the kwazulu/natal indaba: a federalist proposal for south africa

The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba:A Federalist Proposal for South Africa

Edward A. LynchThe National Forum Foundation

In Durban, South Africa, delegates from South Africa's political center proposed a federalsolution to apartheid. Called the KwaZulu/Natal "Indaba, " the plan proposes to merge twohitherto segregated jurisdictions and to bring majority rule to at least one province of SouthAfrica. The system envisioned by the plan includes a bicameral legislature, a consociationalcabinet, proportional representation, minority veto over certain legislation, a segmented represen-tative chamber, and enforcement of a comprehensive Bill of Rights. The "KwaNatal" plan alsocalls for a substantial devolution of power, including the right of the provincial legislature torepeal acts of Parliament that invade areas of provincial competence. This determination toextend local, multiracial autonomy put Natal officials on a collision course with the centralgovernment at Pretoria, which is trying to eliminate the elected provincial governments.

On 3 April 1986, white representatives from the South African provinceof Natal, black representatives from the "homeland" of KwaZulu, anddelegates from thirty-five other racial, business, farming, community, andpolitical groups met in the ornate city hall of Durban. All of South Africa'sracial groups (whites, blacks, Indians, and Coloreds) were represented at themeeting. The representatives opened negotiations aimed at merging theparallel governmental structures of Natal/KwaZulu and creating a single,multiracial entity that would govern all of the inhabitants of that part ofSouth Africa. On 1 December 1986, the delegates presented their consensusproposal to the ruling National Party. Although it was summarily rejectedby Stoffel Botha, a cabinet member and Natal's National Party leader, mostobservers believe that the proposal will remain part of the political debatein South Africa.

If any of South Africa's four provinces is politically and socially ripe formultiracial government, it is Natal. The 600,000 whites who live in this coastalprovince are, for the most part, English-speaking and proud of their reputa-tion for racial tolerance. Natal is also home to 800,000 Indians, the largestconcentration of Asian-descended South Africans in the country. There arealso 90,000 mixed-race Coloreds in the province.

The self-governing "homeland" of KwaZulu is home to five million blacks,mostly of the Zulu ethnic group, of which Chief Minister Mongosuthu Gat-sha Buthelezi is both hereditary monarch and elected chief minister. KwaZulu

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance of National Forum Foun-dation Research Assistant Sandra K. Vanden in the preparation of this article.

Publius: The Journal of Federalism 17 (Summer 1987)231

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article-abstract/17/3/231/1880770by gueston 21 March 2018

232 Publius/Summer 1987

MAP 1KwaZulu Homeland in South Africa

ladhnOcean

KWAZULUHOMELAND

SOURCE: The Washington Post, 29 March 1987, p. A20.

consists of scattered portions of land separated by white farm land, mostof which is used to raise sugar cane. Under the moribund Grand Apartheidplan, KwaZulu was given substantial autonomy by the central governmentat Pretoria. Chief Buthelezi, however, has consistently resisted the "in-dependence" pressed on him by the central government, or even the con-solidation of the KwaZulu territory. Instead, he has concentrated on buildingInkatha, a grass-roots political structure, and seeking peaceful economic andpolitical integration with Natal.

The Durban negotiation, called the "KwaZulu/Natal Indaba," a Zulu wordmeaning serious negotiation, sought regional solutions for two national prob-lems: (1) apartheid, South Africa's system of legalized racial segregation,and (2) the loss of autonomy by the provinces to the central government.Besides instituting multiracial rule in KwaZulu and Natal, or "KwaNatal,"the Indaba was aimed at having the region take over some functions now


KwaZulu/Natal Indaba 233

held by the central government. The negotiators even harbored a more long-term vision of reorganizing South Africa into a federation of autonomousprovinces.1 This determination, in the face of an equally firm commitmentto centralization by the government of South Africa's ruling National Par-ty, makes the existence and progress of the Indaba an important matter forstudents of federalism.

The principles accepted as "points of departure" by the Indaba at its firstmeeting indicated not only the direction the delegates would take, but theamount of work that preceded the actual conference. These principlesincluded:

(i) The Indaba accepts that the KwaZulu/Natal region is a single unit and thatits second tier government should reflect this reality in its political structure,(ii) This Indaba, aware of the economic and strategic interdependence betweenthe KwaZulu/Natal region and the rest of South Africa, and aware of thepatriotism of its people to its fatherland, South Africa, has no desire to besovereignly independent of South Africa.(iii) All people of the region should have the right to full political participationand effective representation.(iv) This Indaba accepts the democratic principles of freedom, equality, justice,the Rule of Law and access to the law. Legislation based on racial discrimina-tion must be abolished.(v) Society in Natal/KwaZulu must be founded upon a free economic systemand the provision of equal opportunities for all people. Provision must alsobe made for the protection of the rights of individuals and groups,(vi) Legislative and administrative power should be devolved as much aspossible.2

In spite of its relatively short life span, and the fact that it has been at-tacked by radicals of both the right and the left, the Indaba made significantprogress toward its goal of a single, multiracial government for KwaNatal.This is all the more remarkable since few decisions were put to a vote. Rather,the Indaba participants sought consensus, a process that would have al-lowed a small minority of delegates to veto key proposals.

Radical black organizations, including the outlawed African National Con-gress (ANC) and the still legal United Democratic Front (UDF), boycottedthe Indaba, although they were invited to participate.3 Radical white groupsincluding the Conservative Party and other organizations dedicated to preserv-ing white rule, also condemned the negotiation.4

'Alistar Sparks, "Idea for Black-White Regional Legislature Stirs Emotions in South Africa,"Washington Post, 11 April 1986, p. A22.

2These basic points of departure were published by the Indaba along with their proposed Billof Rights on 10 July 1986.

3Michael Sullivan, '"KwaNatal Option' may be idea whose time has come in S. Africa,"Washington Times, 3 April 1986, p. 7A.

4"Action White Natal Rejects Natal-KwaZulu Common Administration," Die Afrikaner,30 April 1986, p. 16 [quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Mideast and Africaedition, hereinafter FBIS, 1 July 1986]. Also, Peter Younghusband, "Durban Talks are 'islandof sanity' in troubled S. Africa," Washington Times, 5 August 1986, p. 7A.



The reaction of the central government has been mixed. Originally quitecool to the idea, State President P. W. Botha has warmed to the Indaba con-siderably as increasing violence has forced the government to make a moreserious search for moderate solutions to South Africa's political crisis. Yeteven after very positive signals from the government in the months precedingthe end of the Indaba, the proposal was rejected almost immediately by thelocal National Party leader.

BACKGROUND: THE BUTHELEZI COMMISSION

The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba, like any major political/constitutional develop-ment, did not spring from a vacuum. Much of the theory for multiracialprovincial government came from the Buthelezi Commission, a nongovern-mental body of constitutional scholars, prominent politicians andbusinessmen that met periodically from 1980-1982. The Commission waschartered by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly at the initiative of ChiefMinister Buthelezi. Like the Lombard Commission, sponsored by the SouthAfrican Sugar Association, an essentially white concern, the Buthelezi Com-mission found that KwaZulu and Natal were in fact one geographic unit.Its recommendations, published in 1982, had a federalist orientation, onethat emphasized the region's special needs by calling for a large degree ofregional autonomy.5

The Buthelezi Commission also recognized the importance of protectingminority rights, and its proposal included various mechanisms for doing so.Among these were a consociational cabinet,6 a system of proportionalrepresentation for the legislative assembly, and a minority veto.7 At thesame time, significant political power was to remain in the hands of thevarious regions.8

One of the most striking aspects of the Buthelezi Commission plan is itsrecognition that race must cease to be the sole basis, or even the primarybasis, for group identification in South Africa. The proposed consociationalassembly and cabinet is designed to encourage the creation of multiracialpolitical parties by ensuring that no racial group will automatically receivea dominant majority. This is intended to induce the creation of coalitions,

5The Progressive Federal Party, South Africa's largest white opposition party, also supportsa federal solution for South Africa. See Report of the Constitutional Committee of the Pro-gressive Federal Party and Party Decisions made by the Federal Congress of the P.F.P. at itsfederal Congress held in Durban on 17lh and 18th November, 1978 (Cape Town: Pioneer Press,Ltd., 1978). Their proposals are almost identical to those of the Buthelezi Commission.

6This was suggested by Arend Lijphart, a member of the Buthelezi Commission. See alsoArend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies,Policy Papers in International Affairs, Number 24, University of California, 1985). The majorrecommendations of the Buthelezi Commission are listed in the official magazine of the KwaZulugovernment. See "The Recommendations," Clarion Call, Volume 2 (1985), p. 7.

7Ibid.8"The Major Findings," Clarion Call, Volume 2 (1985), pp. 5-6. See also, Buthelezi,

"Federal and Confederal Futures for South Africa" (Speech before the 265th Wilton Park Con-ference, Sussex, England, 8 May 1984, Mimeo.).



including coalitions across racial lines. The Commission plan also allows forchanges in the structure of both the legislature and the executive to reflectsuch a development. The first multiracial cabinet, for example, may havedesignated portfolios reserved on a racial basis, while subsequent cabinetscould divide power among political parties.9

The writings of South Africa's federalists reflect the hope that combiningthe segregated authorities wiii stimulate the growth and importance ofnonracial associations and groups, and that these groups "will combine andrearrange themselves along the lines of political interests rather than on thebasis of race as an official categorization."10

Political leaders in KwaZulu and Natal followed up the publication of theButhelezi Commission report by talcing concrete steps to join their two ad-ministrations. In November 1984, the KwaZulu/Natal Work Group and theKwaZulu/Natal Strategic Policy Group were formed to address such com-mon matters as health services, education, and roads." The need forcooperation in such matters is one of the main reasons whites have been soagreeable to political integration in KwaZulu. Apartheid requires greatduplication of social services, especially education and health services. Sincewhites pay most of the taxes for this redundancy, they have incentives toseek alternatives.

Informal arrangements, such as the joint working groups, soon led to of-ficial integration at the executive level. In March 1986 negotiations whichestablished a Statutory Joint Executive Authority were concluded. Member-ship on this body is divided equally between the KwaZulu Cabinet and NatalExecutive Committee. Pretoria accepted the arrangement almost immediately.

PROGRESS OF THE INDABA

Within weeks of the completion of negotiations for the Joint ExecutiveAuthority, the Indaba took up the question of joint legislative authority andincreased regional autonomy. With the extreme left and right refusing evento recognize the legitimacy of the effort, the Indaba consisted largely ofmoderates. Some of the organizations represented were the Black AlliedWorkers Union, the Durban City Council, the Islamic Council of Natal, theNatal Agricultural Union, the white opposition New Republic Party and Pro-gressive Federal Party, the South African Sugar Association, the IndianSolidarity Party, and the National Council of Women. Virtually all of thesegroups were represented by their elected leaders or the leaders' designatedrepresentatives.

To understand the structure of the KwaNatal Indaba, it is necessary tounderstand the aims and motivations of the major players, especially the black

'Lawrence Schlemmer, "Constitutional Perspectives," Clarion Call, Volume 1 (1986), p. 42.'""The Recommendations," Clarion Call."William Pascoe, "Indaba We Trust: South Africa's Last Best Hope for Racial Peace,"

Policy Review 39 (Winter 1987): 42-45.



political leaders of KwaZulu and the white provincial authorities in Natal.Both of these groups gave up something of value to make the Indaba a suc-cess. Such compromises normally occur only when political leaders see greatopportunities or great risks.

For Buthelezi and his associates, the danger came from continuously back-ing nonviolent reform while gaining no significant concessions from the cen-tral government. Buthelezi risked becoming a political irrelevancy as the moreradical ANC took credit for the reforms of the Botha government. Todemonstrate that negotiation could lead to concrete results, the KwaZuluauthorities postponed their eventual goal of a unitary state and accepted afederal formula with an enhanced white role in government.

White provincial authorities, for their part, saw political irrelevancythreatened from another direction. Pretoria's determination to centralizeSouth Africa and abolish elected provincial legislatures forced Frank Mar-tin, the leader of the New Republic Party, to make a choice: to surrenderpolitical power to whites in Pretoria or to share political power with the blacksof KwaZulu. The whites chose the latter, and the Indaba was born.

The Bill of Rights

The Indaba's first official publication was a Bill of Rights for the residentsof its eventual jurisdiction. This document showed that the Indaba wouldnot only protect minority rights, but also ignore the laws of apartheid.Based largely on the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution,the bill guarantees equality before the law and the rights to life, liberty,privacy, and property. Repeating the Buthelezi Commission's rejection ofthe Group Areas Act, the Bill of Rights includes the right to "lawfully ownand occupy property anywhere in the Province."12 The rights guaranteed bythe bill would be "constitutionally entrenched and enforceable against . . .all organs of government at the provincial level in Natal"13 and protectedby an independent judiciary.

More significant than the specific protections, or even the method of en-forcement, is the strong emphasis on individual rights, as opposed to "group"rights. Apartheid rests upon the theory that groups derive rights from thecentral government, which then acts to protect those rights. The Indaba'srecognition that the protection of groups depends upon, and starts with, theprotection of individuals is a complete rejection of this notion.

The Proposed KwaNatal Government

The goal of the Indaba is to form a multiracial government having alegislature, executive, and independent judiciary that would govern the com-bined land areas of KwaZulu and Natal. The Indaba addressed the many

12KwaZulu/Natal Indaba BUI of Rights, Article 7.13"Universal Suffrage Envisioned," Johannesburg SAPA in English, 1803 GMT, 28

November 1986 [FBIS, 1 December 1986, p. U7].



FIGURE 1The Indaba Proposal for Power-Sharing in KwaNatal

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

BILL OF

RIGHTSKWAZULU/NATAL

CONSTITUTION

SUPREME

COURTFULL TESTING

POWERS

GOVERNOR

LEGISLATURE

FIRST CHAMBER100 MEMBERSPROPORTIONALLYELECTED15 CONSTITUENCIES

CULTURAL COUNCILS

ECONOMIC ADVISORYCOUNCILS

J-\.

_r\

LOCAL AND TRAD

AUTHORITIES

STANDINGCOMMITTEE(MEMBERSFROMBOTHCHAMBERS

SECOND CHAMBER10 AFRICAN BACKGROUND GROUP10 AFRIKAANS BACKGROUND GROUP10 ASIAN BACKGROUND GROUP10 ENGLISH BACKGROUND GROUP10 SOUTH AFRICAN GROUP

EXECUTIVEPRIME MINISTER + 10 MINISTERS50% FROM MAJORITY PARTY50% FROM MINORITIY PARTIES

LOCAL AND TRAD

AUTHORITIESLOCAL AND TRAD

AUTHORITIESLOCAL AND TRAD

AUTHORITIES

VOTERS 18 YEARS OF AGE, RESIDENT IN NATAL AND KWAZULU

SOURCE: Sunday Tribune (Durban), 30 November 1986.

practical questions of combined government in its proposal of 1 December1986.

The Indaba proposed a provincial legislature that would consist of twohouses and permanent "Standing Committees." The First Chamber of thelegislature (the Indaba proposal does not use the words upper or lowerchamber) would consist of 100 members elected by universal adult suffrage.The combined province of KwaNatal would be divided into fifteen consti-



tuencies, with the number of seats allocated to each district being deter-mined by an electoral commission. Although there would inevitably be dif-ferences in the populations of these districts, the First Chamber is intendedto provide majority rule.14

Following the lead of the Buthelezi Commission, the Indaba proposed thatmembers of the First Chamber be elected through a system of proportionalrepresentation. Sixty-six of the 100 members would be elected from the fif-teen constituencies, with all parties allowed to compete in each district. Theother thirty-four members would be allocated to parties according to thedegree of their electoral support. These provisions are intended to ensurethat there is a direct proportion of seats given to each competing party, re-flecting their electoral strength.

The principal beneficiary of this plan would seem to be the Zulu-basedInkatha party, which is identified with Chief Buthelezi. The party is almostcompletely dominant among the majority Zulus, and could get up to 70 per-cent of the First Chamber seats after a regionwide vote.15 However, ifdistrict representatives were chosen in a "winner-take-all" fashion, the percen-tage of Inkatha members might be closer to ninety, depending on how thedistrict lines were drawn. The decision to elect the First Chamber by propor-tional representation was to allow smaller parties a realistic opportunity forrepresentation.

A proposed Second Chamber would consist of fifty members dividedamong various ethnic groups. English, Afrikaans, Asian, and African"Background Groups" would all be allotted ten seats in the Second Chamber,with the remaining ten seats belonging to a "South African BackgroundGroup" for those who do not wish to vote according to race. All fiftymembers would be chosen by proportional representation of parties withineach ethnic group. One surprising feature of this arrangement is the powerit would give to the Afrikaaner minority. Representing only about 3 percentof the population of Natal, they would be able to elect representatives in-dependently even of other whites.

Two characteristics of the structure of the Second Chamber, however, in-dicate the Indaba's determination to move beyond race in the politics of SouthAfrica. By emphasizing the role of political parties, in a proportional represen-tation system, and by making membership in the unclassified South Africancategory attractive, the Indaba hopes to promote multiracial parties and coali-tions, even though some racial classifications would still exist for purposesof representation. For example, although whites would be given twenty ofthe fifty seats in the Second Chamber, the political divisions between Englishand Afrikaaner-speaking South Africans are so deep, that one could notnecessarily expect collusion between the two blocs. Also, rather than expect-ing the English and Afrikaaners to contentedly cancel each other out, it is

14ibid.15This is based on the 80 percent Zulu majority in KwaNaial and an estimate of Inkatha's

strength in that majority.



more reasonable to assume that each group would try to gain influence withother Second Chamber members. Creating common party affiliations wouldbe one way to accomplish this, a way far easier perhaps for the English,because their reputation for tolerance far exceeds that of the Afrikaaners.

The South African background group could also promote interracialcooperation. With ten seats in a fifty-seat chamber, the South African groupcoum act as the "swing vote in any dispute that might uivide the SeconuChamber. This would all but guarantee that all background groups wouldpersuade their members to register in this South African category so as toincrease their group's representation in the South African group and thusstrengthen their influence among its Second Chamber delegation.

The racially divided, ethnic background groups would therefore have amotivation to promote membership in the one nonracial category that wouldexist in the Second Chamber. At the same time, the South African delega-tion itself would also have a political interest in de-emphasizing race. Itsbargaining power would exist only so long as its ten members voted together.Since the delegation would probably consist of men and women from dif-ferent races, its members would have to find other bases for cooperationor give up the solidarity that would be the key to their political power.

Legislation for the province would have to pass both houses before becom-ing law, with differences between versions of legislation worked out by aStanding Committee whose members would come from both chambers ofthe legislature. The Standing Committee as well as the full chambers wouldhave to pass on legislation. Minorities would be given negative power throughthe provision that any law affecting the linguistic, cultural, or religious rightsof groups be approved by that group's representatives in the SecondChamber.16

The KwaNatal executive would derive its powers from the electedlegislature. The First Chamber members would elect a prime minister forKwaNatal. If Inkatha were able to produce a solid majority in the FirstChamber, which would be likely, the prime minister would be Chief Buthelezi,making him the first South African black elected to a position of politicalauthority over whites.

The prime minister would preside over a cabinet of ten ministers, five ofwhom would be chosen from the prime minister's party, and five chosen byan electoral college consisting of all other parties represented in bothchambers. The Indaba added a consociational element in the provision thateach group in the segmented Second Chamber be represented on thecabinet.17

The executive branch would also consist of several "councils" intendedto assist the prime minister or protect minority rights. Performing the latterfunction would be the "cultural councils," made up of members of differentcultural (or racial) groups. The cultural councils would protect and promote

16David Breier, "Indaba Puts Nats in a Tight Corner," Sunday Tribune, 30 November 1986.17Georgina Stevens, Sunday Tribune, 30 November 1986.



the cultural interests of groups in KwaNatal. They would have the authorityto apply to the provincial Supreme Court for judgment on the validity oflegislation affecting language, religion, and culture.18 Responding to theconcerns of KwaZulu's traditional authorities, who would lose the powerthey have in the existing KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, the Indaba proposalmakes provision for a Council of Chiefs.

While it does provide for majority rule, the Indaba would not create asystem of simple one-person, one-vote democracy, nor does the white minorityseem to have any intention of allowing the black majority to exercise un-bridled power, even in a legislature where blacks would certainly have amajority.

This consensus is the sine qua non of democratic federal rule in SouthAfrica. Whites have agreed to surrender their monopoly in government, andblacks have agreed to accept a white role out of proportion with the whitepopulation. The details of the actual structure should not obscure thesignificance of this historic development.

The Question of Devolution

Whatever the eventual structure of the regional authority, an importantquestion for its designers is how much power KwaNatal would be able towield, especially in a highly centralized state like South Africa. The Pretoriagovernment sent observers to the Indaba, and since any significant changein the structure of Natal's provincial government will have to be approvedby the South African Parliament, the central government's attitude isimportant.

The existing powers of the "self-governing homeland" of KwaZulu arean inevitable starting point for negotiations with the Pretoria government.These powers derive from the moribund "Grand Apartheid" plan, throughwhich the South African government planned to create ten independent black"homelands." Partial implementation of Grand Apartheid has meant a con-siderable degree of autonomy for KwaZulu. Apparently, officials in Pretoriahoped that such autonomy would prompt Buthelezi to accept independence.

The black government of KwaZulu will resist any suggestion that its ef-forts to form a common government with its white neighbors must resultin the loss of some of its autonomy.19 The Natalian authorities, by the sametoken, will likely insist upon the level of autonomy granted to KwaZulu asa minimum. With this in mind, the Indaba proposed that certain functionsbe reserved to the provincial government.

According to an Indaba press release, functions allocated to the provin-cial government would include:

—revenue collection,—school education,

18"Universal Suffrage Envisioned."19Schlemmer, "Constitutional Perspectives," p. 44.



—economic, social, and financial planning,—health services, including social welfare, agriculture, forestry, veterinary and

conservation service, physical and land use planning, including housingschemes and tourism, and

—local government, including tribal authorities.20

These functions would provide the provincial government with wide-ranging powers to determine the educational, economic, and developmentpolicies of KwaNatal. In addition, the Indaba proposed that the provincialgovernment uC given authority over an arrricu "Natai RcgiOfiai rGiCc, aswell as jurisdiction over certain police matters and certain aspects of the ad-ministration of justice.21

Powers reserved for the central government under the Indaba plan wouldinclude:

—foreign affairs, defense, and national intelligence—police and prisons (with the exception noted above)—posts, telecommunications, railways, and harbors—taxes, customs, and excise, and—labor union and arbitration matters.22

In addition, the central government would be allowed to appoint a pro-vincial governor, with the advice of the provincial legislature. Since the powersof the appointed governor would be limited, this provision was seen as a"very small bone" which the Indaba threw to the Pretoria government.23

The Indaba proposal makes clear that the new provincial government woulddesire no interference from Pretoria in those areas entrusted to its competence.The KwaNatal authorities ask for no less than the power to amend or repealany act of the South African Parliament that deals with provincial concerns.After the commencement of the new provincial constitution, no act of Parlia-ment which deals with a provincial matter should apply to KwaNatal. Onlythe new multiracial legislature should have powers to make laws in thosespecific areas.

REACTIONS TO THE INDABA

As November 1986 drew to a close, the Indaba delegates prepared their pro-posal for submission to the central government. The final decision, takenon 1 December 1986, gained the support of the overwhelming majority ofthe thirty-seven delegations, although the Indaba failed to achieve unanimity.

2""Indaba Outlines Scope of KwaZulu/Natal Proposals," Johannesburg SAPA in English,1716 GMT, 28 November 1986 [FBIS, 1 December 1986, p. U6].

2lIbid.22lbid.23"Focus," Sowetan (Johannesburg), 1 December 1986, p. 6 [FBIS, 2 December 1986, p. U9].



South Africa's Political Extremes

Two groups that participated in the Indaba refused to sign the final docu-ment. They were the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings (FAK) andthe Afrikaanse Handelsintituut (AHI), both conservative Afrikaanerorganizations. These parties reported that they were unhappy with the waythe power-sharing issue had been handled. Andres Louw, the AHI represen-tative at the talks, said he thought the Indaba "was terminated before thereal issues had been discussed." He insisted that the result of the Indabawas "a constitution where the jurisdiction of the KwaZulu government hasbeen extended over the whole of Natal."24

Johan Steenkamp, FAK representative, claimed that the voting had beendeliberately rushed to ensure that most of the dissident groups would notbe present. He added that at least five of the organizations present dissentedwith the final report.25

Desmond Clarence, the Indaba chairman, took issue with these claims,both that power-sharing had not been discussed sufficiently and that therewere irregularities in the voting procedure. With regard to power-sharing,Clarence said: "This is the very thing we have been talking about for fivemonths." Suggestions that proposals were rushed through while certaindelegates were not present were "mischievous," according to Clarence.26 Headded that the Indaba had reached consensus on the basic structure of theKwaNatal government three weeks before the final report was issued andthat every delegation "would be given an opportunity to accept or reject theproposals."27 Moreover, some groups delayed signing the final documentpending consultation with their constituencies; their delay did not imply re-jection of the proposal.

To this observer, it is difficult to see how the Afrikaaner participants couldreasonably argue that the Indaba proposal does not provide for power-sharing. As we have seen, each ethnic group, including the Afrikaaners votingas a subset and independently of other whites, was given veto power overmatters affecting its culture, language, and religion. In addition, they weregiven votes in the Second Chamber far in excess of their share of the totalpopulation.

Not surprisingly, the Indaba proposals were also unacceptable to the Con-servative Party (CP), which refused even to take part in the discussions. Theirrejection carried political overtones in the attempt to link the National Par-ty with black rule, a link the Conservative Party often tries to draw in orderto attract votes. The CP did this even after the Natal National Party represen-tative rejected the Indaba. A. P. Treurnicht, the CP leader, also rejected

24Denyse Armour and Shaun Harris, "Now it's over to Heunis," Sunday Times (Johan-nesburg), 30 November 1986.

25Ibid.26"Reasons for Rejection of Indaba 'Untruths'," Johannesburg SAPA, 1215 GMT, 1

December 1986 [FBIS, 2 December 1986, p. U4].27Ibid.



the attempt to present the Indaba to the voters of Natal: "This [referendum]would be yet another ploy to swamp White voters with non-Whitenumbers."25

The Indaba fared no better with groups on the left of the South Africanpolitical spectrum. The African National Congress said through a spokesmanin Lukasa, Zambia, that the Indaba actually extended group feeling by split-ting whites into English and Afrikaaner sections in the Second Chamber.The ANC has stated that it will accept nothing less than a single, nonracialconstitution for the entire country, and is not interested in regionalsolutions.29

The United Democratic Front, considered the legal proxy of the bannedANC, also rejected the devolutionary thrust of the Indaba. LJDF's statedgoal is a unitary state with a nonracial democracy. Azhar Cachalia, UDF'sNational Treasurer, accused the Indaba participants of trying to bypass theANC while it was banned and while its leader, Nelson Mandela, was inprison.30

Like the objections on the right, the points raised by these leftist organiza-tions seem to reveal their political intentions. Virtually any system of regionalautonomy would be anathema to the ANC and UDF, since their goal is amonopoly of power in their own hands after the hoped-for fall of the whitegovernment. It is ingenuous for these groups to argue that they were by-passed. They were invited to the Indaba but chose to stay away. While itmay have been impossible for the banned ANC to participate, the UDF isstill a legal organization in South Africa.

PRETORIA'S REACTION

South Africa's ruling National Party has pledged to do away with apartheid,although the pace of its reforms has satisfied almost no one. Some observershoped that the central government would take advantage of the unique cir-cumstances of Natal, including a more liberal white population and thepresence of Chief Buthelezi, who is trusted by many South African whites,to test multiracial rule.

A South African embassy official in the U.S. indicated that accepting theIndaba proposal would create at least one peaceful area in the country. Inthe wake of increasing violence in South Africa, this could induce the politicalleaders of South Africa's other provinces to seek solutions along similar lines.The embassy official believed that Cape Province was likely to be the nextarea to experiment with joint rule. This belief is supported by evidence ofdissatisfaction with the pace of reform among Cape whites.31

28"Rejection Prompts CP 'Relief'," Johannesburg SAPA, 2028 GMT, 1 December 1986[FBIS, 2 December 1986, p. U4].

29Breier, "Nats in Tight Corner."30Ibid.31Peter Younghusband, "Apartheid Put to Vote," Washington Times, 10 September 1986,

pp. 1A, 10A.



If the provinces of South Africa develop in this fashion, the country couldbecome a federation of provinces, some with multiracial rule and some try-ing to maintain apartheid. The most probable result of this would be a fairlymassive migration of blacks to areas of multiracial rule. The loss of working-class blacks, plus the enormous expense of maintaining apartheid, could erodefurther the will to preserve it. In short, the Indaba pointed to a way for SouthAfrica to use federalism as a peaceful solution to eliminating apartheid, thepurported goal of the ruling party.

It was the demands for greater regional autonomy, however, that put theIndaba on a collision course with Pretoria. The South African government,implementing provisions of the 1983 Constitution, intends to dismantle theprovincial governments. This intention is symbolized by the creation of theRegional Service Councils (RSCs). Rather than a provincial legislature, eachprovince will be governed by a council, which will be responsible to thegovernment in Pretoria and not accountable to the people it governs.32 Thisrepresents a further tightening of central government control over theprovinces.

The attitude of the central government toward the Indaba has been, fromthe beginning, contradictory. Well before the Indaba even convened, StatePresident Botha announced in a widely publicized speech in Natal that SouthAfrica "must find solutions in the devolution of power."33 Yet his govern-ment proceeded apace with the formation of the RSCs.

The Botha regime's recent promise to make the RSCs multiracial indicatesa softening in the central government's position on the racially integrativeaspects of the Indaba, even though whites will remain in a leadership posi-tion on the RSCs. Since these whites will be accountable only to the Pretoriagovernment, however, the move fails to address KwaNatal's determinationto be governed by local officials, and to have those officials elected byresidents of the region.

Similarly, the announcement by Botha in April 1986 that a jointKwaZulu/Natal Executive Authority would be acceptable to the SouthAfrican Cabinet also fails to address regional concerns.34 The joint authorityBotha originally had in mind would link the KwaZulu homeland governmentwith the appointed Natal Regional Service Council. Botha took pains to makeit clear that this decision "had nothing to do with the current Indaba con-cerning a joint legislative body for Natal." This, said Botha, "was a com-pletely different matter and held deep political implications."35

During the summer and fall there were strong indications that Pretoriawould do everything in its power to support the Indaba, while taking carenot to embrace it too obviously, since too close of an identification with

32Sparks, "Regional Legislature Stirs Emotions."33P. W. Botha, Address to the opening of the National Party Natal Congress in Durban,

15 August 1985 (Embassy transcription).34"Joint KwaZulu/Natal administration possible," The Natal Mercury, 19 April 1986 [quoted

in South Africa Digest, 25 April 1986, p . 349].35Ibid.



Pretoria could destroy the Indaba's credibility. The following passage froman Embassy newsletter was typical of the government's new attitude:

[I]n South Africa, blacks and whites working together have just taken anothermajor step toward political power-sharing. . . . It is my hope that such impor-tant work as the KwaNatal Indaba will be recognized as an important initiativefor negotiating democratic power-sharing in South Africa.36

Another recent action by Pretoria also showed promise. Probably as a resultof sustained opposition by Buthelezi and white Natalians, Pretoria has delayedthe establishment of the Regional Services Council for Natal. The delayseemed to represent an admission by Pretoria that the momentum of changein Natal was something the central government did not want to upset.Establishing an RSC for Natal would have seriously undercut the negotiatingposition of Natal's provincial authorities at the Indaba. As of March 1987,the RSC had still not been established, due to lack of cooperation fromKwaZulu authorities.

Pretoria took several dramatic steps in September and October, whichsignaled even stronger support for the Indaba's reforms. First, PresidentBotha appointed a commission to draft a bill of rights for the entire coun-try. A South African source indicated that this bill will draw heavily fromthe Indaba's Bill of Rights.

Second, on 3 September 1986, the Botha government announced thatcriminal enforcement of the Group Areas Act had been stopped and wouldbe made subject to local option. This would allow local communities to decidefor themselves whether they want to continue enforcing the Group AreasAct or even keep it on their statute books.37 The decision removes an im-portant obstacle to implementation of the Indaba Bill of Rights. It also signalssome willingness to devolve power.

In spite of all these positive signs, however, the first government officialto comment on the Indaba proposal rejected the plan outright. Stoffel Botha,the leader of the National Party in Natal and a member of the South AfricanCabinet, said that "although the proposals attempted to accommodateminority rights, the end result would be a one-man, one-vote system."38

Stoffel Botha dismissed as inadequate the mechanisms to protect thecultural rights of groups, saying that effective power-sharing would also haveto be included for the Indaba proposal to gain government approval. Ac-cording to the Indaba's plan, he said, "it was clear a majority party wouldeffectively exercise sole power in the legislative and executive authority, as

36"A Letter from South Africa" [official publication of the Embassy of South Africa inWashington, D.C.], No. 9, 1 September 1986.

37Dominique Gilbert, "Government halts Group Areas Prosecutions," Business Day (Johan-nesburg), 3 September 1986, p. 1. See also Pretoria News, 3 September 1986 and Younghus-band, "Apartheid Put to Vote."

38"Stoffel Botha Rejects Proposals," Johannesburg SAPA in English, 1955 GMT, 30November 1986 [FBIS, 1 December 1986, p. U6].



was the case in a typical Westminster system."39

Botha's comparison with Westminster democracy is easily refuted becausethe Westminster model makes no provision for minority veto, a consocia-tional cabinet, or even effective bicameralism. Perhaps more important thanhis apparent lack of understanding of the Indaba proposals was the alacritywith which he responded to the Indaba proposal. Oscar Dhlomo, Ministerof Education of KwaZulu, concluded that Stoffel Botha made his announce-ment before he studied the proposal,40 and some observers questionedwhether Botha spoke for the government or only in some personalcapacity.41

The nearly complete similarity between Stoffel Botha's objections to theIndaba and those of the two participating Afrikaaner groups caused someSouth African observers to raise questions about the relationship betweenthe National Party, the FAK, and the AHI. The Natal leader of the liberalwhite Progressive Federal Party accused the two groups of allowingthemselves to be used by the National Party to wreck the Indaba.42

Although Stoffel Botha refuted this allegation, it would explain why he re-jected the proposal so swiftly.

The official with the most influence over the prospects for the Indaba isConstitutional Development and Planning Minister Chris Heunis. His in-itial reaction to news reports of the Indaba plan was to avoid commentaltogether, saying he had not seen or had time to study the proposals. Thiswas an odd statement from someone who in July had said that the Cabinet"fully endorsed the KwaNatal Indaba as it could be a constitutional modelfor the rest of South Africa,"43 and whose government had observer statusat the Indaba. Asked about this seeming contradiction, Heunis said he hadreceived no reports from his observers.44 His silence, plus reports that hehad been saying privately that there was "not a hope in hell that the [In-daba] delegates would agree," indicates that the fact that there was any pro-posal at all came as an unpleasant surprise.45

These confusing signals are probably the result of disagreements insidethe National Party leadership and of the difficult balancing act PresidentBotha has performed since 1978. Botha wishes to portray his National Partyas a reformist party, but one that will not abandon South Africa's whitesto black domination. Maintaining this position, in the face of liberal opposi-tion from the Progressive Federal Party and rightist opposition from the Con-servative Party, has led Botha to send mixed signals on important issues.A relevant example is Botha's similarly hasty rejection of the Buthelezi Com-

39ibid.^''Indaba Rejection Regretted," Johannesburg SAPA, 1019 GMT, 1 December 1986 [FBIS,

2 December 1986, pp. U4-U5].•""Reasons for Rejection of Indaba 'Untruths'."42Armour and Harris, "Over to Heunis."43"Rejection Prompts CP Relief."•"Breier, "Nats in Tight Corner."45Stevens, Sunday Tribune.



mission report in 1982, followed later by his acceptance of some of itsproposals.

Whether or not Stoffel Botha voiced the official reaction of the Pretoriagovernment, the Indaba proposal is not something the central governmentcan afford to ignore. The Botha government's position on devolution is notonly contradictory, but also logically and politically untenable. It is illogicalfor the Pretoria government to put pressure on black communities to acceptindependence, by creating nominally independent "homelands," whiletightening its control over white provincial affairs.

Politically, the Botha regime can ill afford to close off one of the last re-maining hopeful avenues of peaceful reform. Many observers in South Africacompared the success of the Indaba negotiation with the utter failure of thePretoria government to even convene its National Council to discuss con-stitutional changes on the national level. Even after Stoffel Botha's rejec-tion of the Indaba, Natal and KwaZulu officials voiced their determinationto hold a referendum on the proposal. Plans to develop a common votersroll also proceeded.46

Moreover, enthusiasm for the Indaba was not limited to Natal. Rumorscirculated in Cape Town in early fall that the mayor had removed the of-ficial portrait of P. W. Botha from city hall. Shortly afterward, the Capeprovincial government declared that it would no longer enforce the GroupAreas Act. This was well in advance of the central government's announce-ment to the same effect. Even a Cape representative of the Labour Party,whose platform stipulates a unitary state system, returned from the Indaba"very impressed" and anxious to "start a Western Cape Indaba along thesame lines." He added: "The crucial point is that the [provinces] should gettogether themselves—as in Natal—and not have their boundaries and com-position forced upon them by central Government."47

It seems clear that political leaders in at least two of South Africa's fourprovinces are unhappy with National Party plans to centralize power evenfurther. If liberal opposition parties make the Indaba an election issue, theNational Party could be forced to write off large segments of the popula-tion, seriously damaging its electoral prospects.

As we have seen, black radicals also oppose the federalist plan, and it isthey who stand to benefit from its failure. If Stoffel Botha's veto of the In-daba is sustained, the result among blacks could be disastrous. Relations be-tween the South African government and Buthelezi, while better than thosebetween the government and more radical black leaders, have never beenclose and have recently undergone severe strains. The Zulus, under Buthelezi'sleadership, are the least radicalized of the major black groups in South Africa.He has staked a great deal of his prestige and credibility on the Indaba.48

The loss of prestige by Buthelezi could lead thousands of blacks, even

4677ie Sunday Star (Johannesburg), 7 December 1986, pp. 1-2, "Review" section.47"Indaba thoughts move south," The Daily News (Durban), 30 May 1986.48"A Zulu Red Herring," The Economist, 1 February 1986, p. 38.



among his own people, to conclude that any peaceful progress is impossibleand that violent confrontation is inevitable. This would especially benefitthe ANC, which tries to portray Buthelezi as a lackey of the white govern-ment and a failure at attaining meaningful political change.49

CONCLUSION

It is not surprising that the Indaba drew heavily from the work of the ButheleziCommission, which is also considered a product of South Africa's politicalcenter. The Indaba proposal was a compromise, so no one who came to theconference was completely satisfied. Individual elements of the proposal areintended to respond to the specific political needs of different groups. Thewhole is a complex fabric of compromises—a requirement, perhaps, for asuccessful constitutional proposal in such a highly charged politicalenvironment.

As we have seen, political leaders from both KwaZulu and Natal have muchto lose if the political contest in South Africa becomes polarized. Their abilityto work together stems directly from their distrust of the Botha governmentand the ANC, both of which they see as rapacious in their quest for power.The next great task for Buthelezi, Martin, and the other Indaba participantsis to convince hard-liners from all races that they too have something to loseif concrete solutions are not part of the discussion of South Africa's future.

The architects of the plan intend to make the Indaba a byword for con-crete, moderate solutions to the problem of apartheid. As 1987 progresses,the fate of the Indaba will become an important barometer of the prospectsfor peaceful change in South Africa.

49ibid.


the kwazulu/natal indaba: a federalist proposal for south africa

Documents