The Marine Rearguard on Bataanhree days after the bombardment of Cavite,Lieutenant Colonel William T. Clement, FleetMarine Officer, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, was summoned to

Manila for talks with General Douglas MacArthur and hischief of staff, Major General Richard K. Sutherland. BothArmy generals were persistent in their efforts to obtain therelease of the Marines in the Philippines from Navy toArmy control. MacArthur wanted a battalion of Marinesto relieve a battalion of the 31st U.S. Infantry to guard hisU.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) Headquartersand to occupy a section of the Philippine capital.

This matter was successfully resisted until 20December. The rapid advance of the Japanese southwardfrom Lingayen Gulf led the USAFFE commander to aban-don Manila and to declare it an open city. He departed on24 December, and on the following day located an admin-istrative USAFFE Headquarters in Malinta Tunnel onCorregidor.

However, some Marines were still destined to performguard duty for the U.S. Army. On 5 January 1942,MacArthur established a forward tactical USAFFE echelonon Bataan, under the command of Brigadier GeneralRichard J. Marshall. It was sited at KM (Kilometer) 187.5,northwest of Mariveles, near a quarry at the junction ofWest Road and Rock Road. On the following day, newly

12

promoted Marine First Lieutenant William F. Hogaboom,commanding antiaircraft Battery A, 3d Battalion, 4thMarines, from Cavite, mounted out an interior guardthere.

Lieutenant Hogaboom was relieved of this duty on 16January when his battery received new orders to join theNaval Battalion at the Quarantine Station at Mariveles.For the next month or so, Marine Batteries A and C were apart of this battalion engaged in combat with a Japaneselanding force which had come ashore on LongoskawayanPoint behind the American lines.

On 10 January General MacArthur made his only visitto the front lines on Bataan. Six days later, First LieutenantRalph C. Mann, Jr., Company F; and First LieutenantMichiel Dobervich, Company E, received verbal ordersfrom Lieutenant Colonel Herman R. Anderson, command-ing the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, on Corregidor, to estab-lish a new guard at the forward USAFFE echelon, nowcalled Signal Hill. The detachment consisted of 43Marines, apparently selected at random from throughoutthe 4th Marines, together with five Filipinos.

The Marine guard had just completed its security pre-cautions when another Japanese force landed at AglalomaPoint to the north and sent patrols forward toward PucotHill. Sniper fire was received from two directions at the

headquarters on 24 January. Lieutenant Dobervich led apatrol of 11 Marine riflemen and one Browning Automaticrifleman out to Pucot Hill seeking any enemy who mayhave infiltrated the Naval Battalion's lines. No contactswere made and the patrol returned at dark.

The TJSAFFE Headquarters moved inland on 27January, reportedly because of proximity to the offensivebeing conducted in the vicinity of Pucot Hill andLongoskawayan Point. The new location was KIvI 167.5,north of the road exiting Mariveles to Bataan's East Roadand east of Hospital No. 1. The site was nicknamed "LittleBaguio," after the elite summer resort in northern Luzon.

Dobervich described the area as that occupied byUSAFFE's Service Command, the headquarters com-pound being entered through a motor pool north of thehighway. An ammunition dump was located to its eastside, dangerously near the hospital. Facilities were sparse,one or two corrugated buildings and squad tents clusteredbeneath a towering canopy of trees, effectively screenedfrom aerial observation. The Marines' tent camp and messwere located north of the headquarters. The whole wassituated on a flat arm of an extinct volcano southeast of theMariveles Mountains.

Marines in the detachment with bolos cut a perimeterpath from the jungle around the headquarters at approxi-mately 500 yards from the outermost structure. Barbedwire was implanted on the outside and smooth wire insidethe path to guide sentries in the darkness. Rocks in cansmounted on trip wires strung outside the wire were occa-sionally disturbed by iguanas, wild pigs, and pythons.Marines manned eight outposts in the perimeter. Watcheswere four hours on, four off.

Several Marines later testified to the tedium of this dutyThere were no incursions this far south by infiltratingJapanese. By this time, rations had been cut more thanhalf, and the content of the ration apparently varied with-in the command structure. Private First Class James 0.Faulkner compared the tantalizing smell of frying bacon inthe commanding general's cook tent to the unappetizingand unsalted messkit of boiled rice he was repeatedlyissued from one day to the next. Apparently someMarines messed with the Army; others recall having got-ten all their meals from the Marine galley. The formerwere probably one sergeant, one corporal, and two pri-vates first class who were assigned as radio operators atStation WTA, USAFFE Headquarters, from Januarythrough mid-March.

Former Private Earl C. Dodson was a driver forLieutenant Mann and acted as mess sergeant. Several oftheir trips were to acquire rations from the Navy tunnelsat Mariveles. He recalls their vehicle being repeatedlystrafed by the Japanese. He said that the lieutenant triedto get transferred to Marine antiaircraft duty, feeling thathis talents were being wasted in the guard detachment.Mann worried about his wife, the daughter of anAmerican official in the consul's office in Shanghai,whom he had married there. Mrs. Mann accompaniedhim to the Philippines in November 1941 and was now a

prisoner of the Japanese in Manila.Lieutenant Dobervich also made trips for supplies,

traveling three times to Corregidor, where his friend, FirstLieutenant Jack Hawkins, Company H, 2d Battalion,assisted him in acquiring them. However, at the end ofFebruary, Dobervich was laid up with malaria for twoweeks at Hospital No. 1.

On 22 February, Washington notified GeneralMacArthur that he was relieved as commander in thePhilippines and that he was to make his way to Australia.Command of the Philippines devolved onto MajorGeneral Jonathan M. Wainwright, of I Corps, and USAFFEwas redesignated U.S. Forces in the Philippines (USFIP).When MacArthur departed on 12 March, Wainwright tookcommand of the newly formed Luzon Force at the LittleBaguio headquarters. However, when he was promotedto lieutenant general on 20 March, he moved to USFIPHeadquarters in Malinta Tunnel on Corregidor.Wainwright selected Major General Edward P. King, Jr., tocommand Luzon Force Headquarters and its combatforces.

Late in March, MacArthur urged Wainwright by radioto make a major counter-attack northward with both hiscorps to capture Japanese supplies at Olongapo andDinalupihan. Before any such plans could be formulated,the enemy struck first with fresh troops. Japanese aircraftbecame more aggressive, one strike coming straight toHospital No. 1, plainly marked with a Red Cross, andbombing it without mercy Manila's Japanese radioannounced on 31 March that the raid was "unintentional,"but the mistake was repeated in following days.

Luzon Force Headquarters and its Marine Detachmentcame in for their share of subsequent bombings, andJapanese artillery began to find the range. LieutenantDobervich urged his Marines to dig foxholes and trenchesand directed that a large shelter be tunneled into a nearbyhillside. This was enlarged until the Marines turned min-ers ran into a huge rock in their path which discouragedfurther progress.

The Japanese Easter offensive broke through the frontlines between the two corps on Good Friday and armedbarges struck the rear flanks from Manila Bay By 8 April,the II Corps eastern front had become chaos and,unknown to Wainwright, General King determined to sur-render Bataan's battered remnants. Marines at the LuzonForce state that they were aware of some of the proceed-ings, that they saw officers in a staff car with a white flagdepart the camp and proceed northward through streamsof troops retreating southward.

At about 2130, 8 April, a severe earthquake shook thepeninsula, and the Marines retreated into their preparedtunnel. An hour later, the first of many explosionsoccurred, when the Navy blew up the USS Cano pus, theDewey Drydock, and its other installations at Mariveles.Army demolition followed, TNT charges setting off theammunition dump between headquarters and HospitalNo. 1 and engineer and quartermaster stores in the adja-cent Service Command. The blasts upset the headquarters

13

building, scattering its furniture. At daylight, it was foundthat all the overhead tree cover had disappeared. Onemerging from their sanctuary, the Marines found the rockblocking their tunnel dislodged and free, and they consid-ered themselves fortunate at not being buried alive.

Dovervich recalls that someone on General King's staffadvised the other officers to remove their insignia of rank,or to hide it in their clothing. They were also told to ridthemselves of any Japanese souvenirs or currency. OneArmy officer did not, and Dobervich later witnessed his

execution. Some enlisted men say they stacked their arms.Others threw their rifle bolts into the jungle and mangledor completely destroyed the remainder of their smallarms. All remaining rations were issued. Some gorged,but others made an attempt to hide and save them for alater time. It seems that no one thought to acquire extrawater, for they had no way of knowing what lay ahead.They sat down to await the arrival of the Japanese.

Richard A. Long

Hart declined to use "his"Marines in such a way. At 1940, 15December, the USAFFE staff metand proposed to convert the 4thMarines into two regiments, andcombine them with two regimentsof the Philippine Constabulary.The brigade would be used as areinforcement unit for USAFFE.The following day, LieutenantColonel William T. Clement, FleetMarine Officer, responded byagreeing to the merger with thePhilippine troops, and to providethem with ammunition and sup-plies. Each Marine battalionwould absorb one or two compa-nies of Philippine troops andMarines would command thePhilippine regiments, with thedivision commanded by ColonelHoward.

However, Admiral Hart andColonel Clement changed the pro-posal and convinced LieutenantGeneral Richard K. Sutherland,MacArthur's chief of staff, that theMarines still needed field trainingafter their long stay in Shanghai.Sutherland then decided that the4th Marines would be used forbeach defense on Corregidor.Indeed, on 2 January, MacArthurstated to his staff that the"Marines had no tactical trainingand were not suitable for use as atactical combat unit."

Admiral Hart informed How-ard that the 4th Marines was nowunder Army tactical command.Howard proceeded with ColonelClement to USAFFE Headquartersand reported directly to Mac-

Arthur for duty. MacArthur senthim to General Sutherland whoprovided him orders to preparefor duty on Corregidor. Howard,realizing the assignment wouldtake the 4th Marines away fromthe front, asked that his regimentbe allowed to guard the westernbeaches on Bataan. Sutherlandreplied that he wanted "the 4thMarines to take over the beachdefenses [of Corregidorl as soonas possible."

On 20 December, AdmiralRockwell ordered LieutenantColonel Adams to move his battal-ion to the Naval Section Base atMariveles. The next day, two bat-teries and two companies of the1st Separate Marine Battalionwere ordered to withdrawpromptly from Cavite toMariveles. Lieutenant Carter B.Simpson remembered, "TheColonel with orders and the trans-portation arrived within oneminute of one another." The 1stSeparate Marine Battalion com-pleted its evacuation of the Cavite-Sangley Point area on the night ofChristmas day with the lastdetachment finishing the destruc-tion of the Navy Yard.

Private First Class James 0.Faulkner drove a truck loadedwith two tons of candy destinedfor the Navy commissary atMariveles. Faulkner noticed themen from his unit resting alongthe road and pulled over beside

14

them. He quietly informed themof the contents of his truck andthen said loudly, "I'm going to getsomething to eat. I don't want tosee you getting on my truck!" TheMarines understood his meaningand when Faulkner returned, thetruck's load was considerablylighter.

On 24 December LieutenantColonel Donald Curtis, the regi-mental executive officer, wasdirected to move LieutenantColonel "Red" Anderson's 2dBattalion to Mariveles withoutdelay. Curtis began work at once.At 1800, 24 December, CaptainBenjamin L. McMakin, CompanyF commander, called his officersand noncommissioned officerstogether and said simply, "Gentle-men, it is Christmas Eve. Wemove all night." The 2d Battalionboarded trucks and began themove to Mariveles at 2000 withtruck convoys continuing for thefollowing two days and nights tomove the regimental ammunitionand equipment. As night fell on 26December all personnel, equip-ment, and supplies were in placein the jungle near Mariveles.

Admiral Rockwell ordered adetail of Marines under MajorFrank P. Pyzick to destroy theOlongapo Navy Yard. At the firstblast of explosives, the power-plant engineer cut off all power tothe Yard and disappeared. Alldemolition work came to a stopuntil a Marine working partyrestored power to detonate theremaining explosive charges. The

MAR I

I

obsolete cruiser USS Rochester wastowed into Subic Bay and sunk bydepth charges blowing open herhull. The PBY ramp was destroyedand all aviation fuel and subma-rine supplies were burned.

"The hard part," rememberedPrivate First Class Wilbur M.Marrs, "was destroying all thefootlockers that had the deepcarved chests inside filled withivory, jade, silk robes, and othersouvenirs" that were carefullybrought out of Shanghai. Marrslater wrote, "Buildings and equip-ment that were not blown up, wepoured fuel on, including thesefootlockers." All structures, exceptfor the main building of theMarine Barracks, were left inflames as the Marine detachmentdeparted the Navy Yard for thelast time at 1900, 26 December.

On Christmas Eve, Japanese air-craft struck Mariveles, concentrat-ing on the Free French freighter,S.S. Si Kiang. The ship was inter-ned in Mariveles harbor, and aguard of eight 1st Battalion Ma-rines prevented the crew frommoving the vessel. A U.S. Armyquartermaster proceeded to un-load the ship's cargo of gasolineand flour, both of which were bad-ly needed ashore. This daylightmovement attracted the attentionof the Japanese who bombed theSi Kiang, sending her to the bot-tom of Mariveles Bay. The 1stBattalion suffered its first losses ofthe war: two Marines killed andthree wounded. The dead wereburied with full military honors,in a somber ceremony presidedover by Regimental ChaplainHerbert R. Trump, ChC, USN.

The celebration of Christmasvaried throughout the 4th Ma-rines. Captain John Clark laterwrote, this was "probably theworst Christmas I ever spent. No

food. Nip airplanes bombing overthe bay and flying over our areaall day long. No damned fun."Marines of the 1st Battalionenjoyed a turkey dinner at Mar-iveles. Corporal George Bue andother members of HeadquartersCompany, 2d Battalion, feasted onpeas and oatmeal as theirChristmas dinner.

For Private First Class James 0.Faulkner, the holiday began bydriving a truck in the last convoyout of the Cavite Navy Yard. Thevehicles halted near the village ofSan Roque when the astonisheddrivers saw Filipinos cookingdoughnuts alongside the road.Enterprising villagers salvagedthe flour from a ship sunk in Ma-nila Bay and the hungry Marineshappily joined in the holiday feast.

Lieutenant Colonel "Red"Anderson was driving towardMariveles with some of his 2d Bat-talion headquarters staff, when henoticed a bombed-out Filipinocabaret outside Olongapo. Ander-son ordered the vehicle stoppedand took his men inside to cele-brate the holiday and "have aChristmas drink." The headquar-ters party found the walls half

gone, but the bar still intact andeveryone soon had a drink inhand. Anderson then called for thesinging of Christmas carols, andthe group gathered around FirstLieutenant Sidney F. Jenkins as heplayed the cabaret piano. Alljoined in the singing as theysipped their drinks. The highpoint of the party was whenPrivate First Class Joseph E."Frenchy" Dupont sang "AdesteFideles," completely in Latin. Fora brief moment, the war was for-gotten.

Four islands protected themouth of Manila Bay from attack.Corregidor, the largest island, wasfortified prior to World War I withpowerful coastal artillery andnamed Fort Mills. The tadpole-shaped island lay two miles fromBataan, and was only 3-1/2 mileslong and 1-1/2 miles across at itshead. This wide area, known asTopside, contained most of FortMills' 56 coastal artillery piecesand installations.

The next feature proceedingeast from Topside was Middle-

The entrance to Naval Base Mariveles after the fall of Bataan.National Archives Photo NH 73459

15

Christmas Day

Marine Detachment, Air Warning Servicehe 1st Separate Marine Battalion at Cavite providedantiaircraft and ground protection for all navalactivities there. It manned three 3-inch, .50- caliber

batteries; one 3-inch, .23-caliber battery; and two .50-cal-iber machine gun batteries. When necessary, enough mencould be mustered to provide infantry protection for theNavy Yard, the Naval Air Station and Hospital on SangleyPoint and the Naval Air Base at Los Banos.

What is not commonly known, for great secrecyappears to have surrounded the matter, is that the battal-ion's communications unit had equipment with the capa-bility to intercept aircraft by "radio detection." Itsacronym, "radar," would not be freely spoken of in mili-tary circles until early in 1943.

Marine Lieutenant Colonel Howard L. Davis, at thattime a captain and battalion communications officer, stat-ed in 1956 that three radar sets had been received at Cavitein November 1941. Two were SCR-268s, short-range setsdesigned to be electronically coupled to Mark IV fire con-trol directors and thence to searchlight batteries and anti-aircraft batteries for effectively controlled fire on enemyaircraft. Unfortunately, the battalion had no fire controldirectors. These sets were subsequently used for trainingadditional personnel at Cavite.

The third set, a long-range mobile SCR-270B, wasdesigned for early air warning, capable of computing dis-tance and azimuth, but not altitude, of aircraft. It had beenplanned to connect the detachment by a radio network tothe Army Air Corps Air Warning Service facility at NicholsField. Its detachment was made up of a few trained tech-nicians and a majority of security and service personnel.Warrant Officer John T. Brainard, who arrived in Cavite inmid-November 1941, commanded the detachment.Master Technical Sergeant Clarence L. Bjork, an electronicsexpert, had reported for duty only two months earlier.

Private First Class Irvin C. Scott, Jr., one of six enlistedMarines chosen from the 1St and 2d Defense Battalions inSan Diego to attend a formal course in radar at the U.S.Army's Signal Corps School at Fort Monmouth, NewJersey, in 1940 and 1941, was the detachment's lone trainedoscilloscope operator. However, in a short time he hadpartially trained two other Marines to spell him in comingmonths in the closed and secluded operator's van.

The unit's comings and goings within a guarded enclo-sure next to Cavite's quartermaster supply at the MarineBarracks were a mystery to its fellow Marines. On 4December, Gunner Brainard moved his 36-man detach-ment and one Navy corpsman into the field, borrowingtrucks and tractors from a Philippine Army unit to towheavy power and scope vans and one antenna trailer toWawa Beach near Nasugbu in Batangas Province, about100 miles south of Cavite. Here, the detachment wasplaced under the direction of then-Colonel Harold H.

George, U.S. Army Air Corps, commanding the VInterceptor Command, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East(USAFFE), for training and to augment the aircraft warn-ing network covering Luzon. The unit remained in placefollowing the news that Pearl Harbor had been attacked,technical personnel maintaining a 24-hour watch overManila Bay and the nearby China Sea. At mid-morning,10 December 1941, Scott picked up on his screen an elon-gated blip unlike anything witnessed in recent training.Continual tracking brought about the startled realizationthat he had spotted a massive airplane formation atapproximately 120 miles to the southwest, approachingManila Bay.

Attempts to raise the Sangley Point towers on the radiowere futile. When the duty radioman did succeed inreaching Army Radio on Corregidor, operators there, hav-ing never heard of radar, exasperatingly refused toacknowledge the transmission or to pass the sighting on tohigher headquarters. Cavite was subsequently bombedinto near rubble by succeeding waves of 54 Japanesebombers. Marine antiaircraft fire was for the most partineffective, for the aircraft were beyond its range. Morethan 400 Marines, sailors and Filipino workmen werekilled or wounded. The effectiveness of Cavite as aprovider of support to the U.S. Fleet was brought to anend.

Realizing that the position on Wawa Beach was nowinsecure, Brainard moved his radar inland several miles,near a sugar cane refinery, taking advantage of adjacentnatural jungle cover to camouflage his vehicles and equip-ment. His caution was rewarded, for several nights latersome of his security riflemen who kept a vigil on the beachsurprised a seaborne Japanese scouting party looking forthe radar emplacement there.

This sole Marine long-range radar became even moreprecious, for on the opening day of the war in the Philip-pines, an identical Army unit at Tha Field, on the westcoast of Luzon, was bombed out of existence. An Armyemplacement at Aparri met the same fate, and anothernorth of Legaspi was destroyed to keep it from falling intothe hands of Japanese who landed there. Shortly there-after, Colonel George sent three surviving soldiers fromone of those units to join the Marine detachment.

Meanwhile, few activities continued at Cavite. The Na-val Hospital moved to Manila, submarines and supplyships departed, and surviving Marines established biv-ouacs in the barrio outside the base and at the radio stationon Sangley Point. However, these were also destroyed inbombings of 19 and 20 December. The 1st Separate MarineBattalion moved to Mariveles on the tip of Bataan and onto Corregidor on 26 December, where on 1 January 1942 itwas redesignated 3d Battalion, 4th Marines.

Finding itself virtually isolated from allied organiza-

16

tion, and in danger of being cut off by Japanese forcesadvancing on Manila from the southeast, the detachmentevacuated its lonely site on Colonel George's orders theday before Christmas. Despite having found only balkyand antiquated alcohol-burning Filipino trucks, Brainardsucceeded in extracting his secret cargo from the jungle inseparate convoys past a nearly abandoned Cavite. Theunit paused in Manila, now aflame and declared an opencity only to collect what extra supplies it could find. Twoconvoys were reunited in the courtyard haven of aCatholic church on the outskirts of San Fernando onChristmas Eve. Christmas dinner consisted of hardtack,cheese spread, and Ovaltine, the missing trucks containingthe regular rations.

On the following day, the power and scope vans joinedthe detachment at Orani, upper Bataan Peninsula, along-side Manila Bay. Brainard selected a well-camouflaged sitein a mango grove at KM (kilometer) 148.5 between Orionand Limay and began operations. In the 31 days since thewar began, the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress fleet had beenpartially destroyed, and the number of operational CurtissP-40 Warhawk fighters was reduced to twelve. TheJapanese had air superiority. Allied antiaircraft capabilitywas desultory. The mission of the Marine Air WarningDetachment was changed from defensive to offensive.Allied aircraft sorties were carefully tracked, and anyother blip on the radar screen was considered an enemy.U.S. pilots were advised and forewarned by radio to eludethese enemy aircraft and their antiaircraft positions.

The vagaries of war had orphaned the detachment.Although its personnel had been assigned toHeadquarters Company of the 1st Separate MarineBattalion, that organization on Corregidor was nowunable to render support. Army and Army Air Corpsquartermasters were reluctant to logistically help them,and the Navy refused to supply a "detached" unit.

Warrant Officer Brainard therefore directed selectMarines to "reconnoiter," or to scrounge for food, fuel, andother supplies the length of the peninsula. Their ingenu-ity was a wonder. In fact, chits signed by Brainard wereissued to non-technical support troops to cover their far-ranging activities, as well as for several men to accompa-fly Army tankers to the front lines as "observers."However, three men were later court-martialed for plun-dering a foreign vessel disabled offshore but not com-pletely abandoned. Five men joined Army Captain Arthur"One Man Army" Wermuth's Filipino Scouts for nightraids on Japanese positions, but Brainard put a stop to thisafter one Marine was killed and two wounded. These andother bold forays earned the Marine Air WarningDetachment the sobriquet "The Rogues of Bataan." As aresult, the Marine command on Corregidor sent FirstLieutenant Lester A. Schade, Company L, 3d Battalion, 4thMarines, to Bataan on 17 January to relieve Brainard incommand. Strictness reigned for a few days, until neces-sity brought back the need to acquire supplies. Brainardstayed on in a technical capacity.

By the end of January, Japanese advances in the II Army

Corps area on the eastern half of Bataan placed the site ofthe detachment in jeopardy. Shells of 240mm artillery hadstraddled their position, and spotter aircraft were gettingtoo close for comfort. They prepared to move again.

Newly promoted Brigadier General George and hisremaining pilots were flying mostly nocturnal missionswith their P-40's from the newly prepared Bataan andCabcaben Fields just east of the barrio of Cabcaben.Brainard chose an elevated site near the flyers' bivouac, onthe northwestern edge of Bataan Field. They began oper-ations there on 3 February, continuing the mission ofinforming American pilots when possible of encroachingenemy aircraft.

In January 1992, Scott, a retired geologist now living inRichmond, Virginia, stated that one night in mid-March1942 he was experimenting with the possiblity of pickingup surface traffic on Manila Bay and succeeded in follow-ing three American gunboats on patrol out of Corregidor.General George was elated and wanted to know if hecould do it again. A few nights later he had the satisfac-tion of tracking a flotilla of small enemy vessels in the bay.Under cover of darkness and spewing a smokescreen, theJapanese were attempting an amphibious landing behindAmerican lines. Scott detected them well out from theshoreline, and his prompt radio alert enabled pilots, Armyartillery in the vicinity, and the Navy's gunboats to repulsethe enemy. No landing was effected.

A massive Good Friday assault by the Japanese coupledwith a general collapse of American and Filipino lines dueto high casualties, battle fatigue, epidemic disease, andshort rations, resulted in the final evacuation of the Marineradar unit. Orders received on 8 April directed them to gettheir equipment and troops to the docks at Mariveles fortransfer to Corregidor. However, on reaching the cut-offroad from the East to West Road and within sight of theirdestination, several factors brought about their disintegra-tion. First, a tremendous earthquake rocked the entirepeninsula, followed by the Navy and Army blowing upships, ammunition, fuel, and other supplies stored in tun-nels and in the open. Japanese bombers contributed to theconfusion, bombing and strafing service facilities and hos-pitals, as well as a mass of equipment and humanitystreaming toward the port on all roads and trails.

Finding their path effectively blocked and the last of themajor vessels capable of transporting their radar, men, andequipment already departed, Brainard directed that thepower, scope, and antenna carriers be properly primed,charges placed, and set afire. Other organizational vehi-cles were backed over a cliff onto rocks and surf below.

Pandemonium reigned. Lieutenant Schade released themen from the unit, each to seek his own means of escape.Four men had been transferred to Corregidor on 4 April.An additional five, some together and the others singly,made their precarious ways to "The Rock," where theyjoined the 4th Marines. A few, including Scott, could nei-ther escape northward, nor find the means to cross thechannel. They were gathered together at the shore by anAir Corps lieutenant who led them to an assembly area,

17

fed them, and promised that a boat was to be sent fromCorregidor. After destroying their small arms, they foundto their dismay that the lieutenant was acting under ordersto surrender them to the enemy. The following morning,

the Japanese marched in and prepared them for what waslater to be notorious as the "Bataan Death March."

Richard A. Long

side, a small plateau containingmore battery positions and bar-racks. East from Middleside wasBottomside, the low groundwhere a dock area and the civiliantown of San Jose was located.Further east was headquarters,hospital, and communication tun-nels contained within MalintaHill. The narrow tail of the islandcontinued east, with a small land-ing strip, Kindley Field, until end-ing among the rocky beaches ofHooker Point.

Fort Hughes lay on nearbyCaballo Island, and contained 13heavy guns, while further southon El Fraile island was Fort Drum,an island which had been leveledand reformed into a "concrete bat-tleship," with two steel turretsmounting four 14-inch guns. FortFrank, containing 14 large-calibercannon on Carabao Island, layonly 500 yards from the Caviteshoreline and was perhaps mostvulnerable to attack.

At 1000, 26 December, the 4thMarines began to move toCorregidor. More than 400Marines of the 1st Separate MarineBattalion were loaded on boardlighters and taken across the chan-nel. They were then transportedby narrow gauge railway toMiddleside Barracks. The forwardechelon of the Headquarters andService Companies and the 2dBattalion loaded on a minesweep-er and lighters just after darknessthe following day. Shortly aftermidnight on 27 December, the 336Marines and their equipment werecompletely unloaded on Corregi-dor.

Two days later at 2010, the 1stBattalion and the remainder of theregiment completed the transfer toCorregidor's North Dock. A 1stBattalion Marine private busilycarried a box of .30-caliber ammu-nition weighing more than 96

pounds to the dock. LieutenantColonel Beecher stepped in frontof the sweating Marine and tookthe box out of his hands. He thendropped the ammunition off thedock into the water. The privatestared dumbfounded as Beecherinformed him, "You're carryingblanks; we are not using themanymore." The 4th took sixmonths of rations for 2,000 men,10 units of fire for all weapons, atwo-year supply of summer cloth-ing, and medicines and equipmentfor a 100-bed hospital, toCorregidor.

Marines were first quartered inthe concrete barracks on Middle-side. When they inquired of theirArmy comrades about protectionfrom bombing, they were assuredthe barracks were bombproof.Captain John Clark wrote later, "Afeeling of safety and security cameover us as we reached the Rock.We were told it was impregnable,and that we had nothing to fearfrom Japanese attack."

At 0800, 29 December, ColonelHoward reported to MajorGeneral George E Moore, com-manding the Harbor Defenses ofManila and Subic Bays. He wasimmediately appointed com-manding officer of beach defense,Corregidor. Howard then began aprompt inspection of the currentbeach defenses.

At 1140 that same day, a flight ofJapanese aircraft approachedCorregidor. Air-raid sirens sound-ed, but most of the 4th Marinespaid little attention to them,believing in the safety ofCorregidor's antiaircraft defenses.

Five members of the 4th Marines pose for the camera on Corregidor. All Marines wererequired to carry their gas masks at all times should the Japanese use chemical agents.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) W-PHI-2

18

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Lieutenant Sidney Jenkins remem-bered, "bombs screaming to earthwith shattering explosions, thecrack of AA guns, the neat 'plopplop' of the AA shells bursting allover the sky. . . there we were, thewhole regiment flat on our bellieson the lower deck of MiddlesideBarracks."

Marines in the upper decks ofMiddleside Barracks sprinted forthe lower deck for protection.Most of the bombs that hit thebuilding exploded on the secondand third decks, but Private FirstClass Don Thompson and 20 otherMarines on the first deck felt anexplosion and a shower of cementdust. He looked up and saw bluesky though a hole in the ceiling ofthe supposedly bombproof bar-racks. Bombs continued to fall forthe next two hours. Corporal VerleW. Murphy died of multiplewounds to the head and chestwhile trying to clear the building,and nine Marines were woundedin the attack.

Private First Class Charles R.Greer and Private AlexanderKatchuck noticed two woundedmen in an abandoned truck. Greerand Katchuck left their shelter anddrove the truck to the hospitaldespite the falling bombs. Theywere awarded Silver Star Medals,the first Marines to be awarded anArmy decoration in World War II,and the first to be mentioned inGeneral MacArthur's dispatches.

Bombs destroyed or damagedthe hospital, antiaircraft batteries,Topside and Middleside Barracks,the Navy fuel depot, and the offi-cers club. Smoke cast a black pallover the island as numerouswooden buildings caught fire.Power, water, and communicationlines were disrupted. Total casual-ties on Corregidor mounted to 20killed and 80 wounded.

After the Japanese bombingended, the 4th Marines wasassembled in front of the barracks

to ascertain casualties. As the menstood in formation, someonedragged a sea bag down the stairsof the barracks, which made anoise like falling bombs. Instantly,the men broke and ran "pell mellback into the safe barracks" onlyto reemerge laughing once the ori-gin of the sound was determined.

Japanese bombers reappearedover Corregidor at 1134, 2 January,and bombed the island for morethan three hours. Private FirstClass Verdie C. Andrews waskilled by debris from the explo-sions and six other Marines werewounded. Periodic bombing con-tinued over the next four daysresulting in one Marine killed andanother wounded. Only two moreraids occurred in January, allow-ing the Marines to improve theirpositions considerably. On 29January, Japanese aircraft droppedonly propaganda leaflets whichgreatly amused the beach defend-ers.

On 29-30 December the 4thMarines moved from its barracksinto field positions. The 1stBattalion took the east sector, fromMalinta Hill to Hooker Point onthe tail of the island. The 2d

19

Battalion moved into the west sec-tor and the 1st Separate MarineBattalion was assigned the middlesector. On 1 January 1941, this bat-talion was officially redesignated3d Battalion, 4th Marines. Forty-four Marines of the battalion weredetailed for antiaircraft defensefor Batteries Wheeler and Cheney.In addition, 46 Marines in two pla-toons of the 3d Battalion underSecond Lieutenant Frederick A.Hagen were deployed with .30-and .50-caliber machine guns toprovide antiaircraft fire and beachdefense of Fort Hughes. Another14 Marines of the 3d Battalionwere deployed to Fort Drum forthe same purpose.

Work began rapidly on con-struction of beach defenses.Typical was the reaction ofLieutenant Colonel Beecher whenhe first inspected his defense area.He later wrote, "The task con-fronting us was appalling. With350 men there were 3,500 to 4,000yards of possible landing beach todefend." The Marines began tobuild barbed wire barriers, tanktraps, bunkers, and trench sys-tems. Working parties began atfirst light in the morning and halt-ed only at noon for a rest period inplace of lunch. The work pro-gressed well, slowed only by

Photo courtesy of Dr. Diosdado M. YapJapanese aircraft prepare to bomb Corregidor.

Deployment

Japanese shelling, bombing, anddarkness.

Tools were carefully guarded,as Lieutenant Jenkins remem-bered, "We took care of our toolslike gems." The Marines ran shortof sandbags, so discarded powdercans from the costal artillery gunswere filled with dirt and used intheir place. Bottles were filled withgasoline to make "Molotov cock-tails," to be dropped over cliffs onthe Japanese. Empty gasolinedrums were filled with dirt androck and set up as tank traps ontrails leading from the beach. Eachposition was carefully camou-flaged for protection and dummypositions were also constructed toattract enemy fire.

Marines of Company B locatedArmy aircraft bombs, and woodenchutes were constructed to dropthe bombs on landing areas. A sec-ond line of defense and reservepositions were also built behindthe front line beach defenses, withthe hope of eventual reinforce-ment.

After the movement of the 4thMarines to Corregidor in Decem-ber, there were still Marines onBataan. Two antiaircraft batteriesoperated in the Mariveles area and

Battalion, 4th Marines during the siege..

formed part of a naval defensebattalion for the southern coast ofBataan. Battery A, commanded byFirst Lieutenant William F. Hoga-boom, was stationed at theMariveles Quarantine Station,protecting an old Dewey DryDock. The battery consisted of twoofficers and 80 men and wasarmed with nine machine guns forlow level antiaircraft defense. OneNavy officer and 65 sailors wereattached to the battery. Battery C,under First Lieutenant Wilfred D.Holdredge was posted in an aban-doned rice paddy between the

Navy Section Base and the villageof Mariveles. The battery wascomposed of four 3-inch antiair-craft guns and had an ensign and40 sailors attached.

General MacArthur learned ofthe presence of Marines on Bataanand ordered Battery A to serve as aguard for USAFFE Headquarters.The officer in charge of the NavalBattalion, Commander Frank J.Bridget, then directed LieutenantHogaboom to return to duty atMariveles instead. On 14 January,MacArthur wrote directly toAdmiral Rockwell requesting thesuspension of Bridget's order.Rockwell replied the same daythat Battery A had yet to berelieved of its duties at theMariveles Section Base, and wasnot yet under Army direction.MacArthur ended the dispute byissuing Field Order Number 6,assigning two officers and 40enlisted men from Corregidor toserve as guards for USAFFEHeadquarters, relieving Battery A

At 0800, 23 January, the aircraftlookout on Mt. Pucot reported toCommander Bridget that aJapanese seaborne landing hadbeen made on Longoskawayan

Austin C. Shofner Papers, Personal Papers Collection, MCHCMiddleside Barracks, March 1942. The barracks housed the reserve company of the 2d

Col Howard decorates PFC Charles R. Geer and Pvt Alexander Katchuk with SilverStar Medals for their heroism during the first bombing of Corregidor.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) COR-11000

20

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Point, 2,000 yards west ofMariveles. Bridget orderedLieutenants Hoidredge andHogaboom to move to the pointand confirm the landing. Japanesestrength was estimated at only onesquad. Unfortunately, Bridgetfailed to inform the two lieu-tenants that two Marine patrolswould be in the area. Holdredgeand Hogaboom had no knowl-edge of each other's movements

Platoon Sergeant Robert A.Clement was ordered by Bridgetto command a hastily gatheredplatoon of 36 sailors to support thetwo Marine lieutenants. Clementasked for another Marine noncom-missioned officer, whom he didget, and led his men into the jun-gle. Sergeant Clement deployedhis men in loose formation andmoved toward LongoskawayanPoint. In a few minutes, he heard asailor calling, "Hey, Sarge!" "HeySarge!" Clement quickly ran overto him. The sailor held up his rifleand asked, "Sarge, how do you getthe bullets in this thing." Clementrapidly held school for the sailorand the platoon moved on.

Clement's men soon reachedthe beach where they came uponthe Japanese supply area. Morethan 150 rifles were neatly stacked

as well as Lister bags of freshwater hanging from poles. TwoJapanese cooks were the onlyenemy in sight and these men ranat the approach of the Americans.Clement ordered each of his mento carry off one of the rifles andreturned to report his success.Japanese machine guns caught thepatrol in an ambush a short dis-tance up the trail, and Clementand a Navy lieutenant were hit inthe initial exchange of gunfire.

The firing alerted the twoMarine patrols. At the sound ofbattle both Hoidredge andHogaboom deployed. They metscattered Japanese patrols anddrove the Japanese back towardthe coast, towards Clement's men.Machine gun fire hit the Marines,killing Private First Class QuentinR. Sitton. Despite the Japanese fire,the two forces joined and togetherwithdrew to a blocking positionon the ridge between Marivelesand Longoskawayan Point.Bridget gathered the men avail-able at the Section Base and rein-forced the detail of the two Marinelieutenants with 30 sailors. At thispoint, the Marine commandersbelieved they had encounteredonly about a platoon of the enemy.

On 24 January the Marines and

21

sailors again advanced on thepoint. Strong Japanese resistancewas encountered and rifle fire andgrenades were exchanged be-tween the two forces. At the firstsight of a hand grenade, a Marineshouted, "Grenade!" and dove forcover. The sailors stood lookingaround, asking, "Where?" Theuntrained sailors learned quicklyhow to take cover thereafter.Lieutenant Hoidredge came upona Japanese light artillery positionand maneuvered to engage theenemy. He soon realized his menwere behind enemy lines andpulled back to the main Marineposition. Firing was spasmodicthe rest of the day and at dusk theAmericans pulled back to theirblocking position.

The two lieutenants realizedthey needed more men to engagethe enemy the following day andrequested reinforcements fromCorregidor. On the morning of 25

A Marine receives a haircut from aFilipino barber during a lull in theshelling and bombing.

Two Marines try to catch up on their reading during a lull in the bombardment.

t ';e.

January a machine-gun platoonand an 81mm-mortar platoonarrived under the command ofFirst Lieutenant Michael E.Peshek. Marine Gunner Harold D.Ferrell directed two 81mm mor-tars on the positions the Japaneseoccupied during the previousday's engagement. By midafter-noon the Marines again movedtoward the points, Hogaboom toLapiay Point and Holdredge toLongoskawayan Point. Hoga-boom found no enemy, butHoldredge's men were met by anambush and had heavy losses.Holdredge and 11 enlistedMarines were wounded andPrivate First Class Warren J.Carver was killed.

The Marines again withdrew totheir blocking position and shortlyafter midnight, 12-inch mortarsfrom Corregidor poundedLongoskawayan Point. On themorning of 26 January, Marine

mortars combined with Filipinoartillery again hit the Japanesedefensive positions. The 60 to 75Marines and 130 sailors probedthe Japanese defenses, but theattack became disorganized. The

Japanese counterattacked andagain the Americans withdrew.Hogaboom reported that "wecould not hope to continue theattack or even hold our groundwith the troops at our disposal."

A platoon of Company H, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, commanded by 2dLt Michael E. Peschek, moves ammunition and weapons toLongoskawayan Point to support the attack there in January 1942.

22

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) OOR-11001

Two Marines relax outside a bunker on Corregidor before the heavy Japanese shellingdestroyed most of the foliage on the island.

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Commander Bridget respondedby ordering Hogaboom to dig inand prepare for another attack inthe morning.

As the tired men returned totheir positions they were met bythe 1st Battalion, 57th Infantry(Philippine Scouts), who relievedthem. The remainder of the NavalBattalion withdrew to Marivelesand three days later the PhilippineScouts had cleaned out theJapanese landing force. The pla-toon that the Marines initiallythought had landed turned out tobe a reinforced battalion withattached artillery. These Japanesewere part of a larger landing forcebut had become separated duringthe night of 22-23 January andlanded unsupported on Longosk-awayan Point.

Battery A moved to Corregidoron 17 February, leaving a MarineAir Warning Detachment, theUSAFFE Guard, and Battery C asthe only Marines remaining onBataan. Disease became a problemfor Battery C, as LieutenantSimpson recalled, "the heat wasterrific, malaria cropped outamong the men every day or so,yet we had to stay manned everyday all day because of constant

enemy air activity." The batteryoften left one gun unmanned tohave full crews on the remainingguns.

On 6 February, Japanese artil-lery opened fire on Corregidorand the fortified islands from posi-tions in Cavite Province. The fortswere shelled eight more days andbombed twice in February.Occasional shelling and bombinghit the fortified islands until 15March, when the Japanese beganpreparations to renew their offen-sive on Bataan. The bombing andartillery raids now continuedunabated until the end of thesiege. The Japanese conductedattacks spaced over every 24-hourperiod after 24 March to preventany rest by the defenders.Japanese harassing artillery fires,conducted every 25-30 minutesthroughout the night, caused theMarines to dub the annoying can-non "Insomnia Charlie." Theartillery spotting balloon overBataan was nicknamed "PeepingTom."

The events of 30 March typifythe constant Japanese bombard-ment. There were two periods ofshelling, beginning at 0950 and

1451, and six bombing raids,beginning at 0040 and spacedthroughout the day. One Marine,Private First Class Kenneth R.Paulin of Company M, 3dBattalion, was killed during theday by shelifire from the Caviteshore. The bombing raids finallyended at 2205. The attacks wererenewed at 0102 on the sameschedule, except 10 bombing raidsoccurred on 31 March.

At this time, the major problemsfacing Major General JonathanWainwright, USA, commander ofU.S. Forces on the BataanPeninsula, were dwindling foodsupply and an increased diseaserate. By March, the daily ration offood for the men on Bataan was1,000 calories with food forCorregidor rationed to last untilthe end of June 1942. On 27 March,Wainwright telegraphed Mac-Arthur in Australia to report theJune deadline and asked for sup-plies. He also stated that "withample food and ammunition wecan hold the enemy in his presentposition, I believe, indefinitely."

On 1 April, General Wainwrightrecognized that little or no foodcould arrive through the Japaneseblockade and ordered a newreduced ration. The 4th Marinesand other defenders of Corregidornow consumed 30.49 ounces offood per day: 8 ounces of meat, 7ounces of flour, 4 ounces of veg-etables, 3 ounces of beans andcereals, 2.5 ounces of rice, 3 ouncesof milk, and approximately 3ounces of miscellaneous food-stuffs.

"We were hungry all the time,"remembered Private First ClassBen L. Lohman, "We ate mulemeat . . . when the mules werekilled in the bombing . . . they'dbring the carcasses down andwe'd eat 'em." Drinking waterwas distributed only twice a dayin powder cans, but bombing andshelling often interrupted the

An unexploded bomb at Middleside, Corregidor, March 1942.Austin C. Shofner Papers, Personal Papers Collection, MCHC

23

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resupply. The staple food for the4th Marines was cracked wheat,sometimes made into dumplings,sometimes served with syrup.The continued lack of a properdiet created major problems forthe 4th Marines, as men wereweakened and lacked reliablenight vision. Some Marines lost upto 40 pounds during the bombard-ment.

On 9 April, Bataan fell to theJapanese after a final offensivebroke through the USAFFEdefenses trapping more than75,000 men. Battery C managed toescape at the last minute, but theMarine guards at USAFFE head-quarters and the Air WarningDetachment were taken prisoner,and endured the infamous BataanDeath March. The Japanese wast-ed little time before focusing theirattention on Corregidor, intensify-ing their bombardment of theisland the same day Bataan fell.

Although food was in shortsupply on Corregidor, ammuni-tion was relatively plentiful. As of7 April, the island had 5,177,900rounds of armor piercing, clipped,and tracer .30-caliber ammunition

and a total of 161,808 rounds of.50-caliber ammunition. GenWainwright wrote, "Our flag stillflies on this beleaguered fortress."and added in his memoir, "I meantto see it keep flying."

As men became available onCorregidor from January until

after the fall of Bataan, they wereintegrated into the 4th Marines tosupport beach defense. InFebruary, 58 sailors formerly ofthe USS Canopus were organizedas a reserve company. LieutenantClarence Van Ray with PlatoonSergeant Leslie D. Sawyer andSergeant Ray K. Cohen trainedand equipped the sailors into anefficient fighting force. TenMarines and 40 more sailors wereadded to the company after thefall of Bataan.

The largest group of reinforce-ments arrived after the fall ofBataan. In the days following 9April, 72 officers and 1,173 enlist-ed men from more than 50 differ-ent organizations were assigned tothe 4th Marines, making theMarine regiment one of the mostunusual units in Marine Corpshistory. These reinforcementsincluded members of the Navy,the Army, the Philippine Army,and Philippine Scouts. Sailorsstranded on land after the loss oftheir ships found themselvesalongside engineers, tankers, andaviators whose units were cap-tured on Bataan. Filipino Scouts

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 58736LtCol Herman R. Anderson stands on the beach on Corregidor with the assembled offi-cers of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines and several Filipino officers. Note the thick layers ofoil on the beaches from ships sunk in Manila Bay.

A Marine shows his friends his portion of a resupply of precious cigarettes brought intoCorregidor by submarine.

24

Reinforcements

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A new supply of cigarettes has just arrived in the Philippines and the Marines are given their ration along with chow.

were assigned with members ofthe islands' Constabulary to the4th Marines. Unfortunately, veryfew of the reinforcements weretrained or equipped for groundcombat. By 29 April, the 4thMarines numbered 229 officersand 3,770 men, of whom onlyabout 1,500 were Marines.

With Bataan on the brink offalling, Captain John H. S. Dessez,the commander of the Navy Baseat Mariveles requested permissionto transfer his 500 sailors to

25

Corregidor. Approval was grant-ed with the condition that thesemen would be part of the beachdefense force. On 10 April, the 4thBattalion was formed under thecommand of Major Francis H."Joe" Williams. His commandwas built with nine Army officersand 16 Navy officers and warrant

1,

NI,

officers commanding 272 enlistedmen. This joint service battalionbivouacked in GovernmentRavine near Battery Geary andbegan to train for ground combat.

Four companies were organizedin the battalion and lettered Q, R,S, and T. Companies Q and R werecommanded by Army officers andS and T by Navy officers. Riflesstill packed in cosmoline, a greasyprotective coating, were issued tothe sailors. This presented inter-esting cleaning problems to theinexperienced mariners. How-ever, rifles were all that was issuedto the battalion in the way ofequipment. There were no hel-mets, cartridge belts, or even first-aid kits.

Williams at once began wea-pons training for his sailors. Withno rifle range available, the blue-jackets used floating debris inManila Bay as targets on which tosight in their rifles. Some of theNavy personnel had not fired aweapon in almost 20 years. Train-ing proceeded with cover and con-cealment, and small unit tactics.Evening lectures were given bymen experienced in combat onBataan. The accelerated infantrytraining by the battalion was

punctuated by the daily shellingand the fact that each man felt"that this battalion would be usedwhere the going was the roughest• . . . The chips were down andthere was no horseplay."

Lieutenant Colonel Beechernow commanded 360 Marines,500 Filipinos, approximately 100

American sailors, and 100American soldiers, totaling 1,024effective fighting men. Thesetroops were armed with the 1903Springfield rifle, grenades, BARs,four 37mm guns, and eight .30-cal-iber machine guns. A few 60mmmortars were available, as well as.50-caliber machine guns takenfrom immobilized ships. Theywere emplaced to defend thebeaches. Additionally, the Philip-pine Scouts had mounted a few75mm guns. Initially, the 37mmand 75mm guns could not be tra-versed quickly enough that a fastmoving boat could not easilyescape their fire.

The Japanese shelling causedserious damage to the beach de-fenses, and casualties among theofficers and men of the battalion,but most of the heavy weaponswere still intact. As of 1 May thebattalion had lost only fourmachine guns and eight cases of.30-caliber ammunition. Far moreserious was the loss of the watersupply and a complete loss of thefield communication lines.Caches of rations were buried orreceived direct hits from lucky

Marines break for one of their two meals a day on Corregidor.

Marines teach Filipino aviation cadets the fundamentals of a water-cooled .30-caliberBrowning machine gun.

26

*4.

1st Battalion Defenses

shells. Casualties among officersand men were equally serious:Major Harry C. Lang, command-ing Company A, was killed;Captain Paul A. Brown of Com-pany B and one of his platooncommanders were wounded; oneof Company D's officers waswounded; and three Army officerswith the reserve company alsowere wounded. Army officers re-placed the commanders but themen had little confidence in them.This acute loss of experiencedleaders would be critical in thecoming fighting.

The area held by the 1st Battal-ion was heavily wooded whenfirst occupied in December anddotted with coastal artillery bar-racks and other buildings. Byearly May, the area was complete-ly barren of vegetation and scat-tered with the ruins of shelledbuildings. Sergeant Louis E.Duncan later remembered, "therewas dust a foot thick," coveringthe entire area.

On 1 May Beecher had reportedto Colonel Howard that the beachdefenses on the eastern portion ofthe island were practically

destroyed by the Japanese bom-bardment and that reiiair underthe continuing fire would beimpossible. Beach wire had beenrepeatedly holed, tank traps filledin, and all the heavy guns of the1st Battalion were in temporaryemplacements as the initial oneshad been spotted and destroyedby the enemy. The Japanese firewas so accurate that the mencould be fed only at night.

Colonel Howard told this toGeneral Wainwright, who saidonly that he would never surren-der. When Howard told Beecherthis, he replied, "I pointed out toColonel Howard that nothing hadbeen said about surrender; I wasmerely reporting conditions asthey existed in my sector."

The enemy bombing andshelling continued with unrelent-ing ferocity. Japanese aircraft flew614 missions from 28 April until 5May, dropping 1,701 bombs total-ing 365.3 tons of explosive. At thesame time 9 240mm howitzers, 34149mm howitzers, and 32 other

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 115.07A

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 58735

LtCol Curtis T. Beecher and his runnerpause during one of his daily inspectionsof 1st Battalion defenses.

artillery pieces poundedCorregidor day and night. Most ofthe Japanese artillery was basedon Bataan with one reinforced bat-talion firing from Cavite Province

On 2 May, a 240mm shellexploded the magazines of BatteryGeary, causing massive casualtiesto the Army crews manning theguns. A Marine rescue party ran toassist in clearing the casualtiesfrom the resulting fires. MajorFrancis H. Williams and CaptainAustin C. Shofner were the firsttwo Marines into the battery, andboth were seriously burned aboutthe hands, face, and ankles in res-cuing survivors from the blaze.Both officers refused to be evacu-

27

On 29 April the 61st InfantryRegiment of the 4th ImperialJapanese Army Division was select-ed to be the first force to be landedon Corregidor. Supporting theinfantry were elements of the 23dIndependent Engineer Battalion andthe 1st Battalion of the 4th EngineerRegiment. Once on shore, elementsof the 1st Company, Independent

A Marine platoon sergeant of the 4th Marines instructs Filipino cadets in the use ofthe Lewis machine gun.

ated.

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Japanese Preparations

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) Phi-9Col Samuel L. Howard, right, inspectsthe beach defenses on Corregidor withLtCol Herman R. Anderson, left, com-mander of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, andMajGen George F. Moore, USA, center,overall commander of the Corregidordefenses.

Mortar Battalion, the 51st MountainGun Regiment, and the 3d MortarBattalion would provide gunfiresupport.

The 61st Infantry and attachedunits, titled Left Flank Force, was toland on the tail of Corregidor onthe evening of 5 May. This 2,400-man landing force would seizeKindley Field and then captureMalinta Hill. The following nighta second reinforced regiment ofthe 4th Infantry Division wouldland on Morrison and BatteryPoints. The two forces would thenjoin for the capture of Topside.

On the evening of 4 May, aPhilippine civilian arrived in asmall fishing boat on the beach atCorregidor. The civilian carried amessage from Philippine intelli-gence on Bataan, and was prompt-ly carried to Lieutenant ColonelGeorge D. Hamilton, the regimen-tal intelligence officer. Hamiltoncalled for Sergeant Harold S.Dennis of the intelligence section

to read the note aloud, as he washaving difficulty disciphering themessage. Dennis read, "Expectenemy landing on the night of 5/6May." Hamilton quieted Dennis,saying, "Hush, hush, hush, don'tsay another word! Do you want tostart a panic?" Hamilton tookDennis with the note to ColonelHoward who listened as the notewas read aloud a second time. Inthe morning of 5 May, Howardcalled a meeting of all the regi-ment's senior officers. Onceassembled, Howard told them thecontents of the note from Bataan.The Japanese were expected tomake their attack that night or thefollowing day.

There followed a discussion ofthe probabilities of the landing. Ifthe Japanese were expected thatnight, the beach positions wouldbe 100% manned at nightfall. If thelanding took place at dawn, thepositions would be 50% manneduntil dawn so the men could eatand rest for the coming attack.Curtis asked the assembled offi-cers for their opinions, which wasfollowed by a spirited discussion.Curtis then called for a vote,which was unanimous for the mento sleep until one hour beforedawn and then fully man thedefenses.

Colonel Howard then spokeand asked for the opinion ofSergeant Dennis, the only enlistedman in the room. Dennis hadstudied Japanese tactics in Chinaand said that enemy landingswere invariably made at night,one hour before the full light of themoon. Colonel Howard thankedhim for his opinion, but did notchange the regiment's orders. Themen would be allowed to sleep fora predawn landing.

Major Max W. Schaeffer com-manded the regimental reserve,which consisted of two companieslettered 0 and P. formed mainlyfrom Headquarters and Service

28

Company's personnel. Schaeffer'swould be the first unit to move toany Japanese landing on Corregi-dor. At 1700, 5 May, he made hisfinal preparation for the night.Major Schaeffer summonedSergeant Gerald A. Turner to hisheadquarters. The sergeant report-ed by asking "Well, Major, what'sthe trouble now?" Major Schaefferreplied, "It may be a long, longnight for you. The reason I'vecalled you down here is becausewe need a 2d platoon, and you'reit." He made Turner a lieutenantand gave him command of 30-35Filipino army officer cadetsformed into a platoon of threesquads. "Don't go out and try tobe a hero." cautioned Schaeffer, "Iwant you to look after these kidsand take care of them." Even withthe addition of Turner's platoon,the regimental reserve numberedless than 500 men.

At nightfall on 5 May ColonelGempachi Sato assembled his LeftFlank Force at Limay on the Bataan

A Japanese artillery piece on Bataanpounds Corregidor, April 1942.

Photo courtesy of Dr. Diosdado M. Yap

The Landing

Peninsula. The gathered troops"sang softly the high thin haunt-ing melody of 'Prayer in theDawn," and then climbed into 19landing craft for the assault. Thelanding craft varied in size, thesmallest carrying 30 men and thelargest 170. More important, fivetanks of the 7th Tank Regimentwere also embarked in two land-ing craft. The landing craft andbarges approached Corregidor ina three-line formation with expect-ed landfall at 2300, shortly beforethe rise of the moon.

At 2240 the artillery shellingconcentrated on the north shorebeach defenses in the 1st Battalionsector. At 2300, supplies of foodand water were just reaching thebeach positions when landingboats were reported offshore. Asecond artillery concentrationpounded the beach defenses for 6-7 minutes. The shelling was par-ticularly intense, ending withphosphorous shells. Three to four

minutes of silence followed thelast shell when word reachedBeecher at battalion headquartersthat seven Japanese landing craftwere nearing the beach. The initialJapanese landing of 790 men of thereinforced 1st Battalion, 61stInfantry was headed for the beach-es from Infantry Point to NorthPoint.

Captain Lewis H. Pickup ofCompany A watched from hiscommand post as the first force oflanding craft in echelon headedfor his company's positions.Searchlights picked up the landingcraft and the 1st Battalion com-menced firing. The 37mm gunshad no trouble tracking the land-ing craft, as Sergeant Louis E.Duncan had altered the traversingmechanism so it could move morefreely. Gunnery Sergeant WilliamA. Dudley held up the trails to his37mm gun to fire down on theincoming boats.

Private First Class Silas K.

29

Barnes heard the boat motors fromhis machine gun position onInfantry Point and for a fewmoments was able to hit theapproaching landing craft thatwere illuminated by the search-lights. He effectively enfiladedCavalry Beach and cut downmany of the Japanese soldiers asthey came ashore. The Japanesestruggled in the layers of oil thatcovered the beaches from shipssunk earlier in the siege and expe-rienced great difficulty in landingpersonnel and equipment. Unfor-tunately, Barnes' and one othermachine gun position were all thatremained of 13 machine guns fromInfantry Point to North Point. Therest had been destroyed by theJapanese bombardment.

The 1st Platoon, Company A,commanded by First LieutenantWilliam F Harris, defended thebeach from Infantry to CavalryPoints, while the 2d Platoon underMaster Gunnery Sergeant John

on 6 May, is here planning that invasion.

Mercurio held the line fromCavalry to North Points. "I've gotword that landing boats willattempt a landing," Harris told hismen, "They'll be coming in heresomeplace. Fix Bayonets." Heordered Private First Class JamesD. Nixon to go to the cliff over-looking the beach, and report onthe location of the Japanese. Nixonlooked at the beach and sawJapanese troops coming ashoreonly 30 feet away. The Marinesplaced a heavy fire on theJapanese as they climbed the steepcliffs and tossed "MolotovCocktails" down on the landingcraft. In the darkness, however,the Japanese succeeded in bypass-ing many of the Marine positions.

Master Gunnery SergeantMercurio's 2d Platoon was spreadthin covering the beach area, withmany of his positions right on thewater. "At high tide," recalledCorporal Edwin R. Franklin, "Icould reach out and touch thewater." The landing craft wereonly 100 yards away from thebeach when Japanese flares lit upthe night. The 2d Platoon beganfiring, but the Japanese were tooclose to halt the landing. A landing

craft beached in front of Franklin'sposition and enemy troops begancoming ashore. Mercurio, armedwith only a pistol, killed aJapanese soldier "so close he couldhave touched him," as theJapanese overran the beachdefenses. The fighting becameparticularly bloody, "with everyman for himself," rememberedFranklin. The Japanese 50mmheavy grenade dischargers or

"knee mortars" were particularlyeffective at close range, and theoverwhelming numbers ofJapanese infantry forced Mer-curio's men to pull back from thebeach.

Corporal Joseph Q. Johnson, a31st Infantry soldier attached tothe 2d Platoon, remembered, "thegun next to me chattered, andglancing to my right, I saw its tar-gets, small, fleeting, darting in theshadows." Johnson fired two beltsof machine gun ammunition andwas firing a third one when agrenade landed 20 yards away. Asecond grenade landed closer, andrifle fire also hit Johnson's posi-tion. When a third grenade landedonly 10 yards from the gunpit,Johnson ran to the next machinegun position and found the twooccupants dead. He kept moving,crawling along the beach with twoother survivors of his platoon,toward Kindley Field.

The survivors of the 2d Platoonfound themselves surrounded bythe advancing Japanese as theytried to reach safety. CorporalFranklin saw a grenade land in thetrail in front of him, which explod-ed and knocked him to the ground

Photograph courtesy of 61st Infantry AssociationCol Gem pachi Sato, who commanded the Japanese forces which landed on Corregidor

Bataan Peninsula is viewed across Manila Bay from the North Dock area onCorregidor. The masts and stack of a ship sunk in the bay are visible in the middle ofthe photograph.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 311-T

30

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from the left in the second row.

with a head wound. Franklin nexthazily saw a Japanese soldiercharging with fixed bayonet. TheMarine said to himself, "I ain'tgoing this f***** way," and jumpedup to engage the enemy with hisown bayonet. Franklin wasstabbed in the chest, but succeed-ed in killing the Japanese soldier.He ran ahead down the trail pastanother enemy soldier, who shotFranklin in the leg, but the Marinecontinued moving until hereached Malinta Tunnel.

Lieutenant Harris was forced topull his platoon out of the area ofCavalry Point after the Japaneseoverran Mercurio's platoon. Mostof the men fought on their ownthrough the night. Private FirstClass Nixon moved toward thehigh ground of Denver Battery,when he encountered a Japanesesoldier, "eyeball to eyeball." Bothmen charged with fixed bayonet,and in the ensuing struggle, Nixonwas able to wound the Japanesesoldier in the side. He left his

enemy in the darkness and movedtoward the sound of firing.

After facing 30-45 minutes ofdefensive firing the landing craftseemed to abandon their attemptsto land and retired to the bay. Thefiring then subsided. Unknown toCaptain Pickup, most of the 1stBattalion, 61st Infantry was ashorein 15 minutes and the barges werereturning to Limay. The Japanesesent up a flare to signal a success-ful landing at 2315. In 30 minutes,Colonel Sato had his men off thebeach and moving inland.

The 785 men of the reinforced2d Battalion, 61st Infantry were notso successful. The Japanese plan-ners had not reckoned with thestrong current in the channelbetween Bataan and Corregidorand the battalion landed east ofNorth Point where all defensivepositions were still intact. Thecraft also hit the Corregidor beach10 minutes after the 1st Battalion,and the Marines were ready andalert for the attack. The Japanese

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came under heavy fire for the next35 minutes, losing eight of 10landing craft on the shore and onemore sinking after pulling off thebeach.

Private First Class Roy E. Haysmanned a .30-caliber machine gunnestled in the cliffs overlookingthe beach area at Hooker Point. Hecould see the barges approach hisposition, but was ordered to holdfire until the landing craft camecloser. Hays decided, "We're notwaiting any longer," and opened adevastating fire at point blankrange. This was instantly followedby accompanying fires from all theweapons positions along thebeach.

The Japanese who did getashore were crowded in mostcases on beaches that were only 30feet wide backed by 30-foot-highcliffs. Most of the officers werekilled early in the landing, and thehuddled survivors were hit withhand grenades, and machine gunand rifle fire.

Private First Class David L.Johnson remembered a sailornamed Hamilton firing a twin .50-caliber machine gun up and downthe beach, "like shooting ducks ina rain barrel. The Japanese wouldrun up and down the beach,"remembered Johnson "and eachtime there would be less men inthe charges. Finally, they swaminto the surf, and hid behind boul-ders." For the remainder of thenight, only small bands ofJapanese were able to scale thecliffs and engage the Marines.

Captain Pickup went out tocheck his platoons, assuming theattack had been repulsed. He thenlearned that some of the landingcraft had made it ashore in theNorth Point area and Japanesetroops were moving inland. At thesame time, Beecher sent runners toall of his company commandersalerting them to the landing. Asplanned, if the enemy penetration

William C. Koch Papers, Personal Papers Collection, MCHCSSgt William A. Dudley physically lifted the trails of his 37mm gun to fire down atthe Japanese landing craft on the night of 5-6 May 1942. Dudley is the Marine second

was successful, Company Awould withdraw and joinCompany B in a line based onBattery Denver, holding the tail ofthe island from the Japanese.Before the line could be formed,the Japanese captured Denver at2350 and were discovered diggingin. Colonel Sato had led his 1stBattalion soldiers to Denver Hillalmost unnoticed.

Platoon Sergeant WilliamHaynes led his 3d Platoon, thereserve platoon from Company B,from the south beaches at MonkeyPoint over to reinforce CompanyA. Haynes kept his men togetherin the darkness and reached thebeach area. Hearing Japanesevoices ashore, the platoon movedand fired trying to make contactwith the Japanese, but they werefiring only at the voices. After anhour the platoon became scatteredin the darkness and each Marinefought the rest of the night on hisown.

Captain Pickup had only justreturned to his headquarters,when he discovered the enemyon Denver. His first reaction wasto pull a platoon off the beachand retake the battery, but in dis-cussion with First LieutenantWilliam Harris, he decided tokeep his beach defenses intactand await reinforcements. MarineGunner Harold M. Ferrell went to1st Battalion headquarters to alertCaptain Noel 0. Castle, com-manding Company D, to theJapanese landing. He had sent arunner to Denver Battery wherehe found Japanese in the gun pits.Castle, a distinguished marks-man and pistol shot who carriedtwo pearl-handled .45-caliber pis-tols, assembled the Marines ofHeadquarters Company and thefew Marines available ofCompany D to drive the Japanese

off of Denver Hill.Castle dispatched Sergeant

Matthew Monk with 15 driversand cooks to occupy an aban-doned beach defense position andsecure his left flank. "Do the bestyou can," he ordered Monk,"Keep the Japanese out of the tun-nel." Castle also scouted thereserve stations at critical roadjunctions, and cautioned the men,"Maintain positions." He thengathered his men for the counter-attack to Denver Battery, declar-ing, "Let's go up there and run thebastards off."

Ferrell warned Castle fromleading the attack himself, but thecaptain replied, "I'm going to takethese people up there and shootthose people's eyes out" and led

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his men to the hill. Castle met theMarines falling back from theJapanese advance, and joined inthe battle. At 0140, the Japaneseattacked the water tower and randirectly into the reinforced pla-toon led by Castle. The two forcescollided in furious combat, practi-cally "face to face," rememberedCorporal Joseph J. Kopacz. TheJapanese advance was halted butthe Marine attack was bloodilyrepulsed.

Castle left the battle line and ranto an abandoned .30-calibermachine gun, which he put intoworking order, while "completelycovered by enemy fire." Castleopened a devastating fire with themachine gun, forcing the Japaneseto cover, which allowed the

National ArchivesA postwar view of the Cavalry and Infantry and Point landing beaches on Corregidorand Kindley Field. Note the Denver Battery ridge on the left of the photograph.

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American advance to continue.The Japanese fell back from thewater tanks to the Denver Batterypositions, but Castle was hit byJapanese machine gun fire andkilled. With their commanderdown, the attack ground to a halt.

Captain Golland L. Clark ofHeadquarters Company, 1stBattalion, then ordered mortar fireplaced on the ridge and for 20minutes Stokes mortars, convert-ed to fire 81mm ammunition,pounded the Japanese positions.However, the Marine with therange card which contained thecoordinates which targeted theentire end of the island could notbe found throughout the night.The mortar firing soon halted asstray rounds were impacting onMarine positions on the other sideof the hill. For the moment onlyscattered Marines from everycompany in the 1St Battalion heldthe Japanese from moving on toMalinta Tunnel.

Gunner Ferrell put togetherwhat few men he could find fromCompany D and formed a line toprevent the Japanese from movingdown from the high ground andtaking the northern beach defens-es from the rear. Marines fromHeadquarters Platoon, CompanyA, joined the battle on their own.First Sergeant Noble I. Wellsformed 25 to 30 Marines on line to

prevent the Japanese from movingalong the north road. The Japanesesoon attacked, screaming,"Banzai! Banzai!" and reachedwithin 15 to 20 yards of the Marineposition before being turned back.The Japanese then tried to infil-trate behind Wells' men. He post-ed two Marines to guard the com-munication trench. CorporalHoward A. Jordan heard a noiseand shouted, "Who goes there?" Avoice responded, "Me Filipino, gothurt foot," and a figure began torun. Both Marines opened fire,and dropped the man who turnedout to be a Japanese soldier.Corporal John H. Frazier laterremarked, "Didn't have to worryabout that foot anymore."

Before midnight, LieutenantColonel Beecher committed hisbattalion reserve, a platoon of 30Philippine Scouts, but theJapanese were obviously firmlyashore and more reinforcementswere needed to drive the enemyback to the beaches. LieutenantColonel Samuel V. Freeny orga-nized a platoon of men, gatheredfrom Malinta Tunnel, to reinforcethe beleaguered 1st Battalion. Oneof the U.S. Army enlisted mencomplained, "I've never fired arifle before, I'm in the financedepartment." Freeny replied, "Youjust go out and draw their fire andthe Marines will pick them off."

With the 1st Battalion fully com-mitted, Colonel Howard orderedthe regimental reserve underMajor Max Schaeffer to report toBeecher. The 4th Battalion wasalerted to be ready to respondshould more men be needed.

At the sound of machine gunfire, Major Schaeffer alerted histwo companies which formed theregimental reserve, and sentSergeant Turner's Filipino cadetplatoon in advance to MalintaTunnel. Shortly before midnight,he moved the rest of his men tothe tunnel. The Marines pulled ontheir bandoliers of ammunition,fastened grenades to their car-tridge belts, and as Private FirstClass Melvin Sheya remembered,said to each other, "Well, here goesnothing." The two companiesmoved along the South ShoreRoad under Japanese artillery fire,but lost only a few men beforereaching the tunnel.

When Sergeant Turner's pla-toon reached Malinta Tunnel, hefound the passage blocked byhundreds of "tunnel rats," sol-diers who had no organization onthe island and lived in the safetyof the tunnel. These men wouldn'tclear the corridor for the regimen-tal reserve to pass into. Turnerordered his men, "Fix bayonets,boys, let's give them a nudge."The main passage of the tunnelwas soon cleared.

Lieutenant Colonel Beecherinformed Schaeffer of the situationon Denver Hill as the Marinesdrew more hand grenades andLewis machine gun magazinesfrom caches planted against aneastern attack. All proceededaccording to plan. A few Marinesand sailors from the tunnel joinedthe column as ammunition bear-

Barbed wire entanglements on the beach at Corregidor. Most of these were destroyedat the time of the Japanese landing.

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ers. At 0100 Major Schaeffer gavehis company and platoon com-manders orders to counterattackand drive the Japanese off the tailof Corregidor. Company P wouldadvance down the road towardKindley Field and upon meetingresistance would deploy to the leftof the road while Company 0would move to the right. Togetherthe companies would sweep to theend of the island. Officers of the1st Battalion would lead the twocompanies into position.

At 0200 the two companies ofthe regimental reserve deployeddown the road leading east fromMalinta Tunnel. Sergeant Turner'splatoon again led the advancefrom the tunnel, literally runninginto Captain Golland L. Clark, 1stBattalion adjutant, who wasdirecting reinforcements to thebattle area. "Oh, Turner, what'syour unit?" Clark asked. "It's myplatoon. They sent me out hereand I'm supposed to contact you,"answered Turner. "I want you togo down this road," Clarkordered, "just keep going as far asyou can until you make contactwith D Company."

Sergeant Turner's platoonmoved less than 200 yards when agreen flare went up right abovethe men. Turner stopped, turned,and called out, "Hit the deck," asJapanese artillery began raking thearea. The platoon went to groundand was prevented from going tothe Denver Battery fight. Rifle firealso ranged into the position andcontinued to pin the platoondown.

Major Schaeffer's main forcefollowed behind Turner. Shotswere soon exchanged betweenMarines of the two companies.Cloaked in darkness it was impos-sible to tell friend from foe. At afork in the road, Company Pturned left and Company 0 took aright turn. First LieutenantHogaboom, commanding Com-

pany P. soon ran into scatteredJapanese fire and Captain Clarkordered Hogaboom to deploy hismen into line formation.Hogaboom soon found that hehad only his 2d Platoon. The othertwo platoons were nowhere to beseen.

Company 0, behind CompanyP, had almost reached the fork inthe road when they began to takeJapanese rifle and machine gunfire. Sergeant Carl M. Hollowayremembered, "we had been soaccustomed to . . . heavy artilleryfire and bombs for so manymonths, that the bullets kickingup dust around our feet seemed attimes almost like rain drops hit-ting the dust." Flares then lit upthe night sky followed by a thun-derous Japanese barrage. The leadplatoon was able to take cover innearby bomb craters but still losteight men in the first few minutesof the shelling. The rest of thecompany was caught in the openand cut to pieces. The 3d Platoonwas left with only six Marinesunhurt while 2d Platoon had onlyfive.

As soon as the barrage lifted,Quartermaster Clerk Frank W.

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Ferguson advanced his 1st platoonas ordered but came under heavymachine gun fire from BatteryDenver hill. Ferguson deployedhis platoon to the left of the roadand tried to tie in with CompanyP. He believed that the two pla-toons behind him would soon beup to anchor his right to the beachand to support his advance. A fewisolated Marines did reach him,but only a handful. Ferguson thenled his men up the hill into theface of concentrated machine gunfire. The commitment of the regi-mental reserve was now whittleddown to two isolated platoons,each advancing unsupported.

At 0300 Ferguson's platooncame to a halt on the hillside. Thesteep slopes were covered byinterlocking machine gun fire anddespite three attempts, only a fewyards were gained. The 1stPlatoon halted only 30 yards fromthe Japanese positions and dug in.The battle now raged around thetwo concrete water tanks on top ofthe ridge, just ahead of the DenverBattery position. Ferguson'simmediate concern was for hisflanks and he moved a Lewis gunand an automatic rifle to cover the

Photograph courtesy of 61st Infantry AssociationThe landing area from Cavalry to Infantry Points, Corregidor.

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too well protected. The remnantsof both companies settled in theirpositions and then began a duel ofAmerican grenades against theammunition of the deadly accu-rate Japanese "knee" mortars.Captain Robert Chambers, Jr., metwith Hogaboom before dawn tocoordinate the battle line of thetwo companies. Both comman-ders agreed that without rein-forcements, the battle would soongo against the Marines.

nearby trees.

road to his right. His left still hadno connection with Company P,but Quartermaster Sergeant JohnE. Haskin brought up his five menof 3d Platoon and Ferguson sentthem to the left to extend thatflank. Captain Chambers orderedthe five survivors of the 2dPlatoon to Ferguson who also sentthem to his left. Soon wordreached Chambers that CompanyP had been joined.

While Ferguson was battling forthe hill, Lieutenant Hogaboomwas advancing along the coastalroad toward the Japanese landingareas. He met a platoon ofMarines of Company A underLieutenant Harris engaged insweeping out Japanese snipersfrom a wooded area. Harrisagreed to support Hogaboom,extending Hogaboom's left to thebeach. Luckily, Hogaboom's 1stPlatoon found its way to the frontand was placed in reserve. Thethree platoons advanced, killing afew scattered Japanese soldiersuntil they hit the Japanese maindefense line in the draw extending

from Battery Denver to the north-ern beaches. Hogaboom's menwere stalled by the Japanese fireand even the 1st Platoon coulddeploy no further.

With no reserve and a tenuousright flank, Hogaboom was forcedto draw a squad to the right rear.As he was deploying the Marines,Japanese landing barges appearedfrom the sea bearing for the beach-es on Hogaboom's left. The 1stBattalion Marines on North Pointopened on the barges sprayingthem with .50-caliber machine gunfire. "The bullets smacking the ar-mor of the barges sounded likerivet hammers rattling away,"remembered Hogaboom. PrivateFirst Class Robert P. McKechnietook a Lewis gun to an overlookand personally disabled two of thebarges, leaving them drifting aim-lessly.

After savaging the attemptedlanding, the Marines tried toadvance to join the members ofthe 1st Battalion at Cavalry Point,but the Japanese machine gun atthe head of the draw proved to be

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Before midnight, ColonelHoward gave orders for the 4thBattalion to prepare to move toMalinta Tunnel and replace theregimental reserve. Major Wil-liams had already alerted his menbased on the view he had of theeast end of the island. The men ofthe battalion needed little warn-ing, having also watched the land-

Capt Noel 0. Castle, expert team shotwith both rifle and pistol, was killed lead-ing the first counterattack on DenverHill. He is shown here at the Camp Perrymatches in March 1937, when he was amember of the Marine Corps rifle team.Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 7563

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) OOR-11004A view of the 4th Marines beach defenses, at this point consisting of sandbaggedbunkers and trenches. Note that the Japanese bombardment has taken every leaf from

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they moved into position.

ing take place. At midnight Wil-liams had extra ammunitionissued and all companies ready tomove. At 0130 he receivedHoward's order to shift to the tun-nel and the 4th Battalion moved atonce.

The battalion marched in thedarkness in two columns alongthe road to the tunnel well spreadout to avoid Japanese artillery fire,but were delayed by a 20-minuteartillery barrage and suffered afew casualties. By 0230, MajorWilliams had his men into MalintaTunnel and awaited furtherorders.

At 0430 Colonel Howard decid-ed to commit his last reserves, the500 Marines, sailors, and soldiersof the 4th Battalion. MajorWilliams' men were long agoready to move out, the MalintaTunnel being severely congestedwith a constant stream of wound-ed Marines from the early fight-ing. Morale in the battalion wasstrained by the constant concus-sions from the Japanese shellingoutside and the proliferation ofrumors in the tunnel. LieutenantCharles R. Brook, USN, remem-bered, "It was hot, terribly hot,and the ventilation was so badthat we could hardly breathe."

Led by Major Williams, the bat-talion emerged from the tunnel inplatoon column. The men were

suddenly subjected to a severeshelling and casualties began tomount before the last companywas able to leave the tunnel.However, within 10 minutes, thebattalion reformed under fire andbegan to move forward. Anotherbarrage soon struck, causing morecasualties and confusion. Minuteslater, the column was again reor-ganized and the advance contin-ued. At 200 yards behind the lineof the 1st Battalion, Williamsordered Companies Q and R todeploy in a skirmish line andguide to the left of the line.Company T repeated the ordersand formed on the right ofCompany R and guided to theright. Company S formed thereserve.

The order of the battalion wasprudent, for the main line ofresistance was badly in need ofreinforcement. In the moonlight,deployment into skirmish forma-tion was difficult, but eventuallyaccomplished. Contact with the1st Battalion was spotty at bestand no Marines were found inline ahead of Company R.Scattered parties of Japanese sol-diers had infiltrated behind theMarine positions all night andtheir sniping proved worrisometo the inexperienced sailors. BothCompanies Q and R were receiv-ing fire from ahead and behind as

36

In the confusion, two sailors,Signalman First Class Maurice C.Havey and Signalman First ClassFrank H. Bigelow, became separat-ed from their command and cameupon an unmanned twin .50-cal-iber machine gun overlooking thebeach area. They manned the gunand opened fire on the Japaneseon the coastline for 30 minutes.Havey fired until the barrelsburned out and Bigelow thenreplaced them. Suddenly, Haveydropped from the gun, turned andsaid, "I'm hit." He staggered to therear toward Malinta Tunnel whileBigelow stayed with the gun.Havey had traveled only 100yards when he was killed by sevenmachine gun bullets across thechest.

Unbeknownst to the Marines,the Japanese troops on Corregidorreceived reinforcements just be-fore dawn. The 3d Battalion, 61stInfantry, engineers, and lightartillery arrived with at least 880men to join the battle. This forcewas originally scheduled to arriveat 0230, but the losses in landingcraft in the initial attack forced thedelay. Even so, five tanks andmost of the field artillery were lefton Bataan due to lack of landingcraft. At 0530, three green flaressignaled the successful landing bythe Japanese.

From 0530 to 0600 the four com-pany commanders of the 4thBattalion tried to put their meninto position but were hamperedby the darkness, lack of know!-edge of the terrain, and the lack ofcohesion of the 1st Battalion. Insome cases the 4th Battalion actu-ally formed a line behind the 1stBattalion positions with no knowl-edge of the Marines ahead ofthem. Luckily, the Japaneseartillery was strangely silent.Major Schaeffer came out of thefiring line to confer with MajorWilliams on the placement of the

National ArchivesA prewar view of Denver Hill from Malinta Hill. Note the water tank on the hill.

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inland from the beaches.

reinforcements, asking, "Joe, whatin the hell did you bring me?"Williams responded, "I have mywhole battalion here—or what'sleft of them. Where is your unit?and what position do you wantmy battalion in?" Schaeffer lost hiscomposure for a moment andreplied, "Joe, I don't know! . . . Idon't know where in hell my non-corns are, I think they are alldead!" Williams motioned a near-by corpsman to check the majorand said, "Dammit now, yourelax, I'll take over this situation."Schaeffer pulled himself togetherand indicated the most needy areawas the gap between his two com-panies. Company S moved out ofreserve and forward to fill thebreach.

flanks to cover the island from endto end. A decision was reached tofind how many men had been lostin getting into position, but thiseffort was unsuccessful. The bestestimate of the strength of the bat-talion at that time was about 400men.

At 0600 Williams ordered hisbattalion to counterattack at 0615,

the break of dawn. In 10 minutesall companies were alerted andjumped off promptly at the desig-nated time. The order, "Charge,"came down the line and theMarines, sailors, and soldiersattacked with fixed bayonets,"yelling and screaming. . . cursingand howling. . ." Gunner Ferrelltried to use the 1st BattalionStokes mortars to support theattack, but again the rounds weretoo inaccurate for use. CompaniesQ and R rapidly gained ground onthe left, but Company S ran atonce into heavy machine gun fireand was halted after moving only100 yards.

Company T also ground to ahalt after gaining little ground.The Japanese sent up flares whichbrought a prompt response fromthe artillery on Bataan. In 10 min-utes the gunfire halted andCompany T resumed the attack onthe ground around BatteryDenver, but machine gun firequickly halted the advance. Amachine gun position on the northroad was knocked out, as wasanother in the ruins on BatteryDenver Hill, but at heavy cost.

Major Williams and his staffarmed themselves with rifles andhand grenades and entered thefront lines where the firing wasthe heaviest. This command deci-sion at times prevented tight coor-dination among the companies asthe commanders often wouldhave little idea how to contact themajor. The dazed battalion settledinto its positions and extended its

37

Photograph courtesy from 61st Infantry AssociationJapanese soldiers pause amid the fighting on 6 May as they move their light artillery

Japanese troops move to the high ground on Corregidor's north shore during the fight-ing on 6 May.

Photograph courtesy of 61st Infantry Association

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Major Schaeffer was pinneddown in his command post bythese two machine guns and hadlost contact with his men. Whenthe fire was silenced, he rose fromhis position, a mixture of dirt andblood from wounds rurming intohis eyes, blinding him. Despite hiswounds, Schaeffer tried to reorga-nize his men and explain toWilliams what had happened.Major Williams had Schaeffercared for and calmly took controlof the action.

Predictably, contact was soonlost between the two left compa-nies, Q and R, and the two compa-nies on the right, S and T. Thecompanies on the left had outdis-tanced those on the right by 200yards. Williams halted CompaniesQ and R, ordering them to regaincontact with the stalled companiesand try to break into the Japaneseflank on Denver. The two boat-loads of Japanese soldiers leftdrifting by Private First ClassMcKechnie, and now hung up off-shore, were successfully destroyeddespite the poor marksmanship ofthe sailors in Company Q. At 0630

Williams began to shift men to theright, which was hard-pressed.

Quartermaster Clerk Ferguson,now in command of Company 0,decided to attack the two machineguns which covered the beachroad by the flank. Ferguson, withsix men, moved down the roadcovered for some distance by theroad embankment. Unfortunately,two new machine guns opened onthe party and they were bracketedby knee mortars. By the timeFerguson was abreast of the firstguns he had only one man left,Corporal Alvin E. Stewart of the803d Engineer Battalion. The twogave up the enterprise and movedto the south side of the road toplace rifle fire on the offendingmachine guns.

The Japanese on top of the hillevidently thought they were beingflanked by a larger party of menand a reinforced platoon began tofile out of Battery Denver tocounter Ferguson's move. TheJapanese were entirely in silhou-ette against the skyline and thetwo Americans by the road hadperfect targets. Ferguson later

38

wrote "There wasn't a chance tomiss them—we were too close forthat." Within seconds 20 Japanesesoldiers were killed or wounded.The Americans were so intent onfiring that they didn't notice aJapanese rifleman coming upbehind them. Ferguson was shotby a glancing bullet in the face,leaving blood streaming from hisnose and cheek. Stewart was ableto pull him back to the Marine bat-tle line without further wounds.

One of the major impedimentsto the Marine attack was aJapanese machine gun placed in ahole in the base of one of the watertanks. Quartermaster SergeantJohn E. Haskin and SergeantMajor Thomas F. Sweeney ranunder fire and climbed up thecement water tower in thepredawn darkness. The twoMarines did not expect to survivethe battle, and their comradesknew that both would attemptsome extreme action during theexpected fighting. Marine GunnerFerrell talked to Sweeney as he ledhis men into action that morning.Sweeney said as they parted,"Well, this is it. We've been in theMarine Corps for 15 years and thisis what we've been waiting for. If Idon't see you, that's the way it is."

The two Marines now lobbedgrenades into the Japanese posi-tions, promptly destroying themachine gun in the water tank.Captain Brook remembered, "AMarine sergeant . . . gathered anarmful of hand grenades andclimbed to the top of a stone watertower near our front line. Fromhere, he threw them at a Japanesesniper position and succeeded inknocking it out." Another Marine,Corporal Sidney E. Funk, wascrawling beside the water tankwhen he heard a voice call down,"Hey Funk, those bastards areright over there in the brush. If Ihad enough hand grenades, I'dblow the hell out of them." Funk

Photograph courtesy of 61st Infantry AssociationThese two water tanks were the focus of the heaviest 4th Marines fighting on 6 May.The tank in the foreground overlooked the Denver Battery positions and was whereQMSgt John E. Haskin and SgtMaj Thomas F. Sweeney died.

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belonged to and quickly crawledaway for cover.

Despite drawing fire to them-selves, Haskin and Sweeney con-tinued to have some initial suc-cess, destroying at least one moremachine gun. However, their sup-ply of grenades was soon exhaust-ed and Haskin was killed whilereclimbing the tower with moreammunition. Sweeney was killedsoon after. The two "were veryclose friends in life," rememberedQuartermaster Clerk Frank W.Ferguson, "it was most fitting thatthey should go out together."

The American advance on boththe right and the left was nexthalted by an enemy machine gunlocated in the gun pit of BatteryDenver near the water tower.From this commanding positionthe gun could hit any movementfrom the north coast to the south.The gun drew the attention ofMajor Williams who personallytook on the gun with hisSpringfield rifle with no result. At0730 Lieutenant Bethel B. Otter,USN, commanding Company T,took Ensign William R. Lloyd andfour volunteers, armed only with

gun.Under covering fire of the com-

pany, Otter crawled with his vol-unteers to within 25 yards of thegun pit and lobbed grenades intothe position. For a few momentsthe weapon was silent, the guncrew dead. Almost immediatelythe gun crew was replaced and allbut one member of the assaultparty was killed. With the gunstill in operation, no movementfurther east could be accom-plished. Army Captain Calvin E.Chunn of the battalion staff tookover the company and led anadvance on a group of Japanesesoldiers setting up a light artillerypiece. As the company moved for-ward, a shell struck amidst thecommand group, woundingChunn and two other officers. By0900 the 4th Battalion was stalledand Williams sent to ColonelHoward for reinforcements andartillery support to resume theattack. Neither were available.

First Lieutenant Mason F.

Chronister of Company B, on thesouth shore beaches, could see inthe growing daylight the Japaneseholding the high ground around

Denver Battery. He organized hisplatoon with volunteers from theNavy Communications Tunneland Battery M, 60th CoastArtillery, to attack the Japanesefrom the west at the same timeWilliams was attacking from theeast. The attack proceeded up theridge, but hit Japanese reinforce-ments from the recently landed 3dBattalion, 61st Infantry, also mov-ing up the hill. LieutenantChronister withdrew his menfrom the larger force, and movedthem along a trail, joiningWilliams' line at the watertank.

During the morning actionMajor Williams fought beside hismen, moving from position toposition along the line. CaptainBrook remembered, "He waseverywhere along the line, orga-nizing and directing our attack,always in the thick of it, seemingto bear a charmed life. I haveheard men say that he was thebravest man they ever saw."

From 0900 until 1030 the fire-fight proceeded without change inposition. The lines were so closethat none of the companies couldshift a squad without drawingmachine gun fire and artillery. Allof the 4th Battalion was fightingwithout helmets, canteens, or evencartridge belts. However, theMarines had the advantage ofbeing too close for the Japaneseartillery to be of use. Small partiesof Marines occasionally were dis-patched to take out Japanesesnipers who were firing into therear of the Marine position fromthe beach area.

The Japanese were now facing aserious problem, which threat-ened to lose the battle for them.Each Japanese rifleman cameashore with 120 rounds of ammu-nition and two hand grenades.The machine gun sections carried

had no idea who the voice hand grenades, to take out the

Col Sato confers with his staff during the fighting for Denver Battery hill. The absenceof an ammunition resupply threatened the success of his landing.

Photograph courtesy of 61st Infantry Association

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only two cases totalling 720rounds of ammunition and threeto six grenades. The knee mortarsections had only 36 heavygrenades and three light grenades.A large quantity of additionalammunition had been loaded onthe landing craft due to the expect-ed problems in resupplying theforce. However, the ammunitioncrates had been hurriedly dumpedoverboard by the crews of thelanding craft as they grounded onCorregidor and now few boxescould be recovered in the murkywater. By morning most of theJapanese on Denver Hill wereeither out of ammunition or veryclose to it. Many Japanese soldierswere now fighting with the bayo-net and even threw rocks at theMarines to hold the hill.

At 0900, Captain HermanHauck, USA, reinforced theMarines and sailors with 60 mem-bers of his Coast Artillery battery.Williams placed the soldiers onthe beaches to his left where heavylosses had whittled away at hisstrength. With the reinforcementssome advance was made, butagainst strong enemy resistance.Nevertheless, much of the fightingwas done with the bayonet, as theJapanese were running out ofammunition. The tide was begin-fling to turn against the Japanese.As Lieutenant General MasaharuHomma reflected one year afterthe surrender, "If the enemy hadstood their ground 12 hourslonger, events might not havetranspired as smoothly as theydid."

The Japanese were able to setup a mortar battery on NorthPoint and opened with tellingeffect on Williams' left companies.Two squads were sent out to flankthe guns, but ran into machinegun fire which wiped out almostthe entire right squad. Three moresquads were sent out, two to theleft and one to the right of the

mortars. After heavy fighting andloss, the deadly mortars weresilenced.

The machine gun at the head ofthe draw at Cavalry Point also hadheld up the progress of theadvance. U.S. Army LieutenantOtis E. Saalman of the 4thBattalion staff was ordered byWilliams to go to the left and seewhat he could do to get the linemoving. With the help of CaptainHarold Dalness, USA, Saalmantook a party of volunteers up thedraw to silence the gun. TheAmericans crawled unobserved towithin grenade range and thenopened fire on the enemy withrifles and grenades. One of theJapanese defenders picked up agrenade and lifted it to throw itback at the Americans when itwent off in his hand. The gun wasat last silenced and the way layopen to link up with the 1stBattalion survivors to the east.Saalman was able to observe theJapanese landing area where hewatched three Japanese tanksclimbing off the beach.

The Japanese landed threetanks, two Type 97 tanks and acaptured M-3. Two other tankswere lost 50 yards offshore whilelanding with the 2d Battalion, 61stInfantry. The surviving tanks werestranded on the beach due to thesteep cliffs and beach debris andwere left behind by the advancinginfantry. In one hour, the tankcrews and engineers worked apath off the beach. When the tanksreached the cliffs, they found theinclines too steep and were unableto move further. The Marines werealerted to the presence of the tanksand Gunner Ferrell went toCavalry Point to investigate therumors of tanks, and found thevehicles apparently hopelesslystalled.

40

At daylight the Japanese wereable to cut a road to Cavalry Beachbut were still prevented frommoving inland by the slopebehind the beach. Finally, the cap-tured M-3 negotiated the cliff andsucceeded in towing the remain-ing tanks up the cliff. By 0830, allthree tanks were on the coastalroad and moved cautiouslyinland. At 0900, Gunnery SergeantMercurio reported to MalintaTunnel the presence of enemyarmor.

At 1000 Marines on the northbeaches watched as the Japanesebegan an attack with their tanks,which moved in concert with lightartillery support. Private FirstClass Silas K. Barnes fired on thetanks with his machine gun to noeffect. He watched helplessly asthey began to take out theAmerican positions. He remem-bered the Japanese tanks' guns"looked like mirrors flashingwhere they were going out andwiping out pockets of resistancewhere the Marines were." TheMarines still had nothing in oper-ation heavier than automatic riflesto deal with the enemy tanks.Word of the enemy armor causedinitial panic, but the remainingMarine, Navy and Army officerssoon halted the confusion.

One of the Marines' main prob-lems was the steady accumulationof wounded men who could notbe evacuated. Only four corps-men were available to help them.No one in the battalion had firstaid packets, or even a tourniquet.The walking wounded tried to getto the rear, but Japanese artilleryprevented any move to MalintaTunnel. No one could be sparedfrom the line to take the woundedto the rear. At 1030 the pressurefrom the Japanese lines was toogreat and men began to filter backfrom the firing line. MajorWilliams personally tried to haltthe men but to little avail. The

tanks moved along the NorthRoad with Colonel Sato personallypointing out the Marine positions.The tanks fired on Marine posi-tions knocking them out one byone. At last Williams ordered hismen to withdraw to preparedpositions just short of MalintaHill.

With the withdrawal of the 4thand 1st Battalions, the Japanesesent up a green flare as a signal tothe Bataan artillery which redou-bled its fire, and all organizationof the two battalions ceased. Menmade their way to the rear in smallgroups and began to fill the con-crete trenches at Malinta Hill. TheJapanese guns swept the area fromthe hill to Battery Denver and thenback again several times. In 30minutes only 150 men were left tohold the line.

The Japanese had followed theretreat aggressively and werewithin 300 yards of the line withtanks moving around theAmerican right flank. LieutenantColonel Beecher moved outsidethe tunnel, shepherding his menback to Malinta hill. He knew hismen would be thirsty and hungryand ordered Sergeant LouisDuncan to "See what you can doabout it." Duncan broke open thelarge Army refrigerators near theentrance to Malinta Tunnel, andsoon was issuing ice-cold cans ofpeaches and buttermilk to theexhausted Marines.

At 1130 Major Williamsreturned to the tunnel and report-ed directly to Colonel Howardthat his men could hold no longer.He asked for reinforcements andantitank weapons. Colonel Ho-ward replied that GeneralWainwright had decided to sur-render at 1200. Wainwright ago-nized over his decision and laterwrote, "It was the terror vested ina tank that was the deciding factor.I thought of the havoc that evenone of these beasts could wreak if

it nosed into the tunnel." Williamswas ordered to hold the Japaneseuntil noon when a surrender partyarrived.

At 1200 the white flag came outof the tunnel and Williamsordered his men to withdraw tothe tunnel and turn in theirweapons. The end had come forthe 4th Marines. Colonel Curtisordered Captain Robert B. Mooreto burn the 4th MarinesRegimental colors. Captain Mooretook the colors in hand and left theheadquarters. On return, withtears in his eyes, he reported thatthe burning had been carried out.Colonel Howard placed his faceinto his hands and wept, saying,"My God, and I had to be the firstMarine officer ever to surrender aregiment."

The news of the surrender wasparticularly difficult for the menof the 2d and 3d Battalions whowere ready to repel any renewedJapanese landing. Private FirstClass Ernest J. Bales first learnedof the surrender when a runnerarrived at his gun position atJames Ravine, who announced,"We're throwing in the towel,destroy all guns." Bales and his

41

comrades found the news incredi-ble, "hard to take . . . couldn'tbelieve it." One Marine tried toshoot the messenger but waswrestled to the ground.

Private First Class Ben L.Lohman of 2d Battalion destroyedhis automatic rifle, but "we didn'tknow what the hell was goingon," as Japanese artillery contin-ued to pound Corregidor longafter the surrender. "The wordwas passed," recalled Lohman,"go into Malinta Tunnel." Themen packed up their few belong-ings and marched toward theJapanese. Three Marines of 3dBattalion refused to surrender andboarded a small boat and madetheir escape out into the bay.

Sergeant Milton A. Englin com-manded a platoon in the finaldefensive line outside MalintaTunnel, and was prepared to dealwith the Japanese tanks witharmor-piercing rounds from histwo 37mm guns. As he waited forthe Japanese, an Army runnercame out of the tunnel, shouting,"You have to surrender, and leaveyour guns intact." Englin yelledback, "No! No! Marines don't sur-render." The runner disappeared,

Photograph courtesy of Dr. Diosdado M. YapJapanese tanks and infantry on Corregidor after the surrender. Note the captured U.S.M-3 tank on the left of the photograph.

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but returned 15 minutes later, say-ing, "You have to surrender, oryou will be courtmartialled afterall this is over when we get back tothe States." Englin obeyed theorder, but destroyed his weapons,instructirg his men, "We aren'tgoing to leave any guns behind forAmericans to be shot with." The4th Marines, 1,487 survivors,many in tears, destroyed theirweapons and waited for theJapanese to come.

The defenders of Hooker Pointwere cut off from the rest of theisland and were the last to surren-der. They had finished theJapanese survivors of the 2dBattalion, 61st Infantry, in the day-light hours and for the rest of theday faced little opposition. Asevening approached, they heardthe firing on Corregidor diminish,and Forts Hughes and Drum fell

silent. First Lieutenant Ray G.Lawrence, USA, and his second incommand Sergeant Wesley C.Little of Company D, formed hismen together at 1700, andmarched to Kindley Field under abedsheet symbolizing a flag oftruce. The Marines soon foundJapanese soldiers, who took theirsurrender.

Marine casualties in the defenseof the Philippines totaled 72 killedin action, 17 dead of wounds, and167 wounded in action. Worsethan the casualty levels caused bycombat in the Philippines was thebrutal treatment of Marines inJapanese hands. Of the 1,487members of the 4th Marines cap-tured on Corregidor, 474 died incaptivity

The Japanese recognized thatthe five-month battle for thePhilippines was seen by the world

as a defining contest of willsbetween the United States andJapan. Lieutenant General Masa-ham Homma, Japanese comman-der in the Philippines, recognizedthe critical nature of this conflictwhen he addressed his combatleaders in April 1942, saying:

The operations in theBataan Islands and theCorregidor Fortress are notmerely a local operation ofthe Great East Asia War .the rest of the world has con-centrated upon the progressof the battle tactics on thissmall peninsula. Hence, thevictories of these operationsalso will have a bearing uponthe English and the Amer-icans and their attitudetoward continuing the war.

And so they did.

Beach defenses after the surrender of Corregidor. Note the captured defenders standing in the trenchline.National Archives photograph

42

The Bataan Death Marcht dawn, 9 April 1942, Major General Edward P.King, Jr., commanding Luzon Force, Bataan,Philippine Islands, surrendered more than 75,000

starving and disease-ridden American soldiers, sailors,and Marines, and their Filipino allies, to overwhelmingJapanese forces.

He inquired of the Japanese colonel to whom he ten-dered his pistol in lieu of his lost sword whether theAmericans and Filipinos would be well treated. TheJapanese aide-de-camp indignantly replied: "We are notbarbarians." The forthcoming seven to 14 days wouldprove just how barbaric and uncivilized this enemy couldbe!

The majority of the prisoners of war were immediatelysubjected to robbery of their most trivial keepsakes andbelongings, to personal indignities to their bodies, andsubsequently to a grueling 90-mile enforced march in deepdust, over vehicle-broken macadam roads, and crammedinto sub-standard rail cars to captivity in the now infa-mous Camp O'Donnell.

Thousands died enroute from disease, starvation, thirst,heat prostration, untreated wounds, and wanton execu-tion. Additional thousands died in this and in equally dis-reputable prison camps, the direct result of maltreatmenton the Death March.

There were relatively few Marines on the march, whencompared with other members of the American service.Marine Staff Sergeant Thomas R. Hicks, a field clerk in the4th Marines, kept a "Record of Events" from 8 December1941 to 2 May 1942 on Corregidor. It was apparentlyshipped off the island on the following day on the subma-rine Spearfish and arrived at Headquarters Marine Corpsin Washington on 13 August 1942.

When Bataan fell to the enemy on 9 April 1942, StaffSergeant Hicks enumerated six officers and 71 enlistedpersonnel (including Navy medical) as presumed prison-ers of war. An additional Marine from an antiaircraft unithad contracted polio and was left at Bataan's Hospital No.

The majority of captured Marines belonged to twoorganizations, the USAFFE-USFIP (finally Luzon Force)guard detachment and the Marine Air Warning Unit (anSCR-270B mobile, long-range radar unit). The first wascomposed of 43 enlisted Marines and two officers. The lat-ter also had two officers and 28 communications person-nel. Nearly all made the Death March.

Former Lieutenant Michiel Dobervich considers him-self among the more fortunate of the prisoners. For rea-sons unknown to him, he was selected to drive a GMCtruck loaded with sugar to Camp O'Donnell.

En route, Dobervich was witness to the initial looting,face slapping, beating, and bayoneting of American and

Filipino captives. Guarded by a Japanese captain and asoldier with a bayonet at his back, he was helpless in therage that welled in him. At Balanga, he saw an Armybrigadier general and other senior staff officers runthrough a guantlet of enemy privates, slapped and beatenas they were robbed of their possessions. At the sametime, Dobervich lost 500 Philippines pesos, his wristwatch, two fountain pens, and $40 in U.S. currency. Afriend from USAFFE's motor pool and four others werebeheaded when a Japanese found occupation money ontheir persons.

Although pain and time have dimmed his memory,Dobervich believes that he reached Camp O'Donnell intwo days. He and his companions stood at attention infront of the Japanese commander's quarters for 16 hours,in terrific heat, without food or water, and he was at lastdenegrated by that officer in a haranguing speech on hischaracter and his likelihood of surviving. They occupiedbarracks built for Filipino trainees. Passing out from arecurrence of malaria, he awakened days later to find thata Czechoslovakian had saved him from the dying, or"Zero," Ward by administering quinine to him.

Marine enlisted men of the two detachments faredmuch worse. The experiences of two in particular standout. Corporal Ted R. Williams and Private First ClassIrwin C. Scott, Jr., were key members of the Air WarningUnit. Both were in reasonably good health, althoughWilliams had suffered a minor wound.

Although they and several other Marines of the twounits apparently tried to remain together and to look afterone another, they recalled similar occurrences but alsoremembered other things separately.

All recall being forced together either on the Marivelesairfield or at the Little Baguio motor pool, and beingfrisked for their valuables. Some lost food and canteens;others retained them. Beatings for no apparent reasonwere commonplace, and all witnessed varying degrees ofwanton cruelty. Counted off in ranks of four and march-ing companies of one hundred, their ordeal began on 10April 1942. The road from Mariveles on the tip of Bataanto Orani was unimproved, deep in dust and excrement.On nearing Hospital No. 2 west of Cabcaben barrio, whosewards and beds were in the open beneath tall tree cover,they saw both American and Filipino patients turned outinto the line of march, despite the nature of their wounds.Pitifully few of these survived, falling by the wayside,bayoneted or beheaded, or ground into pulp beneathenemy tanks and trucks.

Some recalled seeing Japanese large-caliber guns hur-ried from the north and emplaced in proximity of the twohospitals. Groups of prisoners were halted—evenmarched back—and placed in front of the artillery in plain

43

sight of Americans on Corregidor. Private First Class EarlC. Dodson, guard detachment, was one of these. Shellfragments in his ankle from a short round was removed bya Navy corpsman. At this point, the line of march beganto distintegrate, and the Japs took their frustration out onthe prisoners.

By this time, Williams began to regret having pleadedignorance of his ability to drive a truck. After having got-ten an artillery prime mover started for a group ofJapanese, he and his companions watched with satisfac-tion as the victors, unable to ply its air brakes, spun itdown the East Road "zig-zag" and over a cliff.

As the Americans topped a rise near Bataan Field, theywere turned off into a small peninsula and stopped for thefirst night in a holding pen. Here they were joined bymore Marines, among them a sergeant from the guarddetachment. He instructed the others on the dangers ofdrinking stagnant water from roadside pools and carabaowallows, supplying them with iodine to sterilize theirwater. Corporal Willard F. Van Alst shared his iodine withScott, but they only rinsed out their mouths with theinsipid liquid. Most of the Marines escaped the shock ofdysentery, which was already wreaking havoc amongother marchers.

The sergeant observed that the front of the column wasseldom selected to rest and thus escaped some of the atroc-ities that befell stragglers. Gradually, they worked theirway forward into that position. Nevertheless, theseMarines were among one group herded into a field justsouth of Pilar and forced to strip and to sit under a blazingsun within sight of a freely flowing artesian well for sev-eral hours, apparently a favored Japanese torture.

Williams observed that "unlikely as it seems, especiallyamidst the reigning chaos, we did not feel defeated, onlybetrayed. This led to a dogged determination and fueledthe desire to survive. Adrenalin pumped and bolsteredcourage. Acts of heroism were as common as the multi-tude of flies, mosquitoes, and the dying."

Scott recalled that after several days the prisonersappeared to be in total shock. Enroute he saw macabreexamples of man's cruelty to fellow man. Short commu-nications poles lined Filipino roads. On these, he had seenat least three prisoners crucified, discarded American bay-onets impaling their hands or throats, feet and stomachs.Near the end of the march, he had a recurring dream,while both awake and in fitful slumber, of lying in a whitebathtub with a clear blue waterfall cascading into his openmouth.

When at last halted, the Marines were driven into anarea replete with feces of those preceding them, amongdead bodies already crawling with maggots. In a trancelater that night, they were jerked into reality by a drivingrain. They prostrated themselves on their backs out ofsight of their captors to catch raindrops on their faces andin their mouths.

44

On reaching Lubao, an advanced Japanese supplydepot, they marched through towering mounds of collect-ed American canned goods and rations, a sight that elicit-ed only their wrath, for they had been starving before thesurrender.

Williams had recently lost his canteen to a Japaneseguard. While passing another American stockpile south ofSan Fernando, an incident occurred that he still considersa miracle. A Japanese non-commissioned officer besidethe road saw among them a Marine with whom he hadbeen acquainted in Shanghai. Tugged from the line, theMarine took with him Williams and the other enlistedMarines alongside him. A short distance away, theJapanese instructed a cook to serve these selected prison-ers rice and vegetables simmering together in a cauldron.All their canteens were filled, and one was given toWilliams. This had been their first food and fresh waterfor four days. Williams still agonizes over the fate of theAmerican who may have forfeited the canteen!

San Fernando was the end of only the first phase of theDeath March. Here they were again penned in filthyenclosures. Scott told of a rifle shot in the night that stam-peded him and his fellow prisoners within a steel wireenclosure. The following morning they were horrified todiscover several men who had been trampled to death.

Here, the 11 Marines who had clung together were sep-arated. Williams, Willard Van Alst, and Corporal Paul W.Koziol were crammed into a diminuitive boxcar with 97others, standing room only. The morning sun beat merci-lessly on the steel sides, as a "blowtorch on a tin can."Men fainted standing up; others died in the same position,the air fouled with the smell of urine and feces. The inter-minable ride ended at a small rail yard at Capas.

Again, they straggled into a semblance of militaryorder, to march the remairying six kilometers to CampO'Donnell. Williams was of unadulterated praise fora Fiipina matron and a ,roup of young women whoentered the school grounds laden with baskets of bread,rice cakes, fresh fruit and other foods and began distribut-ing them to the starving men. The Japanese captain incharge brutalized the older woman in their presence,knocking her down and kicking her. Maintaining hercomposure, she rose and continued to dispense her foodstuff. The process was twice repeated, until the officergave in to her courage.

In admiration, Williams wrote: "1 shall never live downthe shame of having less valor than that wonderful ladywho risked beatings, humiliation, perhaps even death, todo what she could for those who had lost the battle. Herplace in heaven is assured by the virtue of our respectiveprayers."

That there were no known Marine deaths on the BataanDeath March can be attributed, survivors claim, to theirbasic training as Marines. Their motto today is"Surrendered, Yes! Defeated, No!"—Richard A. Long

The capture and subsequent loss in1942 of the original 4th Marines' recordsprove at first daunting to any researcherof the period. The search for source mate-rial must begin with part IV of LtColFrank 0. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig,and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.'s History of U.S.Marine Corps Operations in World War II,vol I, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal (Wash-ington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1958).This work proved to be the single bestaccount of the regiment in the fall of thePhilippines.

Other works of value include HansonW. Baldwin's "The Fourth Marines onCorregidor," Marine Corps Gazette, Nov46-Feb47; Louis Morton, The Fall of thePhilippines, The War in the Pacific: UnitedStates Army in World War II (Washington:Office of the Chief of Military History,1953). Also useful were James H. andWilliam M. Belote, Corregidor: The Saga of aFortress (NY: Harper and Row, 1967);Reports of General MacArthur, vols I and II(Washington: GPO, 1966); Carl M.Holloway, Happy, the POW, (Brandon,Mississippi: Quail Ridge Press, 1981);Donald Versaw, The Last China Band(Lakewood, California: PeppertreePublications, 1990); and William R. Evans,Soochow and the 4th Marines (Rogue River,Oregon: Atwood Publications, 1987).

The 4th Marines records which werebrought out from Corregidor by subma-rine or retrieved from the prison campsafter the war are found in the geographi-cal and subject files in the ArchivesSection, Marine Corps Historical Center.The Personal Papers Collection proved tocontain valuable items, including theThomas R. Hicks journals, which containa daily record of events of the regiment.Also of use were the Reginald H. Ridgelypapers, Curtis T. Beecher memoir, Floyd0. Schilling papers, Cecil J. Peart papers,James B. Shimel papers, Carter B.

Simpson memoir, Wilbur Marrs memoir,and the Charles R. Jackson manuscript.

Many other articles written by Marineparticipants or about the 4th Marines inthe defense of the Philippines were con-sulted for this work.

The best sources, by far, for the 4thMarines experience in the fall of thePhilippines are the survivors themselves.Capt Elmer E. Long, Jr., USMC (Ret) andCWO Gerald A. Turner, USMC (Ret), pro-vided assistance in locating the survivingmembers of the "Old" 4th. More than 100Marines have been interviewed as well asmen from other services.

JMichael Miller is Senior Archivist at

.the Marine Corps Research Center atthe Marine Corps University, Quantico,Virginia. Formerly a member of theHistory and Museums Division, heearned a bachelor of arts degree from theUniversity of Alabama in 1978 and a mas-ter of arts degree from Virginia Tech, bothin the field of history. He has authoredarticles in such publications as Civil War

History, American History Illustrated, Gettysburg Magazine, and Civil WarTimes Illustrated, and has written Even to Hell Itself: The North Anna RiverCampaign (1990) and edited John H. Russell, 1872-1947: A Register of hisPersonal Papers (1987).Richard A. Long, author of the sidebars accompanying the text of this pamphlet, hasbeen an historian in the History and Museums Division for the past 40 years, followingsimilar duties with both the Army and Air Force in Japan from 1954-1958, service withthe Navy during World War II, and as an Army ordnance officer and historian duringthe Korean War. In his four decades with the Corps he has been Curator of theCommandant's House and Head of the Oral History Unit.

945 iøWORLD WAR II I *1 W \\' II '9J

THIS PAJVIPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in theWorld War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines bythe History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance ofthe 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIESDIRECTOR EMERITUS OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)GENERAL EDITOR,

WORLD WAR H COMMEMORATIVE SERIESBenis M. Frank

CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANTGeorge C. MacGillivray

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONRobert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist;

Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-5040

1997

PCN 190 003140 00