Journal oj Personality and Social Psychology1975, Vol. 32, No. 2, 311-328

The Illusion of Control

Ellen J. LangerYale University

A series of studies was conducted to elucidate a phenomenon here referred toas the "illusion of control." An illusion of control was denned as an ex-pectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately higher than the ob-jective probability would warrant. It was predicted that factors from skill situa-tions (competition, choice, familiarity, involvement) introduced into chancesituations cause individuals to feel inappropriately confident. In Study 1 sub-jects cut cards against either a confident or a nervous competitor; in Study 2lottery participants were or were not given a choice of ticket; in Study 3 lotteryparticipants were or were not given a choice of either familiar or unfamiliarlottery tickets; in Study 4, in a novel chance game, subjects either had or didnot have practice and responded either themselves or by proxy; in Study 5lottery participants at a racetrack were asked their confidence at different times;finally, in Study 6 lottery participants either received a single three-digit ticketor one digit on each of 3 days. Indicators of confidence in all six studies sup-ported the prediction.

While most people will agree that there ismuch overlap between skill and luck, a fullunderstanding of how inextricably bound thetwo are has yet to be attained. In principlethe distinction seems clear. In skill situationsthere is a causal link between behavior andoutcome. Thus, success in skill tasks is con-trollable. Luck, on the other hand, is a fortui-tous happening. Success in luck or chanceactivities is apparently uncontrollable. Theissue of present concern is whether or notthis distinction is generally recognized. Theposition taken here is that it is not. Whilepeople may pay lip service to the concept ofchance, they behave as though chance eventsare subject to control. If this is correct, itis of interest to determine the variablesresponsible for this confusion.

A number of different lines of researchprovide support for the position that people

This article is based on a doctoral dissertationsubmitted to the Department of Psychology, YaleUniversity. The author would like to offer specialthanks to her thesis advisor, Robert Abelson, andto Carol Dweck. She is also grateful to the membersof her committee, Judith Rodin, William Kessen,Irvin Child, and Dickon Repucci; and to thosewho helped in conducting the research, Jerry Fields,Carol Marcus, Jane Roth, and Richard Hall.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Ellen J.Langer, Graduate Center, City University of NewYork, 33 West 42nd Street, New York City, NewYork 10036.

assume a skill orientation in chance situa-tions. Studies concerned with the judgment ofcontingency, the "just world hypothesis," orthe attribution of responsibility for an out-come all demonstrate either that people denythe operation of chance or when they doappeal to chance as an explanation for anevent, this appeal is not simply a function ofan objective lack of contingency. A brieflook at some of this literature helps to clarifythis point.

In several laboratory studies, investigatorshave shown that adults often perceive causalrelationships in the absence of contingency.Ward and Jenkins (1965) asked three groupsof subjects to judge, from a set of facts pre-sented in one of three ways, the amount ofcontrol exerted by cloud seeding over rain-fall. The information "seed" or "no seed"followed by "rain" or "no rain" was presentedserially to one group of subjects, in an orga-nized numerical summary to a second group,and serially followed by an organized sum-mary to the third group. Although the event,cloud seeding, was chosen in order to suggestthe operation of chance, the only group thatsuccessfully judged the lack of contingencywas the second group, which received the in-formation only in the summary form. Whenthe information was presented over time, asis usually the case in real life, subjects judgedcontingency when there was none. One might

311

312 ELLEN J. LANGER

argue that the reported inference of contin-gency was a response to the demand charac-teristics in the situation rather than a truereflection of what subjects actually believed.However, in a conceptually similar studyon psychodiagnosis, Chapman and Chapman(1967) also found that subjects expecting tosee a relationship overlooked discontinuingevidence even when offered a $20 prize forbeing accurate.

These and other researchers (e.g., Bruner& Revusky, 1961; Golding & Rorer, 1971;Smedslund, 1963; Starr & Katkin, 1969;Hamilton & Gifford, Note 1) have providedclear evidence that there are many situationsin which people fail to accurately judge thelack of contingency. An interesting variantof this occurs in what has been called the"just world" hypothesis.

A belief in a just world is a belief thatactions and outcomes must have the samevalence. That is, good things happen topeople who do good things, and bad thingshappen to people who do bad things. Thebelief that everyone gets what he deservesdenies the operation of chance. It eliminatesthe necessity for concern and worry over thepossibility that aversive events may occur bychance at any time. Events become predict-able and thus, by being anticipated, are oftencontrollable.

In one of the first of these studies testingthe just world hypothesis, Lerner (196Sb)asked subjects to evaluate two workers, oneof whom was fortuitously rewarded. In orderto make sense of this chance event, subjectsperceived the worker who was rewarded asmore capable. In a study by Lerner andSimmons (1966), subjects witnessed a peerapparently receive severe shocks for makingminor errors in a learning task. They foundthat subjects reject and devalue a sufferingvictim to make the negative consequencesseem deserved when they are unable to alterthe victim's fate. Landy and Aronson(1969), Lerner and Mathews (1967), Rubinand Peplau (1973), Shaw and Skolnick(1971), Simmons and Piliavin (1972), andWalster (1966) have also found support forthe just world hypothesis. One expects goodpeople to do good things, and one expects

good things to happen to good people. As Lee(1971) said of a poker player in a discussionof luck, "If our hero did not win our estima-tion of him would decrease even though ob-jectively we have to realize that getting fourkings had nothing to do with any of hisqualities" (p. 66).

Whether or not an event will be perceivedas determined by skill or chance may dependon factors relatively independent of the actualcontingency. Cohen (1964); Feather (1969);Kelley (1967); Langer and Roth (in press);Streufert and Streufert (1969); Weiner,Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum(1971); and Wortman, Costanzo, and Witt(1973), for example, have all discussed thetendency for people to attribute desirableoutcomes to internal factors but -to blameexternal factors such as luck for failures. Thevalence of the outcome would not be a potentfactor if people distinguished between chanceand skill on the basis of the objectivecontingency.

Some observational support for the asser-tion that people treat chance events as con-trollable comes from sociologists Goffman(1967) and Henslin (1967). While studyinggambling practices in Las Vegas, Goffmannoted that dealers who experienced runs ofbad luck ran the risk of losing their jobs.Henslin studied dice playing and noted thatdice players clearly behave as if they werecontrolling the outcome of the toss. Theyare careful to throw the dice softly if theywant low numbers or to throw hard for highnumbers. They believe that effort and con-centration will pay off. Control can also beexerted when betting; for example, alwaysbet with the person who looks like he hasthe most control. These behaviors are allquite rational if one believes that the gameis a game of skill.

If one were going to try to exert controlover a chance event, one would exert influ-ence before the outcome of the event wasdetermined. Strickland, Lewicki, and Katz(1966) tested this notion. Subjects were in-volved in a dice-throwing game in which theyselected from a number of alternative wagerseither before the dice were tossed or justafter the toss but before the outcome was

THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL 313

disclosed. They found that subjects tookgreater risks, that is, placed larger bets, whenbetting before rather than after the toss.

The previous research shows that peopleoften fail to respond differentially to con-trollable and uncontrollable events. However,the factors that govern this illusory controlbehavior have not been studied systemati-cally. One way to identify these factors isto explore characteristics of skill situations.In skill situations people engage in variousovert and covert behaviors designed to maxi-mize the probability of success: choosingwhich materials are appropriate for the situa-tion and which responses to make, familiar-izing oneself with these materials and re-sponses, spending some time thinking aboutthe task to arrive at possible strategies thatmay be employed, and exerting effort whileactively engaged in the task to increase thechance of success. In addition, skill situationshave certain characteristics not necessarilyinstigated by the individual in order to maxi-mize the likelihood of success. Competition isone such factor.

These skill-related factors may be respon-sible for inducing an illusion of control. Anillusion of control is denned as an expectancyof a personal success probability inappropri-ately higher than the objective probabilitywould warrant. The following studies weredesigned to assess the effectiveness of theseskill-related factors in occasioning an illusionof control. Specifically, the research to bedescribed was designed to test the followinghypothesis: By encouraging or allowing par-ticipants in a chance event to engage in be-haviors that they would engage in were theyparticipating in a skill event, one increasesthe likelihood of inducing a skill orientation;that is, one induces an illusion of control.Thus, one should be able to introduce anyof the previously mentioned aspects of askill situation—choice, stimulus or responsefamiliarity, passive or active involvement,competition—into a chance situation wherethe participants no longer influence the out-come and occasion behavior more appropriateto a skill event.

A strong test of this hypothesis is the intro-duction of these factors into situations such

as lotteries, where the outcomes are com-pletely chance determined. If these factors aresuccessful in inducing an illusion of controlin these mechanical situations, then the effectsshould be far greater when they are intro-duced into situations where there is alreadyan element of control.

The following studies were conducted withpeople of different ages, of different socio-economic status, and of both sexes and, inall but one instance, took place in real-worldsettings. The first study investigated competi-tion. Subjects were engaged in a completelychance-determined card game where theydrew for high card against a confederate whowas either confident or nervous. In the secondstudy participants in a lottery were either givenor not given their choice of lottery ticket.In the third study lottery participants againwere given either choice or no choice, and inaddition, stimulus familiarity was varied byusing familiar or unfamiliar lottery tickets.The fourth study used a piece of equipmentthat enabled the play of a chance game.Participants were either given or not giventhe opportunity to familiarize themselveswith die response that was to be made. Inaddition, they were either to tell the experi-menter which response to make or to be moreactively involved by making the responsethemselves. The fifth study tested the effectsof passive involvement by asking participantsin a lottery at Yonkers Raceway at threedifferent points in time before the drawinghow confident they were that they would winthe lottery. In the sixth study a lottery wasconducted to assess again the effects of pas-sive involvement. Participants either receiveda three-digit numbered lottery ticket on theday of purchase or received part of theirticket, one digit, on three successive days sothat they had to think about the lottery onat least three separate occasions.

EXPERIMENT 1: EFFECTS OF COMPETITIONON THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL

Since people often engage in competitionwhen they are assessing their skills, it ishypothesized that the introduction of thisskill-related factor into a chance setting

314 ELLEN J. LANGER

induces an illusion of controllability. Theamount of control one actually has in pro-ducing a successful outcome in skilled com-petition varies as a function of the ability ofone's opponent. If people respond to chanceevents in which there is competition as ifthese events were skill determined, then theillusion of control should also vary as afunction of characteristics of one's opponent.

In the following study subjects compete ina chance task against either an attractive,confident confederate or an awkward andnervous confederate. If the task is respondedto as if the outcome is uncontrollable, thenfactors other than the likelihood of winningplay a larger role in influencing subjects'bets. Under these circumstances, subjects arelikely to bet a lot when competing againstthe confident confederate either because theconfederate is expected to bet a lot and sub-jects want to appear similar to him or becauserisk is a value in our society (Wallach &Wing, 1968). Subjects may also bet a lotwhen playing against the awkward confeder-ate in order to appear different from him or,again, because risk is a value. However, theymay also bet less when betting against theawkward confederate because he is expectedto bet less, so subjects can take less risk andstill appear to be risky. In either case, sub-jects should not bet more against the awk-ward confederate than against the confidentconfederate. On the other hand, if, as pre-dicted, competition induces a skill orientation,then subjects will bet on the basis of thelikelihood of winning. Since the less com-petent one's opponent is, the more likely oneis to win, subjects should wager more whencompeting against the awkward confederatethan when competing against the confidentconfederate.

Method

Subjects

Subjects were 36 male undergraduates enrolled inthe introductory psychology course at Yale Univer-sity. They were recruited by an advertisement thatoffered course credit and a chance to win money forparticipation in a study on the relationship betweencognitive and physiological responses. They wererandomly assigned to one of two experimentalconditions, with 18 subjects in each.

Procedure

When each subject entered the room in which theexperiment was to take place, he found waiting aconfederate posing as another subject. The confeder-ate, a male undergraduate blind to the experimentalhypothesis, played the role of either a confident oran unconfident person (dapper or schnook condition).

Dapper condition. In this condition the confed-erate appeared confident and outgoing and wasdressed in a well-fitting sports coat. He introducedhimself to the subject and pointed out a sign postedin the room. The sign said that the experimenterwould be right back and asked subjects to fill outa brief questionnaire while waiting. To make thestudy appear to be concerned with physiologicalmatters, the questionnaire asked about diet, familydiseases, and the like. The subject and the confed-erate completed the form and interacted during thistime for approximately 10 minutes. The conversa-tion was unstructured but focused mainly on sportsevents. After this interaction the confederate noncha-lantly knocked on the wall that separated himselfand the subject from the experimenter to signal herto return to the room.

Schnook condition. In this condition the confed-erate appeared rather shy, behaved awkwardly, hada nervous twitch, and was dressed in a sports coatthat was too small for him. In all other respectsthis condition was identical to the dapper condition.

In both conditions the confederate removed hiscoat before the experimenter entered the room. Aftershe apologized for being late, the experimenter in-structed the subjects to sit down and not talk whileshe prepared the materials for the study. Byemploying these measures, it was possible to keep theexperimenter blind to the preceding experimentalmanipulation. The subject and the confederate sat ata table facing each other. After the experimenterplaced a televolter, alcohol, gauze sponges, electrodes,electrode gel, and tape on the table, she recited thefollowing instructions:

We're interested in the effects of certain motoricand cognitive responses on physiological responses.Specifically, we're interested in changes in skinresistance as a function of pressured and nonpres-sured tasks. The study was designed so that, hope-fully, you will enjoy the tasks while I get the in-formation I need. You'll have the chance to eitherwin or lose money so it should be fun—but there'sno guarantee that you'll walk out of here withany extra money. Okay, now the first thing Iwant you to do is tape these electrodes to yourhands. I want to put it on the hand that youdon't write with. Are you right or left handed?Don't worry, none of this will hurt. [The experi-menter tapes electrodes, plugs in the televolter, andbrings out a deck of playing cards.]

The first task is a card game. The rules are thatyou'll each choose a card from the deck, and who-ever selects the higher card wins that round.There will be four rounds, and before each you'llwrite down how much you want to bet. You can

THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL 315

wager anywhere from 0 to 25$ on each round.You'll then show your bets to me but not toeach other. Don't look at the card you choose.This way your bets and the outcomes won'tinfluence your physiological responses on the nexttask. I'll turn the cards over for you and figureout how much was won or lost later with each ofyou individually. The betting is just between eachof you and myself, so if you win I'll pay youand if you lose you'll pay me either in money orsubject time. Are you willing to participate?[Confederate quickly answers, "Sure."] Good, nowwe can begin. Don't write down your bet untilI say ready so that I can get a baseline reading.

The experimenter then instructed subjects torecord their bets and show them to her. The betswere recorded, and then subjects alternately drew acard and, on request, simultaneously showed themto the experimenter, who recorded the outcome andthen placed the cards faced down on a nearby table.Before each step the experimenter appeared to berecording skin resistance fluctuations. This procedurewas repeated for four trials.

Dependent Measure and Manipulation Check

The dependent measure was the amount of moneysubjects wagered on each round.

After the card game was over, subjects were toldthat the next task would be run individually, so thatone of the subjects would have to go to anotherroom where another experimenter would give himinstructions. They were also told that once this ex-periment was over, this experimenter would tell theother experimenter the outcome of the card gameso that the debts could be settled. The experimenterasked the confederate to leave and told him and thesubject to say goodbye to each other, since theirjoint participation was over. Each subject was thengiven an interpolated task so that he won approxi-mately $2 regardless of his previous bets. The sub-ject examined a jar of jelly beans and estimated thenumber present while the experimenter recorded skinresistance fluctuations. Then the subject was givenanother questionnaire that was physiological innature. After he was asked whether he thought theother subject's presence had any effect on his physio-logical responses, he was asked to rate the othersubject on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (not verycompetent interpersonally) to 6 (very competentinterpersonally). The remaining questions were filleritems that related to physiological matters. Afterthese measures were obtained, all subjects werethanked and told to call the author next month ifthey wanted to know the purpose and results ofthe study.

Results

Before examining whether or not theamounts of money wagered varied as a func-tion of the competence of the confederate, it

is important to make sure that the confed-erate was indeed perceived differentially inthe two conditions. The mean rating of theconfederate's competence was 4.8 when hewas supposed to be dapper and 3.17 when hewas playing a schnook. There was almostno overlap between the two conditions. Thedifference between the two means is highlysignificant (t = S.46, p < .005). Therefore, itis safe to say that subjects in the dappercondition saw themselves as competing againsta more competent individual than subjects inthe schnook condition.

It will be recalled that subjects could wageranywhere from nothing to 250 on each of fourrounds of betting. These four bets were aver-aged to give a single score for each subject.The mean bet for subjects in the dapper con-dition was 11.04 as compared with 16.2S forsubjects in the schnook condition (t = 2.39,p<.Q25). The difference between the twogroups should be even more apparent whenwe examine the first bets made, since thefirst round of betting most closely followedthe experimental manipulation. The meanfirst bet for the dapper condition was 9.28,while the mean first bet for the schnookcondition was 16.72 (t = 3.16, p < .005).

Conceptual Test of the Manipulation

In order to make sure that the assumptionthat Yale subjects expect the attractive con-federate to bet more than the unattractiveconfederate was true, two questionnaires wereadministered to random samples of Yaleundergraduates. On the first questionnaire,the task and the participants were describedand subjects were asked whom they thoughtwould bet more. Twelve of the 16 subjectsexpected the attractive person to bet more(x2 — 4> p < .OS). The second questionnairedescribed the task and asked people howmuch they thought they would wager on eachtrial. All of the 15 subjects asked respondedwith the maximum wager (250).

EXPERIMENT 2: EFFECTS OF CHOICE ON THEILLUSION OF CONTROL

Once again, it was hypothesized that whena chance situation mimics a skill situation,people behave as if they have control over the

316 ELLEN J. LANGER

uncontrollable event even when the fact thatsuccess or failure depends on chance is salient.A lottery provides a vehicle for studying thisillusion of control because, apart from thedecision of whether or not to buy a ticket,the outcome is entirely governed by chance.If one could exert control over the outcomeof a lottery, one would increase the likeli-hood of having one's ticket selected. Thisticket would then be of greater value than aticket belonging to someone without this con-trol. And if it were of greater value, it thenfollows that one would require a higher pricefrom a potential buyer.

In the following study a lottery was con-ducted to assess the effects of choice, animportant factor in a skill situation, on theillusion of control. It was predicted that sub-jects who were given their choice of lotteryticket would require a higher price for it.

MethodSubjects

The lottery tickets were made available to adultmale and female office workers employed by one oftwo firms located in Long Island, an insuranceagency and a manufacturing company.1 Since vari-ous drawings and sports pools were not uncommonto these offices, an elaborate justification for runningthe present lottery was unnecessary. With the excep-tion of four females, all people approached by thealleged ticket agent purchased lottery tickets. Sub-jects were randomly assigned to conditions with theresult that there were 24 males and 3 females in thechoice condition and 23 males and 3 females in theno-choice condition.

Materials

The lottery tickets were standard 4 X 2 inch(10.16 X 5.08cm) football cards. On each cardappeared a famous football player, his name, andhis team. The cards were alphabetically arrangedfirst by team name and then by the individualplayer's name. There were two matched sets oftickets, each comprising 227 football cards. Eachsubject kept the ticket from one set while the sameticket from the other set was deposited in a card-board carton from which the winning ticket wouldlater be selected.

Procedure

The lottery was conducted by a male employeeof the insurance agency and a female employee of

1 The firms wish to remain anonymous.

the manufacturing firm 1 week prior to the 1973Superbowl game. Both experimenters were blind tothe hypotheses of the study. They each approachedthe members of their respective offices and askedthem if they wished to purchase a lottery ticketcosting $1. Subjects were told that the tickets werebeing sold in both their office and in another office(the other office was named) and that the entirepot, approximately $50, would go to the winner.Subjects were also informed of the date of thedrawing. After having agreed to enter the lottery,the first subject approached was given the box ofcards and told to select the ticket(s) he wanted.The subject named the card so that the experimentercould select the same card from the second set anddeposit it in the closed carton. At this time theexperimenter also recorded the subject's name andthe card selected. The second subject approachedwas treated in the same manner except that afteragreeing to enter the lottery, he or she was handeda card which matched the choice of the precedingsubject. Subjects were thus alternately placed in thechoice or no-choice condition. The day after thetickets were sold in one office, the same procedurewas carried out in the second office.

Dependent Measure

All subjects were individually approached by theexperimenter from whom they purchased their ticketthe morning of the lottery drawing. They were eachtold: "Someone in the other office wanted to getinto the lottery, but since I'm not selling tickets anymore, he asked me if I'd find out how much you'dsell your ticket for. It makes no difference to me,but how much should I tell him?" The amountquoted constituted the dependent measure. In theevent that a subject said that he would not sell histicket, the experimenter was instructed to prod himuntil he gave a figure and then to record the re-sponse "won't sell" alongside of the amount hefinally offered.

Results

As predicted, the choice manipulation hada considerable effect on the value of thelottery ticket. The mean amount of moneyrequired for the subject to sell his ticket was$8.67 in the choice condition and only$1.96 in the no-choice condition (t = 4.33,p < .005). Although they were asked howmuch they would sell their ticket for ratherthan if they would sell, IS subjects initiallyresponded that they would not sell. Of these,10 subjects were in the choice condition andfive in the no-choice condition (p < .10).The difference previously cited, however, wasnot simply a function of the amounts quotedby these subjects after prodding, since their

THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL 317

responses ranged from $3 to the entire pot of$53, with only 3 subjects in the last category.

While not specifically tested until the fol-lowing study, one of the results obtained inthis study concerns the effect of familiarityon the illusion of control. Females are not aslikely as males to be familiar with the gameof football. Hence, they should be less likelyto enter the lottery in the first place, and ifthey do enter, they should require less moneyto sell their ticket. It should be recalled thatonly four persons refused to participate in thelottery and that each of them was female.Of the six females that did enter, four asked$1 and two asked $2 for their tickets. Thusthe mean amount for females was $1.33 ascompared with $5.89 for males (t = 2.14,p < .05).

EXPERIMENT 3: THE EFFECTS OF STIMULUSFAMILIARITY ON THE ILLUSION OF

CONTROL AND A REPLICATION OFTHE EFFECTS OF CHOICE

In a skill situation one does not feel muchcontrol if the object to be controlled is un-familiar. Under those circumstances one doesnot know what strategies to rehearse or whatresponses will bring about the desired out-come. The same result is assumed to obtainin a chance situation; that is, familiarity isexpected to increase the illusion of control.Once again a lottery was employed to testthis assumption. The lottery tickets wereeither familiar (letters of the alphabet writtenon index cards) or unfamiliar (line drawingsof novel symbols). Subjects were given theopportunity to keep their original ticket orto trade it in for a ticket in a lottery wherethe chances of winning were better. Sincethis was seen as a stronger measure of illusorycontrol than that used in the last study,choice was once again manipulated. Thus thefollowing study utilized a 2 X 2 factorialdesign with familiarity and choice as therelevant variables.

Method

Subjects

All subjects were adult males who were employedby the same two firms as those used in Study 2.There were 13 subjects who were randomly assignedto each of the four conditions in basically the same

manner as in the last study. Of these, 5 subjectsin each condition had participated in the previouslottery.

Materials

Two separate lotteries were run simultaneously.The lottery tickets were pieces of white cardboard2 X 3 inches (S.08 X 7.62 cm) with the words "lot-tery ticket" printed on them. For the familiar set oftickets, one letter was printed on each of 26 cards.For the unfamiliar set, 1 of 26 esoteric symbolsmodeled after symbols that printers use appeared oneach card. There were two sets of each kind ofticket.

ProcedureThe male experimenter of the last study served as

the experimenter for the present investigation. Hispresence in either establishment was not unusual, sincehe was currently employed by one of the firms andwas previously employed by the other. The experi-menter was blind to the major hypotheses of thestudy. The rules for both of the present lotterieswere the same: The pot was fixed at $25, eachticket cost $1, and only one ticket was allowed percustomer. The subjects were given these rules andwere also informed that there were only 26 ticketsavailable. Subjects were only aware of one lotteryat this time.

Subjects in each firm were approached individuallyby the experimenter who randomly assigned them toeither the choice or no-choice condition in one of thetwo lotteries. The assignment to condition wascarried out in such a way that each subject inthe choice condition had at least seven tickets fromwhich to choose and both firms were similarly repre-sented in each condition. Subjects in choice condi-tions were given the cards and told to make theirown selection. After so doing, they were asked thereason for their choice. All subjects kept their ticketswhile a duplicate was placed in a carton (separatefor each lottery) for the drawing.

Dependent Measure

The experimenter contacted all subjects by tele-phone 2 days before the drawing. The apparentreason for the call varied from subject to subject.After approximately S minutes of conversation theexperimenter casually brought up the topic of thelottery:

You bought a lottery ticket didn't you? I wasrunning out of lottery tickets in the lottery you'rein, so I started another separate lottery on thesame basis with a fixed pot of $2S. Twenty-sixpeople bought tickets in the lottery you're in and20 people bought tickets in the other lottery. Itmakes no difference to me, but if you'd like, I canexchange your ticket for one in the other pool.By the way, don't mention this to anybody. [Thislast sentence was included so that it would appear

318 ELLEN J. LANGER

TABLE 1PROPORTION OF SUBJECTS WHO WANTED TO KEEP

ORIGINAL TICKET, STUDY 3

Condition Letter Symbol

ChoiceNo choice

.62

.38.38.15

Note, n = 15 per cell.

as if the offer were being made available only tothis subject.]

The dependent variable then was whether or notthe subject wanted to exchange his ticket whenhis objective chances of winning were 1 in 26 for aticket in another pool where his objective chancesof winning would be 1 in 21.

In the event that the subject wanted to buy aticket in the second lottery and keep his first ticketas well, he was told that he could only be inone or the other, since those were the rules theexperimenter had initially laid down.

Results

Both stimulus familiarity and choice yieldedthe predicted effects on the probability ofkeeping the original ticket. Table 1 shows theproportion of subjects in each condition whochose to keep their original ticket rather thanimprove their chances of winning by enteringthe other lottery. These scores were trans-formed into arc sines, and the analysis ofvariance yielded Z scores = 1.83 (p < .05,one-tailed) for both the main effect of thefamiliarity variable and the choice ma-nipulation.2

If one examines the responses of subjectsin the choice condition of the letter lotteryas a function of the number of tickets avail-able when given this choice, the effects ofchoice for a familiar stimulus appear evenstronger than those suggested above. Fourout of the five subjects in this condition whowanted to make the trade were the last sub-jects sampled. Thus, they had the smallestnumber of tickets from which to choose.

Each subject who gave a reason for hischoice later chose to keep his original ticket.Five subjects chose letters that stood for theirlast names, one selected the initial for his

2 See Langer and Abelson (1972) for a discussionof the use of the arc sine transformation in thiscontext.

wife's first name, one wanted the first letterin the alphabet, and one wanted the last.Simply stating a reason, however, was not anecessary condition for the subject to keephis ticket. No subjects in the choice condi-tion in the symbol lottery gave reasons fortheir choices, although several kept theiroriginal ticket.

EXPERIMENT 4: EFFECTS OF RESPONSEFAMILIARITY AND ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT

ON THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL

The present study employed a piece ofequipment that could be programmed to dis-tribute outcomes randomly. The study at-tempted to determine whether or not famil-iarity with the response one is required tomake induces the illusion of control. Responsefamiliarity, or practice, increases one's controlin skill situations; thus, it is predicted thatthe same result will obtain in a chance setting.In addition to the manipulation of familiarity,the level of active involvement was varied.In skill situations, the more one actively par-ticipates in the event, the more control onehas over the outcome. Hence, it is predictedthat the greater one's active involvement ina chance event, the greater the illusion ofcontrol.

MethodSubjects

There were 13 adult female and 2 adult maleemployees of the Southern New England TelephoneCompany in each of four conditions. Subjects wereapproached while either on a lunch or coffee breakby the author and were asked to participate in somemarketing research by examining a product in anearly stage of development and then answering afew questions about it. Subjects were then escortedto a room in which there were signs bearing thename "Instrumental Organon Corporation" (thename was chosen to account for the IOC printedon the apparatus) and introduced to a female experi-menter who randomly assigned them to one of theexperimental treatments. The experimenter was blindto the hypotheses being tested.

ApparatusThe IOC apparatus is a 17 X 17 X 4.5 inch (43.18

X 43.18 X 11.43 cm) black wooden box with anepoxy glass top on which three interconnected pathsare etched in copper (see Figure 1). The apparatushas a stylus which when placed on one of the paths,may complete a circuit and ring a buzzer. There are

THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL 319

FIGURE 1. Illusion of control apparatus. (In the actual experiment the subjectis situated on the side of the apparatus opposite to the switches.)

10 switches located at the side of the box, whichmay be preset to determine which path on eachof the 10 trials will be activated by the stylus. Abuzzer will sound if the stylus is on the selectedpath for more than 10 sec; however, it may soundalmost immediately on contact. (The motor-operatedswitch closes the circuit for about 2 out of everyten sec.) There is a selector switch which gives theoption for all or none of the paths to be active.When set so that all of the paths are active, thebuzzer will sound no matter which path the stylusis on; when set so that the paths are interactive,the buzzer will disengage.

Procedure

The present study utilized a 2 X 2 factorial designto evaluate the relative effects of involvement andfamiliarity. Involvement was manipulated in thefollowing way:

High involvement. Subjects were shown the threepaths on the machine and were told that the ma-chine was preprogrammed so that on a random basiswhen the stylus was on just one of these paths abuzzer would sound at some point while the pathwas being traveled. The object of the game was toguess the path that they thought would set off thebuzzer on that trial and travel down this path withthe stylus. With the machine turned off, the experi-menter demonstrated the task.

Low involvement. In the low-involvement condi-tions the experimenter, rather than the subject, ma-nipulated the stylus on the route that the subjecthad preselected. The instructions and demonstrationwere otherwise the same as above.

After the apparatus was shown and the taskexplained to the subjects, familiarity was ma-nipulated.

High familiarity. In the high-familiarity condi-tions, the subject was told that the plug on themachine had just broken and had to be repairedbefore they could start. The experimenter suggestedthat the subject become familiar with the machineand practice while she repaired the damage. Theexperimenter took approximately 2 minutes to restorethe plug to working order.

Low familiarity. In the low-familiarity conditionssubjects began the task without this familiarizationperiod.

Dependent Measures

Before the trial on the apparatus, all subjects wereasked to rate how confident they were that theywould select the correct path on a 10-polnt scaleranging from 1 (very unsure) to 10 (pretty certain).Subjects were then given a successful trial on theapparatus, which was followed by a questionnaire.The relevant question asked subjects to rate howtheir performance on the apparatus would comparewith that of a champion chess player if they wereeach given five trials. The scale used ranged from 1(much worse) to 10 (much better). All other itemswere filler questions centering around the market-ability of the product.

Results

Table 2 presents the mean pretrial confi-dence ratings for the four groups. The analy-

320 ELLEN J. LANGER

TABLE 2

MEAN PEETRIAL CONFIDENCE RATINGS OF SUC-CESS ON ILLUSION OF CONTROL APPARATUS,

STUDY 4

FamiliarityInvolvement

High Low

HighLow

6.07S.67

5.673.80

Note, n = 15 per cell.

sis of the variance of these ratings yieldedsignificant main effects for both familiarityand involvement, F(l, 56) = 4.71, p < .05, inboth cases.

Similar results were obtained in responseto the question that asked subjects to com-pare their expected performance with thatof a champion chess player. Table 3 presentsthe mean ratings for this question for thefour groups. Once again the analysis yieldedsignificant main effects for both familiarityand involvement: for familiarity, F(l, 56)= 7.33, p<.01; for involvement, ^(1,56)= 4.25, p < .05.

EXPERIMENT 5: EFFECTS OF PASSIVEINVOLVEMENT ON THE ILLUSION OF

CONTROL IN A FIELD SETTING

The more thought one gives to a skillevent, 'the more probable it is that one willcome upon strategies that will increase thelikelihood of success. Thus greater passiveinvolvement usually results in greater control.It is predicted that when involvement isincreased in a chance situation, there is alsoan increase in the perception of control, theillusion of control.

Yonkers Raceway provided an opportunityto test this idea in a field setting. For a shortperiod of time, Monday night was "give awaynight" at the racetrack. By virtue of having

TABLE 3MEAN CONFIDENCE RATINGS or SUCCESS IN COMPARI-

SON WITH CHESS PLAYER, STUDY 4

FamiliarityInvolvement

High Low

HighLow

7.005.33

5.674.53

Note, n = 15 per cell.

paid an entrance fee, all of the racetrack'scustomers were automatically participantsin a lottery where the winner would beselected late in the night. People were ap-proached at different points in time andasked to rate their confidence in winningthe lottery. It is likely that the more timethere is available for thinking about anevent, the more time people will spend insuch thought. Thus it was predicted that con-fidence would increase over time. Since it wasassumed that men have greater involvementin the races than women, there should be lessthought about the lottery for the formergroup. Therefore, if there are sex differencesregarding confidence in winning the lottery,they should be in the direction of greaterconfidence for women than men.

Method

The procedure for the lottery as set down by theracetrack was as follows: Upon entering the track,people were given lottery tickets to fill out. Theywere told to put their names and addresses on thehalf of their stub to be deposited in a big barrelnear the entrance and to keep the remaining halffor verification if they won. The winner did nothave to be present at the drawing in order to claimthe prize. The drawing took place after the ninthand last race.

Three color televisions were given out the weekbefore this study was conducted. Unbeknownst tothe author until her arrival at the racetrack, theprize for the week in which the present investiga-tion was run was a $2,000 college scholarship. Thisseemed an odd prize to be given away at a race-track and did not appear to be one that would lenditself to much thought on the part of the track'svisitors. However, instead of announcing this prize,whenever the track officials mentioned the drawingover the public address system, they referred to theCadillac that was to be given away the followingweek. Therefore, many of the people in the presentstudy thought that a Cadillac was the current prize.

One female and one male experimenter blind tothe experimental hypothesis helped the author con-duct the present investigation. Twenty minutesbefore the first race, the fifth race, and the ninthrace, the experimenters approached adult males andfemales and asked them if they would answer aquestion for a survey concerning the prizes to begiven out after the ninth race. Subjects were handeda form which asked them to indicate, on a ,10-pointscale, how confident they were that their ticketwould be selected at the drawing. The scale rangedfrom 1 (I'm sure I won't win) to 10 (I've got areally good chance). In Time Period 1, 49 femalesand 73 males were approached; in Time Period 2.

THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL 321

S4 females and 88 males were approached; and inTime Period 3, 62 females and 83 males wereapproached.

If anyone questioned what the prize would be,he or she was told that the experimenter did notknow but that last week three color television setswere given away. The racetrack official announcedthe prize for the following week on two occasions:once after the first race but before the fifth andonce after the fifth race but before the ninth. Im-mediately after the seventh race, both the prize forthe present drawing and the prizs for the futuredrawing were mentioned. The first part of themessage regarding the present drawing, however,was virtually masked by shouts from the winnersand losers of the last race.

Results

Table 4 presents the mean confidenceratings for both male and female subjectsat the three different points in time. Theanalysis of variance of these data yielded asignificant main effect for time, ^(2,403)= 4.09, p < .05, and for sex of subject,F(l, 403) = 7.S8, p < .01. One of the degreesof freedom of the time variable was used todetermine whether the main effect for timewas due to an increase in confidence fromPeriods 1-3. The trend analysis yielded anF(l,403) - 7.94, p < .01. Thus both sexestend to become more confident over time,and females appear to be more confident thatthey will win than males.

EXPERIMENT 6: EFFECTS OF PASSIVEINVOLVEMENT ON THE ILLUSION OF

CONTROL IN A CONTROLLEDFIELD STUDY

In the last study, confidence in winningappeared to increase over time. However,since there was no way to control for thepresence of different types of subjects at theracetrack at different points in time, the re-sults may have been artifactual. In order toretest the prediction that an increase in pas-sive involvement increases the illusion of con-trol under more controlled circumstances, an-other study was conducted. Involvement inthe present investigation was manipulated byencouraging half of the participants in alottery to think about the lottery on threeseparate occasions and not encouraging theremaining participants. As in the third studyin this series, the illusion of control was mea-

TABLE 4MEAN CONFIDENCE RATINGS AT

RACETEACK, STUDY 5

Sex

MaleFemale

Ti

3.144.10

TimeTz

3.3S3.92

Ti

4.055.11

Note. Higher numbers indicate greater confidence.

sured by each subject's willingness to tradehis original ticket for a ticket in a lotterywhere the objective chances of winning werebetter. In addition, subjects were asked torate their confidence that their ticket wouldbe selected. The prediction is that subjectsin the high-involvement condition would beless likely to trade than subjects in thelow-involvement condition and that high-involvement subjects would report being moreconfident of winning.

MethodSubjects

Adult male and female office workers affiliatedwith several different companies located in onebuilding in New York served as subjects. They wereapproached by a male executive associated with oneof the firms located in the building and asked if theywanted to participate in a lottery. (The experimenterwas blind to the experimental hypotheses.) Thosewho complied were randomly assigned to either thehigh- or low-involvement condition. If more thanone person occupied a given office, they were eachassigned to the same experimental condition. Noworker who shared an office with more than threepeople was included in the study. There were 17males and S females in the high-involvement condi-tion and 14 males and S females in the low-involve-ment condition.

Procedure

Subjects were asked if they wished to participatein an office lottery where the tickets cost $1, onlyone ticket was allowed per customer, and the entirepot went to the winner. Tickets were sold on Mon-day, and the drawing took place on the Friday ofthat week.

High involvement. Subjects in the high-involve-ment condition were told that they would get theirthree-digit lottery ticket in installments. It wasexplained that they would be given their first digitthat day, the second digit the next day, and thethird and last digit the day after. It was made clearthat the order the numbers were in was fixed.

Low involvement. Subjects in the low-involvementcondition were given their three-digit lottery ticketon the day of purchase.

322 ELLEN J. LANGER

Dependent Measures

The day before or the morning of the drawing,all subjects were approached individually by theperson from whom they purchased their ticket. Aftera few minutes of casual conversation, the lotterywas mentioned. The subject was told that the de-mand for lottery tickets exceeded the supply. Theexperimenter therefore had started another lotterywhere the pot was fixed at $25, each ticket cost $1,one ticket was issued per customer, and the drawingwas again to be held on Friday. The subject wasfurther informed that 25 people had bought ticketsin the lottery he was in so that there was $25 inthe pot and that only 20 people were in the otherlottery. "It makes no difference to me but if you'dlike, I can exchange your ticket for one in the otherlottery, but please don't mention this to anybody."The primary dependent measure was whether or notthe subject wanted to trade his ticket in orderto objectively increase his chances of winning. Sub-jects who wanted to trade were revisited shortlyafter this by the experimenter, who apologized tothem and explained that the remaining tickets hadbeen lost so that the trade would not be possible.

All subjects were approached again on the after-noon of the drawing and were asked to fill out aone-question questionnaire for a survey on the officelottery. The question asked, "How sure are you thatyour ticket will be selected?" Subjects were askedto indicate their answer by circling a number on a10-point scale that ranged from 1 (not sure at all)to 10 (pretty good chance).

Results

As predicted, subjects in the high-involve-ment condition were less likely to accept theoffer to improve their chances of winning thanwere subjects in the low-involvement condi-tion. This may be seen in Table 5, where thenumber of people in each condition whoelected to either keep or trade their ticket ispresented as a function of the level of involve-ment. Of the high-involvement group, 63.6%of the subjects chose to keep their originalticket, while only 31.6% of the low-involve-ment group elected this option. A chi-square

TABLE 5NUMBER or PEOPLE WHO DECIDED TO KEEP OR TEADF

THEIR TICKET AS A FUNCTION or LEVELOF INVOLVEMENT, STUDY 6

DecisionInvolvement

High Low

KeepTrade

14 613

analysis indicates that this difference is sig-nificant at p < .05 (x2 = 4.19).

In response to the question "How sure areyou that your ticket will be selected?" themean response for the high-involvement groupwas 6.4S (on a scale in which higher numbersreflect greater certainty), while the mean forthe low-involvement group was only 3,00. Thedifference between the two means is highlysignificant (t = 4.16, / > < .005). Subjectswere asked whether or not they wanted totrade their ticket prior to the time they gavethis confidence rating. Thus, it was possiblethat this difference was a function of subjects'earlier responses rather than a separate mea-sure of illusory control. That is, subjectsmight have justified keeping their ticket bygiving a higher rating. Therefore, anotheranalysis was carried out in which only theratings of subjects in the two groups whosemembers chose to keep their original ticketswere compared. The mean rating in this casefor the high-involvement condition was 8.36as compared with a mean rating of 3.67 forthe low-involvement group (t = 4.IS, p <.005).

Conceptual Test of the Manipulation

In order to make certain that the resultswere a function of the level of involvementand not some other factor, a random samplecomprised of Yale students, located in one ofthe university's libraries, and employees ofPrentice-Hall, located in their respectiveoffices in New Jersey, were asked to fill out aquestionnaire that described the study andasked which of the following words—com-plexity, fun, involvement—best described thedifference between the two groups. Of therespondents, 30 believed the difference to beone of involvement, 16 thought it was adifference in fun, and 12 believed the differ-ence was one of complexity (x2 = 9.24, p <.01).

IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS

On the basis of the evidence just presented,it seems that subjects do not distinguishchance- from skill-determined events in theway that is suggested by their definitions. Theobjective contingency does not appear to bethe crucial variable governing subjects' be-

THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL 323

havior. Instead, whether or not an event isreacted to as if it is controllable largely de-pends on factors like competition, choice,familiarity, and involvement, which may beorthogonal to the actual contingency. Thishas been shown to be the case even in situa-tions that are as clearly governed by chanceas a lottery.

The first study dealt with competition ina chance setting and demonstrated that whenthe illusion is operative, characteristics ofone's opponent, for example, his apparentcompetence, affect confidence in one's ownability to bring about desired outcomes. Inthe next two studies it was shown that byallowing subjects to make choices, they cameto behave as though they had an illusion ofcontrol over the outcome. So powerful wasthe effect of choice in this regard, thatsubjects who were given choice in a sensegave up the opportunity to exert real con-trol by failing to enter a lottery where theirobjective chances of winning were better.The same results were obtained for theeffects of stimulus familiarity and passiveinvolvement. In the fourth study, which em-ployed the IOC apparatus, it was found thatresponse familiarity, or practice, on a chancetask resulted in greater confidence in win-ning than did no practice. In the same study,greater confidence also resulted when theapparatus was controlled by the subjectrather than the experimenter, although inboth instances the subject determined theresponse that would be made.

While the factors manipulated in theseexperiments are all characteristics of skillsituations, the results of a subset of the stud-ies may lend themselves to alternative expla-nations. For example, in the two studies in-volving choice, it is possible that subjectschose tickets that were meaningful to themand that because of this rather than an in-crease in confidence in winning, the ticketswere of greater value to them. In response tothis conjecture one might argue that a personcould easily duplicate his ticket so that hecould trade his original ticket to improve hischances of winning the lottery and still havea ticket to save if, for example, having aticket with his favorite letter on it has somepersonal value. Or one might argue that it is

not the intrinsic value of the ticket but ratherthe sentimental value that the person at-taches to it that is responsible for its increasedworth. Even if this "sentiment" interpreta-tion somehow explained the results of thetwo choice situations, it cannot explain theexplicit increase in confidence found in theremaining studies. In any event, taken as awhole, the experiments appear to support theassertion that the more similar a chance situ-ation is to a skill situation, the more likely itis that people approach the chance situationwith a skill orientation. In each study eithera direct or implicit change in confidence ob-tained as a function of these skill-relatedfactors (see Table 6).

Why does this occur? People are motivatedto control their environment. The importanceof control in this context has been widelydiscussed by both therapists and social sci-ence researchers. Whether it is seen as a needfor competence (White, 1959), an instinct tomaster (Hendrick, 1943), a striving for su-periority (Adler, 1930), or a striving for per-sonal causation (deCharms, 1968), most so-cial scientists agree that there is a motivationto master one's environment, and a completemastery would include the ability to "beatthe odds," that is, to control chance events.The more difficult a problem is, the morecompetent one feels in being able to solve it.The greatest satisfaction or feeling of compe-tence would therefore result from being ableto control the seemingly uncontrollable.

A second, although not entirely indepen-dent, reason is that there is motivation toavoid the negative consequences that accom-pany the perception of having no control.There has been much research showing that anonveridical perception of control over animpending event reduces the aversiveness ofthat event (see Lefcourt, 1973, for a recentreview of this literature). A temporary loss ofcontrol is anxiety arousing. A chronic feelingof no control is characterized by passivity andgiving up in the face of failure. (This pointis taken up again in a discussion of the rela-tionship between the illusion of control andlearned helplessness.)

In addition to the motivation to control,there is another reason for the lack of dis-crimination between controllable and uncon-

324 ELLEN J. LANGEE

TABLE 6

SUMMARY OF DATA, STUDIES 1-6

Skill-related factor

CompetitionChoice

Stimulus familiarity

Response familiarity

Active involvement

Study

12

3

3

4

4

Chance activity

Draw for high cardLottery

Lottery

Lottery

Apparatus: "guessthe path"

Apparatus

Subjects

Male studentsMale and female office

workersMale office workers

Male office workers

Male and female tele-phone company em-ployees

Male and female tele-

Dependent measure

Amount wageredPrice required to sell

ticket

Willingness to tradeticket

Willingness to tradeticket

Confidence rating

Confidence rating

Signifi-cance

level infavor

of IOCpredic-

tion

<.025

<.005

<.OS

<.05

<.05

<.05

Passive involvement Racetrack

Lottery

phone company em-ployees

Males and females(variety of occupa-tions)

Male and female officeworkers

Confidence in relative < .05performance

Confidence rating <.05

Willingness to trade < .05ticket

Confidence rating <.OOS

Note. IOC refers to illusion of control.

trollable events. This is the fact that skill andchance factors are so closely associated inpeople's experience. That is, there is not onlya motivation not to discriminate, but there isoften a true difficulty in making the discrimi-nation, since there is an element of chance inevery skill situation and an element of skill inalmost every chance situation. The former isobvious and needs no further explication here.Examples of the latter are knowing what agood bet is in a game of dice (i.e., knowingthe odds) or knowing which slot machinesare rigged to give the highest payoffs. (It isa not too widely known fact, for example,that the slot machines at the airport in LasVegas pay off more often than those locatedin town.)

Aside from the fact that a given situationcontains elements of both skill and chance,the distinction between skill and chance situ-ations is further complicated by the fact thatpositive outcomes are most often attributed

to the action that preceded them. This occursregardless of the actual contingency becausein reality most outcomes are caused by theimmediately preceding act.

Most germane to the present body of dataare the implications this work has for gam-bling. It is reasonable to assume that partici-pation in legalized forms of gambling may beincreased, and thereby bring about a decreasein illegal gambling, by changing the chanceactivities so that they incorporate such skill-related factors as those discussed in the pres-ent investigation. Thus, for example, in orderfor state lotteries to compete more success-fully with the numbers game—whose popu-larity may be a product of the fact that par-ticipants are afforded the opportunity to exertillusory control by choosing the particularcombination of numbers on which they wishto wager—it may be efficacious for the variouslottery commissions to add this element ofchoice to their respective lotteries. (This has

THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL 325

recently been done in Massachusetts.) Per-haps people should be allowed to choose aticket from several categories of tickets sothat they can select one that representssomething with which they are very familiar.In a similar way, the other factors may beintroduced into existing gambling practices,or enhanced where they already exist, inorder to increase participation in a particulargame.

The present work may also have less ob-vious implications. The illusion of control isin a sense the inverse of learned helplessness.Learned helplessness is the perception of inde-pendence between actions and outcomes. It isthe belief that one cannot influence the pro-duction of positive events. Just as one mayerroneously come to learn an independencebetween actions and outcomes, so too mayone erroneously learn a dependence betweenactions and outcomes. In the first case, theorganism has generalized from an instancewhere there was no control to a situationwhere there is control by having attended tothe elements that the two situations still havein common. That is, the discriminative stim-uli that signaled no control in the past arestill present. They are still controlling be-havior, although they are no longer validcues. In the same way, the illusion of controlmay come about because of attention to cuesthat were once valid but are no longer. There-fore, when factors like choice, familiarity,involvement, and competition, which in thepast signaled controllability, are introducedinto a chance setting, they may still functionas discriminative stimuli for control behav-iors and induce a skill orientation.

Because of some recent and rather impor-tant developments in the area of learnedhelplessness, it may be worthwhile to carrythe comparison a step further. Seligman (inpress) believes that learned helplessness isthe root of reactive depression and that re-active depression may be alleviated by teach-ing response-outcome contingencies, that is,by teaching control. Seligman, Maier, andGeer (1968) have shown this to be effectivein alleviating learned helplessness in dogs,and Dweck (1975) has obtained similar re-sults with children. If, indeed, the illusion of

control is -the inverse of learned helplessness,then the illusion of control may contribute tomanic or hypomanic reactions, since reactivedepression is in many ways similar to psy-chotic depression, the believed counterpart ofmania. Mania is characterized by goal-directedoveractivity and very high self-esteem. Beck(1967) describes the manic patient as "opti-mistic about the outcome of anything heundertakes. Even when confronted with aninsoluble problem he is confident that he willfind a solution" (p. 93). Thus he appears tohave an illusion of control. If this is true,then deficient contingency learning, in whichthe individual misattributes causal effectanceto himself as a result of prior training, maybe an etiological factor in manic reactions.This speculation and the treatment it sug-gests should be explored in future research.

It may be meaningful to ask whether anillusion of control is necessarily dysfunctionalfor the individual. An extrapolation from thepresent results to the realm of system changeimplies that this need not be the case. Thepreference for the status quo is more thanlikely a function of the security it provides:It is seemingly controllable. Perhaps one wayto persuade people to make the change fromthe old to the new is to make the new morefamiliar and to increase involvement andparticipation in the changeover. When this isdone, the novelty of the new system may beappreciated because the fear-inducing prop-erty of being uncontrollable has been re-duced. This idea is hardly new. Businesses,for example, have long known that changesare least resisted when employees are givena good deal of information about the changeand are brought into the decision-makingpolicy. What is new, perhaps, is the suggestionthat the ways of increasing acceptance of thenew system, whatever it be, may not dependon distributing real control when that alter-native is impractical. That is, by inducing anillusion of control through the introductionof control-related but outcome-independentfactors, people may be put at ease sufficientlyto increase their risk taking, that is, to ac-cept the "unknown."

In a similar way, the induction of an illu-sion of control may improve the well-being

326 ELLEN J. LANGER

of people in hospitals, old age homes, andmental institutions. In many ways the peoplein these environments, in an increasing orderof magnitude, are deprived of the ability toexert control. This perceived absence of theability to control is debilitating. When thereare good reasons why it is either undesirableor impossible to remove restrictions on free-dom, that is, when it is not possible to enablethe exercise of real control, it may be advan-tageous to induce the illusion of control. Forinstance, using just one of the factors as anillustration, by allowing the patient in thehospital to decide whether he wants an in-jection of penicillin or a penicillin tablet(when the difference in the amount of timeit takes for the medication to get into thebloodstream is not important), he has beengiven the opportunity to exercise control,although the important decision—that he isgoing to have penicillin—has already beenmade. Changes along these lines may havefar-reaching gains, while the costs are negli-gible.

While there exists the very discomfortingpossibility that persons might attempt to in-duce an illusion of control in controllablesituations in order to prevent other peoplefrom exercising real control, it is very possi-ble that such an undertaking would boom-erang. The increase in confidence that mayresult from the introduction of control-re-lated but outcome-independent factors maysufficiently motivate an individual to seekout more rather than less control. For ex-ample, giving so-called unimportant choicesto people in old age homes may help thesepeople to feel once again that they are capa-ble of making and should be making the kindsof decisions that they once had made. Thevalidity of these speculations is as yet un-tested but is one that seems to merit furtherconsideration.

When such a consistent set of results insocial-psychological research has been re-ported, as is the case here, it often representsa subset of the studies that were actuallyperformed. Frequently studies that do notturn out precisely as expected and do notprovide confirmations of theoretical notionsare not presented. However, these studies canbe extremely useful in delimiting the boun-

daries of the phenomena in question; that is,by illuminating the circumstances under whichparticular phenomena do not occur, it is pos-sible to gain a greater understanding of thesituations in which they do occur. Below is abrief description of two other related studiesconducted in this series which did not confirmpredictions but which were informative forthat very reason.

The first attempt to examine the effects ofchoice and passive involvement on the illu-sion of control was in a lottery conducted inthe psychology department at Yale. In thatstudy IBM cards with dates printed on themserved as tickets. Subjects either chose theirown ticket or were given a ticket and wereasked how much they thought they would sellit for at one of three times before the draw-ing. That is, instead of actually being ap-proached by a potential buyer, they wereasked to imagine what they would do if theywere in that situation. Choice had a verystrong effect, but this was only for females,and the effect for time could not be assessedbecause it was confounded by the particulardistribution of females in the various groups.It seemed likely that part of the failure tofind the effect of choice for males was a func-tion of the particular males in the population.Many of the responses from male subjectsimplied a perceived demand to reach a pricebased on rational or mathematical considera-tions. For example, along with his reply, onerespondent included the formula for the ex-pected utility of the ticket that he used toarrive at his estimation. This study may becontrasted with Studies 2 and 3, where theeffect of choice did obtain for males. How-ever, in those studies, subjects were in theactual situation without the perceived de-mand to be rational.

In another study, a written questionnairecontaining an item conceptually similar to thecompetition manipulation reported in Study1 was distributed to various populations. Atypical version of the question read as follows:

Two people, Dan and Sam, overhear youmention that you're going to buy a lotteryticket. Sam is unattractive and seems ratherawkward, while Dan is rather good-lookingand seems quite sure of himself. They each

THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL 327

ask you to buy a ticket for them. The ticketagent sells you tickets number 54, 55, 73.You decide to keep ticket 55 for yourself.

To whom do you give number 54?To whom do you give number 73 ?

For most of the groups there was no differ-ence; however, when there was a significantdifference, it was in the direction opposite tothat predicted. That is, people tended to saythat they would give the number closer totheirs, number 54, to Dan, the confident op-ponent. The hypothetical nature of this ques-tion may be contrasted with Study 1, whichmeasured actual behavior in the situation.These studies served to highlight an impor-tant aspect of this phenomenon. It wouldappear that when asked, people are ofteneither unaware of the motivational factorsthat influence their behavior in chance situa-tions, or they do not wish to appear "irra-tional."

In conclusion, we can say with a fair de-gree of certainty that when an individual isactually in the situation, the more similar thechance situation is to a skill situation inoutcome-independent ways, the greater will bethe illusion of control. This illusion may beinduced by introducing competition, choice,stimulus or response familiarity, or passive oractive involvement into a chance situation.When these factors are present, people aremore confident and are more likely to takerisks.

In the immediate future additional re-search will be undertaken to test the gen-erality of this phenomenon and to validatefurther the present conception of these find-ings. The following propositions will be con-sidered:

(a) When control is desirable, that is, whensuccess seems likely, people will seek out fac-tors such as competition, choice, etc.

(b) When control is undesirable, that is,when failure is both likely and costly, peoplewill avoid these factors.

(c) When there is an intrusion of realitysuch that the focus of attention is shiftedback to the chance elements in the situationand away from the skill characteristics thatwere predominating, the illusion will dissipate.

REFERENCE NOTE

1. Hamilton, D. L., & Gifford, R. K. Illusory corre-lation in interpersonal perception: A cognitivebasis of stereotypic judgments. Unpublished man-uscript, Yale University, 1972.

REFERENCES

Adler, A. Individual psychology. In C. Murchinson(Ed.), Psychologies of 1930. Worcester, Mass.:Clark University Press, 1930.

Beck, A. T. Depression. Philadelphia: University ofPennsylvania Press, 1967.

Bruner, A., & Revusky, S. H. Collateral behavior inhumans. Journal of the Experimental Analysis ojBehavior, 1961, 4, 349-350.

Chapman, L. J., & Chapman, J. P. Genesis of popu-lar but erroneous psychodiagnostic categories.Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1967, 72, 193-204.

Cohen, J. Behavior in uncertainty. London: Unwin,1964.

Cohen, L., & Hansel, C. E. The nature of decisionsin gambling. Acta Psychologica, 1958, 13, 357-370.

deCharms, R. Personal causation. New York: Aca-demic Press, 1968.

Dweck, C, The role of expectations and attributionsin the alleviations of learned helplessness. Journalof Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31,674-685.

Feather, N. T. Attribution of responsibility andvalence of success and failure in relation to initialconfidence and task performance. Journal of Per-sonality and Social Psychology, 1969, 13, 129-144.

Goffman, E. Interaction ritual. New York: Anchor,1967.

Golding, S. L., & Rorer, L. G. "Illusory Correlation"and the learning of clinical judgment. OregonResearch Institute Bulletin, 1971, 11, No. 10.

Hendrick, I. The discussion of the "Instinct toMaster." Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 1943, 12,561-565.

Henslin, J. M. Craps and magic. American Journalof Sociology, 1967, 73, 316-330.

Kelley, H. H. Attribution theory in social psychol-ogy. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska Symposiumof Motivation (Vol. 15). Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 1967.

Landy, D., & Aronson, E. The influence of thecharacter of the criminal and his victim on thedecision of jurors. Journal of Experimental SocialPsychology, 1969, 5, 141-152.

Langer, E. J., & Abelson, R. P. The semantics ofasking a favor: How to succeed in getting helpwithout really dying. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 1972, 24, 26-32.

Langer, E. J., & Roth, J. Heads I win, tails it'schance: The illusion of control as a function of thesequence of outcomes in a purely chance task.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, inpress.

328 ELLEN J. LANGER

Lee, W. Decision theory and human behavior. NewYork: Wiley, 1971.

Lefcourt, H. M. The function of the illusions ofcontrol and freedom. American Psychologist, 1973,28, 417-425.

Lerner, M. J. Evaluation of performance as a func-tion of performer's reward and attractiveness.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965,1, 355-360.

Lerner, M. J., & Mathews, G. Reactions to sufferingof others under conditions of indirect responsibil-ity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1967, 5, 319-325.

Lerner, M. J., & Simmons, C. H. Observers' reac-tions to the "Innocent Victim": Comparison orrejection? Journal of Personality and Social Psy-chology, 1966, 4, 203-210.

Nisan, M. Dimension of time in relation to choicebehavior and achievement orientation. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 1972, 21, 175-182.

Rubin, Z., & Peplau, A. Belief in a just world andreactions to another's lot: A study of participantsin the national draft lottery. Journal of SocialIssues, 1973, 29, 73-93.

Seligman, M. E. P. Depression and learned help-lessness. In R. J. Friedman & M. M. Katz (Eds.),The psychology of depression: Contemporarytheory and research, in press.

Seligman, M. E. P., Maier, S. F., & Geer, J. Thealleviation of learned helplessness in the dog.Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1968,73, 256-262.

Shaw, J. I., & Skolnick, P. Attribution of responsi-bility for a happy accident. Journal of Person-ality and Social Psychology, 1971, 18, 380-383.

Simmons, C. W., & Piliavin, J. A. Effect of decep-tion on reactions to a victim. Journal of Person-ality and Social Psychology, 1972, 21, 56-60.

Smedslund, J. The concept of correlation in adults.

Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 1963, 4, 165-173.

Starr, B. J., & Katkin, E. S. The clinician as anaberrant actuary: Illusory correlation and theincomplete sentence blank. Journal of AbnormalPsychology, 1969, 74, 670-675.

Streufert, S., & Streufert, S. C. The effects of con-ceptual structure, failure, and success on attribu-tions of causality and interpersonal attitudes.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969,11, 138-147.

Strickland, L. H., Lewicki, R. J., & Katz, A. M.Temporal orientation and perceived control asdeterminants of risk-taking. Journal of Experi-mental Social Psychology, 1966, 2, 143-151.

Wallach, M. A., & Wing, C. W. Is risk a value?Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1968, 9, 101-106.

Walster, E. Assignment of responsibility for anaccident. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-chology, 1966, 3, 73-79.

Ward, W. C., & Jenkins, H. M. The display ofinformation and the judgment of contingency.Canadian Journal of Psychology, 1965,19, 231-241.

Weiner, B., Frieze, I., Kukla, A., Reed, L., Rest,S., & Rosenbaum, R. M. Perceiving the causes ofsuccess and failure. In E. E. Jones, D. E. Ka-nouse, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner(Eds.), Attribution. Morristown, N.J.: GeneralLearning Press, 1971.

White, R. W. Motivation reconsidered: the conceptof competence. Psychological Review, 1959, 66,297-333.

Wortman, C. B., Costanzo, P. R., & Witt, T. R.Effects of anticipated performance on the attri-butions of causality to self and others. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 1973, 27, 372-381.

(Received May 3, 1974)