the mamluks' ascent to power in egypt -by amalia levanoni - studia islamica, no. 72 (1990),

8/9/2019 The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt -by Amalia Levanoni - Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990),

1/25

Maisonneuve Larose

The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in EgyptAuthor(s): Amalia LevanoniSource: Studia Islamica, No. 72 (1990), pp. 121-144Published by: Maisonneuve & LaroseStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1595777.

Accessed: 03/02/2015 16:18

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Maisonneuve & Laroseis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Studia Islamica.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 142.51.81.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=malhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1595777?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1595777?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mal


2/25

THE

MAMLUKS'

ASCENT TO POWER

IN

EGYPT*

I.

From

the

very beginning

of the

Ayyubid

dynasty, Ayyubid

rulers

established

units of Mamluks for

military

service. These

units were often ble

to

enthrone r dethronerulers

n

certain

cases

but nowhere

did

they

claim

authority

for

hemselvesas

they

did

in

Egypt

in 1250. The ascent of the Mamluks to

power

n

Egypt

was

connected

with an

important

shift from

the

Ayyubid pattern

of

rulership.

Al-S.lih

Najm

al-Din

Ayyfib,

the last dominant

Ayyubidruler n Egypt (1240-1249), introduced a new patternof

rulership oncerning

he

composition

of the

army,

the nomination

of

people

to

prominent

positions

in the

state

and court

regulations(').

This

new

pattern

of

rulership granted

al-Salih

Ayyfib

n autocratic-centralized

regime

which

suited his

authori-

tative and

ambitious

personality

nd

protected

his rule

against

the

intrigues

of his rival

Ayyubbid

relatives(2).

This

new

pattern

of

rulership,

however,

undermined the traditional

Ayyubid

patterns

of

rule as

it facilitatedthe

cooperation

between the

administration

and the army n their ttemptto actually governthe state after l-

.Slih

Ayyfib's

death. The

cooperation

between

these two sectors

(*)

I

would like

to thank Professor

Michael

Winter

of

Tel

Aviv

University,

Dr.

Butrus

Abu Manneh

of

Haifa

University,

Professor Nehemia

Levtzion

of

the

Hebrew

University

f

Jerusalem

and Professor

P.

M. Holt

who read

this

paper

and

commented

on it

during

its various

stages

of

preparation.

(1)

R.

S.

Humphreys,

From

Saladin

to the

Mongols,

Albany,

1977

(hence-

Saladin)

pp.

1-13,

67-75.

R.

S.

Humphreys,

The

emergence

of

the Mamluk

army , Studia Islamica 45, 1977, pp. 67-100; 46, 1977, pp. 147-182 (hence The

emergence).

(2)

Ibn

Taghri

Birdi,

Jamal

al-Din

Yusiif,

al-NujaIm

al-Zdhirah

fi

Muliik

Misr

wa-al

Qdhirah,

Cairo,

1963

(hence-Nujzim),

6,

pp.

333,

335-6.

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/25

122

A. LEVANONI

finally

paved

the

way

to

the

formal verthrow f the

Ayyubid

ine

in

Egypt.

II.

The

organization

of

the

army

of

Salah

al-Din,

founder f

the

Ayyubid dynasty,

was based

on

the

Iqt5'

system(3).

Most

army

commanders,

the

Emirs,

were

assigned

hereditary

revenues

directly

by

Salh.

al-Din

(which

assured

their

loyalty)

and

they

allocated soldiers

for

military

expeditions

in

return. Under this

system,

most of

the soldiers

in

Sal~h

al-Din's

army,

with the

exception

of

the

IHalqah,

the Sultan's

body-guard,

were under the

Emirs' direct command. The

heterogeneous composition

of the

Emir class,mostlyKurdish and Turkmanor Turkish Mamluksand

a

few of

Salh.

al-Din's

relatives,

also

contributed to

the

army's

loyalty

to

Salh.

al-Din

and

thus,

he

cleverly

maintained the

balance

of

power

between the ambitions

of

the various

ethnic

groups

of

this class. After

Salh.

al-Din's

death these

principles

of

control

became the formula

guaranteeing Ayyubid's

control

of

their

armies(4).

Al-S.lih

Ayyib

was the first

Ayyubid

Sultan

to base most

of his

army

on the Mamluk

element.

Even

before

his

ascent to the

throne,duringthe lifetimeof his father, he Sultan al-Kamil, he

took

advantage

of his

position

as heir to the

Egyptian

throne,

to

use

the

treasury

to

build

up

a

Mamluk unit. Accused

by

his

brother l-'Adil

of

ntending

o seize

power

he was

appointed

by

his

father o be

governor

of

Hisn

Kaifa

and

his brother ook his

place

as

heir

to the

Egyptian

throne.

Al-S.lih

Ayyfib

resumed his

attempts

at

strengthening

is

power

and took over the northern

regions

of

al-Kimil's

kingdom

after the

death of

their

governor,

Shams al-Din

Sawlb

al-'Adili. He then built

up

a

strong rmy

by

purchasing Mamluks and accepting Kurds and Khawarizimians

into

his

army(5).

(3)

Concerning

this

method see:

C.

Cahen,

L'6volution

de

l'iqta'

du

Ixe

au

xiile

si'cle , Annales,

Economics,

Societies,

Civilisations,

Vol.

8, 1953,

p.

45-48.

(4)

Saladin,

p.

16-17, 18, 34-35,

38. The

Emergence,

p.

89-90.

H. A.

R.

Gibb,

The armies

of

Saladin ,

in

Saladin: Studies

in

Islamic

History

ed.)

YusOf

Ibish,

Beirut, 1974,

p.

140.

(5)

C.

Cahen,

'La

Chronique

des

Ayyubids'

d'al-Makin

b.

al-'Amid ,

Bulletin

d'etudesorientalesde l'InstitutFrangais de Damas, Tome XV, 1955-1957 (hence

al-Makin),

pp.

139,

140, 142,

148-149.

See also:

al-Maqrizi,

Ahmad

b.

'Ali,

Kitab al-Suliik

li-Ma'rifa

Duwal

al-Muliik,

ed.

Muhammad

Mustafa Ziysdah,

Cairo,

1934

(hence-Sulak),

Vol.

I,

p.

238,

240,

243, 247,

255,

339.

Ibn

al-Dawfdari,

'Abd

A11h

b.

Aybak,

Kanz al-Durar

wa-Jd-



4/25

THE

MAMLUKS'

ASCENT TO POWER IN EGYPT

123

Following

al-Kamil's

death,

during

the

short

period

he ruled

Damascus

(January 1239/Spring

240),

al-S.lih

Ayyfib

ought

both

his Ayyubidrivals in Syria and Palestine forcontrol of Syria and

his brother l-'Adil

for

ontrolof the

Egyptian

Sultanate.

During

a

military

expedition,

al-S.lih.

Ayyfib

lost Damascus to his

Ayyubid

rivals

through deception.

His

army,

numbering

some

6,000

soldiers

deserted

him,

leaving

him

with his

Mamluks,

and

some non-Mamluk

officials.

Forsaken

by

his

army,

al-.Slih

yyfib,

captured

and

imprisoned

at

al-Karak

by

his

cousin

al-NMsir

5'ud

ibn

al-Mu'azzam,

shared his

imprisonment

with

two

of his Mamluks

-

his

maid-servant

Shajar

al-Durr and

Baybars

al-Bunduqd~ri. Other Mamluks, too, remained faithful o him,

staying

at al-Karak

until

his release from

prison(6).

mi'

al-Ghurar,

d. 'Abd

al-Fattih.

'Ashur,

Cairo 1972

(hence

-

al-Dawadiri),

Vol.

7,

p.

308, 309, 316,

319.

Ibn

W5sil,

Muhammad

Ibn

S5lim,

Mufarrij

al-Kurab

ft

Akhbdr

BaniAyyib.

Ms.

BibliothBque

Nationale

(Paris),

Arabe

No. 1703

(hence

B.N.

1703),

fol. 71 B

and

Ms.

Biblioth6que

Nationale

(Paris)

Arabe No. 1702

(hence

B.N.

1702),

fol.

304B,

305A,

321A.

Al-Yfi'i,

.Hasan

b.

Ibrahim, Kildb Jdmi' al-Tawdrfkh,

Ms.

Bibliotheque

Nationale, Arabe,

No. 1543

(hence-al-Y~fi'i),

fol.

71B,

73B. It

is

actually

al-

'Ayni's

'Iqd

al-Juman

fi

T5rikh

Ahl

al-Zamln.

See:

Catalogue

des

Manuscrits

Arabes

de

la

Bibliotheque

Nationale,

De

Slane,

1883. T.

1,

p.

291.

Ibn

al-Wardi,

Zayn

al-Din

Umar,

Tatimmat

l-Mukhtasarfi

Akhb'r

l-Bashar,

ed.

Ahmad

Rif'at

al-Badrawi,

Beyrouth

1970,

Vol. 8

(hence

-

Ibn

al-Wardi),

p.

232,

242.

Ibn

Khalikin,

AbO

al-'Abbls

Shams

al-Din

Ahmad

b.

Muhammad,

Wafaydt

l-

A'ydn

wa

Anbd'

Abnd'

al-Zamdn.

Ed.

Muhammad

Muhyi

al-Din

'Abd

al-Hamid,

Cairo 1948

(hence

Ibn

Khalikan),

Vol.

4,

p.

173;

5,

p.

302.

(6)

Sulk,

1,

p.

238, 280-288,

316. See

also: Ibn

Duqmlq,

Ibrfhim

ibn

Muhammad, Kitab al-Jawhar al-Thamrn ft Siyar al-Khulafa'

wa-al-Saldt.n,odleian

Library

(Oxford).

Ms.

Digby

No. 28

(hence

-

Duqmiq),

fol.

88A.

B.N.,

1702,

fol.

323B-329A,

330A, 331A, 1703,

fol.

15B, 16B, 17A,

19B. Ibn

Khalikln,

4,

p.

174,

175;

5,

p.

302.

Al-YWfi'i,

ol.

72A,

81B.

Al-Makin,

p.

147, 150,

151. Ibn

al-Wardi,

p.

246,

254.

Al-Dawadlri,

7,

p.

337.

Nujilm

6,

p.

307. See also:

Ibn

al-Jawzi,

Sibt b.

'Abd

Allah.

Mir'dt

al-Zaman,

ed.

J. R.

Wett,

Chicago,

1907

(hence-

Ibn

al-Jawzi),

pp.

479-480,

481.

As

well as:

al-Yinini,

Qutb

al-Din

b.

Muhammad,

Dhayl

Mir'dt

al-Zamdn,

Tab'

Wizarat al-Ma'arif

lil-Huklimah

al-Hindiyyah,

1954

(hence

al-

Yfnini),

1,

p.

141.

As well as:

Ibn

'Abd

al-Z5hir, al-QAdi

Muhji

al-Din,

Al-Rawd

al-Zahir

fi

Strat al Malik

al-Zdhir,

part

of which has been

published

in

: Fatima

Sadeque, Bybars of Egypt,Pakistan, 1956 (hence-Srat al-Zdhir),p. 3. Al-Safadi,

al-.Hasan

b. 'Abd

Allih,

Nuzhat

al-Mdlik

wa-al-Mulfik

-

Mukhtasar

Strat

man wala

Misr

min

al-Mulfik.

Ms.

British

Museum

(London)

Oriental and Printed

Books,

add. 23326

(hence

al-*afadi),

fol.

60A-60B.

Ibn

Asbst,

Hamzah

b.

Ah

mad,

Musannaf

Kitdb

al-Td'rikh,

Ms. Vaticane

Biblioteca, Vaticana,

Vat.

Arabe 270



5/25

124 A. LEVANONI

When

al-S1lih

Ayyfib

ascended to the

Egyptian

throne

he

trusted

no

military

lement that had

previously

ervedhim

except

his own Mamluks. He did not even trust the al-Kfmiliyyah,his

father's

Mamluk

unit,

that had

brought

him into

power.

He

therfore

worked hard to build

up

a Mamluk

army

which would

be

faithful

o no one

but

himself(7).

Already

at

the end

of

his first

ear

as ruler he

began

purchasing

Turkish

Mamluks (8).

The number

of Mamluks

purchased

by

al-

S.lih

Ayyfib

uring

his

reign

nd

the

composition

of

theirunits are

hard to

estimate(9).

Historical sources are

not

clear

with

regard

to the

possible

existence

of

other

Mamluk bodies

at

his

service

besides the Bahriyyah,his elite unit.

Al-Dawidari

notes that all

Mamluks

n

al-S.lih

Ayyfib's

ervice were called

al-S.lihiyyah,

the

Bahriyyah

being only

one

unit(10).

In

Mufarrij

al-Kurihb,

bn

Wasil distinguishes

ime and

again

between the

Bahriyyah

and

the

Jamdariyyah,

both Mamluk units

serving

al-Salih

Ayyfib.

He

remarks hat both

were

fightingmilitary

nits( ).

Our

sources do

not mentionthe numberof

al-S.lih's

Mamluks,

yet they

note

that,

at its

outset,

al-Bahriyyah

was manned

by

about

one thousand

Mamluks(12).

Ibn

Wasif

notes that

al-Silih.

Ayyfib

brought

a

(hence

-

Ibn

Asbat),

fol. 59B.

Abu

al-Fid5,

'Imld

al-Din

Ism'il,

Kildb

al-

Mukhtasar

fi

Akhbdr

l-Bashar,

al-Matba'ah

al-Husayniyyah

al-Misriyyah

hence

Abfi

al-Fid5),

vol.

3,

p.

172.

Al-Maqrizi, Taqi

al-Din

Ahmad

b.

'All,

Kildb

al-Mawd'iz

wa-l'ltibdr

ft

dhikr

l-

Khitat

wa-al-Athdr,

Misr,

1325

(hence

Khilat),

vol.

3,

p.

384.

(7)

Al-Dawldari,

7,

p.

370.

Al-Makin,

p.

152,

153. B.N.

1702,

fol.

337A,

340A,

B,

359B.

1703,

fol. 27A.

Ibn

al-Jawzi,

p.

515.

Ibn

Duqmiq,

fol.

88B-

89A. Sulak, 1, p. 300.

(8)

Ibn

Duqmiq,

fol.

89B. See

also:

B.N., 1702,

fol.

324A.

Al-Makin,

p.

152.

Abu-1

Fid5,

p.

167. Ibn

Asbat,

fol.

62B.

Al-Dawadari,

7,

p.

343.

NujCm

6,

pp.

307,

320.

Ibn

Wasif

Shah,

Ibrahim

al-Misri,

Kildb Jawdhir

l-BuhiCr

wa

Waqdi'

al-UmCr

wa

'Ajd'ib

al-Duhbr

wa

Akhbar

al-Diydr

al-Misriyyah,

British

Museum

(London),

Oriental Ms. No.

OR. 25731

(hence

Ibn

Wasif),

fol.

59A,

60A.

(9)

D.

Ayalon,

Aspects

of the

Mamluk

phenomenon

Der

Islam,

54/1,

1977,

(hence-Aspects

No.

1)

p.

25.

(10)

Al-Dawld

ri,

7,

p.

376; 8,

p.

25.

(11)

B.N.

1702,

fol.

377B;

1703,

fol.

75B, 78B,

81B,

85A, 87B,

88B,

97A,

103B. Sulak, 1, p. 371.

(12)

Ibn

Duqmaq,

fol.

89A. Ibn

Wasif,

fol.

59A.

Such a number

was

considerable for

hat time.

See:

D.

Ayalon,

Aspects

of

the

Mamluk

Phenonenon,

The

Importance

of the

Mamluk

Institution ,

Der

Islam,

53/2,

1976

(hence-

Aspects

No.

2),

p.

197.



6/25

THE

MAMLUKS' ASCENT TO

POWER IN

EGYPT

125

thousand

Mamluks

in

1241-2,

and

bought

more

later(13).

At

al-Slih

Ayyfib's

death,

the

Bahriyya

was

composed

of

at

least two

thousand cavalry(14). The sources, however, are very clear in

regard

to the

composition

of

al-.Slih

Ayyfb's

army,

which

mainly

consisted of

Turkish

Mamluks

purchased

by

al-S.lih

Ayyfib

bove

and

beyond

those of

his

Ayyubid

predecessors(15).

Al-S.lih

Ayyfib

began

to

consolidate his

Mamluks as

a

military

elite

by

passing

down

their

qt5'

to

their

childrenor

Khushdishes:

When one of

his

Mamluks

died,

leaving

a

son,

he

gave

him

his father's

IqtA'.

If

he had no

son,

he

gave

it to

his

Khushdash (16).

Al-S.lih

Ayyfib

lso

took

great

care

to

reserve

most Iqtf'It solely forhis Mamluks: Whenever he imprisoned n

Emir,

he

gave

his

land to

one of his

Mamluks;

he

also

bestowed the

title of Emir

upon

him,

so

that most

Emirs of

the state

were his

Mamluks (17).

Al-S5lih

Ayyfib

made no

change

in

the

Iqt5'

system

established

by

Salfh

al-Din,

yet

the

concentration f

the

positions

of

military

Emirs in

the hands of

the Turkish

Mamluks

finally

ndermined

he

balance

between the various

ethnic

groups

common in

the

Ayyubid

armies

by

consolidating

full

militarypower

n

Egypt

into

the Mamluks' hands. By founding n armywhich was ethnically

homogeneous,

al-S.lih

Ayyfib

had

further

bandoned the

custom

common in

Islamic

countries wherein

the

co-existence

of

varied

elements

n

the

army

were

considered

a

vital

element

in

retaining

equilibrium

and

maintaining oyalty

to the

regime(18).

(13)

Ibn

Wasif,

fol.

59A,

60A.

(14)

Khilat,

3,

p.

484.

Sulafk,

1,

p.

370.

(15) B.N. 1702, fol.359B; 1703, fol. 37B. Ibn

Asb.t,

fol.62B. Sulfk, vol. 1,

p.

300.

Al-Dawd5fri,

7,

p.

370.

Nujiam

6,

p.

331. Ibn

Wasif,

fol.

60A. Ibn

Duqmaq,

fol. 90a.

Al-Yfi'i,

fol. 110A.

Purchasing

a

large

quantity

of

Mamluks was

then

made

possible

since

the

Tatars who

came,

conquered

the lands of

the East

and North and

treated

the

Kipchaks violently.

They

killed

them,

captured

their sons

and sold

them,

so

merchants

brought

them to

the lands

(of

Islam)...

Ibn

Duqmaq,

fol. 93B.

(16)

Al-Dawidari, 7,

pp.

470-471.

Al-YW'fi'i,

ol.

84B. B.N.

1703,

fol.

35B.

For Khushdash

see D.

Ayalon,

L'esclavage

du

Mamlouk ,

Oriental

Notes and

Studies,

No.

1, Jerusalem,

1951,

pp.

29-31.

(17)

Sulak,

1,

p.

300. See

also:

Khilat,

3,

p.

384.

Abii-l

Fidi,

p.

179.

Nujam 6, pp. 319, 320, 331. Ibn Duqmaq, fol.90A. Ibn Asbat, fol.62A.

Al-Safadi,

fol. 62A. Ibn

al-Wardi,

p.

263.

(18)

Aspects

No.

1,

pp.

30-31.

Aspects

No.

2,

p.

207.

Saladin,

p.

304,

The

Emergence,

p.

149

as

well

as: C. E.

Bosworth,

The

Ghaznavids,

Edinburgh,

1963,

p.

108.



7/25

126

A. LEVANONI

The Khawarizmis

serving

under

al-.Slih

Ayyfib

n

Syria

were

then the

only

body

in

Islamic countries

whose

power equalled

that

of the Mamluks in Egypt. Yet in 1246 the Khawarizmis were

defeated

by

al-S.lih

Ayyfib

when

they

tried to rebel

against

him,

and attacked

Damascus under the

inspiration

of

al-S.lih

Ismd'il,

the

Ayyubid

ruler of Ba'al Bek.

They

never restored their

power

and once

the

Khwarizimis had been

beaten,

the

superiority

of

the

Egyptian

Mamluks over

the

Muslim armies

was un-

questioned(19).

The

reports

of the unrestrained treatment

by

the

Turkish Mamluks of

the

local

population

in

Egypt

indicates

their

gaining

of

the

upper

hand

in

al-Silih

Ayyfib's army,

thus

compelling

al-.Slih

Ayyfib to isolate them from the local

population(20).

In

addition to

introducing hanges

into the

composition

of

the

army,

al-.Slih

Ayyfib

was also concerned with the

new rules

n

the

government

and administration.

Towards

the

end of his

life,

Saldh

al-Din had

striven to

consolidate

a

confederation

of

the

autonomous

emirates headed

by

members of

the

Ayyubid family,

who

passed

them

on from father to son. These emirates

had

grown

out

of

Salh.

al-Din's

acceptance

of

the

demand made

by

membersof his family o give thema shareinthegovernment, nd

allot them their

own territories.

Salih

al-Din

was both

head of

the

confederation

and

its

consolidating

element.

He

thus

laid

the

foundation

for the rule of the

Ayyubid dynasty,

following

the

method

earlier used

by

the

Zangis

and the

Seljuks.

Salh.

al-Din

appointed

his own heir

as

ruler

of

Damacus, himself,

taying

in

Egypt

in order

to

secure his

domination

of

the entire

kingdom

and

thus

determining

he subservience

of

Syria

to

Egypt(21).

Following

Saldh

al-Din's

death,

there

was no

unifyingAyyubid

figure

esides al-'Adil I,

yet

the basic elementsof

Ayyubid

rule laid

down

by

Salh,

al-Din

remained

in

practice. Ayyubids despite

their

rivalry,

were

guided

by

the norm

according

to

which

mainly

Ayyubs

were

given

prominent

government

positions.

They

also

(19)

Sulaik,

1,

p.

324.

Al-Dawadari, 7,

p.

358.

Al-Makin,

p.

156.

Ibn

al-

Wardi,

p.

257.

Abfi-l

Fida,

p.

175.

Nujam

6,

pp.

325-326. Ibn

al-Jawzi,

p. 507. B.N. 1702, fol.346B-347A.

(20)

Sulaik,

1,

p.

301

(editor's

note),

p.

340. Ibn

Wasif,

fol.

59A.

B.N.

1703,

fol.

67B.

See also D.

Ayalon,

Le

r6gimentBahriya

dans

l'arm6e

mamelouke ,

Revue des

ltudes

Islamiques,

Paris, 1951,

p.

134.

(21)

Saladin, 34-35, 67,

69, 74-75, 80,

85.



8/25

THE

MAMLUKS'

ASCENT TO

POWER IN

EGYPT

127

refrainedfrom

hedding

Ayyubid

blood.

Similarly,

hey

kept

the

nominal subservience of

Damascus

to Cairo

intact(22).

Al-Silih

Ayyfibdid not adhere to these principles due to his cold and

calculating

character

and his

hostile attitude to

his

Ayyubid

rivals

who had

inflicted

political

troubles

upon

him

by

their internal

intrigues

before he ascended

the

Eyptian

throne. When he

took

power,

he did

not hesitate

to

spill

their blood

during

his

political

struggle against

them.

Thus

he murdered his

brother

al-'Adil

for

fear

that

he

might

be taken

out

of

prison

during

his

absence

and

made

Sultan. He thus

established

a

pattern

later to be

used

by

his

Mamluk Emirs

when

they

overthrew his own son

Tfirdnshah(23). Ibn al-Jawzi, provides us with a finedescription

of

the

link

between

the

precedence

created

by

al-.Slih

Ayyfib's

murderof his

brother,

nd his own son

murdered

by

his

Mamluks:

Those who murdered

[Tfirdnshih]

were

four ..

al-S.lih

Ayyfib

had

said

to

Muhsin,

Go

to

prison

to

my

brother l-'Adil and

take

along

some Mamluks

to

strangle

him

..

They

went to

him

and

strangled

him.

Then

Allah

put

his son

at

their

mercy,

so

they

killed

him,

molesting

him

as

severely

as he had done

to his

brother

24).

In order to build up centralised control,

al-S.lih

Ayyfib

conferred

the

most

prominent positions

in

his

state

upon

his

confidants who had been

faithful

to

him,

rather than

to the

Ayyubids.

Al-.Slih

Ayyfib's

confidants,

unlike

the

Ayyubids

could

not set

up

claims

to

the throne

as

they

were

personally

faithful o

him

and

depended

on

him

for

their

nomination.

Following

his

conquest

of Damascus

(Autumn

1245),

al-S.lih

yyfib

appointed

Mu'Tn

al-Din

Ibn

Shaykh

to

be his

deputy

there,

rather than

appoint

an

Ayyubid

as his

predecessors

had

done. When Mu'in al-Din entered Damascus, he even fulfilled

several

of

the Sultan's

functions,

uch as

issuing

decrees

concerning

Iqt1'

assignment

and

nomination

for

prominent

positions(25).

At

(22)

B.N.

1702,

fol.

320B,

326B-329A.

Al-Safadi,

fol.

60A-60B.

Al-Dawfdfri,

7,

p.

332,

334,

335-338.

See

Saladin,

pp.

368-469.

(23)

Al-Yfinini,1,

p.

187.

Al-Makin,

p.

157,

159.

Nujim,

6,

p.

312. Ibn al-

Jawzi,

pp.

512-513.

(24)

Ibn

al-Jawzi,

p.

520.

See also:

Sulak, 1,

pp.

360-361.

Nujiim

6,

pp.

312,

372.

Al-Makin,

p.

152-153,

159. B.N.

1703,

fol.

29A; 1702,

fol.

336B,

339A-B.

(25)

Abfi

Shamah, Shihab al-Din 'Abd al-Rahmin Isma'Tl,Tarajtm Rijdl al-

Qarnayn,

ed.

'Izzat

al-'Attir

al-Husayni,

Beyrouth,

1974,

vols. 6-7

(hence

Abfi

Shamah),

p.

176.

Sulak,

1,

p.

321.

Nujam

vol.

6,

p.

324.

B.N.

1703,

fol.

48B,

51A,

51B:

1702,

fol.

350B-351A.

Al-Makin,

pp.

155-156.

Al-Dhahabi,

Muhammad b.

Ahmad,

Al-'Ibar

fi

Khabar man

Ghabar,

ed.

al-

Munjid,

Kuwayt,

1960-1966,

vol.

5.

(hence-

al-Dhahabi),

pp.

175-176.



9/25

128 A. LEVANONI

Mu'in al-Din's

death,

al-Sflih Ayyfib

ontinued

nominatingpeople

from

among

his chief officials

for

prominent

positions

in

Damascus(26). Among these Husim al-Din Ibn abi 'All was the

most

distinguished personality(27).

Al-Slih

Ayyfib

gave

him

command

of

the

army

situated

in

Syria,

in

addition to

extensive

executive

power.

Al-.Slih

Ayyfib

subdivided the

regions

he had

conquered

in

Syria,

Palestine

and Trans-Jordan nto

provinces

and

nominated

governors,

Nuwwdb,

over

them.

These

governors,

ike the

gover-

nor

of

Damascus,

were

directly

responsible

to the Sultan. It

should be noted here that these

arrangements

later

became

characteristicof the Mamluk period, either unchanged or only

slightlychanged(28).

In

Egypt

al-Sflih

Ayyfib

delegated

authority

to

functionaries,

secluding

himself

n

his

palace

or

leaving

the

country

to

go

on

military

expeditions(29).

Both

Mu'in;

al-Din Ibn

Shaykh

and

his

successor

Hussm

al-Din

Ibn

Abi

Ali

enjoyed

al-Sflih

Ayyfib's

full

confidencewhen

each served as

the

Sultan's

vice-regent,

Nd'ib al-

Saltanah,

so much so

that

he made each

in

turn

replace

him

in

the

Sultan's

pavilion,

al-dihlfz

l-sultdnf.

Although

al-S.lih

Ayyfib's

intentionin doing this was to demonstratehis presence in the

country,

he

went

so far as

to

allow his

prominent

avorites

o

enjoy

participation

in

royal

ceremonies.

In

the

case of

Mu'in

al-Din,

al-.Slih

Ayyfib

trusted

him with the Sultan's

pavilion

and

treasures

when he was

at the head

of

the

conquering

army

in

Palestine

in

1244

actually giving

him his own

position (3?).

When

IHusim

al-Din

stayed

at

al-S.lihiyya

in

1250 he fulfilled

the Sultan's

functions (31).

(26)

Al-Tawashi

Shihab al-Din was nominated as the Sultan's

vice-regent

t the

Damascus

Qal'ah (B.N.,

1703,

fol.

51B; 1702,

fol.

350B-351A.

Al-YA'fi'i,

fol.

102B.

Al-Makin,

p.

156).

Husam

al-Din was nominated

as

vice-regent

f the

city

of

Damascus

(al-Makin,

p.

156).

Jam~l

al-Din

Ibn

Matriah

eplaced

Hushm

al-

Din in

1246

(al-Makin,

p.

157).

Then Jamal

al-Din Ibn

Yaghmfir

was nominated

to the same office

al-Yifi'i

fol.

106B. B.N.

1702,

fol.

356B.

Al-Makin,

p.

158).

(27)

He

gained

al-Salih

Ayyfib's

full

confidence

hanks

to his

being

one of

the

few to have

stayed

with him

following

his downfall.

.Hushm

al-Din had been

imprisoned

at

Ba'al

Bek

for his

loyalty

to

al-.Slih

Ayyib.

Nujfim

6,

pp.

321,

326.

Al-Dawfdari,

7,

p.

359.

Sulark,

1,

p.

314,

321,

326,

332.

B.N.

1702,

fol.

322B, 357B; 1703,

fol.

22A, 45A,

60A.

(28)

Sulak, 1,

pp.

318,

320, 329,

338.

Al-Makin,

pp.

149, 156,

157,

158.

1703,

fol. 52A.

Al-Y5'fi'i,

fol. 104A.

Saladin,

pp.

298,

299.

(29)

Nujam

6,

p.

331.

Sulak, 1,

pp.

306-307, 318-319, 321,

330.

(30)

Sulak, 1,

pp.

318-319.

See also:

al-Makin,

p.

155.

(31)

Sulalk,

1,

p.

330. See also:

B.N.,

1702,

fol.

353A,

354B.



10/25

THE MAMLUKS' ASCENT TO POWER

IN EGYPT

129

The

position

of

Shajar

al-Durr,

who was first

al-.Slih

Ayyfib's

slave

and

later

his

wife,

is the best

example

of the

extensive

authoritybestowed by

al-S.lih

Ayyfibupon those fewpeople that

he trusted. Needless to

say

that

Shajar

al-Durr's

position

in al-

S.lih

Ayyfib's

kingdom

was

a rare

exception

in

Islam as

women

never

enjoyed

formal

positions

in

the courts. She

ran

the

kingdom

affairs

during

his

[al-S.lih

Ayyfib's]

bsence on

military

expeditions.

Her

orders were

obeyed,

her decrees

were carried

out and

she

signed

with the seal of Umm

Khalil (32).

In

addition

to the broad

ruling

authority

she also

enjoyed

also

extensive

influenceover

the

army

since she was

familiar

with

his

[al-S.lihyyfib's]character and the positions of his Emirs and Mamluk-

s

1

3).

Al-S.lih

Ayyfib

ntroduced

court

regulations

preventing

direct

contact between

himself

and

position-holders

ower

than

that

of

the

top

officials

n his

kingdom.

Such

officialswere

not

accepted

by

the

Sultan,

but would discuss

the

requests

[that

they

had

addressed

to

the

Sultan]

with the

courtiers,

nd he

[al-.Slih

Ayyfib]

would

sign

them as confirmed

by

the clerks in

charge

of

correspondence 34).

III.

Al-.Slih

Ayyfb's

court

regulations

and his

system

of

bestowing

authority

on

people

close to

him,

did

not

cope

with

the

rule

of

maintaining

direct

connection

between the Sultan

and

the

army

and

the

bureaucracy,

that

Salh.

al-Din had been so

keen on

maintaining.

This did

not

endanger

al-S.lih

Ayyfib's position

personally,

because of his

strong

authority

and

the

loyalty

of

the

Mamluk units

with

which

he

surroundedhimself.

However,

when

he

grew gravely

ll,

later

dying

n

the

midst

of

the crisis

created

by

the Franks' invasion of Egypt (April 1249), a vacuum was created

and

his

government

procedures

and

the

homogeneous

composition

of his

army

enabled his officials

o take over

the

running

of the

kingdom's

affairs,

eaving

Tfirdnsh~h,

al-S.lih

Ayyfb's

son and

legitimate

heir,

as ruler

in

name

only.

Shajar

al-Durr

concealed

al-S.lih

Ayyfib's

death

in

the

middle of

the

war

against

the

Franks

(November

1249)

until

she

(32) Ibn Wasif, fol.64B, see also: Ibn Duqmaq, fol. 92A. Nujfim6,

p.

373. See also:

Ibn

al-Jawzi,

pp.

514,

515.

(33)

Strat

al-Zdhir,

p.

5.

(34)

Nujam,

6,

p.

331.

See

especially:

Ibn

al-Jawzi,

p.

515. See

also:

1703,

fol.

67A, 74B;

1702,

fol.

359B-360A.

Al-Ydfi'i,

fol.

109A.



11/25

130

A.

LEVANONI

was assured

of

the

support

of

the

army,

and

important

officials,

n

putting

Tfirinshih

on his father's

throne.

She shared her

secret

with

al-Tawishi Jamil

al-Din

Muhsin,

who had been in

charge

of

al-.Slih

Ayyfib's

Mamluks.

Shajar

al-Durr and

al-Tawishi

Muhsin

needed the

cooperation

of Fakhr al-Din Ibn

Shaykh

al-Shuyfikh(3)

who was the chief commander

of

the

army

stationed

in

Damietta,

since it

was

in

his

power

to unite the

army

in

time

of

crisis,

although

he was

not of the Mamluk

class(36).

With

Fakhr al-Din's

knowledge,

the

Emirs

stationed

facing

the Franks were

called

to

obey

al-S.lih

Ayyfib's

decree(37)

making

them swear

allegiance

to

him

and his son

after

him,givingFakhr al-Din command over the

army

and its

Atdbakiyyah,

s

well

as

running

he affairs

of

the

kingdom (38).

A

similar decree

concerning

the oath

of

allegiance

to be

given by

the honoraries

and soldiers

of

the

state (39)

n

Cairo

was

given

to the

Emir

Husim

al-Din,

the Sultan's

vice-regent

in

Cairo. The

swearing

of

allegiance

in

Cairo

was

attended

by

Egypt's

chief

Qidi,

Sadr

al-

Din Yusfif

Ibn

Muhsin

and

the

Qfdi Bahi'

al-Din

Zuhayr,

the

secretary

n

charge

of

the

correspondence

Bureau,

Kalib

al-Insha

'(40).

Once the army,

the

judicial bureaucracy

and

government

institutions

had all

given

their

consent,

Fakhr

al-Din

started

carrying

out the Sultan's

functions(41).

Study

of our sources reveals

that those

people

who

cooperated

in

keeping

al-Silih

Ayyfib's

death

secret until

Tfirinshih

was

brought

to

Egypt

were divided into two

groups

with

basically

contradictory

interests.

The

conflicting

nterests

of the two

(35) Concerning his history, see: B.N., 1703, fol.77A; 1702, fol.340A,

363A. Ibn

al-Jawzi,

p.

500.

Al-Dawadiri,

7,

pp.

359,

374.

Nuji~m,

6,

p.

320. Ibn

al-Wardi,

p.

258.

Suliak,

1,

p.

309,

322,

324,

327,

328, 331,

335.

(36)

B.N.,

1702,

fol.

362A-B.

Al-YMi'i,

fol.

110A-B.

Ibn

al-Jawzi,

p.

514-

515.

Sulik,

1,

pp.

322,

342-343.

(37)

This

decree,

like those that

followed,

may

be assumed to have

been

forged

by

a

servant of

al-.Slih

Ayyfib.

See:

B.N.,

1703,

fol.

77A.

Ibn

al-Wardi,

p.

264.

Suliak,

1,

p.

344,

or else

by Shajar

al-Durr

herself.

Ibn

al-Jawzi,

p.

515.

B.N., 1702,

fol.

362B,

1703,

fol.

76B-77A.

Nujiam,

6,

p.

374.

(38)

SulMk,

1,

p.

343.

See

also:

Ibn

al-Wardi,

p.

264.

B.N.,

1703,

fol.

76B;

1702,

fol.

362B.

On the

aidbakiyyah

bearer

in

the

Ayyubid

ruling

system,

see

al-Qalqashandi, vol. 4, p. 18. For examples, see: Saladin, pp. 54, 60, 112, 155.

(39)

Al-Dawfd~ri,

7,

p.

374.

B.N., 1702,

fol.

362B;

1703,

fol.

76B-77A.

(40)

B.N.

1703,

fol. 77A.

(41)

Op.

cit.,

1702,

fol.

362A-B.

Ibn

al-Jawzi,

p.

516.

Al-Yfi'i,

fol.

l l0A.

Sulak, 1,

pp.

343-344,

345.

Al-Daw5dari,

7,

p.

375.

Al-Makin,

p.

159.



12/25


IN EGYPT

131

groups

and the

illegitimate way

in

which

Shajar

al-Durr

chose to

act,

indicate that

Tfirinshih's

inauguration

primarily

erved the

personal interestsof those who made himSultan. Shajar al-Durr

and

al-TawishT Jamil

al-Din

Muhsin

belonged

to the

Mamluk

institution

that had

been

the corner-stone of

al-S.lih

Ayyfb's

rule.

As mentioned

above,

Shajar

al-Durr had

enjoyed

extensive

authority

for

running

state

affairs,

whereas

al-Tawishi

Muhsin

held

the

sensitive

and

extremely

powerful

role of

running

both the

Mamluk units and

al-S.lih

Ayyfb's

retinue(42).

Since both were

part

of the late

Sultan's

Mamluk institution

nd

would

both

have

had to be

replaced

by

the

ascending

Sultan's new Mamluks

according to the norms of the Mamluk system(43), hey were

interested

n

helping

Tfirinshih

ascend

the

throne,

thus

guaran-

teeing

the new Sultan's

dependence

on them.

TOfirnshih's

unstable character

and

his lack of

familiarity

with the

Egyptian

political

system

further

ncouraged

them.

Unlike

Shajar

al-Durr and

al-Taw~shi

Muhsin,

Fakhr al-Din

Ibn

Shaykh

al-Shuyfikh

was a

political

rival of

al-S.lih

Ayyfb.

Fakhr al-Din

had

already toyed

with the

idea

of

taking power

when

al-S.lih

Ayyfb

ascended the throne

-

thanks to the

power

held by his family and his own popularity.

Al-S.lih

Ayyfb,

although having

once

imprisoned

Fakhr al-Din and

placing

him

under house

arrest,

ater

managed

to

use Fakhr al-Din's

power

to

promote

his own rule. He

appointed

him

as chief commander of

his

army

and showered

presents

upon

him( ).

Yet

deep-rooted

mistrust

between the two

still

existed.

It

sprang up

when

Fakhr

al-Din,

appointed by

al-S.lih

Ayyfib

to

protect

Damietta,

abandoned the

city

with its arsenals

and

military

supplies

to the

Franks when

they

attacked

his

camp.

Al-.Slih

Ayyfb

bore

Fakhr al-Din a grudgeforwhat he had done, but did not punish

him,

since the time

allowed

nothing

but

to forebear

and close

one's

eyes .

Ibn

al-Furit

notes

that if

al-.Slih

Ayyfb

had not

(42)

B.N., 1702,

fol.

362A; 1703,

fol.

75B.

AI-Yfifi,

fol.

O10A.

Suliik, 1,

p.

343.

(43) D. Ayalon, Studies on the Structureof the MamlukArmy ,Bulletinofthe

School

of

Oriental and

African

Studies,

XV/2,

1953,

pp.

206-208.

(44)

B.N., 1702,

fol.

340, 363A;

1703,

fol.

77A,

78B.

Suliik, 1,

pp.

309, 322, 324,

327,

328,

331,

335.

Nujiim,

6,

p.

320.

AI-Dawfddri,

7,

pp.

359,

374.

Ibn

al-

Jawzi,

p.

500,

Ibn

al-Wardi,

p.

258.



13/25

132

A.

LEVANONI

died,

he would

surely

executed

him

when

the

battle was

over(45).

The

people

whom Fakhr al-Din had chosen

as

confidants

when

he was appointed Aldbakal-'Asakirhad been expelled by al-S5lih

Ayyfib.

BahW'

al-Din

Zuhayr

had been

expelled by

al-Sfliih

Ayyfib

from his

position

as

Katib

al-inshd'

due to

an affair for

whichhe bore

him a

grudge (4e)

ut Fakhr

al-Din restored

im

to

his former

position.

Jamil

al-Din

Ibn

Matrfih

had

been

removed

y

al-Silih

Ayyfib

rom

is

position

s the Sultan'svice-

regent

in

Damascus,

yet

later he was to become

Fakhr

al-

Din's close

friend(47).

Needless to

say,

all

three

were free-born

Muslims(48).

This made

their commitment o

al-S.lih

Ayyfib

somewhat ess obligatoryhan that of members f the Mamluk

establishment.

It

was not

surprising,

herefore,

hat both

Shajar

al-Durr

nd

Jamil

al-Din

Muhsin

made Fakhr al-Din

bring

Tfirinshah

back

from

Hisn

Kaifa and were on their

guard

against

his intentions

by

inciting

he Mamluks

gainst

him

whenever

hey hought

hat

he

meant

to

take

over the

rule(49).

Shajar

al-Durr seems

not to have taken

IHushm

l-Din

Ibn Abi

All into

her

confidence

n

spite

of his

prominent osition,

mainly

because of his devotion to

Tfirinshah,

which stemmed from his

former

relationship

with

al-Silih Ayyfib

which was reflected n

several

events

related

to

Tfirinshah's

arrival in

Egypt.

First,

Hushm

al-Din had

begged

al-.Slih

Ayyfb

to

bring

Tfiranshih

back

on timefrom

isn

Kaifa to

Egypt

s

part

of

his

preparation

or he

throne(50).

econd,

he was

quick

to act

to

bring

him to

Egypt

(45)

Ibn

al-Furat,

p.

19.

Sulak, 1,

p.

336.

B.N.,

1702,

p.

356B.

357A-B;

1703, fol. 63B-64B. Ibn Asbat, fol. 62A. De Joinvillewho describedLouis IX's

expedition

to Damietta

in

his memoires laims

that Fakhr al-Din deserted the

city,

for

he

thought

the Sultan died. Villehardouin and

de

Joinville,

Memories

of

the

Crusaders,

trs. F.

Marzials, London, 1957,

p.

175.

See also:

al-Yafi'T,

fol.

108B.

Ibn

al-Jawzi,

p.

513.

(46)

B.N.,

1703,

fol.

71B; 1702,

fol. 363B.

Al-Yfinini,

1,

p.

185.

Sulak,

1,

p.

343.

Concerning

his

history,

ee:

B.N.,

1703,

fol. 71A-B.

Al-YnTini,

1,

pp.

184-189.

(47)

B.N.,

1702,

fol.

362B,

363B;

1703,

fol.

72B, 73B, 77A,

78A.

Sulak,

1,

pp.

332,

343-344,

345.

Ibn

Khalikin,

5,

pp.

302-303.

Ibn

al-Wardi,

p.

260.

Al-

Yfinini,

1,

p.

198.

Al-Makin,

p.

158.

(48) B.N., 1703, fol.6A, 21B, 24A, 82B.

(49)

Ibn

al-Jawzi,

p.

515.

B.N.,

1703,

fol.

75B, 77A, 77B,

78A;

1702,

fol. 364A.

Al-Dawdiri,

7,

pp.

373-374.

(50)

Sulak, 1,

p.

360.

B.N.,

1702,

fol.

359A-B,

361B-362A,

364A.

Al-Y~fii,

fol.

98A-B,

113A.

Ibn

al-Jawzi,

p.

500.



14/25


IN

EGYPT

133

following

l-SAlih

Ayyfib's

death

and his

messenger

was the first

o

reach

Tfirnshih

at

Hisn

Kaifa with

a

letter

urging

him

to come to

Egypt lest he lose the throne. Third, when he learnt that the

Sultan's

decrees were

forged,

he

imprisoned

al-'Adil',s

14

year

old

son,

the

Prince

al-Mughith

n

order

to

protect

Tfirinshih's

reign

from Fakhr al-Din's ambitions.

He feared that Fakhr al-Din

would

practically

rule

Egypt

through

the nominal rule

of

al-

Mughith(51).

Last but not

least,

even

after

Tfirinshfh

had

deposed

him from he

vice-regency,

e tried to defendhim

against

the

rebel Mamluks at

Ffris Kfir(52).

It seems that

Shajar

al-Durr

and

al-Tawashi

Muhsin

used a

political play in choosingFakhr al-Din,

Tfirnshah's

politicalrival,

to

play

a

part

in his ascent to

the

sultanate

ratherthan

.Husim

al-

Din,

his faithful

lly. They

thus increased

Tfirinshah's

depen-

dence

on

them,

since

they

alone could

restrain Fakhr al-Din's

aspirations.

On his

way

to

Egypt,

Tfiranshih

planned

to kill

Fakhr

al-Din

for

fear

of

his

ambitions.

He was

greatly

relieved

when he

heard of Fakhr al-Din's

death,

during

a

sudden attack

by

the Franks

on the

Muslims near

al-Mansfirah (9th

February

1250).

Upon

Fakhr al-Din's

death a new

aidbak

was not

nominated and

Shajar

al-Durr took over

military

affairs in

addition to the

treasury

ffairswhich

she

already

controlled.

It is

reported

that all matters

n

the

kingdom

were run

by Shajar

al-

Durr even before

Tfirinshah

reached

Egypt(53).

When

Tfirinshih

came to

Egypt

(23rd

February

1250),

he

adopted

his father's

policy

with

regard

to

ruling

patterns.

Like

his fatherbefore

him,

he

was

suspicious

of

his

Ayyubid

rivals,

and

relentlessly

strove to drive them out of

Egypt.

He

removed

al-Mughith

Fakhr al-Din

'Umar

Ibn

al-'Adil and

Fath

al-Din

Hasan

Ibn al-'Aziz to

jails

in Shaubak and

Damascus( ).

(51)

Sulak, 1,

pp.

344,

345-346.

Nujam,

6,

p.

372.

B.N., 1703,

fol.

77B, 78A,

78B; 1702,

363B.

(52)

Op.

cit.,

1703,

fol.

8B,

90A.

Suliik,

1,

p.

358.

(53)

AI-Yafi'i,

fol.

lllA,

113A.

Sulik, 1,

p.

351,

353.

Khitat, 3,

385. Ibn al-

Furst,

p.

39.

Ibn

al-Jawzi,

p.

520,

Ibn

Wasif,

fol. 61B.

Al-DawadAri,

7,

p.

382. See also: Ibn

Habib

al-Hasan

b.

'Umar,

Kitdb

Durral

al-Asidk

fT

Dawlat al-

Alrak,

Biblioth6que

Nationale,

Ms.

Arabe,

No. 1719.

Cod. Arabe 688

(hence-

Ibn

Habib), fol.3B. Concerning hajar al-Durr's running he state affairs, ee: Ibn al-

'Ibri,

Ghrighuryus

bfi-l-Faraj,

Td'rikh

Mukhtasar

al-Duwal,

ed. Father

Anton

Salihani,

Beyrouth

1890,

p.

454.

(54)

B.N., 1703,

fol. 93B. Ibn

Khalikin,

5,

p.

178.

Sulik,

1,

p.

358.

Nujaim,

6,

p.

312.



15/25

134 A.

LEVANONI

He maintained the

government

and

administrative

framework

established

by

his

father nd continued to

appoint non-Ayyubids

to key positions. In Damascus he retained Jamal al-Din Ibri

Yaghmfr

as vice-

regent(55).

In

Egypt

he

kept

Hushm

al-Din

as

vice-regent

for

about two

months,

but later dismissed

him,

replacing

him

by

Jamil

al-Din

Aqfish

al-Najibi( ).

Tfirinshih

also

adopted

his father's method

of

bestowing authority

on

officials,

outdoing

him

by surrounding

himself

with courtiers.

He

kept

away

from

people

more than his father had

done (57),

was one comment.

Like

al-S.lih Ayyfb

before

him,

Tfiranshah,

too,

strove

to

strengthen

his

power by introducing

his confidants into the

regime(58).

He

promoted

the

young

military

Emirs

leaving

the

older ones behind. Yet

Tirinshah

lacked his father's

political

wisdom,

as

he failed to

recognize

he resultsof the

changes

brought

about

by

his father'snew

rulingpatterns,

wherein he

political

and

military

powers

accumulated

in

the hands of his father's

confidants. Whereas

al-S5lih

Ayyib

knew

how

to

destroy

the

centers of

power

of the

previous

rule

gradually

and

tactically,

Tfirnshih

set about

removing

he veteran

army

Emirs

and

people

belonging

to the

previous

reign

as soon as the

fight gainst

the

Franks was over: He

wished

to establish his

kingdom

at the

beginning

.. When his fatherwished to

establish a new order in

his

kingdom,

he did so

gradually

and over a

long period (59).

Tfiranshih

accompanied

his

actions with a torrentof childish

threats

against

the

Bahriyya

veteran

Emirs

and

Shajar

al-Durr,

so

that the

latter were

able

to

anticipate

his

intentions,

ismiss them

or,

perhaps,

even eliminate

them(60).

Needless to

say,

Tfirinshih

had

great

trouble

carrying

out his

threat,

since

Shajar

al-Durr

controlled both the

treasury

and the

army.

Tfirinshah

had not

managed

to build

up

a Mamluk unit of his own

when he

was

murdered

by

the

Bahriyya

Emirs

instigated

by

Shajar

al-Durr

during

his

stay

in

his

army

camp

at

Ffris

Kfir

(5th

May

(55)

Sulfk,

1,

p.

352.

B.N.

1703,

fol.81A.

(56)

Sulik, 1,

p.

354,

358.

B.N.

1703,

fol.

84A, 88B,

1702,

fol. 372A-B.

(57)

Sulik, 1,

p.

359.

Nuja2m,

6,

p.

370.

(58)

Sulfk,

1,

p.

359.

AI-Dawfddri,

7,

p.

382. Ibn

Wasif,

fol.

61B.

B.N.,

1703, fol. 87B-88A.

(59)

B.N., 1703,

fol.

89A; 1702,

fol. 371B.

Ibn

Duqmaq

fol.

88B-89A.

(60)

When

Tfirnshfh

got

drunk,

he

would

chop

off

andle-tops

with his

sword,

maning

each one

for

Bahriyyah

Emir,

declaring

he

would do the same

to all of his

father's Mamluk

Emirs

(al-YfiT,

fol.

113A).



16/25

THE

MAMLUKS' ASCENT

TO POWER IN

EGYPT

135

1250)(6).

Yet it

seems

that

although

Toirnsh5h's

conduct

made the

administration

and

army

personnaly

resent

him,

it

did not sufficiently ustify the overthrow of

Ayyubid

rule in

Egypt.

There

had been

Ayyubid

rulers who

had

conducted

themselves in

a

similar

fashion;

they

had,

indeed,

been over-

thrown,

but were

substituted

by

other

Ayyubid

rulers.

Moreover,

such

substitutions

had

taken

place

with

Ayyubid

aid

and

encouragement.

Thus,

for

example,

al-SAlih

Ayyfib

had

been

invited to

rule

n

Egypt,

replacing

his brother

l-'Adil,

as

the

result

of

cooperation

between

al-Kimiliyyah,

al-Kamil's

Mamluks,

and

al-Nisir

D5'ud,

the

governor

of

al-Karak(62).

This

exampleindicates that

al-.Slih

Ayyfib's

new

patterns

of

ruling

had

paved

the

way

to

undermining

he

line

of

Ayyfib;

Tfiranshah's

conduct

served

as

a

catalyst

for

a

process

that

had

started

prior

to

his

arrival in

Egypt.

Circumstances on

al-.Slih

Ayyfib's

arrival in

Egypt

differed from

those

prevailing

there

on

the

arrival of

Tfirnshlh.

Whereas

al-S.lih

Ayyfib

had

found

a

balanced

ruling

system

n

Egypt

following

he

rulingpatterns

established

by

Salih

al-Din,

Tfirinshih

found

a

crystallized

coalition of

involved

administration and

militarypersonalities eager

to

preserve

the

favours

they

had obtained

during

al-S.lih

Ayyfib's

ife-time.

A

further

ndication

that

al-S.lih

Ayyfib's

new

ruling patterns

which

originated

n

Egypt

served as the main

element

conducive to

the

overthrow

f

Ayyubids may

be found n

Damascus

during

the

period

following

he

Mamluk

revolt in

Egypt. Ayyubid

control

over

Syria

had weakened due

to the new

ruling patterns

established

by al-Slih

Ayyfib.

As mentioned

earlier,

he

had

appointed

non-Ayyubidgovernors

directlyresponsible

to him

over

his Syrian provinces and had also stationed a Salihite Mamluk

army

there.

All

these

might

have

made

Damascus

identify

with

the

Mamluk rebellion

n

Egypt.

Yet,

factors

n

Damascus refused

to

recognize

the

rebels,

and,

upon

learning

of

Tfirinshih's

death,

(61)

Following

his

murder,

the

HIalqah,

Tfirinshih's

Mamluk

body-guard,

numbering

ome

fifty

men

B.N.,

1702,

fol.

364B;

1703,

fol.

79A,

90A)

as

well

as

his

personal

servant

and

retinue,

escaped

(Ibn

al-Furdt,

p.

42.

B.N.,

1703,

fol. 91A.

Al-Makin,

p.

160. Abfi

Shfmah,

p.

185,

Ibn

Wasif,

fol.

61B).

(62) Compare Sulak, 1, pp. 357-359 with: Ibn Duqmiq, fol.86B-87A. Al-

Makin,

p.

148.

B.N.,

1702,

fol.

352B.

Compare

also al-'Adil's

conduct on the throne

(op.

cit.,

1703,

fol.

7A)

with

Tfirknshih's

(op.

cii., 1702,

fol.

327A;

1703,

fol.

87B,

89A).

Al-Dawiddri,

7,

p.

339.

See

also:

Ibn

Duqmiq,

fol.

88A.

AI-Yfnini,

1,

160.



17/25

136

A.

LEVANONI

ensured

that

Damascus receive another

Ayyubid

ruler,

al-Ndsir

Salh.

al-Din

Yusfif(as).

Circumstancesprevailing n Damascus duringthat periodmust

have

been closer to the

traditional

Ayyubid ruling

pattern

than to

those

established

by

al-S.lih

Ayyfib

n

Egypt.

The

structureof

the Damascus

army

was

heterogeneous

and still retained a

large

group

of Kurdish

Emirs out of the

Qaymariyyah.

As

mentioned,

this

army

structure

guaranteed

the

balance

typical

of

Ayyubid

armies and

ensured the

strong probability

of the

Ayyubid's

dynasty's

rule. Unlike the

position

n

Egypt,

Tfirnshah

retained

direct hold over the Damascene

treasury,

consequently

enjoying

both administrative nd military upport(64). Prior to his arrival

in

Egypt,

Tfirnshah

bestowed

privileges

on the Damascus

administration,

and

distributed all the

money

in the Damascus

treasury,

300,000

dinars in

all,

among

the

military

Emirs

of

Damascus,

adding

more

money

that he had to send for from l-

Karak(86).

When

Tfirnshih

arrived

in

Egypt

the

pragmatic

policy

laid down

by

Sal.h

al-Din

for

Ayyubid

rule had

already

gone.

Unfortunately

orthe

Ayyubids,

Tfirinshih's

conduct was

not concerned

with

restoring

the old

Ayyubid

order

but

with

consolidating

his

personal

rule

by adopting

his father's

patterns

of

rule. Thus the nominal removal

of

the

Ayyubids

was

a

question

of time and

the

time

was

ripe following

he Mamluk

victory

over

the Franks

in the

battle

of

al-Mansfirah(66).

IV. Mamluk

victory

over the Franks

in

the

battle of

al-

Mansfirah,

gained

in

spite

of the absence of

an

Ayyubid

sultan,

gave

the Mamluks

not

only

a claim to

the

traditional

title of

defenders

of Islam but also

a

moral basis for their demand

to

continue

al-.Slih

Ayyfib'srulingpatterns in Egypt. It laid the

foundation

for

retainingkey positions

n

the hands of the

Sfilihite

centers

of

power,

or rather

those

of

Shajar

al-Dur and the

(63)

B.N.,

1703,

fol. 93B.

Abii-I

Fidd,

p.

183,

AI-Daw~ddri,

7,

pp.

385-

386.

Sulak,

1,

pp.

366-367.

(64)

B.N., 1702,

pp.

374A-B; 1703,

fol.

81A,

98B-99A.

Al-Yafi'i,

fol.

114A.

Al-DawAdAri,

,

pp.

385-386.

Sulalk,

1,

p.

366.

Al-Makin,

pp.

159-160.

Ibn

al-

Ibri, p. 354, al-Yfinini,1, p. 55.

(65)

B.N., 1702,

fol.

366A-B,

370A; 1703,

fol.

79B,

81A.

Al-Ydfi'i,

fol.

llOB,

112B. Ibn

al-Jawzi,

pp.

514,

516.

Sulilk, 1,

p.

352.

(66)

Ibn

al-Jawzi,

p.

517.

Sulak,

366-367.

Khitat,

3,

p.

385.

Al-Dawfddri,

7,

p.

376.



18/25


IN

EGYPT 137

Bahriyyah

Mamluks. This is

clearly

expressed by

their

treatment

of the

struggle

hey

led

against

Tfirdnshah ver

their

position

and

his subsequent murder at their hands: When he [Tfirinshah] s

safe

and sound he'll

chop

everything

ff...

which will

eventually

lead

to

the

extinction

of

the

S.lihite

State (67).

By

the same

reasoning,

the

Bahriyyah

chose

to

make

Shajar

al-

Durr

Sultan( ).

Her

reign formally symbolized

the

continuing

rule

of

al-S.lih

Ayyfib.

Shajar

al-Durr

knew

how to

rule the

S.lihite

kingdom

n the same

way

as

al-S

lih

Ayyfib

had chosen to

rule it.

Al-S.lih

Ayyfib

had

approved

of

her

administering

he

kingdom

during

his

absence,

so that her ascent to the Sultanate

was but a direct continuation of her formal position in the

past(69).

Since she had been authorized

by

al-S.lih

Ayyfib

o rule

during

his absence

by

virtue of

being

the motherof his son

Khalil,

the Mamluks used

her

family

relation

to

al-S.lih

Ayyfib

to

symbolize

the continuation of his

rule(70).

Yet

Shajar

al-Durr's ascent

to

the Sultanate based

on

the

alliance between

her and the

Bahriyya-Jamdfriyya

Mamluks

actually

meant that the Mamluks

were

to rule

in

the

long

run,

since a

woman-ruler was an alien

idea to

the

Muslim

ruling

tradition, necessitating the co-rule of Aldbak al-'Asdkir. The

alliance between

Shajar

al-Durr and the Mamluks thus

brought

about

the revival of the role of

Aldbak al-'Asdkir,

nd its inclusion

in

the oath

of

allegiance

to

the

Sultan. Such an oath

made

the

formal

status of the

Aldbakiyya

equal

to that of

the Sultanate.

This formal

position

of the

Aldbakayya,

ndicating

the

army's

part

in the

rule,

could have

paved

the

way

to the time when the

Sultanate

would be

passed

on to

a Mamluk

figure

with no further

political

crisis.

Special

care was therefore

aken

in

the choice of

Atdbak

al-'Asdkir

during

this interim

period.

Obviously,

the role

of

Aldbak al-'Asdkir

would have

suited

one

of

the

prominent

Bahriyyah

and

Jamddriyyah

Emirs

if

they

had

had

a

single

unifying leadership.

Prominent

Emirs

such as Faris al-Din

(67)

Sirat

al-Zdhir,

p.

4.

(68)

The manner of

announcing

her ascent

to

the Sultanate was

unusual.

Compare

her ascension with those

of

Aybak

al-TurkmAni

B.N.,

1702,

fol.

376A;

1703, fol.113A) and al-AshrafMfisa Ibn Duqmaq, fol.92B-94A). For Muslims'

reaction

to

her

Sultanate

see: Ibn

Wasif,

fol.

62B.

Al-YOfi',

fol.

115A.

B.N.,

1702,

fol. 373A:

1703,

fol.

21A, 91B,

97B.

Nujim,

6,

p.

379.

(69)

B.N.,

1702,

fol. 373A.

Sfrat al-Zdhir,

p.

5.

(70)

Al-Y~fi'i,

fol.

114A.

Sulak, 1,

p.

362.

Ibn

Asb.t,

fol.

64B.



19/25

138 A.

LEVANONI

Aqtay(71),

Rukn

al-Din

Baybars

al-Bunduqdari(72),

Sayf

al-Din

Balabin

al-Rashidi and Shams al-Din

Sunqur

al-Rfimi(73)

aspired

to be Sultan yet fear of their fighting mong themselves (74)

made them all refrain from

taking up

the

position.

Thus

they

were

eager

to choose a weak candidate forthe

Aldbakiyya

o

that

the

opportunity

o seize

it

would remain

open

forthem. The

AMd

bakiyya

was first ffered o

Hushm

al-Din;

Ibn

Abi

'All

and

once

he

refused,

t

was next offered o

al-Tawishi Shihfb

al-Din al-

Kabir,

who

also declined.

It

was

next offered o the Emir

Khass

Turk

al-Kabir who refused t as

well. The

fourth

nd final choice

was

'Izz

al-Din

Aybak

al-TurkmnTi.

When the Emir's choice fell upon Husim al-Din to be their

candidate,

they

claimed that

he

represented

al-.Slih

Ayyfib's

eign

better

than

anyone

else

in

the

Kingdom.

In

fact

this

formal

laim

was a half-truth ut

Husim

al-Din,

although

a

respectable

Emir,

was weak. When

he

was offered

he

Aldbakiyya,

he had no real

ruling

authority,

since

Tfirinshih,

about a month

prior

to his

murder,

had dismissed him

from

Niydbal

al-Sallanah(76).

Furthermore,

Husim

al-Din was a free-born Kurdish

Emir

so that his

position

in

any

army

with a

majority

of Turkish

Mamluks was rather vulnerable. There are many illustrations

for

the

vulnerability

of the Kurdish Emirs

in

the

.Slihite

army.

The

Kurdish

Emirs,

including

IjHuam

al-Din,

refrained

from

defending

Tfirinshih

on the

occasion

of his murder due to

their

weakness vis-a-vis the Mamluks of the

Bahriyya

and

Jamdariyya.

On the

11th

July

1250,

the

.Slihite

Mamluk Emirs

ordered the arrest

of some

Kurdish Emirs

in

order to

purge Egypt

of

pro-Ayyubids.

Husam

al-Din

was

very

anxious lest he

might

be

arrested and

special

messengers

were sent to assure

him that

he

would not be

harmed(76).

The

two

other Emirs offered his

position,

Shih~b

al-Din

and

Khass

Turk,

were both

Tawashiyya

Emirs,

that is to

say,

Emirs in

a

disintegrating

nit(77).

Their

not

belonging

o the

Bahriyya

and

(71)

Concerning

his

history,

ee

:

al-Yfi'i,

fol.

124B.

(72)

He was the commander

of

al-Jamddriyyah

nit.

Concerning

his

history,

see

:

Nujilm,

7,

p.

34

ff.

(73)

Al-Yfinini,

1,

p.

55.

(74) Op. cit.

(75)

B.N.,

1703,

fol.

91A-B, 1702,

fol.

373A,

375B-376A.

(76)

B.N.,

1703,

fol.

88B,

90A,

94B.

(77)

D.

Ayalon,

Studies

on

the Structure

of

the

Mamluk

Army ,

Bulletin

of

the

School

of

Oriental and

African

Studies,

vol.

XV/3, 1953, pp.

464.



20/25

THE

MAMLUKS'

ASCENT

TO

POWER IN

EGYPT

139

Jamddriyya

was well-demonstrated

n

their lack of

enthusiasm

about

fighting

or he Mamluks when the

latter

faced

the

Ayyubid

army,headed by al-NBsirYusfif, t al-Sanih on the 3rd September

1250(78).

'Izz

al-Din

Aybak

al-Turkmani was

chosen

by

the Emirs

because

he was one of the

middle-ranking

Emirs

rather

than

one

of the

prominent

ones (7').

He served as

Aldbak

al-'Asdkir

for bout

three

months,

.e.

May-

August

1250.

On

22nd

July

news reached Cairo that

al-Nisir

Yusfif had entered

Damascus

by

invitation of

Jamil

al-Din Ibn

Yaghmfir

and the

Qaymariyyah

and that the

S.lihite

Mamluk

Emirs

were

imprisoned

there

following

his entrance. Yet the

Bahriyya and

Jamdfriyyah

Emirs did not doubt their rightto

rule,

attributing

he

separation

of Damascus from

Egypt by

the

Sultanate

to its

being given

to

a

woman(s8).

They

therefore

decided to make

Aybak

al-Turkmani

Sultan

for the same reason

for

which

they

had made

him

Atabak

-

they

considered

that

he

would

be

easy

to

depose

when the

right

moment came. So

they

said,

'we'll be able

to

remove

this one when we

wish,

for

he

is

powerless

and is

one of the

middle-ranking

Emirs'

(81).

Aybak

al-Turkmani

was Sultan for

five

days.

On the

day

following

his accession ceremony, he Mamluk Emirs realized tha

the mamluks' ascent to power in egypt -by amalia levanoni - studia islamica, no. 72 (1990),

Documents