the hellenic parliament: the new rules of the game

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The Hellenic Parliament: Thenew rules of the gamePenelope Foundethakis Associate Professor in theSchool of Lawa Panteion University of Social and PoliticalSciences , AthensPublished online: 08 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Penelope Foundethakis Associate Professor in the School ofLaw (2003) The Hellenic Parliament: The new rules of the game, The Journal ofLegislative Studies, 9:2, 85-106, DOI: 10.1080/1357233032000250644

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The Hellenic Parliament:The New Rules of the Game

PENELOPE FOUNDETHAKIS

The transition of the Hellenic Parliament from post-war autocratic parliamen-

tarism and a dictatorship that collapsed in 1974, to rational parliamentarism

within a polarised political system up to 1985 has already been well

researched.1 This article attempts to focus on the new data that make up the

character of the Hellenic Parliament.

Although parliament had a fundamental role at the basis of the new demo-

cratic regime, it failed to develop into an efficient and democratically run insti-

tution. The weakness of the parliament proved to be a key problem during

the 1985–2001 period. This was demonstrated first in the parliamentary

response to the gradual reduction of its political power, due to the strengthen-

ing of the executive; secondly, in the parliamentary response to the scorn to

which its members were subjected by ‘public opinion’ due to the frequent

accusations of non-transparency and improper exchanges with the sources

of economic power. A balance between its new roles shaped by the

complex reality of mass democracy in international society has not yet been

achieved by the Hellenic Parliament. During the process of the recent consti-

tutional revision, many members of parliament referred nostalgically to a past

age of parliamentary resplendence.

Equilibrium is also being sought between the two basic opposing parlia-

mentary tendencies at the level of internal procedures. This can be observed

in two areas: first, the individual institutional role of the member of parliament

(MP) comes into conflict with that of the collective parliamentary formations;

second, the need for broader participation comes into conflict with the need for

greater speed and effectiveness. Clearly, the constitution and the standing

orders (SO) gave priority, in the first area, to the weakening of the institutional

role of the MPs and the reinforcing of the parliamentary groups. In the second

area, reference is made to effectiveness at the expense of democratic legitimi-

sation of the parliamentary process.

Penelope Foundethakis is an Associate Professor in the School of Law, Panteion University ofSocial and Political Sciences, Athens.

The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol.9, No.2, Summer 2003, pp.85–106ISSN 1357-2334 print/1743-9337 onlineDOI: 10.1080/1357233032000250644 # 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd

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The revision of the constitution in April 2001 and the SO in December 2001

dealt with these problems in a positive way. However, both of the major parties

displayed political timidity and a closed shop mentality on some of the issues.

How these new provisions will be implemented and the influence they will have

on the Greek political system remains to be demonstrated.

THE HELLENIC PARLIAMENT IN BRIEF

The Greek Parliament consists of one Chamber and fulfils the function of the

legislative body in a parliamentary republic. There is no tradition of a Senate,

although there are two historical examples, in 1844 and in 1927, which did not

last long. There are 300 MPs, according to the law. The constitutional pro-

vision allows for between 200 and 300 Deputies, but the ‘tradition’ is for

the maximum. The Greek peculiarity lies in the weak status of the parliamen-

tary opposition, in the very strong relationship between the governmental

party on the one hand and the state and the administration on the other.

This fact is the relic of a democracy, economy, and even society, dominated

by the state since the nineteenth century. Since 1987 steady efforts have

been made, through the revision of the SO, to strengthen parliament – that

is, to strengthen the opposition. The identification between government and

parliamentary majority has been helped by (a) an almost absolute party disci-

pline and (b) an electoral system which traditionally restricts the political

game to the two main parties – the centre-right and the centre-left.

Until the latest revision of the constitution and the SO (2001), parliamen-

tary work was very centralised. Although there was a constitutional provision

about the possibility of splitting the plenum into two sections, practice worked

against this choice. The institutions of the Presidium of the Parliament and of

the Conference of Presidents, created in 1987, have contributed considerably

towards a more organised parliamentary work.

There is a steadily increasing number of committees. The need for a

‘working’ parliament has led to an enlargement of the new legislative compe-

tences of the six permanent parliamentary committees (standing committees),

which has resulted in taking over a great deal of the work of the plenum. These

committees are: the Standing Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs;

on Defence and Foreign Affairs; on Economic Affairs; on Social Affairs; on

Public Administration, Public Order and Justice; and on Production and

Trade. There are also two special committees: on the Financial Statement and

the General Balance Sheet of the State, and on European Affairs. Besides

these, there are four special permanent committees: on Greeks Abroad; on Insti-

tutions and Transparency; on Technology Assessment; on Equality and Human

Rights. The internal affairs of parliament are the subject matter of four commit-

tees established in every regular session (Committee on SO of the Parliament;

86 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES

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Committee on Parliamentary Finances; Committee on the Parliamentary

Library; and Committee on International Parliamentary Affairs). Finally there

are the investigation committees and the ad hoc parliamentary committee for

the conducting of preliminary investigations in the case of impeachment.

THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 1985 – 2001: THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM,

THE PARTIES AND GOVERNMENTAL CRISES

The Greek political system was marked by the change of government in 1981,

when the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) came into power. In 1985,

PASOK won the elections again and implemented a system of ‘reinforced’ pro-

portional representation with elements of a majority system.2 The constitutional

revision of 1986, the content of which was restricted to a drastic reduction of the

excessive powers of the President of the Republic, did not succeed in reinfor-

cing the parliament.3 On the contrary, it reinforced the predominance of the

governing party, primarily its leader, and the prime minister.

This took place within the framework of a bi-polar system and of single-

party governments, the rule in the Greek political system,4 in combination

with a deficit of intra-party democracy,5 which continues to the present day.

Intra-party democracy is a problem in Greece, perhaps more so than in other

European countries, as there is a solid tradition of politicians with strong

personalities, who ‘owned’ their parties and imposed absolute party discipline.

The last party leaders of this tradition were Konstantinos Karamanlis and

Andreas Papandreou. During the last 10–15 years there has been an effort

within the parties to improve the democratic process of party decision-

making. However, to this date, there is a legal disagreement over the vague

constitutional provision on political parties (article 29, para.1), on whether

it commits parties to internal democracy or not.

Due to the Koskotas scandal,6 which acted as a catalyst for political devel-

opments, the atmosphere of the 1989 elections was intensely loaded against

the socialist party. A few months prior to the election, the governing party

passed a bill establishing a system of genuine proportional representation.7

This changed the existing system of ‘reinforced’ proportional representation

in place since 1974. The clear aim was to hinder the right-wing party of

New Democracy (ND) in the formation of a majority government. Following

the election of June 1989, a paradoxical coalition government of the right in

co-operation with the Communist Party was formed.8 Its slogan was ‘purifi-

cation’: ‘catharsis’. It aimed at bringing impeachment charges against

Andreas Papandreou and three other ministers of the PASOK government

in the ad hoc Special Court.9 This was followed by the government of Grivas,

which conducted the elections of November 1989 when once again a single-

party government failed to emerge. The publicly accepted government of

THE HELLENIC PARLIAMENT 87

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Zolotas – a non-parliamentarian and university professor10 – led to the dissol-

ution of parliament after the failure of the parties’ agreement concerning the

election of the President of the Republic. A New Democracy government

emerged from the elections of 8 April 1990, with a marginal majority: its

majority was secured thanks to the vote of the one MP elected from the centre-

right party ‘Democratic Renewal’ (‘DIANA’). This government fell after some

of its MPs seceded. However in the first months of its term, the ND government

had already brought back the system of ‘reinforced’ proportional represen-

tation11 with a law which remains in force.12 Andreas Papandreou was declared

not guilty13 and, following the elections of October 1993, PASOK gained a

large percentage difference over ND, forming once again a Papandreou govern-

ment, followed by the Simitis government.14 Single-party governments of

PASOK emerged in the elections of September 1996 and April 2000 under

the same electoral law.15

Three elements stand out in this turbulent period which help to interpret

the provisions of constitutional law: the first is the endurance of the political

system under intense strain; the second is the successful implementation of the

detailed provisions for the cabinet formation process which were enacted with

the 1986 revision;16 the third is the on-going preference of the electorate for

the bi-polar model and single-party governments.17

The instrumentalist use of electoral law by every governmental majority,

frequently making changes a few months prior to elections, resulted in the

addition to the constitution, in its recent revision, of a clause dealing with

this issue. According to the new provision (article 54 para.1 Constitution

[C]), the electoral system is defined by statute law that comes into effect in

the elections subsequent to the forthcoming elections. This is the case, unless

two-thirds of the MPs decide that it will come into effect in the forthcoming

elections. The new provision that expresses the admitted distrust of the govern-

mental majority was accepted by all – MPs, parties and public opinion. Given

the repeatedly abusive dissolution of parliament to date,18 the question arises as

to whether the problem has simply been transposed from the timing of the

passing of electoral law to the timing of the dissolution of the parliament.19

THE RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

The extensive revision of the Greek Constitution concerned 51 articles and

was passed in parliament on 6 April, 2001.20 The revision process was seen

as particularly consensual, a point of view supported in part by the number

of votes in favour of the proposed provisions. The consensus was achieved

easily, however, as confrontational issues of great political interest (state–

church relationship, non-public universities, dissolution of parliament, rights

of immigrants, protection of property rights) were not discussed. The revision


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TABLE 1

VOTES AND SEATS, 1985 – 2000

Parties Fourth Term2 June1985

Fifth Term18 June1989

Sixth Term5 November

1989

Seventh Term8 April1990

Eighth Term10 October

1993

Ninth Term22 September

1996

Tenth Term9 April2000

% ofvotes

no ofseats

% ofvotes

no ofseats

% ofvotes

no ofseats

% ofvotes

no ofseats

% ofvotes

no ofseats

% ofvotes

no ofseats

% ofvotes

no ofseats

PASOK 45.82 126 39.13 125 40.67 128 38.61 123 46.88 170 41.49 162 43.79 158New Democracy 40.84 161 44.28 145 46.19 148 46.89 150 39.30 111 38.12 108 42.73 125Communist Party 9.89 12 19 4.54 9 5.61 11 5.53 11Synaspismos1 1.84 1 13.12 28 10.97 21 10.28 19 2.94 0 5.12 10 3.20 6POLAN2 – – – – – – – – 4.87 10 2.94 0 – –DIKKI3 – – – – – – – – – – 4.43 9 2.69 0DIANA4 – – 1.01 1 0.67 1 – – – – – –Ecologists – – – – 0.58 1 0.77 1 – – 0.08 0 0.05 0Other5 1.61 0 2.46 16 1.59 27 2.78 68 1.47 0 2.21 0 2.01 0

300 300 300 300 300 300 300

Notes: 1 The Coalition of the Left and of Progress was the co-operative effort of the Communist Party of Greece and the Communist Party of the Interior,which ran together in the elections of 1989 and 1990. In the elections of 1985 they ran separately, while in the elections of 1993 and thereafter, theCommunist Party of Greece had left the united coalition.

2 Political Spring under Antony Samaras, a personalised party of the centre-right with nationalistic positions in external policy. Not active since 1999.3 Democratic Social Movement under Dimitris Tsovolas, former minister of PASOK, a personalised party of the left.4 Democratic Renewal under Costis Stefanopoulos, with MPs who left the New Democracy Party. It dissolved itself in 1994.5 None of the parties or the independent MPs included here won a percentage over 0.8%. The far right National Patriotic Union in 1985 won its largestpercentage of the votes, 0.60%.

6 The MP Rodopis Sadik Achmet Sadik, with 0.38% is elected as an independent.7 Two independent MPs.8 Six independent MPs.

Source: Official Results, published by the Ministry of the Interior.

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was therefore considered as ‘superficial and only procedurally consensual’,

‘not daring’, ‘colourless’, ‘awkward’ and ‘dangerous’.21

In contrast to the revision process as a whole, where consensus remained

difficult to obtain, the constitutional law provisions aiming at parliament’s

modernisation emerged as an area of very broad agreement between the two

major parties and disagreement with the small parties. It was the section on

parliament that underwent the most changes. Thirty provisions received

more than 250 votes in both rounds. These were related to: the election and

composition of parliament; electoral disqualifications and incompatibilities

of MPs; the rights and duties of MPs; the organisation and functioning of

parliament; as well as the powers of parliament. Only two provisions relating

to the powers of parliament received less than 180 votes.22 The systematic

coherent voting alignment by party is a clear indication of the intensity of

party discipline, even though the party leadership had declared that throughout

the revisionary procedure party discipline would not apply.

Certain general conclusions can be reached with regard to the revised pro-

visions. First, recourse was made to constitutional rules on provisions which

could be the subject matter of formal law. The second, which follows from

the first, are the very detailed changes that reach the point of breaking the

unity of the constitutional text. A typical example in the area of parliamentary

law is where the constitutional provisions make recommendations on electoral

funding (article 29 para.2 C), on electoral law (articles 51 and 54 C), as well as

on electoral disqualifications and incompatibilities (articles 56 and 57 C). This

tendency towards ‘obesity’ of the constitutional text demonstrates the mistrust

towards the governmental majority and is connected with the manipulation of

the legislative process to produce mere superficial legislative changes, clien-

telism, superfluous provisions in bills and the lack of real participation of the

opposition in the law-making process.23

The parliamentary debate on the revision of the provisions on parliament

had three central points. The first is the anxiety expressed by MPs concerning

the improvement of their role and putting forward their particular points

of view. The second concerns the demand for ‘an improved parliament’, a

‘reorganisation of the functioning of popular representation’ which was con-

nected with ‘modernisation and rationalisation of the legislative proceedings

and of control over the executive’. The third point is related to the problem

of corruption, of illegal political funds, and of the improper and illegal connec-

tion of economic interests and political choices.24

LEGISLATION

The most significant amendment concerns the legislative competence of the

permanent parliamentary committees that are formed and function for each


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yearly parliamentary session (article 70 para.2 C).25 According to the amended

article 70, these committees, which had competence only in the processing of

bills following the revision, acquire in addition autonomous legislative com-

petence, with the exception of cases in which the plenary session has exclusive

competence.26 The small parties and a fair number of MPs from the two large

political parties were completely opposed to this change. Despite the objec-

tions, the amendment was accepted with the following addition: all MPs

may submit law proposals27 and additions or amendments in any permanent

committee irrespective of their membership thereto. Any permanent commit-

tee may refer any dispute concerning its competence to the plenum by resol-

ution adopted by an absolute majority of all its members (article 72 para.3 C).28

In accordance with the constitutional adjustments, the competence of the per-

manent parliamentary committees is conditional upon the competency of the

plenum.29 The SO overturned the ruling of competence in favour of the com-

mittees (article 89 para.3 SO) and turned the rule into the exception, stating

that the Conference of Presidents may introduce a bill for debate and vote

by the plenum.

Irrespective of these problems, however, we must underline the signifi-

cance and usefulness of the new adjustment on legislative competence of

the permanent committees. It contributes indisputably to the rationalisation

of parliamentary functioning.

Another classic example of the contortion of the legislative process is

the issue of provisions and amendments not related to the subject matter of

a law, which has been taking place constantly since 1974.30 These are unre-

lated provisions either embodied in the bill, or proposed suddenly as additions

and amendments at the last moment, usually late at night. Their existence is

overtly declared in the title of the laws by the common denotation

TABLE 2

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 1981 – 91

Terms Ministerial Ruling Party Opposition Total

Third 1981–85Fourth 1985–5.1989

1,058 29% 438 12% 2,160 59% 3,656 72.6%

Fifth6.1989–11.1989

17 7.5% 157 69.5% 52 23% 226 4.5%

Sixth11.1989–3.1990

67 23.7% 216 76.3% – – 283 5.6%

Seventh4.1990–15.6.1991

233 26.7% 228 26.1% 411 47.1% 872 17.3%

Total 1,375 27.3% 1,039 20.7% 2,623 52% 5,037 100%

Source: D. Melissas, ‘Legislation in Greece’, Parliamentary Review, 7–8 (1991), p.100(in Greek). Data adapted.


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‘and other provisions’.31 The unrelated provisions exacerbate the fragmented

and contradictory adjustments, facilitate the clientelistic accommodations and

hinder citizen access to the laws that affect them, especially if one takes into

consideration the relative scarcity of codifications.32 This problem was not

solved by the revision, and the clause remained as it was. As a result, in the

case of dispute over whether a clause of a bill is related to its main subject

matter or not – and being thus considered unconstitutional – parliament is

competent for the decision, that is the parliamentary majority.33

The implementation of the Constitution of 1975 has demonstrated that in

the Hellenic Parliament issues of whether the content of a bill is contrary to the

constitution are made on the basis of party discipline of the members of any

governmental majority, as well as of the opposition. Very often, members

of the government declare that the solution to some controversial issue is

the passing of the respective legal provision, when the provision itself, as

part of a presidential decree, has already been judged unconstitutional in the

preventive controls undertaken by the ‘Conseil d’Etat’. This constitutes a con-

tortion of the parliamentary examination of the constitutionality of bills. In

combination with the refusal of courts to examine the interna corporis of

the parliament and the absence of a Constitutional Court, it leads to an inse-

cure political situation, in so far as some laws are judged unconstitutional in

retrospect and in a fragmented fashion.

Still, the revision broached this topic of unconstitutionality on the issue of

the time period during which additions and amendments can be introduced.

Prior to the constitutional revision, ministers could introduce additions and

amendments at any time, even during the course of the parliamentary

debate. MPs could introduce these as late as the day before the debate

began. The revision provides for the amendment and additions of the ministers

and MPs to be introduced at least three days prior to the initiation of the

debate, so as to avoid the legislative body being taken by surprise.34

The revision of the debate and the voting process on the State Budget and

the General Balance and Financial Statements of the State were positive.

According to the new rules, the Minister of Finance is obligated to present

a draft budget to the competent permanent parliamentary committee on the

first Monday of October. The Minister of Finance introduces the budget to par-

liament at least 40 days (as opposed to the prior 30 days) before the beginning

of the fiscal year, ‘taking the comments of the Committee into consider-

ation’.35 This interpolation allows actual control over budgetary figures and

is very important, particularly taking into account that voting in the plenum

takes place by ministry on the total amount, without the possibility of the

amounts being amended.

With regard to the General Balance and the Financial Statements of the

State, the revised provision of article 79, paragraph 7 stipulates that the


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government must append the report of the Court of Auditors. Altogether these

constitute the subject matter which is processed by a special committee of

MPs, after which they are announced by the plenum. This greatly facilitates

the business of the parliament and ensures the transparency of the data

required for a sound assessment by the plenum.

In an attempt to reinforce the role of parliament, the government is

obligated to inform parliament on issues subject to decrees within the frame-

work of the European Union and their debate, based on the revised provisions

of article 70, paragraph 8 C. In this case, the competent committee makes its

findings known, which are then conveyed to the competent ministry as pro-

vided for in the SO (article 32A SO and 41B SO).

Of course, the quality of legislation does not depend only on constitutional

provisions. The legal framework should be complemented by the qualifications

of the constitutional provision for the actual improvement of the performance of

the parties, the parliamentary groups and the individual MPs. This is achieved

with direct access to and complete provision of information concerning the

business of the government in every field, with scientific support both in parlia-

ment as well as for the MPs. The new provisions of the SO bring about real

improvement in the legislative process. However, parliament continues to legis-

late without fully informing or briefing, without being able to enter the minis-

terial mazes involved in legislating and the drafting of laws.36 This deficit

primarily concerns the opposition and may account for the exercising of legis-

lative initiative almost exclusively by the government.37

PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER THE EXECUTIVE

Until recently, exercising control over the government was taboo for MPs and

for the governmental party. Over the last decade, their timid adoption of

means of parliamentary control has been observed. In all cases, and reasonably

so within the framework of present day parliamentarism, control remains the

basic competence of the parliamentary opposition.38

The Greek Constitution provides only for a few means of parliamentary

control, particularly addressing reports and complaints (article 69 C), the sum-

moning of a minister (article 66 para.3 C), the investigation committees

(article 68 para.2 C) and of course the motion of censure (article 84 C). The

remaining control devices are specified by the SO: questions and current ques-

tions, interpellations and current interpellations, questions of the MPs to the

ministers, the ‘informing and briefing’ procedures of parliament and

announcements or declarations of the government to the parliament (articles

124–38A SO).

The revision of 2001 brought about two positive amendments: (1) the

awarding of competence for parliamentary control to the permanent


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parliamentary committees as well as to the section when parliament is in

recess – in the past this competence was held only by the plenum (article

70 para.6 C) – and (2) the ease with which the permanent committees can

summon ‘any person’ (‘any civil servant’ in its former wording) whom they

consider useful for their work (article 66 para.3 C).

Intense criticism could be levelled at the refusal of parliament to revise

the controversial provision concerning the investigation committees. The

problem rests on two points: the first concerns the decision of parliament on

the establishment of investigation committees on issues of foreign policy

and national defence, where an absolute majority of MPs is required (article

68 para.2.2 C).39 During the revision, an amendment, which would extend

the right of the minority to set up investigation committees, was not accepted.

Thus a ‘privilege’ of governmental majority is preserved, justified by the need

for the ‘protection’ of classified data on ‘sensitive national issues’. This is an

endemic tendency that in essence limits the possibilities of parliamentary

intervention in many fields. A long tradition of secretiveness on the part of

the Greek administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry

of Defence contributes to the all too easy characterisation of documents as

confidential. This results in awkwardness and often the avoidance of inform-

ing parliament on many issues. It also makes the conduct of scientific research

in these fields difficult.

The second point concerns the general provision on the formation of

‘ordinary’ investigation committees. In its article 68 para.2.1 C, there is a con-

tradiction regarding the decision on the formation of those committees. This

stems from the phrase ‘majority of two-fifths’, since two-fifths does not con-

stitute a majority. The SO interpret the controversial constitutional provision

in favour of the parliamentary majority. In other words, it is specified that the

relevant decision requires an ‘absolute majority of those present, which cannot

be less than two-fifths of the entire number of the MPs’.40 The application of

this provision to date has demonstrated that each and every time the interpret-

ative version that best serves any government is chosen. Of course, opinions

change when the former governing party becomes the opposition and, vice

versa, when the opposition becomes the governing party.41 In this way, the

parliamentary minority is deprived of an important means of parliamentary

control, while the contradictory and ‘opportunistic’ interpretations of the con-

stitution damage the credibility of MPs and the parties.

AMENDMENTS OF THE STANDING ORDERS

The amendments of the SO as a corollary of the constitutional revision began

eight months after the new constitution came into force. They were passed on

6 December 2001, after debate by the plenum for only two days.42 The SO


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passed in June 1987 still constitute the basic text in which many new insti-

tutions have been established, such as the multi-party presidium, the Confer-

ence of Presidents, the current questions and interpellations and the permanent

committees. These to some degree reinforce the position of the opposition

comparatively to the previous SO of 1975, and provide for much more analyti-

cal regulations.43 The latest amendment confirms the characteristics of the

post-1974 SO with regard to the interpretation and the specification of the con-

stitutional provisions. First, the parliamentary majority is reinforced at the

expense of the minority. Second, the rights of the MPs give way to the

rights of the parliamentary groups. Third, the time allowed for participants,

MPs and ministers to speak is gradually being reduced. The reasons behind

these choices are connected primarily with facilitating the majority and secon-

darily with the permanent appeal to effectiveness at the expense of actual

work. However, fears of the misuse of rights by the minority and obstruction-

ism aimed only at opposition are not misplaced. Prior to 1967 and also after

1974, this was a method used by the opposition. The recent past has not

been marked by many similar phenomena. It should however be stressed

that some of the changes in the SO over the past decade, besides its last

broad revision, seek a reinforcement of the rights of the minority parliamen-

tary groups.44

The presidium of the parliament is elected for the entire parliamentary

term and is made up of the speaker, five deputy speakers, three rectors and

six secretaries. Two of the deputy speakers, one rector and two secretaries

are from the opposition (article 6 SO). With regard to actual involvement in

the parliamentary procedure, the Conference of Presidents is important. It

was established in 1987 to co-ordinate parliamentary legislative and control

business. It consists of the speaker, the former speakers, the deputy speakers,

the chairmen of the permanent committees, the chairman of the Committee on

Institutions and Transparency, the heads of the parliamentary groups and an

independent MP as a representative of the independents. Its decisions are

made by absolute majority (article 13 SO).45 The most important competen-

cies of the conference are the examination of the Order of the Day, setting

the time allowed for debating bills, the choice of members of the independent

public authorities, and making proposals to the plenum. During the recent

amendment of the SO, there was particular debate over the nature of the

Conference of Presidents as a screen for the speaker himself, where he (or

she) would be able to determine the outcome of decisions without publicly

doing so. The criticism was made that there is an over-representation of the

parliamentary majority, when one takes into account that all the chairs of

the permanent committees belong to the governing party.

The SO specify the detail for the constitutional provision on the under-

taking of parliamentary business. With the exception of the plenum, they state


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that the section, when parliament is in recess, exercises parliamentary control

through questions (article 126 para.5 SO), current questions and current inter-

pellations (article 129 para.1 SO). At the beginning of each sitting, the perma-

nent committees of the session may hold a ‘debate at the initiative of MPs’ on

one or two issues of more general interest to the ministry within whose juris-

diction the bill is being debated (article 128 SO), using in effect a control

device that was already available for the plenum (article 132A SO).

The interpellations constitute an effective means of parliamentary control,

but they are not entrenched with a constitutional provision. The new amend-

ments of the SO specify the debate of current interpellations every Monday.

Those MPs who have signed the interpellations, as well as the competent min-

ister, take part in these debates. It can be seen as positive that the conference

under the new provisions cannot easily avoid issues that are politically unplea-

sant for the majority.46

The questions of the MPs to the ministers (articles 126–8 SO) as well as

the answers (within 20 days) from the competent ministers are presented in

written form. The current questions are of particular interest (articles 129–

32 SO); they were established for the first time in 1987 and have undergone

quite a few amendments with regard to procedure. Following the amendments

of October 2000, the questions of the MPs are directed not only towards the

ministers, but also towards the prime minister.

The ‘informing and briefing’ procedures of parliament constitute means of

parliamentary control in the broader sense. The debates with priority over the

Order of the Day were established in the SO of 1987 (article 143 SO), forma-

lising a practice that had existed since 1974. The debate concerns national

issues or issues of more general interest on which the prime minister

informs parliament and a debate ensues in which the chairs of the parliamen-

tary groups and one or two ministers take part.

The announcements or declarations of the government to the parliament

(article 142A SO), established in 1993, are announcements by the prime min-

ister on any public matter. They are followed by comments from the chairs of

the parliamentary committees. The prime minister informs the speaker, in

writing, that he intends to address the parliament on a serious public issue,

mentioning the subject matter. The speaker has to inform the leaders of the

parliamentary groups at least 24 hours before the announcements of the

prime minister. The announcements take place in the plenum and there is

an oral procedure, prior to any other issue on the Order of the Day. The

prime minister may speak for ten minutes, the leaders for five minutes.

There is also a second round with five and three minutes respectively.

The proliferation of parliamentary committees is also a constant in the

amendments of the SO. In the recent amendment, a new committee was

created: the Special Standing Committee on the Financial Statement and


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General Balance of the State (article 31A SO). In 1996, the special permanent

committees were created (article 43A SO) and included the following: Greeks

Abroad; Institutions and Transparency; Technology Assessment on Issues of

Bioethics; and now a Committee on Equality and Human Rights has been

added, in which provision has been made for the equal participation of men

and women MPs.

Special mention must be made of the new amendments to the SO on

research and specialised support, as well as administrative support of parlia-

mentary business. In the amended SO, the research support service of parlia-

ment (articles 160–63 SO) is greatly enlarged47 and the scientific council

acquires broader competence. The research support of parliamentary business

is directed particularly toward European, international and computer-related

issues. However, questions to experts are exclusively posed by the chairs of

the committees, while individual MPs have support from only one research

assistant. Time will tell whether in this way the existing information deficit

of MPs and the research support of their work will be adequately dealt

with. This is probably unlikely. In any parliament, the research service can

offer means to build up criticisms at the stage of legislative initiative, which

in Greece is monopolised by the government. The need for critical examin-

ation of the proposed statutes assists the parliament vis-a-vis the government,

however de facto it consolidates the opposition. It is unknown whether these

ambitious amendments will be able to deal with the political friction created

by the organisation of impartial research support for parliament.

THE GOVERNMENT–PARLIAMENT RELATIONSHIP

The relationship between government and parliament is of course scattered

among provisions of parliamentary law. This is due to the overlapping of

the legislative and the executive powers in the parliamentary regime. The

relationship between the two powers is, for instance, influenced by the over-

lapping of parliamentary and ministerial jobs. The very few ministers who

are not MPs are often treated in a rather hostile manner by governmental

MPs. Given the very large number of ministers and under-secretaries – 48

at present – all MPs may hope, theoretically, that they will acquire ministerial

status within the parliamentary term.48

During the 1990s, three elements created a new situation that influenced

the relationship between government and parliament.

The first concerns the weakening of MPs in their traditional clientelistic

role. This is related primarily to the possibility of appointing candidates to

positions in the public sector. During the 1980s, appointments of those

favoured by the governmental party came under the control of the party mech-

anism, creating tension between party officials and MPs. Later, the passing of


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a bill on recruitment in the public sector with open examinations and objective

criteria removed such a possibility from the hands of the MPs.

The second concerns the overall antagonism between MPs and ministers

that runs through the overall functioning of parliament. The important thing

for the government is to maintain a balance between its ministers and the gov-

ernmental party MPs so as to preserve intact its own partisan and ideological

homogeneity within and among the parliamentary majority.

The third element, a very recent one, is the extension of the competencies

of local government. The prefects, now elected since 1994 as well as the

mayors, have much greater political and economic strength than in past

decades, often stronger than the MPs themselves.49

From the debates on the amendment, a desire emerges for a new ‘arrange-

ment’ of the given ideological and political identification of the government

with the majority in parliament; that there should be a systemic independence

between majority and government. Many MPs mentioned or alluded to the

need for the parliamentary majority to be differentiated, if only in tone,

from the government. This was seen to be necessary in order for the autonomy

of its role to be convincing and to contribute to the credibility of parliament

overall. On the other hand, strengthening the rights of the minority and of

individual MPs as counterweights to the prime ministerially centred govern-

mental hierarchy, was the reason used to justify most of the changes.

On the technical issues of the relationship between government and parlia-

ment, the following changes have taken place.

First, the parliament acquires the competence to rule on the incapacity

of the prime minister in exercising his duties for health reasons (article 38

para.2 C), after the submission of a proposal by the parliamentary group of

the prime minister’s party, or by two-fifths of the MPs. This addition

emerged from the situation that existed when Andreas Papandreou was ill

and the country found itself ungoverned in August 1988.

Second, important changes were introduced in an area that can be con-

sidered as part of the relationship between parliament and government: the

independent public authorities (IPAs). From 1989 to the present, more than

20 of these authorities have been established by law. They have the privilege

of ‘independence’, often with the safeguard of autonomous administration and

financing as well as the protection of the independence of their members.50

The common basis of the IPAs is transparency in areas of social life where

relations of power put human rights at risk. The amended constitution

included some IPAs51 where the issues of their formation and functioning

were provided for in a general provision (article 101A C), considering these

a sui generis form of the organisation of executive functioning. A number

of points characterise this amendment with regard to parliament. First, the

individuals who staff these authorities (technocrats and research assistants)


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are chosen by the Conference of Presidents of the Parliament, by consensus or

by a four-fifths majority. Second, the members are appointed for a set term and

enjoy personal and functional freedom. Third, parliamentary control of these

authorities is conducted according to the specific provisions of the SO. Fourth,

the constitution does not provide for the financial autonomy of the IPAs. The

SO specify the obligation of the IPAs to submit a yearly report on their work to

the speaker, who conveys it to the competent committee, which comes to con-

clusions about the work of the IPA and sends it to the competent minister

(article 138A SO). A major problem for parliament–government relations is

the possible blow to parliamentary authority insofar as the IPAs depart from

the hierarchical pyramid of administrative organisation.52 But, to date, it

is not possible to ascertain yet the extent of the effects of the IPAs on the

relationship between government and parliament.

THE STATUS OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

The conflict that appears between the two constitutional principles of free

representative mandate and party discipline constitutes a major problem.

The operational criterion of the Greek political system is probably party

discipline that is set by the political leaders; strict party discipline is always

justified by the appeal to unity and the effective functioning of the party.

The deficit in intra-party democracy is carried to the parliamentary field and

becomes visible when the chairs of the parliamentary groups publicly

declare without hesitation when they will ‘allow’ the MPs to exercise their

‘free vote’. The only outlet for overcoming the juxtaposition between the

party and the parliamentary fields is an ad hoc balancing of two constitutional

principles, within the framework of the ‘theory of harmony in practice’.53 It

would be difficult for a revision of the constitution to overcome this inherent

constitutional ‘contradiction’. The balancing referred to above is part of the

general functioning of the political system, primarily of the Greek political

culture that cannot be solved vaguely at the level of constitutional provisions.

In any case, the new legislative and control competencies of the permanent

parliamentary committees reinforce the individual presence of the MPs, as

committee work is less party-dominated.

A major issue concerning the position of MPs is citizen perception of their

trustworthiness. General scorn is expressed about political and parliamentary

discourse as seen in many different surveys of public opinion in Greece.

Specific amendments and their applications contribute to this situation. It

was not by chance that the debate of the position and the rights of MPs

during the revision of the constitution was connected with the closed shop

manner in which they execute their role,54 in connection with the more

general perception of corruption. On this point, three issues were identified:


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parliamentary immunity, parliamentary salary and the funds of MPs during

electoral periods.

The issue of immunity was brought up by all the parties and a revision of

the respective provision was proposed by the opposition, which in the end was

not passed (article 62 C). The amendment on the immunity of MPs is a classic

example of a volitionally mistaken application of a reasonable constitutional

provision. There were strong reactions from the press, public opinion and MPs

themselves against the usual rejection of all the proposals on the revoking of

immunity: from 1974 to September 1996, about 700 applications were made

to revoke immunity and only three were accepted.55 This has happened even

in cases of behaviour obviously not becoming to the status of MP.56 The par-

liamentary minority proposed the reversal of the requirements for the revoking

of immunity, whereupon immunity would be granted only when there were

political causes. Parliament proposed that the provision remain as it was,

the basic argument being in the difficulty in defining the exact meaning of

political causes.

The issue of MPs’ salaries (article 63 C) was the subject of debate in con-

nection with the proposal of the majority for the addition of a phrase (con-

sidered pompous by many) to demonstrate ‘honour and respect’ for the

MPs. This was withdrawn, but it does constitute an example of the low

esteem in which MPs are held. It also illustrates the limited means available

to them relative to the general and special secretaries of the ministries or

the mayors or prefects. The entire network of provisions on the research

and administrative support of MPs is specified in the SO, without reference

to the constitution.57

The parliamentary funds during the pre-electoral period are connected to

the issue of party funds during the same period.58 The strict new provision

was laid down following an intense debate concerning illegal funds of the can-

didates, their ‘covert’ backers, the illicit relations with the mass media, which

create inequalities between candidates and distort the will of the electoral

body. The amended constitution imposed a ceiling on funding, the violation

of which constitutes grounds for the forfeiture of MP status. A special body,

in which members of the judiciary participate, has competence for this

control.59

There are new amendments with regard to electoral disqualifications and

incompatibilities for MPs, which in Greece are traditionally regulated by

the constitution. During the debates on the revision, an absence of party cohe-

sion was noted in this area. Two diametrically opposed tendencies were

observed with regard to the disqualifications, which did not follow party

lines. One tendency favoured the extension of disqualifications, while the

other supported their drastic reduction. The viewpoint of the majority’s

general rapporteur is typical of the contradictions involved in this issue:


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according to him, the disqualifications ‘work as a means of settling intra-party

relations and of managing the role of political officials’.60

The total number of disqualifications (article 56 C) were reduced and

amended as follows. First, they were described in more detail so that contro-

versial judicial decisions would be avoided in the future. Second, return to the

public sector is facilitated for those who have to resign to become candidates.

Third, the complete disqualification of prefects is provided for over the course

of their four-year term, even if they resign. Fourth, disqualifications are

imposed on members of the independent authorities.

The incompatible attributes (article 57 C) were extended so that there

would be a barrier between the economic functions of the state and MPs’

status. Here, too, the parliamentary debate brought to light the major

problem of the improper interweaving of economic and political power. The

new economic reality led to new incompatible capacities such as that of

administrator, member of a board of directors or shareholder of a company

that enters into any kind of contract with the public sector, or of a company

of the printed or electronic media. Inter-party conflict emerged from the pro-

posal and the final voting on the provision prohibiting MPs from working.61

CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE PARLIAMENT AS AGORA

The Hellenic Parliament is attempting to overcome the obstacles posed de jure

and de facto by the reinforcement of the executive. The constitutional revision

of 2001 attempted to deal with the above-mentioned parliamentary crisis of

many decades, despite the vague content of that crisis. The whole effort is

marked by awkwardness and the debate was not able to bring the new insti-

tutional role of the parliament to the fore.

In the present period, along with an unavoidably limited consolidation of

its role of legislation and control, parliament may also attempt to promote the

field in which it has a comparative advantage relative to the other instruments

of the state. This is the promotion of transparency in the decision-making

process. Indeed, over and above the specific competencies granted to it by

the constitution, the parliament recognises its mission, critical to the regime,

of distinguishing itself as the most important public forum which gives power

to all political forces represented therein.62 Three elements determine the

legitimisation produced by the parliamentary procedure: (a) the recognition

of conflict of interests and consequently, its regulation; (b) the necessity of

political compromise; and (c) the visibility of the processes through which

attempts are made to establish specific decisions.

For these reasons, publicity constitutes a founding principle of parliamen-

tary law,63 aiming to achieve political communication through the visibility of

the parliamentary process. According to the theory of the legitimisation of the


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parliamentary decision, debate in the plenum does not produce the decision,

taken for granted the cohesion of parties, but it rather entrenches an already

materialised decision by revealing the reasons why every parliamentary

group and each MP support their views and opinions. In this sense, the

MPs, who already know the issues and the arguments for and against a politi-

cal decision, are not the only recipients of parliamentary debates. The

speeches of members of parliament and members of the government are

directed mainly, or at least to a significant degree, towards the audience,

towards the representatives of the press and towards the electorate more

generally. This is less so in the committees where the participation of each

MP is more effective. The broad publicity of parliamentary business is also

seen as briefing the citizens, and as the basis for conducting scientific

studies related to the functioning of parliament.

The perception of parliament as a forum is revealed in many interventions

of MPs during the course of the debates on the constitutional revision of 2001:

a fact not found in the fifth and the sixth parliamentary revisions of 1986 and

1974–75.64

This broadly defined publicity may be accomplished through the media,

primarily the electronic media, but also through means other than those pro-

vided for in the constitution and the SO. Such means might include the

easy, direct and quick access to official minutes of the business of the

plenum and the committees, which in Greece is only in part feasible

through the Internet. Other means could be the option of buying parliamentary

minutes and other parliamentary publications in bookstores, the organisation

of seminars on that subject and the conduct and the publication of scientific

research for MPs and on the business of parliament.65

The printed and electronic media are recognised as the most important

means of ensuring the publicity of the parliamentary processes. The new pro-

vision of article 15 para.2 C stipulates that the legislator defines the obligatory

and free broadcast of the business of parliament and of its committees by radio

and television. Moreover, since September 2003 the Greek Parliament

operates its own TV channel that broadcasts the parliamentary debates and

informs the public on the activities of the parliament.

NOTES

1. N. Alivizatos, ‘The Difficulties of “Rationalisation” in a Polarised Political System: TheGreek Chamber of Deputies’, in U. Liebert and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliament and DemocraticConsolidation in Southern Europe (London and New York: Pinter, 1990), pp.131–53.

2. Law N1516/1985 was passed a few months prior to the elections on 2 January 1985. The basiccriterion for this law was the electoral victory of the governmental party. For this period, seeC. Lyrintzis and I. Nikolakopoulos (eds.), Elections and Parties in the 1980s. Developments inand Prospects for the Political System (Athens: Themelio, 1990).


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3. On the unexpected and the lightning-speed 1986 constitutional revision, proposed byA. Papandreou and PASOK on 9 February 1985, in addition to the marginal and thedubious legality of the parliamentary process, see A. Manessis, The Constitutional Revisionof 1986 (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1989), pp.18 ff.

4. See the results of the parliamentary elections of the period 1985–2000, Table 1.5. P. Foundethakis, Intra-Party Democracy, according to Article 29 of the Greek Constitution

(Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1987).6. The Koskotas scandal was connected with the manipulation of bank and publishing activities

in favour of the governing socialist party and with the bribing of government officials. Con-cisely for this period, see T. Diamantopoulos, Greek Political Life: The Twentieth Century(Athens: Papazisis 1997), pp.263–306.

7. Law 1847/1989.8. The Tzannetakis government (2 July–12 Nov. 1989).9. Provided in art. 86 para.4 C. The impeachment was also supported by some MPs from

PASOK.10. The duration of this government was from 23 November 1989 to 11 April 1990. It was formed

from all the parties with the exception of the ecologists.11. This is a translation of a term often used in Greek literature referring to the difference between

the aim of the electoral system and its practical results. The aim of the electoral system is tolead to a strong government in a political system where the two major parties have a differenceof 1–10 per cent of the votes in the elections. The electoral law does not favour partycoalitions: the first party gains seats ‘stealing’ from the second, and the third party also hasa percentage of seats higher than the second party. There is also a mechanism to ensurethat the maximum difference between the percentage of votes and the percentage of seatsis 0.7 (see Table 1), as well as a threshold of three per cent.

12. Law 1907/1990. On the inequity of ‘reinforced’ proportional representation at the expense ofsmall parties and coalitions of parties from 1974 to 1990, see K. Chrysogonos, The ElectoralSystem and the Constitution (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1996), pp.247–87.

13. The exoneration decision of 15 January 1993 with seven votes in favour and six against (in theSpecial Court, one of the supreme courts, presided over by the president of the Supreme Civiland Criminal Court – Areopag), allowed for a variety of interpretations.

14. 13 Oct. 1993–17 Jan. 1996 and 22 Jan. 1996–22 Sept. 1996 respectively.15. The main points of the electoral law are referred to in P. Spyropoulos, Constitutional Law in

Hellas (The Hague: Kluwer – Sakkoulas, 1995), p.74 ff. Empirical research on the electionsof 1996 and 2000 with analytical data from gallop polls, see P. Kafetzis, G. Mavris andI. Nikolakopoulos, ‘Elections 1996’, Greek Review of Political Science (GRPS), 9 (April1997), pp.167–207, and K. Zafeiropoulos et al., ‘Elections 2000’, GRPS, 17 (May 2001),pp.7–139. For the previous period, see K. Zafeiropoulos and T. Chatzipantelis, ‘ElectoralFluctuations in the 1985–1996 Period’, GRPS, 13 (May 2000), pp.5–29.

16. Article 37. See G. Anastasiadis, The Three Applications of Article 37 of the Constitution(June, October and November 1989) (Thessalonika: University Studio Press, 1990). Theprovision of article 37 is part of a whole revision aiming to reduce the competences of thePresident of the Republic. The constitutional provision on the formation of governmentdoes not leave any room for presidential initiative. Almost everything is regulated in detailby the constitution.

17. The choice of the two large parties by the electorate, based on electoral results from June 1985to 2000, moved between 79.8 per cent, the lowest, in 1996 with a system of ‘reinforced’proportional representation, and 86.86 per cent, the highest, in November of 1989, in amuch more proportional system.

18. In the nine electoral periods since 1974, in only one case (after the elections of June 1985) hasthe four-year term been served to its end.

19. The dissolution of parliament has turned out to be a prerogative of the government, especiallyof the prime minister, who can dissolve parliament and proclaim elections at the most favour-able timing. Since 1977, the usual way to cause parliament’s dissolution has been by quoting a‘national issue of exceptional importance’ on the proposal of the cabinet (art. 41 para.2).


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20. In the parliament submitting the proposal for revision of the constitution (term IX), the debatewent on in the Revision Committee from 21 October 1997 to 4 March 1998, in the plenumfrom 2 April to 20 May 1998. In the Revisionary Parliament (term X), the debate went onin the Revisionary Committee from 30 August to 19 November 2000, in the plenum from17 January to 6 April 2001. The debate on the issues of the parliament occupied theplenum of the Revisionary Parliament for seven of the total of its 22 sessions.

21. Particularly with regard to the two final characterisations, see N. Alivizatos, UncertainModernisation and the Nebulous Constitutional Reform (Athens: Polis, 2001), pp.155–232.

22. For the entire new constitutional framework, see K. Mavrias, Constitutional Law (Athens:Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 2002), pp.599–669.

23. See G. Sotirelis, Constitution and Democracy in the Age of ‘Globalisation’ (Athens: Ant.N. Sakkoulas, 2000), pp.197–224; G. Kaminis, ‘Parliament: The Challenge of Improvement’,in Twenty Years of the 1975 Constitution (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1998), pp.163–99;P. Foundethakis, The Rights of Parliamentarians in the Greek Parliament: The Principlesof Parliamentary Law (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1993).

24. P. Foundethakis, ‘The Role of the Parliament in the Proposal for Constitutional Revision’, ToSyndagma, 26/6 (2000), pp.1177–204.

25. S. Koutsoubinas, ‘Legislation in the Parliament at the Time of the Revision Proposal’, ToSyndagma, 26/6 (2000), pp.1225–30.

26. These cases are defined in article 72 para.1 C.27. Any single member of parliament may submit a ‘law proposal’. The competent ministers may

submit ‘bills’. The difference between the two terms is merely terminological.28. Thus the problem was created of whether the plenum can in essence alter legislative

provisions which a permanent committee has prepared, or whether it must pass it as is orreject it, see articles 72 para.4 C, 104 para.5 SO, 108 SO.

29. Article 72 para.2.1 defines that the debate and the passing of all the bills which do not belongto the absolute competence of the plenum ‘may take place during the course of the session, bythe competent Permanent Committee’.

30. On the practical significance of the amendments see Table 2. There are 5,037 amendments for1,015 bills.

31. From 1975 until 1993, 522 out of 2,178 laws had in their titles ‘and other provisions’, see theresearch of the National School of Public Administration, ‘Disfunctionalities in the Making ofLegislation in Greece’ (1995), pp.6–7.

32. According to the Greek Constitution, judicial or administrative codes drafted by special com-mittees established under special statutes may be voted through in the plenum of parliamentby a special statute ratifying the code as a whole. Legislative provisions in force may also becodified by simple classification.

33. Article 74 para.5 C. According to the general rule of article 67 C, parliament decides with anabsolute majority of the members present, which cannot be less than one-quarter all the MPs,that is, 75 out of the 300.

34. Article 74 para.3 C and article 87 para.2 SO.35. Article 79 para.3 C.36. Kaminis, ‘Parliament: The Challenge of Improvement’, pp.181–6.37. From 1974 until 1990 only four bills proposed by the opposition had become laws, all on

totally secondary issues. From April 1990 until September 1996, 556 laws were passed.Only three of these came from the opposition.

38. See the related P. Foundethakis, ‘The Institution of Parliamentary Opposition’, inHarmossinoAristovoulos Manessis, Constitutional Law and Philosophy of Law Studies, vol. II (Athens:Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1998), pp.509–26.

39. There are two types of investigation committees: ‘ordinary’ investigation committees thatdeal with every matter except issues of foreign policy and national defence and the investi-gation committees on issues of foreign policy and national defence.

40. Article 144 para.5 SO.41. On this issue, see P. Foundethakis, ‘Committees of Investigation, According to art. 68 II of the

Greek Constitution’ Armenopoulos, 41/6 (1987), pp.641–50.


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42. Plenary sessions of the parliament on 5 and 6 December 2001.43. Besides this, ten amendments followed 1987’s revision (9.1989, 7.1990, 5.1991, 3.1993,

11.1993, 2.1994, 6.1996, 4.1997, 12.1997, 10.2000). They were basically aimed at a slightreinforcement of the rights of the minority, at the facilitating of technical issues, at the inte-gration of European matters into the functioning of the parliament and at the reduction in thetime allowed for all those involved in the parliamentary procedure to speak.

44. Symbolically, the reinforcing of the role of MPs in relation to ministers was expressed in thenew provision of article 64 SO on the permanent committees, in which MPs have priority overthe list of speakers.

45. Given that all the chairs of the permanent committees belong to the governing party, the over-representation of the majority is clear. Only in the Committee on European Affairs (newarticle 32A SO) is one of the two deputy speakers from the official opposition and the sec-retary is from the third most powerful parliamentary group.

46. Articles 134–8 SO.47. Provision was made for 80 scientific positions.48. The period of government of A. Papandreou (1981–89 and 1993–96) was marked by frequent

cabinet re-shuffles. On the contrary, the period of government under K. Simitis (1996–2004)was characterised by the longevity of the members of the cabinet.

49. In many cases, MPs prefer to leave their parliamentary seats to be elected as prefects ormayors. There are also, on the contrary, many MPs who come from local government,which constitutes an example of the power and the recognisability which facilitates their elec-tion, bringing them into conflict with MPs of their own party.

50. M. Antonopoulos, Independent Regulatory Agencies (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas 1993).51. These are (a) the Personal Data Authority (article 9A C), (b) the National Radio and Televi-

sion Council (article 15 para.2 C), (c) the Authority for Confidential Communications (article19 para.2 C), (d) the Supreme Council for the Choice of Personnel (article 103 para.7 and 118para.6), (f) the Ombudsman (article 103 para.9 C).

52. I. Kamtsidou, ‘The Principle of the Division of Power and the Independent RegulatoryAgencies’, To Syndagma, 25/3–4 (1999), pp.543–53.

53. For each case in which an MP differentiates himself from his party through a free vote wecannot say that either one of the two principles predominates. This depends upon theissue. It is then a political decision as to which principle is more appropriate. Overall, onthe interpretative principle of ‘Praktische Kondordanz’, see K. Hesse, Grundzuge des Verfas-sungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Heidelberg: C.F. Muller, 20th edn. 1995),p.28.

54. It is indicative of the fact that no one mentioned, in the constitution revision debates, thepossibility of reducing the number of MPs. A reduction to 200 is allowed in the constitution,article 51.

55. See I. Varvitsiotis, Parliamentary Immunities. Greek and European Practice (Athens: Ant.N. Sakkoulas, 2000), p.20.

56. The most blatant recent examples were a car accident caused by an MP who was drunk, andthe beating up of a referee in a football stadium. In the second case, the MP was afterwardsmade an under-secretary!

57. Compared to most countries of the EU, Greek MPs receive approximately one-third. Everydebate on increasing their salary is an occasion for the press and ‘public opinion’ to demon-strate their populism and make further uncomplimentary comments, see V. Voloudakis,Current Constitutional Issues, 1983–1994, vol.II (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1994),pp.93–4.

58. Article 29 para.2.59. The proposal for control to be exercised by the Court of Auditors was not accepted.60. E. Venizelos MP, The Parliamentary Session, 26 Sept. 2000, p.35.61. In the transitional provisions of the Constitution, article 115 para.7 C, the position on pro-

fessional incompatibility which would have come into force by law no later than 1 January 2003.62. Analytically, see Foundethakis, The Rights of Parliamentarians in the Greek Parliament,

pp.163 ff.


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63. Article 66 para.1 for the plenum, amended article 66 para.3 C for the permanent parliamentarycommittees. With this amendment, the publicity of the committee business, which issupported by a provision of the SO, article 38 para.1 SO (25 Nov. 1993), is now based inthe constitution. Prior to 1993, the sessions of the committees were not made public.

64. In his proposal to the Revision Committee of the Revisionary Parliament, the GeneralRapporteur of the majority recognised this new reality, referring to the safeguarding functionof the parliament to ensure transparency, E. Venizelos, Report (Athens: Hellenic Parliament,2000), p.639.

65. Problems are created due to the difficulty of access to the minutes of the parliament prior to1998, and of all the publications, since their sale is not permitted by parliament or any book-store. It is also well known that very little use is made of the Internet in Greece; even univer-sity libraries do not have the minutes of the revisions of the constitution after 1974. Thus, duealso to the difficulty of access to the actual functioning of parliament, studies with publishabledata are almost non-existent in the Greek literature.


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the hellenic parliament: the new rules of the game

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