavy presence, large hotels are among the most prominent symbols of Western culture — especially recognized Western chains such as Marriott, Hilton, Inter-Continental and Radisson hotels. Also, Islamists long have looked upon hotels as places of vice: They are places where men and women mix freely, and guests can engage in the consumption of alcohol, music and dance, fornication and adultery. This provides an


additional justification for attacking hotels. In fact, these were among the reasons cited by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in his claim of responsibility for the Nov. 9 bombings in Amman — though he also claimed the hotels were being used as bases for operations by the U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies.

Because large hotels are places where Westerners are most likely to be found — either in residence or living or attending meetings, parties or conferences — they offer the best opportunity for militants in many countries to kill or injure large numbers of Westerners, possibly including visiting business and government leaders, in a single attack. Such elites are particularly high-value targets, especially if they are seen as collaborating with or supporting “illegitimate” or “apostate” rulers in Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or Jordan. In Issue No. 7 of al Qaeda’s online training manual, Camp al-Bataar Magazine (issued in March 2004), an article providing guidance for striking human targets notes: “The primary targets should be Jews and Christians who have important status in the Islamic countries.… Our advice is to start with unprotected soft targets and the individuals from countries that support the local renegades.” Hotels might be the best way of attacking Jews and Christians who are visiting and collaborating with local regimes.

Additionally, jihadists increasingly have shown an interest in attacks that carry economic impacts. Spectacular attacks against hotels in certain countries — especially those with tourism-based economies — can generate substantial economic pain. One example is the 2002 nightclub bombings in Bali, Indonesia, which temporarily decimated the island’s tourism trade and impacted the wider Southeast Asian tourism industry. The bombing of the Paradise Hotel in Mombassa, Kenya, in 2002 and of the JW Marriott hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, the following year had similar impacts, resulting in government travel warnings that cut into those countries’ economies. Elsewhere, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and ETA in Spain also have struck at hotels and tourist sites as a means of harming the economy and pressuring the enemy governments, a factor that also was at issue in the recent bombings in Sinai and possibly in Jordan as well.

B o m b i n g s : T h e P r i m a r y T h r e a tHotels figure prominently as targets in a long list of successful attacks, with two main types of operations: car and truck bombings and human suicide bombings. Assassinations and kidnappings at hotels also should be considered significant risks for Westerners. The most substantial threat comes from bombs: either a car or truck bombing at a hotel entrance, inside a garage or other perimeter locations, or a suicide bomber who seeks to detonate his explosives within a hotel lobby, restaurant or other public gathering place inside a hotel.


Vehicle bombings tend to generate the greatest number of casualties — and they are difficult to defend against, especially without some type of countersurveillance program. Car or truck bombings involving hotels as targets have occurred in: Taba, Egypt (October 2004); Jakarta, Indonesia (August 2003); Costa del Sol, Spain (July 2003); Mombassa, Kenya (November 2002); Karachi, Pakistan (May 2002), as well as on multiple occasions in Iraq. Suicide bombings or human-placed bombs have occurred inside and outside hotels in: Amman, Jordan (November 2005), Taba, Egypt (October 2004); Kathmandu, Nepal (August 2004); Moscow (December 2003); Casablanca, Morocco (May 2003); Bogota, Colombia (December 2002); Netanya, Israel (March 2002); Jerusalem (December 2001); and Phnom Penh, Cambodia (July 2001).

In both types of attacks, the majority of those killed or injured were just inside and outside of the hotel lobbies and on the ground floors, with some impact also to the hotels’ lower floors. Many of the deaths and injuries result from flying glass, which means that window film is a cheap and effective way of lowering the death toll.

K i d n a p p i n g s a n d A s s a s s i n a t i o n sWhile bombings remain al Qaeda’s favored tactic globally, the number of kidnappings and assassinations has increased as Islamist militants adapt to changing circumstances. As events in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Chechnya and the Philippines have shown, jihadists have begun to adopt kidnappings — often followed by murder — both as a symbolic act and a practical means of raising funds. The editions of Camp al-Bataar Magazine issued in April and May 2004 give very detailed tactical recommendations for carrying out assassinations and kidnappings. Related targeting guidance has placed increased emphasis on symbolic individuals, including executives from Western countries. This certainly does not preclude lower-level employees of companies based in the West from becoming targets as well. Hotels, with their substantial traffic and relatively uncontrolled environments, are a prime venue for kidnappings or assassinations. Even high-profile, protected individuals who have constant security protection while traveling generally are more vulnerable at hotels than elsewhere.

Though security teams can be deployed ahead of time to protect the sites that VIPs visit during the day, individuals tend to be at greatest risk while entering or leaving hotels — which, again, are high-traffic, high-risk environments. Moreover, in such a location, it would be possible for a guest to be kidnapped or killed without anyone noticing his or her absence for some period of time. Sophisticated attacks potentially could be carried out at hotels, where a VIP’s location remains static for the longest period of time.


The creativity or planning that terrorist groups could employ in an attack against a VIP at a hotel should not be underestimated. And the threat of a hotel-based assassination of a VIP is not just theoretical: In fact, hotels have been on al Qaeda’s radar screen for more than a decade.

T h e N e w Y o r k C i t y B o m b P l o t sIn the aftermath of the first World Trade Center (WTC) bombing in 1993, several plots were uncovered that centered around attacks against the U.N. Plaza Hotel and the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City. Extensive surveillance of the hotels had been conducted — both inside and out — and various attack scenarios were outlined by Ramzi Yousef (the mastermind of the WTC bombing) and the local militant cell. As past experience testifies, it would be foolish to discount these plans today; al Qaeda is known to return to past targets and plot scenarios. In the New York cases, operatives had devised the following scenarios:

• Using a stolen delivery van, an attack team would drive the wrong way down a one-way street near the Waldorf “well,” where VIP motorcades arrived. A hand grenade would be tossed as a diversionary tactic by a lone operative from the church across the street. A four-man assault team (a tactic used in al Qaeda attacks in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere) would deploy from the rear of the van and attack the protection cars and then the VIP’s limousine. • Infiltrating the hotel after midnight — when they knew protection levels were lower — assailants wearing gas masks and armed with assault weapons, hand grenades and tear gas would take the stairs up to the VIP’s floor, attacking their target in his room. • Stealing hotel uniforms and infiltrating a banquet via the catering kitchen, which is always a chaotic location.

Follow-up analyses by counterterrorism authorities determined that these scenarios would have carried a 90 percent success rate, and the VIP — as well as multiple protection agents — would have been killed. In the aftermath of the New York City bomb plots, intelligence also indicated that elements associated with al Qaeda had planned to detonate car bombs at hotels where high-value targets were staying.


D e t e r m i n i n g t h e T h r e a t L e v e lThe threat to hotels is not equal around the globe, and in fact is highly correlated to geography. Geographic threat rankings are as follows:

• High: Hotels in Muslim countries with a proven level of militant activity and a regime that Islamists consider hostile, especially: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Turkey, Kuwait, Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan. At a slightly lower level, the rest of the Persian Gulf can be included in this ranking, as can North Africa — including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt — and much of Central Asia. Though Israel boasts some of the world’s most secure hotels, the threat level there remains quite high.

• Moderate: Hotels in other countries with a proven Islamist militant presence, especially: India, Russia, Malaysia and much of Western Europe — notably Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Asian nations that are considered allies of the United States — Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, and particularly those with a rich tourism trade such as Australia and Thailand — also are included. Hotels in major U.S. cities, such as New York City; Washington, D.C.; San Francisco; Los Angeles; Chicago; Atlanta; Detroit and Houston rank in this tier. Stratfor views Houston, New York City and Washington as particularly high-risk cities.

• Low: Hotels in Latin America are at low risk of strikes by Islamist militants. Most of Central, Eastern and Northern Europe ranks in this tier, as does China and most of North America (excepting the major U.S. cities noted above). Hotels in the United States and, to some degree, Europe, are at lower risk, due to the vast number of other soft targets — especially public transportation — available to militants.

U.S. counterterrorism authorities long have been particularly concerned about hotels in two loca-tions: Amman, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In Amman, the concerns have centered on the large Western hotel chains that serve as forward deployment locations for contractors, journalists and others waiting to enter Iraq. The U.S. embassy at one point was located quite near a hotel that is popular among Westerners; it has since been moved. In general, hotels and bars are filled with Westerners and thus make attractive targets.

The demographics within Jordan have further substantiated concerns about a threat, since the kingdom has a strong thread of Wahhabist/jihadist sentiment — strengthened in part by events in Iraq, which have brought higher levels of militant traffic through the country. It is known that al-Zarqawi’s branch of al Qaeda, based in Iraq, has tried for some time — though unsuccessfully — to use operatives based in Jordan in carrying out attacks; the recent hotel bombings apparently were carried out by Iraqis who slipped across the border.


Sources within Saudi Arabia also have expressed concern about the large Western hotel chains, specifically because they lack basic security measures — such as standoff perimeters and ballistic window film. Stratfor shares the view that an attack against a Western hotel in Saudi Arabia likely is just a matter of time.

R e c o m m e n d a t i o n sThe first step for large hotel operators in dealing with this threat is to undertake a vulnerability assessment to identify properties that are most likely to be at risk. Such an assessment — based primarily on the geographic location of assets and an understanding of Islamist militants’ goals, methodologies and areas of operations — will allow companies to focus their time and resources on the most vulnerable properties, while more generally ensuring that security measures do not overshoot or undershoot the threat level for a particular property. This allows for better, more efficient use of resources. For high-threat properties, the next step is usually a physical security survey to identify specific weaknesses and vulnerabilities. In some cases, diagnostic protective surveillance can help to ensure that properties are not currently under hostile surveillance. Some kind of ongoing protective surveillance program is the best means of interdicting hostile actions. Because of the very large number of potential targets in most locations, the implementation of some very basic but visible measures might be sufficient to send an attacker on to the next possible target. These security enhancements include:

• Greater number and visibility of (armed) guards inside and outside the building. • Prominent security cameras around the perimeter and throughout the hotel. Even if the tapes are not monitored by guards trained in countersurveillance techniques, they can help to identify suspicious activity or deter hostile surveillance. • Landscaping in front of and around the hotel that prevents vehicles from directly approaching the entrance or actually entering the building — for example, large cement flower pots that can stop vehicles, hills with rocks embedded in them, and palm trees.

Other security measures might be appropriate in medium- and high-threat level locations:

• If possible, increase the stand-off distance between the hotel and areas of vehicular traffic. Physical barricades are among the most effective deterrents to vehicle bombings, as they help to keep drivers from crashing through the doors of a hotel and detonating explosives in high-traffic areas.


• In higher-threat level locations, use static surveillance around the hotel’s perimeter. In areas of lesser threats, roving vehicles patrolling the perimeter at varying times might be sufficient.

The following practices also are recommended for all areas:

• Plastic window film: This should be used throughout the hotel. Because it reduces the level of flying glass from explosions, it is one of the best and most cost-effective ways of minimizing casualties in the event of an attack.

• Protective surveillance: In all areas, hotel owners should consider hiring protective surveillance teams dedicated to this purpose.

• Employee education: At minimum, hotels should train employees, especially doormen and other ground-level employees, in basic protective surveillance techniques.

• Liaisons: Maintain a good working relationship with local police and other relevant authorities. Identifying hostile surveillance is useless unless a plan is in place to deal with it. Sound relationships with local police and other agencies — such as foreign embassies — are part of the answer. Though authorities might not be able to spare resources to monitor a hotel, in many places they will respond quickly to reports of suspected surveillance activity, to confront suspicious people and possibly head off an operation.

• Background checks: The ability to share guest lists with local authorities for comparison with a militant watch list could help to determine if a registered guest is engaging in pre-operational surveillance.


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Global Intelligence and AnalysisThe Essential Intelligence You Need, At Your Fingertips. For nearly a decade, Stratfor has placed its clients consistently ahead of the curve by providing daily access to a wealth of fast-forward information unavailable from any other source. Stratfor’s depth of analysis and relevance of its breaking intelligence are vital to many businesses, associations, governments and individuals, helping them to stay explicitly informed, better understand threats to their interests, and seize opportunities before the competition. A variety of service levels are offered for organizations to effectively and efficiently manage intelligence needs within a range of accessible programs.

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the militant threat to hotels · 2014. 1. 14. · analysis of global activities to keep ahead of...

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