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The Lance as the Weapon ofCavalryMajor-General M. Von CzerlieuPublished online: 11 Sep 2009.

To cite this article: Major-General M. Von Czerlieu (1903) The Lance as theWeapon of Cavalry, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 47:299, 39-47, DOI:10.1080/03071840309418118

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THE ADVANTAGES AXD DISADVANTAGES OF THE LANCE I N ACTION.

T H E question lias already been tlireslied out in thc author’s work (publislied 1880) on “ A Uniform Cavalry.” He lias combatted in tha t work the views Brix pu t forward in his translation of Denisoii’s “ History of Cavalry ” (1S79). From tha t time up to tlic present. no fresh argumeiit lias been advanced iii favour of the laiice; mid tlic author can find no reason for modifying tlie attitude taken up by liini

’ in 1880 on this question.

ALLEGED ADVANTAGES OF TIIC IAKCE.

1. Tlie i i i j i ir ies cnitsrrl 119 t h e lonce nrr gtwi-er tJ i ( i r i t liose cniisetl 11g t h e siiwrd.

It must be remembered, however, tliat tlic sword can equally deal a thrusting blow while also inaintaining its capacity for cutting. Tlie sword is not limited to downward cuts, which might be met by a strong headdiess or’protected slioulders.

Xore tliaii one instance like the following lias been recorded :- 111 1812 a n officer received fourteen lance wounds, and survived

to figure ?fterwards in tlie distinguished service list. 11 \ ~ e l l - l i l ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ i German staff-surgeon lias stated tliat lance wounds

arc in the liigliest degree liumaiiej arid lias advocated a no re deadly point.

5’. This ndrniitage is a doubtful one with regard to tlie lance, since

i t is counterbalanced by tlic added weight and-by tlie fact tliat of two wenpoiis tlic one might bc superfluous which breaks tlic easier or wliich is rendered useless by bending, viz., the lance.

2. P’hr lniirr is I i i ~ g e r t h r i i i t h e zirortl ni id t l i e brtyoiiet 3 r d t o t h e ri//c.

lyit l i tlie laiice lield at the centre of gravity, to ensure steadi- ness and accuracy in tlirusting, this advantage becomes lialf unreal wlien compared to sword or bayonet, since lialf its lengtli must be deducted, so that from tlic lo~igest-the Grrmaii of 13 feet 5 inches-aily R lengtli of G feet 10 inches can be’considered. Kou- that is approximately tho length of tlie sword held a t outstretched arm; the bayonet is even loiiger. This can be verified by measnrement. Further, the swords-

Tim m ~ i 1 ) o i i s for close qiiurters (ire b r t f e r tJiciti one.

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40 THE LANCE AS THE WEAPOX OF CAVALRY.

man can lean forward in the saddle more easily and carry his shoulder further to t h e front, i n n way vliich is impossible for the Iaiicer witI1- ou t his being thrown from the saddle after a successful thrust. Tllc Germans seem to have found their former lance of 12 feet G inclies of insufficient lengtli.

T h e lance i s s i ip~iosc t l to b e t l i c r e d ic-erilion of slrock t a c t i c < ; from .zi4icli it niuy b e concliirle'cl tha t it is i n t e d e t l i n ri clrnrgr t o bring dolr71 one of t h e eizeniy in bo th of t h r front i-[inL.s.

But this is questionable if such a shock be consiclercd a littlc more closely, and horse and liorseman be regarded as living beings, endowed witli nerves.

I n moments of extreme danger tlie iierrrs rc-act iiidependcntly of the will of the individual. (The author liere goes on to describe various symptoms of extreme mental tension v4iicli ~voulcl impair the stendi- iiess of hand necessary to a n effective use of the lance.) Again the liorse must also be considered a t such a crisis. Horses, i t is me11 kno\vn, become unmanageable in the presence of danger. Coulcl a man, tlicre- fore, rely on his horse so far as to be able to devote liis attention to directing his lance, and feel sure all the time tha t tlie aiiiiiial will nrt play liiin false by some movement of tcrror ?

The author tlien quotes n personal experience tha t took place a t the Cavalry course in 1573, aud, further, mother occurrence in 186E,

effective handling of the lance mould be liiglily questionable. Again, at TGniggrltz, so n friencl of liis relates, a Prunsian dragoon rode a t him, shouting " You dogs," without attempting to draw his sword. but clinging desperately to his reins. The man seems to have had 3

difficult horse tha t he could not hold with one Iiand. Could this not often happen to tlie lancer ? If so, wlicre would his lance avail him ?

W e must' admit tha t the horse can a t tlic last inoment s~vervc to the Icft o r right, or even bacli\*;ards, or more probably jump forimrd. I1711cre then will t he lance points be directed ?

One cannot imagine a cavalry charge, conducted by two opposing boclies of cavalry trained to shock tactics, to resemble a collision of railway trains, as if all the horses ivould crash together, head against head ; their riders even could not achieve this. Instinctively they would innkc for the gaps, and in a inomcnt their heads ancl nccks would be pressed against the shoulders of tlic opposing animals, wliile the position of their riders would be altered according to tlie gaps in question. 3Ieali\vhile tlie lance points would be pushed this way and tha t by the tossing. of tlie horses' lirads both sidewaya and upivards. They might well miss their thrust, without perhaps even striking t h e next man-though this might be possible.

The sword is in this respect in a better position, since the wrist of the horseman is pliable, and by being held higher cannot be turned aside by the enemy's horse. L c t two ranks, armed with swords and lances rcspectively, in order of innrcli approach each other a t a walk, without losing toucli, until they meet ancl the horses' heads fit into the spaces 1)etween tlie enemy. and let tlieiii remain there slioulder to slioulder until they can p t no further. The cliances in favour of lance and sword can thcn bc accurately gauged, aucl-unless tlie esperimcnt be preparcd for by previous drill purposely to give another result-judgment, must he pronounced in farour of the sword.

.J.

.0 while hunting, both of which convince him tha t in such moments a n

This can be easily demonstrated.

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THE LANCE AS w E WEAPON OF CAVALRY. 4 1

Data drawn from persoiial esperience in action are, unfortunately. Iiarc! to obtain. The campaign of 1866 shows no instance of tlic superiority of the lance, according to the author.

Military l!istory shows no single instance of an entire front rank being borne down by the lances of a charging enemy. It is chance only that directs t!ie destruction of tlie enemy by cold steel. It is weight that tells; and even after the first moment of the charge it is n matter of pressing onwards through the ni616e. Then only will recourse be 11ad to cold steel.

5. The Ztince is snit2 to cause a great riiorcil inipresfion. If this were so, then Ulilans (lancers) would inspire such awe among

sword-armed cavalry as to deter tlie latter from attacking; but this is not tlie case in history. And still less so will i t be in future, as sv;ords- inen were generally content to cut only, which entailed a more open formation. But swords held for thrusting entail as close a formation as lances. The horse .will accomplish more tlian the lance. The best directed lance tlirust will not save tlie Iancer from being ridd 11 down.

If it will, mliy do officers in a charge not take a lance for a sword 1 I n talking of a bristling wall of lancers ” o n e forgets tlie Irorsc.. C. T h e lance possesses ri specictl rci!?i2 in cin [ i f fuck riyriinst

infcintry. I f an attack of cavalry on infantry is undertaken with any hope

of success, the state of that infantry must be such as to render it a matter of indifference with what weapon the cavalry is armed. The object is to ride down and break up the infantry more tlian a series of isolated personal combats, since the infantry, it may be assumed, will be more numerous than thc camlry, and in single combat, besides the bayonet, would almost certainly still possess one or two cartridges. W e are no longer in niuzzle-loading days.

7. T h e Zanees in t h e rerrr rank render it possible to el/ : r p gopp <n f l i e f ront rank. 8

Where the rear rank el,iarges with lances earricd upright, ,as in Francc and Italy, its only object ceenis to be.to supply fresh lances to tlie front raul; instead of fighting. So we prefer the sword in the rear rank.

Where the second ranl: charges with levellcd lances, as in Germany, there the front rank is esposed to danger more than if tlie rear rank carried swords.

8. Lances niay be used t o f o r m frames for exteniporissZ Loots for crossing rivers; also for tent poles (us in Gerniany and Russia)

We maintain that they could well be replaced by rods or laths. 9. According to Pelet-n’arbonne’s “ Cavalry Service,” I). 259, tlie

lance i s properly ‘‘ tlLe reapo on of t h e ofensive.” Were the swords or sabres of Charles XII., Seidlitz, Nadasky, Xura t less well adapted to i t ? It seems that the chief concern of the lance is to keep the sivortl a t a distance. Where is the offensive there?

DISADVANTAGES OF THE LASCE. 1. It is a disturbing element-even if only partial-in the

uniformity of the equipment, training, and use of cavalry. 2. The lance increases the horse’s load, and the difficulty of

balan’cing it. I n Germany, note the carbine is slung OR the near side, also the new project for a folding lance.

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42 TIlC L.\NCE AS THE \YE.\POS OF CAVALRY.

3. It disturbs a comfortable seat b i the weight on the olf stirrup; and a t D canter it swings about, throwing the right foot forward.

4. It interferes with speedy mounting and dismolinting. In Italy the laiicer has to dismount for foot engagement by stringing liis left leg over to tlie off-side.

The lance renders it almost impossible to carry the carbine slung over tlie slioulder. Tliis mode of carrying the carbine is tlic Iiiost colivenient for disniounted work, a\ it facihtates liiouiiting and dis~nounting. Gerrnaii, Italian, nnd Frcncli troops carry tlie carbines i i i liolstcrs.

ti. I t cntails niore labour, and liinders t h e rapid education of tlic recruit.

* TIi is parcigrcipk iroitltl not irfect the U r i t i d drNI?/.

7.

5.

The Cossaclis carry i t orcr tlic riglit shouldcrs.

The lance is for tlie expert alone.

It betrays tlie positioii of a troop by the glittering poiuts and banderoles (if fised), thus rendering surprise more difficult, and cspos- iiig tlie laiicer liiiiiself to surprise.

At a jump i t must be lifted out of tlic slioc. In thickets, woods, etc., it is i n t he way. The French catch hold of it in sucli country and trail i t along tlie ground.

9. Should n lancer briiig his right hand over to assist his left, lie caiits the lance over liis left shoulder, thus bringing the sharp laricc shoe against the nest horse, whicli is dangerous.

It breaks easily, and is liable to get bent; even in barracks i t must be handled witli somc care.

If the horse of a swordsman comes down and liurts itself, tlie rider may stand ready for action, as he carries sword and carbine on him, and can immediately mount anotlier liorsc. Lancers a t present carry sword and carbine on the saddle. What weapon can lie take if the borse lias fallen on to carbine and sword ? If lie leaves liis lance, what is the use of i t ; and what will lie do, if lie finds another horse, as a Innrer?

12. Tlie shortened lance, when levelled, is &ready sl~own to be cven shorter than the sword carried a t arm’s lengtli, hence no advan- tage for the charge: wlicii in the m5le‘e i t is still more useless than tlic sword.

Tlie long lance is a t a disadvantage in a niGl6e. The Frciicli regulation thus orders lancers to open out. Tliis can only be of advan- tage to the swordsmen, who will in groups of two or tliree attack the single lancer. Thc longer tlic lance, nioreorer, the iiiorc uncertain tlie aim.

14. The lance caii only be lield low do\vn and horizontal, ant1 is subjected to tlie Iiorse’s liead, diereas the sword is lield abovc it.

15. The lance is held in tlic middle. Hencc it projects fa r to tlic rear, and might cause injury to the *rear rank. The hand and arm also are fa r inore esposerl tlian in tlie case of the sword.

At two paces interval between ranks the rear rank must carry lances upright, as in Framice and Italy. Lances will only be levelled on collision with tlie enemy. 111 Austria in 1S46 tlie Ulilans of tlic rear rad i had to take the lalice in the left hand and draw sv;ords.

Tliis en- dangers. the front rank seriously; tlie rear rank, again, is exposed t o the pointed butts of the lances of tlie froiit rank. In Germany in

8. It rciidcrs more difficuIt the passage of obstacles.

It impedes tlie management of the rcins.

10.

11.

13.

16.

I n Germany both ranks cliarge with levelled lances.

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THE LANCE AS THE \VEAPON OF CAVALRY. 43

peace exercises there have been 6G0 accidents (nearly 11 per cent. fatal) since the universal adoption of t he lance. It is clear t ha t i n the rear rank if lances are not levelled they arc useless.

Two or tliree horsemen in the front rank do not level lanccs in rear of troop leaders; probably also not in rear of squadron, regi- ment leaders, etc. We see, tliercfore, tliat i n some Armies the whole of tlie rear rank and soine of tlie front rank do iiot use tlie lalice a t all.

18. After the sliock aiicl in riding down the enemy quickness in turning is of great advantage. Lances will be more in the way tlinn swords.

19. I n dismounted figlitiiig the lance causes all sorts of difficulties.

Quickness of mounting and dismountiiig is impaired, etc. Gerinaiiy every otlier maii holds a lance as well as a horse, and cairies one in either hand, having oiie lance bucket on each stirrup. The Germans have fouiid the French aiid Italian method of fastening the laiice to tlie empty saddle impracticable.

I f tlie horses are tctlicrcd tlie lances are laid down or gatliered into pyramids, wliicli wastes time in rapid movements.

30. On service, patrols will have to seek liigli cover to hide tiiem- selves, when on the move. So obsei-ving patrols may find it better to leave their lances behind; while for scouting i t is always best to liave firearms in hand. x .C.0 . ’~ who have on sucli occasions to m e a map are severely handicapped according to tlic German regulations.

I n swimming streams, crossing marshes-in all places wliere maii aiid horse are separated-the laiice becomes a burdcn. No regula- tion has yet laid down how a man is to swim with a lance about him.

I n case of a surprise of n columii of lancers by swordsinen, tlie lancers, i n wheeling to form front, run grave danger of being injured by their comrades’ lances in tlie confusion.

A t a distance of two paces betweeii ralilis tlicre is already considerable difficulty in levelling lances. Wliat v.*ould be tlie result in columii ? This formation inay be still iiecessary, especially wlierc lancers might find themselves caught in n defile. - 24. I n tlie m816e small bodies of lancers cannot be quickly Iiandled, as tlicy impede each otlier, and a t a rapid pace they endanger their comrades. I n Germany rcserve squadrons are allo~ved to

Why ? In various evolutions a t n quick pace, carrying lances, iiot to

17.

111 !

31.

22.

23.

. brigades, b u t not to regiments. 25.

mention wielding tlicm, becomes a serious matter.

COSCLVSIOXS.

Tlic friends of tlic laiice arc pursuing n pliantom, aiid are deceived by appearances. Tlie laiice can be opposed successfully; Cliarles XII. fouiid out how to deal with tlic lances of his innumerable enemy.

It is largely a matter of ?irrvousncss; oiie inan may feel i t more tliaii another. But lie ~ ~ l i o is iiervous bcforc n lance will be equally so if lie be armed mitli oiic. It is the picture of tliat “ serried rank of steely points” tliat appals-and we can show tliat this iiced not be so. I n Germany every attempt is made to keep tlie rsnks closed as fa r

To meet lancers successfully they must be opposed by troops of equal value. Tlie inferior men will always come off worse. The object in view is to force gaps in the opposing line of lancers for the swordsmexi.

. as possible.

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44 THE LANCE A S THE \YEAPOX OF CAVALRT.

How TO OPPOSE THE LISCE. 1. Increased efficiency in cavalry swordsmanship. The same

importance must be attached to this as is done in Germany to the use of the lance, where the training is extremely serious and pkactical. i n past ages tlie lancers were always highly trained men. The lance is only to be feared in the hands of an expert.

The swordsman must be taught to grip well with tlie lower part of tlie leg, to stretch well forward with the riglit shoulder so as to offer a smaller mark for tlie lance, to keep his eyes open, watch the opposing lance, aiid press it out\vards right or left by holding the sword a little lower than in the act of pointing a t tlie enemy. Tlie

‘sword to be held a little to the right above tlie horse’s neck, tlie blade inclined forwards, edge out. The lance can tlieii be effectually turned aside in delivering tlie thrust. The usual direction of striking the lance upwards is not practicable in shock tactics. This position is also tlie best against swords.

In “Cavalry Service,” p. 365 (Pelet-Narbonne), it is stated that the lancer requires a certain room to use liis weapon to best advantage; -wedged up between tlie eneniy lie is powerless. So close quarters should be tlie aim of the swordsman’s training; it s h o d d Lc instiiled into liiiii as’an article of belief that the inore lie attacks witli v;gour the better liis cliance of success.

Tlie lancers must, on approaching, aiid before deploying, be harassed by carbine and revolver ; small patrols sent boldly forward to fire a t a range a t which they can be sure of doing esecution.

Simultaneously to the frontal attack, flank and rear attacks, even by small dctachments, must be arranged. The niaiii body may, over favourable ground, be witlidrawn, and by a feigned retreat, when tlle flank attacks make themselves felt, meet tlie lances by a suitable manaeuvre.

6 . Before tlie shock, place two bold horsemen to set upon each leader of the opposing charge. These sliould carry revolvers or automatic pistols. These weapons, indeed, would semi to be 1e;s dangerous to one’s own side than tlie long two-pointed lance.

I n France, Italy, and Austria, tlie leading officers fall back in lint witli tlie troop leaders.

7. The laiicers will often betray their approacli by their lances. This is clear gain in preparing to receive them.

8. As niaiiy lancers go into action carrying lances upriglit, in- struction should lie given the sivordsmen to strike a t tlie wrist and arm of the lancer.

Tlie lancers being a t a disadvantage in dismounted actions, every effort must be made to dram tliein into sucli actions, and then, if possible, charge them.

10. A more effective arming of cavalry. Carbines and horse batteries mill keep pace with tlic improvements in tlie armament of the Army.

Experiments are now going on with automatic pistols. The revolver has already proved its value. In France an automatic sword- pistol has been tried. It would be curious if cavalry, which, so far professes to despise the revolver, saw itself forced to accept such a weapon.

3.

‘

3.

4.

5.

In’ Germany and Russia they remain out.

9. .

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’ THE LANCE AS THE WEAPON OF ChVALl<T. 45

KO drill-book mentions two possible cases : - (I.

L. Where a cavalryman a t close quarters is unhorsed. When figlitiiig dismounted lie is attacked by cavalry as such-

111 1864, a t Okolona, tlie niouiited Secessionists, under Forrest, relmlsed t h e e successive cavalry attacks with their carbilles, .having previously dismounted ; a fourth and far more determined attack was defeated entirely by revolver fire. Again, in a like nlanner a t Tislli- mongo Creek, Forrest defeated an infantry attack.

The author here advocates a lighter sword, and comments 1111- favourably on tlie Maxim gun as a cavalry \vea1>01i--rcasons :-

I

u. I ) . Delicacy of meclianism- e . The water jacket.

It docs not scatter its fire sufficiently.

He, however, *praises tlie horsed nlitrailleusc, and suggests sonic improvements for it. He suggests the adoption of four such weapons to a cavalry brignde : it would avoid dismounting for long-range shooting, and allows the men to save ammunition.

I Ie comments on the rcsults obtained by Maxims in South Africa, and declares them to have failed to acliieve what was expected of them.

H e discusses mitrailleuses generally, and illustrates his views with a reference to South Africa.

11. I n the front rank must be placed the heaviest and strongest horses, with the strongest and coolcst riders. The rear rank nien must, however, support their front rank as far as they possibly can in tlie m81e‘e.

After an attack, it should be required from cvciy horseniaii that his sword should be bloodstained, and this should be ascertained >,fore swords arc put away. i\Iany a young soldier might, in thc turmoil of the nGle‘e, forget to use his weapon.

All officers and men riding in front of tlie line must, on the charge, fall in with tlie line, either into blank files for troop leaders, etc., or in tlie spaces betwccn squadrons, etc., for higher officers.

Swordsmen must always attack lancers on rising or sloping ground, in moods, thiclrets, and orchards ; they niust engage them in dcfilcs and envelop then1 a t night, especially when they are in villages ; they must draw them into artillery and infantry fire. Whenever the ground or weather is unfavourable, the lancers should be attacked. Swordsmen are not limited to attacking lancers 011 level ground only. If they do not advance against them when the latter are not in n position .to keep a solid formation with a view to a charge, their (the swordsmen’s) best chance is lost.

Should nothing avail to destroy the fear of tlie lance, should the revolver and automatic pistol be discarded, nothing remains but to arm the swordsmen with the cuirass; the lower half of the body is guarded by the equipment. Should the lance become general it is possible the cuirass may come into use again. When, some years ago, the reintroduction of the lance was contemplated, our War Office (Austrian) was charged with an enquiry into the vqlue of that weapon in mar. It could not be proved in any single case that a success gained by lancers could be attributed exclusively to that weapon. The Prussian Uhlans in 1866, for instance, were niountcd on heavy powerful horses. It was the shock that told.

Briefly.-In early middle agcs the lance is the weapon of offence- then came thick plate armour, and the sword became more important.

.

12.

13.

14.

15.

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46 ‘THE LANCE AS ‘l’l1k; \YEAPOX OF CAVALRY.

On the ’rtdoption of firearms tlic lance and armour disappeared; towards the end of the eighteenth century, the primitive pistols, etc., have driven out the lance and armour. Yet to-day,,in tlie face of incom- parably better firearms, there is a craze for the introduction of i? weapon discarded two centuries ago.

Suitinzing Up.-The successes of Charles XII. were won by tlic splendid qualities of the Swedish cavalry against overwhelming nun,- bers of irregular lancers. These qualities are the secrets of his successes.

111 188Y, when the lance was brought into the German Service, tlie French Recice rlc Cciralerie supported its adoption in France simply on the ground of following others. One must always bear in mind that the cliief argument for the lance is the m o d impression it arouses, and that this is obtained only by the weapons of the front rank, and that its great drawbacks exist chiefly in its adoption by the rear r ink; also that the remaining drawbacks are, to a certain extent, avoided by arming only the front rank with them. But there is no argument for arming only lancer regiments with the lance. It is either all or nothing.

NINOI: DIFFICULTIES.

Difference i n equi lmeir t would entail a difference in use, and con- quently a difference in training. If all regiments are not equally avail- able for the task in hand it must become a source of weakness; i t is not so much a question of numbers, but’of efficiency all round.

The carrying of the carbine over the shoulder is to be preferred. The Cossacks carry the carbine over the right shoulder; tlie sword is fastened to tho saddle, as in Germany, France, Italy, and England.

Thc N.C.O.’s of the front rank ought to be armed with lances; those of the rear rank with carbines. The rear rank if armed with magazines carbines, should in a11 but the most serious situations suffice. Thus there arises the question of how to distribute the men. Is it to be the best riders in front; the best shots in rear?

Then there is the question of material. The Gernian lance of 13 feet 6 inches, of tubular steel is strong and light; but it can easily be damaged, by being trodden on even. This is not easy to avoid if thc lance is laid down. A lance also should alloiv of a swinging blow being dealt without its bending.

XOTEWORTHT OPIKIOSS. Seid l i t : is quoted in conclusion. In the charge it.is a matter of

indifference what weapon the soldier carries. The chief thing is that 7 ~ e sholtld Be well niozrnted; and he should bear in mind the unshake- able resolution to ride down his enemy witli his horse’s breast. I n the mCle‘e the sword and mace are tlie only weapons practicable.”

This riding-down can also be effected in open fighting, especially with well-triined horses and where an enemy can be charged obliquely.

The freedom of movement of the swordsman in the m6lke is not restricted by his Keapon; and this should be used incessantly in sing10 combat against lancers. A passirc attitude leads to tho sw-ordsniaIi’s undoing. The success of the lance is due to poor swordsmanship.

In Russia tho question of tho lance has again been brought for- ward. General Dochturov stated mnny years back, when tlie questioii was first raiscd: “ The arming of the carali-y for the charge is of little

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?HE L . i s c E .is THE ~ ~ ~ i r ~ o s .dr CAV.~LI:T.

value. A badly trained body of poor armed liorsemeii will ‘always be inferior to an unarmed bu t bold and well-mounted enemy.”

Colonel de Witte declares “ that changes, and many of them, may conic about i n tlie arming of cavalry; and we neeci not be at all surprised tha t if the wliolc Russian cavalry werc to adopt the lance, the Germans should discard it immediately.”

Lastly, ‘* Bleibtreu,” iii No. 31 of Drrn:er ’s .Irr,iee Xeifzcriy, writes under tlie title “ The IAaiice as \Veapo~i ” :-

“ The Gardc Clicvaulegers received lahces only after Wagram. Napoleon was doubtless influenced in this direction by the Polisli clement. Their number was small; also the Dutch ‘. red ” lancers and tho troops of the Grand Duchy of Berg had set t he example. Originally Napoleon gave one laiiccr reginieiit td each division of Cuirassiers, to do the scouting. B u t this was not always carried out, as the Polisli regiments seem to have kept together. Nowhere do lancers x c m to have achieved a decisive success. Thrice t h e renowned Polish lancers were routed by tlie Prussiaii cavalry. Once only, a t Waterloo, did they succeed-where a lancer regimeiit broke up Poiisonby’s exha-usted brigade of dragoons, and another Vandeleur’s Hussars. Even then tlie result was clue to a flank attack-as it lias always been when lancers have been successful. Individual instances can be adduced on either side of the question. I f the swordsinen pene- trate tlie linc of lancers. the latter are lost. On the other hand, the lancc has certain advantages-in flank attacks, in shock tactics against a clumsy enemy, while i n the m W e against a determined on- slaught i t is often at ? disadvantage. It is not the \i.cnpon, b u t t!ie quality of t he men and skilful leadership that win the cavalry battle.”

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