Journal Title: The Tibet journal.

Vol. 14, Is. 1

MonthNear: 1989

Article Title: Broido, Michael; The Jo-nang-pas on Madhyamaka; A sketch

The Jo-nang-Pas on Madhyamaka: A Sketch

Michael Broido

We summarize the views of .Dol-po Shes-rab rGyal�mtshan (S) on Madhyamaka according to his Ri-chos Nges-don rGya-mtsho (R). References are given for straightforward points, but details and scholarly apparatus are omitted.

1. Shes-rab rGyal-mtshan as a Madhyamika

S refrains from advancing ontological views of a substantialist kind and so is surely a Madhyamika. On garbha theory he is not an

ontologist, a point on which. he has been widely misrepresented (s� below). He is not a Cittamillrin, arguing convincingly (lOSa-I09a) that many "Yogacara" works go beyond Cittamatra. He uses the three svabMvas epistemically, meaning three nil}svabhavatas (97a4, l03b2; Sandhin.irmocana ch 7), and stresses the origin of this doctrine in the PrajMparamita literature, reconciling it with orthodox Madhyamaka by relating the nil}svabhavatas to the two satyas. He is an aprati�fhitaVl[din (cf Maitrtpa), and is not a mayavadin. Madhyamaka negation is non· committing (med·dgag) on sarpvrti but committing (ma-yin-dgag) on paramartha. This is not established by argument; S is not a svatantrika.

2. Nitartha and neyartha sutras (87a-89b)

The second turning is common (thun-mong) darSana, 84b6, and neyartha. R deals not with samatha, maitrt, equality of self and others and the utpattikrama &c, but with distinctions relevant to the vajrayana, 86a2. The third turning is mainly on the ultimate content (don mthar· thug) of the Great Middle (dbu-ma chen-po) and of the/vajrayana (not with cittamatra), 89a6. On this view mKhas-grub�rje's claim that the third turning sUtras are inconsistent is w rong, and his argument that they cannot be nnartha collapses.

3. Rang-stong and gzhan-stong

The correlations of rang-stonglgzhan-stong with vijnana/jfiana

TIlE JONANG-PAS ON MADHYAMAKA: A SKETCH in

and with the three svah�vas (97a ff.) are explicitly epistemic. These senses of "sunyatn" re based on the MPS (94al-95a3) and differ epistemically (97a3). In S's usage a siddham(grub-mthn) is a fixed philosophical position based on axioms and seules of argument; a darsana (lta-ba) is a point of view in a broad nse .. including what derives directly from experience. As in thMahnparinirvnJ;lasUtra (MPS), he" calls his darsana "The Great Mdle" (dbu-ma chen-po), and intends it to be connected with expeence and to be contrasted with dbu -ma (Madhyamaka) as a .ddhanta. "gZhan-stong" can stand for this darsana: the way thinB are taken by one who sees them as they really

. are (don-darn-par, gnaSugs-su). Rang-stong for S, though a siddhanta, is part of gzhan-stong, ot opposed to it: it is the way Parikalpita and paratantra are to be takn, namely as both absent (in parini�panna), or in Madhyarnaka terms the total nonexistence (abh�vasunyata, 95a3, b6, 96al) o f sa1'J1vri. Thus rang-stong is stronger than m ere svabha:vasUnyam (abseJce of parikalpita). Opposition between the two

, terms appears only whn we take "gzhan-stong" as a description of parini�panna, which is nt rang-stong (115a4). This oscillation between two different (if c()rrelaed) uses of the terms by S is responsible for a lot of later confusions.

The MPS calls gzhan-stong mi-stong-pa'i stong-pa (R 94a4), illustrating it by the ab�nce of horse in a cow (95al); but literally, S says, this is not even kun-rdzob stong;;nyid (101ab). Rather, gzhan­stong is the stong-gzhi (21bl, 35bl, 96ab &c), abha:vasvabha:vasunyam (95a-96a), remaining when all philosophical views are abandoned and all emotions purified: sarva:ka:ravaropetaSunyata:, radiant light, parama:rtha-satya, unchanging tathata:, epistemically present in gnas­lugs: not the changing dhannas. It "really exists" (yang-dag-tu yod-pa, 97ab) as as31'J1skrta (96b4, 98a4), but this only means it does not come into or go out of existence (98a3) and is beyond the catu�ko!i (155a-156b); so when speaking of gzhan-stong S uses a three-valued logic (cf phung-po gsum-pa, 155b l, IS6ab). Thus to call it an Absolute [H86] or to call the d octrine an ontology [S63] is inconsistent with S's explanations (and w ith the general drift of his thinking on Madhyarnaka); the doctrine is epistemic. gZhan-stong experience is not a blank or sameness (samahita-jf\ana has no status). It is vital to vajraya:na (86a, 95a, 116a, 112b).

S often correlates the soterjological duality of visuddhacitta and a:gantukaldesa with the epistemic duality of gzhan-stong and rang­stong ( 1 90a6). The purity of citta again has two aspects: prakrtivisuddhacitta in sentient beings and vaimalyavisuddhacitta in Buddhas. Stress on prakrtivisuddhacitta fits in well with gzhan-stong, a

. sudden (cig-car) approach to insight (Kong--sprul) and a non-causal analysis. of goal-attainment, whereas stress on vaimalyavisuddhacitta fits in more naturally with rang-stong and a gradual (rim-gyis)

88 THE TIBET JOURNAL

approach to insight governed by a causal analysis (as by Tsong-kha-pa). Ontological dualisms do not illumine these distinctions ..

4. The two satyas

mana is paramartha-satya, parini�panna and gzhan-stong. S

recognizes (190b5) Candrakirti's contrast of sarpvrti-satya/samyak· sarpvrti with sarpvrti-matra/mithya-sarpvrti (MMV VI.25: cf W79). Paratantra is sarpv[ti-satya while parikalpita is mere sarpv[ti-matra; but both are vijfl.ana, rang-stong, and to be rejected (97b &c). This sharp

rejection of paratantra and sarpvrti-satya and with them the changing dharmas, in contrast with acceptance of tathata and of the unchanging Buddha-qualities as paramartha-satya, is the most characteristic doctrinal feature of R. If the dharmakaya were rang-stong, it would be totally non-existent� as the Jainas held (94al ). Perhaps this is trivial; but equally the same skandhas. dhatus and ayatanas normally said to be paratantra have an asa1J'lSkrta. parini�panna and gzhan-stong aspect

(96b3). S's vocabulary sometimes seems to harbour a confusion between different ways of knowing and differences in what is known, but this impression cannot survive any careful examination of his use of ontological terms. Here, for instance, he is entirely free of the absurd ontological view that there are two separate sets of skandhas &c (one real and one imaginary, as it were). Parini�panna does not have an identical or different nature or essence from parikalpita and paratantra (ngo-bo gcig [dang] tha-dad ma-yin, 98a3).

Rejecting sarpv[ti-satya, unlike Padma dKar-po [B85], S has no room for satyadvayayuganaddha. Hookham [H86, 1.30] says that here

different use of techinical terms conceals similarity of doctrine; but the two authors views of sarpvrti-satya are too similar for this to be plausible. S accepts grias-lugs phyag-chen (97b6, 122a1), but as Padma dKar-po notes (P 84b-91a; B85, p.29), he rejects sarpvrti-satya and 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen (cf. dri-ma'i gnas-lugs, R 101a1). Thus within yuganaddha, S rejects cognitions with a normal linguistic component (without attachment or wrong views, of course); Padma dKar-po accepts them. This is a great improvement, permitting an intelligible account of the apparent effectiveness of pratityasamutpannasamskrta· dhannas in the world of sarpsara. The doctrinal difference e�erges again in their rather different notions of sarvakaravaropetasunyata: for S the akaravara are only the unchanging gshis-qualities. while for Padma dKar-pa they include the changing gdangs-qualities [ef B85

p.lO and fn.lOaJ. Modem gZhan-stong-pas follow Padma dKar-po on this matter, not S: see 7(a).

TIlE JONANG·PAS ON MADHYAMAKA: A SKETCH 89

s. The status of gar'lha theory

S devotes a great deal of attention to clearing u p misunderstandings in this area. The garbha i s not a n atman, being bdag-gnyis-kyis stong-pa, but it exists (pre-anlytically), as in the Lailkavatara, the MPS and the tantras (33b2-34b6, 36a3, 37a3, 38b5, 39b3, 42a-44b, 49t2-5). The point of the celebrated claim that "the garbha really exists' (don-dam-du yod-pa, sec. 3) is that is survives the rejection of emotionlism and wrong views and so is found at the level of experience devol of non-existent essences (abhava-svabhavaSUnya), viz the gzhan-ston( level. This is a very simple claim, yet is badly dist o r t e d in the lGe-Iugs accounts used in [ S 63]. Hookham interestingly points out that garbha theory in R is simpler than in treatments which take the sUtras less literally and introduce artificial distinctions in the garbha as ground, path and goal. [H86, 2045]. This simplicity gives it a certain undeniable impressiveness. Garbha theory figures mainly in ch. l of R; it is not essential to gzhan-stong which only enters in ch.2.

6. Sges-rab rGyal-mtshan and modern gZhan-stong-pas: some differences

(a) Modem �han-stong-pas weaken S's radical rejection of paratantra las sarpvrti-satya: (see (5». This allows the use of the two satyas to develop a theory of satyadvayayuganaddha, which was impossible for S, and leads to a description of the vajrayana which stays closer to the sources, as well as giving sllJ!lvrti-satya an intelligible role.

(b) They speak of gzhan-stong as a siddhiinta (grub-mtha), while S reserves this description for rang-stong. So they are confused in a way S was not (sec. 3) on whether the rang-stonglgzhan­stong contrast is one of siddhanta or darSana (for S it was the constrast between siddhanta and darSana).

(c) They speak of rang-stong-pas, people who hold the rang-. stong view. S did not, since for him rang-stong is a siddhanta,

which he accepts himself, as far as it goes; it cannot apply to absolutely everything (e.g. dhanna-kaya, secA). So it can be uncertain or arbitary who is to count as a rang-stong-pa or what is to count as a rang-stong-pa interpretation of some doctrine. Given the further confusion (b), the rang-stong­pal gzhan-slong-pa contrast, as used by modem gZhan-stong­pas (see [KK151b ff], [TN 72b ff)and by their Western interpreters (cf [H86]), is a source of serious confusions, frequently issuing 'in the ridiculous claim that the contrast is one between reason and faith. This misrepresents both parties.

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(d) In the tantras they c ombine (a-c) i n a theory o f satyadvayayuganaddha. Kong-sprul defines rang-stonglgzhan­stong in the tantras thus: "rang-stong holds that the object is common with the hetuyIDla, the subject being special to the

mantras, while gzhan-stong holds that the object too is special, as sarvakaravaropeta" [KKI53b5, my translation; cf. H86

1.12, based on K44b). Note Kong-sprul's typical confusion of epistemology with ontology. It is unclear why the first view is rang-stong (compare S's own oscillation in the use of "rang­stong"). The second view is similar to Padma dKar-po's (in P), yet is historically anomalous, making him a gzhan-stong-pa when in fact he opposed Shes-rab rGyal-mtshan in this very area [B85). These modifications of Shes-rab rGyal-mtshan's views thus

help to make them seem more similar to traditional bKa'-brgyud doctrines, but (in some cases) at heavy cost in clarity, coherence, and doctrinal interest.

References

K, KK: Shes-bya kun-khyab by Kong-sprul (K: Lokesh Chandra ed. vol. hum; KK: mKhyen-brtse bLa-brang ed. vol.-ml)

M: dBu-ma-Ia-'jug-pa'i mam-bshad dpal Dus-gsum-mkhyen-pa'i zhal-Iung Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje (1508-54)

P: Phyag-rgya chen-po man-ngag-gi bshad-sbyar rgyal-ba'i gan­mdzod by Padma dKar-po (1527-92)

R: Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho by Dol-po Shes-rab rGyal­mtshan (1292-1361)

TN: bsTan-pa'i mam-bzhag by 'Jigs-bral Ye-shes rDo-rje (1905-1987)

S63: David Seyfort Ruegg: "The Jo-nang-pas: a School of Buddhist Ontologists according to the grub-mtha sel-gyi me-long", JOAS vol. 83, pp.73-91

B85: Michael Broido, "Padma dKar-po on the Two Satyas", JIABS vol.8 no.2

H86: Susan Hookham, "Tathagatagarbha Doctrine according to the

gZhan-stong interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhaga", Oxford Ph.D. thesis, 1986

W79: Paul Williams, "Tsong-kha-pa on kun-rdzob bden-pa", in the

Proceedings of the 1979 Oxford Conference in Tibetan Studies (ed. Aris & Kyi)

CONTRIBUTORS

Paul Williams (D.Phil, Oxford) is Lecturer in Indo-Tibetan Studies at the University of Bristol. He is the author of many articles and reviews, mainly o n Madhyamaka Buddhism, and one book, Mahay a n a Buddhism: T h e Doctrinal Foundations, (Routledge, 1989). He is currently European Secretary of the International Association of Buddhist Studies.

Jeffrey Hopkins i!Director of the Center. for South Asian Studies, and Ass o c i ate P rofeso r of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Studies i n the Department of Relgious Studies at the University of Virginia. He has established sixten books mainly on various aspect of Tibetan Buddhism.

Donald S. Lopez, Jr (PhD, University of Virginia, ,1982) is Professor of Religion at Middlebury College. He is the author of A Study of Svatantrika (Snow Lion), The Heart Sutra Explained: Indian and Tibeta n Comm entaries (SUNY Press), and editor of Buddhist Henneneutics (University of Hawaii Press).

Tom J.F. Tillemans is at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland, where h e w o rks primarily on Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka and Epistemology.

Michael Broido (phD. and M.A. from Cambridge) has worked on the Madhyamika and Vajrayana thought of India and Tibet since 1973. He has ,been a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford since 1967, and taught mathematics there for many years. Currently he is Senior Research

Fellow in Linguistics there.