the impact of the electoral system on post-communist … · this paper uses a case study of the ......

F ~ U T T E R W O R T H I ' V E I N E M A N N

Electoral Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 377-398 Copyright © 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd

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The Impact o f the Electoral System o n Post -Communist Party Development: the Case o f the 1993 Russian Parliamentary

Elections

ROBERT G MOSER

Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, Burdine 536, Austin, TX, 78712-1087, USA

This paper uses a case study of the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections to explore the influence of proportional representation and plurality electoral systems on party formation in a post-communist regime. The mixed PR-plurality electoral system used by Russia in the 1993 elections is a particularly useful case for such analysis for it allows the simultane- ous study of these two electoral systems under the same set of social, economic, and cultural conditions. This study found that common emphasis placed on the number of parties allowed by PR versus plurality systems is misplaced in the context of Russian politics. The vital impact of electoral systems under post-communist conditions is their permeability to independent candidates. PR systems tend to impose party labels on the electorate and elites and thus bolster the status of parties as electoral agents. Plurality systems allow independents to compete on a level playing field with partisan candidates, robbing parties of the preferential treatment they need to get established in the initial years of democratic governance.

Elections are the raison d'dtre of political parties. By definition, political parties in

competi t ive polities exist in order to compete for government office through electoral contests (Epstein, 1967). This is one of the most crucial differences be t w e e n political parties, which try to capture political power, and other intermediary institutions, such as interests groups and the media, which only try to inf luence those already in power. Regularly held elections are a necessary but not sufficient condi t ion for the deve lopment of competi t ive political parties beyond a clandestine state or a superficial existence that thinly veils some authoritarian regimes. Many features of a party's existence are inextricably tied to elections. A party's survival and strength is measured in terms of electoral outcomes. Parties sustain a meaningful existence only if they can consistently gain a decisive amoun t of electoral support and a party 's strength is often measured in the n u m b e r of votes it can muster. Moreover, party systems are usually described by the n u m b e r of parties w inn ing substantial electoral support (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966; Sartori, 1976) and changes in these systems are marked by critical or realigning elections (Key, 1955).

Consequent ly , e lect ions occupy a special place in the study of party development . The first compet i t ive elect ions fol lowing the end of authori tar ian rule, in

378 The Case of the 1993 Russian Parliamentary Elections

par t icular , has r ece ived m u c h scholar ly a t tent ion. The founding e lec t ion is though t to p r o v o k e pol i t ical part ies , b r ing ing t h e m to the c e n t e r of the pol i t ical stage. Fur the rmore , the t iming, sequence , conduc t , and results of the founding e lec t ion are cons ide red to have a signif icant and lasting effect on the e m b r y o n i c pa r ty sys tem (O 'Donne l l and Schmit ter , 1986).

Besides p rov id ing the m e c h a n i s m th rough w h i c h par t ies f ind a reason for ex i s tence , e lec t ions also d i rec t ly affect the form and func t ion of par t ies and pa r ty systems. The e lec tora l system, that is, the m a n n e r in w h i c h an e lec t ion is con te s t ed and votes are t rans la ted into seats, great ly inf luences the n u m b e r and type of par t ies that deve lop . Poli t ical analysts s ince John Stuart Mill have d e b a t e d the c o n s e q u e n c e s of different types of ballots, magn i tudes of e lec tora l districts, and the benef i ts and liabili t ies of p lura l i ty versus p r o p o r t i o n a l r ep re sen t a t i on systems. I ndeed a w h o l e academic subf ie ld has e m e r g e d a round the in te r re la t ionsh ip b e t w e e n a s ta te ' s e lec tora l system, its pa r ty system, and the quali ty and stabil i ty of its gove rnmen t .

The 1993 pa r l i amenta ry e lec t ion was Russia 's founding e lect ion. This e lec t ion was no t the first na t ional compe t i t i ve e lec t ion to be he ld on Russian soil s ince the advent of democra t iza t ion . Nor was it the first e lec tora l con tes t to be he ld after the col lapse of c o m m u n i s t power , the Apri l 1993 r e f e r e ndum hold ing that honor . However , the 1993 e lec t ions marks a w a t e r s h e d in Russian pol i t ical d e v e l o p m e n t because it was the first ins tance of e lec tora l c o m p e t i t i o n for nat ional pub l i c office he ld u n d e r Russian (as o p p o s e d to Soviet) hegemony . It was also the first con tes t for pub l i c office to be freely and legally c o n t e s t e d on a mul t ipar ty basis un fe t t e red by man ipu la t ions of the once dominan t CPSU.

This art icle invest igates the impac t of the 1993 pa r l i amenta ry e lec t ion on the d e v e l o p m e n t of Russia 's pol i t ica l par t ies . It seeks to examine Russia 's 1993 parlia- men ta ry e l ec t ion f rom the pe r spec t i ve of e lec tora l engineer ing. W e r e Russia 's founding e lec t ions he ld in such a w a y as to p r o m o t e or h inde r pa r ty deve lopmen t? Did e lec tora l rules have the e x p e c t e d effects on Russian par t ies that compara t ive s tudies o f e lec tora l sys tems claim t h e m to have? In s tudying these ques t ions special a t ten t ion will be given to the centra l e l emen t of e lec tora l engineer ing: the e lec tora l system.

The 1993 pa r l i amen ta ry e lec t ion had m i x e d results for par ty d e v e l o p m e n t in Russia. It d id b r ing an e n h a n c e d status to e lec tora l b locs and part ies . The 13 e lec tora l organiza t ions on the pa r ty list ballot, even those recen t ly manufac tu red specif ical ly for the ensuing e lec t ion , en joyed a level of a t t en t ion and inf luence unpara l l e l ed in Russia 's pos t - communi s t expe r i ence . In this sense, the 1993 parlia- men ta ry e lec t ion ac ted accord ing to genera l e x p e c t a t i o n s for founding elect ions. The ho ld ing of e lec t ions p r o v i d e d a fo rum in w h i c h par t ies o c c u p i e d a centra l role. However , this n e w l y found status for Russia 's nascen t par t ies was par t ia l and superficial.

Inc reased par ty inf luence was par t ia l because par t ies con t ro l l ed the nomina t ions of only one of the th ree e lec tora l con tes t s for pub l i c office inc luded in the e lect ion. As will be exp l a ined in m o r e detai l be low, the 1993 e lec t ion was d iv ided into th ree separa te races, t w o for the l o w e r house and one for the u p p e r house . Seats to the l o w e r house , the State Duma, w e r e c h o s e n bo th on a pa r ty list PR basis and in s ingle-member , f irst-past- the-post races. Seats to the u p p e r house , the Federa t ion Council , w e r e c h o s e n in two-member , p lural i ty contes ts . Russian par t ies and e lec tora l b locs con t ro l l ed the nomina t ions in the PR con te s t by default because only reg i s te red par t ies w e r e a l lowed to run a list of candidates . No nonpar t i san lists of

ROBERT G MOSER 379

candidates were registered. In the plurality contests, independent candidates predominated. More than half of the individual candidates to the lower house were independents and a vast majority of candidates to the upper house were independents. Thus, despite the fact that public attention was focused on the 13 electoral blocs competing in the PR race, parties were thc primary electoral agent in only that one part of the election.

Moreover, this increased party influence and status was superficial in the sense that party organizations remained personalistic, organizationally amorphous, and ideologically ambiguous. While the 1993 election may have increased the stature of Russia's parties, it did little to improve on their organizational weakness, inces- sant infighting, or lack of reliable socio-economic constituencies. Like the party organizations preceding them, the electoral blocs that emerged to contest the 1993 election continued to be little more than vehicles for the well-known personalities that formed them.

To what extent can these shortcomings in party development be attributed to poor electoral engineering? It is argued here that the electoral system had a significant but limited effect on the emerging party system in Russia. The clcctoral system and pre-election registration requirements greatly determined who would be allowed to participate in the elections and even influenced the success and failure of individual parties.

However, as will be shown, the electoral system had some consequences that run counter to some of the most hallowed propositions in the scholarly literature on the subject. It is argued that the common emphasis on the number of parties allowed by PR and plurality systems is misplaced in the Russian context. Neither system was particularly adept at controlling the large numbers of new electoral associations trying their hand in the founding elections. Rather, the crucial difference between PR and plurality systems lay in their permeability toward independent candidates. PR systems bolstered the status of political parties by keeping independent candidates off the ballot and forcing elites and voters alike to think in terms of party affiliation. By contrast, single-member, first-past-the-post contests undermined party development by allowing independent candidates onto the ballot easily. By allowing powerful local elites the option to run unattached, this system denied parties the preferential treatment they need to thrive in the initial years of electoral competition in post-communist states.

Electoral Systems and Parties

The electoral system is the most commonly cited instrument of political engineering affecting parties and party systems. The study of the impact of electoral systems on party systems has a long tradition and strong claims to universal generalizabil- ity regardless of geopolitical status, socio-economic development, or culture. This subfield has benefitted from the fact that its subject matter-votes and seats-are easily operationalized and measured and hence comparable across a wide variety of cases (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). Moreover, there has developed a relatively strong scholarly consensus that the electoral system does have a significant effect on a country 's party system. While scholars have modified Duvcrger's strongly- worded law and hypothesis which sparked the modern debate, few scholars have argued that the choice of electoral system has no effect on a country's party system.


Scholars have ou t l ined several genera l features u p o n w h i c h to ca tegor ize e lec tora l systems. These inc lude the s t ruc tures of the ballot, dis t r ic t magni tude , and alloca- t ion rules (Rae, 1971; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). There are also o the r more specif ic e l emen t s of e lec tora l laws such as vot ing th resho lds and dis t r ic t appor - t i o n m e n t w h i c h may also have impor t an t effects for pa r ty de ve lopme n t .

The s t ruc ture of the bal lot c o n c e r n s the mechan i c s of the vo te itself, that is, the type of cho i ce vo te rs are g iven w h e n dec id ing b e t w e e n e lec tora l contes tants . Two types o f bal lots have b e e n observed: ca tegor ic and ordinal. Categor ic bal lots requi re voters to make an unequ ivoca l dec i s ion for one cand ida te or pa r ty over all others . Ordinal bal lots a l low voters to make a more c o m p l e x dec i s ion by a l lowing t h e m to rank cand ida tes or par t ies . Holding o t h e r factors constant , ca tegor ic bal lots are e x p e c t e d to cons t ra in the n u m b e r of par t ies by concen t r a t i ng each vo te into a single manda te for a single contes tant , wh i l e ord ina l bal lots are e x p e c t e d to diffuse the vo te rs ' manda te s among a large n u m b e r of par t ies (Rae, 1971; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989).

One fac tor no t addres sed in the compara t ive l i te ra ture on bal lot s t ruc ture is the issue of nonpar t i sansh ip , w h i c h we ighs heavi ly in the 1993 Russian pa r l i amenta ry elect ions. However , the effect of nonpar t i s an bal lots is d i scussed in the l i tera ture on state and mun ic ipa l e lec t ions in the US w h e r e nonpar t i san e lec t ions m a k e u p c lose to two- th i rds of the e lec t ions at this level (Cassel, 1986). Scholars of Amer ican nonpar t i s an e lec t ions have found that r emova l of pa r ty labels f rom the bal lot largely s u c c e e d e d in marginal iz ing pa r ty act ivi ty in mun ic ipa l e lect ions. Adrian found that after the a d o p t i o n of the nonpar t i s an bal lot par ty act ivi ty was a lmost always incon- sequent ia l in the e lec t ion of candida tes even in cases w h e r e par t ies c o n t i n u e d to try to assume the i r t radi t ional m o n o p o l y over e lec t ive office (Adrian, 1959). Moreover , the vot ing dec i s ion itself was found to be of a different cha rac te r in nonpar t i san elect ions. W i t h o u t pa r ty labels to give then cues as to the po l i cy pos i t ions of candidates , voters in nonpar t i san e lec t ions t e n d e d to p lace more emphas i s on pe r sona l charac ter i s t ics of the candida te . Empir ical research suggests that vo te rs in nonpar t i s an e lec t ions t e n d e d to be more in f luenced by the a s sumed c thnic i ty of candida tes ' su rnames and even the o rde r in w h i c h candida tes ' names appea red . Whereas , such factors p layed little role in similar e lec t ions w h e r e partisan labels w e r e inc luded on the bal lot (Cassel, 1986). Finally, the nonpar t i san bal lot may actual ly change the vo te rs ' p e r c e p t i o n of the value and role of par t i san affiliation, cu ing voters to d i s regard par t i san affiliation of candida tes even w h e n it is genera l ly k n o w n by the vot ing publ ic . Adrian (1959) wri tes :

. . . t h e voting public views participation in partisan and nonpartisan elections as two different kinds of activity, each independent of the other; and the nonpartisan office-holder is normally expected by the voting public to keep any party activity on his part separate from his role in nonpartisan office.

It mus t be n o t e d tha t no t all na t iona l e l ec t ions have i n c l u d e d pa r t i san descr ip- t ions o f cand ida tes . For e x a m p l e , ba l lo ts in Grea t Britain have on ly r e c e n t l y intro- d u c e d cand ida t e d e s c r i p t i o n s o f any k ind on to the ballot . H o w e v e r , British pa r t i e s w e r e we l l - e s t ab l i shed long be fo re c o m p e t i t i v e e l ec t ions w i t h universa l suffrage w e r e held. Brit ish pa r t i e s c o n t r o l l e d the n o m i n a t i o n p r o c e s s and the par t i san affil- ia t ion o f cand ida t e s was qu i te c lea r to all. Thus, m e c h a n i c a l cons t r a in t s such as n o n p a r t i s a n bal lo ts are on ly ef fec t ive w h e n the role of pa r t i e s as e l ec to ra l agents

ROBERT G MOSER 381

is vu lne rab le , such as local A m e r i c a n po l i t i c s and, as wi l l be seen, c o n t e m p o r a r y Russian pol i t ics .

Distr ict magn i tude ( the n u m b e r of legislat ive seats ass igned to each e lec tora l dis t r ic t ) and a l loca t ion rules (p lura l i ty sys tems versus PR) shou ld be c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r because they are so i n t e r connec t ed . Plurali ty a l locat ion rules in w h i c h v ic tory is ach ieved by winn ing m o r e votes than any o t h e r c o n t e n d e r in the dis t r ic t is a lmost a lways c o u p l e d w i th a low dis t r ic t magn i tude (M), usual ly M = 1. P ropor t iona l r epresen ta t ion , in w h i c h seats are d i s t r ibu ted accord ing to a c o n t e n d e r ' s p r o p o r t i o n of the vote , requi res a dis t r ic t magn i tude g rea te r than one and be t t e r a p p r o x i m a t e s its i n t e n d e d effect of p ropor t i ona l i t y b e t w e e n a pa r ty ' s share of legislat ive seats and its p r o p o r t i o n of the p o p u l a r vote as dis t r ic t magnitudes get larger. Consequent ly , scholars have found that dis t r ic t magn i tude ra ther than a l locat ion rule was the dec is ive e l e m e n t in an e lec tora l sys tem affect ing the n u m b e r of par t ies in a po l i ty (Rae, 1971; Taagepe ra and Shugart, 1989).

Plurali ty sys tems w i th l ow dis t r ic t magn i tudes ( typica l ly s ing le -membcr dis tr ic ts) t end to cons t ra in the n u m b e r o f par t ies and of ten lead to two-par ty systems. This is because s ing le -member distr icts severe ly pena l ize par t ies that canno t ob ta in a plural i ty o f the vo te in any one district . Over t ime, suppo r t e r s of w e a k par t ies wil l t i re of "wast ing ' the i r vo te on a con t inua l loser and t end to shift the i r s u p p o r t to a pa r ty more l ikely to w i n represen ta t ion . Moreover , leaders of m i n o r par t ies may be cons t r a ined f rom even runn ing candida tes be c a use they have no h o p e of achiev- ing the plural i ty necessa ry for r ep re sen t a t i on (Duverger , 1954).

Conversely , mu l t i -member distr icts and p r o p o r t i o n a l r ep re sen t a t i on t end to be co r re l a t ed w i th mul t i -par ty d e m o c r a c i e s and coal i t ion government s . This is because vo tes for smal ler par t ies are not w a s t e d as they are in s ing le -member plural i ty distr icts . Ins tead of having to w in plural i t ies in small distr icts , par t ies in PR sys tcms are a w a r d e d scats accord ing to the i r p r o p o r t i o n of the p o p u l a r vo te in larger, multi- m e m b e r distr icts . Again, dis t r ic t magn i tude is a decis ive fac tor in de t e rmin ing the p ropor t i ona l i t y of PR sys tems and the level of par ty prol i fera t ion. At l o w dis t r ic t magn i tude levels (M < 5), even PR sys tems t end to favor larger par t ies at the e x p e n s e of smal ler ones to the e x t e n t that the i r legislat ive seat d i s t r ibu t ions more c losely r e semble the 'p lura l i ty ' p r inc ip le than anyth ing p r o p o r t i o n a l to the e lec tora l d i s t r ibu t ion of the p o p u l a r vote. At dis t r ic t magn i tudes of five and above, the level of p ropo r t i ona l i t y is m o r e accep tab le . However , for par t ies rece iv ing m o r e minus- cule p e r c e n t a g e s of thc p o p u l a r vo te (5 p e r cen t and less), t hey can not h o p e for r ep re sen t a t i on unti l dis t r ic t magn i tudes reach 20 o r more . Because of this, Taagepe ra and Shugart argue that e lec tora l sys tems should be c ons ide r e d along a c o n t i n u u m of p ropo r t i ona l i t y ra ther than as a d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n plural i ty and PR sys tems (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989).

It should be n o t e d that the link b e t w e e n e lec tora l sys tems and the n u m b e r of par t ies is no t d i rec t ly causal. S ing le -member p lura l i ty sys tems do no t c rea te two- par ty sys tems on the i r o w n and mu l t i -member PR sys tems do no t cause pa r ty proliferat ion. Rather, e lec tora l sys tems are like filters w h i c h cons t ra in and channe l a coun t ry ' s pre-exis t ing conf igura t ion o f pol i t ical forces. Plurali ty sys tems w i th l ow dis t r ic t magn i tudes arc p o w e r f u l filters w h i c h t end to cons t ra in pol i t ica l forces and force t h e m to conso l ida te into larger e lec to ra l coal i t ions capab le of w inn ing plural- i t ies in a large n u m b e r of geograph ica l ly d i spe r sed e lec tora l distr icts . As dis t r ic t magn i tudes g r o w and PR sys tems arc a d o p t e d the fi l ter of the e lec tora l sys tem gets w e a k e r and a l lows the conf igura t ion of a coun t ry ' s pol i t ica l forces to e xp re s s i tself


in its natural, and oRen times, more fractionalized state (Sartori, 1966). However, as the oR-cited case of Austria shows, PR systems can coincide wi th two-party systems if social cleavages are such that they are effectively expressed by two major

parties.

The Russian Electoral System: Combing Two Extremes

The 1993 Russian electoral system combined single-member plurality district races wi th a party-list PR system containing one nation-wide district magni tude of 225 seats;

thus combin ing the two extremes along the plurality-PR c on t i nuum in one system

(Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). Before the campaign even began, electoral blocs and individual candidates were required to collect signatures to appear on the ballot. Parties and electoral blocs wishing to field a party list in the national PR contest were required to collect 100,000 signatures. Moreover, these signatures had to come from a reasonably wide geographical distribution. Signatures had to come from different

administrative districts with no more than 15 per cent of the signatures coming from any one district. Essentially, this meant that blocs had to collect signatures from at

least seven administrative regions (Rossiiskie vesti, 12 October 1993). Individual candidates for the s ingle-member districts to the State Duma could get

onto the ballot e i ther by being nomina t ed by an electoral bloc w h i c h met the signature r equ i remen t for the party list votc or by gathering signatures cqual to 1 per

cent of the n u m b e r of registered voters in his or her electoral district, typically about 5000 signatures (Rossiiskie vesti, 12 October 1993). Candidates to the uppe r house could be nomina t ed by a registered electoral bloc or gather signatures equal to 2 per cent of the registered voters in his or her administrat ive region but no less

than 25,000. The elect ions to the u p p e r house were dua l -member plurality contests. The districts for these seats were based on the administrat ive regions of the Russian Federat ion (republics, krais, oblasts, au tonomous oblasts and au tonomous okrngs) m u c h like the US Senate 's district are based on the 50 states. Each of the 89 administrative regions of the Russian Federat ion was granted two seats in the Federat ion Counci l (Ukaz Prezidenta, 'O vyborakh v Sovet Federa t s i i . . . ' ) .

The 1993 electoral system used a categoric ballot forcing the voter to give his or

her mandate to only one candidate or bloc. However, the Russian voter was given one addit ional choice no t c o m m o n l y found on ballots in the West. He or she could vote against all the candidates listed by marking the box 'against all' (protiv w'ekh) at the bo t tom of the ballot. This is a holdover from the Soviet era w h e n voters did no t vote for candidates bu t ra ther crossed out the names of candidates they did not support . In that period, voters could vote against all the choices by just crossing out all of the names. In the end, while the n u m b e r of votes against all candidates or blocs showed the frustrat ion and confus ion of the Russian voter, these were essentially wasted votes because they did not invalidate the e lect ion no matter h o w many voted that way.

Certain legal thresholds were also employed. In the party list PR contest , a legal threshold of 5 per cen t of the nat ional vote was established before any party list could gain representa t ion. For s ingle-member plurality races, a m i n i m u m of 25 per cen t of an electoral district 's registered voters had to turnout . This threshold only invalidated races in six electoral districts. In one of these, in Chechnya, electoral sites were no t o p e n and the e lect ion was no t held. In the five others in Tatarstan, the local elite called on the popula t ion to boycot t the elect ions and the tu rnou t

ROBERT G MOSER 383

was wel l b e l o w the 25 p e r cen t th reshold . T w o legal th resho lds w e r e r equ i r ed to val idate the e lec t ion to the u p p e r house . At least th ree cand ida tes had to con te s t the t w o seats up for e lec t ion and 25 p e r cen t of reg i s te red vo te rs had to tu rnou t for the e lect ions .

The plural i ty races for b o t h the l o w e r and u p p e r houses w e r e c o n t e s t e d on a nonpar t i s an ballot . The bal lot l is ted a cand ida te ' s name, year of bir th, occupa t ion , and r e s idence but no t his or he r par t i san affiliation or lack thereof . In format ion on a cand ida te ' s par t i san affiliation cou ld be ga ined only f rom med ia coverage and a cand ida te ' s pe r sona l campaign . Given the low level of vo t e r k n o w l e d g e and inter- est in this pa r t of the campa ign bo th sources failed to inform many vote rs abou t the par t i san a t t achmen t s of the individual cand ida tes in these races.

The Russian e lec tora l sys tem c o m b i n e d PR and plura l i ty sys tems as i n d e p e n d e n t par t s of the same system. This is different f rom the Ge rman sys tem of 'personal - ized PR', w h i c h also c o m b i n e s e l emen t s of bo th plural i ty and PR sys tems in a two- t i e red e lec tora l system. However , in the G e r m a n system, the resul ts o f the p lura l i ty and PR con tes t s are i n t e r connec t ed . After the results of the s ing le -member plurality con tes t s are c o m p u t e d , par t ies are a w a r d e d the n u m b e r of seats roughly p ropor - t ional to the i r share of the na t ional vote in the PR con te s t minus the n u m b e r of seats they w o n in the p lura l i ty contes ts . In this w a y par t ies den i ed p r o p o r t i o n a l r ep re sen t a t i on in the p lura l i ty con tes t s are c o m p e n s a t e d by the concu r r en t ly he ld PR race (Rae, 1971).

As in some o the r pos t - communi s t states such as Bulgaria, Russian e lec tora l eng ineers p r o v i d e d for no such link b e t w e e n PR and plural i ty systems in the m i x e d sys tem (see Nadais, 1992). Parties and b locs w e r e a w a r d e d all o f the seats t hey w o n in bo th races regardless of w h e t h e r the d is t r ibu t ion of seats to the State Duma c o i n c i d e d w i t h the d is t r ibu t ion of votes in e i ther one of the e lec tora l races. As will be seen, the results of the t w o e lec t ions w e r e vastly different , not only in the degree of p ropor t iona l i ty , bu t also in the relat ive success of individual par t ies .

The Impact of the Pre-election Registration Rules

Before the e lec tora l campa ign even began, the regis t ra t ion rules p layed a significant role in de te rmin ing the n u m b e r and type of par t ies that w o u l d par t i c ipa te in the elect ions. Certain types of par t ies w e r e res t r ic ted f rom par t i c ipa t ion e i ther th rough d i rec t pres ident ia l dec ree or rules making it difficult for such par t ies to ge t on the ballot. The mos t virulent oppos i t i on groups, w h i c h w e r e engaged in the violent a t t empts to o v e r t h r o w the Yeltsin regime, we re b a n n e d f rom par t i c ipa t ion by decree . On 4 October , Yeltsin su spended a n u m b e r of oppos i t i on g roups and publi- cations, inc luding the Communi s t Party of the Russian Federa t ion , w h i c h la ter was a l lowed to par t i c ipa te in the e lec t ions (see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 O c t o b e r 1993). Whi le this official censor sh ip den i ed the oppos i t i on some of its mos t n o t e w o r t h y leaders and publ ica t ions , it d id no t exc lude the i r reconci lab le oppos i t i on f rom compet i t ion . In fact, this ac t ion may have unin tent ional ly h e l p e d to consol ida te the nat ional is t oppos i t i on by r idding the field of c o m p e t i n g blocs wi th a non-communist oppos i t ion i s t or ientat ion. The non-communi s t p ro tes t vote had few op t ions o the r than Vladimir Zhi r inonsky ' s Liberal Democra t i c Party to exp res s itsclf.

Similarly, the r e q u i r e m e n t of the co l lec t ion of 100,000 s ignatures for regis t ra t ion e x c l u d e d a signif icant n u m b e r of wou ld -be e lec tora l con tenders . Upon announce- men t of this c r i te r ion for pa r t i c ipa t ion the po ten t ia l field was instant ly n a r r o w e d


f rom the a lmost endless myr iad of small g roups and c l iques (Rossiiskaya gazeta, 14 O c t o b e r 1993 pub l i shed a list of 92 social associa t ions w h o cou ld legally p r e s e n t candida tes ) to less than t w o d o z e n ser ious organiza t ions that cou ld feasibly pu t t oge the r a pe t i t ion campaign . This g roup was fur ther wh i t t l ed d o w n to 13 by the 100,000 s ignature th reshold .

Ano the r target of reg is t ra t ion rules was e thnica l ly based part ies . Many of Russia 's e thn ic minor i t ies have the i r o w n adminis t ra t ive distr icts . Of 89 adminis t ra t ive subjects , the Russian Federa t ion conta ins 32 e thn ic -based adminis t ra t ive regions: 21 republ ics , 10 a u t o n o m o u s okrugs, and the Jewish A u t o n o m o u s Oblast . However , the t i tular na t ional i ty does no t necessar i ly make up a plural i ty of the p o p u l a t i o n in its o w n repub l i c o r a u t o n o m o u s oblast. In fact, in some e thn ic -based regions the t i tular nat ional i ty does not even make up the s e c o n d largest g roup after Russians in the region. For example , in Bashkortostan, Russians cons t i tu te 39 p e r cen t of the r epub l i c ' s popu la t ion , Tatars 28 p e r cent , and Bashkirs only 22 p e r cent . For the p u r p o s e s of this s tudy ' e thn ic -based region ' wil l refer to those 32 adminis t ra t ive distr icts n a m e d for a non-Russian e thn ic group.

Such a federal a r r angemen t has t e n d e d to pol i t ic ize e thnic i ty . Since the b r e a kup of the Soviet Union, many of Russia 's e thn ic -based r epub l i c s have dec l a red the i r sovere ignty and s t ruggled to gain a u t o n o m y and even i n d e p e n d e n c e f rom Moscow. Chechnya and Tatars tan s tand as the mos t e x t r e m e e x a m p l e s of this push for political and e c o n o m i c sovereignty. By requi r ing that no more than 15 p e r cen t of a b loc ' s valid s ignatures c o m e f rom onc region, regis t ra t ion rules great ly u n d e r m i n e d the fo rmat ion of e thnica l ly based e lec tora l blocs. As in tended , no e lec tora l b loc r ep re sen t ing a par t i cu la r na t ional i ty (e.g. Tatars, Bashkirs) nor any b loc represent - ing the in teres ts of e thn ic -based areas as a w h o l e was able to get on the pa r ty list ballot.

However , an u n i n t e n d e d c o n s e q u e n c e o f this move may have b e e n the disen- gagemen t of e thn ic -based regions f rom par ty poli t ics . None of the reg i s te red par t ies and b locs was able to recru i t a s ignif icant n u m b e r o f successful el i tes f rom these regions into the emerg ing pa r ty system. At the same t ime, e thn ic i ty s e e m e d to remain a sal ient fac tor in the e lec t ion of r ep resen ta t ives in e thn ic -based areas. Whi le only 16 of 178 w inn ing cand ida tes in Russian regions w e r e non-Russian (9 p e r cent) , 23 out of 40 w inn ing candida tes in e thn ic -based reg ions w e r e non-Russian (58 p e r cenO. Conce rn ing the latter, 19 of 23 non-Russians e l ec t ed in e thn ic -based regions w e r e m e m b e r s of the t i tular nat ional i ty of the reg ion f rom w h i c h they w e r e e l ec ted ( In terna t ional Republ ica l Inst i tute, 1994).

Table 1 shows a c o m p a r i s o n of the level of par t i sansh ip in Russian versus ethnic- based r e g i o n s ) In the p lura l i ty contes t , e thn ic -based regions w e r e dec ided ly less par t i san than Russian regions. The average p r o p o r t i o n of par t i san candida tes running in an e lec tora l dis t r ic t was signif icantly l o w e r in e thn ic -based regions. Electoral dis tr icts in e thn ic -based regions averaged 27 p e r cen t par t i san candida tes whi le dis tr icts in Russian regions averaged 50 p e r cen t par t i san candidates . There was also a m a r k e d d i f ference in the success of par t i san candida tes runn ing in ethnic- based regions. Only seven out of 40 w inn ing candida tes (17.5 p e r cen t ) f rom an e thn ic -based reg ion w e r e par t i san candidates ; whi l e 76 out of 178 winn ing candidates (42.7 p e r cen t ) in Russian regions had an official par t i san affiliation. Finally, the c o m p l e t e absence of par t i san act ivi ty in s ing le -member distr icts was more c o m m o n in e thn ic -based than in Russian districts. Of 40 e lec tora l dis tr icts f rom e thn ic -based regions, e leven (27.5 p e r cen t ) w e r e c o m p l e t e l y nonpar t i san w i th no

ROBERT G MOSER

TABLE 1. Partisan activity in Russian versus ethnic-based regions

385

Type of district Average % of % (No.) of totally % (No.) of elected partisan candidates non-partisan candidates that had

per district districts* partisan affiliation

Ethnic-based districts (N = 40) 27 27.5 (11) 17.5 (7) Russian districts (N = 178) 50 4.5 (8) 42.7 (76)

Source: Rossiiskaya gazeta, 30 November 1993, pp. 4-5. *Defined as districts with no partisan candidates.

cand ida tes wi th a p r o c l a i m e d pa r ty affiliation; c o m p a r e d to e ight nonpa r t i s an con tes t s (4.5 p e r cen t ) out of 178 in Russian e lec tora l distr icts .

Of course , c i t izens in e thn ic -based reg ions w e r e fo r ced to make a cho i ce a m o n g par t ies in the PR race. Table 2 c o m p a r e s the act ivi ty and success in e thn ic -based regions of seven par t ies and b locs w h i c h o v e r c a m e the nat ional 5 p e r cen t thres- ho ld for r epresen ta t ion . 2 Results in the PR race for e thn ic -based regions re f lec ted some of the genera l t r ends found in the rest of the country . Like Russian regions, Zhi r inovsky ' s LDP w o n the grea tes t share of the PR vo te in e thn ic -based reg ions a l though at a s o m e w h a t l o w e r pe rcen tage . However , e thn ic -based regions t e n d e d to be m o r e communi s t -o r i en t ed p r o b a b l y at the e x p e n s e of Russia 's Cho ice w h i c h p e r f o r m e d m o r e poo r ly in e thn ic -based reg ions than in the rest of the count ry . The se l f -proc la imed 'par ty of the regions ' Sergei Shakhrai ' s Party o f Russian Unity and Acco rd (PRES) s h o w e d the grea tes t i m p r o v e m e n t in e thn ic -based regions , a lmost doub l ing its p r o p o r t i o n of the PR vo te f rom 6.7 p e r cen t for the coun t ry as a w h o l e to 12.0 p e r cen t for non-Russian regions.

As for the s ing le -member p lura l i ty contes ts , no pa r ty was par t icu la r ly successful in gaining r ep re sen t a t i on in any par t of Russia. However , par t ies and e lec tora l b locs w e r e vir tual ly shut ou t of e thn ic -based regions. Part of the p r o b l e m was a lack o f pa r ty p e n e t r a t i o n into e thn ic -based regions. Most b locs c o n t e s t e d a lmost tw ice the p r o p o r t i o n of Russian distr icts than e thn ic -based distr icts . PRES was the only e lec tora l pa r ty to field cand ida tes in bo th Russian and e thn ic -based reg ions at c o m p a r a b l e rates. However , PRES failed to gain a signif icant n u m b e r o f seats f rom this i nc reased p e n e t r a t i o n into e thn ic -based areas, w inn ing only t w o seats. This may have b e e n m o r e a func t ion of the genera l lack of success of PRES cand ida tes in the s ing le -member distr icts than a par t i cu la r ant i-part isan sen t imen t among the e lec to ra te in e thn ic -based distr icts . The pa r ty w o n only two scats in Russian single- m e m b e r distr icts .

It might be a rgued that the lack of par t i san act ivi ty in e thn ic -based reg ions arose f rom o the r factors bes ides e thnici ty . Ethnic-based regions, par t icu lar ly a u t o n o m o u s okrugs, t end to be sparse ly popu la t ed , u n d e r d e v e l o p e d regions. Pe rhaps par t ies and e lec tora l b locs s imply ignored these areas beca use they lay on the coun t ry ' s poli t- ical, social, and e c o n o m i c pe r iphe ry . However , the ra t ional i ty i m p o s e d by the e lec tora l sys tem w o u l d suggest o therwise . The sys tem actual ly o v e r r e p r e s e n t e d the sparse ly p o p u l a t e d e thn ic -based regions by award ing each subjec t of the f ede ra t ion at least one e lec tora l dis t r ic t regardless of popu la t ion , no t to m e n t i o n t w o seats in the u p p e r house . Th i r t een e lec tora l dis tr icts had less than 200,000 reg is te red voters . Ml of these w e r e loca ted in non-Russian a u t o n o m o u s oblasts and republ ics , w i th the smallest con ta in ing only 13,863 el igible voters . The average of e l igible vo te rs

3 8 6 The Case of the 1993 Russian Parliamentary Elections

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ROBERT G MOSER 387

for each electoral district was 472,000 (Biuleten', 1994). Thus, a party or bloc that was able to capture the electorate of an ethnic-based region would be overcom- pensated.

It is not suggested here that the existence of ethnically based parties would be beneficial for the development of a multiparty system in Russia. Often times ethnically based parties lead to polarization of political forces and even threaten the stability and territorial integrity of the state. This is why they are often restricted through electoral rules similar to those used in the 1993 Russian elections (see Horowitz, 1985). What is argued here is that the absence of ethnically bascd parties did not remove or in any way help alleviate the problem of ethnicity in Russian politics. None of the parties or blocs effectively coopted elites or electorates in ethnic-based regions. Thus, nationalist sentiment had to find expression in other ways such as the boycott of the December elections engineered by the Tatar leadership that invalidated the election in Tatarstan.

The Impact o f the PR Party List Contest

The results of the 1993 elections were greatly influenced by the rules by which votes were translated into legislative seats. These rules not only influenced the number of parties that would comprise the emcrging party system; they also influenced what type of parties would gain representation. Given the drastically different results between the PR and plurality contests, the choice of electoral system may even have had a hand in the succcss and failure of individual parties.

By combining plurality and PR contests for seats in its lower house, the Russian electoral system provides the unique opportunity to study the impact of these two types of electoral systems within the same political system at the same time. Therefore, first the PR and plurality contests will be examined separately. An analysis will be made on what type of party system each would have produced indepen- dently. Then the party system that emerged in the State Duma out of the mixed PR-plurality system will be analyzed.

Electoral studies have tended to focus on the impact electoral systems have on the number of parties allowed representation in the legislature. As noted above, PR systems are thought to be more permissive, allowing more proliferation of political parties, while plurality systems tend to constrain the number of parties. When examined separately, the PR and plurality contests of the 1993 Russian elections fail to support this basic assertion. As expected, the PR component of the system allowed the representation of a large number of electoral blocs. However, the single-member plurality contests did not work to constrain the number of parties any more than the PR system.

Table 3 shows the distribution of seats for parties in the PR party list race. As expected, the PR contest allowed a large number of parties to gain representation. Of the 13 electoral blocs on the ballot, eight blocs overcame the five per cent legal threshold required to win scats in the PR contcst. The Laasko and Taagepera effective number of parties index was used to determine the number of parties produced by each electoral system. The Laasko and Taagepera effective number of parties index is designed to determine the number of parties in a party system taking into account each party's relative size. This index can be based on either the proportion of the electoral vote (Nv) or on the proportion of seats a party receives after these votes are translated into seats (N,). By comparing the effective number of


TABtE 3. Results of PR Party-list contest

Electoral Bloc % of Nation-wide % (No.) of seats PR vote from PR contest*

Deviation between % of votes and % of seats

(dev. as % of column 1)

Russia's Choice 15.51 17.78 (40) +2.27 (+14.6) Yabloko 7.86 8.89 (20) +1.03 (+13.1) PRES 6.73 8.00 (18) +1.27 (+18.8) Democratic Party of 5.52 6.22 (14) +0.70 (+12.7) Russia Agrarian Party 7.99 9.33 (21) +1.34 (+16.8) Communist Party 12.40 14.22 (32) +1.82 (+14.7) Liberal Democratic 22.92 26.22 (59) +3.30 (+14.4) Party Women of Russia 8.13 9.33 (21) +1.20 (+14.8) tRussian Mvt. for 4.08 0 (0.0) -4.08 (-100) Democratic Reforms tCivic Union 1.93 0 (0.0) -1.93 (-100) tDignity and Charity 0.70 0 (0.0) -0.70 (-100) *Future of Russia 1.25 0 (0.0) -1.25 (-100) tKEDR ecology bloc 0.76 0 (0.0) -0.76 (-100)

*percentage in brackets refers to the seats won as a percentage of the total in the PR contest (225). ?denotes bloc that did not gain enough seats to form legislative fraction. Sources: Russia: Election Observation Report, 12 December 1993,

(Washington DC: International Republican Institute, January, 1994). Biulleten" tsentral'noi komissii Rossiskoi Federatsii, No. 1, 1994.

seats available

electoral parties (N,) wi th the effective n u m b e r of par l iamentary parties (IV,) one

can de te rmine the effect of the electoral system on the n u m b e r of parties (see Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). Both PR and plurali ty systems tend to const ra in the

n u m b e r of parties and favor larger parties, the former to a m u c h lesser ex ten t than the latter. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) argue that electoral systems in general t end to reduce the effective n u m b e r of parties by an average of about one half of a party (iV., = N, - 0.4).

The effective n u m b e r of electoral parties for the PR part of the 1993 Russian elect ions was 7.58. 3 In comparat ive perspect ive, 7.58 effective electoral parties is quite high. According to Taagepera and Shugart 's (1989) analysis of 48 countr ies

in the 1980s only Ecuador (10.3) had a higher n u m b e r of effective electoral parties. In compar i son to pos t -communis t compet i t ive elect ions in Eastern Europe, 7.58 remains on the high end wi th only the 1992 Polish party system wi th 10.9 effective parties be ing more fractionalized (McGregor, 1993). This shows that not only did a large n u m b e r of parties and blocs contes t the e lect ion for this part of the electoral system, bu t that the vote was dis t r ibuted in such a way that no one or two parties were clearly dominant . Therefore, despite the press coverage on the surpris ing showing of the LDP, the vote in the PR contes t was rather evenly distrib- uted.

The effective n u m b e r of legislative parties for the PR por t ion of the vote was 6.40. Thus, thc PR system cons t ra ined the n u m b e r of parties gaining legislative representa t ion by over one effective party. This suggests that the legal threshold of

ROBERT G MOSER 389

five p e r cen t d id have its i n t e n d e d effect to some degree . However , c loser exami- na t ion of the vote d i s t r ibu t ion w o u l d suggest that the five p e r cen t legal t h r e sho ld was no t h igh e n o u g h to encou rage substant ia l p re -e lec t ion coal i t ion-bui lding. Most ser ious par t ies f igured they cou ld o v e r c o m e the bar r ie r and only one, the Russian M o v e m e n t for Democra t i c Reforms (RDDR), was mis taken. Indeed , the five p e r cen t t h r e sho ld only d e n i e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to the mos t marginal part ies . The total share of the vo te for the five par t ies den i ed r ep re sen t a t i on be c a use of the t h re sho ld to ta l led a mere 8.7 p e r cen t of the total vote . Many b locs e n t e r e d the race expec t - ing little m o r e than to o v e r c o m e the five p e r cen t bar r ie r and secure e l ec t ion for the i r h ighes t p l a c e d elites. This is in fact w h a t mos t of the b locs m a n a g e d to accom- plish. Five out o f e ight b locs ga ined less than ten p e r cen t of the vote. A h igher t h r e sho ld of ten p e r cen t may have had a m u c h s t ronger cons t ra in ing inf luence on the pa r ty system. This w o u l d have den i ed r ep re sen t a t i on to all bu t the th ree s t ronges t par t ies (Russia 's Choice, LDP, and the Communis t s ) . Faced w i th a s o m e w h a t m o r e formidable barr ier , some of the smal ler par t ies may have consid- e red coal i t ion m o r e seriously.

T h e I m p a c t o f t h e S i n g l e - m e m b e r F i r s t - p a s t - t h e - p o s t C o n t e s t s

Whi le the PR resul ts s h o w e d an e x p e c t e d pro l i fe ra t ion of par t ies , the impac t of the p lura l i ty p o r t i o n of the e l ec t ion was surpr is ing in its inabil i ty to cons t ra in the n u m b c r of par t ies w inn ing represen ta t ion . S ing le -member f irst-past- the-post e lec t ions are s u p p o s e d to e n c o u r a g e pre-e lec tora l conso l ida t ion of l ike-minded pol i t ical forces in to larger part ies . Small par t ies are p r e suma b ly p u n i s h e d for the i r inabil i ty to w in a signif icant n u m b e r of plural i t ies in individual distr icts . Consequent ly , t hey do no t w in sufficient r ep re sen t a t i on to sustain ex i s t ence or do no t even b o t h e r to run candida tes . This d id no t o c c u r in the 1993 Russian e lec t ions . Table 4 shows the d i s t r ibu t ion of seats among the 12 reg is te red par t ies and th ree pos t -e lec t ion legislat ive fact ions that had w in n ing cand ida tes in s ing le -member distr icts . Only the eco log ica l bloc, KEDR, d id not manage to e lec t at least one of its cand ida tes in the s ing le -member dis t r ic t races. In the e lec t ion , the p lura l i ty sys tem actual ly a l lowed m o r e par t ies and e lec tora l b locs (12) to w i n at least one seat than the PR sys tem wi th its five p e r cen t threshold . This is not en t i re ly surpris- ing. Rae (1971) po in t s ou t that p lural i ty sys tems actual ly have a l o w e r th re sho ld for the en t r ance of n e w par t ies than PR sys tems because they only requi re that a pa r ty win a p lura l i ty in one distr ict . This is f ewer votes than a legal or cffcct ive threshold in PR sys tems w h i c h requi re a p r o p o r t i o n of the na t ional vote to ach ieve repre- sentat ion. If one inc luded the par t ies that fai led to mee t regis t ra t ion r equ i r emen t s bu t m a n a g e d to e lec t the i r lcadcrs as i n d e p e n d e n t cand ida tcs (for example , Irina Khakamada (Party of Economic Freedom) , Nikolai Lysenko (Nat ional Repub l i can Party), and Sergei Baburin (Russian M1-Peoples Union) all w o n seats as i n d e p e n d e n t candida tes) , the n u m b e r of par t ies a l lowed r ep re sen t a t i on w o u l d be even higher . Moreover , the p lura l i ty e l ec t ion also s p a w n e d an addi t ional th ree legislat ive fact ions (bes ides the e ight fact ions based on the e lec tora l b locs w h i c h w o n r ep re sen t a t i on in the PR con tesO c o m p o s e d p r e d o m i n a n t l y of r ep resen ta t ives w h o had no partisan affiliation dur ing the e lec t ion .

Some p r o b l e m s w i th the data and the very na ture of the results f rom the single- m e m b e r dis t r ic ts make it difficult to d e t e r m i n e the effect o f the p lura l i ty sys tem on the n u m b e r o f par t ies in the emerg ing par ty system. First, no na t ion-wide vo te totals


TABLE 4. Results of single-member plurality districts

Electoral bloc or No. elected No. of No. joining Total joining faction under party independents from leg. faction

label joining bloc or different faction blocs

Russia's Choice 29 8 1 35 Yabloko 7 0 0 7 PRES 4 7 3 12 Democratic Party 2 0 0 1 of Russia Women of Russia 2 2 0 2 Agrarian Party 18 13 3 34 Communist Party 16 0 0 13 Liberal Democratic 5 0 0 5 Party Russian Mvt. for 5 N/A N/A N/A Dem. Reforms Civic Union 6 N/A N/A N/A Future of Russia 1 N/A N/A N/A Dignity and Charity 3 N/A N/A N/A New Regional N/A 57 9 66 Policy Union of 12 N/A 19 6 25 December Russian Path N/A 12 3 15

Sources: Rossiiskaya gazeta, 30 November 1993, pp. 4-5. Russia: Election Observation Report, 12 December 1993, (Washington DC: International Republican Institute, January, 1994). 11 yanvarya- 11 fevralya 1994, (Moscow: Infonnatsionno-analiticheskaya gruppa, 1994).

Note: The total joining a bloc's legislative fraction (column 4) does not always add up to columns 1-3 because of cross-party jumping. For example, the Communists lost three candidates originally elected under its party label to the Agrarian Party, New Regional Policy, and Russian Path. Likewise, Russia's Choice lost three candidates: two to the Union of 12 December and one to the Agrarian Party.

were publ i shed for parties and blocs from the plurali ty contests. In fact, vote totals for individual candidates besides the w i n n e r were no t systematically publ i shed even in the local press making such a compi la t ion of results impossible. Thus, one can not discern w h e t h e r the n u m b e r of seats w o n by a party or bloc in the plurality races was at all p ropor t iona l to that party 's share of the total nat ional vote from all s ingle-member districts. Moreover, 121 i ndependen t s were elected, more than all of the candidates from electoral blocs combined .

The proliferat ion of i n d e p e n d e n t s makes the effective n u m b e r of parties very difficult to calculate. The fact that many of these deput ies later jo ined a legislative faction of one of the electoral blocs further compl icates the issue. The effective n u m b e r of electoral parties (N~) seems impossible to calculate wi th any certainty given the high n u m b e r of independen t s . However, one can calculate the effective n u m b e r of par l iamentary parties (N~) p roduced by the plurality contes ts ff one treats legislative factions as par l iamentary parties. This means s t retching the term parlia- menta ry party to inc lude legislative factions wh ich had no cor responding electoral party and coun t ing i n d e p e n d e n t s wh ich later jo ined a legislative faction as 'party

ROBERT G MOSER 391

members'. Given the fact that all but four deputies from the single-member district races joined factions and that the literature provides no alternative for dealing with independents this step seems justified. Based on the legislative factions joined by candidates from single-member districts, the effective number of parliamentary parties emerging from the plurality portion of the electoral system was 5.79, which was only slightly lower than the effective number of legislative parties produced by the PR contest. 4

What accounts for this failure of the plurality system and single-member districts to constrain the number of parties? Rae (1971) offered only one exception to Duverger's 'law' concerning the correlation of single-member plurality elections and two-party systems: 'Plurality formulae are always associated with two-party competition except where strong local minority parties exist.' This was not the case in Russia in 1993. The 'minority' parties that did receive representation were not parties with geographically concentrated support. The registration rules limiting the number of signatures from any one region of Russia made sure no such parties would compete in the 1993 elections.

The failure of the plurality portion of the 1993 Russian elections to constrain the number of parties suggests a more fundamental oversight in the literature on electoral systems. The quantitative studies upon which hypotheses concerning the number of parties allowed by plurality systems have been based have studied established democracies over an extended period of time. This is especially true when considering plurality systems because of the relatively low number of them. Lijphart (1994) did include 'new' democracies such as Costa Rica and India in his analysis which should have curbed this problem. However, both of these cases had established parties before the introduction of free elections, the Congress Party in India and National Liberation in Costa Rica. Thus, the consistent correlation between two- party systems and single-member plurality elections has been observed in systems which have pre-existing large parties and a series of elections.

What happens in founding elections when there are no large parties capable of seriously contesting each and every electoral district with a network of powerful local cadres? The 1993 Russian elections suggests that in such an atmosphere local notables unattached to any electoral bloc predominate. Russian parties and blocs were successful in single-member district races only when they could recruit already established notables to run under their label. However, Russian parties and blocs had very little to offer powerful local elites. Most (with the possible exception of Russia's Choice) lacked sufficient monetary and personnel resources to adequately support their own party list campaign much less individual candidates running in local districts. The most powerful local candidates already possessed more name recognition and logistical support from their local position in government, business, or social organizations than any electoral bloc could provide. Moreover, the post-communist era has been and continues to be marked by widespread anti-party sentiment. The general public distrusts parties and party candidates. Politicians beginning with Boris Yeltsin himself tend to shun partisan labels and attachments. Therefore, besides having little to offer the most influential candidates, party attachments were shunned as a liability. This can be seen in the high number of instances of candidates with previous party attachments who ran as independents only to join the same bloc in the legislature that they shunned during the campaign. Interestingly, this was most common in a conservative party, the Agrarian Party of Russia, which had 18 independents later join its faction.


Consequent ly , in mos t cases par t ies and e lec tora l b locs w e r e left recru i t ing the only cand ida tes w h o cou ld reasonably benef i t f rom par t i san affiliation: little k n o w n candida tes wi th few resources . In some ins tances w e l l - know n local el i tes w h o had p rev ious a t t achmen t s to d e m o c r a t i c m o v e m e n t s or the Communi s t Party and agro- industr ia l c o m p l e x (Agrarian Party) ma in ta ined those ties and ran as par t i san candidates. (As m e n t i o n e d earlier, o the r s s u b m e r g e d those ties unti l af ter the e lec t ion . ) In o t h e r distr icts , the t w o g o v e r n m e n t blocs, Russia 's Choice and to a lesser e x t e n t PRES, m a n a g e d to take advantage of the i r pos i t ion in the Yeltsin adminis t ra t ion to recru i t Yel ts in 's local appo in tees . However , by and large, par t ies ' and b locs ' individual cand ida tes w e r e the 'ou ts ' r a the r than the ' ins ' o f the local p o w e r s t ructure .

One can see the l o w e r poli t ical inf luence of par ty candida tes as c o m p a r e d to i n d e p e n d e n t candida tes by compar ing the occupa t iona l status of winn ing candidates . Those w h o he ld pos i t ions in the local adminis t ra t ive appara tus had the greates t advantage in the e lec t ion in te rms of name recogni t ion and pa t ronage . Those in local legislative organs also he ld an advantage over non-state candida tes bu t had less name recogni t ion and had less con t ro l over state resources . Thus, it is not surpr is ing that a lmost 20 p e r cen t of winn ing candida tes he ld a significant pos i t ion in the local adminis t ra t ion (oblast, city, o r rayon head of adminis t ra t ion, assistant head of admin- istration, or head of adminis t ra t ive depar tment ) . Whereas , only six p e r cen t of w inne r s came from local legislative bodies . The s t ronges t candida tes (from local adminis t ra t ions) t ended to be more i n d e p e n d e n t than w e a k e r candida tes (from local legislatures). Of the 21 winn ing candida tes f rom adminis t ra t ive organs, 14 w e r e i n d e p e n d e n t s whi le only seven had pa r ty affiliations. However , of the 12 winn ing candida tes f rom local soviets, six w e r e i n d e p e n d e n t s and six we re part isan, s

Moreover , the use of nonpar t i san bal lot p l ayed a signif icant role in unde rmin ing par t ies ' role in the nomina t i on p roces s in s ing le -member districts. W h e r e s t rong par t i san feel ings for one pa r ty or b loc w e r e e x p r e s s e d in the pa r ty list race, for Zhi r inovsky ' s LDP for example , one might e x p e c t to f ind coat-tail effects in the s ing le -member dis t r ic t races. However , the absence of par t i san labels on the single- m e m b e r dis t r ic t bal lot made it qui te difficult for voters to vote a s traight t icket in bo th the PR par ty list race and the s ing le -member plural i ty contes t . Party candida tes w e r e essent ia l ly h idden e x c e p t to the minor i ty of voters pol i t ica l ly act ive e n o u g h to k n o w the i r local cand ida tes ' par t i san affiliation or campa ign p rog rams f rom the local press campa ign coverage . In re t rospec t , g iven the surpr is ing v ic tory of Zhi r inovsky ' s LDP in the PR race, the nonpar t i san bal lot p r o b a b l y h e l p e d the re formers by hiding the ident i ty of little k n o w n LDP candida tes in distr icts w h e r e Zhi r inovsky was e x t r e m e l y popular . At the same t ime the nonpar t i san bal lot h i n d e r e d genera l pa r ty d e v e l o p m e n t on the local level.

Moreover , as Adrian a rgued in the case of Amer ican nonpar t i s an e lect ions , the nonpar t i san bal lot may have in f luenced Russian vo te rs ' p e r c e p t i o n s of the appro- pr ia te r ep resen ta t ive f rom local s ing le -member distr icts . The nonpar t i s an bal lot may have d i sc red i t ed par t i san cand ida tes in favor of p o w e r f u l i n d e p e n d e n t candida tes w h o w e r e seen as less t ied to the M o s c o w es tab l i shment and thus be t t e r able to de fend the in teres ts of the local i ty in Moscow. Surveys taken dur ing the campa ign s u p p o r t such an analysis. Responden t s c la imed to pay very little a t t en t ion to partisan labels in making the i r cho ice in the s ing le -member dis t r ic t races. Only 3.2 p e r cen t of r e s p o n d e n t s said they used pa r ty affiliation as a basis for the i r vo te for individual candidates ; whi l e ' pe r sona l quali t ies ' , ' a t t en t ion to needs of region ' , and 'po l i cy p r o g r a m ' w e r e each c i ted by 19 p e r cen t o f r e s p o n d e n t s (Colton, 1994).

ROBERT G MOSER 393

Thus, instead of p roduc ing two large political parties and shutt ing out smaller parties, the single-member first-past-the-post races p r o d u c e d very opposi te results. Because of a lack of strong pre-existing parties and anti-party sentiment, independents ruled the day and parties were able to elect only a handful of their best candidates. Incentives to consolidate like-minded political forces to avoid splitting the vote and allowing less popular foes to be elected were u n h e e d e d on both ends of the spectrum. Moreover, the nonpart isan ballot r emoved any chance for a significant amount of straight-ticket voting that wou ld have benefi t ted parties that had a s t rong showing in the PR race. By failing to impose party format ion on elites and the electorate as the PR party list system had done, the plurality system left the door o p e n to cont inue the personalistic, anti-party politics that has character ized post-soviet Russian politics.

This is not to say that the consolidating effects of s ingle-member plurality elections will not come into play over time. Duverger ' s law is premised on a psycho- logical effect that is only manifested over a series of elections. Thus, these findings may be unique to a founding election in w h i c h the lessons and logic o f electoral systems are not yet internalized by elites and voters. Comparat ive analysis of the n u m b e r of parties contest ing founding elections does suggest a decline in the effective n u m b e r of parties with subsequent elections. However , the decline in the effective n u m b e r of parties is relatively small (approximately 0.30) w h i c h suggests a 'fine-tuning rather than a major adjustment ' (Turner, 1993).

Only future elections will tell w h e t h e r the proliferation of independents in Russian single-member plurality elections will continue. Will incumbents w h o ran as independents in the founding elections be able to maintain this status in future elections? Or will they willingly adopt (or unwillingly be saddled with) a partisan label cor responding to the legislative faction they joined while in thc legislature?

T h e E l e c t o r a l S y s t e m : H e l p i n g t o D e t e r m i n e W h o W o n a n d Los t

The results of the 1993 Russian elections suggest that electoral rules actually may have helped to determine wh ich parties w o n and lost. Different Russian electoral blocs and parties were dramatically more or less successful under different types of electoral systems. Figure 1 compares the number of seats w o n by the eight electoral blocs and three post-election legislative factions in the PR and plurality elections: '

Thosc parties wi th a relatively strong cadrc of local notables because of patron- age systems (Russia's Choice) or a local organizational base (Communis t and Agrarian Parties) were more successful in the plurality elections than those parties and blocs w h i c h lacked a local cadre. This was not so m u c h an issue of local organization as one of elite recruitment. Travkin's Democrat ic Party of Russia (DPR) was relatively well-organized on the local level. However , its local cadre was made up of lesser k n o w n politicians w h o held less influential govc rumen t posit ions in the local soviets rather than in the execut ive structures if they held state positions at all.

A system of only single-member plurality districts wou ld have bcnef i t ted the three 'cadre ' parties (Russia's Choice, Agrarians, and Communis ts ) and perhaps PRES if it could have con t inued to attract a substantial n u m b e r o f modera te independents . More importantly, such a system wou ld have enhanced even further the influence of independen t candidates and their ' nonpar ty ' legislative factions, fur ther strength- ening the anti-party t rend underlying Russian politics.


80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

# of Seats

i

!

RC

i i" , 12Dec YAB PRES NRP WR DPR APR KPRF LDP RP

Legislative Factions

PR E l Plurality

FIG. 1. Percentage of seats by PR and plurality rules

On the o ther hand, the PR party list contes t a l lowed parties and electoral blocs

wi th little or no local organizat ion or cadre base to gain representa t ion. The three parties and blocs wi th a local cadre were by no means disadvantaged by their struc-

ture as their success in bo th electoral realms demonstrate . The PR system was more of an oppor tun i ty than a constraint . In this part of the election, a bloc having one charismatic leader wi th a knack (and the financial backing) to effectively use televi- sion could c o m m a n d e e r an e lect ion stacked against it as Zhir inovsky and his Liberal Democrat ic Party (LDP) powerful ly demonstra ted. However, another bloc, W o m e n of Russia, showed that an attractive message of moderat ion, social welfare, and social reconci l ia t ion could also find success despite the absence of extensive

resources, we l l -known leadership, or charismatic appeal. Undoubtedly , the LDP and W o m e n of Russia wou ld have had a very marginal impact on the e lect ion had it

no t b e e n for the PR party list race. Consequent ly , the different electoral systems had different effects on the

ideological c o n t e n t of the State Duma. The PR contes t accen tua ted the polariza- t ion of radical market reformers and c o m m u n i s t and nat ional is t oppos i t ion wi th

very little r ep resen ta t ion for centr is t blocs. This radical reform/ant i - reform polarization was also manifes ted in the three successful cadre parties in the single- m e m b e r district con tes t s - -Russ ia ' s Choice, the Communis ts , and the Agrarian Party. However , if one looks at the i n d e p e n d e n t candidates w h o formed the three post-e lect ion legislative factions, the largest faction, New Regional Policy (NRP), occupies the amorphous cen te r whi le the two m u c h smaller blocs occupy the ex t reme posi t ions on each side of the political spectrum. This more closely resem- bles wha t most survey data suggest is the basic con tours of Russian popu la r opinion. According to one massive survey, 48 per cent of r e sponden t s favor a gradual t ransi t ion to the market, whi le only 14 per cen t favor a quick market transi- t ion and 17 pe r cen t are against market reform. Twenty-one per cen t did no t k n o w

h o w to r e spond (Hough, 1994).

ROBERT G MOSER 395

Mixing PR a n d Plurali ty: a Sys tem tha t Mult ipl ied Part ies

One effect of the variegated success of different parties in the PR and plurality contests was that combining the two systems actually multiplied the final number of effective parties in the State Duma even further. The effective number of parliamentary parties of all 440 deputies elected to the State Duma who joined factions was 8.66, substantially higher than the PR score (6.40) and plurality score (5.79) when the two parts were examined separately.

How is it that the number of effective legislative parties in Russia's mixed system was greater than either of its parts taken separately? The answer lies in the differ- ential success of the parties in the two parts of the election. As noted above, only Russia's Choice, the Agrarian Party, the Communists, and (to a lesser extent) PRES enjoyed significant success in both the PR and plurality portions of the election. The other parties tended to excel in one or the other electoral realms. When the two parts are combined this tended to expand the number of parties found in the State Duma.

In a strictly PR system, Russia's Choice, the Agrarian Party, and PRES would have been less influential; not to mention, the three post-election legislative factions which would not have been formed. In a strictly plurality system, Women of Russia, Zhirinovsky's LDP, the Democratic Party of Russia, and the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev- Lukin bloc (Yobloko) would have virtually dropped out.

By combining the two systems an expansion of the number of legislative parties occurred. Moreover, a more equitable distribution of the numbers of deputies in each legislative party was produced. Blocs which performed well in the PR race saw their percentage of seats in the State Duma diminish with the addition of the single-member district winners and vice versa.

Conc lus ions : t he P o w e r a n d Limits o f Electoral E n g i n e e r i n g

The experience of the 1993 Russian elections shows the power and limitations of electoral engineering upon the character of the country's emerging party system. The electoral system had important implications for the Russian party system. However, the effects of the electoral system were somewhat different than those commonly observed in the literature on electoral systems and diverged significantly from the intentions of those who crafted the system itself. Six general propositions arise from this study.

First, the registration rules for nomination greatly constrained the number of participants allowed to participate even before the official campaign began. The signature requirement whittled the number of registered electoral organizations down from 97 to 13. Furthermore, registration rules that limited the total number of signatures allowed from any one region removed ethnic-based and geographically-concentrated parties from competition. This not only removed the threat of potentially disintegrative forces from attaining a spot on the ballot, but also undermined the integration of elites and electorates from ethnic-based regions into the emerging party system.

Second, the introduction of a party list PR system imposed parties upon elites as well as the electorate. The addition of this electoral device was the single most important instrument facilitating the formation of parties and electoral blocs intro- duced in the 1993 elections. In addition to forcing the formation of parties and


blocs, the PR system lowered the start-up costs for electoral associations by allowing ambitious politicians to form electoral blocs without an extensive nation-wide organization. Political entrepreneurs such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Grigorii Yavlinsky could contest elections based on their personal appeal without a well- established grass-roots organization or network of local cadre capable of running competitively in local districts.

Third, the plurality proportion of the election was far less conducive to party development precisely because it required a national network of local notables capable winning nonpartisan local races. No party or bloc had the organizational capacity or cadre to be competitive in even half of the 225 single-member districts. This left the field open to local notables, who ran predominantly as independents because parties offered few tangible benefits and some costly burdens. The nonpartisan ballot further undermined party development in the plurality elections by hiding partisan candidates from an unaware public, thus hindering straight-ticket voting in PR and plurality contests.

Fourth, in terms of the number of parties, both the PR system and plurality system allowed for the proliferation of parties, blocs, and legislative factions but for different reasons. As expected, the PR system allowed for the entrance of many parties because of the oft-cited proportionality achieved under proportional allocation rules with large district magnitudes. In 1993, Russia's PR electoral district was as large as it could be - - one nation-wide district--and thus achieved a high degree of proportionality. A five per cent legal threshold denied representation to only the most marginal parties with the possible exception of the reformist Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms (RDDR), which only narrowly failed to overcome the threshold.

On the other hand, the plurality system was expected to constrain the number of parties and promote a consolidation of political forces into large coalitions but failed to do so. The Russian party system had yet to establish large parties capable of reaping the benefits of the disproportionality of plurality systems. Consequently, there was a proliferation of independent candidates that dominated this part of the election. This suggests that at least in founding elections where parties are poorly developed, single-member first-past-the-post systems may actually open the door to the proliferation of independent candidates and thus perpetuate a system devoid of large electoral parties. More comparative study needs to be done on this question. A similar outcome occurred in the first post-communist elections in Ukraine in 1994. Ukraine used a single-member majority system with a second ballot run-off to fill all of its legislative seats. Approximately half of the winning candidates had no party affiliation in the electoral campaign but most independents later showed partisan sympathies after being elected (Arel and Wilson, 1994).

Fifth, the different portions of the electoral system (PR and plurality) awarded and penalized different types of parties and blocs. The plurality system favored independents and those blocs with more developed local cadres: the Agrarians (which was the only party to win more single-member seats than PR seats), Russia's Choice, and the Communists. On the other hand, the PR system allowed personalistic blocs (Yabloko, DPR, and Zhirinovsky's LDP) and one bloc geared to a narrow constituency (Women of Russia) to gain significant representation. Without the PR contest, these blocs would have had little or no impact on the elections.

Finally, because the two parts of the electoral system benefitted different parties, their combination into one system tended to multiply the number of effective parties in the State Duma. Taken alone both the PR and plurality portions of the

ROBERT G MOSER 397

system p roduced approximate ly six effective legislative parties. However, together

they p roduced almost n ine effective parties in the n e w State Duma. The crucial

difference b e t w e e n the Russian system and mixed plural i ty-proport ional systems as

found in Germany appears to be the lack of ties b e t w e e n the two parts of the

system (Rae, 1971). The electoral system had a major impact on Russia's emerging party system.

However, it will take t ime to de te rmine to wha t ex ten t electoral rules in f luenced

the internal organizat ion of parties. During the campaign, electoral rules had little impact on the internal cohes ion of Russia's emerging parties. Russian politics remained personalistic, wh i ch con t inued to u n d e r m i n e the organizat ional develop- m e n t of political parties and the inst i tut ionalizat ion of parties b e y o n d the fate of their leaders. Parties and blocs remained fragile organizat ions filled wi th internal dissension, personal i ty clashes, and ideological battles.

The PR party list contes t should have given party leaders great inf luence over rank-and-file member s and a powerfu l w e a p o n to enforce party loyalty and disci-

p l ine over those elected to the State Duma on party lists. I n d e p e n d e n t s joining

factions after the e lec t ion may feel greater f reedom to defy their fact ion 's political line. Future research could investigate h o w the electoral rules c on t i nue d to shape

the deve lopmen t of parties as they make the t ransi t ion from the electoral to the govern ing realm.

N o t e s

1. Russian regions are defined as all oblasts, krais, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. According to this definition, out of the 89 subjects of the federation there are 57 Russian regions with 178 single-member electoral districts and 32 ethnic-based regions with 40 single-member electoral districts.

2. The Women of Russia bloc was omitted bccausc it had very few candidatcs running in single-member districts and no candidates running in districts in ethnic-based regions.

3. The total vote for the 13 electoral blocs was less than 100 per cent (95.78 per cent), probably on account of the 'against all' vote. To account for this, I revised each bloc's vote percentage by dividing it by 0.9578. The rest of the computation was carried out according to Laasko and Taagepera's formula, 1 /~e 2, where P equals the revised vote percentage of each bloc.

4. Six seats were left unfilled in December and four independents remained unaffiliated. To account for this, the percentage of seats for each legislative faction was computed by dividing each faction's number of seats by 215 rather than 225 (the total number of seats to be filled in single-member districts). The effective number of parties index was then computed according to the formula outlined in note 3.

5. Occupational status and partisan affiliation of candidates were published in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 30 November 1993, pp. 4-5.

6. These figures are based on the faction affiliation of legislators as of February 1994. As already noted most factions contained members who ran as independents and only joined after the elections. A list of legislators and their faction affiliation was published in Aleksandr Sobianin, Eduard Gelman, and Oleg Kayunov, 'Golosovaniya deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy, 11 yanvarya-l l fevralya 1994 goda,' (Moscow: Informatsionno- analiticheskaya gruppa, 1994).

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the impact of the electoral system on post-communist … · this paper uses a case study of the ......

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