A R V I N D S H A R M A

T H E I S S U E O F M E M O R Y AS A P R A M A N A A N D

ITS I M P L I C A T I O N F O R T H E C O N F I R M A T I O N O F

R E I N C A R N A T I O N IN H I N D U I S M

The most obvious evidence for rebirth would seem to be an appeal to the actual ability to recall past lives, both empirically and spiritually. Empirically it would consist of an examination of spon- taneous memories of a past life among children? Spiritually it would consist in the development of the faculty to do so through yoga. 2 This latter view is confirmed by the following statement of Swami Vivekananda contained in his paper on Hinduism delivered on 19th September, 1893 at Chicago.

We cannot deny that bodies acquire certain tendencies from heredity, but those tendencies only mean the physical configuration, through which a peculiar mind alone can act in a peculiar way. There are other tendencies peculiar to a soul caused by its past actions. A n d a soul with a certain tendency would by the laws of affinity take birth in a body which is the fittest instrument for the display of that tendency. This is in accord with science, for science wants to explain everything by habit, and habit is got through repetitions. So repetitions are necessary to explain the natural habits of a new-born soul. A n d since they were not obtained in this present life, they must have come down from past lives.

There is another suggestion. Taking all these for granted, how is it that I do not remember anything of my past life? This can be easily explained. I am now speaking English. It is not my mother tongue, in fact no words of my mother tongue are now present in my consciousness; but let me try to bring them up, and they rush in. That shows that consciousness is only the surface of the mental ocean, and within its depths are stored up all our experiences. Try and struggle, they would come up and you would be conscious even of your past life.

This is direct and demonstrative evidence. Verification is the perfect proof of a theory, and here is the challenge thrown to the world by the Rishis. We have discovered the secret by which the very depths of the ocean of memory can be stirred up - - try it and you would get a complete reminiscence of your past life. 3

Journal o f lndian Philosophy 24: 21-36, 1996. © 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

22 ARVIND SHARMA

This passage also contains a reference to habitual tendencies as evidence of rebirth in the first paragraph, but the stress is subse- quently laid on the recovery of memory. It has not been realized that in doing so Swami Vivekananda reversed the relative role assigned to these two factors in tradition, something which Mahatma Gandhi does not follow him in doing. For Gandhi the habitual tendencies still carried the main weight of evidence, as is apparent from the following autobiographical observation regarding the night following the wedding: "And oh! that first night. Two innocent children all unwittingly hurled themselves into the ocean of life. My brother's wife had thoroughly coached me about my behaviour on the first night. I do not know who had coached my wife. I have never asked her about it, nor am I inclined to do so now. The reader may be sure that we were too nervous to face each other. We were certainly too shy. How was I to talk to her, and what was I to say? The coaching could not carry me far. But no coaching is really necessary in such matters. The impressions of the former birth are potent enough to make all coaching superfluous. We gradually began to know each other, and to speak freely together. We were the same age. But I took no time in assuming the authority of a husband. ''4

If one examines the matter closely one realizes that the emphasis on memory of past life as evidence of it emerges relatively late as an argument in Hinduism (in contrast with Buddhism) 5 and never acquires much weight in traditional Hinduism, despite its eviden- tiary obviousness as evidence of rebirth. It is true that ~mandagiri (thirteenth century), while commenting on gaflkara's commentary on Bhagavadgitfi XV.15, glosses the words smrti and jhdna as follows: "Memory of what was experienced in the past births and knowledge of things transcending the ordinary limits of space, time, and visible nature, ''6 when Krsna claims that: 'From me are memory, knowledge as well as their loss' (mattah. sm.rtir j~dnamapohanam. ca). However, although memory of past births is alluded to, it is not alluded to as evidence of rebirth. One comes very close to such a statement in Bhagavadgitfi IV.5 when Aljuna, baffled by K1.sna's claim that he taught yoga to VivasvS_n, who precedes him by several generations, is told by Krsna: 'Both you and I, Arjuna, have spent many lives; I know them all but you don't.' However, here again this statement is not used by Saflkara to establish the fact of

T H E ISSUE OF M E M O R Y 23

reb i r th bu t G o d ' s p u r e na tu re and u n o b s t r u c t e d knowledge . T h e r e are thus m a n y close calls bu t they are on ly that - - close calls. T h e same is t rue even of Yoga, as u n d e r s t o o d by Albirfini, w h o even t hough he regards me t empsychos i s as the "sh ibbole th" of H i n d u i s m ] ra re ly al ludes to men ta l m e m o r y as ev idence of it, as dis t inguished f r o m the spiri tual m e m o r y of the soul, in the fol lowing passage which he cites f r o m the b o o k of Patafijali:

The pupil asks: "If a man commits something which necessitates a retribution for him in a different shape from that in which he has committed the thing, and if between both stages there is a great interval of time and the matter is forgotten, what then?"

The master answers: "It is the nature of action to adhere to the spirit, for action is its product, whilst the body is only an instrument for it. Forgetting does not apply to spiritual matters, for they lie outside of time, with the nature of which the notions of long and short duration are necessarily connected. Action, by adhering to the spirit, frames its nature and character into a condition similar to that one into which the soul will enter on its next migra- tion. The soul in its purity knows this, thinks of it, and does not forget it; but the light of the soul is covered by the turbid nature of the body as long as it is connected with the body. Then the soul is like a man who remembers a thing which he once knew, but then forgot in consequence of insanity or an illness or some intoxication which overpowered his mind. Do you not observe that little children are in high spirits when people wish them to a long life, and are sorry when people imprecate upon them a speedy death? And what would the one thing or the other signify to them, if they had not tasted the sweetness of life and experienced the bitterness of death in former generations through which they had been migrating to undergo the due course of retribution? ''s

T o w a r d s the end o f the passage the a rgumen t shifts to habi tual expe r i ences as ev idence of rebir th , as dis t inguished f r o m an individual 's specific exper iences , a po in t and a d is t inct ion which is des t ined to be consequen t i a l fo r this paper .

T h e s e r emarks m a y be p laced in thei r p r o p e r pe r spec t ive by drawing a t ten t ion to the we l l -known p a r a d o x that the w id esp read a c c e p t a n c e the be l ie f in reb i r th within the t rad i t ion coexists with ha rd ly any a t t e mp t to justify it. 9 T h e r emarks m a d e ear l ier d e e p e n this pa radox . N o t on ly are on ly a few a t tempts m a d e to justify the belief, such effor ts as are m a d e paradoxica l ly avoid the mos t obv ious p r o o f - - tha t f r o m m e m o r y ! T h e s e two p a r ad o x es p r o v i d e the ra t iona le fo r the th ree fo ld p u r p o s e of this paper : to examine ev idence within the t rad i t ion w h e r e implicit just i f icat ion of re incar- na t ion m a y be present ; to examine similar ev idence of explicit

24 ARVIND SHARMA

rational justification and finally to offer some rational reason why such rational evidence is so limited in nature.

II

It is a curious fact that the rational explanation of reincarnation is implicit where we would expect it to be explicit and explicit where we would expect it to be implicit - - at least in the context of the two sources I am going to treat next: Advaita Vedfinta and Ayur- veda. Advaita VedS.nta deals with issues of reincarnation and liberation from reincarnation in a major way. We would, therefore, expect an explicit t reatment of the theme therein. Contrary to our expectation, the treatment is implicit. In the case of Ayurveda, which deals with health and longevity in this life, one would expect the t reatment to be implicit. It is explicit.

III

In keeping with my professional bias let me first examine such rational explanations of reincarnation as might be forthcoming f rom within Advaita Vedfinta. Our task has been facilitated by Eliot Deutsch who has already under t aken such an examination in the context of karma 1° and it is clear that in the Hindu context karma and reincarnation constitute logical corollaries. 11 M. Hiri- yanna has gone so far as to assert: "The fact of moral conscious- ness, as students of Western philosophy know, is, according to Kant, the guarantee of personal immortality. In a similar way, the law of karma is here our assurance of the truth of transmigration. ''12

One must now turn to the epistemology of Advaita Vedfinta to examine whether reincarnation can be demonstrably established. Advaita Vedfinta accepts six pramdn, as or "means of valid knowl- edge," namely, (1) perception (pratyaksa); (2) inference (anumdna); (3) comparison (upamdna); (4) testimony (~abda); (5) postulation (arthdpatti) and (6) non-cognition (anupalabdhi). It is clear that reincarnation cannot be established by perception. The fact that someone is born is available to immediate sense perception but not the fact that someone is reborn. The same is true of inference as "Induction, and hence ultimately inference, for Advaita, depends on perception ''13 and it has just been demonstra ted that reincarnation

T H E I S S U E O F M E M O R Y 25

cannot be established on the basis of perception. Comparison as a valid means of knowledge involves a case "where X is an object immediately perceived and Y is an object previously perceived and now brought to consciousness in the form of memory. ''14 But we have already seen how perception cannot be brought in relation to reincarnation. Non-cognition involves absence of perception and implies absence of that which is not perceived -- so its tenor goes not for but against reincarnation. This brings us to the well-known point that formally in Advaita the validity of reincarnation is established through postulation or arth@atti on the following argument: Acts produce appropriate results and if we find that an action does not produce appropriate result in this life we must postulate that it does so in another incarnation. However, even this argument really offers a case for pos tmor tem survival and not reincarnation per se, although reincarnation is a form of postmor- tem survival. In fact this argument is used in Pfirvamimfirhsfi 1~ to establish that the performer of a sacrifice will survive death and reap the reward in heaven -- and strictly speaking, not to establish that the person will be reincarnated in our usual sense. Moreover , the inequalities the reincarnation hypothesis tries to explain may be accounted for in other ways such as God's will, for example. 16

The final means of valid knowledge left to explore is the Veda and one would expect this to be the Advaific t rump card. However, Advaita Vedfinta's own concept of revelation reduces the trump- card to a joker - - in the sense that Veda is authoritative only in matters of dharma and moksa which are considered supersensible, while reincarnation belongs to the 'sensible' empirical realm! Such revelatory self-castration deprives it of all potency in this matter.

Hence it can be argued that it is not possible to rationally, that is, epistemologically, establish reincarnation as logically demonstr- able in Advaita Vedfinta through its own categories.

IV

One must now turn to Ayurveda to examine its case for reincarna- tion. The Eleventh Chapter of Caraka-Safiahitfi 15 (of uncertain date) ~8 states that there are four methods of sifting truth from falsehood: (1) words of sages; (2) perception; (3) inference and (4) reasoning. The text then proceeds explicitly to establish reincarna-

26 A R V I N D S H A R M A

t ion o n the basis of all the fou r tests. By the w o r d s of the sages the text m e a n s the V e d a s and then goes o n to state:

Scriptural testimony is based on the Vedas or other scriptural material in agreement with the Vedas which is enunciated by the experts, approved by gentlemen and initiated with a view to bringing about happiness to the man- kind. The scriptural testimony, as a source of knowledge, is derived from the words of authorities. It has been stated that donation, penance, sacred rituals, truthfulness, non-violence and brahmacarya are supposed to provide heaven and to help in liberation. (This establishes the theory of continuation of soul after death and thus of rebirth). 19

I t a lso appea l s d i rec t ly to the specia l p o w e r s of the sages:

The theory of rebirth has been enunciated after careful observation by ancient sages endowed with divine faculty. These sages were devoted to the path of virtue; they were devoid of fear, attachment, hatred, greed, confusion and vanity; they were in tune with the Almightly; they were reliable par excellence and were conversant with the principles of 'Karman' or action; their mental and intellectual faculties were never tarnished. So one should not doubt this theory? °

T h e d i f fe rence b e t w e e n the Adva i t i c and the A y u r v e d i c pos i t i on is obvious . T h e ro le of r eve l a t ion or o f the sages in rece iv ing it is no t as c i r c u m s c r i b e d h e r e as in A d v a i t a Vedfinta . I t c an appea l to s u p e r n a t u r a l p e r c e p t i o n in s u p p o r t of re incarna t ion .

P e r c e p t i o n is a p p e a l e d to nex t as p r o o f of rebir th:

Even the observation establishes the theory of rebirth. For example: birth of children dissimilar to their parents; parentage and other factors being the same, difference in complexion, voice, shape, mind, intellect and fate; birth in high and low family; slavery and sovereignty; happy and miserable life; difference in the span of life; enjoyment of results without the corresponding action in this fife; manifestation of actions like crying, suckling breast, laughing fear, etc., even without training (found in new born) appearance of marks in the body indicating good or bad fortunes; action being the same, difference in its results, intuitive interest in certain types of work in some persons and not in others; preservation of memory in some persons of previous life; appearance of persons being the same, their amicability or otherwise. 21

In f e r ences in f a v o u r o f the doc t r i ne a re also offered:

Inference is applied as follows -- the action performed in the previous life which is unavoidable, eternal and having continuity is known as fate. Its results

THE ISSUE OF MEMORY 27

are enjoyable in this life. Action performed in this life will bring about its results in its future fife. The seed is from the fruit and fruit from the seed. 22

Finally, reason in general is appealed to:

Reasoning also supports this view. The embryo is formed out of the combina- tion of the six dhdtus. Actions are manifested by the combination of the agent (kartr) and the instrument (karana); the results come out of the action performed. There can be no germination without a seed. The result is always corresponding to the action. A seed cannot bring out heterogenous products. This is reasoning. 2s

The conclusion is then reached that "so all the four means of knowledge establish the theory of rebirth." Significantly the word used here is pramdn, a or a valid means of knowledge whereas initially the word used was pariks..d or mode of examination.

v

Clearly something is seriously amiss here. A philosophical system such as Advai ta Vedfmta has a problem in philosophically estab- lishing the fact of reincarnation, despite what some may be inclined to regard as a fairly impressive epistemological apparatus, through any of the six pramdnas admitted in it. On the other hand, a medical system represented by the Caraka-Sarhhitgt is prepared to establish the fact of reincarnation through all of the four epistemo- logical categories it admits, one of which incidentally, yukti, is not accorded the status of an independent pramdna in Advaita while another - - the Vedas, are unders tood more formally as a pramdna.

In the context of reincarnation then one faces a situation of indetermination in the context of Advaita Vedfinta and overdeter- mination in the context of Ayurveda. In fact the arguments a d d u c e d in Ayurveda may be plausible but would scarcely amount to proof. The situation induces a measure of introspection: Have I been looking at the wrong place? After all, in Advaita, ontology takes preference over epistemology and in Ayurveda therapeutics takes precedence over epistemological propedeutics. Should one not turn to the school of Ny~ya in Hindu thought, since its "distin- guishing feature is its belief in the utility of analysis and in the reliability of reason? ''24 If one adopts such a course, one has no

28 ARVIND S H A R M A

re a son to j u m p with glee, bu t one is no t d i sappo in t ed either. T h e Nyfiyasfi tra def ines t ransmigra t ion (I .1.19) bu t as it is visual ized as occur r ing in re la t ion to the soul ( IV. I .10) a rguments fo r t rans- migra t ion are o f fe red in the con tex t of the p roofs of the exis tence o f a soul. as T h e y are p r e s e n t e d in detail in Nyfiyasfi tra I I I . 1 .19 - -27 and have b e e n conven ien t ly summar i zed as follows:

One of the arguments in support of transmigration, commonly met with in Indian philosophical literature, starts from the fact that all men are born with certain predilections, and deduces from this that, since they are not traceable to the present life, they necessarily point back to the experiences of another but forgotten existence as their source. And, as the same argument can be extended to that existence (and also to every other preceding existence), it is concluded that there must have been in the case of every one a series of lives, which has had no beginning in time. The readiness to suck the mother's milk, found in a new-born babe, is the example usually given to illustrate this argument. As another example, we may mention man's innate fear of death, which is explained as a sign of the many sufferings undergone on occasions of former death. Some of these congenital dispositions may perhaps be explained as purely physiological, but not all. The infant's sucking of the mother's milk, for instance, cannot be so explained in view of the fact, pointed out by ancient Indian writers, that it involves a psychological factor, viz., the exercise of will (s), in however rudimentary a form. Nor can it be ascribed, it seems, to heredity, for that principle leaves unexplained why a particular child should be born in a particular family. If the connection between the two is not to be a matter of sheer accident, it can be explained only by assuming a certain affinity between them and, in the very act of doing so, admitting the pre-existence of the self. 26

It is obvious that these a rguments are of the na tu re of in fe rence and by no means i rrefutable. H o w e v e r , what is cur ious abou t them, and to which I wou ld like to d raw y o u r a t tent ion, is the fact that they all re la te to what we might call samskdra or vdsand or menta l impress ions in genera l r a the r t han specifically to m e m o r y as such of p rev ious lives. W h a t wou ld cons t i tu te a s t ronger p r o o f than the claim to actual m e m o r y of past lives? A n d yet, so far, it has no t b e e n invoked in Adva i t a Vedf in ta and Nyfiya at all, and only in passing in Ayurveda . T o pu t the ma t t e r succinctly: " E v e r y deed we do leads to a doub l e result. It no t only p r o d u c e s what m a y be t e r m e d its d i rec t resul t (phala) - - the pa in or p leasure fol lowing f r o m it accord ing to the d e e d done; it also establishes in us a t e n d e n c y (samskdra) to r epea t the same deed in the future . ''27 W h a t is r e ma rkab l e in the p resen t con tex t is the fact that it is

THE ISSUE OF MEMORY 29

human samskdras as a species which have been appealed to rather than as individual beings as such and the phala aspect -- the specific deed and its result -- a link which could be provided by memory, is overlooked. This is particularly significant in view of the fact that the followers of Nyfiya accuse the Buddhists of being unable to account properly for memory because of the Buddhist doctrine of anatta! 28

VI

It is quite obvious f rom the above that whereas the various argu- ments adduced may direct our mind in the direction of considering the idea of reincarnation in a plausible or even favourable light, none of them can amount to proof. It is remarkable that both in the implicit and explicit discussions in favour of reincarnation the one fact which could perhaps amount to proof, namely, the actual m e m o r y o f pas t life, is virtually not alluded to. This is a most remarkable omission. How is it to be accounted for?

What makes the plot even more intriguing is the fact that the Hindu tradition of rdjayoga actually claims that such retrieval of memory is possible (Yogasfitra III.18) and a recently discovered commentary on the Yogasfitra attributed to ~aflkara states:

From direct perception of the samskdra-s, knowledge of previous lives. The samskdra-s referred to here are the samskdra-groups called vdsand, both observable and unobservable, caused by memory and taints. The observable have begun to evolve the experience of the ripening of taints and karma as mental dharma-s caused by righteousness and unrighteousness: the unobserv- able are mental dharma-s which have been laid down in previous existences, performed in an absolutely endless chain of births, as change, activity, inhibition, power, life, and righteousness, as explained before (under Ilia 5). Samyama made on these two kinds of say0. sk~ra-s has the power to give direct perception of the samskdra-s.

And because they go into operation associated with place, time, cause, and experience, when they are directly perceived it must also be in association with the particular place and so on. Therefore They can never be perceived apart from the place, time, cause, and experience. So it is with those associations that the yogin attains knowledge of previous births from direct perception of samskdra-s.

This kind of samyama can be applied to other living beings also: from the samyama on such samsk~ra-s of those whose births he wishes to know, the knowledge of their previous births comes to him. 29

30 ARVIND SHARMA

What is of immense interest here is the fact that the knowledge of previous lives is not claimed to come to us directly through memory, the way the knowledge of what happened yesterday or the day before comes to us directly through memory in normal life. It is derived through the vdsands and samskdras. It is remarkable, specially in contrast with Buddhism, that even when such memory is revived according to the stitra, such indirectly revived memory of past lives is not produced as evidence of reincarnation, 3° even if that claim itself may be open to objections f rom a modern standpoint. 31

v i i

What is the explanation of this enigma that in Advaita Vedfinta and Nyfiya memory of previous lives is not directly appealed to as evidence of incarnation, indeed not even in Sfifikhya-Yoga and barely in Ayurveda? The answer seems to lie in a curious aspect of Hindu thought - - The memory is not accorded the status of a valid means of independent knowledge. As it is not accepted as a pramdna it cannot be adduced as proof. Why, one would not wish to know, is it not accepted as a pramdna ? In much of Hindu thought one distinguishes between useful means of knowing and independent means of knowing. The whole debate around verbal testimony in Hinduism turns on this point: "Of the numerous facts which a man needs to know, it is only a small fraction that he can learn of himself; and for the rest he has to depend entirely upon the testimony of others which comes to him through their words - - whether spoken or written, it does not matter. The value of testi- mony as a means of communicating information to others or of enriching our own experience may therefore be admitted readily. But it may be questioned whether so much is sufficient to consti- tute it into an independent pramdna. The dispute is thus solely about the logical status of verbal testimony, and not about its usefulness. ''32 In this case verbal testimony won the battle and was admitted as a pramgm, a. However, this was a battle which memory lost. In Hindu thought the view gained ground that "knowledge, to be valid, should not only correspond to the given object . . . but should also contain an element of novelty. That is to say, it must be in the nature of a discovery, and signify an addition to our knowl- edge - - a point to whose bearing on the teaching of the Veda we

THE ISSUE OF MEMORY 31

have already referred more than once. The result of so defining truth is to exclude from the category of pramd all knowledge pointing to what has been known before, including memory which presupposes former experience. This does not, however, mean that such knowledge is not serviceable or that its object is false, but only that the doctrine attaches no particular epistemological significance to it. ''33 Memory lost its claim to be a pramdn, a because it did not generate prarnd when "pramd is defined as a piece of valid knowledge or experience." And this "validity or truth consists of its presentational character," whereas memory possesses a representational character. 34 Whether memory was a pramdn, a or not was argued at some length, especially in the Nyfiya-Vai~esika school, 35 as well as in Vedfinta, though with less gusto. One factor, however, adds to the present intrigue. Nyfiya insists on both anadhigatva and abddhitatva as the criteria of pramd much more vigorously than Advaita VedS.nta, whose primary concern is abddhitatva. It has even been suggested that Advaitins are some- what indifferent in the matter, 36 which should make them less hostile to memory. After all, 'recognition' plays such a crucial role in Advalta. True recognition is different from memory, but close enough to it to have to be differentiated from it! Nevertheless Advaita also does not allow memory as a pramdna. 37 It is a form of true knowledge but not a true form of knowledge! One aspect of Advaitic thought might have contributed to its disregard for memory ontologically, although epistemologically it is more casual than Nyfiya on the question of anadhigatava. In Advaitic ontology ignorance (avidyd) is regarded as homogeneous (vide gafikara's commentary on Brahmasfitra ILl.36). If loss of memory is construed as a state of ignorance, then Advaita would be less predisposed to take the lack of specific recall of details of the memory of a specific past life into account and would not differentiate it from the more general condition of loss of memory. This could be an additional reason for lack of interest in specific past life recall in Advaita, in addition to the epistemological point regarding the status of memory.

In general, however, in this epistemological inadmissibility of memory perhaps lies the reason why memory of previous lives is not generally cited as evidence of reincarnation within Hinduism. (It is almost like certain aspects of person's past life not being

32 ARVIND S H A R M A

admiss ible as ev idence in a cou r t of law in cer ta in kinds of cases.) H i n d u ep i s t emology p r e v e n t e d what we would t end to regard as the mos t obvious p r o o f of r e inca rna t ion f r o m being o f fe red as such because of the way it defines what knowle d g e is and h o w it ma y be acquired . This po in t regard ing the admissibi l i ty of m e m o r y as a pramdna has b e e n a subject of m u c h deba t e in H i n d u ph i lo sophy bu t o n c e the emphas is c a m e to be laid on the p resen ta t iona l (and novel ) cha rac t e r o f knowledge , m e m o r y came to be a c c e p t e d as a f o r m ra the r than a means of knowledge , and h e n c e cou ld no t be used to establish re incarna t ion . H i n d u ph i lo sophy and H i n d u rel igion somet imes , just somet imes , m a k e s t range bedfel lows.

N O T E S

1 See Ian Stevenson, Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation (second edition) (Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1974), etc. 2 Yogas~tra II.39. Note, however, that according to the s~tra such memory as such does not constitute proof of rebirth, only its content. 3 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda (Mayavati Memorial edition) (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1970) Vol. I, pp. 8--9. 4 M.K. Gandhi, The Story of My Experiments with Truth (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1948) p. 21, emphasis added. This may be contrasted with the tremendous impression the feat of memory performed by Raychand- bhai made on him (ibid., p. 112). What seems to have been stated by Mahatma Gandhi in passing is a matter of much philosophical discourse within the tradition, as noted by Karl H. Potter (Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies [Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977] Vol. 2, pp. 172-- 173): "In connection with the proof that an individual's self or soul is eternal, Gantama provides some arguments for its pre-existence. (1) 'Because the new- born infant experiences joy, fear, and sorrow -- which could follow only from the continuity of remembrance of what has been repeatedly gone through before (the self existed before),' 011.1.18) (2) '(The self must be regarded as eternal) because of the desire for milk from the mother's breast, which is evinced (on birth) after death, and which can only be due to repeated feeding (in the past).' (111.1.21) Commentators on this passage add further variations. Uddyotakara argues that the same self is child and man, because of its smile, and Vficaspati points out that the child's fear of falling can only be explained on the hypothesis that it has fallen before and remembers it.

Now the obvious answer to these arguments is that the phenomena alluded to -- reactions of joy and fear, of attraction to the mother's breast -- are natural, that is to say, they are events occurring in the body and needing no appeal to an agency inside to explain them. Gautama considers this answer. For example, he has an opponent say that reactions of joy and fear are like the

T H E ISSUE OF M E M O R Y 33

opening and closing of a flower, and his answer is to the effect that the opponent is eventually unable to say what these motions of the flower are due to, and ~ have to assent to the principle that motions are caused by conscious agents. This principle provides the basis also for the main Nygya argument for God's existence, as we shall see.

Again, an opponent argues that the attraction of the child to its mother's breast is like the attraction of iron to a magnet, and needs no conscious agency. Gautama's answer is too short to be completely intelligible, and the commentators labor to interpret it. Vfitsyfiyana's interpretation is this: iron, alone among metals, is attracted by magnetism. As there is a special factor among the causal conditions of the phenomenon of magnetism which limits the kinds of metals which are attracted by magnets, so there is a special factor among the causal conditions of the phenomenon of breast-feeding which limits the kinds of objects which are attracted to the breast. Now what is the special factor in each of these cases? Vfitsyfiyana has no opinion to offer about the explanation of magnetism, but as for the child's response to the breast he says that the special factor here is the memory on the child's part of this sort of experience in the past, and that this hypothesis is 'entrenched' in our actual experience that desire for food proceeds from our memory of past experinces." 5 Arvind Sharma, "Attitudes Towards Past Lives in Theravfida Buddhism and Advaita VedS_nta," in N. K. Wagle and F. Watanabe, eds., Studies in Buddhism: in Honour of Professor A. K. Warder (University of Toronto: Centre for Asian Studies, 1993)pp. 145--148. 6 See Alladi Mahadeva Sastry, tr., The Bhagavadgita with the Commentary of Sri Sankaracharya (Madras: Samata Books, 1985) p. 409. 7 Ainslie T. Embree, ed., Alberuni's India (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1971) Vol. I, p. 50. 8 Ibid., pp. 55--56. 9 M. Hiriyanna, Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1952) p. 43; but also see Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, ed., Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) p. xxi. 10 Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Veddnta: A Philosophical Reconstruction (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1969) Chapter 5. 11 T. M. P. Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism (Bombay: Chetana Limited, 1971) p. 61. 12 M. Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1949) p. 47. 13 Eliot Deutsch, op. cit., p. 72, note 9. 14 Ibid., p. 70. 15 M. Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, p. 142. 16 Eliot Deutsch, ot). cir., p. 74. i7 Ram Karan Sharma and Vaidya Bhagwan Dash, eds., Caraka Samhitd (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1976) Vol. I, p. 210. 18 Ibid., p. 215. 19 Ibid.

34 A R V I N D S H A R M A

20 Ibid., p. 216 .

21 Ibid., p. 218, emphasis added. 22 Ibid., p. 218 .

23 Ibid. 24 M. Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, p. 84. 25 B. D. Basu, ed., The Nydya Stitras of Gautama (Allahabad: Panini House, 1913) pp. 68--69 . 26 M. t-Iiriyanna, Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy, p. 45. 27 M. Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, p. 49. 28 B. N. Singh, Indian Logic (Varanasi: Asha Prakashan, 1986) p. 17, note 1. 29 Trevor Leggett, tr., The Complete Commentary by ~qatikara on the Yoga S(ttra-s: A Full Translation of the Newly Discovered Text (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1990) p. 327. 3o Eliot Deutsch, op. cit., p. 71, note 8: "It is of course true that the rdja- yogins claim that 'by bringing the residual tendencies (samskdras) into con- sciousness ]through concentration] (samyama) the knowledge of previous lives (ptirva-jdti) is obtained' (Yoga S(ttra, lII, 18); nevertheless, t heAdva i t i n does not use this claim as a support for karma, and even if he did, he would be faced with the difficulty, similar to that of 'parapsychology' in general, of establishing new empirical laws of nature on the basis of the 'extrasensory' perceptual experience of a privileged few. Until such time as a direct appre- hension of previous life-states is obtained in such a way that it can serve as confirming data for karma, karma must clearly be held to be undemonstrated. And it must also be held to be undemonstrable so far as the ability to obtain this data would seem to require a different kind of person - - biologically, physically - - that the man we know today. When one asserts empirical indemonstrability, it is unders tood that one is concerned with man as he now is, and not with man as he may conceivably evolve." Deutsch's last point has been anticipated and answered by M. Hiriyanna as follows: "A clear awareness of the persistence of the self through them all [i.e. various lives] would no doubt transform our life profoundly; but forgetfulness in this respect does not disprove the c o n t i n u i t y . . . " (Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy, p. 43). 31 From a modern standpoint the issue has been addressed by John H. Hick. He identifies three factors through which personal identity over time may be established: (1) through the physical body; (2) through memory and (3) through mental dispositions. In a case of reincarnation the first criterion naturally does not apply. The enormous problems created in the absence of the second factor, which shifts the burden of proof on the third, are identified by him as follows (Philosophy of Religion, Fourth Edition, [Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990] pp. 134--135): "Thus, all that is left to be the bearer of personal identity is the third strand, which is the psychological continuity of a pattern of mental dispositions. It is this that now has to carry all the weight of the identity of two persons, one of whom is said to be a reincarnation of the other. For the only connection left, wlien memory and bodily continuity are excluded, lies in the psychological dispositions that constitute one's personal character. It is claimed that B, who is A reincarnated, has the same personality traits as A. If A

T H E I S S U E O F M E M O R Y 35

was proud and intolerant, B will be proud and intolerant. If A becomes in the course of her life a great artist, B will start life with a strong artistic propensity. If A was kind and thoughtful, B will be kind and thoughtful. But much now depends, for the viability of the theory, upon the degree of similarity that is claimed to exist between the total personalities of A at t I and B at tL Many people are kind and thoughtful, or have artistic temperaments, or are proud and intolerant, but as long as they are distinct bodily beings with different and distinct streams of consciousness and memory, the fact that two individuals exhibit a common character trait, or even a number of such traits, does not lead us to identify them as the same person. In the case of people living at the same time, to do so would be a direct violation of the concept of "same person." In the case of people who are not alive at the same time such an identification is not ruled out with the same a priori logical definitiveness; but it is nevertheless beset with the most formidable difficulties. For the similarity between A (t 1) and B (t 2) must, in most cases, be so general as to be capable of numerous different exemplifications, since A and B may be of different races and sexes, and products of different civilizations, climates, and historical epochs. There can be general similarities of character, found in such qualities as selfishness and unselfishness, introverted or extroverted types of personality, artistic or practical bents, and in level of intelligence, between, let us say, a male Tibetan peasant of the twelfth century B.C.E. and a female American college graduate of the twentieth century C.E. However, such general similaritieies would never by themselves lead or entitle us to identify the two as the same person. Indeed, to make an identity claim on these gornnds - - on a case in which there is neither bodily continuity nor any link of memory -- would commit us to the principle that all individuals who are not alive at the same time and who exhibit rather similar personality patterns are to be regarded as the same person. But in that case there would be far too many people who qualify under this criterion as being the same person. How many people of Lugdi's generation were as much like Shanti Devi in general character as Lugdi was? Probably many hundreds of thousands. How many people in the last generation before I was born had character traits similar to those that I have? Probably many hundreds of thousands. On this basis alone, then, it would never have occurred to anyone that Lugdi and Shanti Devi were the same person, or that I am the same person as any one particular individual who rived in the past. On this basis I could equally well be a reincarnation of afiy one of many thousands of people in each past generation. Thus, this criterion of character similarity is far too broad and permissive; if it establishes anything, it establishes much too much and becomes self-defeating.

Thus the idea of reincarnation in the sense of the transmigration of the self without memory of its previous lives from death in one body to birth in another is beset by conceptual difficulties." 32 M. Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, p. 43. 33 Ibid., p. 143. 34 B. N. Singh, op., cir., p. 17. 3s Karl H. Potter, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 172--174.

36 A R V I N D S H A R M A

36 D. M. Datta, Six Ways of Knowing: A Critical Study of the Vedanta Theory of Knowledge (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1960) Introduction. 37 Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Study of Indian Philosophy (London: Rider & Company, 1960) p. 213 read with T. M. P. Mahadevan, op. cit., p. 144.

Faculty o f Religious Studies, McGill University, Montreal Canada