"The main threat to the stability of the Weimar Republic in the period 1919-1923 came from political violence of the extreme right." How far do you agree with this judgment?

There were a plethora of threats posing Germany in early years of the Weimar republic, which albeit fragmented and disorganized did lead to its eventual downfall. Rightfully, to contemporaries with the recent Russian Revolution in mind, the threat of the revolutionary left was very real. Similarly, other factors linked to economic issues caused by Treaty of Versailles, such as hyperinflation and the war guilt clause, led to much suffering for the German people through loss of savings and jobs. Moreover, the political system further hindered the stability of the government as it was fundamentally based on coalitions. Nevertheless, contrary to contemporary belief, it was the rejection of the Weimar republic by those who dominated important institutions within the state -the army, judiciary and civil service- which posed the most serious threat to democracy. In this context, in agreement to the above judgment, the main threat to the Republic derived from the right. Also, adding to the accuracy of the judgment is the elaborate distinction between sheer violence and ‘political violence’ of the extreme right. This implies that even though the breakdown of extreme right putsches showed weakness in the right, the elite allowed the extreme right to become more of a powerful force by providing them with lenient sentence which for example, allowed Hitler to reassess his strategy and lead to the emergence of the Nazis.

It is evident that the extreme right had the uttermost role in undermining the Republic. In this context, it was a huge political mistake by Elbert and his SPD colleagues to believe that the threat to the republic came from the left. Because of this misjudgment, they used antidemocratic forces such as the Freikorps to restore so called order ‘order’. Both in Berlin in January 1919 and in the spring of 1919 when they were used extensively to end strikes and to shut down the so called ‘Republics of Councils’ created in cities such as Munich. As a result, democracy was becoming a rather obscure principle since the government itself was not reluctant in using violence. Nevertheless, the army’s embitterment with after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles was immense. In fact, the reduction in army size was too much for a number of right wing nationalists who demanded the rejection of the Treaty and the Weimar state to be overthrown. This resulted to an attempted monarchist take of power in 1920 –the Kapp-Luttwitz Putsch, named after its leaders. It was an attempt to overthrow the President Elbert and the Weimar government as general von Luttwitz led his Freikorps into Berlin where they seized the government district of the city. The government ordered the army to act but General Hans von Seeckt, one of the Reichswehr's senior commanders, refused, claiming that ‘troops do not fire on troops’. However, a large General strike

paralysed the capital and thus the Kapp regime collapsed. But, despite its failure, most importantly, the Kapp-Luttwitz Putsch revealed the army’s reluctance to support the Republic. This explicitly indicates that the Putsch had widespread support of the military as it was the reaction of the labour rather than the army which led to its defeat. In Bavaria however, ironically enough the fear of the left led the government to use the Freikorps to defeat the workers who had organized in opposition to Kapp-Luttwitz despite the Freikorps dubious role in the whole affair. As a result the military leaders had forced the SPD government to resign. Ultimately, the events of the Kapp Putsch underline the extent to which the republic relied nearly exclusively on unreliable forces to maintain a semblance of ‘order’ and indicate that the fear of the left did not allow the government to perceive its real threat.

Nevertheless, as far as the political violence of the extreme right is concerned the Munich Putsch constitutes a better example. Seemingly, the Putsch was a failed attempt at revolution that occurred in November 1923, when Nazi Party leader Adolf Hitler, Generalquartiermeister Erich Ludendorff, and other heads of the Kampfbund unsuccessfully tried to seize power in Munich. However, despite the humiliation, Hitler was able to employ the political violence of the right as he turned defeat into great triumph. Indeed, his subsequent trial for high treason was transformed into a propaganda coup by giving him and his comrades as nationwide platform for his beliefs. The sympathy of the judges ensured he received the minimum term of five years imprisonment, implicitly revealing the right wing tendencies of the judiciary. In a different aspect as well, the episode convinced Hitler that the Nazis could not come to power by using violence alone. Such was the sympathy of the authorities that Hitler only served nine months of his prison sentence. In this context, political violence exerted by the right and more specifically the judiciary, enabled the consolidation of the greatest threat that the Weimar Republic would face: the far right Nazi Party. After all, political violence in its worst form was apparent throughout the period with the murders of KPD leaders Liebknecht and Luxembourg in 1919 or of Weimar politicians Rathenau, Erzberger and over 200 others.

Furthermore, the contemporary belief that revolutionary left placed a significant threat to the stability of the Weimar Republic cannot be underestimated. In fact, extreme left wing groups in Germany rejected any democratic parliament and pressed for a revolution. For instance, the Spartacists hoped for a revolution on similar lines to that in Russia in 1917 in order to create a communist state. In January 1919 members of the Spartacist Union with support of other left wing groups formed the German Communist Party (KPD).This was followed by a revolt in Berlin that begun on 5 January during which newspaper offices were taken over and a revolutionary committee was formed. This was not the only challenge from the left as there were many uprisings in the first months of 1919 in Berlin and in Munich. Also, a more serious challenge to the state came from the

establishment of a Soviet republic in Bavaria in April 1919. However, due to the poor organization of the uprisings, they were all crushed by the government that used the Freikorps troops and the army (Reichswehr). Similarly in 1920, the Ruhr revolt was toppled by the Freikorps leading to the collapse of the Ruhr Red Army. As a result, someone could argue that the threat of the left was rather overestimated since it was not as dangerous as it was perceived. The revolutionary left was divided and weakened by the lack of widespread support. Indeed, the working class was more propitious towards the center party and the SPD and despised revolution. In fact, there are examples of working class hostility to the KPD such as in December 1918 a congress of soldier’s and workmen’s councils in Berlin refused to allow the KPD leaders to address them. Indeed, their tactics, divisions and links with the Soviet Republic acted to diminish their threat. Eventually, it can be argued that the most important consequence of the revolutionary left was that it merely deflected attention from the most serious threat to the democracy, the anti-republicanism of right wing nationalism.

Moreover, it is safe to argue that throughout the period the ghost of the treaty of Versailles continued to haunt the German people justifying its significance as a destabilizing factor. At the Versailles settlement Germany was humiliated as a great power. She lost territory of economic importance (up to 20% of coal production and 15% of agricultural resources) as well as territory of symbolic importance such as West Prussia. Also the army capability was destroyed, causing huge resentment among the military. On top of that, one of the most unpopular aspects of the treaty was Article 231 in which Germany accepted full responsibility for the causing of war. Consequently, military chief Hindenberg and the extreme right claimed that the clique left wing politicians (the so called November criminals) signed the treaty because of their anti-patriotic sentiments. This would facilitate the consolidation of the ‘stab in the back theory’ which was mighty useful to the anti-republican right. In this context, the Weimar Republic was under threat as right wing parties which while distancing themselves from Versailles, would derive support from popular resentment. Indeed, the nationalist DNVP’s percentage of the votes increased from 10.3% in January 1919 to 14.9% in June 1920. As a result, the fact that the leaders of the Weimar Republic had signed the Versailles treaty was significant in giving anti-democratic groups a focus for popular opposition which would have a destabilizing effect. However, even though the Treaty or more appropriately its intentionally altered interpretation can be perceived as one of the contributory factors to the political violence of the extreme right, it is evident that in reality the terms of the Treaty in themselves did not threaten the existence of the Weimar Republic. Versailles left Germany humiliated and scared but she was left potentially strong. More precisely, the treaty left Germany as a united nation with the potential to regain her status as an important diplomatic power even in the short term. This was proved by the treaty of Rapallo in

1922 between Germany and the Soviet Union which so concerned the allies. Nevertheless, as this was rather obscure in the minds of contemporaries, accusations of treachery (directed to the November Criminals) gave the extreme right a misplaced belief in the morality their political violence.

In order to provide a more holistic approach to the question, someone has to examine the non-violent aspects of danger directed to the stability of the Republic. For instance, there were huge problems in coming to terms with economic readjustment and debt. Reparations made matters worse. By late 1922 their national debt was 469 milliard marks. Without any meaningful currency reform and a balancing of the budget, the Republic was set on a course of hyperinflation. In short it printed more money to cover its debts. This move was taken as sabotage to reparation payments. As a result, the German defaulting on Reparations led to the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923 with 60,000 troops. The German government encouraged the workers to offer passive resistance. This meant that the government had to pay millions of marks to those that lost income and it also led to less income from tax. Thus the government printed even more money permitting its eventual collapse into hyperinflation. However, the crisis did not result to the collapse of the republic thanks to Stresemann’s currency reform of November 1923. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Ruhr crisis precipitated the gravest crisis of the Weimar Republic in the years 1919-1923 as it shook the faith of many Germans who saw their savings destroyed and their income drop in real terms. This is reflected by the German federal election in May 1924 with the increase in the power of antidemocratic parties such as the communist KPD and the far-right nationalist DNVP. In this context, it can be inferred that non-violent threats were equally significant in causing instability.

Finally, one has to take into account that the political system in Germany was by nature unstable. Indeed, the voting system of proportional representation generated minority governments and unstable coalitions unable to pass fundamental laws that would control the growing threats to the Republic. Arguably, throughout the period there was no consensus on how to deal with the country’s economic and social problems. As a result, the government remained reliant on the army which, as demonstrated above, was proven to embrace antidemocratic beliefs. However, this is a far too simplistic argument as it is clear that the failure of coalition governments was not that the voting system forced them into being, but that the leading political parties chose not to operate the system effectively. For instance, coalitions throughout the period between the SPD, the Centre Party, the DDP, and the DVP were dissolved in the onset of crisis such as the ratification of the treaty of Versailles (1919) and the issue of reparations (1921). Ultimately, the fact that there were huge ideological gaps between the coalition parties held some significance as a threat too.

In conclusion, the main threat to the stability of the Weimar Republic came from political violence of the extreme right to a large extent while other factors such the Treaty of Versailles