Kathrin Nina Wiedl

The Hama Massacre – reasons, supporters of the rebellion,consequences

Seminar paper

Document Nr. V63819http://www.grin.com/ISBN 978-3-638-56770-1

9 783638 567701

1

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

MA Program for Middle East Studies

Course: Israel and Arabs – Between War and Peace

Spring Term 2006

Term Paper to the Topic:

The Hama Massacre – reasons, supporters of the rebellion, consequences With a special emphasis on the triangle between Asad, the Muslim Brotherhood and

West Germany

By: Nina Wiedl

Beer Sheva, 25.9.2006

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TABLE OF CONTENT:

TABLE OF CONTENT: ............................................................................................................ 2

1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 3

2 The Hama Massacre and its forerunners ............................................................................ 8

3 Stage A: Syria - Internal supporters of the Hama revolt: ................................................. 11

3.1 Excursus:The Alawis/Nusairis (Sources: Seale, Asad, pp. 252/253; Kramer.,

Syria’s Alawis and Shi‘ism)................................................................................................. 11

4 Stage B: The Middle East - Regional supporters of the Hama revolt .............................. 17

5 Stage C: The international level: The interests of the superpowers and its allies in the

Hama Revolt............................................................................................................................. 22

6 Stage D: West Germany................................................................................................... 27

6.1 Three ways how West Germany supported the Syrian Brotherhood ....................... 27

6.2 West German media coverage of the Hama rebellion.............................................. 28

6.3 The roots of the Muslim Brotherhood in West Germany......................................... 31

7 Conclusion........................................................................................................................ 33

8 NOTES:............................................................................................................................ 41

BIBLIOGRAPHY: ................................................................................................................... 35

BOOKS: ............................................................................................................................... 35

ARTICLES:.......................................................................................................................... 36

ONLINE SOURCES:........................................................................................................... 38

TV and RADIO REPORTS: ................................................................................................ 39

LECTURES:......................................................................................................................... 40

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The Hama Massacre – reasons, supporters of the rebellion, consequences

With a special emphasis on the triangle between the Asad, the Muslim Brotherhood and West

Germany

“I tell this story because it's important that we understand that Syria, Egypt,

Algeria and Tunisia have all faced Islamist threats and crushed them without

mercy or Miranda rights. Part of the problem America now faces is actually the

fallout from these crackdowns. Three things happened: First, once the

fundamentalists were crushed by the Arab states they fled to the last wild,

uncontrolled places in the region — Lebanon's Bekaa Valley and Afghanistan —

or to the freedom of America and Europe. i Friedman, T.L., 2001

1 Introduction

In February 1982 the Syrian city of Hama became well known worldwide as the place of

the “Hama massacre”. After an uprising of Muslim rebels, mainly consisting of the Syrian

Muslim Brotherhood, Syrian government forces crushed the rebellion “with brutal force”ii

.“Select Syrian army units…under the control of General Ali Haydar besieged the city for 27

days, bombarding it with heavy artillery and tank (fire) before invading it and killing 30.000

to 40.000 of the city´s citizens in addition to 15.000 missing who have not been found to this

day….”iii “Many civilians were slaughtered, whole districts razed and numerous act of

savagery reported…(and) a third of the inner city was demolished”.iv Preceding the fighting

was an ambush against government army units in the night between 2nd to 3rd of February,

who searched for dissidents in Hama. Snipers of the guerrilla commander Abu Bakrv killed

some of the soldiers and Bakr gave the command for a general uprising. The call of Jihad

against the Ba´th was called in the city. ”At this signal hundreds of Islamic fighters rose from

their hiding places. Killing and looting, they burst into the homes of officials and party

leaders, overran police posts and ransacked armouries in a bid to seize power in the city.”vi

On February 3rd, Hama was declared a “liberated city”, some 70 leading Ba´thists were killed

by the terrorists and Asad was faced with the largest urban insurrection in the history of his

reign.

4

This incident evoked heavy condemnation of the so-called pro-Moscow military regime

of Asadvii in the German press. It was accused to “be one of the bloodiest regimes in the

Middle East, shaken from fear of espionage and with pro-soviet declarations and refusal of

any peace policy overbidding itself every day anew.”viii The Asad regime was portrayed in

West German newspapers, just as in the writings of the Brotherhoodix, as a sectarian minority

regime; the Sunni majority was portrayed as restrained under Alawi minority rulex and little

distinction was made between the goals of the Brotherhood and the goals of the Syrian

masses.xi

The media coverage of Syria resembled in those times, the middle of the cold war, in

wording and content the media coverage of the eastern Block, especially the German

Democratic republic (GDR). The pro-Asad demonstrations after the Hama incident at the

anniversary of the seizure of power of the Ba´th party, were commented with sentences like.

“The core of the demonstrators were transported with busses from one place to the other”xii,

an explanation also commonly used in West German media during the cold war to explain

pictures of public pro-GDR or pro-Soviet demonstrations as directed by the government.

The Hama incident was an example of state brutality and a violation of civil and human

rights in order to crush a rebellion, a counter-terrorism measure which seemed very

exaggerated if taken out of the temporal national and regional context. But regarding the

situation of Asad in 1982, one year after the assassination of Sadat by the Brotherhood in

1981 was follow by leaflets distributed in Damaskus that warned Asad of the same fate and

regarding the brutality of the preceding attacks of the Brotherhood against the Syrian ruler

might help to understand the gravity of the threat and the necessity of the measures as the last

option to defend the rule of Asad against the Brotherhood, an organisation that in goals and

measures was at least as totalitarian and terroristic as Asad himself.xiii

Preceding this battle were many years of fighting between the Brotherhood and the

Syrian ruling Ba´th party. Already in the late 60s and early 70s, leaders of the Brotherhood

recognized that the oppression of the Ba´thist regime could only be ended through well

organised armed struggle, and they took the decision in the early 1970s to bear arms and

begin preparation for the ultimate confrontation with the regime.xiv The Brotherhood openly

declared Jihad against Hafiz Asad´s regime, according to An-Nadhir, on 8.2.1976.xv

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In the late 70s and early 80s the Brotherhood executed many attacks against the

government, on 26.6.1980 Asad himself barely escaped death from a terrorist attack.xvi Seale

claims that after the Hama-uprising: “The regime itself (was) shook….Hama was a last-ditch

battle which one side or the other had to win and which, one way or the other, would decide

the fate of the country.”xvii Friedman confirms that it was a zero-sum game, both sides knew

that the winner will win everything and the looser be destroyed.xviii

A stronghold of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in exile during those times was West

Germany. Syrian Muslim Brothers had influence in Islamic Centers, such as the “Islamic

Center Aachen” and the “IZM-Islamic Center Munich” and were organised in the “Syrian

National Committee Germany and Austria”xix. Many members of the Brotherhood had fled

from Syrian persecution to Germany, lured on the one hand by the German asylum law on the

one hand, which guarantees asylum to political pursuedxx and on the other hand by the long-

term roots of Arabs in Germany, dating back to the time before WW2.( see: chapter 6)

This Syrian exile-group influenced not only the media coverage of the Hama incident, but

also caused a continuation of the fight between Syria and the Brotherhood on German

territory after the Hama incident. On 3rd of March 1982 the BKA, German National Police,

arrested a group of three Syrians that was accused of having planned attacks against the

Brotherhood in Germany.xxi The German newspaper “Pfälzischer Merkur” reported that Asad

had hinted before to execute the fight against the Brotherhood from then on also in foreign

countriesxxii After the detention a Syrian group – which was said to be linked to Asad - in

Lebanon obtained the release of the three men, threatening to execute bomb attacks against

Germans in Lebanon if the men were not released. Because of the threats Germany released

the three men to Syria and shut down several German institutes in Beirut. Hence the fight

between Asad and the Brotherhood worsened the barely existing relations between and Syria

and West Germany, which felt blackmailed by Asad.

This paper aims to examine the reasons, supporters and consequences of the Hama

massacre, especially the triangle between Asad, the Brotherhood and West Germany. I raise

the question, why the Brotherhood in exile in its fight against Asad acted mainly from West

Germany and what reasons West Germany had to support or tolerate those actions. This

question will include an analysis of the different groups and countries, internal, regional and

international, involved in the support of the Hama incident – supporting Asad or the

Brotherhood and of the profits they expected from a destabilisation of Syria. On a global level

I will classify the Hama incident into the terms of cold war and the involvement of the

Superpowers USA and USSR in the Middle East in 1982. In order to access the role of West

6

Germany I will put an emphasis on an analysis of West German newspaper articles about the

Hama incident, the cooperations between West German and USA and the West German-

Syrian relations in 1982 and analyse from wording and content the intentions of West

Germany in the incident. Furthermore I will examine the foundation of the Muslim

Brotherhood in Germany and explain why especially Germany played a key role in the exile

of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and its foundation in Europe.

This paper does not aim to describe details of the Hama incident, which can be read in the

book of Thomas Friedman (1998):”From Beirut to Jerusalem” Harper Collins Publishers,

London; or in a publication of the Muslim Brotherhood related publisher house dar el-itisaam:

“Hama: Tragedy of our time”, Cairo,1984. It aims rather to describe regional and international

connections and influences , reasons and aftermaths of this incident, especially the role of the

Brotherhood and West Germany.

My research about the Hama massacre is based on books about Syria and the Syrian

Muslim Brotherhood, such as Seale,P., Asad; Abd-Allah, the Islamic struggle in Syria; Fisk,

R., Pity the nations; Ma´oz, M., Middle Eastern Minorities; Friedman, T., From Beirut to

Jerusalem, especially the chapter “Hama rules”; further on several articles in magazines,

material from the Library of Congress Country Studies and on an analysis of the German

media coverage of the incident. In order to find information about the backgrounds of the

Hama massacre I used various articles about Syria, its involvement in the Lebanon war, the

economic developments in the late 70s and early 80s in Syria, the involvement of the

superpowers in the Middle East and the cold war and articles about the Muslim Brotherhood

and fundamental Islamist organisations in general, which can be found in the Bibliography.

This texts did usually not deal specifically with the Hama massacre, but provided me a basis

of how to access the incident and how to filter biased texts and newspaper articles about an

incident and the role of the Brotherhood as well as interests of other states; articles which

were often used for anti-Syrian propaganda from the West and anti-Western propaganda from

Syria.

In order to access the connection between Syria and Eastern Germany, during the 80s an

enemy of West Germany and object of anti-communist propaganda, I used furthermore

official documents of Syrian-East German cooperations and treaties, which can be found in

the internet ( see bibliography).

The hardest obstacle while writing this paper was to get access to the West-German

interests in tolerating or indirectly supporting the exile-activities of the Syrian Brotherhood

from German ground. Searching about the history of Islam in Germany I found information

7

about cooperations between Hitler and the Brotherhood and found out that many of those

Muslims had stayed in Germany and built up their own communities. I found furthermore

literature that proved the close cooperation between West German and US-.American

strategic objectives in the Middle East. But little was written about the official position of

West Germany in the 1980s towards the Brotherhood in Syria or Germany after WW2.

Especially I found a lack of critical articles dealing with the program and goals of the

Brotherhood in distinction to the will of the Sunni majority of Syria and a missing

differentiation in the media coverage between fundamental and moderate Islam as well as

between individual religious freedom and enforced religious laws. My conclusions are

therefore based on conclusions from the behaviour, the interests, and the role of Germany, the

USA, Syria and the Brotherhood and the analysis of the media coverage in West German

newspapers in wording and content.

8

2 The Hama Massacre and its forerunners

The conservative city of Hama in central Syria has always been a center of the anti-Ba´th

opposition, in addition to other urban centers, such as Aleppo and Hams. Opposition consisted

Sunni fundamentalists, parts of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood, but also of other

groups that were disadvantaged from the regime of Asad. Among them were local

shopkeepers and artisans who had an interest in maintaining their autonomy from financiers

and state administratorsxxiii and local notables who were stripped of political influence.xxiv

Friedman furthermore mentions that the Muslim Workers Union and young seculars, who

were disappointed by the oppressive measures of Asad´s troops against the people of Hama in

the past, supported the rebellion.xxv Hama has always been a radical religious city and a center

of Muslim fundamental organisatins, opposing the secular regime in Damascus. Already in

1961 a group of students from Damascus university who wanted to stop in Hama was forced

back into the bus by an angry crowd, because the girls were in trousers.xxvi Hama was

furthermore the hometown of Marwan Hadid, a Muslim fanatic who died in June 1976 in

Syrian jail after a hunger-strike and became a marthyr. His death was often proclaimed as one

reason for the declaration of Jihad in 1976 by the Brotherhood against Asad´s regime.xxvii

Since 1979 Syria had experienced many uprisings and fights between Islamic

Mudejaheddin and special forces of Asad. In June 1979 a massacre of Muslim rebels against

an Artillery school marked the beginning of a full-scare urban warfare against Alawisxxviii,

Aleppo, another main city of opposition which was like Hama hard to control with its little

streets where cars could not drive, was occupied in August1980 for one whole year by the

government forces, the division of general Shafiq Fayadh.xxix , fights were also reported from

Homs and Hama in 1981 xxx.

Since Asad narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in 26th.6.1980 he had hardened his

policy against the insurgents. On the following day defence companies of his brother Rif´at

killed some five hundred prisonersxxxi, all members of the Brotherhood, in a jail in Palmyra

and on July the 8th membership in the Muslim Brotherhood was made a capital offence.xxxii

When Islamic terrorists killed Anwar AL-Sadat in 6. October 1981, leaflets in Damascus

threatened Asad with the same fatexxxiii; not later than now Asad probably began to see that

this fight was not only a political one but a personal fight for life and death, a zero-sum game

that can be won only by one side destroying the other.

9

The Hama uprising started at 2 a.m. in the night of 2.-3- February 1982 when an army

unit combing the old city fell in an ambush, Jihad was declared and a strong guerrilla force

killed and looted the homes of officials and party leaders, killing some 70 leading

Ba´thists.xxxiv After that the guerrilla declared the city “liberated”. Asad, aware that all his

former methods had come short in stopping the Islam militants, started a drastic example of

anti-terror fighting and sent all troops and forces available to Hama, the city was besieged by

some 12 000 men- other sources mention only 6000 to 8000xxxv.On 16.2. Asad even ordered

the 3000 men strong special forces under the command of his brother Rif´at to withdraw from

Lebanon, where they had been deployed as part of the Syrian “peacekeeping force”, and

ordered them to support the battle in Hama.xxxvi During the three weeks of “civil war”xxxvii

some soldiers probably deserted and the troops of Asad killed about 20.000 people, including

many civilians.

The exact number of killed persons is not known until today and, as much of the reports

about Hama, object of political bias. This is also a result of the fact that during the incident

journalists were not allowed to enter the city and most of the reports are based on testimonies

of eyewitnesses or diplomats, both of them mainly biased. The number varies from 3000, the

official stand of the Syrian governmentxxxviii, to 30.000xxxix out of a population of 300.ooo. xl

According to Amnesty International about 10.000 to 25.000 people, mainly civilians, were

killed xli.Seale estimates the number lower and claims: ”A figure between 5.000 to 10.000

could be close to the truth.”xlii The Syrian Human Rights Committee claims furthermore that

in addition to the death 10.000 persons disappeared.

The question whether troops of Asad deserted was also a matter of political propaganda,

hence the reports varied depending on the political intention of the author. A large number of

deserting troops would prove that the regime of Asad was working against the will of his

people and the rebellion of the Muslim Brotherhood was not only a rebellion of some Islamist

extremists, but widely supported by other parts of the Syrian people. It would furthermore

encourage people who are still afraid of Asad´s troops to join the rebellion, if they believed

there was a real chance of winning it. Fisk, an eyewitness of Hama during the rebellion,

reported that one soldier claimed “Some of our people, our soldiers, have gone to the other

side” and one officer asked another: “Why don’t they let us fight on Golan instead of this?”xliii

which proved that there was a sense of discontent among the Syrian army. Seale mentions

only that some deserted to join insurgentsxliv, avoiding giving exact numbers. Lawson, an

author who described the reasons of the Hama revolt mainly in social and economical terms,

avoiding to mention sectarian strifes or an oppressive regime of Asad, does only mention

10

civilians joining the rebellion, claiming that “Whether or not Syrian army units defected to the

rebel’s side remains an open – and politically very sensitive – question. Later accounts

suggested that the rebels had dressed in regular army uniforms and this constituted the basis

for reports about defections”xlv.Abd-Allah on the other hand, whose book “The Islamic

Struggle in Syria” supports the demands of the Brotherhood against Asad, claims that “parts

of the brigades 21 and 47 mutinied.”xlvi, The West German newspaper FAZ also claims that

probably some members of the 47th tank brigade and the 21st brigade mutinied.xlvii. The West

German “Rhein Zeitung” claims that – according to information from the Israeli secret service

a complete brigade deserted and joined the rebels.xlviii This newspaper, however, writes in the

same style as Abd-Allah, claiming that the Sunni majority in Syria hates the Alawi rulers,

which are considered to be godless. The style of the article describes Asad as a military

regime that can only remain in power because it uses force against the Sunni majority and

does not differentiate between the aims of the Sunni majority and the Brotherhood. By that it

follows the argumentation of the Brotherhood.

These two examples of diverse reports from the same event were given in order to

demonstrate how biased most of the books and articles about the Hama massacre are, using

details that can not be proven in order to support their own bias. It demonstrates furthermore

that West German newspapers often followed often the argumentation of the Brotherhood in

the description of the events and the accusations against Asad, the reasons for that will be

examined in chapter 6.

After this action the power of the Brotherhood in Syria was broken. The leader of the

Brotherhood in Hama, Adib el Kilani was killed and the goal of Asad, to “banish such

Puritanism once and for all” xlix was successful. Ma´oz confirms this, claiming:” This

suppression of the Hama revolt undoubtedly neutralized the Islamic opposition to Asad´s

regime for a long period”l, Friedman confirms: “That Syria has not had a Muslim extremist

problem since”li and also Lucas states: “There has understandably been no serious opposition

to the regime since”.lii But Asad paid a heavy price for this security. The former UN official

Brian Urquhard calls it the “unacceptable face” of the regime, “a formidable and secretive

autocracy sustained by pragmatic ruthlessness.”liii Ma´oz, who explains the problems in Syria

as mainly in sectarian terms, claims that these actions “further alienated other Sunni Muslims,

conservative and liberal alike.”liv And Seale states that this time enlarged the solitary and

authoritarian aspects of Asad´s personality, claiming:” In 1970 he (Asad) was popular, by

1982 he was feared.” lv

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3 Stage A: Syria - Internal supporters of the Hama revolt:

The internal reasons for the Hama uprising are identified by most authors as an attempt of

the Brotherhood to overthrow the hated regime of Asad. The Brotherhood had been able to

organise openly as a political party until the early 50s and again after the break of the UAR in

the early 60s, until the Ba´th coup in March 1963. In 1961 the Brotherhood had gained 10

seats in parliament, after the coup the Brotherhood lost the parliamentary opportunity and the

leader of the Brotherhood, Isam al Attar, was exiled and went to West Germany.lvi But beside

the Brotherhood other Islamic groups opposed Asad, the Aleppo-based Islamic Liberation

Party which was established in Jordan in the 50s, the Muhammad’s Youth, Jundullah

(Soldiers of God) and Marwan Hadids Group, often called At Tali´a al Muqatilia (Fighting

Vanguard)lvii

A main reason for the fight against the Ba´th can be found simply in the fact that the

political arm of the Brotherhood was declared illegal under the Ba´th and that the Ba´th as a

socialistic party, is a natural competitor with the Brotherhood for the support of the working

class, both claim to fight for the values of equality, a fair distribution of wealth, a fight for the

simple people against big landlords and against Western and American influenceslviii.

A main criticism from the Brotherhood against Asad was the accusation that he would work

for Israel and the USA and against Islam and the Palestinian cause. The Brotherhood linked

this accusation with sectarian strifes, claiming:”… the Nusairis (= Alawis) have played

a…role of subservience to imperialist interests. …The Nusairis… in Syria now...and in the

past, they played similar roles of direct complicity in support of the crusaders…against the

Muslim population of the region.”lix

3.1 Excursus:The Alawis/Nusairis (Sources: Seale, Asad, pp. 252/253; Kramer., Syria’s Alawis and Shi‘ism)

The Question if the group of Alawis, to which Asad´s family belongs, is recognized as Muslims or

not has political consequences not only for the situation inside Syria, but also for the relations between

Syria and Iran.

The Alawis constitute about 1 Mio persons, 12% of the Syrian population. Living in the

mountainous corner of Syria they claim to represent the furthest extension of 12-er Shi´ism. Alawi

religion is an esoteric knowledge, preserved only by a few initiated sheikhs (shuyukh al-din), the mass

of the uninitiated Alawis knew only the exoteric feature of their faith. Since the 19th century some of

the secret esoteric texts of the Alawis were published, they showed some indisputable Shi´ite roots but

12

also some unorthodox believes, such as astral Gnosticism and transmigration of souls. Prayer was not

regarded as an obligation, since religious truth was in the hands of a few sheikhs only and also

mosques were not built in Alawi regions. Because of this lack of exoteric signs of Islam, Sunni

heresiographers viewed Alawis as disbelievers (kuffar). Twelver Shi´ite heresiographers were a bit less

vituperative and regarded them as “ghulat” (= “Those who exceed” all bounds in their deification of

Ali).

The first time that Alawis were recognized as Muslims was in 1936 by the Sunni Mufti of Palestine

and President of the General Islamic Congress of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini. It was the time of

the end of French mandate and the Alawis realised that separatism, which served well under French

rule, would disadvantage them in Syrian independence. Sunnis wished to integrate Alawis in the new

state in order to lower resistance and possible opposition and decided that a recognition of Alawis as

Muslim would serve both groups best.

In 1936 a group of Alawi shaikhs declared Alawis as believing Muslims, performing the five basic

obligations (arkan) of Islam and soon after that al-Husseini issued a fatwa that declared them Muslims

and called on all Muslims to work together for the good of Islam. One of the reasons for the Mufti

might also have been that 1936 was the year that the Mufti called for general strike against the British

in Palestine, supported by the Muslim Brotherhood. In times of war it is important to solve internal

Arab conflicts.lx The authorities of the 12-er Shi´ites were not involved in this recognition and still

regarded Alawis as “ghulat”; furthermore the recognition came from Jerusalem, not from Damascus,

which made it questionable.

Thirty years later the problem arose anew. In 1973, two years after Asad became the first Alawi

President of Syria; his government released a new draft constitution that would abolish Islam as the

state religion. Sunni riots followed and forced Asad to change the text, stipulating that the president

must be Muslim. But this change could not stop the riots and the resentment of the Sunni majority that

had once embraced the Alawis in order to achieve help in their fight for an independent Syria, but now

found themselves beaten by the results of this: ruled by a minority.

The dislike of the Alawi minority is deep rooted in Syrian society, Friedman states that fundamental

Sunnis referred to the Alawis as “kuffar” (unbeliever) and radical seculars, that they accused them of

coming to power only because of their role in the military and the Ba´th party, and the Sunni nobles

thought Alawi, whom they regarded to be ignorant peasants, are not worth of being in power.lxi

After the riots the Alawi sheikhs realised the urgent need to be also by the 12-er Shi´ites officially

recognized as Muslim. The solution appeared in the person of Imam Musa al-Sadr, head of the

Lebanese Shi´a Supreme Council, who had his own power interests in recognizing the Alawis. He

attempted to bring the Lebanese Alawis of the north under his jurisdiction in order to extend his reach

from the Shi´a south of Lebanon to the north. But in order to reach this goal he first had to deal with

the Syrian Alawis. Al-Sadr had been in dialogue with the Alawis since 1969 and now things went

pretty fast: Asad needed a quick recognition, al-Sadr aimed to become a powerful patron of the

13

Lebanese Alawis: In July 1973 al-Sadr, an accepted authority of 12-er Shi´ism, recognised Alawis as

Muslims.

This recognition had consequences not only for the situation inside Syria but also deeply affected

the friendship between Syria and Khomeini, because al-Sadr openly collaborated with the Iranian

religious opposition and Asad owed his recognition as Muslim to al-Sadr, hence he supported him in

any way. This support for Iran after the revolution and in the Iran-Iraq war had further consequences

on the relations between West Germany and Syria, as West Germany was allied with the Shah and

opposed the regime of Khomeini, furthermore it was a close ally of the USA, which was also afraid of

their decreasing influence in Iran after the revolution and therefore opposed Khomeini.

The Syrian Brotherhood claims that the name “Alawi” designates the Syrian version of the Turkish

term “Alawi”. Both groups believe that Ali ibn Talib, the companion, first cousin and son-in-law of

the prophet Muhammed, was a divine incarnation. But apart from that both groups have not much in

common and the name “Alawi” was never applied to the Nusairis until Western orientalists began

using it as a designation for them in the 19th century.lxii

I will continue to use the term “Alawi” in this paper, but when I quote writings of the Brotherhood

and affiliated groups also the term “Nusairis” will appear. (End of excursus)

The Syrian intervention in Lebanon against the PLO in 76 was interpreted by the

Brotherhood as a clear sign of cooperation with the enemy - USA, Israel and the imperialists

in general - and as a milestone to Camp David, which they opposed as a threat on the Arab

cause.lxiii. They claim that Kissinger (USA) welcomed Asad´s intervention and that only

because of Asad´s intervention Israel was able to occupy South Lebanonlxiv.

It is true that the so-called “red-line agreement” between Israel and Lebanon forced Syria

to come to an agreement with Israel before invading Lebanon. It was agreed that if one

country invades, the other will invade, toolxv, but it is questionable if any kind of agreement

means already cooperation or has rather to be regarded as a normal sign of state relations, as

the brotherhood claims. The Brotherhood furthermore criticises that Asad did not wage war

against Israel after the latter annexed the Golan heights in December 1981lxvi and that Syria

did not properly oppose the Fahd plan at the Arab summit in Faz in November 1981, a Saudi

project for recognizing Israel in exchange for vacating occupied land; all those incidents are

interpreted as a secret cooperation between Israel and the USA.lxvii But these accusations of

conspiracy are only one of many points of criticism on Asad and reasons used to justify the

struggle for an Islamic Republic in Syria.

The publications of the Brotherhood and of authors and newspapers that support the fight

of the Brotherhood, directly or indirectly, justify the fight with the oppressive character of

Asad´s regimelxviii and his various actions against Islam; such as the attempt to abolish the

14

hijablxix in 29.9.1981 and the enforced unveiling of women in the streets of Damascus by

groups of young girls called “pink panther”, mainly young Alawis trained by the

government.lxx Furthermore they criticize the draft constitution of 1973 that abolished Islam

as the state religion. That draft had to be changed after riots of Sunni militants and after that a

provision that the president of Syria must be Muslim was included, followed by an immediate

declaration that Alawis are also Muslims – hence justifying an Alawi-Presidentlxxi. The

Brotherhood furthermore criticizes the hard measures against their own leaders, such as the

death of Marwan Hadid, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and close friend of Hassan al

Banna, in a Syrian prison in 1976, not mentioning that his death was caused by a self-initiated

hunger-strikelxxii.

The Brotherhood avoids direct sectarian strifes in their publications, claiming that their

fight is not directed against the Asad regime because he is Alawi (they use the term:

Nusairilxxiii) but because of the corrupt nature of his rulelxxiv, Seale confirms this accusations,

claiming that government and business became intertwined in the late 70s, which led to

corruption and patronage.lxxv The Brotherhood claims furthermore that the Syrian people did

not back Asad and that he could only maintain in rule because his sect controls the army

forceslxxvi. “The front seeks the destruction of the regime not because it is Nusairi but because

its rule has been tyrannical, oppressive and unjust…the Islamic revolution…does not seek the

downfall of one sect so that it can be replaced by another; rather, it calls for a government

and political system that will guarantee the rights of all ethnic and religious minorities in

Syria and grant them direct representation, including Nusairis who have not taken part

directly in the crimes of the present regime.”lxxvii

On the other hand the Brotherhood accuses the Alawis of being “ghulat” (extremist) Shi´a

sect, “having much more in common with pre-Islamic paganism…and Christian

trinitism”lxxviii than with Islam, worshipping starslxxix (which is forbidden in Islam), abrogating

basic Islamic obligations, such as prayer, zakatlxxx, fasting, pilgrimate and allowed things

strictly forbidden in Islam, such as alcohol and male sodomylxxxi.

This double strategy was an attempt to win the support of the Alawis, especially in the

army, for a rebellion against Asad, because the Brotherhood needed them with their

influential positions in their fight. This double strategy furthermore enables the Brotherhood

to present her program in German media as a fight of the Syrian majority for freedom and

against oppression, and avoid questions about the question of civil rights and the planned

treatment of “Dhimmislxxxii” in an Islamic state.

15

But also other reasons are mentioned in order to explain the Hama rebellion. Lawson

explains the revolt mainly in social and economical terms, claiming that an uprising on this

scale and this specific time and place needs more reasons than a general resurgence of Islamic

fundamentalism. He claims that small manufacturers and trades people, who were

disadvantaged from the results of Asad´s programme of large-scale industrial development

and the opening of the markets for foreign investment, had a large role in this rebellion The

program had reduced their standard of living relative to workers, enhanced the political

position of the rich and middle peasants at the expense of most urban dwellers and increased

the cost of industrial crops needed by small manufacturers. Government policies in late 1981

reinforced these trends especially in the Hama arealxxxiii.

But also Lawson acknowledges the linkage of this group to the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideals

of “fairness”, “just rule” and “moderate wealth”lxxxiv and claims furthermore: “ In present-day

Syria the most compelling elements of “Islamic thinking are anti-statist. They are not very

tolerant of heterodoxy. As in Algeria, they help to set small-scale manufacturers “both

against rustic ignoramuses” and “against those who aspire to or possess privileges in virtue

of their “ties to the West.”lxxxv Hama´s artisans and shopkeepers, urban-based large

landholders and more or less peripheral cotton and textile merchants can best use these

aspects of Islam in their struggles against the coalition of state-officials, industrial managers

and rich Damascus import-export merchants who buttress and benefit from the present

regime.”lxxxvi This contemplation can serve as an additional source of information about the

large scale of uprising in February 1982 in Hama, but it does not contradict the argument that

the rebellion against Asad was the peak of an ongoing fight of the Brotherhood in order to

overthrow Asad. This article of Lawson furthermore shows that articles in German

newspapers that explained the rebellion as a fight of the people against the socialistic regime

of Asadlxxxvii are much too simple, because exactly the (for a socialistic country)unorthodox

move of Asad of opening his markets to the West was one reason for the rebellion.

Ma´oz also mentions the incapability of Asad, like his Ba´th predecessors, to win the

acquiescence of Sunni Muslim urban society, but he adds that this society mainly consists of

the conservative religious element and was alienated by the fact that Asad´s military and

security forces were mainly Alawi and Asad furthermore had made some decisions against

conservative Islam; for example the attempt to change the constitution in 1973 or the support

of Maronite Christians in Lebanon in 1976)lxxxviii. With this he follows in general the sectarian

argument, which is also found in most of the West German media coverage about Hamalxxxix,

and the arguments of the Brotherhood, as described above.

16

These arguments that equal the aims of the Brotherhood with that of the whole Sunni

majority run short, regarding that the Prime minister since 1980 Dr. Abd al Ra´uf al-Kasm

was not only Muslim but also the son of a Mufti from Damascusxc and not all Sunni Muslims

were religious fundamentalists .Furthermore it is important to notice that the struggle of the

Brotherhood was directed against Muslims as well. During the uprising in Aleppo between

1979 and 1981, the rebels killed not only some killed not only some 300 people, mainly

Alawis and Ba´thists but also a dozen Islamic clergy, who had denounced the murders. Sheikh

Muhammed al-Shami was slained in his mosque in 2.2.1980.xci

Friedman mentions that the Brotherhood in Hama was supported furthermore by the

Islamic Worker Union, who also demanded an end of the state of emergency, declared by

Asad in some years before as a reaction on the frequent attacks of the Opposition on

governmental persons and institutionsxcii.

Other internal opposition stemmed from intellectuals and professional associations, who

did not strive to overthrow the regime but to reform it and from expatriate Syrian politicians,

mostly Sunni Ba´th politicians under the leadership of Bitar, the cofounder of the Ba´th party.

These politicians of the pre-66 era opposed the military and sectarian nature of the regime, but

were not religious fundamentalists. Those non-Islamist groups formed in 1980 a loose

alliance, the National Democratic Gathering, in 1980, but had no contact with the

Brotherhood. They neither shared its goal to build a fundamental Islamic state, based on the

Sharia nor did they strive to use violence in their fightxciii, a difference that was never

mentioned in West German news coverage.

17

4 Stage B: The Middle East - Regional supporters of the Hama revolt

Regarding the inter-Arab relations during the time of the Hama massacre, I will

concentrate on the relations that influenced the West-German- Syrian relations and the

relations between Asad and the Brotherhood. These relations can serve as a source of

information for the attitude of West Germany towards the Syrian Brotherhood and the Asad

regime as well as the external supporters of the Hama revolt. In addition I will give a brief

overview of the Syrian relations to other states and groups in the Middle East in 1982in order

to assess the incident from all sides.

The PLO was a main enemy of Asad, since he had intervened in the Lebanon war in

1976. First Asad had supported the Palestinian/leftist coalition but than changed sides and

backed the established combination of Maronite president and Sunni Muslim premier.xciv

Arafat saw a leftist Lebanon where he held power as a spring board for a free Palestine, but

Asad opposed this view. He explained that in his opinion there is no connection between

“fighting the Christians in the Lebanese mountains and recovering Palestine. In a major

speech on 12.4., he declared: We are against those who insist on continuing the fighting. A

great conspiracy is being hatched against the Arab nation…Our brothers in the Palestinian

leadership must understand and be aware of the gravity of this conspiracy. They are the

prime targets”xcvAsad was afraid that USA and Israel had initiated the war in order to give

Israel a reason to invade Lebanon, the Western flank of Syria. This would lead to severe

security problems of Syria and a changed power balance in the Middle East. But other

authors, among them Seale, doubt the deep support of Asad for the Palestinians, claiming that

he was primarily interested in his own stability and security and used the Palestinian cause as

a means to get financial support from the Gulf states (as a front-state to Israel), but in reality

they were nothing but a constant source of trouble from his point of viewxcvi. Asad himself

declared his claim of controlling the Palestinian actions, claiming, that the Palestinian cause is

too important to leave it to the Palestinians.

The Syrian intervention in Lebanon had weakened the local Palestinians and the fight of

the PLO; the Hama rebellion forced Asad to withdraw troops from Lebanon, which gave the

PLO an interest in supporting the Brotherhood. The Library of Congress Country Studies

claim that al-Fatah of the PLO supplied the Islamist opposition in Syria with training and

assistance. West Germany had no ties to the PLO in 1982; the PLO was still regarded as a

terrorist organisation and had furthermore ties with the West German terrorists of the RAF /

18

Baader Meinhof Gang. One example was a hostage-taking in Khartoum, committed by the

military arm of the PLO, Black September, in March 1973 in Sudan. The hostage-takers had

demanded inter alia the freedom of RAF members from West German prisons. The West

German intelligence organisation EIRNA confirms further links between European terrorist

organisations and the PLO, stating that the PLO was linked with the ETA in Spain.xcvii Hence

an interest of West Germany to support the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria because of a support

of the PLO emits. Furthermore West Germany was allied to Israel and the USA and had no

interest in strengthening the Palestinian resistance.

Since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 Syria has aligned itself with Iran, it has

provided a haven for Iranian opposition even before, when offering asylum to Khomeini in

1987.xcviii The reasons were on the one hand common enemies – USA and Israel – on the

other hand the personal ties of Asad to al-Sadr, a supporter of the Islamic revolution in Iran.

The Shah Muhammed Reza Pahlavi of Persia has had personally and economically close ties

to the West and Israel and had been a major partner of the USA and supported by CIA since

the 50s. Seale claims that “The fall of the Shah was a blow to Israeli and Western

interests…Khomeini’s Islamic internationalism was an indigenous movement determined to

affirm itself against outsiders. Denouncing the United States as the “Great Satan”, Khomeini

tore up the Sha´s agreements with it, broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, stopped the

flow of oil to it, withdrew from the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), and, in a symbolic

gesture, turned over the Israeli embassy in Tehran to “Arafat’s” PLO”xcix.

The West was an opponent of an Islamist, anti-Western Iran and consequently of its ally,

Syria. All Western states, among them Germany, France and Israel backed Iraq during the

war, although they did not involve too much. The USA secretly supplied Iran with anti-tank

weapons (“Contra-affairc”), but officially also supported Iraq.

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, although of fundamental Islam belief, was not

supported by Iran; not only because of the personal ties between Khomeini and Asad but also

because Iran’s fundamental Shi´ism was very different from the Sunni Brotherhood. Although

both strove for an Islamic state, the first were not Arab, not part of the fight for Arab

nationalism that had been connected with the countries of Sunni Islam and the call for jihad in

those countries, and not connected to the Brotherhood. Seale claims that Iran’s government

was a “revolutionary Islamic movement that challenged the Sunni establishments”. ci The

Syrian Brotherhood itself asked for the support of Iran, praising Iran’s Islamic struggle

against world imperialism in its publications and claiming that “it is crucial to the integrity of

Iran’s revolution that its leaders and supporters understand the seriousness of their mistake

19

(to support Asad). Whatever material benefits may have been gained by this relationship are

greatly outweighed by the harm it causes to the Islamic revolution.”cii They stressed the unity

of Islam, Sunni and Shi´as alike, claimed that the sectarian differences between Sunni and

Shi´a are small and the support of a Nusairi-dominated military regime that fights against the

Islamic revolutionary Sunnis inside Syria is opposed to the goals of the Islamic revolution.ciii

Iran, on the other hand, stood firm to his ally Syria and condemned the attacks on Asad by the

Syrian Brotherhood in the same way as Asad, as “…gangs carrying out the Camp David

conspiracy against Syria in collusion with Egypt, Israel and the United States.” civ And

indeed, the CIA had its own interests to support the Syrian Brotherhood against Asad, as I

will explain later in chapter 5.

The relations between Iraq and Syria were bad after Asad had allied with Khomeini.

Asad was convinced that Iraq supported the Brotherhood in Syriacv and also the US-funded

Library of Congress Studies claims that Iraq and Lebanon assisted the Brotherhood by

smuggling weapons into Syria.cvi Iraq and Syria were nonacceding about the biggest enemy:

Iraq claimed that it was the Syrian ally Iran, while Syria claimed it was Israel.cvii Seale claims

that Syria sold weapons to Iran in the Iran-Iraq warcviii and supported internal riots inside Iraq.

In August 1980 Iraqi forces stormed the Syrian embassy in Baghdad, accusing them of

supporting Shi´as inside Iraq with weapons.

On the second of October1980, Iraq officially broke off relations with Damascus.cix In 1981

the West German newspaper “Trierscher Volksfreund”, relying on an article from the

“Sunday Times” reported that the international terrorist “Carlos” was working for Asad on

acts of sabotage in Iraq in order to overthrow the Iraqi system.cx

Asad was furthermore on the worst possible terms with King Hussein of Jordan, who

had tolerated that the Jordanian brotherhood assisted the Syrian brethrens in their fight against

Asad. Although officially supporting the Arab cause Hussein was regarded pro-UScxi and

relied deeply on the protection of the West against its internal and regional enemies. In the

mid 70s drawn together for a short time against the common danger of Egypt’s negotiations

with Israel, the relationship between both countries soon reached a new low at the end of the

70s. Jordan ´s Brotherhood flourished in the absence of governmental repression and

supported the Jihad of its Syrian brethren with training camps and supply of refugee for

Syrian brethren. When Syria tried to assassinate Brotherhood leaders on Jordan territory in

1980 and Jordan consequently killed two Syrian intelligence operatives, both states began to

deploy troops on the border and nearly went into a war.cxii Only the mediation of Saudi Arabia

20

prevented an escalation of the troops already deployed on both sides of the border. The

different sides both states took in the Iraq-Iran war since 1980 further widened the gap. On

23.1.1982 an armed man came from Jordan to Syria and opened fire on a Syrian military

vehicle, killing two Syrian soldiers. Syria blamed the Jordanian government for this

incident.cxiii The Jordan government tolerated the actions of the Brotherhood, in order to

achieve internal peace. The protests against the peace process were criticised by the regime

itself, hence the protest of the Brotherhood was not threatening the king. But the king was

also afraid of a growing Islamic fundamentalism and the possibility of being overthrown,

especially after the Khomeini revolution in Iran. It served them well if the Brotherhood was

involved in protesting against other governments, such as Egypt or Syria. King Hussein as an

ancestor of the guardians of the holy places in Mecca had always been an exception among

non-fundamental rulers in the Middle East in his relations to the Brotherhood. His ancestry

gave him some bonus and the Brotherhood had always taken his side, even supported him in

1956 when the political opposition demonstrated against him. In the 1970s he allowed the

Jordanian Brotherhood to help the Brotherhood in Syria with military training. It is not prove

that Jordan actively supported anti-Syrian actions, but obvious that it did not do enough to

prevent them, because of his opposition to Asad, his good ties to the Brotherhood and because

this might endanger the internal security situation in Jordan.cxiv

The relations between Egypt and Syria were very bad after the Israeli-Arab peace treaty,

that had not only put Syria “out of the game”, negotiating the Israeli and Palestinian question

without Syrian involvement, but also cracked the anti-Israeli front of Arab states and

threatened Syria of political marginalisation if other states would follow the Egypt example.

Egypt, however, had no interest to support the Brotherhood in Syria; it was fighting against

the Brotherhood that killed Saddat in 1981, in its own country.

Saudi Arabia was an ally of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war and supported it financially, hence

it had a reason to oppose Iran’s ally Syria. It shared with Saddam Hussein the fear of a Shi´a

rebellion against a Sunni government. Exile-Syrians from the Gulf States were among the

financial supporters of the Brotherhood, as they wanted the Asad regime to fall.cxv Saudi

Arabia itself was still supporting Syria financially as a front-line state to Israel and because it

wished to moderate Syria’s radical policiescxvi, although it had scaled down its financial aid

because of the Syrian invasion in Lebanon, and because an extension of Syrian influence via

Jordan or Iraq was a threat to the Saudi interests.cxvii

21

The relations between Israel and Syria were at a low point before the Hama incident.

“Menachem Begin´s election, the settlement of the West Bank, the destruction of the Iraqi

nuclear reactor, the annexion of the Golan, the US-Israeli agreement on strategic

cooperation and the invasion of Lebanon were evidence in his (Asad´s) eyes that Israel was

irredeemably aggressive and expansionist, seeking nothing less than regional mastery and

Arab capitulation… The latent Arab view of Israel as a foreign body in Arab Asia, the

product of an outdated Western colonialism which could not live in Arab environment was

revived.”cxviii Asad was the main opponent of the peace process, the hardest part of the eastern

front against Israel ( Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq)cxix, Jordan, although protesting, kept a door

open for a future Jordanian involvement in the process, Lebanon was weak, Iraq involved in

the war against Iran and hostile to Syria. This hostility of Asad towards Israel’s existence and

the peace process forced Israel to weaken Syria and avoid any expansion of its influence in

the Arab world. One way of weakening Asad was the support of the Brotherhood, for example

when Israeli secret service reported of incidents of the Hama massacre during the ongoing

fights in a way that appealed opponents of Asad to participate in the fights. This influenced

also the West German media coverage of the incident, which partially was based on Israeli

intelligence in formationscxx.

22

5 Stage C: The international level: The interests of the superpowers and

its allies in the Hama Revolt

The outlook of the superpowers and its allies on the Middle East, including Syria, was in

the 1980 determined by the cold warcxxi. It was the time when the Soviet Union had lost

influence in the Middle East because it was stuck in Afghanistan and so the USA had free

hand; but this didn’t prevent the USA from their fear of an increased Soviet influence in the

region, enhanced by the fact that the Afghanistan invasion was interpreted as a sign of

growing aggressive and expansive behaviour of Moscow and by US-fears that Moscow might

use the Iran-Iraq war for its own expansion in the Persian Gulf. The Middle East was

determined furthermore by the first big step to a peace process at Camp David 1, but more

than Camp David counted now the fight against Soviet influencecxxii. The USA had started

since the late 70s to increase its pressure on Syria, which was listed since 1979 on the US-list

of “State Sponsors of Terrorism”cxxiii, officially because of its intransigence towards Israel and

its refusal of the Egypt –Israeli peace agreement. But regarding the anti-communist doctrine

of the USA the close ties of Syria to Moscow probably contributed to this listing, which

included an embargo of armament supply. In the early 80s Syria relied heavily on the Soviet

Union in military terms and was isolated from the West. The USA and some West European

governments, for example West Germany, accused Syria of actively supporting international

terrorism.cxxiv This was one more reason for West Germany to oppose Asad. Furthermore

West Germany was a close ally of the USA in the cold war and opposing any state that had

relations with the Soviet Union or East Germany and any system that was somehow

socialistic.

In October 1980 Syria signed a treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet

Union that provided Asad with economic aid, diplomatic support and arms. It resupplied the

Syrian armed forces with sophisticated weapons. This cooperation was endangered because of

the Hama revolt, during which the Russian general lieutenant Yashkin, chief advisor of the

Syrian defence ministry, ordered a secret evacuation of Russian families from Syria.cxxv But

despite this military cooperation, Asad was not a puppet-state of Moscow, as the Reagan

administration had falsely declared, and by that driven Syria into the arms of Moscowcxxvi.

The massing of troops on the Jordanian border in 1980, the moving of missiles into the Biqa´

were just two examples of Syrian actions without Soviet knowledge. Asad depended on

Moscow for arms but wanted on the other hand full political autonomycxxvii. For West

23

Germany and the USA this internal controversies did not count. Syria was simply regarded

and treated as a “rogue state”, like other Soviet allies, for example Lybia, Cuba or East

Germany.

The attacks of the Brotherhood included Soviets inside Syria as well as governmental

officials of Ba´th and Alawis. In October 1981 an attack of the Muslim Brotherhood in

Damascus damaged an apartment-building of Soviet military experts that were in Syria to

train the Syrian army in new weapons. The Soviet news agency TASS blamed the USA and

Israel of supporting the Brotherhood in order to achieve instability in Syria.cxxviii In 1981

posters of the Brotherhood in Syria, signed by “The leadership of the Islamic revolution in

Syria” listed a series of attacks against the Syrian government including the “Russian secret

service building”cxxix. In January 1982, one month before the Hama incident, the “Neue

Züricher Zeitung” reported that the Soviet Union and Syria agreed to cooperate more close in

the future, especially military, condemned the annexion of the Golan, and declared the

strategical cooperation between Israel and the USA as a “dangerous action” that will have

international consequences, exceeding the region of the Middle East.”cxxx

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was an ally of the Soviet Union and a close

ally of Syria. Syria was one of the first states that acknowledged the GDR in 1969 together

with other Arab states. The GDR shared with Syria the permanent accusation of Israel and the

USA as an “international conspiracy of imperialists and Zionists against the Arab nations cxxxi

“Uns verbinden die festen Prinzipien des Kampfes gegen den Imperialismus und Zionismus”,

( German for: we are connected by the firm principles of the fight against imperialism and

Zionism) was the headline of a comment of the governmental newspaper Assaura regarding

the visit of Günther Kleiber, head of a delegation from the GDR, in Syriacxxxii. The East

German TV program “Stimme der DDR” claimed, as Asad, that:”Israel was waging a war in

the whole world”cxxxiii. The list of international cooperation pacts between the GDR and Syria

starts in 1956 with an agreement about academical and technical cooperation, followed by

more than a dozen cooperation pacts about military, cultural, educational and academical

cooperations.cxxxiv These close relations forced West Germany to support Syrian opposition in

order to weaken the Soviet block until it will fall.

The relations between the USA and Syria had never been good, but before 1978 Asad had

still left a door open for further negotiations. When Carter became president, Asad had first

hoped that he might become a partner, but he was heavily disappointed by the

outmanoeuvring of Syria and split in the Arab front against Israel after the Egypt-Israel peace

treaty in 26.3.1978, which was regarded by Asad as “Carter’s betrayal”cxxxv After this the

24

relation between the USA and Syria were at a low point and only the Soviet Union left as a

possible supplier of arms. Moscow gave its O.K. to military help, although it was in general

disappointed of Syria – because of its anti-leftist anti-PLO intervention in Lebanon and the

Arab world in general because Egypt dropped out of the anti-Israeli anti-Western camp.cxxxvi

The victory of Reagan in 1981 – an anticommunist hardliner- further worsened the relations.

He adopted the “Kirkpatrick doctrine” of supporting any anticommunist group worldwide

who fought against pro-Soviet regimes, even if those groups are undemocratic. During the

reign of Reagan “the contest in the Middle east was described almost exclusively in cold war

terms with scant mention of the peace process.” And the containment of Soviet influence was

more important than improved relations to Asad, especially after the outbreak of the Iran-Irak

war made the USA fear that Moscov might use this conflict to expand its influence in the

region.

In March 1980 Asad publicly accused the CIA of encouraging “sabotage and

subversion” in Syria in order to “bring the entire Arab world under joint US-Israeli

domination”cxxxvii. “We were not dealing just with killers inside Syria, but with those who

masterminded their plans. The plot thickened after Sadat´s visit to Jerusalem and many

foreign intelligence services became involved. Those who took part in Camp David used the

Muslim Brothers against us.”cxxxviii

Asad himself explained the Hama rebellion with a conspiracy of the West – mainly the

USA, CIA and “the Zionists” against him, claiming on 7.3.1982 in Damascus on the eve of

the 19th anniversary of the Ba´th revolution: “Brothers and Sons, death to the criminal Muslim

brothers! Death to the hired Muslim Brothers who tried to play havoc with the homeland!

Death to the Muslim Brothers who were hired by US intelligence, reaction and Zionism”cxxxix.

In the eyes of Asad the battle at Hama, which followed immediately on the long unsuccessful

struggle with the USA and Israel over the nature of the post-Yom-Kippur war, “was an

extension of the diplomatic one which had ended with the disastrous US-sponsored Camp

David accords, only the latest as he saw it in a long string of Western conspiracies, dating

back over fifty years to the First World War, to divide and enfeeble the Arabs.”cxl

Part of these accusations was also the media coverage in Western media about the Hama

incident, which was considered to be a support of the rebellion; for this reason the US

ambassador Robert Paganelli was called during the beginning of February 1982 to the Syrian

Foreign Ministry and the Syrian government delivered a strong letter of protest, criticising the

US-American media reports about rebellions in Syria.cxli A Syrian government spokesperson

accused the USA of intervention into Syrian internal affairs and declared Information about

25

fights between the Syrian army and members of the Muslim Brotherhood were “only lies and

a new American provocation against Syria.”cxlii And “part of an information-war in order to

distract from the fact that the USA was defeated during the UN-referendum about the Israeli

annexation of the Golan.”cxliii

Until the 1970s The United States has considered the Federal Republic of Germany

(BRD) as one of its closest and most dependable allies within the Western alliancecxliv.West

Germany had a strategically important place as a front-state to the East Block and the USA

had a large military presence in West Germany, which was an important economical factor for

Germany. The USA needed West Germany as a place for the deployment of medium range

missiles against Moscow and as a basis for troops in case of a crisis in the Middle East. After

the Warsaw pact had deployed medium-range missiles of the type SS20, the NATO decided

in the “NATO-Dual Pact” of 1979 to deploy more than 500 additional nuclear missiles in

West Germany and the Netherlands as a determent for Moscow. This armament caused

opposition among the West German peace movement. Anti-war demonstrations made the

USA uncertain if West Germany was still a reliable partner. But these movements were not

part of the governmental policy and officially West Germany still followed the pro-US

course, supporting the USA also in its foreign policycxlv . Hence the goals of the USA in the

Middle East as described above were supported by West Germany, including the weakening

of Asad by supporting the Brotherhood and anti-communist propaganda. The USA had under

the reign of Reagan (since 1981) worked on this propaganda and built up Syria, beside Libya,

to a so-called “hoard of terror”cxlvi. This anti-communist propaganda served furthermore the

West German interest of weakening the Soviet block, including East Germany until the long-

term goal, the “Einheit in Freiheit” (Unity in freedom) will be achieved: a re-union of both

Germanys. Freedom meant in this connection capitalism , like the BRD or the USA.cxlvii

West Germany and the USA waged during the time of the cold war, which was at a new

peak during the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan, a war against any state in the “Soviet camp”

and against socialism as an idea itself, accusing socialist states of being a dictatorship, ruling

against the will of the population, manipulating demonstrations and polls and keeping the

population in poverty, unliberated and without a change to rebel because of the high internal

security forces. Syria, as an ally of the Soviet Union, fit well in this picture of an “enemy

state”, hence any rebellion was supported as a prove that a socialist state can only maintain

against the will of the population by the means of military dictatorship and in order to weaken

Moscow. It was for this reason, too, that the CIA to supported another fundamental Islamic

26

group, the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan, with weapons and training to rebel against Soviet

invasion in the 1980s. cxlviii

Another reason for West Germany to oppose Asad was his involvement in international

terrorism, such as the RAF (Baader Meinhof Gang)cxlix and the “Movement 2nd of June –

Tupamaros West Berlin”. Michael (Benni) Baumann, a member of the movement of the 2nd of

June fled in 1972 to Syria and was concealed there from German policecl.

West Germany, as an ally in the anti-Soviet camp, had a reason to support the

Brotherhood in Syria and to provide them a safe exile in Germany as a place from where they

could continue their attempts to overthrow Asad, in order to weaken the Soviet bloc. West

Germany - simply ignorant or supporting the Kirkpatrick doctrine - ignored the fact that the

Brotherhood demanded among other things a “commitment to the Shari´a law in all

legislation”cli, in no way congruent to the propagation of Western democracy by the USA and

the BRD.

The Syrian Brotherhood had put down firm roots in West Germany (see chapter 6.3) and

the West German government was at least tolerating, if not supporting, their activities. The

Syrian Muslim Brotherhood did not endanger the West German government because their

struggle during those times was not directed against the West, but mainly against secular

regimes in their homelands. Germany, on the other hand, suffered from the attacks of Syrian

intelligence on the Brotherhood in exile, such as the attack against the IZM, the Islamic

Center of Munichclii. The IZM is a base of the Brotherhood in West Germany and used as

headquarter of the IGD, the Islamic Community in Germany e.V., which is regarded as the

biggest Organisation of Brotherhood supporters in Germany. The IZM is until today linked to

the Brotherhood.cliii The influence of the Brotherhood in Germany can be an additional reason

for Germany to oppose Asad in order to avoid unrests inside Germany.

27

6 Stage D: West Germany

6.1 Three ways how West Germany supported the Syrian Brotherhood

West Germany supported the Hama rebellion in three ways: It provided asylum and a save

haven from where the exile-brotherhood could organise its struggle against Asad, it protected

them against attacks of Syrian intelligence, and West German newspapers reported about the

Hama incident in a way that supported the aims of the Brotherhood.

1. Providing asylum for Syrian Muslim Brothers in West Germany and enabling them to

organize their fight against Asad from German ground.

The German constitution, § 16a, guarantees the right of asylum for persons who are

politically pursued in their homeland. The German Zuwanderungsgesetz § 60 (immigration

law) furthermore prohibits a deportation of asylum-seekers, if their life or freedom is

endangered by the state or political groups/organisations that control the state or fundamental

parts of the state in their home country; further if they are endangered of torture or death

punishment, even if they were sentenced to this by a law court because they committed a

crime. These laws enabled Muslim Brothers, even if they committed crimes in Syria, to get

asylum in Germany, especially after Asad had ratified in 19.7.1980 law No. 49, which

declared membership in the Muslim Brotherhood as a capital offence.

Germany accepted as one of 141 countries worldwide the Geneva Convention relating

to the Status of Refugees (Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention) of 1951, which defines a refugee as

somebody who has a reasonable fear of persecution and fled his home country because of this,

reasons for the fear are among others: religion and political persecution. Muslim brothers

were declared in West Germany as political persecuted.

2. Protecting the Brotherhood in exile against Syrian agents, who are declared as terrorists

When members of the Syrian Brotherhood live in Germany, the Syrian government is not

allowed, according to German law, to persecute them. This led to the development of Syrian

state terrorism on German ground in the 70s and 80s; a bomb attack on the IZM – Islamic

Center of Munich – in January 1982 was assigned to the Syrian secret service.cliv

In March 1982 the German media reported about a victory of German criminal police

(BKA) against the international terrorism from Syria under the headline: “Terror-command

from Syria caught in Stuttgart”clv. These men were accused of having planned attacks against

members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany. It was further reported that one of these

men, Ali Hassan, was already known by the police from previous crimes. This kind of media

28

coverage portrayed Syria as terrorists and the Brotherhood as the persecuted victims. The

newspaper “Pfälzischer Merkur” adds that Asad was hinting after the Hama massacre that he

will continue his future fights against the Brotherhood also in foreign countries.clvi

After Germany arrested this terrorists, “radical Syrians obtained the release of those men,

threatening to bomb West German organisations in Lebanon”clvii, as the West German

newspaper “tz” reported. West Germany reacted with shutting down institutions in Lebanon

and flew the three men out to Syria. The newspaper “Frankfurter Rundschau” reports

furthermore about the existence of death lists with names of German citizens in Beirut in

connection with the arrest of the three men.clviii. The newspaper “Tagesblatt” claims under the

headline:” New Syrian threat against West Germany” clix that even after the men were returned

to Syria, the organisation “Asbaqiyeh martyrs” warned the West German government not to

grant any more asylum to members of the Muslim Brotherhood and accused the West

Germany of hindering the Syrian command in their mission to assassinate Muslim Brothers in

Germany. The headline did not distinguish between the Syrian government and the

organisation “Asbaqiyeh martyrs” in the headline. The “Frankfurter Neue Presse” criticised

that the West German government was blackmailed by this organisation which was said to

have acted instead of the Syrian government.clx

Asad always distanced from this actions, claiming in an interview in 1986 when asked

about the connections of Syria to terrorists in Berlin and London:” I want to say that some

Western forces were behind this terrorism and were masterminding it…the CIA has a hand in

every terrorist organisation in the world…We oppose terrorism…we have said so previously,

we say it now, and shall say it again in the future. Terrorism is one thing and the struggle for

liberation…something else.”clxi

3. Reporting in newspapers about the Hama incident in a way that supported the

Brotherhood’s

aims (see chapter 6.2)

6.2 West German media coverage of the Hama rebellion

The media coverage of the Hama rebellion was built around three main topics: the

condemnation of communist systems, the portrayal of the Brotherhood as representing the

will of the Sunni majority and a strengthening of the resistance by reporting about strong

resistance forces.

29

1. The interest of the West to condemn communism, the Soviet Union and its allies:

German media coverage emphasized the anti-socialistic aspect of the Hama rebellion,

claiming: “Die Rebellion richtet sich gegen das sozialistische Regime von Präsident Asad”

(The rebellion is directed against the socialistic regime of president Asad)clxii and stressing the

fact that Russian troops helped Syria to perform the massacreclxiii. Especially in Western

media coverage the brutal actions of Asad were used to portray him as a pro-soviet military

regime that was opposed by the majority of his oppressed populationclxiv. Pro-government

demonstrations in those countries were always portrayed as directed by the government,

describing that the demonstrators were brought about and transported by governmental busses

to the places of the demonstrationsclxv. It is assumed to be a natural will of every person to

strive for Western democracy, portraying the USA as the example of freedom, democracy and

justice. Hence the regime of Asad was portrayed in the same way as the GDR or Cuba, and

the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood explained as a natural rebellion of the people against

this kind of regime. This followed the Kirkpatrick doctrine and the mission of the United

States and West Germany during the cold war to portray themselves and their capitalism as

the only just and free system in the world, which gave them the right to support any rebellions

inside of countries that were aligned with the Soviet Union “in the name of the citizens”. The

fact that not every country in the world will elect a US-like government was out of notion in

the days of the cold war, but the hard measures against communists in the USA and West

Germany proved that there was still the fear that people might freely choose another system.

Any rebellion in a non-western state helped to justify the US policy. This background

information explains why the BRD had to support the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and tried

to cover them under the umbrella of the will of the Sunni majority, in order not to admit that it

was an extremist, right wing, totalitarian party uprising against another authoritarian leader.

2. The interest of the West to portray the goals of the Brotherhood as congruent with the

goals of the majority of Syrians.

The West tried to create an “enemy”, Asad; hence the rebel had to be the “good”. German

media coverage used this psychological system of “black and white” that makes it easier to

influence the population against Asad, a system which was already used in propaganda

movies produced by the Documentary Film Unit (DFU) of the American Military

Government after WW2 in West-Germany and influenced the style of West German media

after thatclxvi. Putting an emphasis of the sectarian strifes, portraying the regime of Asad as a

30

minority sect which is keeping up a military regime against the will of the majority, helped to

avoid any controversy with the program of the Brotherhood. The majority of the country was

described as Sunnis, ruled by a small sect of Alawis, without distinguishing between Sunnis

in general and the Muslim Brotherhood, by that stressing that the rebellion of the Muslim

Brothers was congruent with the will of the majority. This argument was used also by the

Brotherhood, who claimed that it was a justified rebellion against a country ruled by a

minority sect. Examples for this emphasis on sectarian strifes can be found in nearly all West

German newspapers articles about The Hama incident, for example:

“The Shi´a sect of Alawis rules the country”clxvii; “Among the Sunnis, that constitute 65% of

the population, the discontent about the government in Damascus increased dramatically

during the last time. The government and army are dominated by members of the small Alawi

sect, also Asad declares to be member of this sect.”clxviii “ Hama is a center of the Sunni

Muslim Brotherhood, which opposes the superiority of the Alawis (12% of the population).

The Sunni majority (more than 65%) feels oppressed by the Alawis…a Shi´a secret sect that is

rejected by Sunnis as heretic.”clxix

The Syrians, who lived in Germany, used appeals to the German Red Cross and amnesty

international by their organisation “Syrian National Committee in Germany”, a name that

indirectly suggests that it represents the Syrian population, to protest the use of Napalm and

the catastrophic humanitarian conditions in Syria. German media reported about this demands

without checking the details of the accusations or backgrounds of the members in the Muslim

Brotherhood.clxx This served the West German interest to portray Asad as cruel and acting

against the will of his own population.

3. The interest of the West to support the rebellion by taking up US- and Israeli intelligence

information about a strong resistance and deserting governmental troops, by means of that

strengthening the anti-Asad opposition inside Syria and encouraging neutral Syrians to

support the rebellion, thinking they might win the fight. Examples of this kind of coverage are

found in articles of the “Rhein Zeitung” and the “Nordsee Zeitung”, that reported a whole

brigade deserted to the rebel troops, relying only on Israeli intelligence Information.clxxi

31

6.3 The roots of the Muslim Brotherhood in West Germany

Germany and the Arab world are connected by a long relationship, dating back to the

time before World War 2. Already in 1921 the German Ambassador in London commented

on the Arab view of past Arab-German relations as follows: “They have never had hostile

feelings to Germany, having instead trusted Germany more than the other Great Powers

because of their impression that, in the pursuit of its interests, Germany has never acted in a

purely selfish manner, having instead respected the interests of the indigenous habitants.” clxxii

The first Syrians that came in the early 20th century to Germany were mainly students

that studied on German Universities. The leader of the Arab students, which merged in

organisation like “Islamiya” or “Arabiya” was the Syrian Hadjj Mohammed Nasi Tschelebi,

editor of the newspapers “Islamische Gegenwart” (Islamic Present), “Der Islamische Student”

(The Islamic Student) and “Islam Echo” (echo of Islam).According to reports of the former

American prosecutor Loftus, The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna was a

secret admirer of Hitler and wrote him frequently letters.clxxiii. In Syria and Iraq developed

since the 1930s pro-fascist organisations that found direction in Hitler-Germany. They

adopted elements such as “Fuehrer” principle, the aim to annihilate Jews and the one-party-

system, but not the Arian superiority claim.clxxiv The Grand Mufti Amin al-Husseini from

Jerusalem became a key figure in the transmission of Nazi-ideology into the Middle East; in

1933 he established contacts to the Hitler government and helped to form a Muslim division

for the SS, called “Handschar”.clxxv. Some of this Muslims, mainly former prisoners of war

from Russian minority groups, stayed after the war in Germany and together with other

Russian Muslim minorities that joined the German refugees in 1945 they began to build up

their communities, mainly in Munich and Nuerenberg. clxxvi.

Members of the Muslim Brotherhood fled from persecution in their homelands since the

50s and 60s to Europe, also to Germany. The Syrian head of the Muslim brotherhood since

1957, Islam (Isam) al Attar was exiled after the Ba´th coup in 1963 and lived after that in

Aachen/ West Germany, where he founded the newspaper “Al Raid” (The Guide)clxxvii. He

continued to lead the Brotherhood from exile, but was removed from the leadership after an

internal crisis in 1970clxxviii. He was the founder of the “Islamic Center Aachen – Bilal

mosqueclxxix”, which is considered by German politicians to be part of the Syrian

Brotherhood.clxxx. In 1973 Attar became a member of the IZM, Islamic Center of Munich,

headquarter of the contemporarily IGD, previously called-“Islamische Gemeinde

32

Süddeutschland”. The German intelligence “Verfassungsschutz” designates the IGD as an

organisation of supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.clxxxi The second founder of the

“Islamic Center Aachen” was the banker and billionaire Yusuf Nada, known today as the

cashier for Al Qaeda in Europe.clxxxii

In the late 70s and early 80s the climate between Islam and Germany was friendly.

Fundamental Islamic terrorism had not reached Europe and in general little difference was

made between Islamic fundamentalism and moderate Islam. It was important for the West to

avoid Soviet influence in the Arab countries, and for that Germany needed to befriend Islam.

The Arab states were important in order to gain influence in the block-free countries, as the

German president Scheel accented in a laudation for the Islamic theologian and diplomat

Mohammad Aman Hobohn. Hobohn, who had contacts to the “World Muslim league” and the

“Islamic World Congress”, was praised to” be a connection between us and this states and

nations, which are very important for the future of our world and the world peace.”clxxxiii

Especially his role in the conference of the block-free countries 1976 in Colombia was

praised. In this climate which was unable to distinguish between different levels of

fundamentalism inside Islam, it was easy for the brotherhood to present its goals as “religious

freedom” and the Syrian government as a “pro-Soviet minority military regime“. The terror

attacks of the Brotherhood were not visible in Germany, but the counter-terrorism measures

of the Syrian government were visible, as they happened on German ground. This caused the

condemnation of Syrian state-terrorism on the part of West Germany and the condemnation of

the humanitarian catastrophes inside Syria, but the ignorance of the terror of the Brotherhood,

partly planned from Germany. Until today little is written about Germany’s indirect role in

supporting the anti-Syrian terror of the Brotherhood in the days of the cold war.

33

7 Conclusion

The Hama massacre was an example of a very cruel suppression of an internal

opposition, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, against the regime of Asad. It included atrocities

against innocent civilians, acts of barbarism and savageness by governmental troops. In the

aftermaths of the massacre Asad pursued the Brotherhood even in its exile in Germany, which

further increased the bad relations between the pro-Soviet Syria and the pro-US West

Germany during the cold war.

Many Syrian groups had reasons to oppose the rule of Asad, former Ba´th members, secular

intellectuals, economical disadvantaged groups and the Islamic fundamentalists. Some of

those groups preferred the way of un-violent reform while others, among them the

Brotherhood, openly called for jihad against Asad.

But the brutality of Asad was just one side of the medal: All sources confirm that Hama

was a zero-sum gameclxxxiv, the end of a long war between the Brotherhood and the

government, and regarding the goals of the Brotherhood - Implementation of Shari´a law in

Syria - it has to be questioned if they, as the West German media coverage gives the

impression of, represented the will of the majority. Rather they were just a militant minority

group which, once in power, would continue with another totalitarian undemocratic rule.

The relations between Syria and the rest of the Arab countries were tense during 1982,

many countries had reasons to support Syrian opposition groups. Asad had disappointed the

PLO with his invasion in Lebanon 1976 in support of the existing government; Syria was

allied with Iran in the war between Iran and Iraq, which intensified the long-standing conflicts

between Syria and Iraq; it had almost waged war against Jordan three years before and was

still declaring that Israel has no place in the Middle East, opposing any peace negotiations and

Camp David.

The USA was at a new peak of the cold war after the as aggressive regarded Soviet

invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 with implications for the Persian Gulf regionclxxxv, the new

president Ronald Reagan had adopted a hardliner anti-communist policy, following the

Kirkpatrick doctrine that allowed the support of any anti-communist movement no matter

how undemocratic it was or what methods of terrorism it used. West Germany was despite

small disputes about the deployment of more missiles on German ground still a close ally of

the USA and supporting its foreign policy. It had furthermore its own interests in weakening

34

pro-Soviet systems, waging its own propaganda war against the GDR, striving to support

revolts in the east block in order to re-unite Germany.

Syria was in spite of internal differences between both countries one of the last countries

in the Middle East allied to the Soviet Union, received military aid and was closely allied to

other countries in the East Block, such as the GDR. Because of its open pro-Soviet attitude

and its opposition to any peace process, to the peace between Israel and Egypt and to Camp

David, furthermore because of its socialistic regime, Syria was regarded as an enemy to the

USA and its allies, such as West Germany. West Germany’s support of the Brotherhood and

its ignorance towards the terrorism of the Brotherhood inside Syria, planned and supported

also from exile-Syrians in West Germany, can not be explained simply with the good will of

Germany to help the Sunni majority, defend human rights and fight against military

dictatorship or a blind eye towards the complexity of the situation. It can only be explained

with the to support the foreign policy of the USA and the ambition to weaken the pro-Soviet

Asad and, who was furthermore opposing the peace process with Israel, by any possible

means, in the same way as the USA supported the anti-Soviet Mujaheddin in Afghanistan.

West Germany was especially suitable for becoming a center of Syrian Brotherhood in exile

because they were already rooted there and the asylum laws guaranteed them a save haven.

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had lasting roots in West Germany, dating back to the

time of World War 2, and took advantage of the German Asylum Law, which guaranteed

refugee to Muslim Brothers because they were declared as political refugees. Furthermore

West Germany supported the Syrian opposition in order to undertake anti-Soviet propaganda

and portray Syria as a military regime that can only exist with the help of a strong army and

secret services, oppressing and frightening the population. It was not the aim of West

Germany to erect an Islamist state in Syria, as it was not the aim of the USA to erect an

Islamist state in Afghanistan when supporting the Taliban, but it was the only available

possibility to weaken Asad and the Soviet influence in the Region.

German media coverage exhibits these governmental goals, concentrating on mainly

three topics: condemnation of socialism as opposed to the will of the population, emphasizing

sectarian strifes and equalling the aims of the Brotherhood with the will of the majority and

finally supporting the rebellion by spreading information of Israeli and American intelligence

about the rebellion in order to pretend that the rebellion will be successful and encourage

more people to join the rebels.

35

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40

LECTURES:

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Term 2006, BGU, Beer Sheva

2. Ulfkotte,U., member of the German party FDP, lecture about Islam in Germany,

published online:http://www.test-

homepages.org.liberale.de/meldung.php?id=96848p=0&printerversion=1

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8 NOTES:

i Friedman, T.L., Hama Rules, New York Times editorial, 21.9.2001 ii Library of Congress Country Studies: Syria, Ethnic and Religious Opposition Movements, iii Hadidi, S., The Hama massacre and the Syrian “experience” in fighting terrorism, Al Quds Al Arabi (London), 11.01.02; the numbers given are uncertain, see footnote Nr. 38 iv Seale, P., Asad, p.333 v Abu Bakr was the „nom de guerre“ of Umar Jawwad vi Seale,P., Asad, p. 332 vii see: Ranke, P.M., Nur noch mit Gewalt, Die Welt, 12.2.1982, see also: Kordt, W., Der Schock von Hama, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7.4.1982. see also: Ranke, P.M., Schweigen über Hama, Die Welt, 19.2.1982 viii Ranke, P.M., Nur noch mit Gewalt, Die Welt, 12.2.1982 ix See: ‘Umar ‘Abd-al-Hakim, The Confrontation Between the Sunni Population of Al Sham against Al-Naserieh ,Crusaders and Jews, Kabul, Afghanistan, 22.6.2000; this new document resembles in argumentation and wording the Muslim Brotherhood of the 80s in Syria. See furthermore: Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle of Syria, p 44 (Abd-Allah mentions of the word “crusaders”, accusing Asad to serve the interests of the crusaders; ibid, p. 45 (Abd-Allah mentions incitement against the Alawis, who are accused of being allowed to do sodomy and for not keeping the main pillars of Islam and having more in common with Christians or Phoenicians than with Islam). x See: Trierscher Volksfreund, Volksaufstand gegen Asad Herrschaft, 12.2.1982; xi See: Binswanger, K., Wie Asad den Syrern den Islam austreiben will, Luzerner Neueste Nachrichten, 17.10.1981: This article describes the resistance of the Syrian civilians against Alawi pioneers (the term pioneers was also used for East German youth organisations) who ripped down the veil of women on the streets of Damascus. See furthermore: Trierscher Volksfreund, Volksaufstand gegen Assad-Herrschaft, 12.2.1982: This article describes the rebellion in Hama as a rebellion of the Syrian people, the Sunni majority which is unhappy of being ruled by a minority of Alawis. Again the sectarian element is highlighted, the Sunni majority is equalled in their goals with the Muslim Brotherhood and the government of Asad described as a minority regime imposing its will by the use of military force over the majority. xii Kordt, W., Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Der Schock von Hama, 7.4.1982 xiii about Syria’s alleged use of terrorism to achieve diplomatic, military and strategic objectives in the Middle East in the 80s, see for example: Syria-Sponsorship of terrorism, Library of Congress Country Studies, p.1 xiv see: Reissner, J., Ideologie und Politik der Muslimbrüder Syriens, von den Wahlen 1947 bis zum Verbot unter Adib as_Siskali 1952, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, vol. 55, Freiburg im Breisgau, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1980; cited in: Abd-Allah,U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, , p. 108 xv see: An-Nadhir, 2:2, cited in: Abd-Allah, Dr. U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 109. The reason for this date was not explained in the article, Abd-Allah mentions that the“ first shot of Jihad” was given when the news of the death of the Muslim Brethen and imam of the Barudiya mosque Marwan Hadid “under the brutal torture of the Ba´thist regime” (ibid, p. 109) spread. Seale, on the other hand, dates the death of Hadid to June 1976, when he died in a military hospital after a hunger-strike. Seale further claims that Asad tried to prevent Hadid from dying and even sent Hadid´s brother Kan´an, then a Syrian diplomat in Tehran, to persuade him to stop the hunger strike. (Seale, Asad, p. 324) xvi see: Seale, P., Asad, p. 328. In this incident the personal bodyguard of Asad, Khalid al-Husayn, saved Asad´s life by jumping on a grenade next to them, he died in this incident. xvii ibid, p. 333 xviii see: Friedman,T., From Beirut to Jerusalem, p. 80 xix see: Frankfurter Rundschau, Syrer appellieren an DRK und Amnesty International, 18.3.1982 xx The definition of political pursued persons included the Syrian Brotherhood, especially after Asad had ratified in 19.7.1980 following a failed assassination attempt on him, law No. 49, which declared membership in the Muslim Brotherhood as a capital offence.

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xxi See: Neue Presse, Terrorkommando aus Syrien in Stuttgart gestellt, 3.3.1982 xxii see: Pfälzischer Merkur, Sprengstoff- Fund in Homburg: Terroranschlag verhindert?, 2.3.1982, xxiii see: Lawson,F.H., Social Bases for the Hamah Revolt, MERIP Reports No. 11, Syria’s Troubles, 11/12 1982, pp. 24-28, p. 27 xxiv see: Seale, P., Asad, p.321 xxv see: Friedman, T., From Beirut to Jerusalem, pp. 77-80 xxvi see: Seale, P., Asad, p. 334 xxvii see: Abd-Allah, Dr. U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 109 xxviii Seale, P., Asad, p. 324 xxix see: ibid, p. 328 xxx see: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Berichte über Massaker in Hama und Homs, 3.6.1981 xxxi This number is taken from Seale, P. Asad, p. 329. The Syrian Human Rights Committee estimates the number of dead persons about 1000. (See: SHRC, Genocide and a crime against humanity, 2.2.2006, The high emotional wording, the missing links to other human rights organisations such as amnesty international and the fact that the SHRC does not mention sources make it probably biased. xxxii see: Seale,P., Asad, p.329 xxxiii see: ibid, p.331 xxxiv see: ibid, p.332 xxxv the number 12.000 is used by Seale,P., Asad, p. 333 based on a Report from Hama by Fisk,R., The Times,, 19.2.1982; the German newspapers Frankfurter Rundschau and Trierscher Volksfreund claim that the number of soldiers deployed by Asad is about 6 to 8000 (see: Frankfurter Rundschau, Aus Syrien wird Rebellion gegen Asad-Regime gemeldet, 12.2.1982; see also: Trierscher Volksfreund, Volksaufstand gegen Asad-Herrschaft, 12.2.1982) xxxvi see: Berliner Morgenpost/dpa, Kämpfe halten an – Syrien zog Libanon Truppen ab, 17.2.1982 xxxvii Seale,P., Asad, p.333 claims this incident was not an ordinary military operation but a civil war xxxviii see: ibid, p. 334, see also: http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%A2%D7%9C%D7%90%D7%95%D7%95%D7%99%D7%9D xxxix The number is given by the Syrian Human Rights Committee, see: SHRC, The Massacres of Hama: Law Enforcement Requires Accountability, 1.2.2005; the same number is also mentioned in Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 192. Ma´oz, M. claims a very vague number between 10.000 and 30.000 victims ( Ma´oz, M., Middle eastern Minorities, p. 63), Taheri, A. mentions 20.000 killed (Taheri, A., American Foreign Policy Interests, 2003, Iraq, the failure of an Arab model, NC AFP); Waywell estimates the number about 20.000 (Waywell, T., a failure to modernize, the origins of 20th century Islamic fundamentalism). xl the number of inhabitants is taken from Abd-Allah, U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p.192 and from a report of the Syrian Human Rights Committee, The Massacres of Hama: Law Enforcement Requires Accountability, 1.2.2005. Friedman mentions only 180.ooo inhabitants (Friedman, T., From Beirut to Jerusalem, p. 76) xli see: Friedman, T.L., Hama Rules, 21.9.2001, New York Times editorial; see also: Friedman,T., From Beirut to Jerusalem, p. 78; xlii Seale,P., Asad, p.334 xliii Fisk, R., Pity the Nations, pp. 185/186 xliv see: Seale,P., Asad, p. 333 xlv Lawson, F.H., Social Bases for the Hamah Revolt, MERIP Reports No. 11, Syria´s Troubles, 11/12 1982, pp. 24-28, p. 28; referring to the articles:” Des combats entre les frerres musulmans et les forces de l`ordre”, Le Monde, 12.2.1982 and David Ignatius´story on the revolt in the Wall Street Journal, 6.5.1982 xlvi Abd-Allah, Dr. U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 193 xlvii see: Kordt, W., Der Schock von Hama, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7.4.1982 xlviii see: Rhein Zeitung, Syrische Brigade rebelliert mit, 16.2.1982 xlix Seale,P., Asad, p. 334 l Ma´oz, M., Middle Eastern Minorities, p. 63 li Friedman, T.L., Hama Rules, 21.9.2001, New York Times editorial lii Lucas, I,, The paradox of Syria, p.7 liii Urquhard,B., cited in Lucas, I,, The paradox of Syria, p.7

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liv Ma´oz,M., Middle Eastern Minorities, p. 63 lv Seale,P., Asad, p. 338 lvi see: Abd-Allah, U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, pp. 100-101; Isam or: Islam al Attar was not exiled directly to Germany but first allowed to make a pilgrimate to Mecca after which he was not allowed to return and finally went to Aachen, West Germany. There he became the leader and founder of the Islamic Center Aachen. lvii see: Library of the Congress Studies, Syria, the Asad Era lviii see: Wendell, Ch. (transl.), Five Tracts of Hassan al Banna, 1978;see also: Abd-Allah, U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, Appendix (Manifesto of the Islamic Revolution in Syria) lix Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 44 lx see: http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arabischer_Antisemitismus lxi see: Friedman, T., From Beirut to Jerusalem, p. 76 lxii see: Abd-Allah, Dr. U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, pp. 43/44 lxiii see: ibid, pp. 70,72,73 lxiv see: ibid, p. 69 lxv see: Zamir, M., lecture in the MAPMES course „Arab-Israeli-Conflict“, Spring Term 2006, BGU, Beer Sheva lxvi see: Abd-Allah, U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 190 lxvii see: ibid, pp. 190-192 lxviii see: ibid, pp.210/211 – The manifesto of the Islamic Revolution in Syria, to the “Alawis” lxixTraditional Islamic dress for women lxx see: Abd-Allah, Dr. U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 189; see also: Binswanger,K., Luzerner Neueste Nachrichten, Wie Assad den Syrern den Islam austreiben will, 17.10.1981 lxxi see: Library of the Congress Studies, Syria, the Asad Era lxxii Abd-Allah, U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, pp. 103ff; see also: Seale, Asad, pp. 322-324 lxxiii Abd-Allah , U.F. claims, that the name Alawi designates the Syrian version of the Turkish term “Alewi”, both groups believe that Ali ibn Talib, the companion, first cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammed, was a divine incarnation. But apart from that both groups have not much in common and the name “Alawi” was never applied to the Nusairis until Western orientalists began using it as a designation for them in the 19th century. See: Abd-Allah, U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, pp. 43/44 lxxiv see: Abd-Allah, U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, pp.210/211 – The manifesto of the Islamic Revolution in Syria, to the “Alawis” lxxv see: Seale, Asad, pp. 317ff lxxvi see: ibid, p. 80 lxxvii Abd-Allah, U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, pp. 42/43 lxxviii ibid, p. 45 lxxix see: ibid, p. 47 lxxx zakat is one of the five pillars (obligations) of Islam and means a submitting of a special part of the income, in fundamental Islam only from special sectors of income, which has to be distributed according to the Islamic law to seven sectors of social welfare including the promotion of Islam. lxxxi see: ibid, p.45 lxxxii “Dhimmi” is an expression that designates “people of the book”, monotheistic non-Muslim minorities, to whom Islam grants special rights of protection and the possibility to practice their religion, but not the same civil rights as the Muslim majority. The description of this “protection” of religious minorities – the Manifesto of the Islamic revolution in Syria does not speak about equality, only about protection – is not found in the Manifesto itself, but a look at the writings of Hassan al-Banna and the Quran itself reveals that the nature of the “protection” of “Dhimmis” means also being deprived of full civil rights and the Islamic value of equality and shura, a value that attracted many non-fundamental Muslims in the fight against Asad, is referred only to (male) Muslims. lxxxiii See: Lawson,F.H., Social Bases for the Hamah Revolt, MERIP Reports No. 11, Syria´s Troubles, 11/12 1982, pp. 24-28 lxxxiv see: ibid, pp. 27-28 lxxxv ibid, p. 28; cited from: Gellner, E., The Unknown Apollo of Biaskra: The Social Base of Algerian Puritanism”, Government and Opposition, Summer 1974, pp. 294 and 384)

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lxxxvi ibid, p. 28 lxxxvii see: Nordsee Zeitung, 16.2.1982, Weiter Kämpfe im Hama; see also: Aachener Volkszeitung, Neue Unruhen in Syrien?, 15.2.1982 lxxxviii see: Ma´oz, M., Middle Eastern Minorities, p. 63 lxxxix see: Ranke, P.M., Nur noch mit Gewalt, Die Welt, 12.2.1982; see also. Trierscher Volksfreund, Volksaufstand gegen die Asad Herrschaft, 12.2.1982; see also: Lerch, W.G., FAZ, Wie lange hält Damaskus den Muslimbrüdern noch stand?, 12.2.1982 xc see: Seale, Asad, pp. 326/327 xci see: ibid, p. 325 xcii see: Friedman,T., From Beirut to Jerusalem, p. 77 xciii see: Library of the Congress Studies, Syria, the Asad Era, xciv see: Lucas, I., The Paradox of Syria, p. 9 xcv Seale, Asad, pp. 282/283 xcvi see: ibid, p. 282 xcvii see: Executive Intelligence Review Nachrichtenagentur GmbH (EIRNA), Terrorismus in der post-kommunistischen Aera, , p. 61 xcviiisee: Seale,P:, Asad, p. 352 xcix ibid, pp. 353/354 c The money from this weapon deals was used to support the fights of the Contras against the Sandinists in Nicaragua. ci Seale, Asad, p. 351 cii Abd-Allah, U.F., p. 181 ciii see: ibid, pp. 180 ff civ ibid, p. 183 cv see: Seale, Asad, p. 358 cvi see: Library of the Congress Studies, Syria, the Assad Era cvii see: Seale, Asad, p. 357 cviii see: ibid, p. 358 cix see: ibid, p, 257 cx see: Trierscher Volksfreund, „Carlos“ angeblich Syrischer Agent, 16.11.1981

cxi see: Kimmerling/Migdal, The Palestinian People: A History, p. 322 cxii see: Seale, Asad, p. 462; see also: Bar, S., The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, p. 37 cxiii see: Der Tagesspiegel, Syrien meldet Zwischenfall an der Jordanischen Grenze, 23.1.1982 cxiv see: Bar, S., The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, pp. 34 -36; see also: Encyclopaedia of the Orient, Muslim Brotherhood – Jordan cxv see: Library of the Congress Studies, Syria, the Asad Era cxvi see: ibid cxvii see: Seale, Asad, p. 294 cxviii Seale, Asad, p. 345 cxix see: Zamir, M., BGU, lecture in the course: Arab-Israeli Conflict; MAPMES, Spring Term 2006 cxx see: Rhein Zeitung, Syrische Brigade rebelliert mit, 16.2.1982 cxxi see: Quandt, W.B., Peace Process, American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 248 cxxii see: ibid, pp. 248 ff cxxiii Beck, M., Pariastaat Syrien – zwischen externem Druck und internem Beharrungsvermögen, p.2 cxxiv see: Library of the Congress Studies, Syria, the Assad Era cxxv see: Frankfurter Rundschau, Aus Syrien wird Rebellion gegen Assad-Regime gemeldet, 12.2.1982; cxxvi see: Lucas, I., The Paradox of Syria, p. 10 cxxvii see: Seale, Asad, p. 397 cxxviii see: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Anschlag auch in Damaskus, 9.10.1981 cxxix Fisk, R., Pity the Nations, Oxford University Press, Oxford/ New York, 2001, p. 182 cxxx see: Neue Züricher Zeitung, Syrisch-Sovietische Zusammenarbeit im Militärbereich, 19.1.1982 cxxxi Bator,W., Die DDR und die arabischen Staaten, p.157. cxxxii see: Aktuelle Kamera, GDR Television, 18.6.1980 cxxxiii see: horizont, Nr.8/1969; Nr.4/1971

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cxxxiv see: Bundesgesetzblatt 1991 Teil II Seite 1002; http://www.jura.uni- de/BGBl/TEIL2/1991/19911004.2.HTML cxxxiv see: Seale, Asad, p. 307 cxxxv see: ibid, p. 307 cxxxvi see: ibid, pp. 309-311 cxxxvii The Times, 17.3.1989; Le Monde, 18.3.1980; cited in: ibid, p.335 cxxxviii Seale, P., Asad, p. 335 cxxxix ibid, p. 337; see also: Frankfurter Rundschau, Aus Syrien wird Rebellion gegen Assad-Regime gemeldet, 12.2.1982; cxl Seale,P., Asad, p. 337 cxli see: Frankfurter Rundschau, Aus Syrien wird Rebellion gegen Assad-.Regime gemeldet, 12.2.1982 cxlii Jeversches Wochenblatt, Syrische Regierung: Keine Unruhen in Hama, 11.2.1982 cxliii Der Tagesspiegel. Damaskus bestätigt die Abriegelung der Stadt Hama, 12.2.1982 cxliv see: Schlauch, W., West Germany: Reliable Partner?, p. 108 cxlv In the 1980s the euro missile-controversy about US-American arms deployment split the SPD, ruling in 1982 under the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The party-basis criticised Schmidt’s security policy and the opposition grew to a serious strength, the first time the USA was concerned about the reliability of its partner West Germany. See: Breyman, S., Why Movements Matter: The West German Peace Movement and US Arms Control Policy, p.70 cxlvi Brönner,W., Lybienkrise Signal des Neoglobalismus, n.p. cxlvii see:Geschichtsverein Köngen e.V., BRD 1982-1987, http://geschichtsverein-koengen.de/HelmutKohl.htm cxlviii see: Mintz, J./Farah, D., In Search of Friends among the foes, Washington Post, 11.9.2004, page A04, cxlix The name Baader Meinhof Gang is used outside of Germany as a name for the West German terrorist organisation “Rote Armee Fraktion – RAF, probably in order to avoid a mistake with the Royal Air Force. This name is not correct, as it designates only the first generation of the movement, led by Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. clSee: Baumann, B. ,Wie alles anfing cli Fisk, R., Pity the Nations, p. 181 clii see: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Bombenanschlag auf das Islamische Zentrum in München, 15.1.1982 cliii see: Bundesministerium des Inneren (Ed.), Verfassungsschutzbbericht 2004, p. 204 cliv see: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Bombenanschlag auf das Islamische Zentrum München, 16.1.1982 clv Neue Presse, Terrorkommando aus Syrien in Stuttgart gestellt, 3.3.1982 clvi see: Pfälzischer Merkur, Sprengstoff Fund aus Homburg: Terroranschlag verhindert?, 3.3.1982 clvii tz, Radikale Syrer pressen Landsleute frei, 27.3.1982 clviii see: Henkel, P., nach Drohungen Syrer abgeschoben, Frankfurter Rundschau, 27.3.1982 clix Tagesblatt, Neue Syrische Drohung gegen die Bundesrepublik, 1.4.1982 clx see: Fraiberg, F., Mordkommando, Frankfurter Neue Presse, 6.4.1982 clxi Hafiz al-Asad, Bradlee, B.; Hogland, J.; Randall, J; Kerbitte, S; Hafiz al-Asad: Terrorism and the anti-Syria campaign, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 15, Summer 1986, pp. 3-16; pp.5-6 clxii Nordsee Zeitung, 16.2.1982, Weiter Kämpfe in Hama clxiii see: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Russen halfen Syrischen Truppen in Hama, 27.2.1982 clxiv see: Ranke, P.M., Nur noch mit Gewalt, Die Welt, 12.2.1982, see also: Kordt, W., Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Der Schock von Hama, 7.4.1982. see also: Ranke, P.M., Schweigen über Hama, Die Welt, 19.2.1982 clxv see: Kordt, W., Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Der Schock von Hama, 7.4.1982; see also: Neue Züricher Zeitung, Hama nach der Niederschlagung des Aufstandes, 7.4.1982 clxvi Zimmermann, P. (2002), Deutschland ein Wintermärchen. Deutsche Teilung und Wiedervereinigung in dokumentarischen Programmen der ARD und des DDR-Fernsehens, p.1 clxvii Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Berichte über Massaker aus Hama und Homs, 3.6.1981 clxviii Frankfurter Rundschau, Aus Syrien wird Rebellion gegen Assad Regime gemeldet, 12.2.1982; similar articles: see also: Trierscher Volksfreund, Volksaufstand gegen die Asad Herrschaft, 12.2.1982

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clxix Die Welt, Assad kennt keine Gnade, 15.2.1982 clxx see for example: Frankfurter Rundschau, Syrer appellieren an DRK und amnesty international, 18.3.1982 clxxi see: Rhein Zeitung, Syrische Brigade rebelliert mit, 16.2.1982; Nordsee Zeitung, Weiter Kämpfe in Hama, 16.2.1982 clxxii PA (Political Archives of the foreign ministry): Pal.Abt. III, Politik 6-Palästina, Bd.1, DB, London an AA/Berlin, K.Nr.69, 1.Sept. 21, cited in: Nicosia, F., Arab Nationalism and National Socialist Germany, 1933-1939: Ideological and Strategic Incompatibility, Int. J. Middle East Stud., pp. 351-372. p. 352 clxxiii see: Loftus,J., Jewish Community News, 4.10.2004 clxxiv see: http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arabische_Antisemitismus clxxv see: Lingenfelder, M./ Meining, S. , Die Unheimliche Allianz, TV Report of Bayrischer Rundfunk, Report München, 17.7.2006, clxxvi see: Abdullah, M.S., Geschichte des Islams in Deutschland, pp.38/39 clxxvii see: http://www.sicherheit-heute.de clxxviii see: Abd-Allah, U.F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 101 clxxix homepage: http://www.izaachen.de clxxx see: lecture of Dr. Ulfkotte, U., member of the German party FDP, about Islam in Germany, published online: http://www.test-homepages.org.liberale.de/meldung.php?id=96848p=0&printerversion=1 clxxxi see: Bundesministerium des Inneren (Ed.), Verfassungsschutzbbericht 2004, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Köln, p. 205 clxxxii see: http://www.zoominfo.com clxxxiii Abdullah, M.S., Geschichte des Islams in Deutschland, p. 33 clxxxiv see for example: Seale, P., Asad, p.333 184 see: Quandt, W.B., Peace Process, American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 245 81