the meru special report: the meru land case

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRSNOT FOR PUBLICATION

IMW-32The Meru

Mr. Richard H. NolteInstitute of Current World Affairs366 Madison AvenueNew York 17, New York

Ndurumanga EstateUsa River, TanganyikaNovember 5, 1963

Dear Mr. Nolte:

Political and economic developments in tribal societiesare generally overshadowed by national developments and as aresult receive scant attention. Until recently it has mainlybeen anthropologists who have considered the nature of theAfrican response to European intrusion. Nevertheless it is theproblems which arise as a result of this contact which are atthe heart of developments within Africa today. The extent towhich the new nations can attain their oft-stated goal of be-coming modern democracies with increasing rates of economicgrowth depends on how effectively western political, social,and economic systems can be adapted to local situations withmaximum development and minimum social dislocation.

Perhaps the most far-reaching legacies of European col-nialism were the introduction into village life of a cash economy,and scientific methods in agriculture and animal husbandry. Theresponse has varied, depending on the nature of the tribe and thedegree of European impact. Clearly, many western innovationsdon’t fit African conditions. The introduction of new farmingtechniques, for instance, often meet with opposition. To Africanssuch methods are not self-evidently good if they challenge cus-tomary ways of doing things, as aid administrators have oftenlearned to their despair.

Clearly the unit for study of this process is the tribe.The Meru of Arusha District in northern Tanganyika (see IMW-)are interesting in that although fifteen years ago they werefar behind other tribes which had similar influences bearing onthem (i.e., Chagga), they are today skillfully and eagerly deve-loping their hilly land. Their p_ capita annual income is nowamong the highest in Tanganyika.

The reasons for this advance are many and varied. Anumber of elements which characterize development in other areasare found here too: close contact with Europeans and their methods,a healthy environment which allows, if not encourages, intensiveagriculture, and a ready market for their produce. Other elementsare purely local, such as the repercussions of the Meru Land Case,

* In Swahili the people of Meru are known as WaMeru; one Meruis an MMeru; their country is UMeru; and their language isKiMeru. For the sake of simplicity I shall use only Meru exceptwhere necessary for clarity.

IMW-32 -2-

and their cultural affinities to the Chagga and Masai.

The Meru are better known than their small numbe (approxi-mately 0,000) might suggest. It is the Meru who went to theUnited Nations Trusteeship Council in 1952 for help in regaininga portion of their land which had been alienated to Europeansettlers over their determined opposition. The British narrowlyavoided an adverse vote, but more important it marked the end ofan era when a colonial power could rule freely, and the beginningof one when a small, unimportant tribe could make its voice heardin a matter concerning its own administration. Their near successat the U.N. suggested the dimensions of nascent African politicalpower, and it encouraged the subsequent rapid growth of Africannationalism. Indeed, their petitioner at the U.N., Kirilo Japhet,was one of the founders of TANU.

The Meru, who call themselves VaRwo, inhabit the easternportion of Arusha District on the southern and eastern slopesof Mt. Meru, a spectacular 14,976 foot volcanic cone which wouldbe considerably more impressive were it not overshadowed by itsgiant neighbor, Kilimanjaro, forty miles away. Surrounded bythe Masai and the Arusha on the south and west and by the Chaggaon the east, their’s is an attractive and fertile land. Nearbyis Ngurdoto Crater, a small gem of a national park where visitors,seated safely on the rim, can observe elephant, rhino, buffalo,and giraffe far below, as well as black and white colobus monkeyssporting in the trees above them. Momela Farm, where King Solomon’sMines, Hatari, and other movies have been filmed, is now part o-inationai park.

Among the first Europeans to visit the Meru were CountSamuel Teleki and his companion and recorder, Lieut. Ludwig vonHohnel, who together in 1887 carried out explorations in thearea. They felt the Meru were like all mountaineers: active,

brave, and independent. Indeed,after being duly warned of their"thievish propensities" Teleki’ s menwere set upon and robbed. Althoughtheir primary objective was to climbMt. Meru, the chief’s extortionatedemands for .h.o..ngo (a payment entitlingthe donor to pass freely and unmolestedthrough tribal land), and a spate ofrainy weather combined to defeat themin this objective.

In a more positive vein, vonHohnel records that the Meru, whothen numbered about 1,OO0, lived ina luxurient area and that bananasformed the chief part of their diet,although various grains were alsogrown. He noted they bred cattle,

Black and White Colobus (Colobus abyssinicus) sheep, and goats, and that their bees

yielded an excel-lent honey. Theythen lived inscattered huts,mostly made ostraw and in theshape o a hayrick.

Culturally,the Meru are a Bantutribe, an oshootof the Chagga whomthey resemble bothin language andculture, althoughthey have notdeveloped educa-tionally, politi-cally, nor eco-nomically in theway the parenttribe has, norhave they beenso responsive to

WaMeru

missionary influence. In general they have been a difficult tribeto administer. Traditionally they share a common origin with thewestern Chagga. Legend has it that about 200 years ago two Chaggabrothers split off from their clan. @ne went up to the west sideof Kilimanjaro to what is now Machame, and the other went to Meru(to Sakila hill), and they were to light fires signalling theirarrival. Sometime later the Meru were conquered by the Masai,and in coming to terms with them adopted certain of their customs,notably the age-set system. Many of these customs are now on thewane through the influence of Christian missions, although thisprocess is not yet complete.

The tribal area is divided into 14 parish units or mitaa.The Meru have never lived in villages as we know them, preferringrather to live in small family units, each with its own plot offarmland. These are usually lO0 to 200 yards apart even in themost thickly populated areas. The tribe is composed of more than25 clans, generally exogamous units meaning that marriages areusually contracted with members of another clan. In the mitaaeach clan has a leader, a deputy leader, and a number of helpers.There is also a leader responsible for sacrifices and the spiritualaspects of clan life. Although anyone with ability can becomea clan leader in a mitaa, members of a clan’s senior branch havecertain advantages.

Parallel with the clans are the age-sets of which thereare five together with the uncircumcized youth. Traditionallyage-sets were of political and military importance. For a longtime, however, their political functions have been increasinglyexercized by a chief, an innovatio borrowed from the Chagga and

IMW-32

strongly encouraged by aEuropean administration seek-ing to pin-point authority andresponsibility. At the sametime their military unctionshave become unnecessary, andso the importance c age-setsis on the decline.

Ngurdo.tP... cra..te.r

An age-set has one ortwo leaders, washili, in eachmitaa, and each Washili hasan assistant. Although thetwo older age-sets have onlyone leader apiece, the threeyounger ones have adjusted tothe influence of the Christianmissions, each having twowashili, one Christian and onepagan. The washili were impor-tant in Meru; as representativeso the people they were tradi-tionally responsible for themaintenance o roads, schools,and irrigation furrows. AlthoughChristians are in a minority,they have managed to achieveequal representation in theage-sets through this systemo divided leadership. Inpractice Christians have aneven more important politicalrole in the tribe than do pagans.

Finally, there is also a headman umbe, in each of themitaa. Chosen by the clan and age-set eaders together, he is therepresentative of the local authority and, until recently, of theChief, Man_. Although jumbes are usually appointed by the washili,they rare+/-y come from the ranks o the traditional leaders becauseof the danger of conflict between his obligations to the peopleand to the government.

According to Henry Fosbrooke, an ex-Government Sociolo-gist, much of the Meru’s subsequent "political malaises.., derivesin large measure from the coexistence within the tribal polit-ical structure o two important institutions, a mangi, borrow-ed rom the Chagga, and age-sets, borrowed rom the Masai".

An observer who knows them intimately has written:

Ordinarily, the WaMeru are divided amongst them-selves, first as pagan and Christian, and, further,as East and West (the latter being the cradle ofthe tribe and the center of the ruling Clan). Unitycomes only through some overriding, major issue

such as a threat to the security of the land theyoccupy. The tribe lacks some of the traditionalcourtesy, good manners and, particularly, kind-ness to strangers usually associated with theBantu (perhaps due to the overlay o Masai). Theyare a stubborn, suspicious, proud a.nd parochialpeople, who, nevertheless, are responsive to firm andpatient handling. Having accepted a new idea theWaMeru may be relied upon to give it their fullsupport. They are able and industrious culti-vators, and make excellent use o the high, ertileland on the mountain slopes, and are also beginningto adapt themselves to.quite different conditionson the plains.

During my stay in Arusha, I will concern mysel with theorigins o economic and political development among the Meru.To begin with, there follows a somewhat lengthy account o theMeru Land Case. I have gone into this matter in some detailnot because it is the ons et origo o Meru development (it isn’t),but rather because it gave a considerable impetus to such devel-opment, and also because it is a convenient starting point whichcan be pinpointed in an otherwise vague and gradual process.Clearly, however, other actors are o even greater importance.One would expectsomething to happenat the point whena progressive mis-sion had securedsufficient adherents;when a proportion ofthese had had someeducation; when thishas coincided withthe fruits of anintroduced cash crop(in this case coee)and when the triballeadership had beenexposed to outsideinfluences. Indeed,a pertinent questionconcerning the Meruis why things didn’thappen sooner.

Neverthelessthe Meru Land Casedoes present a turn-ing point. Thegradual evolution of

Lake Duluti

Mount Meru

pre ssure s Ieadingto change combinedwith the impact ofthe Land Case creat-ed a situationwhere tribal lifecould no longercontinue as before.Regardless of therights and wrongsof the case, theresult has bene-fitted the Merutremendously asKirilo Japhet lateremphasized: "TheMeru Land Case...was the key to theawakening of theWaMeru to modernprogress. Thebesinning wasbitter, but instead of defeating our people, out of it has comemuch good."

Very sincerely yours,

fan Michael Wright

The line drawing of a colobus monkey on page three is reproducedby courtesy of Miss Ruth Yudelowitz.

Received in New York November 29, 1963.

NOT FOR PUBLICATIOI’

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

The Meru Land Case

November 17, 1951--April 22, 1962

lan Michael Wright

THE MERU LAND CASE

It is not easy to convey the intense lifelong passion mostAfricans feel fo the land. In subsistence economies land assumesa very special importance. It serves as a link between the pastand the present, it is the source of authority, and from a materialstandpoint it is the sole means of support, poor as it may be, forthe great majority. In contrast to the system of individual rightswe know, the dominant African conception is that of communal owner-ship where each member of a tribe has a legitimate claim to theland of the community.

Guy Hunter, in his comprehensive The New Societies of Tro-pical Africa, has pointed out that for these re’asons",’ "’h"d meansnot onl the patch actually under cultivation, but the surrounding’bush’, which seems unoccupied to the European but is in fact thereservoir of wild foods, of game, perhaps of fish. It is also arecreation ground, it often contains the sites of old villages andthe graves of ancestors; it is as much a part of life as the villageclearing and its huts Land and the community are inseparable inthese conditions." He goes on to say, "This psychology of the sub-sistence economy (combined, too, with malnutrition and debilitatingdisease) was at the root of many European judgements on Africanmentality---on lack of forethought, lack of effort, lack of persis-tence, lack of individual ambition, the obstinate refusal to alterland tenure, the elevation of communal loyalty to a shibbolethbeyond all sense and reason."

The importance of land to the African has made him extremelysensitive to the attitude of colonial administrations to his ownrights and to the alienation of land to non-Africans and, more thanany other factor, has influenced the relationship between the colon-ial administration and the people. In Tanganyika less than 1% ofthe land has been alienated. Since it has been considerations ofclimate and soil which have directed the stream of European settle-ment, however, this represents some of the best land in the territory.

The Meru have had contacts with Europeans for more than acentury. Because of the attractiveness of their mountain and itsland, a high proportion of their problems in coming to terms withthem have centered about the land and its ownership. At the out-set the German rgime hoped for a large influx of settlers andtherefore set about encouraging them. An Imperial Decree of 1895declared all land Crown Land subject to individual and corporaterights. Areas were to be reserved for Native occupation, and alocal Ordinance required them to reserve for the Natives at leastfour times the amount of land under cultivation. Lord Halleycomments that, "The provision contemplated was thus more sys-tematic than any scheme of colonization organized by the KenyaAdministration, but the precautions for the protection of Nativerights seem to have been neglected in practice."

When the Germans first took possession of what is nowArusha District in the last decade of the 19th century, theywere impressed by its pleasant climate and apparent agriculturalpotential. At that time the Arusha and Meru tribes lived inscattered settlements high on the mountain which afforded someprotection from raids by the few Masai bands which roamed freelybelow. Since the District appeared almost entirely empty, itseemed clear that European settlers could best develop the land,and so large areas were set aside for their use where farmingwould be attractive and, it was hoped, profitable. Very littledelimitation of tribal land was carried out though, and thealienations dangerously reduced the area available for tribalcultivation.

The Meru do not seem to hve objected to this. On thecontrary, their chiefs were usually associated with the alien-ations, often receiving presents for their efforts (which followsMeru custom). Today the Meru insist that neither the chiefs northe people fully realized they were giving land away for thepermanent nd exclusive use of Europeans, since the whole conceptof absolute ownership of land was contrary to tribal custom. Atthe same time their numbers were few, and theyhardly anticipatedtheir lter population increase. Also, on the whole they werenot directly affected by the changes, since the new owners allow-ed them to graze their cattle and squat freely on the land prob-ably, among other reasons, to ensure an adequate supply of labor.

Contrary to general expectations, however, there was onlya trickle of missionaries and settlers. Soon after the turn ofthe century, a group of Afrikaners known as the Irreconcilablessettled to the north of Mt. Meru. Ironically, they had trekkedoverland to Tanganyika after the Boer War, because they refusedto live under English rule in South Africa. Other settlers fol-lowed, and a few began to realize the alienations were beingcarried out without any regard for the future needs of the Meru,but their warnings went unheeded. A later official report (theWilson Report) observed, "An iron ring of alienated land wasclamped around the native lands on the mountain."

Meanwhile, the benefits of security, law and order, edu-cation, and medical services had led to a rapid population in-crease, and the German Administration took steps to preventfurther alienation. The First World War intervened and Germanylost control of Tanganyika. The Mandatory Instrument under whichthe British Government took charge in 1920 was noticeably vaguein its references to native land rights and policy. It restrict-ed itself to prescribing that no rights were to be given to non-Africans without the previous consent of the Government. Thepractice of consulting the Native Authority concerned beforegranting such rights to non-Africans was later made mandatory in950.

Nevertheless, the new administration adopted a cautiousattitude and issoed no new freehold titles, restricting itselfentirely to leaseholds. It felt bound, however, to honor the

rights granted by the Germans. Thus alienated land for the mostpart remained alienated regardless of whether it was actuallyoccupied by European settlers at the outbreak of the War or not.This distinction is important, because much of the land claimedby the Meru in 1951 was in fact alienated by the Germans althoughnever actually settled by either the Germans or the British.Instead it was used freely for grazing by Europeans and Africansalike. The latter, since they could see no occupants and werenot attuned to the intricacies of western legalities, consideredit theirs for the taking.

Today, it is said the Africans’ first fears that all wasnot well arose at the end of the First World War when the Germanfarms were sold to British and Greek settlers rather than toAfricans. The Wilson Report noted that, "There would appeareven then to have been no proper appreciation of the future landneeds of the Arusha and Meru tribes and the realienation of themajority of the farms so thoughtlessly demarcated by the Germansproceeded without protest. An unparalleled opportunity for re-adjustment was lost. This was very soon realized, but it wasthen too late. The farms had been sold and the ring was oncemore in place."

During the redistribution of ex-enemy property in 1920,eight German farms were retained for the use of the Arusha tribebut none for the Meru. In 1928, however, a group of Meru bandedtogether and bought Farm No. 31 (known as Kilimambozi) at NgareNanyuki, which together with Farm No. 328 was later to assumespecial importance. In 1931, as a result of the recommendationsmade in the Land Development Commission Report, two further farmswere acquired for the Meru, one of which was Farm No. 328 atLegurukio They were bought by the tribe acting through itstreasury encouraged by the Government which had decided the Merushould pay for them by a two shilling annual increase in the polltax over a twenty-seven year period. This decision was made ata time of severe financial stringency in Tanganyika, and in factthey paid the tax for only six years, the remaining payments be-ing waived.

These various transfers proved little more than a palliative.Not only did the Meru continue to demand more land, but the Euro-peans were doing the same, especially the Afrikaners who prefer(as do the Meru) to divide their land amongst all their sons.In order to solve the problem once and for all, the Governmentinitiated a thorough investivation, but this was interrupted bythe Second World War. A situation similar to that after theFirst World War then arose when a good proportion o the alien-ated land was vested in a Custodian of Enemy Property (showingthat many Germans had bought farms in the inter-war years). In196 the Government took over these properties and announcedthey would be disposed of in the best interests of the territory.Soon after, a one-man Commission of Mr. Justice Mark Wilson wasappointed to formulate a comprehensive plan for the redistribu2tion of alienated and tribal land on and around Mt. Meru and Kili-manjaro. His terms of reference included recommendations for ways

Mt. N.eru from Kilima-njaro

to improve "the homo-geneity of alienatedand tribal lands".

Wilson’s was aformidable task indeed.Over the years pressurehad so built up betweenthe two groups’ com-peting claims anddesires that any com-promise was destinedto founder on therocks of pure obstinacy.This quality was evi-dent on both sides.The Meru, increasinglyangry the land hadbeen alienated in thefirst place, wantedevery acre handed over to them. The Europeans, on the other hand,expected the Government to guarantee the farms they had bought orleased. With motives somewheme between personal gain and adesire to see the fullest possible economic development of thearea, they also hoped to obtain the exclusive us of the SanyaCorridor, a block of land stretching between the two mountains,for large scale cattle ranching to supply the territory’s andthe world’s growing demand for meat and dairy products. Thiswould also link the alienated lands of Ngare Nanyuki and Arushaon the west with those of Ngare Nairobi and Moshi on the east.

Wilson found himself not only between the conflictingdesires of European and African, but the Government itself was inthe process of re-evaluating its land policy and moving away fromits traditional one of tribal land protectionism toward one ofland utilization in the interest of tNe territory’s economicdevelopment. Until the Second World War the Government had fol-lowed a policy formulated in 1928 by Sir Donald Cameron ofalienating land where it was available. His policy was basicallyone of protection of native land rights and interests, but hefelt the higher economic efficiency of the European would be anobject lesson to the African. "If land is available and Europeanenterprise and capital desire to undertake those processes then,in my view, it is directly contrary to the interests of thecountry as a whole for the Government to refuse to admit thatenterprise and capital and attempt to hold the land under a deadhand." Concerning the Meru, Cameron said" "The alienation ofwhich I am most proud is the alienation of some 5,000 acres ofland on the lower slopes of Meru and Kilimanjaro, land which wasnot being used by the natives and was denied to the non-natives,land which will I believe be used profitably by a large number

of enterprising persons for growing maize..." Nevertheless,officially there was never any question that African interestswere paramount.

At the end of the Second World War, however, this policyhad changed somewhat in emphasis. Although the new TrusteeshipAgreement’s Articles concerning land were similar to those ofthe Mandatory Agreement which it superseded, the positive eco-nomic development of the territory assumed even greater importance.Article lO .states the Administering Authority should promote "thepolitical, economic, social and educational advancement of theinhabitants of Tanganyika". There nevertheless remained a stronglyprotective bias. In 1946 the Colonial Secretary informed theGovernor that although further alienations would be acceptable,he should avoid racial discrimination in the actual allocationof land, and "I assume also that non-native settlement schemeswould not involve the compulsory movement of the African popu-lation."

Thus there was a gradual change in policy from the para-mountcy of native interests to the co-ordination of racial interests;multi-racialism became the order of the day. Thus economicdevelopment and prosperity, and the combined efforts of all com-munities appeared to be the accepted standards at the time JudgeWilson formulated his report. To anticipate a few years, thispolicy was voiced officially only in 1950 by a new Governor, SirEdward Twining: "The emphasis has...changed from one of who shallhave a particular piece of land to a decision in each case as tohow that piece of land can best be devel.oped in the common interestof all communities in the Territory." Later, he was to be support-ed in this pronouncement by the East Africa Royal Commission of1953-5.

This gradual change in policy coincided with a greaterinterest in economic development throughout the world, but itcreated special problems in Tanganyika, especially in theNorthern Province around Kilimanjaro and Mt. Neru. Here therewas increased utilization or alienation of land for productivepurposes, and since most of this ls.nd went to non-Africans, itaroused suspicions and engendered racial animosity. It also ledto conflict between the British Government and the TrusteeshipCouncil as to which obligation, native land protection or economicdevelopment, was more important.

At the time of Wilson’s investigations, the land situationwas as follows. Lying roughly between the Nduruma River (on thewest) and the Usa River (on the east), Meru country can be saidto fall into several separate zones. The upper slopes, immedi-ately below the forest, are still largely non-Christian and stillused mainly for annual subsistence crops, coffee and pyrethrum.A few of the old grass paddocks, where both the Meru and theArusha kept their cattle with them on the mountain (probably tokeep them out of the hands of the Masai), are still to be seenhere, although they have almost completely disappeared from thecentral area below.

The central mountain zone lies athwart the old Gemmanhomse track to Moshi. Representing the Menu heamtland, it isdensely populated with a chain of mainly Lutheman schools andseveral minom markets and shopping centers. The numerous rivemsand stmeams raising on the mountain have cmeated geographicaldivisions which have become clan divisions and spheres of influencewhich ame reflected in the mitaa om parish names as well as bythe pattemn of chumches. Then comes the ring of alienated land,with a few commidoms through it, below which is expansion landon the south and east. This land is infommally elated to thevamious mitaas, so that on the quite different plains land theold divisions ame maintained.

The pressures leading to the need for expansion land areseveral. Mainly, of course, is population growth. From varioussources the following very approximate population figures emerge:

188 i, 0001922 II, 000198 25,000

3o, ooo1962 O, O00

The 1948 census proved their number to be a good deal largerthan previously estimated and increasing at a rate higher thanthe Tanganyika average of 2% a year. Thus the Meru find in-creasingly less room for expansion on the mountain slopes.

Of considerable importance also, however, is the changein pattern of living caused by the introduction of cash crops,especially the introduction of coffee by the missionariesduring the early years of the century. This proved to be thedeath knell of the position of cattle on the mountain, and asa result the first Meru coffee planters were bitterly opposedby their neighbors. As the area under coffee cultivation grew,the need also grew of moving the cattle off the mountain. Thusthe creation of settlements to the east and south. In the souththe grazing was near enough for the cattle to move down and backdaily, although it encouraged the wasteful habit of daily trekkingand delayed the inevitable process whereby coffee would displacethe cattle completely (except for stall fed milk cows) and cattlewoud be run on the plains by permanent settlers. As the ringof alienated land tightened, however, penetration became moredifficult and cattle corridors occupied a great deal of admin-istrative time. But on the east the situation was differentand more permanent herding camps were necessary.

A third factor causing increased land pressure is theinflux over the years of Africans alien to the tribal areawho have been allowed to settle with little or no control bythe Native Authority. This has taken place especially in thesouth but also in the east, and until recently the majority ofthe taxpayers in some of the southern parishes have been non-Meru.

Finally, and of most importance emotionally and politically,is the question of European settlement. Although the Meru were

Ngurdoto Crater

fortunate in havinglarge alien estateson their bordersto keep back theMasai and althoughthey have neverbeen short of ex-pansion land, lifewould have beenpleasanter and lesschallenging if theyhad had the wholeof the mountainslopes down toMasailand avail-able to them.

The WilsonReport was pub-lished in 197. Whilerecommending that no fundamental redistribution of either tribalor alienated land was feasible, it did consider certain modi-fications in the pattern of ownership to be desirable. As forthe Meru, their immediate needs could best be met by the re-version to them of "a moderate number of ex-enemy farms". Sincetribal needs were greater than the total area of alienated land,however, the real need was expansion into the lower areas awayfrom the mountain, and it was therefore suggested a planneddevelopment project be set in motion to prepare the plains frsettlement, namely at Ongadongishu and Chai, the former to beexcised from Masailand and incorporated into Arusha District.

The solution for the Europeans was just what they hadbeen pressing for all along. The Commission considered itwould be economically unjustifiable to remove them completelybecause of their importance to the economy of the territory asas a whole. Instead it suggested the Sanya Corridor become ahomogeneous European ranching block in which African settlementand grazing would be excluded. The Veterinary Departmentsupported this on the grounds it would then become an infection-free compulsory-dipping zone. The whole of the North MeruReserve, largely populated by Meru and considered sub-marginaland therefore never taken over by settlers, would then bedivided into thirteen large European estates. The Commission’sunderlying assumption was that Africans were incapable of main-taining European standards in cattle ranching.

The Meru were accordingly being asked to give up the twofarms at Ngare Nanyuki (No. 31) and Leguruki (No. 328), thelatter of which was considered to have limited agriculturalpossibilities. They would also have to abandon their previouspractise of grazing their cattle on the rest of the North Meru

Reserve. It was felt the exclusion of the Meru would alsoeliminate a potential source of friction by removing an areawhere the expanding Meru and Chagga tribes were bound one dayto meet. The land they were to be given in return was said tobe better with considerably more room for expansion. Theywould also receive compensation in the form of cash and severalEuropean farms in the central tribal area which would helpdecrease congestion there. Nevertheless, the Report questionedthe need for segregation ("Is it necessary or desirable to seg-regate races, each of which has something to contribute to thewelfare of the other and to the common good?"), and yet itclearly stated that, "The only solution partaking of the natureof the finality to the problem of congestion in the mountaintribal areas is of course to encourage and persuade (and if needsbe to compel) the overcrowded populations to come down from themountains and settle permanently in the lower lands in sufficientnumbers to relieve the present excessive pressure on the upperlands." By accepting the major recommendations of the Report,the Government showed a willingness to accept a policy designedto effect geographical segregation, in part at least, of thepeoples of the territory on grounds of race and social difference.

The Wilson Report, although up to then the most thorougheffort to solve the land problem, was out of touch with Africanopinion and therefore bound to fail. This is most evident inhis misunderstanding of the idea that the entire North MeruReserve belonged to them. From Wilson’s point of view, theReserve had been alienated by the Germans and later by theBritish, and so the Meru had no claim to it whatsoever. Thisled him to believe his solution would be acceptable to them.For if one leaves out the North Meru Reserve and analyzes whatthe Meru would get and lose, they stood to gain both in acreageand quality of land. The eal losers were the Masai, for therevision of their boundary with the Meru meant the latter gainedan enormous amount of land, albeit land not suitable for croppingwithout irrigation.

On the recommendation of the Northern Province Land Utili-zation Committee, a body including both European and Africanmembers, a number of modifications and adjustments were madebetween 199 and 1951. According to Government sources, themodified scheme meant this to the Meru: about 330 familiesrepresenting 1,O00 persons or 5% of the tibe would have tomove from Farms Nos. 31 and 328 (an adjustment had been madewhereby 150 families would be allowed to remain on a small andfertile area in the southern part of Farm No. 328), an area of5,800 acres. In return they would receive ll,O00 acres of aliena-ted land acquired from Europeans in central Meru, the Ongadongishu-Chai area to the south, and an area known as Kingori comprisingabout 18,0OO acres. In addition the use of important salt pans(including those on Farm No. 328) and the necessary means ofaccess to them, were reserved for the tribe.

Furthermore the Government, which steadfastly maintainedthat Kingori was better land than the two farms which the Meru

-lO-

then held, proceeded to develop it as a resettlement area. Apipeline was aid to fifteen domestic and two cattle wateringpoints, two cattle dips were installed, and a veterinary stationwith an African veterinary assistant in charge was set up (todeal with any sickness arising from the presence of a few tsetseflies). The Meru to be moved were to be paid compensationassessed at 14,000, provided with free transport, temporaryhuts in the resettlement area, supplies of food for the settling-in period, and they were to be exempt from taxation for one year.At the same time a development plan of 46,000 for the entireMeru area was drawn up. Altogethe the Government was preparedto commit about 75,000 on the scheme. Again, leaving out theNorth Meru Reserve, the scheme was not ungenerous.

The Meru approached the issue differently, however, andopposition to it was overwhelming. They claimed the land wastheirs traditionally in spite of the Masai origin of its name,Ngare Nanyuki. Ten years later Kirilo Japhet, the Meru leaderwho represented them at the United Nations, spoke of the Meruattitude:

This land was especially beloved by the Merupeople, because it was here that their firstpioneers had come several hundred years before,and from Ngare Nanyuki they had spread south-westwards around the mountain. That area,especially (farm 31), had been a place of con-tention more than once. At an early date in thetribe’s history the Masai bad come and driven offthe WsMeru who were living there, and at a laterdate the WaMeru had returned and chased away theMasai. When in the 1870s the WaArusha had con-quered the western side of the Meru Chiefdom,some of the WaMeru had fled to live in NgareNsnyuki with relatives there. With the arrivlof the Germans much of this land was alienated,but not all of it was settled by Europeans. Onmuch of it, called the "North Meru Reserve", theWaMeru continued to graze their flocks. Thishistorical connection was also one of thereasons why the WaMeru opposed te recommenda-tions of the Wilson Report.

Opposition to the plan grew by leaps and bounds. Alreadydeeply mistrusting Europeans, their suspicions seemed to be con-firmed when they learned they were to be evicted to make roomfor thirteen European estates. When assured the new land wasbetter than that which they farmed, their immediate response was:"If that were true our fathers would long ago have moved there.If you really think it is better, why don’t you give it to thesettlers and just leave us alone on our inferior land?" Theywere convinced the Wilson Report merely served as an apologyfor carrying.out the settler-conceived Sanya Corridor ranchingscheme

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Mt. Meru from SanyaChini

Local politicsalso became inextri-cably intertwinedwith these moreobvious feelingsagainst the move.The then chief, MangiSante, was not ef thetraditional chieflyclan; rather he had beenelected from two candi-dates at a public meet-ing. He was not parti-cularly popular, andsince the thirtiesthere had been acampaign to replacehim by Kishili of thechiefly clan. Although Kishili was once successful for s shortperiod, Sante was reinstated as sole Native Authority early in195. The source of this continuous agitation was a traditionalrivalry between the eastern and western (home of the chiefly clan)parts of Meru, and as such was not likely to die out with thetemporary ascendence of one faction over the other. Oppositionto Sante continued as before, and in an effort to undermine theNative Authority a section of the tribe opposed a proposal fora coffee cess, while at the same time alleging corruption andinitiating a land dispute with the Chief. As his position wasbolstered by the Government, this often took the form of non-cooperation with the Government itself.

In 198 an attempt was made to revise the Native Authorityconstitution on more democratic lines with the assistance of theGovernment Sociologist, Henry Fosbrooke, who sought advice fromabout fifty Meru, including those in opposition to Mangi SanteoUnfortunately the new constitution was hurriedly devised, andalthough it was apparently accepted by the Chief, the Jumbes(headmen), and the 500 age-grade leaders of the Meru, it does notseem to have been put to the people themselves. In essence thisnew constitution enlarged the Native Authority to the Chief andhis tribal council, but it never really worked because the sectorin opposition to Sante, while favoring the constitution, refusedto cooperate in making it work until Sante was removed from office.The Government could hardly accede to such a demand since thecharges against him had not been substantiated. As a result ofcontinuing opposition, twelve of the leaders of this group weredeported to other parts of the territory following judicial proceed-ings. Local government in Meru Chiefdom was ineffective, and littlemore than an uneasy peace prevailed between the two factions.

On June 7, 199 at a baraza (tribal meeting) the Government

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definitely announced its intention of moving those Menu involvedto Eingori. Although it had formally obtained the consent ofMangi Sante for the move (esrlier, when he was sole NativeAuthority), it had been given unwillingly and under duress, andhis present council was strongly opposed to it, as were the vastmajority of his people. Since Sante was already under fire byan increasingly powerful segment of the tribe, his acquiescenceonly brought the tribe closer together in common opposition notonly to himself but also to the Native Authority and the Govern-ment. He was blamed for the loss of the land and accused ofhaving sold it to the Government for his own profit.

Further opposition came from those who stood to lose mostby the evictions, te mainly Christian wealthy cattle-owners ofEast Meru who were using Ngare Nanyuki for grazing their excesscattle, and especially those forward looking ones who had cutup most of their grazing on the mountain and planted coffeeinstead. For them the offer of exchange at Kingori would havemeant an impossibly long food supply line. Those who stood togain were those who could use the pro’fered arable land. Indeedlater it was people from West Meru who first defied the ban ontaking up land in the new settlement areas. In effect theydouble-crossed the East and carved out huge estates f themselves.

There was also suspicion of the age-grade leaders whoplay an important role in the traditional Meru political system.Although they said they opposed the resettlement scheme, mostMeru felt they had done little to oppose it. In general it canbe said that although the proposed move had aroused the deepestfeelings of resentment and bitterness among the tribe, the tradi-tional leaders had not risen to the occasion and fought as hardas their people had expected them to do.

Into this vacuum stepped the Meru Citizens’ Union, Umojawa Raiao Formed in 198 when the possibility of the loss ofthe ’la-nd loomed large, it was encouraged and assisted by theChagga’s Kilimanjaro Union (Nsilo Swai, the present Minister forDevelopment Planning, was its adviser) which was working amongthe Meru ith the object of affiliating them to i$. By pro-claiming the convictions of the common people whose traditionalrulers had failed them, the Meru Citizens’ Un$on quickly becamethe strongest force in Meru. Under the leadership of KiriloJaphet, son of a Lutheran treasurer and namesake of a famousAfrican doctor and himself a Native Authority dresser, Christ-ia-n leader, and Secretary of the Union, it advised the peoplenot to oppose the eviction violently but to refuse to acceptthe compensation offered by the Government. Instead it plannedto take its case to the Colonial Secretary and, if need be, tothe U.N. itself. Its strength at that time is shown by the totalsupport it received in caying out its program.

To the great surprise of most people, the Meru did justthis. They sent appeals to the Governor, to the Colonial Secretary,and to the United Nations. They brought their case before the

1951 U.N. Visiting Mission, which did not have time to investi-gate it fully but expressed the opinion that the removal ofany lnd from actual occupation by Africans was open to questionand warranted the serious attention of the Trusteeship Council.Before its report was issued, however, the Meru had been forciblyevicted.

Two years of intensive effort had obviouslz failed toconvince them that the plan wss for their ultimate benefit. Thus,on October 31, 1951 the new Governor, Sir Edward Twining, intro-duced specisl legislation to facilitate the implementation ofthe Wilson Report. Theme was virtually no opposition to thisordinance and only two Members of the Legislative Council comment-ed on it at all. One, a staunch Afrikaner settler from Arusha,argued it was time to ignore the Fabian Society and the UnitedNations. The other, Chief Kidaha, was one of two African nom-inated Members, and he incumred the everlasting wrath of the Meruand nationlists in general by castigating certain elements ofthe Meru tribe for deliberately trying to go against an honor-able agreement which bound them. .is political influence amongAfricans rspidly declined, and ecently he was exiled to Sumba-wanga in south-western Tanganyika (where the monkeys have notails, they were bitten off by whales---in the old bar-room song).

Outside Legislative Council, however, there was a moderateamount of criticisms. Early in 1951 Mr. E.R. Danielson, Super-intendent of the Lutheran Church of Northern Tanganyika, wroteto the Government expressing his belief that if the scheme werecarried out a smouldering resentment would be started among theAfricans, who believed that the European settlers were forcingthe issue on the Government, and that this resentment might causeincreasing trouble for many years to come. Certain members ofthe District administration also advised strongly against themove, and the District Commissioner himself asked to be reassignedrather than carry out his orders.

Nevertheless the ordinance csme into effect on November 3and the first evictions took plsce two weeks later. It isdifficult to ascertain exactly what happened between November 17and December 12, by which time the evictions were completed.The official Government position is stated clearly in a WhitePaper published later as a result of widespread interest andcriticism in Tanganyika, the United Nations, and elsewhere.According to this document (The Meru Land Problem. GovernmentPrinter, Dar es Salaam---1952), the Meru were informed at abaraza that those who vacated their lands voluntarily beforeoveber 17 would receive free transport for themselves, theirpersonal effects and foodstuffs; that they would have theopportunity of choosing the best land in the resettlement areaand would receive exemption from income tax for 1953. They werealso warned that if they declined to leave, their possessionswould be removed to Kingori and their huts would be demolishedbehind them. In spite of this the Meru refused to move, andsubsequent events showed a high degree of organization amongthem undoubtedly sponsored by the Meru Citizens’ Union.

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The Meru were determined, and when police and trucks cameto move them off Farm No. 31, they abandoned their houses andfrom a distance watched their belongings taken away and theirhuts destroyed. Three prsons harranguing the crowd werearrested and later convicted of trespass. As the demolition oftheir houses appeared to have little effect, 400 cattle and1,200 sheep were impounded and, after being dipped, were removedto Kingori where they were quickly claimed by their owners. Therest of the cattle and sheep on Farm No. 31 were immediately re-moved after this. Two cattle died of East Coast Fever, unattri-butable to the move, but there were no other losses.

The move from Farm No. 328 and other areas concerned wentmore smoothly, no doubt because many of those moved were non-Meru.A man who had volunteered to move, however, died before he board-ed the truck, but a post mortem determined he was in an advancedstate of tuberculosis and had been ailing for some time. TheCitizens’ Union later claimed a woman in childbirth had beenforced from her home and her child had died as a result. "Thefacts are that the woman was visited by the District Commissionerwho told her that she could remain until her condition improved.Nevertheless, she was removed by the tribesmen and on a later visitthe District Commissioner found her gone. No information of anykind regarding her later condition or whereabouts was received andany responsibility regarding the alleged death of the child mustrest on those who moved the child contrary to advice."

Altogether some 330 taxpayers representing about 1,O00persons were evicted, 92 homes and storehouses were destroyed,O0 cattle and 1,200 sheep were moved to Kingori, and twenty-five arrests were made with subsequent terms of imprisonmentranging from two weeks to the maximum penalty of three months.

The White Paper concluded: "It has always been Govern-ment’s policy not to allocate land under Rights of Occupancyunless the Native Authority concerned has been fully consultedand normally, its agreement obtained Where, however, landis required in order to carry out a scheme of general benefitto the territory it may be necessary to acquire land compulsorily&n the absence of consent, as in the present case."

The evictions aroused widespread indignation, as itappeared the interests of the European settlers had been con-sidered over and above those of the African majority. Duringthe evictions, on December 5, 1951, the following exchange tookplace in the House of Commons with Mr. Lennox-Boyd, Minister ofState for Colonial Affairs:

Mr. John Paton: Would the Minister inform theHouse who are the beneficiaries of this newly formedranch land, and whether it is the case that some ofthe new lands offered the tribesmen are tsetse in-fected?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: All th questions were goneinto b the native authorities and they are fullysatisfied with proposals of th late Government,

which this Government fully endorse.

Mr. Paton: Would the Minister please answermy question? Who are the beneficiaries in respectof the land?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I hope the beneficiaries arethose people who will bring prosperity to thewhole territory. (Hon. Members: Will they beEuropeans?) Yes, no doubt they will be Europeans.

Most of those who had been evicted moved in with theirrelatives in the already congested central tribal area. Onlytwenty-one non-Meru families moved to Kingori, although as timewent on a few Meru drifted there from other settled areas. OneMeru alone claimed compensation, while eleven non-Meru accepted310. The Government charged the Citizens’ Union with usingintimidation to prevent anyone accepting compensation.

Meru fortunes were at a low ebb. Bitter and hostile, theyrefused to cooperate with the Government or any of its officials,even agricultural and cooperative officers. The Native Authorityceased to function, as did the courts, and at no time had relationsbetween the Administration and the tribe been worse. There werethreats against Mangi Sante’s life, and it appeared to some thatin answer to the forced evictions the tribe was prepared also toresort to force if necessary. Another cause for apprehensionwas that only a few months previously Kirilo Japhet had personallyconducted eight Meru schoolchildren to Jomo Kenya tts’s IndependentSchool at Githunguri in Kenya. The rapidly deteriorating situ-ation there and this evidence of close contact between Meru andKikuyu political leaders caused great concern in official circles.

The Government seriously wanted a rapprochement but therift was wide. The Meru neglected everything and submergedthemselves in the emotions generated by the evictions. Aneconomic recession set in. Their mainstay, the coffee crop,dropped by half and its quality plummeted. Only the boomprices of 1952-53 kept reductions in income bearable, and moralehit bottom.

In January 1952 the Citizens’ Union wrote the ColonialSecretary who replied three months later that the decision toset aside the land for European ranching scheme was final.Since their appeal to the Trusteeship Council was due for con-sideration in July, the Union hastily collected funds by pri-vate subscription to sen a tribal representative and lawyer topresent their petition. The Meru Coffee Growers’ Associationlent over 2,000 for this purpose, and early in July, KiriloJaphet, accompanied by Earle Seaton, a Bermudan advocatepracticing in Moshi, left for New York.

The dispute, since known as the Meru Land Case, was thustaken to the United Nations where the Trusteeship Council firstdiscussed the petition in July 1952o They heard Kirilo Japhetand Earle Seaton give quite a different account from that which

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the Administering Authorityhad given. They claimed the .....move had caused great hardship

AsanditsUhadfferbeening ameffe ctedng the Msoi eyerufor the benefit of thirteenEuropean settlers, they con-sidered it a clear example ofracism. Mr. Seaton went on tostate that 3,000 Meru were evic-ted; 724 homes, 489 storehouses,and 23 cattle pens were des-troyed; 707 cows, i,0 sheep,and 1,941 chickens ere lost;one man died; and seven womensuffered miscarriages. Here iiSeaton brought in the questionof the 78,000 acre North MeruReserve which has since beendeleted from maps of the area.He claimed the Meru owned theentire Reserve and not onlythe two farms amounting to5,800 acres.

Kir_ilo .J.aphet

Three weeks later Kirilo Japhet appeared before the Council"Whand asked pointedly, o is in control of Tanganyika?" Later,

in his final appearance, he said, "I must discourage my peopleagainst resorting to the means of force and anarchy now employedby some Africans in Kenya. But in doing this, I should like youto tell me what I should tell my people."

But the Trusteeship Council was confronted with a faita_ccompli about which it could do little. Although the WilsonReport had been published in 197, the British Government hadsteadily maintained the Council could review a matter only aftera decision had taken place, and this was not a case where reversalwas possible. After hearing both sides, it passed a resolutionon July 22 (8 to l) regretting the Administering Authority shouldhave found it necessary to move any of the people and to evictthem forcibly but recognizing that the movement "forms part ofa larger scheme...advantageous to the majority of the indigenousinhabitants of the Arusha-Moshi area". It further suggested thatin future no further movements be made without "a clear expressionof the collective consent". It otherwise urged the Government totake action on resettlement, compensation, and general development.

The Tanganyika Government immediately replied with theWhite Paper, and the Governor told the Legislative Council that"There is nothing in the resolution which conflicts with thepolicy which Government is already pursuing, and Government isalready taking action on the very lines urged by the resolution."The Meru, however, were dissatisfi@d with the outcome; so theybrought their case before the Fourth Committee of the GeneralAssembly a few months later. Here they received a more sympathetic

hearing. By 92 votes to 17 it adopted a resolution recommendingthe immediate restoration of the land in question to the Merupeople. It also recommended that the Administering Authorityeducate and train the tribe in modern agriculture and ranchingtechniques.

This victory was received jubilantly by the Meru whorefused to believe the General Assembly might not uphold theFourth Committee’s decision. But this is just what happened.A few days later in the Genersl Assembly the voting was only28 for to 20 against, thus failing to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority by a meagre but all-important four votes. TheMeru were baffled over the question of a two-thirds majority,and they suspected they had won but that the British were nottelling the truth. This could have led to violence had not away been found out of the impasse.

Clearly bold and imaginative political action was calledfor. The Native Authority had been reorganized, because theGovernment could no longer afford to support an unpopular chiefwhose own government had collapsed. Accordingly, Mangi Santewas persuaded to resign. He announced his resignation at abaraza on December 17, 1952 when he made it clear that he haddone so in the interests of his tribe and of his own free will.It was further announced that the entire Native Authority con-stitution would be revised and, in a calculated risk to proveits good intentions, the Government allowed the political detaineesexiled in 198 to return home.

This served to clear the air a bit and offered an oppor-tunity to deal with the political and economic problems of thetribe. On December 29 at another baraza the Provincial Commis-sioner announced his intention of revising the constitution,and he asked the pro-Citizens’ Union adience to cooperate insetting up a drafting committee. By this time the Union hadbecome the only effective political body in Meru. The Chairmanof the Meru tribal council had recently joined it, resultingin its increased stature and the virtual elimination, politically,of the tribal council. The Union’s first reaction to the PC’soffer was that their own management committee would make anideal constitutional committee, but Government frowned upon thisself-appointed body. After protracted negotiations, however, itallowed the Union to nominate all 16 African members of the Com-mittee, which was known formally as the Committee to Examine theAdministration of Local Government and Local Courts Amongst theWaMeru. Two official European members, Michael Davies and HenryFosbrooke, District Commissioner of Arusha District and SeniorGovernment Sociologist respectively, completed the Committee.Michael Davies was Chairman, and two Meru served as Vice-Chair-man and Secretary. Three of the ex-deportees also sat on theCommittee.

Although Meru political leaders had re-established contactwith the Government and were beginning to move into power, the

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mood of the people remained as before, hostile and antagonistic.In March 1953, the Government posted a Social Development Officer,Horace Mason, to live amongst them and concern himself with thepolitical situation within the tribe and try to bring about arapprochement between Administration and people. During 1953snd part of 195, the only Government officials with whom theMeru had any contact at all were Michael Davies, Henry Fosbrooke,and Horace Mason. Clearly this type of personal administrationws hrdly satisfactory state of affairs.

The Meru once more brought their case before the Trust-eeship Council in 1953, but this time it deferred any decisionuntil the 1954 U.No Visiting Mission to Tanganyika could investi-gate the situation. It continued to keep close track of eventsby the normal means of report and questions, however.

The Meru Land Case continued to be a sore point, exacer-bating relations between Government and tribe. Kirilo Japhetreturned from America in July 1953 and in December headed adelegation to the District Commissioner to inform him that theMeru intended to reoccupy the Ngare Nanyuki farms in the newyear. As a result of grve warnings by the DC and advice againstit by the Superintendent of the Luthersn Mission, no such actionwas tken, but it nevertheless cast doubts upon Kirio Japhet’sleadership and led to a decline in his influence with the newleaders, prticularly those from West Meru.

Gradually the situation began to improve. The Con-stitutional Committee agreed upon new and more democraticconstitution, slbeit at s cost. United on the land issue,the Citizens’ Union split wide open on the question of futurepolitical ognization. The pogressives wanted to give thepeople more power through democratic elections, and the conserva-tives were determined the traditional leaders should retain dominantauthority. The resulting constitution was more advanced than theold, but it retained many of its traditional undemocratic features.In the subsequent voting for a new Council and a new Chief, theconservative candidate from the traditional chiefly clan, SylvanusKaaya, was returned by a narrow mrgin (in a 1% poll) over themore progressive east side candidate. Th old cleavage of Merusociety had reappeared, this time as a result of implementing anew democratic constitution.

Thus within a year and a half of the Ngare Nanyuki evic-tions a new constitution had been devised, promulgated, and putinto operation. For the first time in many years Meru Chiefdomhad a working government representing a higher proportion of thepeople than ever before, and relations had been re-establishedbetween Government and tribe.

Meanwhile, Government wanted to revise the Meru develop-ment plan which had been implemented without consulting the Meruand without their participation. Although only half the 6,0OOoriginally earmarked for the plan was left, the previous invest-

The meeting at NgsreNanyuki on EasterSunday.

ment hardly influ-enced life in Meruat all. Most of ithad been used forthe improvement ofthe resettlementarea at Kingori wherethe vast majority ofthose evicted refusedto settle. By widen-ing the tribe’s rolein spending the rest,it was hoped to adda bit of local ini-tiative in thedevelopment of theChiefdom. The money was accordingly set aside for use by the Councilen community development, self-help schemes, roads, water supplies,and education.

Soon, however, a rift began to develop between the new Counciland the Citizens’ Union. As the Council increased its power, thelatter began to decline. A number of prominent Union members wereappointed to responsible positions in the Native Authority, and theygradually began to transfer their loyalties to the new organization.A further conflict appeared when those ishing to keep Mangi Syl-vanus Kaaya in office showed their disinclination to follow theUnion’s leadership by accepting the compensation offered by theGovernment and moving to Kingoi against its ban.

In September 195 the U.N. Visiting Mission (generally con-sidered pro-Meru) investigated the situation thoroughly and foundthat in 1952, after the land was cleared of Africans, it was indeedalienated to thirteen European settlers in blocks of from 2,000 to20,000 acres. Four of these were on the verge of failure, and themodern dairying industry envisaged in the Wilson Report was not evenin sight. The Meru, as stubbornly as ever, demanded the eturn ofthei farms and still refused to accept compensation. Their casewas discussed and their position supported throughout the territoryby the more educated Africans and by the newly-formed TangnyikaAfrican National Union (TANU). To Africans the problem was stillvery much alive.

The Mission also noted that the amount of land in ArushaDistrict alienated to a few hundred people was larger than thatavailable for settlenent by Africans who then numbered about 120,000.The Administering Authority disputed this, although its figuresshow the amount of African land only slightly in excess of alien-ated land.

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In discussions with the Government, the Mission heard themmaintain the move had been in the interests of the area as a whole.The Government was also carrying out the planned development pro-gram, and rapport with the tribe was being re-established. Officialssaid, however, that dissension was growing within the tribe, and that"the position of those most strongly urging it not to move from itsposition .on the case had weakened." It was suggested also that therewas some dissatisfaction with the accounting of funds raised by theMeru Citizens’ Union to send Mr. Kirilo Japhet to the United Nationsin 1952 and for other purposes, including legal expenses. Finally,officials of the Government described Mr. Japhet to the Missionas a ’dangerous agitator’, although it heard no hints of criticismon these matters from any of the Meru people with whom it cameinto contact.

The Mission also talked with the Meru Citizens’ Union, theMeru Council, and the Northern Province branch of TANU, all ofwhich espoused similar views. The Citizens’ Union still pressedfor the return of the two farms, but they criticized the Govern-ment on a wide range of topics from land policy to education andmedical services. They were particularly upset about the pipedwater supply at Kingori which, they said, was unfit for human con-sumption and had even dried up a few months before. They broughthe Mission two bottles of clean water from their old supply andone of brownish water from the pipeline. The Mission later visit-ed the two supplies and noted the piped water was indeed brown,although the Meru women drank it freely (there was no alternative).The Administering Authority claimed that although water from theNgare Nanyuki River appeared clear, it had an excess of flourineand was perhaps even dangerous.

When the Mission talked with the Meru Council, the followingexchange took place with one of the evicted farmers:

Q. What do you people feel should be done now?A. I want only to return to Ngare Nanyuki.Q. Do you want the settlers to be moved away?A Yes, because I was there---it is my place.Q. Would you be satisfied with some other land?A. No, because Ngare Nanyuki is very good for

cattle, and because I want only to go baek there.Q. Even if land just as good or better was offered to you?A. I don’t want to go to any land except Ngare Nanyuki.

The Meru Citizens’ Union and the Meru Council brought tothe attention of the Mission a further land dispute involvingthe Focsaner farm at Singisi Poll (Farms Nos. 90 and 91) in themain area of European settlement separating the central tribalarea from the plains. They claimed that irrespective of Mr. Foc-saner’s title the land had always been theirs and had been settledcontinuously even before the Germans alienated it, Meru familieshad remained on it, and there was no problem until Mr. Focsanertried to sell part of the farm and found the Meru unwilling tomove. This was further complicated when he fenced off and threat-ened to close a corridor which was traditionally used as a live-stock passage between the high villages and the plains below.

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The church at NgareNanyuki. Above thedoor is en.gravedUhamisho (The Re-moval) 17-11-51,KuRudi (The Return)2-k62.

The administrationsupported Mr. Foc-scaner and consider-ed the Meru squat-ters.

The Meru tookthe case to court,but in view of therecent Ngare Nanyukievictions the Govern-ment felt it couldnot risk a judge-ment unfavorable to the tribe. But by purchasing the land andthereby prejudging the issue, it ran the risk of having its motivesmisunderstood. It was decided to take the risk, however, and the20 acres in dispute were bought by Government for the Meru. Theremaining 760 acres were acquired later at an inflated price.

The Mission also visited Ngae Nanyuki and Kingori whileon a drive around Mt. Meru. Although it was unable to judge therelative merits of the land, it noted diplomatically that while thethe new land was greener, it lacked the scenic charm of the old.

It was only by chance the Mission heard the extent of thedissatisfaction of the settlers who had taken up the farms fromwhich the Meru had been evicted. In Moshi, it was approached by aMr. Barrington, one of the new farmers. Speaking for severalsettlers, Barrington claimed they had found the cost of clearingand development prohibitive, and their work showed no signs ofever becoming remunerative. In order to avoid friction, they wereforced to allow Africans to graze cattle on their land. In spiteof this they feared a crisis similar to that occurring in Kenya.Some destruction of signposts and boundary markers had alreadytaken place, and their lives had been indirectly threatened. Theyfelt they had never been fully informed of the extent of the Africans’resentment and hostility to the alienation of the land.

Furthermore, some of the land was unsuitable for the purposes(mixed farming) for which it was granted to them. They felt itwas ideal for peasant cultivation because of its hundreds of pocketsof rich arable land, whose broken nature on the other hand madeEuropean farming methods impracticable. In other wods, they wouldbe more than happy to sell as long as the received land in exchange(he mentioned Kingori as appropriate land) and compensation forthe improvements they had made.

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The Mission concluded that "the land and its use and tenurecomprise, in the African mind, the outstanding political and eco-nomic issues of the day If the Meru case is a by-word amongpolitically conscious Africans throughout the Territory, it isnot so much for the sake of the Meru people as because of thedoubts which their case has raised as to the whole meaning andintention of non-African, and especially European, settlement inthe Territory." It would be unwise, therefore, to delay thesettlement of the question any longer in the face of the consistentMeru attitude and the failure of several of the European farmsinvolved.

But by then Government was concerned only to forget the case.The satisfactory settlement of the Focsaner dispute as well as thepurchase of two European farms to be devoted to the social, eco-nomic, and educational advancement of the tribe demonstrsted asmuch as anything its goodwill. In October 1955 a large number ofevictees came forward to claim compensation despite the ban by theCitizens’ Union. By 1957 individual Meru had accepted 7,437 incompensation, and claims were still being received. The developmentof the Sanya Corridor as a large-scale ranching and dairying areahad failed, and by 1960 some of the European settlers had soldtheir land back to the Meru. At that time the major obstacle re-maining concerned the value of the land which had increased greatlybeyond the amount of compensation set aside for it in 1951.

On April 22, 1962, Easter Sunday, the strings of the storycame together. The occasion was the dedication of a church onFarm No. 31, built with funds received in compensaotion for anotherchurch destroyed during the evictions of 1951. The ceremony waswidely hailed as the formal conclusion of the case, and many ofthose involved attended. Kirilo Japhet spoke of the history of theaffair; others spoke of the future; choirs and bands entertainedthe small proportion of celebrants who managed to squeeze intothe church; and several bees buzzed those seated near the altar.Later, an ox was roasted in a giant barbecue. It was crowded andfestive. The warm sun beat down on the corrugated iron roof, andeveryone rejoiced.

The Meru affair was played out on two stages, and thecharacters and issues on each were quite different. On the worldstage, at the United Nations, it formed a small episode in thegrowing pressure against Great Britain and its resist@nce tointerference in colonial matters. Kirilo Japhet and Earle Seatonmade the most of their case and stretched things a bit, but thenso did the Administering Authority. There is little doubt thepublicity and resulting moral pressures on Britain to justify heractions had a sobering effect, although this also deepened therift between Government and people. In general the United Nationssupported the idea of a large-scale ranching scheme, but it didnot accept the need for forcible evictions. The political im-portance of the case lay in the creation of two racially homo-

geneous areas in a trust territory and an avowedly multi-racialsociety.

Locally the issues were different. The Government wascertainly misguided in its efforts to force a solution on the Meruin the face of such overwhelming opposition. Indeed, in Dar esSalaam it was generally considered that a psychological and admini-strative blunder had occurred. Clearly the local administrativepeople should have been more in touch with Meru opinion. Theirfailure lay in only sounding out an unpopular chief who opposedthe scheme (although no Meru believed this) but later allowed him-self to be pressured into supporting it. What probably hit theMeru hardest was the realization that the entire North Meru Reservedid not belong to them. Had the administration realized the emotionsbehind their stand, they could not have made such a blunder in think-ing that what was proposed would be acceptable to them. Neverthe-less, the Meru reaction contrasts markedly with those of the Chaggaand Masai who, although opposed to the sections of the Wilson Re-port concerning them, cooperated in the execution of the scheme.

It is often said that the then Governor, Sir Edward (nowLord) Twining, was misled by his advisers and would not have agreedto the proposals had he looked at them on the ground. Later hecommented, "In the light of experience, it is clear that theGovernment made a psychological mistake in forcing the issue afterthe strong opposition of the Meru had been displayed, but at thetime there was the conviction of the rightness of the case andthat the ultimate benefit to be derived by all concerned made itnecessary to evict the Meru compulsorily as had been done in thecase of the European sett].ers."

In retrospect, it would have been sad had the scheme notbeen carried out, because in the long run the Meru benefittedenormously by this blunder. Lacking unity and developed leader-ship, the tribe came together over the question c land. Althoughthis unity unfortunately lasted only a short time, it was sufficientto stimulate them to fairly spectacular progress.

Received in New York November 29, 1963.

the meru special report: the meru land case

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