the interstate child uccjea & uifsa · 7/30/2017  · child. act. a-2 status vs personal...

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The Interstate Child UCCJEA & UIFSA Barry J. Brooks Assistant Attorney General Child Support Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas P. O. Box 12027, Mail Code 590 Austin, TX 78711-2027 [512] 433-4678 FAX [512] 433-4679 [email protected] 7/30/17

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Page 1: The Interstate Child UCCJEA & UIFSA · 7/30/2017  · child. act. A-2 Status vs Personal Jurisdiction The most fundamental difference between the UCCJEA and the UIFSA is the approach

The Interstate Child

UCCJEA & UIFSA

Barry J. BrooksAssistant Attorney General

Child Support DivisionOffice of the Attorney General of Texas

P. O. Box 12027, Mail Code 590Austin, TX 78711-2027

[512] 433-4678FAX [512] 433-4679

[email protected]

7/30/17

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Table of Contents

PageBackground.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Part A - Basic Concepts

A-1 Subject Matter Jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

A-2 Status vs. Personal Jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

A-3 ECJ/CEJ.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Part B - The Process

B-1 Courts, Tribunals and Private Attorneys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

B-2 Information Provided to the Tribunal.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

B-3 Choice of Law/Service of Process.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

B-4 Evidence Discovery, and Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

B-5 Communication Between Tribunals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

B-6 Immunity.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

B-7 Emergency and Simultaneous Proceedings /“Clean Hands”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

B-8 Inconvenient or Inappropriate Forum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

B-9 Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Part C - Going Interstate

C-1 Registration.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

C-2 Assuming Modification Jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

C-3 Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

C-4 Agency Involvement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Part D - Unique Provisions

D-1 UCCJEA - Expedited Processing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

D-2 UCCJEA - Temporary Visitation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

D-3 UIFSA - Multiple Orders.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

D-4 UIFSA - Minor as a Party.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

D-5 UIFSA - Defense of Nonparentage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Part E - Interjurisdictional applications

E-1 Tribes.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

E-2 International.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

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The Interstate Child

(As used in this paper, “family” means one child, at least, and the parents of that child,regardless of the marital status of the parents.)

Background Historically, family law is a matter of state rather than federal law. However, for variousreasons, people travel more. As a result, family law has to take on an interstate, andinternational component. The Uniform Law Commission (ULC) is tasked with drafting laws onvarious subjects that attempt to bring a uniformity across state lines.

With respect to family law, different states had adopted different approaches to issues relatedto custody and visitation, a.k.a. “parenting time”, that often resulted in conflicting resolutions. To seek harmony in this area, the ULC has promulgated the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdictionand Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).

Likewise, it also promulgated the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) to governissues related to family support. In doing so, the UIFSA was specifically written to stop theexisting practice of creating multiple valid orders with differing support amounts that could beentered as an obligor moved around the country.

While each Act deals with a different family related issue, they share very common features. Often, there are virtually identical provisions although the placement within the act; although, within a certain section, it may vary.

UIFSA UCCJEA

• is the successor to the UniformReciprocal Enforcement of Support Act(URESA) & the the Revised UniformReciprocal Enforcement of Support Act(RURESA) which had been adopted bydifferent states with differing versions

• was originally “mandated “ for adoptionby all states under the provisions of thefederal Personal Responsibility and WorkOpportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996

• all states* must have enacted the versionpromulgated in 2008

• is in harmony with the federal Full Faithand Credit for Child Support Orders Act(FFCCSOA), 28 U.S.C.A.1738B

• is the successor to the Uniform ChildCustody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)

• is not mandated for adoption

• 45 states have adopted the UCCJEA withthe others having some version of theUCCJA

• is in harmony with the federal Full Faithand Credit Given to Child CustodyDeterminations more commonly known asthe Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act(PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. 1738A

* the “states” subject to the mandate are all 50 States plus the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands

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The UCCJEA was approved by the then NCCUSL, now ULC, in 1997 and has beenunchanged. The UIFSA has been more of a “work in progress”. Originally approved in 1992, itunderwent revisions in 1996 primarily to accommodate the needs expressed by employersregarding the new ability to seek implementation of income withholding across state lines. TheUIFSA was also revised in 2001 and 2008 with the main focus on the processing ofinternational cases. The excerpts used in this paper are from the UIFSA 2008.

Part A - Basic Concepts

A-1 Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Both the UCCJEA and the UIFSA make clear exactly what aspects of the family dynamic aregoverned by which act. They do so using both inclusive and exclusive language. The mostimportant feature of both acts is the specific exclusion of the subject matter covered by theother act. The UCCJEA also deliberately omits adoption proceedings and there are severalInterstate Compacts that cover this issue.

One shared element that each act must deal with is the issue of parentage. Parentage mayarise in the context of either getting a custody order or obtaining a support order. Whileparentage issues under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) are beyond the scope of this paper,the UPA is drafted to work in harmony with both the UCCJEA and the UIFSA.

While the primary focus of the UIFSA is upon child support, it is also the legal mechanismthrough which spousal support can be established, modified, and enforced.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 102. DEFINITIONS. In this [Act]:(3) “Child-custody determination” means ajudgment, decree, or other order of a courtproviding for the legal custody, physical custody,or visitation with respect to a child. The termincludes a permanent, temporary, initial, andmodification order. The term does not include anorder relating to child support or other monetaryobligation of an individual.(4) “Child-custody proceeding” means aproceeding in which legal custody, physicalcustody, or visitation with respect to a child is anissue. The term includes a proceeding fordivorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency,guardianship, paternity, termination of parentalrights, and protection from domestic violence, inwhich the issue may appear. The term does notinclude a proceeding involving juveniledelinquency, contractual emancipation, orenforcement under [Article] 3.

SECTION 103. PROCEEDINGSGOVERNED BY OTHER LAW.This [Act] does not govern an adoptionproceeding or a proceeding pertaining to theauthorization of emergency medical care for a

SECTION 102. DEFINITIONS. In this act:(28) “Support order” means a judgment, decree,order, decision, or directive, whether temporary,final, or subject to modification, issued in a stateor foreign country for the benefit of a child, aspouse, or a former spouse, which provides formonetary support, health care, arrearages,retroactive support, or reimbursement for financialassistance provided to an individual obligee inplace of child support. The term may includerelated costs and fees, interest, incomewithholding, automatic adjustment, reasonableattorney’s fees, and other relief.

SECTION 104. REMEDIES CUMULATIVE.(a) Remedies provided by this act are cumulativeand do not affect the availability of remediesunder other law or the recognition of a foreignsupport order on the basis of comity.(b) This act does not:

(1) provide the exclusive method ofestablishing or enforcing a support orderunder the law of this state; or (2) grant a tribunal of this state jurisdiction torender judgment or issue an order relating to childcustody or visitation in a proceeding under this

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child. act.

A-2 Status vs Personal Jurisdiction

The most fundamental difference between the UCCJEA and the UIFSA is the approach to the“other” jurisdiction needed. In addition to the requisite subject matter jurisdiction, the UCCJEArequires a court have “status” jurisdiction vis-a-vis the child. This status jurisdiction is based onthe location of the child and the significant connection the child has with the forum state. Theultimate determining factor is the “home state” of the child. The historical basis for the homestate approach is that a state has an interest in the protection and use of “property” located inthat state. While a state is empowered to make a custody determination without havingpersonal jurisdiction over every individual, the UCCJEA recognizes that a binding effect canonly be imposed on those who have been served or notified.

To impose a financial obligation upon an individual, the U. S. Constitution requires the forum tohave “personal” jurisdiction over the obligor. However, the requirement for personal jurisdictiondoes not mean the obligor has to be currently residing in the forum state. The inquiry iswhether the individual has taken some purposeful act which would create a reasonableexpectation that the forum would have a justiciable interest in the action or the result of theaction. In promulgating the UIFSA, the ULC set forth several bases that are intended toencompass all conduct that is legally sufficient for personal jurisdiction.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 102. DEFINITIONS. In this [Act]:(7) “Home State” means the State in which achild lived with a parent or a person acting as aparent for at least six consecutive monthsimmediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding. In the case of a child lessthan six months of age, the term means the Statein which the child lived from birth with any of thepersons mentioned. A period of temporaryabsence of any of the mentioned persons is partof the period.

SECTION 201. INITIAL CHILD-CUSTODYJURISDICTION.(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 204,a court of this State has jurisdiction to make aninitial child-custody determination only if: (1) this State is the home State of the child onthe date of the commencement of the proceeding,or was the home State of the child within sixmonths before the commencement of theproceeding and the child is absent from this Statebut a parent or person acting as a parentcontinues to live in this State; (2) a court of another State does not havejurisdiction under paragraph (1), or a court of thehome State of the child has declined to exercisejurisdiction on the ground that this State is themore appropriate forum under Section 207 or 208,

SECTION 201. BASES FOR JURISDICTIONOVER NONRESIDENT.(a) In a proceeding to establish or enforce asupport order or to determine parentage, atribunal of this state may exercise personaljurisdiction over a nonresident individual [or theindividual’s guardian or conservator] if: (1) the individual is personally served with[citation, summons, notice] within this State; (2) the individual submits to the jurisdiction ofthis state by consent in a record, by entering ageneral appearance, or by filing a responsivedocument having the effect of waiving any contestto personal jurisdiction; (3) the individual resided with the child in thisState; (4) the individual resided in this state andprovided prenatal expenses or support for thechild; (5) the child resides in this state as a result of theacts or directives of the individual; (6) the individual engaged in sexual intercoursein this state and the child may have beenconceived by that act of intercourse; (7) [the individual asserted parentage of a childin the [putative father registry] maintained in thisstate by the [appropriate agency]; or (8) there is any other basis consistent with the

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and: (A) the child and the child’s parents, or the childand at least one parent or a person acting as aparent, have a significant connection with thisState other than mere physical presence; and (B) substantial evidence is available in thisState concerning the child’s care, protection,training, and personal relationships; (3) all courts having jurisdiction under paragraph(1) or (2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction onthe ground that a court of this State is the moreappropriate forum to determine the custody of thechild under Section 207 or 208; or (4) no court of any other State would havejurisdiction under the criteria specified inparagraph (1), (2), or (3).(b) Subsection (a) is the exclusive jurisdictionalbasis for making a child-custody determination bya court of this State.(c) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdictionover, a party or a child is not necessary orsufficient to make a child-custody determination.

SECTION 106. EFFECT OF CHILD-CUSTODYDETERMINATION.A child-custody determination made by a court ofthis State that had jurisdiction under this [Act]binds all persons who have been served inaccordance with the laws of this State or notifiedin accordance with Section 108 or who havesubmitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and whohave been given an opportunity to be heard. Asto those persons, the determination is conclusiveas to all decided issues of law and fact except tothe extent the determination is modified.

constitutions of this state and the United States forthe exercise of personal jurisdiction.(b) The bases of personal jurisdiction set forth insubsection (a) or in any other law of this Statemay not be used to acquire personal jurisdictionfor a tribunal of the State to modify a child supportorder of another State unless the requirements ofSection 611 are met, or, in the case of a foreignsupport order, unless the requirements of Section615 are met.

SECTION 202. DURATION OF PERSONALJURISDICTION. Personal jurisdiction acquired by a tribunal of thisstate in a proceeding under this act or other law ofthis state relating to a support order continues aslong as a tribunal of this state has continuing,exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order orcontinuing jurisdiction to enforce its order asprovided by Sections 205, 206, and 211.

A-3 ECJ/CEJ

The historical problem addressed by both the UCCJEA and the UIFSA was the practice ofdifferent courts or tribunals issuing different orders. The pervasive practice pre-UIFSA was fora state with current jurisdiction over an obligor to issue its own order setting a support amounteven when there were previous orders in one or more states. The fundamental problem wasthat each of those orders was valid which resulted in the ultimate support obligation being aconsolidation of the various amounts ordered, using the highest order in effect at the time. Often, the higher order was not the most recent order and not the order being actively enforced. The multiple order situation was confusing to both the obligor and obligee.

A similar problem existed when the current home state entered a custody or visitation orderdifferent from the order entered in a previous home state. A federal attempt using the ParentalKidnaping Prevention Act ( PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. 1738A, had not resolved the problem.

Thus, both the UCCJEA and the UIFSA adopted a concept recognized in many states thatthere should be only one tribunal with the exclusive jurisdiction to modify the current

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arrangement. The UIFSA uses the term “continuing, exclusive jurisdiction”; the UCCJEA uses“exclusive, continuing jurisdiction”. It should be noted that the exclusivity to modify does notpreclude another forum from enforcing the existing order. Especially for support, nothingprecludes several forums from taking simultaneous enforcement actions based upon thelocation of the obligor or an obligor’s asset. Of course, the enforcement actions must be co-ordinated in order to prevent double payment by the obligor or one action having somepreclusive effect on the other action.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 202. EXCLUSIVE, CONTINUINGJURISDICTION.(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 204,a court of this State which has made a child-custody determination consistent with Section 201or 203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction overthe determination until: (1) a court of this State determines that neitherthe child, the child’s parents, and any personacting as a parent do not have a significantconnection with this State and that substantialevidence is no longer available in this Stateconcerning the child’s care, protection, training,and personal relationships; or (2) a court of this State or a court of anotherState determines that the child, the child’sparents, and any person acting as a parent do notpresently reside in this State.(b) A court of this State which has made a child-custody determination and does not haveexclusive, continuing jurisdiction under thissection may modify that determination only if ithas jurisdiction to make an initial determinationunder Section 201.

SECTION 205. CONTINUING, EXCLUSIVEJURISDICTION TO MODIFY CHILD-SUPPORTORDER.(a) A tribunal of this state that has issued achild-support order consistent with the law of thisstate has and shall exercise continuing, exclusivejurisdiction to modify its child-support order if theorder is the controlling order and: (1) at the time of the filing of a request formodification this state is the residence of theobligor, the individual obligee, or the child forwhose benefit the support order is issued; or (2) even if this state is not the residence of theobligor, the individual obligee, or the child forwhose benefit the support order is issued, theparties consent in a record or in open court thatthe tribunal of this State may continue to exercisejurisdiction to modify its order.(b) A tribunal of this state that has issued achild-support order consistent with the law of thisState may not exercise continuing, exclusivejurisdiction to modify the order if; (1) all of the parties who are individuals fileconsent in a record with the tribunal of this statethat a tribunal of another state that has jurisdictionover at least one of the parties who is anindividual or that is located in the state ofresidence of the child may modify the order andassume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction; or (2) its order is not the controlling order.(c) If a tribunal of another state has issued achild-support order pursuant to the UniformInterstate Family Support Act or a lawsubstantially similar to that Act which modifies achild-support order of a tribunal of this state,tribunals of this state shall recognize thecontinuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal ofthe other state.(d) A tribunal of this state that lacks continuing,exclusive jurisdiction to modify a child-supportorder may serve as an initiating tribunal to requesta tribunal of another state to modify a supportorder issued in that state.(e) A temporary support order issued ex parte orpending resolution of a jurisdictional conflict doesnot create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the

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issuing tribunal.

SECTION 206. CONTINUING JURISDICTIONTO ENFORCE CHILD-SUPPORT ORDER.(a) A tribunal of this state that has issued a child-support order consistent with the law of this statemay serve as an initiating tribunal to request atribunal of another state to enforce: (1) the order if the order is the controlling orderand has not been modified by a tribunal of anotherstate that assumed jurisdiction pursuant to theUniform Interstate Family Support Act; or (2) a money judgment for arrears of support andinterest on the order accrued before adetermination that an order of a tribunal of anotherstate is the controlling order.(b) A tribunal of this state having continuingjurisdiction over a support order may act as aresponding tribunal to enforce the order.

SECTION 211. CONTINUING, EXCLUSIVEJURISDICTION TO MODIFYSPOUSAL-SUPPORT ORDER.(a) A tribunal of this state issuing aspousal-support order consistent with the law ofthis state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction tomodify the spousal-support order throughout theexistence of the support obligation.(b) A tribunal of this state may not modify aspousal-support order issued by a tribunal ofanother State having continuing, exclusivejurisdiction over that order under the law of thatstate or foreign country.(c) A tribunal of this state that has continuing,exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal-support ordermay serve as: (1) an initiating tribunal to request a tribunal ofanother state to enforce the spousal-support orderissued in this state; or (2) a responding tribunal to enforce or modify itsown spousal-support order.

Part B - The Process

B-1 Courts, Tribunals, and Private Attorneys

The task of the ULC is to draft uniform Acts for general use and applicability. It is certainlyanticipated these will be used by private practitioners. However, in drafting the UIFSA, the ULCwas acutely aware of the role the state-based child support agencies (a.k.a. IV-D agencies,based on the section of the Social Security Act that created them) play in the establishment,modification, and enforcement of child support obligations. To seek harmony between the waythese agencies operate and the legal structure imposed by the UIFSA, the Drafting Committeeinvited numerous Observers to participate.

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One of the early issues identified is the fact that many states operate their child supportprograms using an administrative or quasi-judicial process. As a result, the UIFSA uses theterm “tribunal” to describe the entity with the authority to handle support issues. Each statedesignates its particular tribunal. Some states have designated courts for some functions andadministrative agencies for others.

Another area the drafters of the UIFSA were sensitive to was a possible perception that the Actcould only be used by the child support agencies. To allay any concerns, the UIFSA contains aspecific provision regarding private counsel representation.

As a general matter, the Title IV-D child support agencies are precluded from activeinvolvement in child custody matters; however, local Domestic Relations Offices may offerthese services. Due to the absence of most IV-D issues, the UCCJA contains neither thetribunal concept nor any specific language about private counsel involvement. The term“tribunal” will be used to include courts unless there is a need for a distinction.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 102. DEFINITIONS. In this act:(6) “Court” means an entity authorized under thelaw of a State to establish, enforce, or modify achild-custody determination.

SECTION 102. DEFINITIONS. In this act:(29) “Tribunal” means a court, administrativeagency, or quasi-judicial entity authorized toestablish, enforce, or modify support orders or todetermine parentage of a child.

SECTION 103. TRIBUNAL OF STATE. (a) The [court, administrative agency,quasi-judicial entity, or combination] [is thetribunal] [are the tribunals] of this state.(b) The [public official, governmental entity, orprivate agency] [is] [are] the support enforcement[agency] [agencies] of this state.

SECTION 309. PRIVATE COUNSEL. Anindividual may employ private counsel torepresent the individual in proceedings authorizedby this act.

B-2 Information Provided to the Tribunal

Both the UCCJEA and the UIFSA recognize they are inheriting a world in which someinformation must be shared and other information protected. Both acts also recognize theybecame effective in a world that had created multiple orders dealing with the same rights andduties. As a result, the UCCJEA requires the existence of other orders or other proceedingsinvolving the child be revealed in the initial pleading. The court can then decide if it isappropriate for it to assert any jurisdiction.

The UIFSA dynamic regarding multiple orders contemplates the registration process will beutilized. [see C-1] In the UIFSA 96, a strict reading might lead to the conclusion that submission of all existing orders to the tribunal was duplicated by having them included both atthe time of registration and when a pleading was filed, which could be simultaneously. TheUIFSA 2008 revises this to provide a “fall back” requirement to include copies of multiple ordersonly if they have not been tendered as part of the registration process.

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With respect to nondisclosure of identifying information to protect a person from potential harmor abuse, the UIFSA 96 adopted a process that was soon seen to be unworkable. Ostensibly,the party seeking protection had to pursue getting an order for nondisclosure in that person’sstate. In the UIFSA 2008, the drafters adopted the process already in the UCCJEA, i.e. basedupon a sworn affidavit or pleading filed in the state ruing on the custody or support issues, thetribunal would order the information not be disclosed unless the other party demonstrates aneed for disclosure.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 209. INFORMATION TO BESUBMITTED TO COURT.(a) [Subject to [local law providing for theconfidentiality of procedures, addresses, andother identifying information], in] [In] a child-custody proceeding, each party, in its firstpleading or in an attached affidavit, shall giveinformation, if reasonably ascertainable, underoath as to the child’s present address orwhereabouts, the places where the child has livedduring the last five years, and the names andpresent addresses of the persons with whom thechild has lived during that period. The pleading oraffidavit must state whether the party: (1) has participated, as a party or witness or inany other capacity, in any other proceedingconcerning the custody of or visitation with thechild and, if so, identify the court, the casenumber, and the date of the child-custodydetermination, if any; (2) knows of any proceeding that could affect thecurrent proceeding, including proceedings forenforcement and proceedings relating to domesticviolence, protective orders, termination of parentalrights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the court,the case number, and the nature of theproceeding; and (3) knows the names and addresses of anyperson not a party to the proceeding who hasphysical custody of the child or claims rights oflegal custody or physical custody of, or visitationwith, the child and, if so, the names andaddresses of those persons. (b) If the information required by subsection (a)is not furnished, the court, upon motion of a partyor its own motion, may stay the proceeding untilthe information is furnished. (c) If the declaration as to any of the itemsdescribed in subsection (a)(1) through (3) is in theaffirmative, the declarant shall give additionalinformation under oath as required by the court. The court may examine the parties under oath asto details of the information furnished and othermatters pertinent to the court’s jurisdiction and thedisposition of the case. (d) Each party has a continuing duty to inform

SECTION 311. PLEADINGS ANDACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS.(a) In a proceeding under this [Act], a [petitioner]seeking to establish a support order, to determineparentage of a child , or to register and modify asupport order of another state or a foreign countrymust file a [petition]. Unless otherwise orderedunder Section 312, the [petition] or accompanyingdocuments must provide, so far as known, thename, residential address, and social securitynumbers of the obligor and the obligee or theparent and alleged parent, and the name, sex,residential address, social security number, anddate of birth of each child for whose benefitsupport is sought or whose parentage is to bedetermined. Unless filed at the time ofregistration, the [petition] must be accompaniedby a copy of any support ordert known to havebeen issued by another tribunal. The [petition]may include any other information that may assistin locating or identifying the [respondent].(b) The [petition] must specify the relief sought. The [petition] and accompanying documents mustconform substantially with the requirementsimposed by the forms mandated by federal law foruse in cases filed by a support enforcementagency.

SECTION 312. NONDISCLOSURE OFINFORMATION IN EXCEPTIONALCIRCUMSTANCES.If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleadingunder oath that the health, safety, or liberty of aparty or child would be jeopardized by disclosureof specific identifying information, that informationmust be sealed and may not be disclosed to theother party or the public. After a hearing in whicha tribunal takes into consideration the health,safety, or liberty of the party or child, the tribunalmay order disclosure of information that thetribunal determines to be in the interest of justice.

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the court of any proceeding in this or any otherState that could affect the current proceeding.[(e) If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleadingunder oath that the health, safety, or liberty of aparty or child would be jeopardized by disclosureof identifying information, the information must besealed and may not be disclosed to the otherparty or the public unless the court orders thedisclosure to be made after a hearing in which thecourt takes into consideration the health, safety,or liberty of the party or child and determines thatthe disclosure is in the interest of justice.]

B-3 Choice of Law/Service of Process

Section 201(c) of the UCCJEA states that personal jurisdiction over a particular person is notnecessary in order to enter a child custody determination. To effectuate this concept, theUCCJEA links when notice or joinder are required, and the effects of failure to join or notify, tothe laws and procedures applicable to intrastate cases. However, it recognizes that an orderentered without notice may not be enforceable against the person who did not receive thenotice. For the initial establishment of an order under § 205, the UCCJEA provides that themethod of service can be in accordance with the law of the forum or the location of thenonresident person. For enforcement of any custody determination, service must be inaccordance with the law of the enforcing state. § 309.

Needing to have all affected parties properly noticed, the UIFSA specifies simply that the law ofthe forum state applies to all aspects. To obtain valid service, it must be accomplished incompliance with the forum’s law. With respect to the establishment of the initial order or themodification of the tribunal’s own order, § 303 states the law of the forum will apply, but withexceptions. Those exceptions involve the modification or enforcement of another state’s order.

When enforcing another state’s order, basic choice of law concepts distinguish between the lawapplicable to substantive issues versus the law applicable to procedural aspects. Section 604of the UIFSA sets out in detail the resolution. One interesting choice is that the statute oflimitations of the order issuing forum or order enforcing forum, whichever is longer, applies. Clearly, the most vexing problem, particularly for the IV-D agencies, is interest. The collectionof interest is a matter of substantive law; thus, linked to the law of the order issuing forum. When pursuing enforcement in another jurisdiction, the calculation can be problematic. Theissue is compounded when there are multiple orders contributing portions to the consolidatedarrears and is exacerbated when one jurisdiction modifies the order of another jurisdiciton. Togive some clarity, the UIFSA 2008 provides that the law of the forum whose order will governprospective support should apply to the interest to be applied not only on missed payments inthe future but also to the arrears.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 205. NOTICE; OPPORTUNITY TO BEHEARD; JOINDER.(a) Before a child-custody determination is madeunder this [Act], notice and an opportunity to beheard in accordance with the standards of Section

SECTION 303. APPLICATION OF LAW OFSTATE. Except as otherwise provided in this act, aresponding tribunal of this state shall:(1) apply the procedural and substantive law

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108 must be given to all persons entitled to noticeunder the law of this State as in child-custodyproceedings between residents of this State, anyparent whose parental rights have not beenpreviously terminated, and any person havingphysical custody of the child.(b) This [Act] does not govern the enforceabilityof a child-custody determination made withoutnotice or an opportunity to be heard.(c) The obligation to join a party and the right tointervene as a party in a child-custody proceedingunder this [Act] are governed by the law of thisState as in child-custody proceedings betweenresidents of this State.

SECTION 108. NOTICE TO PERSONSOUTSIDE STATE.(a) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdictionwhen a person is outside this State may be givenin a manner prescribed by the law of this State forservice of process or by the law of the State inwhich the service is made. Notice must be givenin a manner reasonably calculated to give actualnotice but may be by publication if other meansare not effective.(b) Proof of service may be made in the mannerprescribed by the law of this State or by the law ofthe State in which the service is made.(c) Notice is not required for the exercise ofjurisdiction with respect to a person who submitsto the jurisdiction of the court.

SECTION 309. SERVICE OF PETITION ANDORDER. Except as otherwise provided in Section311, the petition and order must be served, by anymethod authorized [by the law of this State], uponrespondent and any person who has physicalcustody of the child.

generally applicable to similar proceedingsoriginating in this state and may exercise allpowers and provide all remedies available inthose proceedings; and(2) determine the duty of support and the amountpayable in accordance with the law and supportguidelines of this State.

SECTION 604. CHOICE OF LAW.(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection(d), the law of the issuing state or foreign countygoverns: (1) the nature, extent, amount, and duration ofcurrent payments under a registered supportorder; (2) the computation and payment of arrearagesand accrual of interest on the arrearages underthe support order; and (3) the existence and satisfaction of otherobligations under the support order.(b) In a proceeding for arrears under a registeredsupport order, the statute of limitation of this stateor of the issuing state or foreign country,whichever is longer, applies.(c) A responding tribunal of this state shall applythe procedures and remedies of this state toenforce current support and collect arrears andinterest due on a support order of another state orforeign country registered in this state.(d) After a tribunal of this or another statedetermines which is the controlling order andissues an order consolidating arrears, if any, atribunal of this state shall prospectively apply thelaw of the state or foreign country issuing thecontrolling order, including its law on interest onarrears, on current and future support, and onconsolidated arrears.

B-4 Evidence, Discovery, and Procedure

Some of the more significant provisions of both the UCCJEA and UIFSA are those that providefor use of technology in conducting hearings with parties and witnesses in places other than thehearing room.

Both Acts permit telephonic testimony and participation. However, there is a significantdifference regarding the compulsion to appear. The UCCJEA makes specific provisions thatenable a court to compel the appearance of a party with or without the child. This is appropriatesince the matter to be resolved involves custody of the particular child and having the physicalpresence of the parent with physical possession of the child at the hearing may increase theability to actually enforce the determination.

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The UIFSA, especially in the 2008 version, takes the opposite approach in stating that physicalpresence is not required and telephonic testimony shall be used. Note that the language in theUIFSA should not be taken to mean physical presence is not required when the remedy soughtrequires it, i.e. when contempt is sought, the physical presence of the person who is thepotential contemnor is compelled to avoid a capias or arrest warrant being issued.

Recognizing the interstate aspects of the issues involved, both acts allow the admission ofdocuments and records without the requirement for production of the original. As use oftechnology and the internet increases, especially in child support cases, these Acts seek tomake both custody and support proceedings as “user friendly” as possible while still assuringthe due process and other rights of all parties.

Both Acts abolish any privilege or immunity deriving from the family relationship and theassertion of the right against self- incrimination can result in a negative inference.

The UIFSA contains a rather unique provision regarding the use of “standard forms”. Becauseof the substantial involvement of IV-D agencies in processing interstate support cases, thefederal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) was authorized to promulgate forms thatare routinely used. These include a General Testimony and Declaration in Support ofEstablishing Parentage. They serve the purpose of providing evidence in the absence of thenonresident party. There is nothing in the UIFSA that prohibits use by private practitioners andthe forms are readily available from the OCSE website.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 111. TAKING TESTIMONY INANOTHER STATE.(a) In addition to other procedures available to aparty, a party to a child-custody proceeding mayoffer testimony of witnesses who are located inanother State, including testimony of the partiesand the child, by deposition or other meansallowable in this State for testimony taken inanother State. The court on its own motion mayorder that the testimony of a person be taken inanother State and may prescribe the manner inwhich and the terms upon which the testimony istaken.(b) A court of this State may permit an individualresiding in another State to be deposed or totestify by telephone, audiovisual means, or otherelectronic means before a designated court or atanother location in that State. A court of this Stateshall cooperate with courts of other States indesignating an appropriate location for thedeposition or testimony.(c) Documentary evidence transmitted fromanother State to a court of this State bytechnological means that do not produce anoriginal writing may not be excluded fromevidence on an objection based on the means oftransmission.

SECTION 316. SPECIAL RULES OF EVIDENCEAND PROCEDURE.(a) The physical presence of a nonresident partywho is an individual in a tribunal of this state is notrequired for the establishment, enforcement, ormodification of a support order or the rendition ofa judgment determining parentage.(b) An affidavit, a document substantiallycomplying with federally mandated forms, or adocument incorporated by reference in any ofthem, which would not be excluded under thehearsay rule if given in person, is admissible inevidence if given under penalty of perjury by aparty or witness residing outside this state.(c) A copy of the record of child-supportpayments certified as a true copy of the original bythe custodian of the record may be forwarded to aresponding tribunal. The copy is evidence of factsasserted in it, and is admissible to show whetherpayments were made.(d) Copies of bills for testing for parentage of achild, and for prenatal and postnatal health care ofthe mother and child, furnished to the adverseparty at least [10] days before trial, are admissiblein evidence to prove the amount of the chargesbilled and that the charges were reasonable,necessary, and customary.(e) Documentary evidence transmitted fromoutside this state to a tribunal of this state by

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SECTION 210. APPEARANCE OF PARTIESAND CHILD.(a) In a child-custody proceeding in this State, thecourt may order a party to the proceeding who isin this State to appear before the court in personwith or without the child. The court may order anyperson who is in this State and who has physicalcustody or control of the child to appear in personwith the child.(b) If a party to a child-custody proceeding whosepresence is desired by the court is outside thisState, the court may order that a notice givenpursuant to Section 108 include a statementdirecting the party to appear in person with orwithout the child and informing the party thatfailure to appear may result in a decision adverseto the party.(c) The court may enter any orders necessary toensure the safety of the child and of any personordered to appear under this section.(d) If a party to a child-custody proceeding who isoutside this State is directed to appear undersubsection (b) or desires to appear personallybefore the court with or without the child, the courtmay require another party to pay reasonable andnecessary travel and other expenses of the partyso appearing and of the child.

SECTION 310. HEARING AND ORDER.(c) If a party called to testify refuses to answer onthe ground that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the court may draw an adverseinference from the refusal.(d) A privilege against disclosure ofcommunications between spouses and a defenseof immunity based on the relationship of husbandand wife or parent and child may not be invoked ina proceeding under this [article].

telephone, telecopier, or other electronic meansthat do not provide an original record may not beexcluded from evidence on an objection based onthe means of transmission.(f) In a proceeding under this act, a tribunal ofthis state shall permit a party or witness residingoutside this state to be deposed or to testify underpenalty of perjury by telephone, audiovisualmeans, or other electronic means at a designatedtribunal or other location. A tribunal of this stateshall cooperate with other tribunals in designatingan appropriate location for the deposition ortestimony.(g) If a party called to testify at a civil hearingrefuses to answer on the ground that thetestimony may be self-incriminating, the trier offact may draw an adverse inference from therefusal.(h) A privilege against disclosure ofcommunications between spouses does not applyin a proceeding under this act.(I) The defense of immunity based on therelationship of husband and wife or parent andchild does not apply in a proceeding under thisact.(j) A voluntary acknowledgment of paternity,certified as a true copy, is admissible to establishparentage of the child.

SECTION 210. APPLICATION OF ACT TONONRESIDENT SUBJECT TO PERSONALJURISDICTION. A tribunal of this state exercising personaljurisdiction over a nonresident in a proceedingunder this act, under other law of this staterelating to a support order, or recognizing aforeign support order may receive evidence fromoutside this state pursuant to Section 316,communicate with a tribunal outside this statepursuant to Section 317, and obtain discoverythrough a tribunal outside this state pursuant toSection 318. In all other respects, Articles 3through 6 do not apply and the tribunal shall applythe procedural and substantive law of this state.

B-5 Communication between tribunals

To have a legal structure that is designed for situations where not all parties reside in the samestate, it is critical that tribunals in different states be able to communicate and assist each other. This is particularly true in custody and visitation disputes. Thus, in many situations under theUCCJEA, communication and co-ordination is required: § 204 - Temporary EmergencyJurisdiction, § 206 - Simultaneous Proceedings, and § 307 - Simultaneous Proceedings [see B-7].

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Both acts go beyond basic communication and empower courts in one state to assist courts inother states with obtaining evidence. The UCCJEA contemplates another court can conducthearings and order evaluations even when it is not the forum where the issues will be resolved.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 110. COMMUNICATION BETWEENCOURTS.(a) A court of this State may communicate with acourt in another State concerning a proceedingarising under this [Act].(b) The court may allow the parties to participatein the communication. If the parties are not ableto participate in the communication, they must begiven the opportunity to present facts and legalarguments before a decision on jurisdiction ismade.(c) Communication between courts on schedules,calendars, court records, and similar matters mayoccur without informing the parties. A recordneed not be made of the communication.(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection(c), a record must be made of a communicationunder this section. The parties must be informedpromptly of the communication and grantedaccess to the record. (e) For the purposes of this section, "record"means information that is inscribed on a tangiblemedium or that is stored in an electronic or othermedium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

SECTION 112. COOPERATION BETWEENCOURTS; PRESERVATION OF RECORDS.(a) A court of this State may request theappropriate court of another State to: (1) hold an evidentiary hearing; (2) order a person to produce or give evidencepursuant to procedures of that State; (3) order that an evaluation be made withrespect to the custody of a child involved in apending proceeding; (4) forward to the court of this State a certifiedcopy of the transcript of the record of the hearing,the evidence otherwise presented, and anyevaluation prepared in compliance with therequest; and (5) order a party to a child-custody proceeding orany person having physical custody of the child toappear in the proceeding with or without the child.(b) Upon request of a court of another State, acourt of this State may hold a hearing or enter anorder described in subsection (a).. . .(d) A court of this State shall preserve thepleadings, orders, decrees, records of hearings,evaluations, and other pertinent records with

SECTION 317. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEENTRIBUNALS. A tribunal of this state maycommunicate with a tribunal outside this state in arecord, or by telephone, electronic mail, or othermeans, to obtain information concerning the laws,the legal effect of a judgment, decree, or order ofthat tribunal, and the status of a proceeding. Atribunal of this state may furnish similarinformation by similar means to a tribunal outsidethis state.

SECTION 318. ASSISTANCE WITHDISCOVERY. A tribunal of this State may:(1) request a tribunal of another State to assist inobtaining discovery; and(2) upon request, compel a person over whom ithas jurisdiction to respond to a discovery orderissued by a tribunal of another State.

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respect to a child-custody proceeding until thechild attains 18 years of age. Upon appropriaterequest by a court or law enforcement official ofanother State, the court shall forward a certifiedcopy of those records.

B-6 Immunity

Both Acts recognize the interplay of support and custody/visitation issues. All too frequently,one issue may be raised as a “defense” to the other. The UIFSA specifically states thatcustody and visitation issues should not be “linked” with the duty to pay support. Certainly,when one tribunal has both ECJ under the UCCJEA and CEJ under the UIFSA, it will be oneplace where both issues can be appropriately raised. The concern is when a tribunal withoutthe required subject matter jurisdiction tries to enter an order that is void. The drafters of theUIFSA were particularly concerned about the potential to “ambush” the party exercising avisitation right by filing a motion to modify support.

In addition to the substantive restrictions on where an existing order can be modified, both actsprovide a procedural “shield” so that a participant in a court action under that act is immunefrom most other civil process.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 109. APPEARANCE AND LIMITEDIMMUNITY.(a) A party to a child-custody proceeding,including a modification proceeding, or a petitioneror respondent in a proceeding to enforce orregister a child-custody determination, is notsubject to personal jurisdiction in this State foranother proceeding or purpose solely by reason ofhaving participated, or of having been physicallypresent for the purpose of participating, in theproceeding.(b) A person who is subject to personaljurisdiction in this State on a basis other thanphysical presence is not immune from service ofprocess in this State. A party present in this Statewho is subject to the jurisdiction of another Stateis not immune from service of process allowableunder the laws of that State.(c) The immunity granted by subsection (a) doesnot extend to civil litigation based on actsunrelated to the participation in a proceedingunder this [Act] committed by an individual whilepresent in this State.

SECTION 305. DUTIES AND POWERS OFRESPONDING TRIBUNAL.. . .(d) A responding tribunal of this state may notcondition the payment of a support order issuedunder this act upon compliance by a party withprovisions for visitation.

SECTION 314. LIMITED IMMUNITY OF[PETITIONER].(a) Participation by a [petitioner] in a proceedingunder this act before a responding tribunal,whether in person, by private attorney, or throughservices provided by the support enforcementagency, does not confer personal jurisdiction overthe [petitioner] in another proceeding.(b) A [petitioner] is not amenable to service ofcivil process while physically present in this stateto participate in a proceeding under this act.(c) The immunity granted by this section does notextend to civil litigation based on acts unrelated toa proceeding under this act committed by a partywhile physically present in this State to participatein the proceeding.

B-7 Emergency and Simultaneous Proceedings/ “Clean Hands”

The paramount concern of both acts is to make determinations that are in the best interest ofthe children involved. While it is certainly important to provide for the support of a child (or

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spouse in appropriate situations), it is more important to provide the child with a safe and stablephysical environment. The UCCJA provides a structure that enables a court to enter temporary emergency orders when needed while acting consistently with the concept that there is to beone court with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. The UIFSA has no such compelling need for asecond tribunal to enter a temporary emergency support order.

Given the emotional subject matter combined with the interstate aspect, a “race to thecourthouse” is a very real possibility under both the UCCJA and the UIFSA. The resolutionstaken by each act are slightly different. Under the UCCJEA, the simultaneous proceeding issueshould most often be moot as there will be only one “home state” at a time. Modifications arecompletely finessed by the ECJ concept. If there is no home state, no court with ECJ and bothcourts are in states with a “significant connection”; then, the first court to have the proceedingcommenced is the “winner”.

The UIFSA resolution takes a couple of additional steps. When a pleading is filed in the firststate, the second pleading must be filed in the second state within the time allowed for aresponsive pleading challenging the jurisdiction of the first state and an timely challenge mustbe made to the original filing. At that point, if the matter is purely one of subject matter orpersonal jurisdiction, it should be able to be resolved based upon prevailing law. Morecommonly, both states may have the requisite subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Inthose situations, the “home sate” of the child will be the “winner”. It should be noted that thisone time use of the “home state” concept in the UIFSA is based upon the same definition of“home state” which appears in and is used throughout the UCCJEA. The UIFSA section is alsolimited to only establishment actions in recognition that the CEJ concept precludessimultaneous filings for modification.

In resolving both the potential need for temporary emergency orders and well as which courtprevails when simultaneous proceedings are filed, the UCCJEA imposes the requirement thatthe person seeking the relief not have engaged in “unjustifiable conduct” (more often describedas “having clean hands”). This same doctrine is applicable when resolving the InconvenientForum issue discussed in B-8. Such a person is also potentially subject to extensive costs andother remedies. [see B-9] There is no comparable provision in the UIFSA.

As mentioned in B-5, there is also the requirement under the UCCJEA that a court being askedto issue and emergency order or that becomes aware of simultaneous proceedings is tocommunicate with other appropriate courts to make the appropriate resolution. There is nocomparable requirement for tribunal communication under the UIFSA; however, there is also noprohibition . Ostensibly, the timing of the UIFSA related pleadings filed in the other state can beused to resolve the issue. Nevertheless, the tribunals in an action under the UIFSA may wantto communicate to assure the support issue is timely resolved by some tribunal.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 204. TEMPORARY EMERGENCYJURISDICTION.(a) A court of this State has temporaryemergency jurisdiction if the child is present in thisState and the child has been abandoned or it isnecessary in an emergency to protect the childbecause the child, or a sibling or parent of thechild, is subjected to or threatened with

SECTION 204. SIMULTANEOUSPROCEEDINGS.(a) A tribunal of this state may exercisejurisdiction to establish a support order if the[petition] or comparable pleading is filed after apleading is filed in another state or foreign countryonly if: (1) the [petition] or comparable pleading in this

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mistreatment or abuse.(b) If there is no previous child-custodydetermination that is entitled to be enforced underthis [Act] and a child-custody proceeding has notbeen commenced in a court of a State havingjurisdiction under Sections 201 through 203, achild-custody determination made under thissection remains in effect until an order is obtainedfrom a court of a State having jurisdiction underSections 201 through 203. If a child-custodyproceeding has not been or is not commenced ina court of a State having jurisdiction underSections 201 through 203, a child-custodydetermination made under this section becomes afinal determination, if it so provides and this Statebecomes the home State of the child.(c) If there is a previous child-custodydetermination that is entitled to be enforced underthis [Act], or a child-custody proceeding has beencommenced in a court of a State havingjurisdiction under Sections 201 through 203, anyorder issued by a court of this State under thissection must specify in the order a period that thecourt considers adequate to allow the personseeking an order to obtain an order from the Statehaving jurisdiction under Sections 201 through203. The order issued in this State remains ineffect until an order is obtained from the otherState within the period specified or the periodexpires.(d) A court of this State which has been asked tomake a child-custody determination under thissection, upon being informed that a child-custodyproceeding has been commenced in, or a child-custody determination has been made by, a courtof a State having jurisdiction under Sections 201through 203, shall immediately communicate withthe other court. A court of this State which isexercising jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 201through 203, upon being informed that a child-custody proceeding has been commenced in, or achild-custody determination has been made by, acourt of another State under a statute similar tothis section shall immediately communicate withthe court of that State to resolve the emergency,protect the safety of the parties and the child, anddetermine a period for the duration of thetemporary order.

SECTION 206. SIMULTANEOUSPROCEEDINGS.(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 204,a court of this State may not exercise itsjurisdiction under this [article] if, at the time of thecommencement of the proceeding, a proceedingconcerning the custody of the child has been

state is filed before the expiration of the timeallowed in the other state or foreign country forfiling a responsive pleading challenging theexercise of jurisdiction by the other state orforeign country; (2) the contesting party timely challenges theexercise of jurisdiction in the other state or foreigncountry; and (3) if relevant, this state is the home state of thechild.(b) A tribunal of this state may not exercisejurisdiction to establish a support order if the[petition] or comparable pleading is filed before a[petition] or comparable pleading is filed inanother state or foreign country if: (1) the [petition] or comparable pleading in theother state or foreign country is filed before theexpiration of the time allowed in this state for filinga responsive pleading challenging the exercise ofjurisdiction by this state; (2) the contesting party timely challenges theexercise of jurisdiction in this state; and (3) if relevant, the other state or foreign countryis the home state of the child.

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commenced in a court of another State havingjurisdiction substantially in conformity with this[Act], unless the proceeding has been terminatedor is stayed by the court of the other Statebecause a court of this State is a more convenientforum under Section 207.(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 204,a court of this State, before hearing a child-custody proceeding, shall examine the courtdocuments and other information supplied by theparties pursuant to Section 209. If the courtdetermines that a child-custody proceeding hasbeen commenced in a court in another Statehaving jurisdiction substantially in accordance withthis [Act], the court of this State shall stay itsproceeding and communicate with the court of theother State. If the court of the State havingjurisdiction substantially in accordance with this[Act] does not determine that the court of thisState is a more appropriate forum, the court ofthis State shall dismiss the proceeding.(c) In a proceeding to modify a child-custodydetermination, a court of this State shall determinewhether a proceeding to enforce thedetermination has been commenced in anotherState. If a proceeding to enforce a child-custodydetermination has been commenced in anotherState, the court may: (1) stay the proceeding for modification pendingthe entry of an order of a court of the other Stateenforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing theproceeding for enforcement; (2) enjoin the parties from continuing with theproceeding for enforcement; or (3) proceed with the modification underconditions it considers appropriate.

SECTION 208. JURISDICTION DECLINED BYREASON OF CONDUCT.(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 204[or by other law of this State], if a court of thisState has jurisdiction under this [Act] because aperson seeking to invoke its jurisdiction hasengaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shalldecline to exercise its jurisdiction unless: (1) the parents and all persons acting as parentshave acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction; (2) a court of the State otherwise havingjurisdiction under Sections 201 through 203determines that this State is a more appropriateforum under Section 207; or (3) no court of any other State would havejurisdiction under the criteria specified in Sections201 through 203.(b) If a court of this State declines to exercise itsjurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a), it may

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fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure thesafety of the child and prevent a repetition of theunjustifiable conduct, including staying theproceeding until a child-custody proceeding iscommenced in a court having jurisdiction underSections 201 through 203.. . .

B-8 Inconvenient or Inappropriate Forum

The UCCJEA has several sections that establish when it is appropriate for a court to exerciseits jurisdiction. As discussed in B-7, resolution of the issue can also be affected by the “cleanhands” of a person seeking relief. Even if it is determined that the court is an appropriate forumand there is no compelling basis to refuse to assert jurisdiction, the court may still declinejurisdiction. While specific factors to consider are enumerated, the abiding concern is to havethe matter resolved in a forum with the best ability to obtain the information necessary whilealso considering the relative impact on the participants. One interesting consideration is (b)(5)with allows the parties to agree on a preferred jurisdiction. There appears to be no time limitsuch that the agreement could be made prior to the litigation.

The UIFSA makes no provision for an inconvenient forum. Presumably, the general concept offorum non conveniens would be applicable. What the UIFSA does provide is for one tribunal toforward documents to another tribunal when appropriate. This provision recognizes thedifficulty often faced by an obligee in trying to obtain a support remedy against a person whowill frequently move to intentionally avoid the process.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 207. INCONVENIENT FORUM.(a) A court of this State which has jurisdictionunder this [Act] to make a child-custodydetermination may decline to exercise itsjurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is aninconvenient forum under the circumstances andthat a court of another State is a more appropriateforum. The issue of inconvenient forum may beraised upon motion of a party, the court’s ownmotion, or request of another court.(b) Before determining whether it is aninconvenient forum, a court of this State shallconsider whether it is appropriate for a court ofanother State to exercise jurisdiction. For thispurpose, the court shall allow the parties to submitinformation and shall consider all relevant factors,including: (1) whether domestic violence has occurred andis likely to continue in the future and which Statecould best protect the parties and the child; (2) the length of time the child has residedoutside this State; (3) the distance between the court in this Stateand the court in the State that would assumejurisdiction; (4) the relative financial circumstances of the

SECTION 306. INAPPROPRIATE TRIBUNAL.If a [petition] or comparable pleading is receivedby an inappropriate tribunal of this state, thetribunal shall forward the pleading andaccompanying documents to an appropriatetribunal of this state or another s state and notifythe [petitioner] where and when the pleading wassent.

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parties; (5) any agreement of the parties as to whichState should assume jurisdiction; (6) the nature and location of the evidencerequired to resolve the pending litigation, includingtestimony of the child; (7) the ability of the court of each State to decidethe issue expeditiously and the proceduresnecessary to present the evidence; and (8) the familiarity of the court of each State withthe facts and issues in the pending litigation.(c) If a court of this State determines that it is aninconvenient forum and that a court of anotherState is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay theproceedings upon condition that a child-custodyproceeding be promptly commenced in anotherdesignated State and may impose any othercondition the court considers just and proper.(d) A court of this State may decline to exerciseits jurisdiction under this [Act] if a child-custodydetermination is incidental to an action for divorceor another proceeding while still retainingjurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.

B-9 Costs

It has been a requirement for interstate support cases since the promulgation of URESA in1950 that there be no filing fee assessed. Under URESA and RURESA, the provisionspecifically applied to fees assessed against an obligee. Recognizing that obligors may alsoutilize the UIFSA, it provides for no filing fees from the petitioner. While usually considered inthe context of a nonresident party seeking relief, the section could be read as applying when aresident files the petition seeking relief against a nonresident. When it comes to enforcementunder the UIFSA, it allows costs to be assessed against the obligor if the obligee prevails withno corresponding assessment if the obligor prevails.

The UCCJEA has the more balanced approach. Although stated in different ways, theUCCJEA provides that the “winner” recover costs from the “loser”.

Neither act can serve as the legal basis for imposition of costs against a state agency involvedin the case although other state law’s may allow for the assessment.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 112. COOPERATION BETWEENCOURTS; PRESERVATION OF RECORDS.(c) Travel and other necessary and reasonableexpenses incurred under subsections (a) and (b)may be assessed against the parties according tothe law of this State.

SECTION 208. JURISDICTION DECLINED BYREASON OF CONDUCT.(c) If a court dismisses a petition or stays a

SECTION 313. COSTS AND FEES.(a) The [petitioner] may not be required to pay afiling fee or other costs.(b) If an obligee prevails, a responding tribunal ofthis state may assess against an obligor filingfees, reasonable attorney’s fees, other costs, andnecessary travel and other reasonable expensesincurred by the obligee and the obligee’switnesses. The tribunal may not assess fees,costs, or expenses against the obligee or the

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proceeding because it declines to exercise itsjurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a), it shallassess against the party seeking to invoke itsjurisdiction necessary and reasonable expensesincluding costs, communication expenses,attorney’s fees, investigative fees, expenses forwitnesses, travel expenses, and child care duringthe course of the proceedings, unless the partyfrom whom fees are sought establishes that theassessment would be clearly inappropriate. Thecourt may not assess fees, costs, or expensesagainst this State unless authorized by law otherthan this [Act].

Article 3 - EnforcementSECTION 310. HEARING AND ORDER.(b) The court shall award the fees, costs, andexpenses authorized under Section 312 and maygrant additional relief, including a request for theassistance of [law enforcement officials], and seta further hearing to determine whether additionalrelief is appropriate.

SECTION 312. COSTS, FEES, ANDEXPENSES.(a) The court shall award the prevailing party,including a State, necessary and reasonableexpenses incurred by or on behalf of the party,including costs, communication expenses,attorney’s fees, investigative fees, expenses forwitnesses, travel expenses, and child care duringthe course of the proceedings, unless the partyfrom whom fees or expenses are soughtestablishes that the award would be clearlyinappropriate.(b) The court may not assess fees, costs, orexpenses against a State unless authorized bylaw other than this [Act].

SECTION 317. COSTS AND EXPENSES.If the respondent is not the prevailing party, thecourt may assess against the respondent all directexpenses and costs incurred by the [prosecutor orother appropriate public official] and [lawenforcement officers] under Section 315 or 316.317

support enforcement agency of either the initiatingor the responding state or foreign country, exceptas provided by other law. Attorney’s fees may betaxed as costs, and may be ordered paid directlyto the attorney, who may enforce the order in theattorney’s own name. Payment of support owedto the obligee has priority over fees, costs andexpenses.(c) The tribunal shall order the payment of costsand reasonable attorney’s fees if it determinesthat a hearing was requested primarily for delay. In a proceeding under Article 6, a hearing ispresumed to have been requested primarily fordelay if a registered support order is confirmed orenforced without change.

Part C - Going Interstate

C-1 Registration

When an action is taken regarding an order issued by a tribunal in one state, a procedure isneeded to bring the order to the attention of the tribunal in another state. Classically, the taking

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of judicial notice under the second state’s Rules of Evidence is the process. However, both theUCCJEA and the UIFSA established a “registration” process. Except for some difference in theinformation to be contained in the respective documents, the procedures for registration arebasically the same:

A. The proponent of the order requests the Clerk of the appropriate court or tribunalissue a Notice of RegistrationB. The Notice of Registration asserts the validity of the order (and includes acalculation of arrears under the UIFSA) and puts the nonregistering party on notice thatthe nonregistering party must contest the assertions regarding the validity of the order(and the arrears)C. Failure of the nonregistering party to contest results in confirmation of the validity ofthe order (and the arrears) by operation of law.D. If contested, there are limited defenses.

The major change wrought by the Registration process is a shifting of the burden to obtainconfirmation of the order (and arrears).

The Registration process is made explicit in the UIFSA for either enforcement or modificationactions. While explicit only for enforcement under the UCCJEA, it should be considered aviable procedure regarding modifications as well.

Actions for support can often involve the enforcement of several orders issued by differenttribunals over time. The procedure for this in the UIFSA 96 was an implicit registration of eachorder. Under the UIFSA 2001, only the alleged “controlling” order for prospective support isactually registered along with an assertion of the consolidated arrears. Failure to contest eitherthe controlling order assertion or the consolidated arrears amount results in confirmation byoperation of law. For a greater discussion of the multiple order issues, see D-3.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 305. REGISTRATION OF CHILD-CUSTODY DETERMINATION.(a) A child-custody determination issued by acourt of another State may be registered in thisState, with or without a simultaneous request forenforcement, by sending to [the appropriate court]in this State: (1) a letter or other document requestingregistration; (2) two copies, including one certified copy, ofthe determination sought to be registered, and astatement under penalty of perjury that to the bestof the knowledge and belief of the person seekingregistration the order has not been modified; and (3) except as otherwise provided in Section 209,the name and address of the person seekingregistration and any parent or person acting as aparent who has been awarded custody orvisitation in the child-custody determination soughtto be registered.(b) On receipt of the documents required bysubsection (a), the registering court shall: (1) cause the determination to be filed as a

SECTION 601. REGISTRATION OF ORDERFOR ENFORCEMENT.A support order or income-withholding orderissued in another state or a foreign support ordermay be registered in this state for enforcement.

SECTION 602. PROCEDURE TO REGISTERORDER FOR ENFORCEMENT.(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 706,a support order or income-withholding order ofanother state or a foreign support order may beregistered in this state by sending the followingrecords to the [appropriate tribunal] in this state: (1) a letter of transmittal to the tribunalrequesting registration and enforcement; (2) two copies, including one certified copy, ofthe order to be registered, including anymodification of the order; (3) a sworn statement by the person requestingregistration or a certified statement by thecustodian of the records showing the amount ofany arrearage; (4) the name of the obligor and, if known:

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foreign judgment, together with one copy of anyaccompanying documents and information,regardless of their form; and (2) serve notice upon the persons namedpursuant to subsection (a)(3) and provide themwith an opportunity to contest the registration inaccordance with this section.(c) The notice required by subsection (b)(2) muststate that: (1) a registered determination is enforceable asof the date of the registration in the same manneras a determination issued by a court of this State; (2) a hearing to contest the validity of theregistered determination must be requested within20 days after service of notice; and (3) failure to contest the registration will result inconfirmation of the child-custody determinationand preclude further contest of that determinationwith respect to any matter that could have beenasserted.(d) A person seeking to contest the validity of aregistered order must request a hearing within 20days after service of the notice. At that hearing,the court shall confirm the registered order unlessthe person contesting registration establishes that: (1) the issuing court did not have jurisdictionunder [Article] 2; (2) the child-custody determination sought to beregistered has been vacated, stayed, or modifiedby a court having jurisdiction to do so under[Article] 2; or (3) the person contesting registration wasentitled to notice, but notice was not given inaccordance with the standards of Section 108, inthe proceedings before the court that issued theorder for which registration is sought.(e) If a timely request for a hearing to contest thevalidity of the registration is not made, theregistration is confirmed as a matter of law andthe person requesting registration and all personsserved must be notified of the confirmation.(f) Confirmation of a registered order, whether byoperation of law or after notice and hearing,precludes further contest of the order with respectto any matter that could have been asserted at thetime of registration.

SECTION 306. ENFORCEMENT OFREGISTERED DETERMINATION.(a) A court of this State may grant any reliefnormally available under the law of this State toenforce a registered child-custody determinationmade by a court of another State.(b) A court of this State shall recognize andenforce, but may not modify, except inaccordance with [Article] 2, a registered child-

(A) the obligor’s address and social securitynumber; (B) the name and address of the obligor’semployer and any other source of income of theobligor; and (C) a description and the location of property ofthe obligor in this state not exempt fromexecution; and (5) except as otherwise provided in Section 312,the name and address of the obligee and, ifapplicable, the person to whom support paymentsare to be remitted.(b) On receipt of a request for registration, theregistering tribunal shall cause the order to befiled as an order of a tribunal of another state or aforeign support order, together with one copy ofthe documents and information, regardless oftheir form.(c) A [petition] or comparable pleading seeking aremedy that must be affirmatively sought underother law of this state may be filed at the sametime as the request for registration or later. Thepleading must specify the grounds for the remedysought.(d) If two or more orders are in effect, the personrequesting registration shall: (1) furnish to the tribunal a copy of every supportorder asserted to be in effect in addition to thedocuments specified in this section; (2) specify the order alleged to be the controllingorder, if any; and (3) specify the amount of consolidated arrears, ifany.(e) A request for a determination of which is thecontrolling order may be filed separately or with arequest for registration and enforcement or forregistration and modification. The personrequesting registration shall give notice of therequest to each party whose rights may beaffected by the determination.

SECTION 603. EFFECT OF REGISTRATIONFOR ENFORCEMENT.(a) A support order or income-withholding orderissued in another state or a foreign support orderis registered when the order is filed in theregistering tribunal of this State.(b) A registered support order issued in anotherstate or a foreign country is enforceable in thesame manner and is subject to the sameprocedures as an order issued by a tribunal of thisstate.(c) Except as otherwise provided in this act, atribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce,but may not modify, a registered support order ifthe issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.

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custody determination of a court of another State SECTION 605. NOTICE OF REGISTRATION OFORDER.(a) When a support order or income-withholdingorder issued in another state or a foreign supportorder is registered, the registering tribunal of thisstate shall notify the nonregistering party. Thenotice must be accompanied by a copy of theregistered order and the documents and relevantinformation accompanying the order.(b) A notice must inform the nonregistering party: (1) that a registered order is enforceable as ofthe date of registration in the same manner as anorder issued by a tribunal of this state; (2) that a hearing to contest the validity orenforcement of the registered order must berequested within [20] days after notice unless theregistered order is under Section 707; (3) that failure to contest the validity orenforcement of the registered order in a timelymanner will result in confirmation of the order andenforcement of the order and the allegedarrearages; and (4) of the amount of any alleged arrearages.(c) If the registering party asserts that two ormore orders are in effect, a notice must also: (1) identify the two or more orders and the orderalleged by the registering person to be thecontrolling order and the consolidated arrears, ifany; (2) notify the nonregistering party of the right toa determination of which is the controlling order; (3) state that the procedures provided insubsection (b) apply to the determination of whichis the controlling order; and (4) state that failure to contest the validity orenforcement of the order alleged to be thecontrolling order in a timely manner may result inconfirmation that the order is the controlling order.(d) Upon registration of an income-withholdingorder for enforcement, the support enforcementagency or registering tribunal shall notify theobligor’s employer pursuant to [theincome-withholding law of this State].

SECTION 606. PROCEDURE TO CONTESTVALIDITY OR ENFORCEMENT OFREGISTERED SUPPORT ORDER.(a) A nonregistering party seeking to contest thevalidity or enforcement of a registered order in thisstate shall request a hearing within the timerequired by Section 605. The nonregistering partymay seek to vacate the registration, to assert anydefense to an allegation of noncompliance withthe registered order, or to contest the remediesbeing sought or the amount of any allegedarrearages pursuant to Section 607).

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(b) If the nonregistering party fails to contest thevalidity or enforcement of the registered supportorder in a timely manner, the order is confirmedby operation of law.(c) If a nonregistering party requests a hearing tocontest the validity or enforcement of theregistered order, the registering tribunal shallschedule the matter for hearing and give notice tothe parties of the date, time, and place of thehearing.

SECTION 607. CONTEST OF REGISTRATIONOR ENFORCEMENT.(a) A party contesting the validity or enforcementof a registered support order or seeking to vacatethe registration has the burden of proving one ormore of the following defenses: (1) the issuing tribunal lacked personaljurisdiction over the contesting party; (2) the order was obtained by fraud; (3) the order has been vacated, suspended, ormodified by a later order; (4) the issuing tribunal has stayed the orderpending appeal; (5) there is a defense under the law of this stateto the remedy sought; (6) full or partial payment has been made; (7) the statute of limitation under Section 604precludes enforcement of some or all of thealleged arrearages; or (8) the alleged controlling order is not thecontrolling order.(b) If a party presents evidence establishing a fullor partial defense under subsection (a), a tribunalmay stay enforcement of the registered supportorder, continue the proceeding to permitproduction of additional relevant evidence, andissue other appropriate orders. An uncontestedportion of the registered support order may beenforced by all remedies available under the lawof this state.(c) If the contesting party does not establish adefense under subsection (a) to the validity orenforcement of a registered support order, theregistering tribunal shall issue an order confirmingthe order.

SECTION 608. CONFIRMED ORDER.Confirmation of a registered support order,whether by operation of law or after notice andhearing, precludes further contest of the orderwith respect to any matter that could have beenasserted at the time of registration.

SECTION 609. PROCEDURE TO REGISTER

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CHILD-SUPPORT ORDER OF ANOTHERSTATE FOR MODIFICATION. A party or support enforcement agency seeking tomodify, or to modify and enforce, a child-supportorder issued in another state shall register thatorder in this state in the same manner providedinSections 601 through 608 if the order has notbeen registered. A [petition] for modification maybe filed at the same time as a request forregistration, or later. The pleading must specifythe grounds for modification.

SECTION 610. EFFECT OF REGISTRATIONFOR MODIFICATION. A tribunal of this state may enforce achild-support order of another state registered forpurposes of modification, in the same manner asif the order had been issued by a tribunal of thisstate, but the registered support order may bemodified only if the requirements of Section 611 or 613 have been met.

C-2 Assuming Modification Jurisdiction

Both the ECJ and CEJ concepts have the exclusive jurisdiction to modify remain with theissuing state so long as one of the parties (parent per UCCJEA; obligor/obligee per UIFSA) orthe child continues to reside in the order issuing state. However, since both acts are focusedupon situations where not all family members reside in the same state, provisions are made forthe assumption (“transfer”) of jurisdiction to modify.

Under general “transfer” provisions, transfer is sought by returning to the original tribunal for anorder transferring the case from that tribunal to another tribunal. The UCCJEA retains thisreturn to the original court approach in the situation where either all family members have leftthe state or not all members have left but there is a “more convenient” forum. UIFSA does notvest the original tribunal with the ability to transfer the case to a tribunal in another state basedon the “more convenient” concept.

The major change to “moving” jurisdiction in both the UCCJEA and the UIFSA is when all familymembers have left the original order issuing state. The tribunal where one on the partiesresides is empowered, under certain circumstances, to “assume” jurisdiction. Under theUCCJEA, the assumption would be most often by a court in the child’s “home state”. Under theUIFSA, the party seeking the support modification has to have modification jurisdictionassumed by the tribunal where the other party resides. When all parties have left the originaljurisdiction and the assumption action is taken by the tribunal in the successor jurisdiction, the“losing” tribunal has no authority to stop the assumption.

There is one significant change to the movement of jurisdiction that has occurred under theUIFSA. The general principle is that subject matter jurisdiction can not be conferred upon atribunal by agreement. The original version of the UIFSA created an exception by allowing theparties to agree for the jurisdiction where the child currently resides or that has personaljurisdiction over one of the parties to assume CEJ even though someone remained in theoriginal order issuing state. This “choice of forum” capability was expanded by UIFSA 2008 to

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allow the parties to agree the issuing forum retains jurisdiction even when all parties have leftthat state. See § 205(a)(2) in A-3.

It was also recognized that the parties may have all left the order issuing state and one residesin another state while the other resides in another country. The UIFSA provides in that situationthat the state that issued the order retains the jurisdiction to modify it. It may be possible thatboth parties can agree to have the state where the one party resides assume the jurisdiction.

Upon assuming jurisdiction to modify, there is an important limitation under the UIFSA to thetribunal’s powers. The assuming tribunal is to apply its support guidelines in determining theamount of prospective support. However, the tribunal is not empowered to modify the durationof the support obligation.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 102. DEFINITIONS. In this [Act]:(11) “Modification” means a child-custodydetermination that changes, replaces,supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previousdetermination concerning the same child, whetheror not it is made by the court that made theprevious determination.

SECTION 203. JURISDICTION TO MODIFYDETERMINATION. Except as otherwise provided in Section 204, acourt of this State may not modify a child-custodydetermination made by a court of another Stateunless a court of this State has jurisdiction tomake an initial determination under Section201(a)(1) or (2) and:(1) the court of the other State determines it nolonger has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction underSection 202 or that a court of this State would bea more convenient forum under Section 207; or(2) a court of this State or a court of the otherState determines that the child, the child’sparents, and any person acting as a parent do notpresently reside in the other State.

SECTION 611. MODIFICATION OFCHILD-SUPPORT ORDER OF ANOTHERSTATE.(a) If Section 613 does not apply, upon [petition] atribunal of this state may modify a child-supportorder issued in another State which is registeredin this state if, after notice and hearing the tribunalfinds that: (1) the following requirements are met: (A) neither the child, nor the obligee who is anindividual, nor the obligor resides in the issuingState; (B) a [petitioner] who is a nonresident of thisstate seeks modification; and (C) the [respondent] is subject to the personaljurisdiction of the tribunal of this state; or (2) this state is the residence of the child, or aparty who is an individual is subject to thepersonal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state,and all of the parties who are individuals have filedconsents in a record in the issuing tribunal for atribunal of this state to modify the support orderand assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.(b) Modification of a registered child-supportorder is subject to the same requirements,procedures, and defenses that apply to themodification of an order issued by a tribunal of thisState and the order may be enforced and satisfiedin the same manner.(c) A tribunal of this state may not modify anyaspect of a child-support order that may not bemodified under the law of the issuing state,including the duration of the obligation of support.If two or more tribunals have issued child-supportorders for the same obligor and same child, theorder that controls and must be so recognizedunder Section 207 establishes the aspects of thesupport order which are nonmodifiable.(d) In a proceeding to modify a child-supportorder, the law of the state that is determined to

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have issued the initial controlling order governsthe duration of the obligation of support. Theobligor’s fulfillment of the duty of supportestablished by that order precludes imposition of afurther obligation of support by a tribunal of thisstate. (e) On the issuance of an order by a tribunal ofthis state modifying a child-support order issued inanother state, the tribunal of this state becomesthe tribunal having continuing, exclusivejurisdiction.(f) Notwithstanding subsections (a) through (e)and Section 201(b), a tribunal of this state retainsjurisdiction to modify an order issued by a tribunalof this state if: (1) one party resides in another state; and (2) the other party resides outside the UnitedStates.

SECTION 613. JURISDICTION TO MODIFYCHILD-SUPPORT ORDER OF ANOTHERSTATE WHEN INDIVIDUAL PARTIES RESIDEIN THIS STATE.(a) If all of the parties who are individuals residein this state and the child does not reside in theissuing state, a tribunal of this state hasjurisdiction to enforce and to modify the issuingstate’s child-support order in a proceeding toregister that order.(b) A tribunal of this State exercising jurisdictionunder this section shall apply the provisions ofArticles 1 and 2, this article, and the proceduraland substantive law of this State to the proceedingfor enforcement or modification. Articles 3, 4, 5, 7,and 8 do not apply.

C-3 Enforcement

With respect to enforcing an existing order, the differences between the UCCJEA and theUIFSA are based on the ultimate goal of each. When custody or visitation issues are involved,the focus of the court is getting the child into the appropriate physical possession. Thus, theemphasis for the UCCJEA is orders granting possession with the ability to issue warrants totake physical custody of the child. To prevent a person who is in wrongful possession of thechild from getting a favorable, “home town” order, courts in one state are to give full faith andcredit to enforcement orders entered by another state. In appropriate circumstances, theenforcing court does have the ability to enter emergency orders. See B-7.

The enforcement objective under the UIFSA is for the obligor to pay the current and backsupport owed. To effectuate that goal, the tribunal is given a panoply of remedies. In situationswhere the obligor is charged with criminal non-support, the governor of the charging state canseek the extradition of the obligor from the state where the obligor currently resides.

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UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 303. DUTY TO ENFORCE.(a) A court of this State shall recognize andenforce a child-custody determination of a court ofanother State if the latter court exercisedjurisdiction in substantial conformity with this [Act]or the determination was made under factualcircumstances meeting the jurisdictionalstandards of this [Act] and the determination hasnot been modified in accordance with this [Act].(b) A court of this State may utilize any remedyavailable under other law of this State to enforce achild-custody determination made by a court ofanother State. The remedies provided in this[article] are cumulative and do not affect theavailability of other remedies to enforce a child-custody determination.

SECTION 307. SIMULTANEOUSPROCEEDINGS. If a proceeding for enforcementunder this [article] is commenced in a court of thisState and the court determines that a proceedingto modify the determination is pending in a courtof another State having jurisdiction to modify thedetermination under [Article] 2, the enforcing courtshall immediately communicate with the modifyingcourt. The proceeding for enforcement continuesunless the enforcing court, after consultation withthe modifying court, stays or dismisses theproceeding.

SECTION 308. EXPEDITED ENFORCEMENTOF CHILD-CUSTODY DETERMINATION.(a) A petition under this [article] must be verified. Certified copies of all orders sought to beenforced and of any order confirming registrationmust be attached to the petition. A copy of acertified copy of an order may be attached insteadof the original.(b) A petition for enforcement of a child-custodydetermination must state: (1) whether the court that issued thedetermination identified the jurisdictional basis itrelied upon in exercising jurisdiction and, if so,what the basis was; (2) whether the determination for whichenforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed,or modified by a court whose decision must beenforced under this [Act] and, if so, identify thecourt, the case number, and the nature of theproceeding; (3) whether any proceeding has beencommenced that could affect the currentproceeding, including proceedings relating todomestic violence, protective orders, termination

SECTION 305. DUTIES AND POWERS OFRESPONDING TRIBUNAL.(a) When a responding tribunal of this statereceives a [petition] or comparable pleading froman initiating tribunal or directly pursuant to Section301(b), it shall cause the [petition] or pleading tobe filed and notify the [petitioner] where and whenit was filed.(b) A responding tribunal of this state, to theextent not prohibited by other law, may do one ormore of the following: (1) establish or enforce a support order, modifya child-support order, determine the controllingchild-support order, or determine parentage of achild; (2) order an obligor to comply with a supportorder, specifying the amount and the manner ofcompliance; (3) order income withholding; (4) determine the amount of any arrearages,and specify a method of payment; (5) enforce orders by civil or criminal contempt,or both; (6) set aside property for satisfaction of thesupport order; (7) place liens and order execution on theobligor’s property; (8) order an obligor to keep the tribunal informedof the obligor’s current residential address,electronic-mail address, telephone number,employer, address of employment, and telephonenumber at the place of employment; (9) issue a [bench warrant; capias] for an obligorwho has failed after proper notice to appear at ahearing ordered by the tribunal and enter the[bench warrant; capias] in any local and statecomputer systems for criminal warrants; (10) order the obligor to seek appropriateemployment by specified methods; (11) award reasonable attorney’s fees and otherfees and costs; and (12) grant any other available remedy.(c) A responding tribunal of this state shallinclude in a support order issued under this act, orin the documents accompanying the order, thecalculations on which the support order is based.. . .(e) If a responding tribunal of this state issues anorder under this act, the tribunal shall send a copyof the order to the [petitioner] and the [respondent]and to the initiating tribunal, if any.(f) If requested to enforce a support order,arrears, or judgment or modify a support orderstated in a foreign currency, a responding tribunal

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of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identifythe court, the case number, and the nature of theproceeding; (4) the present physical address of the child andthe respondent, if known; (5) whether relief in addition to the immediatephysical custody of the child and attorney’s fees issought, including a request for assistance from[law enforcement officials] and, if so, the reliefsought; and (6) if the child-custody determination has beenregistered and confirmed under Section 305, thedate and place of registration.(c) Upon the filing of a petition, the court shallissue an order directing the respondent to appearin person with or without the child at a hearing andmay enter any order necessary to ensure thesafety of the parties and the child. The hearingmust be held on the next judicial day after serviceof the order unless that date is impossible. In thatevent, the court shall hold the hearing on the firstjudicial day possible. The court may extend thedate of hearing at the request of the petitioner.(d) An order issued under subsection (c) muststate the time and place of the hearing and advisethe respondent that at the hearing the court willorder that the petitioner may take immediatephysical custody of the child and the payment offees, costs, and expenses under Section 312, andmay schedule a hearing to determine whetherfurther relief is appropriate, unless the respondentappears and establishes that: (1) the child-custody determination has not beenregistered and confirmed under Section 305 andthat: (A) the issuing court did not have jurisdictionunder [Article] 2; (B) the child-custody determination for whichenforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed,or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do sounder [Article] 2; (C) the respondent was entitled to notice, butnotice was not given in accordance with thestandards of Section 108, in the proceedingsbefore the court that issued the order for whichenforcement is sought; or (2) the child-custody determination for whichenforcement is sought was registered andconfirmed under Section 304, but has beenvacated, stayed, or modified by a court of a Statehaving jurisdiction to do so under [Article] 2.

SECTION 310. HEARING AND ORDER.(a) Unless the court issues a temporaryemergency order pursuant to Section 204, upon afinding that a petitioner is entitled to immediate

of this State shall convert the amount stated in theforeign currency to the equivalent amount indollars under the applicable official or marketexchange rate as publicly reported.

SECTION 801. GROUNDS FOR RENDITION.(a) For purposes of this article, “governor”includes an individual performing the functions ofgovernor or the executive authority of a statecovered by this act.(b) The governor of this state may: (1) demand that the governor of another statesurrender an individual found in the other statewho is charged criminally in this state with havingfailed to provide for the support of an obligee; or (2) on the demand of the governor of anotherstate, surrender an individual found in this statewho is charged criminally in the other state withhaving failed to provide for the support of anobligee.(c) A provision for extradition of individuals notinconsistent with this act applies to the demandeven if the individual whose surrender isdemanded was not in the demanding state whenthe crime was allegedly committed and has notfled therefrom.

SECTION 802. CONDITIONS OF RENDITION.(a) Before making a demand that the governor ofanother state surrender an individual chargedcriminally in this state with having failed to providefor the support of an obligee, the governor of thisstate may require a prosecutor of this state todemonstrate that at least [60] days previously theobligee had initiated proceedings for supportpursuant to this act or that the proceeding wouldbe of no avail.(b) If, under this act or a law substantially similarto this act, the governor of another state makes ademand that the governor of this state surrenderan individual charged criminally in that state withhaving failed to provide for the support of a childor other individual to whom a duty of support isowed, the governor may require a prosecutor toinvestigate the demand and report whether aproceeding for support has been initiated or wouldbe effective. If it appears that a proceeding wouldbe effective but has not been initiated, thegovernor may delay honoring the demand for areasonable time to permit the initiation of aproceeding.(c) If a proceeding for support has been initiatedand the individual whose rendition is demandedprevails, the governor may decline to honor thedemand. If the [petitioner] prevails and theindividual whose rendition is demanded is subject

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physical custody of the child, the court shall orderthat the petitioner may take immediate physicalcustody of the child unless the respondentestablishes that: (1) the child-custody determination has not beenregistered and confirmed under Section 305 andthat: (A) the issuing court did not have jurisdictionunder [Article] 2; (B) the child-custody determination for whichenforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed,or modified by a court of a State havingjurisdiction to do so under [Article] 2; or (C) the respondent was entitled to notice, butnotice was not given in accordance with thestandards of Section 108, in the proceedingsbefore the court that issued the order for whichenforcement is sought; or (2) the child-custody determination for whichenforcement is sought was registered andconfirmed under Section 305 but has beenvacated, stayed, or modified by a court of a Statehaving jurisdiction to do so under [Article] 2.. . .

SECTION 311. WARRANT TO TAKEPHYSICAL CUSTODY OF CHILD.(a) Upon the filing of a petition seekingenforcement of a child-custody determination, thepetitioner may file a verified application for theissuance of a warrant to take physical custody ofthe child if the child is immediately likely to sufferserious physical harm or be removed from thisState.(b) If the court, upon the testimony of thepetitioner or other witness, finds that the child isimminently likely to suffer serious physical harmor be removed from this State, it may issue awarrant to take physical custody of the child. Thepetition must be heard on the next judicial dayafter the warrant is executed unless that date isimpossible. In that event, the court shall hold thehearing on the first judicial day possible. Theapplication for the warrant must include thestatements required by Section 308(b).(c) A warrant to take physical custody of a childmust: (1) recite the facts upon which a conclusion ofimminent serious physical harm or removal fromthe jurisdiction is based; (2) direct law enforcement officers to takephysical custody of the child immediately; and (3) provide for the placement of the child pendingfinal relief.(d) The respondent must be served with thepetition, warrant, and order immediately after the

to a support order, the governor may decline tohonor the demand if the individual is complyingwith the support order

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child is taken into physical custody.(e) A warrant to take physical custody of a child isenforceable throughout this State. If the courtfinds on the basis of the testimony of the petitioneror other witness that a less intrusive remedy is noteffective, it may authorize law enforcementofficers to enter private property to take physicalcustody of the child. If required by exigentcircumstances of the case, the court mayauthorize law enforcement officers to make aforcible entry at any hour.(f) The court may impose conditions uponplacement of a child to ensure the appearance ofthe child and the child’s custodian.

SECTION 313. RECOGNITION ANDENFORCEMENT. A court of this State shall accord full faith andcredit to an order issued by another State andconsistent with this [Act] which enforces a child-custody determination by a court of another Stateunless the order has been vacated, stayed, ormodified by a court having jurisdiction to do sounder [Article] 2.

C-4 Agency Involvement

The drafters of both acts recognized a major impediment to processing interstate cases is theinability of the nonresident person to obtain legal services in the state where an action needs tobe taken. Thus, both Acts build upon common structures in each state for obtaining necessaryservices.

Under the UCCJEA, agency involvement does not occur until an order is being enforced. Atthat point, a local prosecutor or some other public official is permitted (“may”) to assist in theenforcement of the order. And, as expected, law enforcement personnel in the enforcing statemay be called upon for assistance.

The UIFSA inherits the IV-D agency structure. Pursuant to federal regulations, each state hasa “state information agency”, often referred to as the “central registry”. Compatible with theseregulations, the UIFSA empowers this information agency to provide information and receiveand process documents. It then applies the same duties in an interstate case to the “supportenforcement agency” that provides services in intrastate cases. Lastly, it designates a publicofficial to oversee and assure both the state information agency and state enforcement agencyperform their respective duties and functions.

With the ratification and implementation of the Hague Convention on the International Recoveryof Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, an issue arose as to whether personresiding in a country that had adopted the Convention was compelled to use the supportagency in that country that was created by the Convention. There was concern that somecountry might adopt the Convention and not provide a viable agency process. The converseissue was to provide an incentive for a country to adopt the Convention. The issue was

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resolved by giving each state the option in § 307 whether to except “direct applications” from aperson residing in a Convention country.

Another issue that has raised concerns, particularly in the IV-D community, is the legalrelationship between attorneys employed by the IV-D agency and the individual who is beingprovided services. Most often, the attorneys may be providing services to someone they havenever met. Like prosecutors, the IV-D agency attorneys are employed by their respectiveagency and sometimes the agency may have a position different from that of the personreceiving services. Acknowledging the situation, both the UCCJEA and the UIFSA specificallyprovide that agency or government attorneys do no have an attorney-client relationship with theperson receiving services under either Act.

Because of the availability of numerous support enforcement remedies that are automated(lottery, unemployment benefits, and tax intercepts; passport denial), the support enforcementagencies are empowered to begin these actions without the necessity of registering anotherstate’s order. It is only when the enforcement action is contested that registration is necessary. In many instances, the contest can even be resolved without the necessity for registration.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 315. ROLE OF [PROSECUTOR ORPUBLIC OFFICIAL].(a) In a case arising under this [Act] or involvingthe Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects ofInternational Child Abduction, the [prosecutor orother appropriate public official] may take anylawful action, including resort to a proceedingunder this [article] or any other available civilproceeding to locate a child, obtain the return of achild, or enforce a child-custody determination ifthere is: (1) an existing child-custody determination; (2) a request to do so from a court in a pendingchild-custody proceeding; (3) a reasonable belief that a criminal statute hasbeen violated; or (4) a reasonable belief that the child has beenwrongfully removed or retained in violation of theHague Convention on the Civil Aspects ofInternational Child Abduction.(b) A [prosecutor or appropriate public official]acting under this section acts on behalf of thecourt and may not represent any party.

SECTION 316. ROLE OF [LAWENFORCEMENT]. At the request of a [prosecutor or otherappropriate public official] acting under Section315, a [law enforcement officer] may take anylawful action reasonably necessary to locate achild or a party and assist [a prosecutor orappropriate public official] with responsibilitiesunder Section 315.

SECTION 307. DUTIES OF SUPPORTENFORCEMENT AGENCY.

Alternative A(a) A support enforcement agency of this state,upon request, shall provide services to a[petitioner] in a proceeding under this act.

Alternative B(a) In a proceeding under this [act], a supportenforcement agency of this state, upon request: (1) shall provide services to a [petitioner]residing in a state; (2) shall provide services to a [petitioner]requesting services through a central authority ofa foreign country as described in Section102(5)(A) or (D); and (3) may provide services to a [petitioner] who isan individual not residing in a state.

End of Alternatives

(b) A support enforcement agency of this statethat is providing services to the [petitioner] shall: (1) take all steps necessary to enable anappropriate tribunal to obtain jurisdiction over the[respondent]; (2) request an appropriate tribunal to set a date,time, and place for a hearing; (3) make a reasonable effort to obtain allrelevant information, including information as toincome and property of the parties; (4) within [two] days, exclusive of Saturdays,Sundays, and legal holidays, after receipt of awritten notice in a record from an initiating,responding, or registering tribunal, send a copy ofthe notice to the [petitioner];

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(5) within [two] days, exclusive of Saturdays,Sundays, and legal holidays, after receipt of awritten communication in a record from the[respondent] or the [respondent’s] attorney, senda copy of the communication to the [petitioner];and (6) notify the [petitioner] if jurisdiction over the[respondent] cannot be obtained.(c) A support enforcement agency of this statethat requests registration of a child-support orderin this state for enforcement or for modificationshall make reasonable efforts: (1) to ensure that the order to be registered isthe controlling order; or (2) if two or more child-support orders exist andthe identity of the controlling order has not beendetermined, to ensure that a request for such adetermination is made in a tribunal havingjurisdiction to do so.(d) A support enforcement agency of this statethat requests registration and enforcement of asupport order, arrears, or judgment stated in aforeign currency shall convert the amounts statedin the foreign currency into the equivalentamounts in dollars under the applicable official ormarket exchange rate as publicly reported.(e) A support enforcement agency of this stateshall [issue or] request a tribunal of this state toissue a child-support order and anincome-withholding order that redirect payment ofcurrent support, arrears, and interest if requestedto do so by a support enforcement agency ofanother state pursuant to Section 319.(f) This act does not create or negate arelationship of attorney and client or otherfiduciary relationship between a supportenforcement agency or the attorney for theagency and the individual being assisted by theagency.

SECTION 308. DUTY OF [ STATE OFFICIALOR AGENCY].(a) If the [appropriate state official or agency]determines that the support enforcement agencyis neglecting or refusing to provide services to anindividual, the [state official or agency] may orderthe agency to perform its duties under this [Act] ormay provide those services directly to theindividual.(b) The [appropriate state official or agency] maydetermine that a foreign country has established areciprocal arrangement for child support with thisstate and take appropriate action for notification ofthe determination.

SECTION 310. DUTIES OF [STATE

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INFORMATION AGENCY].(a) The [Attorney General’s Office, StateAttorney’s Office, State Central Registry or otherinformation agency] is the state informationagency under this act.(b) The state information agency shall: (1) compile and maintain a current list, includingaddresses, of the tribunals in this State whichhave jurisdiction under this act and any supportenforcement agencies in this state and transmit acopy to the state information agency of everyother state; (2) maintain a register of names and addressesof tribunals and support enforcement agenciesreceived from other states; (3) forward to the appropriate tribunal in the[county] in this state in which the obligee who is anindividual or the obligor resides, or in which theobligor’s property is believed to be located, alldocuments concerning a proceeding under thisact received from another state or foreign country;and (4) obtain information concerning the location ofthe obligor and the obligor’s property within thisstate not exempt from execution, by such meansas postal verification and federal or state locatorservices, examination of telephone directories,requests for the obligor’s address from employers,and examination of governmental records,including, to the extent not prohibited by other law,those relating to real property, vital statistics, lawenforcement, taxation, motor vehicles, driver’slicenses, and social security.

SECTION 507. ADMINISTRATIVEENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS.(a) A party or support enforcement agencyseeking to enforce a support order or anincome-withholding order, or both, issued inanother state may send the documents requiredfor registering the order to a support enforcementagency of this state.(b) Upon receipt of the documents, the supportenforcement agency, without initially seeking toregister the order, shall consider and, ifappropriate, use any administrative procedureauthorized by the law of this state to enforce asupport order or an income-withholding order, orboth. If the obligor does not contestadministrative enforcement, the order need not beregistered. If the obligor contests the validity oradministrative enforcement of the order, thesupport enforcement agency shall register theorder pursuant to this act.

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Part D - Unique Provisions

From the analyses above, it can be seen that the UCCJEA and UIFSA share many commonconcepts and processes. However, there are certain aspects of each act that have nocounterpart.

D-1 UCCJEA - Expedited Processing

Certainly mindful of due process considerations, the goal of the UCCJEA is to resolve custodyand visitation disputes so the child is residing with the proper party as quickly as possible. Thus, determining whether a court is initially empowered to act is to be resolved expeditiously. Likewise, appeals are to be expedited to obtain finality.

UCCJEA

SECTION 107. PRIORITY. If a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this [Act] israised in a child-custody proceeding, the question, upon request of a party, must be given priority on thecalendar and handled expeditiously.

SECTION 314. APPEALS. An appeal may be taken from a final order in a proceeding under this[article] in accordance with [expedited appellate procedures in other civil cases]. Unless the courtenters a temporary emergency order under Section 204, the enforcing court may not stay an orderenforcing a child-custody determination pending appeal.

D-2 Temporary Visitation

The primary focus of the UCCJEA is resolution of custody issues. Nevertheless, being able toexercise visitation is an important right as well. If the custody order has a specific visitationschedule, it can, and should, be enforced. If visitation is authorized in the custody order but thedetails are not specified, an enforcing court can enter a temporary visitation order while aspecific order is sought in the court with ECJ.

UCCJEA

SECTION 304. TEMPORARY VISITATION.(a) A court of this State which does not have jurisdiction to modify a child-custody determination, mayissue a temporary order enforcing: (1) a visitation schedule made by a court of another State; or (2) the visitation provisions of a child-custody determination of another State that does not provide fora specific visitation schedule.(b) If a court of this State makes an order under subsection (a)(2), it shall specify in the order a periodthat it considers adequate to allow the petitioner to obtain an order from a court having jurisdictionunder the criteria specified in [Article] 2. The order remains in effect until an order is obtained from theother court or the period expires.

D-3 UIFSA - Multiple Orders

One of the major challenges facing the drafters of the UIFSA was dealing with the multiplesupport orders that were created under URESA and RURESA. Based on a series of casesholding an order for support could always be modified as circumstances changed, an existing

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order was not entitled to full faith and credit. Assuming the issuing court had subject matter andpersonal jurisdiction, it could enter an order that set a different amount of support as well as adifferent duration.

The task under the UIFSA became to set out a process to make one of the existing multipleorders be the “controlling” order. The resolution is founded upon what state is in the bestsituation to address the needs of the child or the ability of the obligor to pay. As a starting point,if there is only one order, it is the controlling order even if no one currently resides in the statethat issued it. When there are at least two orders:

A. The order issued by a “home “ state is the controlling order.B. If only one of the states that issued one of the orders has a person residing in that state,it is the controlling order.C. If no one resides in any of the states that entered the orders, there is no controllingorder per se and a tribunal that currently has subject matter and personal jurisdiction is toestablish a “replacement” order that will be the controlling order.

The important aspect of a controlling order determination is that it determines the one orderentitled to prospective enforcement. Attached to this prospective enforcement is the exclusivityto modify the prospective support obligation, i.e. the controlling order establishes the tribunalwith CEJ to modify.

What a controlling order determination does not do is impact the amount of the consolidatedarrears. Case law and a specific provision in RURESA established the concept that asuccessive order did not nullify or supercede the existing order(s) so that support continued toaccrue. What does occur is the support amounts accrue simultaneously and not in theaggregate. The UIFSA and its predecessors specifically provide that payments made pursuantto one order are to be applied to the support accruing under another order in existence duringthe same time period.

The issue of determining which of two valid orders governs prospective support has becomealmost totally moot. The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act became effective inOctober, 1994. Like UIFSA, it provided that there would only be one valid order regardingprospective support; thus, any attempt at a second order after the effective date are almostalways declared to be void. Since the vast majority of orders do not extend beyond a child’s23RD birthday, the situation of two, pre-1994, valid orders still being in force and effect forprospective support is really non-existent. However, the collection of support arrears underboth the old orders is still viable and ongoing.

UIFSA

SECTION 207. DETERMINATION OF CONTROLLING CHILD-SUPPORT ORDER.(a) If a proceeding is brought under this act and only one tribunal has issued a child-support order, theorder of that tribunal controls and must be so recognized.(b) If a proceeding is brought under this act, and two or more child-support orders have been issued bytribunals of this state, another State or a foreign country with regard to the same obligor and samechild, a tribunal of this state having personal jurisdiction over both the obligor and individual obligeeshall apply the following rules and by order shall determine which order controls and must berecognized: (1) If only one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this act, the order ofthat tribunal controls. (2) If more than one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this act: (A) an order issued by a tribunal in the current home atate of the child controls; or

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(B) if an order has not been issued in the current home state of the child, the order most recentlyissued controls. (3) If none of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this act, the tribunal ofthis state shall issue a child-support order, which controls.(c) If two or more child-support orders have been issued for the same obligor and same child, uponrequest of a party who is an individual or that is a support enforcement agency, a tribunal of this Statehaving personal jurisdiction over both the obligor and the obligee who is an individual shall determinewhich order controls under subsection (b). The request may be filed with a registration for enforcementor registration for modification pursuant to Article 6, or may be filed as a separate proceeding.(d) A request to determine which is the controlling order must be accompanied by a copy of everychild-support order in effect and the applicable record of payments. The requesting party shall givenotice of the request to each party whose rights may be affected by the determination.(e) The tribunal that issued the controlling order under subsection (a), (b), or (c) has continuingjurisdiction to the extent provided in Section 205 or 206.(f) A tribunal of this state that determines by order which is the controlling order under subsection(b)(1) or (2) or (c), or that issues a new controlling order under subsection (b)(3), shall state in thatorder: (1) the basis upon which the tribunal made its determination; (2) the amount of prospective support, if any; and (3) the total amount of consolidated arrears and accrued interest, if any, under all of the orders afterall payments made are credited as provided by Section 209.(g) Within [30] days after issuance of an order determining which is the controlling order, the partyobtaining the order shall file a certified copy of it in each tribunal that issued or registered an earlierorder of child support. A party or support enforcement agency obtaining the order that fails to file acertified copy is subject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure to file arises. The failure to file does not affect the validity or enforceability of the controlling order.(h) An order that has been determined to be the controlling order, or a judgment for consolidatedarrears of support and interest, if any, made pursuant to this section must be recognized in proceedingsunder this [Act].

SECTION 209. CREDIT FOR PAYMENTS. A tribunal of this state shall credit amounts collected for a particular period pursuant to anychild-support order against the amounts owed for the same period under any other child-support orderfor support of the same child issued by a tribunal of this state or another state, or a foreign country.

D-4 UIFSA - Minor as a Party

The immutable fact is that minors are the parents of children. Lest there be doubt about thecapacity of a minor to bring an action for support, the UIFSA makes it clear a minor can pursueobtaining support without the necessity of going through a “next friend”.

UIFSA

SECTION 302. PROCEEDING BY MINOR PARENT. A minor parent, or a guardian or other legalrepresentative of a minor parent, may maintain a proceeding on behalf of or for the benefit of theminor’s child.

D-5 UIFSA - Defense of Nonparentage

There are several defenses that can be raised at the time of registration of another state’sorder. See C-1. There are other defenses that can be raised to the specific remedy sought.

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One issue that can not be raised collaterally is parentage. Any attack on that issue must bemade in the forum that issued the original order.

UIFSA

SECTION 315. NONPARENTAGE AS DEFENSE. A party whose parentage of a child has beenpreviously determined by or pursuant to law may not plead nonparentage as a defense to a proceedingunder this act.

Part E - Interjurisdictional applications

E-1 Tribes

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applies primarily in custody situations where placement isbeing sought in institutions or with persons other than the parents. The UCCJEA seeksharmony with the ICWA by deferring to tribal proceedings and recognizing a tribal order whenappropriate. The UIFSA recognizes the authority of tribal courts to enter valid support ordersand treats a tribe the same as other “states”. It should be noted that FFCCSOA applies both tostates and tribes.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 104. APPLICATION TO INDIANTRIBES.(a) A child-custody proceeding that pertains to anIndian child as defined in the Indian Child WelfareAct, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., is not subject to this[Act] to the extent that it is governed by the IndianChild Welfare Act.[(b) A court of this State shall treat a tribe as if itwere a State of the United States for the purposeof applying [Articles] 1 and 2.][(c) A child-custody determination made by a tribeunder factual circumstances in substantialconformity with the jurisdictional standards of this[Act] must be recognized and enforced under[Article] 3.]

SECTION 102. DEFINITIONS. In this act:(26) “State” means a state of the United States,the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the UnitedStates Virgin Islands, or any territory or insularpossession under the jurisdiction of the UnitedStates. The term includes an Indian nation ortribe.

E-2 International

The UCCJEA provides a general legal framework for recognition and enforcement of foreigncustody and visitation decrees originating from foreign jurisdictions. It specifies that a decreemade by a party to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abductionwill be enforced and the United State is a party to Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects ofInternational Child Abduction.

The United State is also a party to the Convention on the International Recovery of ChildSupport and Other Forms of Family Maintenance which provides for the establishment,enforcement, and modification of child or spousal support; also referred to as child or spousalmaintenance. However, there remains a large group of countries who are not parties to thisConvention. With respect to establishing a support order, the status of the country of residence

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of a person seeking to establish support under UIFSA is totally immaterial. The UIFSA appliesto anyone who resides “outside this State”, regardless of the “status“ of the country where theyreside.

Where the status of a particular country comes into play is when an order from that countryexists and a state is being asked to enforce or modify that order. Basically, a country can be a“foreign country” which includes a country that has enacted the Convention or has a state orfederal level reciprocal agreement. A foreign country can then have its orders enforced undervarious provisions of the UIFSA.

For those countries that are not “foreign countries”, the enforcement of their order can beaccomplished under the concept of “comity”. [see A-1, UIFSA § 104] However, the rulesregarding comity only provide for enforcement and not modificaiton.

[NOTE: The provisions for enforcing and modifying an order from a Convention country arecontained in Article 7 of UIFSA. The are quite extensive and not set out or discussed in thispaper.]

With regard to a foreign country order, one issue that does have distinct treatment is the abilityof a state to modify the foreign support order of a non-Convention foreign country. If no oneresides in the non-Convention foreign country that issued the order, the general modificationprovisions of the UIFSA apply. The UIFSA also enables either party to seek a modification in astate; but, only upon a showing that the non-Convention foreign country where a party resides“will not or may not” modify it’s order.

UCCJEA UIFSA

SECTION 105. INTERNATIONALAPPLICATION OF [ACT].(a) A court of this State shall treat a foreigncountry as if it were a State of the United Statesfor the purpose of applying [Articles] 1 and 2.(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection(c), a child-custody determination made in aforeign country under factual circumstances insubstantial conformity with the jurisdictionalstandards of this [Act] must be recognized andenforced under [Article] 3.(c) A court of this State need not apply this [Act] ifthe child custody law of a foreign country violatesfundamental principles of human rights.

SECTION 302. ENFORCEMENT UNDERHAGUE CONVENTION. Under this [article] a court of this State mayenforce an order for the return of the child madeunder the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspectsof International Child Abduction as if it were achild-custody determination.

SECTION 102. DEFINITIONS. In this act:(3) “Convention” means the Convention on theInternational Recovery of Child Support and OtherForms of Family Maintenance, concluded at TheHague on November 23, 2007.

(5) “Foreign country” means a country, includinga political subdivision thereof, other than theUnited States, that authorizes the issuance ofsupport orders and: (A) which has been declared under the law of theUnited States to be a foreign reciprocatingcountry; (B) which has established a reciprocalarrangement for child support with this state asprovided in Section 308; (C) which has enacted a law or establishedprocedures for the issuance and enforcement ofsupport orders which are substantially similar tothe procedures under this act; or (D) in which the Convention is in force withrespect to the United States.(6) “Foreign support order” means a supportorder of a foreign tribunal.(7) “Foreign tribunal” means a court,administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity of aforeign country which is authorized to establish,

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enforce, or modify support orders or to determineparentage of a child. The term includes acompetent authority under the Convention.

SECTION 615. JURISDICTION TO MODIFYCHILD-SUPPORT ORDER OF FOREIGNCOUNTRY.(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 711,if a foreign country lacks or refuses to exercisejurisdiction to modify its child-support orderpursuant to its laws, a tribunal of this state mayassume jurisdiction to modify the child-supportorder and bind all individuals subject to thepersonal jurisdiction of the tribunal whether theconsent to modification of a child-support orderotherwise required of the individual pursuant toSection 611 has been given or whether theindividual seeking modification is a resident of thisstate or of the foreign country.(b) An order issued by a tribunal of this statemodifying a foreign child-support order pursuantto this section is the controlling order.

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