the meaning of evaluative expressions

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T H E M E A N I N G OF E V A L U A T I V E EXPRESSIONS 1

BERNARD DAVIS

Since G. E. Moore ' s Principia Ethica, ~ the major question of meta-ethics has been "What do ethical expressions mean?" And since R. M. Hare ' s The Language of Morals,8 a major par t of this question has become "Are ethical expressions prescriptive or descriptive?" 4

To see how the prescription vs. description argument generally goes, let us consider the non-ethical evaluative judgment " the word ' th rough ' should be spelled ' t ' , 'h ' , ' r ' , 'o ' , 'u ' , 'g ' , ' h ' . "

If we regard the sentence as a prescription we will want to say that " ' th rough ' should be spelled ' t ' ' h ' ' r ' ' o ' ' u ' 'g ' ' h ' " is analytically equivalent to " ' t h r o u g h ' is spelled ' t ' ' h ' ' r ' ' o ' ' u ' 'g ' ' h ' " taken prescriptively, to "let us spell ' th rough ' as ' t ' ' h ' ' r ' ' o ' ' u ' 'g ' ' h ' , " or to some similar prescriptive sentence. A n d we may argue that such an equivalence is needed in order to explain the efficacy of evaluative terms in guiding conduct.

On the other hand, if we choose to regard the sentence as a description we will want to say t h a t " ' th rough ' should be spelled ' t ' 'h ' ' r ' ' o ' ' u ' 'g ' ' h ' " is analytically equivalent to some sentence taken descriptively, e.g., "in this society educated people spell ' th rough ' ' t ' ' h ' ' r ' ' o ' ' u ' 'g ' ' h ' . " We can then argue that i tds because the person who accepts the sentence wants to do what is by definition what he should do that the evaluative judgment is efficacious in guiding conduct. In our example, the evaluative judgment will

a I cannot overestimate my debt to R. M. Hare, first, in that this paper is primarily a refinement of the views he put forth in The Language of Morals and Freedom and Reason, second, in that his lectures at The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education in the fall term of 1968-69 led me to write it, and third, for his very helpful criticism of a preliminary version of this paper.

An earlier version of this oaoer was oresented to the meeting of the American Philosophical Association (Western Division) in Cleveland, May 1969.

2 Moore, George Edward. Principia Ethica. Cambridge, 1903. s Hare, R. M. The Language o[ Morals. Oxford, 1952. 4 For characterizations of "prescriptive" and "descriptive," cf., R. M. Hare, The

Language of Morals, Oxford, 1952, pp. 1-16, pp. 180-197; and Freedom and Reason, pp. 21-29. And G. E. M. Anseombe's definition that a sentence is descriptive if in case of disagreement with the state of the world it is wrong, but prescriptive if in case of disagreement with the state of the world is wrong. - cf., Intention, Oxford (1958) .~ 33, Vl~. 56-57.

The definition I would larefer (for taking or accepting as 1oreseril~tive) is the following, where P is the statement that p or the sentence which states that p: someone accepts P as descriptive if, if not p, then he rejects P; someone accepts P as prescriptive if, if not p, then he does not, for this reason, reject P, but rather attempts, insofar as he thinks it feasible, to alter the world so that p.

220 The Journal of Value Inquiry

be efficacious because the hearer wants to spell "through" as educated people in his society spell "through."

Considering the sentence a prescription will not account for the feeling of the evaluator that some things are necessarily what he ought to do. And it will not account for the fact that we can ordinarily derive from the evaluative judgments of members of our own society, factual information about the things evaluated. But these phenomena, we could argue, can be explained on the basis of the evaluator's beliefs or dispositions to act (and in the second case on the basis of our knowledge of his beliefs or dispositions).

Considering the sentence a description will not account for the efficacy of evaluative judgments in guiding behavior. And it does not account for the fact that we can ordinarily derive from people's evaluative judgments information about what they will do with regard to the things evaluated. But these phenomena, we could argue, can be explained on the basis of the evaluator's beliefs or dispositions to act (or of our knowledge of his beliefs or dispositions).

I can see no argument by which the holder of either view can defeat his opponent. For the dispute consists only in the holder of one view taking as analytic the equivalence between an evaluation and some correlated prescription, while his opponent takes as analytic the equivalence between the evaluation and some description.

But, what is meant by saying that an equivalence between two expressions is analytic? While the question of the clarity of the analytic-synthetic distinction has been hotly disputed for some time, when an equivalence is called analytic it is at least meant that this equivalence is true and that it is one of a set of true relations which, together, imply the truth of no sentence which says anything of the world, and which include the relations which constitute logic and those which constitute definitions. No one wants to take a set of relations which violates these conditions as analytic. One who holds that evaluations are prescriptions and one who holds that they are descriptions only disagree as to which set of relations (each set satisfying these conditions) is to be considered analytic. This can be determined either by looking at how people speak or by stipulations.

If this disagreement is to be settled by stipulation there is nothing to be said. One disputant will stipulate an analytic equivalence between the evaluation and some prescription. The other will stipulate an analytic equivalence between the evaluation and some description. In this case we can argue about the adequacy of the resulting language. But, we have already allowed that inadequacies are to be covered by allowing one's opponent's purported analytic relations to exist, not as analytic, but just as a matter of the evaluator's beliefs or dispositions to act.

On the other hand, the dispute may be taken to be settled by what people actually do take to be analytic. But this too will fail, for people don't take connections (or sentences) to be analytic or non-analytic. They do take some connections to be tighter and harder to break than others. But ana-

Discusaions]i 221

lyticity only comes in when their speech is described in the model of 'meanings' commonly used by philosophers. What is analytic is a signifi- cant question for this model. But this model is not a very good one. Words and sentences are noUused in such a way that what is communicated or understood by them is something limited to what is analytically equivalent to them. If I look into a dictionary, under 'gnu,' I learn much more than can be considered analytic (e.g., the fact that oxlike antelopes inhabit southern Africa). If I say "John is as ugly as a gnu," neither a meaning nor a dictionary definition will suffice for you to understand me.5 A more ac- curate description of the actual function of expressions might be formed if we had some notion like that of sameness of meaning but wherein the restriction that only analytically equivalent expressions have the same 'meaning' could be replaced by some restriction more suitable to the function of the expression. In fact, we can define such a notion.6

We will define having the same functional meaning so that two expressions will have the same functional meaning with respect to S under R if and only if their equivalence is derivable from S by R, where S is a set of sentences and R is a set of rules of inference. This can be done in the following way: let Conseq R(S) be the set of all sentences derivable from the sentences in S by repeated applications of the rules in R. We will say that two sentences A and B have the same functional meaning with respect to S under R if and only if A ~ Conseq R (S~{B)) and B e Conseq R (S~{A}). We will say that two expressions a and 13, of any syntactic category, have the same functional meaning with respect to S under R if and only if substitution of 13 for a, in any sentence A which contains ~, yields a sentence B which has the same functional meaning with respect to S under R as does the sentence A. (Substitution will not be considered to extend to expressions within quotation or indirect discourse, and the language will be as- sumed devoid of homonyms.)

With respect to the information contained in thermodynamics alone "the temperature of this gas" and "the mean kinetic energy of the molecules of

A very cogent argument for the thesis that analytic information is not generally sufficient for interpretation is provided by Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, "The Present Status of Automatic Translat ion of Languages" (Appendix III) in Advances in Computers, Vol. I, New York, 1960, pp. 158-163.

With respect to the function of expressions in science, Hilary Putnam, in "The Analytic and the Synthetic", Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3, Minneapolis, 1962, pp. 358-397, has shown that whenever a term has theoretical ties to more than one set of logically equivalent expressions, whether any particular connection is deemed analytic makes no difference as to how the term is used in science. And, he argues, in this case none of these connections can have all of the properties ascribed to analytic connections.

e In any actual use of a not ion of meaning, it is not important whether a meaning is to be considered a class of expressions, a mental entity, or some other thing. All that is important is what constitutes equivalence, or partial equivalence, of meaning. Therefore, we need only define what it is to have the same 'meaning. '


this gas" do not have the same functional meaning. But their functional meaning with respect to the science formed when thermodynamics is re- duced to the statistical mechanics of molecules is the same, and we can say that the temperature of a gas just is the mean kinetic energy of its molecules, and that this is what "temperature" 'means.' If S and R contain all that is analytic then "to triturate" and "to grind" have the same functional meaning with respect to S under R. But "to triturate" and "to grind" will not have the same functional meaning with respect of S' under R', for S' and R' containing only the information available in most pocket dictionaries.

If we turn to speaking of the functional meaning of evaluative expressions, with respect to S and R which need not be limited to analytic truths, we can do justice to evaluative expressions as people actually conceive them and use them - as having both a prescriptive and a descriptive 'meaning.'

In The Language o] Morals, R. M. Hare states that the word "good" has both a prescriptive and a descriptive meaning. He regards these, however, as separate meanings. And he regards the prescriptive meaning as the real or 'primary' meaning.7

7 In Freedom and Reason, pp. 21-29, Hare restates his position in a manner which can be read as fully agreeing with the one I shall take in this paper. This essay can be regarded as an investigation of how this view of the nature of evaluative terms is related to the actual function and interpretation of all terms.

J. O. Urmson, in "On Grading", in Logic and Language, second series, Antony Flew, ed., Oxford, 1953, pp. 159-186, makes a number of observations on peculiaxities of grading labels, which, it seems to me, can only be accomodated by some position s'Lmilar to the one I shall take in this paper.

Urmson notes that a grading label is not merely descriptive, yet he notes that grading is by definite criteria. He insists that grading labels are not synthetically related to their criteria:

. . . to regard the relat ion between 'good' and the criteria for a good apple as synthetic is . . . absurd. If someone were to admit that an apple was of 2 inches diameter, regularly shaped, of pleasing taste, high vitamin content, and pest- free, no r claimed that it lacked some other essential characteristic but none the less denied that it was a good apple it would not merely be empirically surprising; it would involve a breakdown in communication. (Logic and Language, p. 176)

Yet he wants to insist that the relation isn't analytic. The facts noticed [about the relation of a grading label X to its acknowledged natural criteria A. B and C ] . . . tempt us to say that 'This is X ' is just an ordinary empirical statement, that X is just an abbreviat ion for A, B, C . . . . But this doctrine . . . does not survive much reflection . . . we may merely note tha t the puzzle of how our intelligent apprentice was to distinguish apple grading from sorting out black and white draughts pieces is in effect repudiated by this naturalistic doctrine with the answer that there is no real distinction. And this is obviously false. (Logic and Language, pp. 171-172)

If we consider evaluations to be either descriptions or prescriptions we must simply deny the t ru th of some of these purported facts about grading labels. The notion of

Discuss ions 223

. . . the meaning of 'good motor-car ' . . �9 is something that might be known by someone who did not know the criteria of its application; he would know, if someone said that a motor-car was a good one, that he was commending it; and t o

know that, would be to know the meaning of the expression. F u r t h e r . . . someone might k n o w . . . (how to apply the word to the right objects, and use it for giving and getting information) and yet be said not to know its meaning; for he might n o t

know that to call a motorcar good was to commend it.s

H a r e insis ts tha t r e l a t ions of e n t a i l m e n t c a n n o t h o l d b e t w e e n desc r ip t i ve

s en t ences and e v a l u a t i v e sen tences . H e notes , h o w e v e r , tha t :

� 9 the relation of the expression 'good motor-car' to the criteria for its application is very like the relation of a descriptive expression to its defining characteris- ties . . . . 9

O f the w o r d " o u g h t " H a r e s tates:

It i s . . . possible to treat 'I ought to do X' as a confused mixture of three judgments. (1) 'X is required in order to conform to the standard which people generally

accept' (statement of sociological fact); (2) 'I have a feeling that I ought to do X' (statement of psychological fact); (3) 'I ought to do X' (value-judgment). . . . it is usually impossible for an ordinary person, untrained in logical subtleties, to ask or to answer the question 'Which of these three judgments are you making, just (1), or (1) and (2), or all three, or some other combination?' The situation i s

very similar to that of the scientist who is asked by the logician 'Is your statement that phosphorus melts at 44~ analytic or synthetic; if you found a substance which was in other respects just like phosphorus, but which melted at another temperature, would you say "it isn't really phosphorus" or would you say "Then after all some phosphorus melts at other temperatures"?' The scientist might w e l l . . , answer 'I don't know; I haven't yet come across the case which would make me decide this question; I have got better things to worry about'�9 Similarly, the ordinary person, making moral decisions on the basis of his accepted principles, very rarely has to ask himself the question that we have just asked. So long as his value-judgments correspond with the accepted standards, and with his own feelings, he does not have to decide which he is saying, because, as we might put it, all three are as yet for him materially equivalent; that is to say, no occasion arises for saying one which is not also an occasion for saying the other two. He therefore does not ask himself 'As I am using the word "ought", are the sentences "I ought to do what I feel I ought" and "I ought to do what every- body would say I ought" analytic or synthetic?' It is the crucial case that makes him answer such a question . . . . It is these cases that really reveal the difference in meaning between the three judgments that I have listed.10

functional meaning, on the other hand, can accept, and indeed explain, all of Urmson's observations.

s Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 117. 9 Ibid., p. 118. lo Ibid., pp. 167-168.


But, in the phosphorus case, it is not that the scientist has not found out which parts of his concept of "phosphorus" are analytically equivalent to the term. Rather, he has not decided which parts are to be analytically equivalent. He could decide either way. In fact, he is not going to decide at all. But, should he decide, whichever way he decided could equally be (or not be) considered a meaning change. It is not that there are some analytic connections which have not been noticed to be analytic, but that no decision has been made, and no connection is yet analytic, - or yet non- analytic, in the sense the model of meaning gives this term. Rather, all the connections are equally part of his concept, and the sentences defining his concept entail non-analytic information.

The scientist can run through all the usual introspective moves - it just wouldn't be phosphorus unless . . . . But he can run through these moves with any of the properties he connects with phosphorus. What such feelings of necessity are based on, then, is not the meaning 11 of 'phosphorus,' but a functional meaning of 'phosphorus' with respect to some S under R which is more inclusive in that either not every sentence in S is analytic or not every sentence A derivable from a sentence B by a rule in R is such that B analytically implies A. The necessity seen by introspection is not analytic necessity, but simply the necessity within a theory which attaches to every- thing which is in that theory. The scientist who accepts a theory from which it is derivable that phosphorus melts at 44~ will feel that phosphorus must melt at 44~ Such a feeling may be more or less strong, depending on how closely this statement ties in with other statements in the theory. But the feeling will not be limited to analytic truths.

Hare's case of "I ought to do X" is similar. The evaluator does not have a mixture of three judgments. Rather, he has a judgment, using the functional meaning of "ought" with respect to his evaluative system, which implies all three of these judgments. Using this functional meaning of 'ought,' it is derivable that what I ought to do is what is required to conform to the standard which people generally accept and is what I have a feeling I ought to do. When the evaluator reaches a point where he decides not to do what is required in order to conform to the standard which people generally accept, he can say "What I ought to do isn't what is required in order to conform to the standard which people generally accept." But, he can equally weU say, "I see no reason to do what I ought to do." Either of these decisions changes his system of evaluations and results in a more restricted functional meaning of 'ought.' But neither of these decisions in- volves a meaning change more than does the other.

The case of "good" is similar. If Hare's parson le who always calls girls

11 Meaning, as generally defined by philosophers, can be considered to be one sort of functional meaning - two expressions will have the same meaning if, and only if, they have the same functional meaning with respect to any S such that every sentence in S is analytic, under any R such that A is derivable f rom B by R if and only if B analytically implies A.

m Cf., Hare, The Language oJ Morals, p. 146.

Discussions 225

good if and only if they are modest, chaste and churchgoing, breaks with the church and his former evaluative beliefs, he can say "I t isn't true that girls are good if and only if they are chaste, modest and churchgoing." But he can, equally well, say "I no longer approve of girls being good." In either case the former parson can insist he has not changed the meaning of 'good.' But, equally well, he can insist, in either case, that, upon his conversion, the meaning of "good" did change for him.

An evaluator can, by using his evaluative concepts (which are functional meanings with respect to his evaluative system), derive an evaluation from a description and a prescription from an evaluation. But, while this shows that, given this description, the evaluator accepts this prescription, it does not show that a description can logically or analytically entail a prescription. For, as we have noted, the evaluator's concepts may entail non- analytic information. And such an inference need not be valid. 1~ An analytic inference must be valid, for, by definition of 'analytic,' such an inference must be true and can say nothing of the world, rather it can lead only to something which is part of what it was inferred from. But in any inference allowing other than analytic rules and axioms we are without such an argument. That we 'see' each step in such a deduction as clearly as we see steps in logic, that the inference is accepted by a linguistic group, or that the inference is based solely on the dictionary, is no defense. For neither introspection, nor group acceptance, nor dictionaries are restricted to what is analytic. Nor is it any defense to say that there is a sort of reasoning appropriate to ethics, and it has its own criteria of validity. We could equally say that there is a sort of reasoning appropriate to the flat earth theory, and it has its own criteria of validity. To accept such criteria of validity for evaluative reasoning is just to accept a system of values.

St. Mary's University, Halifax

13 In Logic and Morals, pp. 180-196, Hare argues that such an inference cannot be valid. This is disputed by Max Black, "The Gap Between 'Is' and 'Should', Philo- sophical Review, Vol. 73 (1964), pp. 165-181, and by John Searle, "How to Derive Ought from Is", Philosophical Review, Vol. 73 (1964), pp. 43-58. Reprinted in Theories o[ Ethics, Philippa Foot, ed., Oxford, 1967.

C[., also, Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs", Proceedings o[ the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 59 (1958-59), pp. 83-109; reprinted in Theories o[ Ethics, Philippa Foot, ed., Oxford, 1967.

the meaning of evaluative expressions

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