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SUPPLEMENTTO

The London GazetteOf TUESDAY, the >jth of JANUARY, 1947

__^ Registered as a newspaper

THURSDAY, 9 JANUARY, 1947

Air Ministry,January, 1947. .

AIR OPERATIONS IN GREECE, 1940-1941The following report was submitted to the Air

Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East,on August i$th, 1941, by Air Vice-MarshalJ. H. D'Albiac, D.S.O., commanding theRoyal Air Force in Greece.

REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BYTHE ROYAL AIR FORCE IN GREECE : NOVEMBER,

1940, TO APRIL, 1941.* Appendix " A "—Memorandum on Air Policy

in Greece.* Appendix " B "—Lessons of the Campaign.Sir,

I have the honour to forward the follow-ing report on the operations carried out bythe Royal Air Force under my command inGreece from November, 1940, to April, 1941.Introduction:

2. In framing this report, my object is todescribe the various problems with which wewere con-fronted from tune to time and how weattempted to solve them; our reasons for adopt-ing certain definite lines of policy; the difficul-ties with which we were faced; our successesand failures; and finally to draw attention tosome of the lessons we learnt in a campaignwhich, although perhaps not entirely successfulin its highest conception, contributed 'materiallyto the prosecution of the war as a whole andformed a chapter in history of which the RoyalAir Force may well be proud. I do not proposeto compile a day to day record of all the activi-ties of the Command. Apart from the im-mensity of such a task, an account of this de-scription would not serve any useful purposeand would only tend to obscure those particu-lar points which I wish to emphasise. Neverthe-less in order to obtain some form of continuity,it is necessary to deal with the campaign inchronological sequence. I propose, therefore,

* Not reproduced.

dividing it into three periods of two months intowhich arrangement the campaign convenientlydivides itself from the strategical point of view.

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1940.Declaration of War:

3. At 3 o'clock in the morning of 28th Octo-ber, 1940, the Italian Minister in Athens handedto the Prime Minister of Greece a note from hisGovernment complaining in strong terms ofalleged Greek assistance to the Allies and de-manding for the Italians the right to occupycertain strategic bases in Greece. GeneralMetaxas regarded this note as an ultimatumwhich lie promptly refused and a few hourslater, Greece was at war with Italy.

Unlike the Italians, the Greek -forces werelittle prepared for war. Their repjular Armyunits were at their peace time stations through-out the country and general mobilisation hadnot been ordered. On being attacked, theGreek units holding the frontier posts on themountainous borders of Albania, althoughfighting with the greatest gallantry, wereoverwhelmed in some cases by sheer weight ofnumbers and compelled to give ground. Thiswas particularly the case in regions where con-ditions were suitable for the employment ofItalian mechanised forces. The progress of theItalian army was, however, slow for althoughItaly had concentrated large forces on the Greekfrontier, the firm attitude adopted by ,the Greekgovernment came as somewhat of a surprise asit had been thought that all Italian demandswould be met without resort to arms. It wasconfirmed also from the reports of prisonerstaken in the first few days that the opening ofhostilities was quite unexpected by the Italiansoldiers themselves, who had been led to expect.a diplomatic victory and a peaceful advanceinto Greek territory.

206 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 9 JANUARY, 194?

The Greek Problem:4. It was clear that the problem confronting

the Greeks was largely one of time. Could herfrontier units hold .the Italian forces sufficientlylong to enable her armies to be mobilised andconcentrated? As is well known, Greece isbadly served by communications. Roads andrailways on the mainland are few in numberand the former are in most cases bad. A num-ber of her reservists had to come from theGreek islands and it was estimated that it wouldtake at least three weeks for the Greek mobilisa-tion to be completed and for sufficient forcesto be concentrated in the battle area •before shecould really consider herself reasonably safe.In the meantime, the Italian air force could, ifhandled properly, play havoc with their mobili-sation and concentration arrangements. This,for some unaccountable reason, the" Italiansfailed completely to do and wasted their com-paratively strong air force in abortive attackson undefended islands and hospitals in Salonika.The Greek Air Force.

5. The Greek Air Force, although small andoutnumbered by the Italian, fought most gal-lantly during this initial stage. Their pilots,'many of whom had attended courses in Eng-land at the C.F.S. and elsewhere, were keenand wjiat they lacked in modern war techniquethey made up for in personal bravery. Theiraircraft, like those of most small independentnations not possessing an aircraft industry oftheir own, consisted of a number of differentforeign types, French and Polish predominat-ing, with a limited range of spares.

6. Operationally, the Greek Air Force wascontrolled by the General Staff and was usedalmost entirely in direct support of their army.They were quite unable to obtain any degreeof air superiority and in consequence theysuffered severe casualties. In addition, owingto the difficulty of obtaining spares, an abnorm-ally high proportion of unserviceability soonexisted and in a comparatively short time, theireffort was reduced to negligible proportions.

Decision to send an R.A.F. Contingent.7. In response to an urgent appeal for help,

the British Government decided to send a con-tingent of the Royal Air Force .to Greece fromthe Middle East. The force decided upon wasto consist of two medium bomber squadrons,one mixed medium bomber and two-seaterfighter squadron—aM armed with Blenheim air-craft, and two single-seater fighter squadronsarmed with Gladiator aircraft. On my arrivalin Athens on 6th November, 1940, the advanceelements of this force had already arrived andwere ready for action.

Air Policy.8. That evening I attended a conference with

the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Ghief todiscuss the war situation generally. Everypressure was brought to bear on me to employmy force in the same manner as .the Greek AirForce, in .close support of the land forces. Iappreciated, however, .that the best help I couldgive to the Greek armies was to concentrate mysmall bomber force on the enemy's disembarka-tion ports in Albania and the important centresin his lines of communication. I argued that sucha plan would do far more to delay his advancethan if I attacked his forward elements. If,however, .the situation deteriorated consider-

ably, and a break through occurred, I wouldof course devote the whole of my force to theimmediate task of stemming the enemy'sadvance. I finally obtained agreement on thispolicy and attacks were directed forthwith onthe enemy's back areas. These attacks weremaintained at maximum intensity with the fewday bomber aircraft at my disposal and the de-tachments of Wellington aircraft sent over fromEgypt to operate during the periods of moon-light. By the end of November, ,the Italianadvance had been stemmed and the Greekforces who had by then completed their con-centration were able to take the offensive. TheGreek General Staff were most appreciative ofthe prompt and valuable 'help we had been ableto provide for their gallant soldiers who, withferocious intensity, had disputed every footof the Greek soil, and they expressed -the viewthat it was largely due to our assistance that thesituation had now become satisfactory.Selection of Aerodromes.

9. One of the main difficulties I experiencedin establishing my force and one which wasa constant handicap throughout the whole cam-paign, was 'the extreme scarcity of aerodromessuitable for the employment of modern aircraft.There were no all weather aerodromes, and onthe mainland of Greece there are few areas inwhich aerodromes of any size can be made. Inthe Salonika area, the country is flat and anumber of dry weather aerodromes alreadyexists. For political reasons, however, I wasnot even allowed to reconnoitre these grounds,let alone use them. In the Larissa plain, therewere many sites possible but by November, therains had already commenced and, although Idid station a fighter squadron in that area on itsarrival, it was soon flooded out and aircraft weregrounded for a period of ten days before theycould be moved. There are few other sites inGreece except an occasional-flat stretch on thecoast and a certain number of level areas inthe valleys, but the heavy rainfall and theprevalence of low clouds and mist make the'latter quite unsuitable for operational purposesduring the winter months, at any rate formodern bombers. I was forced, therefore, toconcentrate my bomber force on the two aero-'dromes in the vicinity of Athens, and stationmy fighter squadrons on whatever grounds Icould find near the front line, where they hadto operate under conditions of the greatest dis-comfort and difficulty. •

10. The main disadvantage of .the aerodromesnear Athens was that they were a long way fromthe front and it meant long hours of flying toand from the targets. They were, however,better drained a"nd were only out of action fora few days after heavy rain. Furthermore, fbeing near the sea, they were not so liable to*get completely covered in by low clouds.Criticism has been made that .the initial .forcewhich was sent to Greece was inadequate andmany more squadrons should have been pro-vided. I should like to point out, however,that even if these squadrons had been available,which they were not at the time, the lack ofsuitable aerodrome accommodation would, inmy opinion, have prevented us from acceptingthem. During my first week in Greece, I madea tour of all possible sites and on my returnpressed the Prime Minister to undertake im-mediately <the construction of all weather run-ways at Araxos and Agrinion. I pointed out

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 9 JANUARY, 1947 207

to him the operational disadvantages of theexisting situation and that, unless suitable run-ways were provided near the front, the supportthat we could give to the Greek nation duringthe winter months would be severely limited.He agreed fully with any recommendations andarranged for the construction of runways toproceed immediately. After consulting withthe head of the department concerned, he in-formed me that the runways would be com-pleted by the end of January, 1941. (NOTE.—Unfortunately, owing .to weather conditionsand shortages of material, this forecast provedover optimistic, and neither of these was readyfor use when I left the country at the end ofApril.)

Arrival of the Force:n. Units of the force continued to- arrive

throughout the months of November andDecember and by the end of the year the con-centration was complete and 'the whole com-mand functioning smoothly. When the com-position of the force was being considered hi theMiddle East, it was decided that all the ancillaryservices such as hospital, works, rationing,etc., should be provided by the Army, withappropriate Army officers on my Headquartersstaff to deal with them. This arrangement wasparticularly successful. Although, even in ourrespective services, few of us had served to-gether before, officers of this combined staffsoon settled down and worked with the greatestenthusiasm and co-operation. This happyatmosphere which existed at the top had, Iconsider, a beneficial effect on the relationshipbetween the operational units and the actualservices themselves who at all times providedour requirements in spite of countless difficultiesoccasioned by .weather and terrain. Similarly,the liaison that existed between the Britishforces in Greece and the Greeks was at alltimes close and cordial. Every evening Iattended a conference with the Commander-in-Ohief and the Greek General Staff to discussthe day's land and air operations and to planthe programme of work for my force and forthe Greek air force for the following day. Thesenightly meetings which were attended fre-quently by His Majesty the King and GeneralMetaxas, when matters of higher policy werefreely discussed, were carried on throughout thewhole of my stay in Greece and were invaluablefrom a co-operation point of view.

Progress of Operations:12. As regards the actual operations them-

selves, the Greeks had by now taken the offen-sive on land and, although handicapped bysevere weather conditions and shortage of equip-ment, had managed ̂ to drive all the Italianforces off Greek territory and in some sectorshad even advanced into Albania. In the air,our continued bombing offensive against theports of Valona and Durazzo and the focalpoints on the enemy's rearward system washaving a serious effect on 'his supply organisa-tion. In addition, during moonlight periods, ourbomber effort was being extended to targets onthe mainland of Italy by means of Wellingtonaircraft detached from Egypt for the purpose,and considerable damage was being inflicted onports on both sides of the Adriatic. Similarly,our fighter aircraft were establishing a definiteatmosphere of moral if not of numericalsuperiority, in this theatre.

JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1941.Operational Difficulties.

13. The new year opened with a deteriorationin the weather conditions. Heavy falls of snowand much low cloud made flying conditionsdifficult and dangerous. A further handicap nowappeared in the form of severe icing conditionswhich were experienced by our aircraft over themountainous country between their bases andthe targets in Albania. To avoid this seriousstate of affairs, we were forced to route ourbomber aircraft by way of the coast. Over thesea, the flying conditions were considerablybetter, but this longer route limited the opera-tional radius' of action of our aircraft andmilitated against effecting surprise. Further-more, enemy aircraft opposition was nowbecoming increasingly stronger, and largenumbers of modern enemy fighters were 'beingencountered constantly over the targets. Thesereinforcements were undoubtedly being broughtover in an effort to reduce the scale of ourattacks on the enemy's rearward communica-tion system, which were obviously causing himgrowing embarrassment. Whilst it was com-forting to think that our ibomber offensive waspresumably having ithe desired effect, thisaddition to the enemy's fighter strength in-creased considerably our operational difficul-ties. It was now necessary to make full .useof cloud cover and to adopt a system of fighterescorts for our day ibomber raids if heavycasualties were to 'be avoided. Our lack ofmodern fighter aircraft and the difficultiesencountered in arranging for bombers and theirescorts to meet, owing to the distance betweenour 'bomber and fighter aeflpdjromes, ibadlyconnected iby communications, with weatherconditions constantly changing, all tended toreduce the operational effort of my ibomiberforce and it ibecame increasingly obvious that,until the fine weather came and more aero-dromes were made available, there would belittle opportunity for any decisive action on ourpart.

14. I would here like to pay a tribute to themagnificent spirit in which the pilots and aircrews carried out their work during an exceed-ingly difficult period of operations. Based asthey were dn the Athens area, every raid carriedout by the bomber squadrons involved a pre-liminary1 flight of at least 200 miles to thetheatre of operations in weather conditionswhich were at times quite indescribable.Throughout the journey, the pilots and aircrews were fully aware that they would meetstrong fighter opposition over the targets, andwould have to engage the enemy before theywere able to deliver their attacks. The numberof lucrative targets in Albania was strictlylimited and the Italians had toy this time beenable to concentrate a high scale of anti-aircraftartillery to defend them, and it was seldomthat our 'aircraft came through unscathed.Having carried out their task, the long andarduous journey home had to be completed.Direction finding aids existed but the verynature of the country made their results un-reliable and much had to be left to the skill,judgment and determination of the individualpilots. In spite of all these difficulties, how-ever, squadronls cheerfully aVxepted all thetasks I gave them and maintained a scale ofeffort far beyond that which is normallyexpected! fr6m Service squadrons working under

208 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 9 JANUARY, 1947

more favourable conditions. This same spiritprevailed in (the fighter squadrons which wereoperating from forward aerodromes in condi-tions of extreme discomfort. Although out-

, numbered and armed with aircraft inferior inperformance to those of the enemy, the pilotsnever hesitated to give battle whenever theenemy appeared.

Reinforcement Plan.15. Early in .the new year, I visited Cairo

in order to discuss the question of reinforcementwhich was then under revision. Operationsin the Western Desert were being brought to asuccessful conclusion and at was hoped that,by the time ihe weather conditions had im-proved in Greece so as to allow occupation ofmore aerodromes, it would be possible to spareadditional squadrons from the Middle EastCommand. The reinforcement plan envisageda total force in Greece of fourteen squadronsand I dntimated that I would be prepared tostart accepting the additional squadrons byI5th January. »It was hoped that the wholeprogramme would be complete by i5th April.In planning the reinforcement programme, Iagain endeavoured to get permission to use theaerodromes in the Salonika area, some of whichhad remained generally serviceable throughoutthe winter and could be occupied forthwith.The Germans, however, had commenced theirinfiltration into Roumania, and the GreekGovernment were particularly anxious to avoidgiving them any idea that we 'had any hostileintentions in Macedonia which could be directedonly against German interests.

The Greek Air Force.16. As I have stated already in this report,

the Greek Ah* Force had suffered severe casual-ties in the early stages of the war and by 'theend of the year, it was reduced to a mere tokenforce of a few serviceable operational aircraft.Promises of the provision of modern fighteraircraft had been received from the U.S.A.,and the (British Government had agreed also tosupply aircraft as and when they became avail-able. Whilst admiring the esprit de corps andenthusiasm of the officers and airmen of theGreek air force, I considered that operation-ally they had a lot to learn before they wouldget 'full value out of really modern aircraft.Similarly, from the maintenance point of view,a considerable amount of re-organisation was•necessary before they would be able to main-tain a reasonable degree of serviceability. As•these American and British aircraft would beprovided presumably at the expense of theR.A.F. reinforcement or expansion programme,I was determined to do all I could to ensurethat full use was made of them. I had pre-viously discussed the whole problem with H.M.the King of Greece and the Prime Ministerand had made the suggestion to them that aBritish Mission of qualified R.A.F. officers andairmen should 'be appointed to help them in thereconstruction of their flying service. They

- welcomed the suggestion and in due course amission was provided, and the work of re-organising the Greek air force on modern lineswas commenced. In addition to their primaryrole, the Mission undertook also to reconnoitreand supervise the work on all the new aero-dromes which it was desired to use in spring,and much valuable work they did in thisrespect.

Offer of British Expeditionary Force.17. Early in January, conferences were held

to discuss the possibility of sending a Britishexpeditionary force to Greece, but the GreekGeneral Staff, on learning the limited size ofthe force that could be made available at thetime, decided that its presence would only tendto provoke Germany, whilst it was not strongenough to be able to provide any very materialsupport.

iBattle for Valona.

18. The Greek General Staff now realisedthat, if as seemed probable the Germans in-tended to make a move through the Balkans,they might be faced dn the spring with a cam-paign on two fronts. They therefore con-sidered it essential that every effort should bemade to bring the Italian campaign to an endbefore such an eventuality arose, or at any rateto shorten their front in Albania as much aspossible so as to have troops available tostrengthen their front in Macedonia. Theyappreciated that an advance to a line northof Valona would certainly accomplish the latterand might conceivably, in view of the lowmorale of the Italians at that time, achieve theformer. Consequently, early in February, theGreek armies in Albania started -a fierce offen-sive in the direction of Valona. The prelimin-ary attacks were successful and a certainamount of progress was made. Bad weather,however, intervened and, although the Greeksoldiers fought with their customary heroic dis-regard of danger, the Italians were able tobring up reinforcements and the advance washeld up just north of Tepelene.

Change of Air Policy.19. This 'battle for Valona is interesting from

the ah* point of view inasmuch as a changeof policy was forced upon us. Hitherto, mybombing offensive had been directed almostentirely upon lines of communication, portsand aerodromes to the rear, and with thelimited means at my disposal was, I think,instrumental in reducing the flow of reinforce-ments and supplies to the Italian armies in thefield. When discussing this new operation bothwith His Majesty the King and the Ctommander-in-Chief, they stressed the vital importance ofa success, particularly as the morale of thenation had recently been badly shaken by thedeath of their Prime Minister, General Metaxas.They pointed out that the Greek soldiers onthe front had experienced a severe winter and,although full of fight, -were not too well off formunitions and supplies. Consequently, it wasessential that they should have the utmost en-couragement and support that could be pro-vided. This could best be given by my bomberforce being used in close support of the Greekattack. I produced all the stock argumentsagainst -this form of co-operation, and stressedthe fact that by bombing enemy communica-tions leading to the battlefield a greater degreeof help would be given to their troops fightingthe actual battle. However, they reminded methat the morale of some of the Greek soldiershad been shaken severely by enemy bombingattacks, and that the success of the whole opera-tion might depend on the stimulus afforded byseeing the Italians treated in the same way. Itherefore acceded to their requests.


Reorganisation of Command.20. It was obvious that, if successful close

support was to be provided, a certain reorgani-zation of my forces was necessary. It wasquite out of the question to attempt to keep intouch with a fluctuating battle in Albania froma headquarters in Athens, and if immediate andconstant support was to be given, my aircraftmust operate nearer the front. Accordingly,I formed a wing headquarters in the area ofoperations, and moved part of my bomber forceto a landing ground which was found to besufficiently dry close to the front. For the firstfew -days, until road communication could beestablished, this landing 'ground was provisionedby air. I delegated the command and operationof all the bomber aircraft engaged in this opera-tion, and a fighter squadron, to the commanderof the wing, who was in constant touch withthe Greek commander conducting -the landoperations. From a purely local and spectacularpoint of view, this form of co-operation wasan instant and complete success. The moraleof the Greek soldiers was raised considerablyand I received fulsome praise and appreciationof .the work carried out by the pilots. I waseven approached by one divisional commanderwho implored me to order my pilots not tofly so low over the Italians for fear they wouldbe shot down. Our efforts were made much ofin official communiques, and I think that,during .this particular period, the prestige ofthe R. A.F. was higher in the minds of the Greeknation than at any other period during our stay.I felt the whole time, however, that this highregard was based on false premises for, althoughwe were invigorating our friends, we were mis-employing our aircraft. Later events provedthis to be the case. If the weather had beenkinder, the Greeks might have succeeded inattaining their objective, but heavy falls ofsnow and rain held up their progress, andearly in March, the Italians who had been ableto assemble reinforcements, staged a heavycounter attack which, although held by theGreek forces, destroyed all hopes of capturingValona.

Actually, even if we had employed ourbomber force solely on ports of disembarkationin Albania, I doubt very much whether wecould have interfered to any great extent withthe flow of Italian reinforcements. Our avail-able bomber (force was small, the weather wasbad, and it was clear that, after their recentdefeat in Cyrenaica, the Italians were deter-mined to avoid another reverse which, mighthave had disastrous results on the nation asa whole. Freed from the necessity of supportingtheir North African front, they had the troops'available, and under the conditions prevailingat the time it would tiave been difficult to pre-vent their arrival in Albania.

Arrival of Hurricane Aircraft.

21. During the latter part of this period, anevent of considerable importance concerningour fighter strength occurred. The first sixHurricane aircraft appeared in Greece. Up tillnow, the pilots in our two fighter squadrons hadbeen doing grand work with their Gladiators,but with the gradual appearance of faster andbetter types of Italian aircraft, they were find-ing themselves at a disadvantage, and theirre-equipment with a more modern type wasmost welcome. The first appearance of these

well known fighter aircraft over Athens wasgreeted" with the greatest enthusiasm by thelocal population and it was not long beforethey justified fully their reputation of beingfirst class fighting aircraft. On their first sortieover the lines on 20th February, they shot downfour enemy aircraft, and on 28th February, incompany with a formation of Gladiators, de-stroyed 27 enemy aircraft without a single lossto themselves. This fight, which was the biggestever fought in the air in Albania, was stagedover the Greek lines in full view of both armies.All the enemy aircraft destroyed were confirmedfrom the ground and caused the greatest jubila-

. tion.MARCH-APRIL, 1941.

Decision to send a British expeditionary force.22. The opening of this final phase of the

campaign in Greece was notable for the decisiontaken at long last to send a British expedition-ary force to the country. The Germanshad by now completed their subjugation ofRoumania and were repeating their customarypenetration tactics this time into Bulgaria. Tiheusual stories of the arrival of tourists and reportsof preparations being carried out on aerodromesand lines of communication had been coming infor some time, and it was all too clear thatit was only a matter of time before the Germanarmies would be ensconced on the Greeknorthern frontier. The attitude of the Yugo-slavs, on whom the defence of the northernGreek territory depended so much, was strictlynon-committal and unsatisfactory. TheGreeks, realising fully the seriousness of thesituation, were in no doubts that, if they allowedBritish fighting troops to enter their country,war with Germany was ultimately unavoidable.To their lasting credit, however, they preferredto accept such a situation rather than have tosubmit when the time came to a tame capitu-lation in face of overwhelming force. In con-sequence of this decision, a British force wasrapidly assembled in Egypt and the first troopsstarted to arrive in Greece on tfie 7th of March.

23. I do not propose to give a description ofthe dispositions or activities of this force, whichpresumably are included in detail in theG.O.C.'s. report, except in so far as they affectthe air operations in my command. The generalrole of this force was to support the Greekarmies against a German threat from the north,and much discussion took place as to wherethis help could best be given. It was eventuallydecided that, owing to the shortage of timeavailable before it was considered that Ger-many's preparations would be completed, andto the doubtful attitude of Yugo-Slavia, it wouldbe unwise to move up to the Greek-Bulgarianfrontier. Arrangements were therefore madefor a defensive line to be prepared and occupiedin suitable country west of Salonika, coveringthe Larissa plain.

Preparations for the Arrival of the B.E.F.24. As time was all important now, every-

thing had to be subordinated to get this defen-sive position prepared and the force assembled.Engineering works on aerodromes which werenot of immediate importance had to bestopped so that camps could be constructed,roads repaired, and all the preparations neces-sary to receive the force could 'be made.Similarly, in view of the necessity to avoidcongestion at the docks, we were forced to


use all our available transport to move theincoming munitions, stores, etc. On thearrival of G.H.Q., the army services whichhad hitherto been under my command,together with the appropriate army staffofficers, were transferred to Army control.These commitments and re-arrangementsmeant a certain amount of disorganisation inmy command. The weather, however, wasnow improving and the landing .grounds in theplains and valleys drying up. Therefore, novery great delays in our arrangements occurred.Reorganisation of R.A.F.

25. The arrival of the .British expeditionarylorce and the establishment of a new front,meant a further reorganisation of any forceand a readjustment of my slender resources.Although very few reinforcements had arrivedas yet, and my pilots and air crews were begin-ning to feel the strain of heavy and continuousoperations throughout the winter months, anadditional burden was now thrust upon us. Istill had to provide air support for the Greekswho were being ferociously attacked in Albaniaby the Italians, spurred on by the presence ofMussolini himself. I had to provide airescorts for incoming convoys, also someform of air defence for the ports of disem-barkation of .(British troops which were becom-ing alarmingly congested. I had to deliveroccasional attacks on the Dodecanese Islandsto reduce the scale of enemy attacks on convoyswhich were becoming embarrassingly frequent,and finally, I had to allocate a portion of myforce to support the position in process ofoccupation by British troops. I attach asAppendix " A "* to this report a memorandumwhich I issued on i8th March, pointing out thevery parlous condition we were hi at that timeand describing how I proposed to attempt analmost impossible task. Apart from the factthat all my squadrons were much belowstrength in serviceable aircraft, due to the heavycasualties we had suffered and the unavoidableinability to keep us supplied with replacements,the re-equipping of my fighter squadrons withHurricanes was not proceeding as rapidly asI had hoped. Furthermore, the arrival of re-inforcing squadrons was not keeping pace withthe programme decided upon and those thatdid arrive were much below establishment inaircraft and equipment. In spite of thesedifficulties and disappointments, however, Istill hoped that time would be on our side andthat, when the German attack developed, wewould be in a reasonable state of prepared-ness to meet it.The Battle of Cape Matapan.

26. On the a8th of March, a refreshing inter-lude to our troubles on land was afforded bythe naval engagement off Cape Matapan. Allour 'bombing squadrons took part and theMediterranean fleet was able to bring the enemyto battle and inflict on them a smashing defeat.

The Fleet Air Arm.27. At this juncture it is appropriate to men-

tion the good work carried out by the Fleet AirArm operating from western Greece. SixSwordfish aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm arrivedin Greece on nth March, and proceeded toParamythia from where they operated againstValona and Durazzo harbours. Their task wasbeset by various difficulties. The high coun-

* Not reproduced.

try surrounding Valona made a night approachawkward and hazardous, while it was almostimpossible to get info the bay undetected. AtDurazzo, the water was shallow and theapproaches were thereby limited. Hlots re-ported the presence of night fighters overValona. However, in spite of all this, severalships were sunk and many more hit anddamaged during the period the Fleet Air Armwere with us.Germany declares War on Yugo-Slavia and

Greece.28. In the meantime, events were moving

rapidly in the Balkans. While the Regent ofYugo-Slavia was signing away the freedom ofhis country, a coup d'etat was staged and wehad a new 'ally. Large German forces hadcrossed the Danube and were moving intoBulgaria. Time was clearly running short. Inspite of every effort, we were only able toarrange one so called " staff conference " withthe Yugo-Slavs which 'did little beyond pro-viding an opportunity for mutual criticism as.to our state of unpreparedness for war, beforethe Germans declared war against both Greeceand Yugo-Slavia on 6th April, and commencedinvading both countries.

THE GERMAN INVASION.29. I propose to deal with the air campaign

against the German 'air force in somewhatgreater detail than the operations hithertocarried out in Albania. I do this because Ibelieve there are valuable lessons to ibe learntwhich, owing to the great disparity betweenthe (British (and German air forces dn .thiscampaign, are shown up in 'high relief. Inaddition, our air force gave support to aBritish army which may, perhaps, considerthat the major cause which forced it to with-draw from its 'positions and eventually evacu-ate Greece altogether, lay in the lack of thisvery air support. I was fully aware that theair forces at my disposal could not give thesupport which the army desired and whichwe would like to have given. Although Istressed the fact, the full consequences wereperhaps not clearly recognised by the army.I feel, however, that if various aspects of ourair inferiority are discussed, a more completecomprehension of the issues which are at stakemay be gained, and that we may thereby pavethe way ito a better mutual understandingbetween the Services, a state of affairs whichis essential for the efficient conduct of modernwar.Organisation of R.A.F. Component.

30. At the time when Germany commencedthe invasion, my force was organised asfollows: *

A Western 'Wing—consisting of one bomberand one fighter squadron (Gladiator) sup-porting the Greeks in Albania.

An Eastern Wing—consisting of twobomber and one Hurricane fighter squadronssupporting the Anglo-Greek forces facingthe German advance. The squadrons of thiswing occupied landing grounds on theLarissa plain which, although still soft afterthe winter rains, was now drying rapidly.In the Athens area, I had one bomber

squadron and one fighter squadron in processof re-arming with Hurricanes. Expressed interms of aircraft/ my total serviceable strength

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 9 JANUARY, 1947

in the country was some eighty aircraft, towhich were opposed, according to all reports,approximately 800 German aircraft on theEastern front (Bulgaria and Roumania) and160 Italian aircraft (based in Albania plus 150based in Italy (but operating over Albania andGreece, mainly from advanced landing groundsin Albania.

Disposition of Squadrons in Eastern Wing.31. The first problem with which I was faced

in forming the Eastern Wing was that of dis-posing the air forces I could -make available.*My intention was to provide each squadronwith a ibase aerodrome, and at least one andif possible two satellite landing grounds.

The location of the fighter squadron was in-fluenced by its role. This was threefold:

(a) to protect the base area, which includedthe aimy L. of C., the port of Voles andour aerodromes in the Larissa plain.

(6) to provide fighter escort to ourbombers, and

(c) to deal with enemy fighter aircraft inthe battle area.Larissa aerodrome was the most suitable from

the geographical and communications point ofview, and was one of the few aerodromes whichwas serviceable for all but a comparatively shortperiod during the winter. Accordingly, thefighter squadron was based there with a satel-lite on a piece of suitable ground 7 miles tothe west. At Larissa the camp was well dis-persed at the opposite end of the aerodrometo the hangars, which would be likely to attractbombing attack. Aircraft pens of sandbagscapable of taking Hurricanes, .though open atthe top, were constructed in dispersed positions.

32. As regards the two bomber squadrons,it was my original intention to station them atAlmyros, where I hoped they would besufficiently far back to -be immune from escortedbomber raids and low flying fighter attack.Unfortunately, the Greek Air Force were alreadyin occupation of this ground and I did not con-sider it safe for reasons of congestion to stationmore than one squadron there. The other squad-ron had to be sited temporarily at Larissa,pending the discovery of a more suitable ground.This was found eventually at Niamata, whichin spite of a nearby marsh and consequentmalarial infection, and in spite of .the poorstrategical position it occupied in the event ofthe withdrawal of an army to the Olympusline, was the only other which possessed a satis-factory surface and was suitable for night flyingin the whole area north of Attica.

Thus the Blenheim squadrons were locatedat Almyros and Niamata. At each aerodromeevery endeavour was made to gain the maxi-mum dispersion of aircraft and encampments.Except at Larissa, the limits of the squadroncamps lay at least a kilometre from the aero-drome. Aircraft were widely dispersed off theaerodrome at Almyros, but at Niamata this washindered iby a dyke and drainage ditch whichprotected the aerodrome from the marsh andlake beyond.

33. The one army co-operation squadronwhich arrived as the German attack developedI stationed at Kazaklar, where it was suitablysited for meeting the army needs. Unfortunately,however, this squadron rarefy had more than

one Hurricane serviceable at a time and, sincethe remainder of its aircraft were Lysanders,which it was quite impossible to use in the faceof enemy air opposition, the squadron did verylittle useful work.

34. It should be realised that the Germaninvasion of Greece started at a tune when veryfew landing grounds were fit for use on accountof rain. • They were just beginning to dry, andhad the attack been delayed for even a Week,we would at least have had several more satel-lite landing grounds at our disposal. As itwas, the change in the weather favoured theGermans.

Position of Eastern Wing H.Q.35. Considerations influencing the location of

the Eastern Wing Headquarters were:(a) ability of the wing commander to

make quick personal contact with forcecommander.

(6) reliability of communications.(c) ease of access to operational squad-

rons under wing control.(d) reasonable propinquity to aerodrome.

The overriding consideration in locating WingHeadquarters supporting the army on this frontwas that it should be close enough to ForceH.Q. to allow the wing commander and theforce commander to be within easy personaltouch. It was considered undesirable, how-ever, to locate the H.Q. beside Force H.Q.,since the combined encampment would be ofexcessive proportions, difficult to conceal fromthe air, marked by deeply worn tracks, con-gested with vehicles and unwieldy to move.

The fully established wing headquarters failedto arrive in Greece by the outbreak of the cam-paign and, therefore, after consultation withthe force commander, I decided to locate theskeleton wing headquarters beside Force H.Q.at Elason. The wing commander lived in theforce commander's mess and so the closestliaison was formed.

Control of Squadrons.36. At the end of March, the Army Signals

detachment attached to wing headquarters wasasked to link up all the aerodromes which wereeventually used with direct lines to wing head-quarters at Elason. • This task was far beyondthe scope and resources of the Army Signalsdetachment, with the inevitable result that landline communications were extremely poor. The(factors leading to this state of affairs were asfollows. The shortage of Royal Signals per-sonnel resulting from the rapid R.A.F. build-upin Eastern Greece, had stretched to the limitthe resources of the Signals Company de-spatched to Greece in July, 1940. Furthermore,priority for such equipment as was availablewas given to the forces in Libya, and the situa-tion in Greece was acute, particularly as regardslandline cable and wire. Technical 'limitationswere a further cause. The trunk landlinesystem was limited to overhead alignmentswhich were frequently out of action as a resultof hostile air activity, and reliable maintenancewas beyond the resources of the Greek Postaland Telegraph administration. Accordingly theArmy was faced with providing the R.A.F. withfield cable systems which automatically pre-cluded long 'distance speech facilities. Thus,although the wing had a direct line to Larissa,


25 miles of it consisted of field telephone wire,and the utmost difficulty was experienced inusing this line. Tihe force line or Fullerphoneto the main exchange was used whenever pos-sible. Similarly, communication to Almyroswas not possible from Elason. It was thereforedecided to establish a system of relaying opera-tion orders in code by telephone from the wingcommander at Elason to Larissa, where theywere further transmitted as appropriate eitherdirect to the fighter squadron at Larissa or bytelephone to the bomber squadrons at Niamataor Almyros. For this purpose, an officer waspermanently standing by at Larissa to relayoperation orders.

Communication from Larissa to Niamataonly twelve miles away was reliable, but toAlmyros it was most unsatisfactory, largely dueto the fact that the Air Defence Centre usedthe Almyros line for reporting enemy aircraft.As the campaign proceeded, so the demandsboth of the wing and of the Air Defence Centreaugmented until finally it took as much as fiveto six hours to pass a priority .telephone mes-sage from Larissa to Almyros. Thus it wasdecided to use the squadron at Niamata forany fleeting targets which presented themselves,while .the squadron at Almyros carried outdirect support operations, the need for whichcould ibe foreseen some hours previously.Organisation of Fighter Defence.

37. The Greek observer system consisting ofposts with sub-posts radiating from each andlinked to air -defence centres by telephone,operated with a certain degree of success, andvarious interceptions of Italian aircraft 'hadbeen made over the Larissa area.

A fighter operations room was established atLarissa and was run by the squadron stationedthere. Depending on alternative duties, air-craft were standing by throughout the (hours ofdaylight. It was, however, inevitable to leavethe L. of C. and base area unprotected whenthe fighters were required for escort duty orprotective duties over the forward troops.

The system worked well, although there waslittle enemy air activity during the first fewdays of the campaign. When, -however, thewithdrawal of our troops began, the personnelmanning the posts of the observer system hadto withdraw and consequently the system brokedown.Liaison with Force H.Q. *

38. The wing commander visited ithe forcecommander in his office each morning as aroutine, and daily discussions were held in theforce commander's mess both with him andhis B.G.S. The force commander was fullyinformed of the air situation and made no ex-cessive demands upon our resources. Withoutexception, the utmost was done to meet t!herequirements of the 'army and every requestfor reconnaissance made by the force com-mander or the B.G.S. was followed iby a faith-ful endeavour to carry out that task. At theoutset, however, weather was a serious hind-rance, and in spite of the most frequent anddetermined attempts, many failures had to bereported

The choice of targets for the bombers, the•ways and means of providing fighter patrolsover our forward troops, the question of leavingthe base area unprotected whilst fightersescorted bombers or patrolled over the line,ground straffing of M.T., reconnaissance, and

every other aspect of the air situation were dis-cussed, and complete agreement was expressedwith the direction and operations of the squad-rons supporting the army. Neither the forcecommander nor the B.G.S. permitted them-selves to indicate more than a general plan,hi view of .the rapidly changing situation, andthey always expressed their agreement in thesuggested methods of meeting any particularcircumstances.

In addition to the personal liaison 'betweenthe force and wing commanders, an A.L.O.kept in constant touch with the G. Staff, watch-ing and reporting every development in thesituation. It is difficult to know how air forcescould be operated in closer co-operation withthe military forces than was in fact the caseduring .the opening days of the Balkan cam-paign. Whatever shortcomings there may haverbeen in the support 'given by the air forces,they certainly cannot ibe attributed to lack ofco-operation or to lack of the most faithfulendeavours of our pilots. At every availableopportunity, aircraft of -tihis wing were doingtheir utmost to carry out the multifarious taskswhich were required of them.

6th-Qth April—The German Advance.39. On the morning of the 6th April, the

German forces were on the march. The bulkof the enemy moved west from the Stnimavalley, filtering by all available roads into eachvalley and gorge, inundating every plain withtheir swiftly moving forces. The first air re-ports indicated that an attack was being madeupon Mt. Beles and the Rupel Pass. Simul-taneously, our reconnaissance aircraft reportedmovement of M.T., on the road west fromPetricih.

It was certain that this movement would becovered by fighter patrols, .and the fighterswere sent off to carry out a sweep over theroad and over the Greeks on Mt. Beles and inthe Rupel Pass. Twelve Hurricanes met twentyMe. 1095. and our fighters shot down five with-out loss to themselves. This disposed of anyanxiety or over cautiousness which the squad-ron commander of the fighters had felt aboutthe change over from Italians to Germans.Whereas, at the outset, the squadron com-mander expressed the view that his aircraftcould not operate in formations of less thantwelve, he now agreed that-formations of sixwould be able to escort Blenheim formationsacross the line. This meant that the base areaonly had to be left completely unprotectedwhen the Hurricanes went off in strength topatrol over our forward troops. In the cir-cumstances, the wing commander consideredit a reasonable division of fighter strength.

Meanwhile, reconnaissances of the Strumavalley were being carried out. During thecourse of that night Sofia, Gorna Djumaya,Simitli and Petrich were bombed by Wellingtonand Blenheim aircraft both from Athens andfrom the Larissa plain. These raids were mostsuccessful, and pilots on their return reportedgood results. The weather was ibad on thefollowing day and no reconnaissance was pos-sible, but it was .anticipated that considerableconcentrations of enemy M.T would be foundat Strumitsa. Late in the afternoon, in spiteof severe weather, some of our aircraft gotthrough and bombed the rich target presentedby the heavy congestion of German M.T. con-fined to the road in this area by marshes and


watercourses and the surrounding mountainouscountry. The escort of Hurricanes destroyeda Dornier. A large proportion of the Germanforces moving west against the Yugo-Slavarmies had to pass through Strumitsa, as wellas all the forces advancing on Salonika andthose about to deploy themselves before ourpositions on the Mt. Olympus region. Conse-quently, as many heavy attacks as possiblewere made against targets in this area.

On the following day, the Ibad weather con-tinued (but in spite of it, we were aible to getsome of our reconnaissance machines through,and again in the evening we .bombed enemyM.T. in considerable concentration nearStrumifcsa.

Since the army co-operation squadron wasshort of aircraft, and since it was consideredexpedient to avoid sending unescorted Blen-heims on long reconnaissances, the fightersquadron was asked to help out with recon-naissance. This squadron was thereafter fre-quently asked to provide recce aircraft, andalthough the pilots had had no reconnaissancetraining, they carried out the most valuablework throughout this period of great stress.

The wing commander had received an appealto give ibomibing support to the Greeks who werecut off in the Salonika area. On consultingthe force commander as to the relative dangerto the army of the various points which theGerman advance was • threatening, the wingcommander decided, in view of the limitedopportunities for air operations offered by theweather, and in view of his limited air re-sources, not to dissipate any effort on a frontwhich was already lost in spite of the gallantaction still being fought in .the Rupel areaby the Greeks.) Nevertheless, the powerfulbombing attacks against Stntmitsa were boundto have a direct effect upon the situation inthe area of Kilkis and Salonika, since Germancolumns passing through Strumitsa and southto Lake Doiran were attempting to encircle theMt. Beles position.

On the following day, the weather was againvery b>ad. From tho information available,however, it was now clear that very consider-able German forces were passing throughStrumitsa, some advancing south by LakeDoiran were already in or around Salonika,whilst the greater part continued west and northwest and were threatening the Monastir Gap.

The situation was begdnning to unfold, con-tact was expected shortly on the Olympus linebut anxiety was felt on account of the ineffec-tiveness of the Yugo-Slav resistance and thelack of information as to the situation in thenorth. Every effort was -made iby our air forceto alleviate the pressure on the Yugo-Slav armyin order to give them time to withdraw in frontof the highly mobile German forces, and totake up strong positions in the mountains andgorges.

gth-i$th April—ist Withdrawal.40. Communications .between Force H.Q.

and Wdng H.Q. to Athens were now becomingextremely poor, and I was virtually out oftouch -not only with the wing commander butwith the G.O.C., with whom it was essentialfor me to 'be in constant communication.Accordingly, I sent an officer of air rank to takeover operations in the forward area. The airofficer took over at a time when, in view of theintention of the army to withdraw to the

Olympus line, plans were being drawn up towithdraw the ground party of the squadron ofBlenheims at Niamata and to use it only as anadvanced landing ground.

During the next few days, until the completeevacuation of the Larissa plain on the I5th,enemy M.T. columns and concentrations on theroads between Prilep and Bitolj and in theAmyntaion Area were 'bombed successfully byour aircraft. Our army had had little time toprepare strong positions in "this area, which theyhad hoped would be protected for some timeby the resistance of the Yugo-Slavs. A heavyburden was therefore thrown upon our air forceswhich now virtually had to make up for thetime lost by the caving-in of the Yugo-Slavforces. No stone was left unturned to delay theenemy and to shield our ground forces. Mean-while, our army was engaged in fighting a rear-guard action in the areas around Amyntaionand Kleisoura.

No sooner was the withdrawal to the Aliakmonline complete when, on account of the threatto its left flank, it became necessary for the armyto make a further withdrawal to the Thermo-pylae line. Consequently, all R.A.F. unitson the Larissa plain had to be withdrawn atonce with the utmost speed along roads whichwere already congested. At the same time, theR.A.F. continued to throw all its power intodelaying tactics.

On i4th April, the weather improved andGerman air activity intensified. The Germanshad brought their fighters forward to the .Prilepand Monastir areas, where their engineers hadprepared the necessary landing strips. The Ger-man air force was mainly directed in close sup-port of their army, and heavy dive bombingattacks were made against our troops. OurHurricanes, escorting our 'bombers in attackingenemy M.T. on the roads near Ptolemais and

' disorganising his lines of communication, shotdown many enemy aircraft.

41. On I5th April, the main effort of theGerman Air Force was directed against our airforce, which had been delaying their militaryoperations and had taken toll of their aircraft.Large numbers of short range fighters made theirappearance over the Larissa plain and groundstraffed Niamata. In spite of A.A., every air-craft of 'the Blenheim squadron located therewas destroyed. Owing to the breakdown of theGreek observer system, our fighters were at ahopeless disadvantage. When, on oneoccasion, Me. 1095 appeared over their aero-drome at Larissa without any warning, threeHurricanes were attacked whilst taking off andtwo were shot down. The third shot down oneMe. 109. Although, when our fighters wereable to get off, they played havoc with theenemy, the situation was obviously untenable.I was present on the Larissa aerodrome whilstthis attack was in progress and I ordered thesquadrons to withdraw to the Athens area forth-with.

The Albanian Front.42. Meanwhile, the wide manoeuvre of the

German forces advancing swiftly through themountain passes north west and west of Skopljewas developing. Their intention was to forcecontact with the helpless Italian forces nearKukes in northern Albania and to threaten theright flank of the Greek armies in Albania fromthe Lake Ochrida area. The Greeks, who had


fought so valiantly against the Italians through-out the winter months, were hardly in a positionto withstand the extra pressure of the Germanforces. Withdrawal from Albania in the Koritsaarea had been considered expedient by Britishcommanders before the German invasion began.However, the Greeks did not take a sufficientlystrategic view of warfare to allow such a with-drawal to be carried out without seriously affect-ing the morale of the army. This was especiallythe case when wrested from the despised Italianinvaders. To give up their acquisition of theirown free will and to see it fall once more intothe hands of the Italians was for the Greekfighting soldier in the line an intolerable idea.When in fact, the withdrawal was eventuallyforced upon them, it was too late for the Greeks,reliant upon mule and bullock-cart transport,to conduct an orderly retreat. Morale andorganisation collapsed. The Greek army com-mander at Yannina capitulated to the Germans.

As the situation in 'this area deteriorated, itbecame increasingly obvious that it was neces-sary to withdraw the R.A.F. Western Wing,consisting of one Blenheim and one Gladiatorsquadron. This was successfully carried out inspite of difficulties -which arose as the resultof numbers of Yugo-Slav aircraft and personnelarriving at Paramythia aerodrome and requiringfuel and food right up to the last moment.

i^th—2$th April. 2nd Withdrawal.43. At this juncture, I decided to abolish the

Eastern Wing and take over control of all opera-tions from Athens. I left an R.A.F. officerat Force H.Q. to act as liaison between the armycommander in the field and myself. Later,when Force handed over the direction of thewithdrawal to Anzac Corps, this officer wasattached there. The army commander desiredonly reconnaissance and fighter protection whichwe did all we could to provide.

Throughout the withdrawal, the army co-operation squadron carried out what recon-naissance they could. After they had evacuatedKazaklar, north of Larissa, they operated theirfew aircraft from Pharsala,- which by this timewas serviceable. Later they operated fromAmphiklia, just behind the Thermopylae line.Here there was a Greek Gladiator squadronwhich was ground straffed and destroyed assoon as the Germans were able to locate theirfighters on the aerodromes on the Larissa plain.The army co-operation squadron's Hurricaneswere not on the aerodrome at the time of theground straffing, and so luckily escaped, but Iconsidered it wiser to bring them back to theAthens area.

In view of the complete numerical superiorityenjoyed by the enemy, I decided to operate myBlenheim squadrons by night as much aspossible in efforts to delay, as far as lay in ourpower, the enemy's advance. But after thedecision to evacuate had been taken, the wholeweight of the German Air Force was turned onthe Athens area and there was no alternativebut to save what air crews and material re-mained. These squadrons ferried the remainderof "the personnel of their squadrons to Crete andcarried out their instructions with discipline andcourage in the face of great peril.

Direction of Bombing Effort.44. As far as the direction of bombing is con-

cerned, the operations against the Germans fol-lowed four clearly defined phases:

The first phase, lasting for about two days,was the disclosure of the enemy plan prior togaining contact with our troops. During thisphase, bombing was directed at previouslyarranged targets in the Struma valley, includingPetrich, Simitli, Gorna Djumaya and Sofia.

During the second phase, in which the direc-tion of the German advance was recognised andin which every possible effort was made toalleviate pressure thrown against the Yugo-Slavarmies in the west and the Greek armies in theSalonika area, bombing was directed againstsupply columns and concentrations of enemyM.T. at the bottleneck around Strumitsa, wherethe German forces divided into two columns.

The third phase, in which a serious threatdeveloped against the British armies in theregion of the Monastir gap, was devoted to thebombing of bottlenecks, railway junctions,stations, bridges, defiles and concentrations ofenemy M.T. on roads leading towards the Mon-astir Gap, from Skoplje, Veles, Prilep to Bitolj.

The fourth phase was the direction of all ourair effort in hindering and delaying the advanc-ing Germans to allow our army to conduct asuccessful withdrawal. All our resources werethrown into the task of alleviating the pressureon our forces in order to allow them the maxi-mum amount of time to withdraw and toprepare new positions.

Targets were chosen at points where it wascalculated that the effect of dislocation wouldbe most widespread amongst advancing Germancolumns, and yet close enough to the rear ofthe German fighting troops to have the maxi-mum immediate effect upon the progress oftheir advance.

It is impossible to calculate the degree ofsuccess which this policy attained, but Germanprisoners who fell into our hands told woefultales of the heavy bombing which they hadsuffered .from the R.A.F. throughout theiradvance. On the night 14/15^1, our Welling-tons created much chaos at Veles and brokethe bridge across the Vardar. A glance at themap will at once show the importance of adislocation in the German L. of C. at this point.It is the hinge upon which one, perhaps thegreatest, of the main German drives depended.

The continual bombing of M.T. which pre-sented some of the best targets which ourBlenheim pilots, accustomed to such targetsas dispersed vehicles in the desert, ihad everknown, caused much confusion amongst theenemy.

Withdrawal of Fighter Squadrons.45. The fighters were withdrawn to the Athens

area, since no aerodrome north of this was freefrom ground straffing. The constant lack ofintermediary aerodromes made it inevitable that,if our fighters were placed on an aerodromefrom which they could give protection to ourtroops, they were in imminent danger of destruc-tion by ground straffing as soon as they wereon the ground. If, on the other hand, theywere placed beyond the range of ground straff-ing, they were unable to protect our troops andthe tightly packed columns of M.T. withdrawingalong the roads. The utmost efforts were madeto give the maximum protection to our con-tinually harassed troops. All our machineswere working to maximum capacity. Many ofour pilots were working at extreme range, chal-lenging untold odds and at times, after they


had used up their ammunition, pursuing enemyaircraft engaged in ground straffing our troops.

On aoth April, approximately 100 divebombers and fighters attacked the Athens area;my whole force of fighters of fifteen Hurricanesintercepted them, bringing down a total of 22enemy aircraft confirmed and eight unconfirmedfor a loss of five Hurricanes. Small as our losseswere, they were crippling to our small force.

Even after having -been shot down, our fighterpilots would immediately take the air in aircraftwhich had 'been riddled with ibullets and by allnormal standards were totally unserviceable.The courage of these men never failed norlooked like failing. Each day their fellows died,each day they stepped into their 'battered air-craft, not without a sensation of fear but q-niteundismayed. Each man was aware of his greatresponsibility in the face of great odds.

Final Evacuation of Air Forces.46. On 22nd April, I sent the remaining Hur-

ricanes to Argos. From here, I intended thatthey should cover the evacuation of the BritishArmy, but the German air attack became soconcentrated, that after a number of Hurricanes•had been destroyed on the ground on 23rdApril, the remainder were ordered to leave forCrete. In Crete, Blenheim fighter patrols wereorganised to cover the ships evacuating the-troops from the beaches. These escorts weremaintained throughout the evacuation withoutrespite, and I consider it was due largely totheir efforts that such a large proportion of thetotal British forces in Greece were evacuated.

47. A reference to the evacuation would notbe complete without a tribute being paid to theflying boats, both of the R.A.F. and theB.O.A.C. These boats carried out magnificentwork ferrying parties of airmen and soldiers bothfrom the mainland to Crete and from Crete toEgypt. A number of their flights were carriedout in conditions of the utmost danger, and,throughout, the pilots and crews displayed theutmost gallantry and devotion to duty. From,the point of view of interest, the record numberof personnel carried in one single Sunderlandon one trip was 84.

CONCLUSION.48. The lessons and conclusions to be drawn

from a campaign of this description are many,and in Appendix " B "* to this report, I haveincluded those which I consider are of the chiefinterest. In bringing out the various pointsthat come to my mind, I find it difficult toavoid criticising various aspects of serviceorganisation and doctrines. I would like to pointout, however, that these criticisms are madein an entirely constructive sense and in the hopethat profit may be gained by our experience.

49. Where we are in possession of totallyinadequate air forces, there will always be re-quests from every direction for the air supportwhich in ideal circumstances we would com-fortably be able to provide, and which indeedwe would be only too pleased -to give. InGreece, we had the minimum,, and in orderto produce any results at all, it was essentialthat all available force was directed in accord-ance with a carefully conceived plan. As ourbombing forces were inadequate to deal decisiveand instantaneous blows on the enemy, ourpolicy had to be to sustain our small efforts for

* Not reproduced.

as long as possible at points where the resultantdislocation caused the enemy the utmost em-barrassment. This we were able to do inAlbania, for the Italian air strategy was ex-tremely weak, and the numerical odds wereonly some four or five to one against us. When3however, we had to face the full force of theGerman onslaught in addition, the odds becametoo great in spite of the superb gallantry of ourpilots and crews.

50. In spite of the strategic and tactical dis-advantages under which our air forces labouredin Greece, in spite of the great enemy superiorityin numbers, and in spite of the weather con-ditions which there can be no doubt were theworst in which British air forces have had tooperate throughout the world, a considerableoffensive effort was developed. During theAlbanian and German campaigns in Greece,our fighters destroyed 232 enemy aircraft con-firmed, and a further 112 unconfirmed. Ourbombers operating by day and night dropped550 tons of bombs on the enemy. There wasno indiscriminate or area bombing. Each bombwas carefully aimed in order to obtain themaximum effect to ensure that the efforts re-quired to overcome the disadvantages whichbeset our air crews were not in vain.

51. The participation of our land forces inthe Greek caimpaign was dictated entirely bypolitical considerations, and we were fullyaware of our weaknesses both in the air and onthe ground. I have heard criticisms madethat, under these conditions, we should neverhave sent a land force to Greece. I attendedall the conferences held in Greece to' discussthis matter and I would like to say withoutany hesitation, and in the light of subsequentevents, that in my opinion the decision madewas a right one and in accordance with the besttraditions of our race. There was always thechance that, in the first place, Germany wouldrespect .the neutrality of Yugo-Slavia and thather advancing armies might be delayed suffi-ciently long to enable our forces to bestrengthened and our position made secure. Onthe other hand, if Yugo-Slavia threw in herlot with us, which eventually she did, it wasreasonable to suppose that her soldiers, re-nowned for their fighting qualities, would provea tough nut for the Germans to crack and theywould be able to protect our left flank. In anycase, we would be containing large enemy landforces and air forces at a time when Britainneeded a breathing space to perfect her defen-sive arrangements.

Furthermore, the assistance which we wereconsidering was to be given to a nation whichhad sacrificed her all in our cause and washerself quite prepared to face complete extinc-tion rather than capitulate. I suggest that itwould have been difficult to refuse her thishelp and our conduct would have been mostreprehensible in the eyes of our countrymenand those of important neutrals had we failedto do so.

52. Finally, I would like to express on behalfof each individual under my command, mysincere appreciation of the generous hospitalityand friendship which were unfailingly shownto us -by Greeks in every walk of life. We willnever forget the brave >and courteous spirit ofthese people, whose kindness and sympathytowards us were as great when we finally had


to leave Greece to the occupation of the Ger-mans, as when we arrived in November lastin the fever and anxiety of .the opening daysof the war against Italy. It was with a feelingof deep regret but of profound admiration andaffection for this heroic people that we leftthe shores of Greece.

53. Under separate cover, I have forwardedto you the names of officers and airmen who Iwould particularly like to bring to your noticefor their excellent work and devotion to dutyduring this campaign. I have nothing butpraise for all the officers and airmen whom Ihad the honour to command, whose conduct

was at all times exemplary and who, evenduring periods of the greatest stress, continuedto work with that cool and calm efficiencywhich we have become accustomed to expectfrom the members of the Service.

_ , , ,I have the honour to be,

Your obedient Servant,j jj d'ALBIAC./. ' ,.. , '

„ ** Vice-Marshal,Commanding R.A.F. in Greece.

November, 1940, to April, 1941.

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