the major accident hazard management process
TRANSCRIPT
The Installation Safety Case -Identifies and assesses hazards, defines how risks are managed, and documents and demonstrates the basis of safety
Major accidents are:
• deathorseriouspersonalinjuryduetofire,explosionordangeroussubstancerelease
• majordamagetostructureorplant,orlossofstabilityoftheinstallationincludingwell‘blowout’,lossofcontainmentorwellcontrol
• helicopter/shipcollisionwiththeinstallation
• failureofdivingoperations’lifesupportsystems,detachmentofadivingbellortrappingofadiver
• anyothereventinvolvingdeathorseriouspersonalinjuryto5ormorepeople
StudiesarecarriedouttofullyunderstandwhatcangowrongandhowwecandesignandoperatetopreventandmitigatetheeffectsofMAHs
Safetyassessmentsestablishpotentialextentofhazardsandassesswaysofmanagingtherisk.Theseinclude:
• detailedriskassessment• fireandexplosion riskanalysis• droppedobject
assessment• shipcollision• evacuationescapeand
rescueanalysis
OperatorsmustdemonstratetotheHealthandSafetyExecutive(HSE)thattheirinstallationmeetsacceptablelevelsofsafety.Todothis,eachinstallationmustsubmita‘safetycase’totheHSEwhichmustthenbeacceptedbytheHSE.Thesafetycasedescribes:• theinstallation• majoraccidenthazards
andrisks• howtheserisksare
managed
Becauseeachinstallationisdifferentandtechnologiesadvance,eachinstallationhasitsownsafetycasewhichisregularlyupdated.
SafetycriticalelementsaretheessentialplantandequipmentwhichperformfunctionstopreventorlimittheeffectsofaMAH.ThefailureofSCEscouldcauseorcontributetoamajoraccident.
TheroleofSCEsisto:• prevent• detect• control• mitigate• rescue• recover
ExamplesofSCEsare:• hydrocarbon
containment• ignitionprevention• firedetection• firefighting• temporaryrefuge• lifeboats• installationstructure
EachSCEmustattainaperformancestandard(PS)whichoutlinesminimumlevelsof:• functionalperformance
(whattheSCEmustdo)• availabilityofSCE• reliableoperation• howtheSCEsurvives
intheeventofafireorexplosion
AssuranceisthecheckingofSCEsbythoseworkersontheinstallationassignedtomaintainingortestingthoseSCEs.Thischecking,knownaspreventativemaintenanceroutines(PMR)istoassureusthatthesafetysystemsarefunctional.ThesePMRsincludecheckssuchas:• closureandleakoff
testingofemergencyshutdownvalves
• checksongasheads• temporaryrefugeintegrity• delugetesting• inspectionofpassivefire
protection(PFP)• inspectionofstructures
Written Scheme of Examination (WSE) -Sets requirements for plant & equipment performance and Assures and Verifies they achieve this
STEP 1Major Accident Hazards (MAH) are identified
STEP 2Safety Assessmentsare made
STEP 3The Safety Case document is created
List of Safety Critical Elements (SCEs)
STEP 4Performance Standards (PS)
STEP 5Assurance Scheme
STEP 6
3
Verification Scheme and Independent Competent Person (ICP)
STEP 7
33
Verificationisaback-uptotheassurancescheme.Itrequiresanindependentcompetentperson(ICP)[alsoknownastheindependentverificationbody(IVB)]tocheckthattheSCEsarepresentandfunctional.TheICPchecksthattheSCEsarefunctioningaccordingtothePSrequirements.IfthePShasnotbeenmet,remedialactionsrecommended(RAR)aremadetothedutyholder.Thedutyholdermusttakeactiontorepair/replacetheSCEwherenecessary.
VerificationbyICPmayinvolve:• witnesstesting• inspection• auditingandreviewingrecords• interviewingoffshore
personnel
What do you need to know?The Major Accident Hazard
Management Process
coverback
Introduction
Thisleafletisaimedatalloffshoreworkerstohelp them understand what major accidentshazards (MAH) are, and recognise whatactivitiesaredoneonadailybasisbyyourselvesandcolleaguestohelppreventthesehazardsbecoming actual accidents onboard yourinstallation.
It is recognised that the offshore oil industryisahazardousone,andthishasbeenshownbydisastersinthepast.However,afterreadingthisleaflet,youshouldunderstandthatlessonshave been learned from such incidents, andthatcertainsystemsareinplacetohelppreventthemfromhappeningagain.
The prime trigger for the introduction ofmajor accident hazard management controlswas the Piper Alpha accident in July 1988.This may seem historical and irrelevant intoday’s industry, because it happened duringadifferentgenerationofoffshoreworkers,butits legacy lives on. Piper Alpha is as relevanttoday as it was in 1988 when 167 men losttheirlives.LordCullenledtheinquiryintothedisaster and his report recommended thatoperators must put in place certain controlsto stop such an event from ever happeningagain. Two of the recommendations are‘majoraccidenthazardmanagement’,andtheintroduction of the ‘safety case’ regime andthesearecentralfeaturesofthisleaflet.
This leaflet should give you all the information you need to answer the following questions:
1. Doyouknowwhatasafetycaseis,andwhatiscontainedwithinit?
2. Doyouknowwheretogetacopyofthesafetycaseatyourplaceofwork?
3. DoyouknowwhataMAHisandcouldyougiveanexample?
4. CanyounamethreeSCEs?5. WhydoyoucarryoutPMRs(preventative
maintenanceroutines)offshore?6. Howdoweensureallsafetycritical
elementsoffshorearereadyforuseiftheyarerequired?
7. DoyouknowwhattheabbreviationsICPandRARstandfor,andwhattheymeanwithregardstokeepingyousafewhilstoffshore?
This document is one of a series of Assurance & Verification publications by Step Change in Safety. Others include: • seniormanagementsummaryflier
• guidancedocumentprovidingbasicoutlineofAssuranceandVerificationrequirements
• practitioner’sguideprovidingdetailedadviceandcommonpracticeonAssuranceandVerification
Thesedocumentscanbefoundat:www.stepchangeinsafety.net
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SC
Esa
re
addr
esse
d.
Alexander Kiellandsemi-subcapsized
123 killed
1980 2012
0 killed
The Major Accident Hazard Timeline
INTERNATIONAL
1988
167 killed
Piper Alphaplatformexplosion
UK
1989
0 killed
Cormorant Alphaexplosiononplatform
UK
1991
Sleipnerstructuralfailureandtotallossofinstallation
0 killed
INTERNATIONAL
2005
Mumbai Highvesselcollidedwithplatform
22 killed
INTERNATIONAL
2006
0 killed
Roughplatformfire
UK
2010
0 killed
Erskineplatformfire
UK
2010
Deep Water Horizondrillingrigexplosion
11 killed
INTERNATIONAL
Elginplatformgasleak
UK