THE GREAT WAR THAT ALMOST WAS:THE CRIMEA~ 1853·1856

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES B. AGNEW, USA

(Editor's Note: Volume I, Number 3 (Winter1972) contained an article "The ImprobableAlliance: The Central Powers and CoalitionWarfare, 1914-1918," by Lieutenant ColonelJames B. Agnew. In that article, ColonelAgnew analyzed and drew lessons fromcoalition warfare as exemplified by theQuadruple Alliance (Germany, A ustria­Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria) during theGreat War, 1914-18.

In this article Colonel Agnew again focuseson coalition warfare in Europe, but this timein the midc19th century, highlighting theemergence of an "unlikely coalition"-France,Great Britain, Turkey, and Sardinia-againstImperial Russia in a location (the Crimea) farfrom the shores of the major allied powers.He examines the factors that brought Englandand France together as war partners duringthe mid-19th century in an alliance againstCzarist Russia. He points out the price paidby England and France for their failure toachieve unity of command; and he delineatesthe lessons applicable to 20th-century warfarethat were lost to European powers follOWingthe Crimean War. Increasingly, the causes forthe war were almost forgotten by the time theallies invaded the Crimea.)

Lieutenant Colonel Agnew,Field Artillery, graduatedfrom the Anny War College in1971 and when he wrote thisarticle was Acting DeputyHead, Department of Historyat the United States MilitaryAcademy at West Point. He isnow assigned to the Staff andFaculty of the US Anny WarCollege.

* * * * *

46

This was the first time in centuries thatthe British and French were allies ratherthan enemies in a major military contest,and that it occurred while France waslinder a Napoleon made it the mOreremarkable.

B.D. Gooch, The New BonapartistGenerais in the Crimea, (p. 40).

The Crimean War of 1853 through 1856.Who remembers who fought in it? What was itall about? Why was it relatively brief? Whowon, and what were the terms of the peacesettlement? What were its aftereffects; andwhat lessons, applicable to 20th-centurywarfare, were lost on European powersfollowing the Crimean War?

The two most common reminiscences ofthe Crimean War in the English-speakingworld concern relatively minor episodes: (1)The Charge of the Light Brigade, thatsanguinary Tennysonian recapitulation of aparticularly stupid tactical maneuver; and (2)in no less heroic terms, the superb exertionsof the corps of English nurses of FlorenceNightingale, working medical miracles in thesuburbs of Constantinople and Balaclava. Andthat's about it. Few appreciate the disruptiveinfluence of the war upon the standingEuropean order of the times follOWing 40years of peace. In its aftermath, a fearfulPrussia was united and by 1871 hadconquered France, and. was herself vaulted bythe fortunes of the Crimea to continentaleminence for two decades. The fragmentedstates of Italy were also united in the wake ofdeclining Austrian influence following theCongress of Paris in 1856 which promulgatedthe peace terms. The Congress corroboratedthe destruction of the prewar great power

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Great War that Almost Was: The Crimea, 1853-1856

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Crimean War Theatre

LEGEND

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@ SCUlARI.

@ SINOPE-StTE OF DESTRUCTION OF TURKISH FLEET,NOVEMBER 1853.

@ VARNA AND THE OOBRUDJA (1ST ALLIED LANDING,JUNE 1854).

structure, formerly a cooperative, consultativesystem of five major states.

The Crimean War was short by Napoleonicor 20th-century standards, but not by thoseof the 19th century, excepting the AmericanCivil War which was atypically long. Thehostilities consumed only 31 months, datingfrom Russia's occupation of Turkish territory(July 1853) until the armistice (January1856). It is not generally regarded as a "GreatWar," but it had many of the earmarks ofone, to wit:

- It involved the national interests of allfive "Great Powers" of Europe (the Concertof Europe) and a host of lesser ones. Three ofthe great powers (Britain, France, Russia)were actual belligerents. The other two(Austria-Hungary, Prussia), while notparticipating in hostilities, had considerableinfluence on the conduct and outcome of the

47

® CRIMEAN PENINSULA (20 ALLIED LANDING,SEPTEMBER 1854~. see INSET.

® SEBASTOPOL (ALLIED MAIN EFFORT. SEPTEMBER1854· JANUARY 18561.

Q'l KIN8UAN AND @ KERTCH, SITES OF ALLIEDLANDINGS, 1855.

war. The United States was even consideredto be a potential warring power.!

- It was a large war in terms of space andcost. It was widespread geographically, a factthat is little remembered. Battles occurred notonly in the Crimean Peninsula, but in what ispresent-day Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, theBaltic region, and the Far East (a British navalsquadron actually attacked RussianKamchatka). There were also very heavycasualties, estimated at over half a million

THE CRIMEAN WAR HAD THEPOTENTIAL FOR BECOMING AGENERAL EUROPEAN WAR,INVOLVING AS IT DID THEINTERESTS OF ALL THEGREAT POWERS OF EUROPE.

deaths, of which not quite 200,000 werebattle deaths and the remainder from disease,mainly cholera. 2

- It capitalized on the state ofcontemporary technology and even advancedit. Although the "Brown Bess" musket fromthe Napoleonic period was very much inevidence, the breech-loader was issued toselected elements of both allied and Russianforces. Breech-loading cannons were utilized.The majority of the vessels of the allied fleetswere steam powered, and amphibious warfarecame into its own in the Black Sea. Bymid-I 85 5 there was a direct telegraphic linkfrom Paris to the French headquarters in theCrimea, permitting General Canrobert and,later, General Pellissier to receive almostinstantaneous counsel from the FrenchEmperor and the War Ministry. The periodalso witnessed construction of the firstmilitary railroad in history, as well as the firstfloating bakeries, foundries, and hospitalships. 3

The war escalated from a relatively minorreligious issue involving France, Russia, andOttoman Turkey into the political andeconomic realms, attracting British attentionto the Eastern Mediterranean. In July 1853,Russian troops crossed the Pruth River andoccupied the Turkish principalities ofMoldavia and Wallachia. In response, Britainand France ordered naval squadrons to BesikaBay, west of the Dardanelles. Tensions builtduring the summer, until an overlyenthusiastic Turkey declared war on Russiaon 4 October. By April of 1854, France andEngland had allied with Turkey and a state ofwar existed!

A MOST UNLIKELY COALITION

In 1815 England had led the coalition thathad brought Napoleonic France to its knees;indeed, England had been Bonaparte's jaileruntil his death in 1821. As late as 1852, theDuke of Wellington, 'architect of Napoleon'sdefeat at Waterloo, still strode the politicalstage, Britain was riding the crest of afloodtide of liberalism and reform-havingrecently extended the suffrage, reformed itsbureaucracy,and repealed the detested Corn

48

Laws. Colonialism was peaking under anexpansionist Queen and Parliament. Britain,in 1853, was in a crusading mood.

Across the Channel the post-Napoleonicperiod brought shifts in power alignments.Louis Phillippe had fallen and a newNapoleon had risen. Louis, nephew ofNapoleon I, had been elected in 1848 for aperiod of 4 years. In 1851, in a manner notunlike that of his illustrious uncle, he insuredfor himself a longer tenure by a militarilysupported coup d' etat, confirmed byplebiscite. He forthwith proclaimed Francethe seat of the Second Empire and himselfEmperor Napoleon III. Europeans ponderedwhere the first blow would fall. Louis seizedupon the Russo-Turkish religious issue as anopportunity to show a suspicious Europe thatFrance was no longer dormant.

Thus constitutional, liberal England andrevanchist Bonapartist France, longstandingadversaries, jointly embraced the cause of thearchaic, decadent Ottoman Empire, whichhad managed to antagonize almost everyMediterranean state in the previous twodecades.

Finally, in 1855 little Sardinia-Piedmontentered the war, sending a 10,000-man troopcontingent to the Crimea and rounding outthe coalition. Sardinian entry was based onanticipation of postwar concessions from theallies, and the fact that Britain was picking upthe tab for her expenses. The Sardinians werethe Hessians of the 19th century!

This then was the array that confrontedCzarist Russia as the conflict built to a peakin 1854.

Austria-Hungary and Prussia, of theremaining "Great Powers," elected to remainneutral, although Vienna's neutrality was asambivalent as the Black Sea winds. Heractions earned for her a bounty of Russianresentment which would endure into thefateful days of 1914.

COALITION OPERATIONS: INSTITUTIONALAND STRATEGIC ARRANGEMENTS

With respect to their readiness to wage warin a locale far from the Continent, the Frenchwere better prepared at the outset than were

the English. From strategy formulation tologistics, Paris had a head start, due in part tothe loss in 1815 and to a continuous colonialstruggle in Algeria since 1830, thusconfirming the ageless maxim that thevanquished learn more from a war than thevictors. Though there were traces ofBonapartism evident in the French militaryestablishment, the army had developedAlgeria. On the other hand, most Britishcommanders were dedicated but aging relicsof the Iberian Campaigns of 1808-12 andWaterloo (Lord Raglan, the initial BritishCommander in Chief was 66 years old and a"dapper youth," compared with some of hisseptuagenarian subordinates).

Institutionally, the war apparatuses of thetwo governments differed as widely as theages of the respective commanders. In France,a single War Office administered all aspects ofmilitary planning and operations, officerassignments, troop levies, and logistics.Conscription was in effect. A former soldier,Marshal Vaillant, was Minister of War.Military personnel supervised contractadministration of such diverse functions asbaking and cobbling and insured that eachregiment had such services organic. Bothcombat arms and administrative forces couldbe tailored for the job at hand; for eachcombat force there were attached sufficientengineers and service troops to provide therequisite support. Mail, pay, and rations allreached the soldier on time.

The situation in Britain, by comparison,was dismal. Cromwell's heritage lingered-adistrust of standing armies. As of January1854, there were no divisions in the Army;only insufficiently filled territorial regimentsand far-flung colonial contingents. During theconflict, Parliament never passed aconscription law, relying instead on foreignmercenaries (Germans, Sardinians) to fill outher contingents when sufficient red-bloodedEnglishmen and Scots did not step forward.Military authority in England wasfactionalized among Parliament, the Cabinet,and the Crown. In 1853 conduct of militaryoperations was charged to the Minister ofColonies; the "Horse Guards" approximated ageneral staff and controlled cavalry and units;

49

artillery and engineers reported to a separateordnance department. One executive agencypaid the troops, another supplied them, stillanother coordinated their transport. In mostcases, the only common superior was theQueen.4

There were additional impediments, butthe examples cited herein suggest themagnitude of managerial chaos facing theBritish.

I n Constantinople, the Ottomaninstitutions were even more fragile than thoseof the British. In the 19th century, theEmpire was held together by arcane politicalties among Sultanates. Turkey lackedhomogeneity of population; Greeks,Levantines, and Arabs were more numerousthan Anatolians. The war capability was ahollow shell. Troops in Constantinople werewell equipped and trained; elsewhere theywore rags and were poorly disciplined andunskilled. Authority for strategy formulationappeared to oscillate between the ImperialSultan and Reshid Pasha, the Prime Minister.While the Turkish troops would give apassable account of themselves throughoutthe war, they did not enjoy the fruits of fullpartnership; observe these remarks of theirpartners:

Napoleon III: "They are beasts!"5Lord Cowley, British Ambassador to

France: "No Turk is to be trusted."6

Turkey was not so much an ally of Franceand Britain as she was an "excuse."

Grand strategy promulgation began early inthe affair during the fall of 1853. Accountsindicate that Napoleon III took the lead,? andat his insistence, the Anglo-French fleets weresent jointly into the Black Sea on 3 January1854.

The manner which Britain and Francefabricated combined strategy was by a seriesof conferences, held at irregular intervals,frequently in the respective capitals or on theso-called "neutral ground" of Vienna.Napoleon III seemed to prefer the use ofestablished diplomatic channels, consultingfrequently with Cowley, but often using hispre ro gat ives to engage in direct

correspondence with Victoria. Theredeveloped an exchange of visits between theheads of state, commencing in 1854, duringwhich strategy was discussed, usually by theFrench Emperor and Prince Albert (Victoriausually being excused from these sessions inthe fashion of the era).

As to agenda items during these high-leveldiscourses, the extremely critical subject ofsupreme command and its exercise was raisedas early as February 1854 between the Frenchand English. Napoleon's formula (see FigureI) sought French land dominance during daysof "vital action" (presumably all battles);however, any joint action taken would besubject to previous consultation among thecommanders of the national contingentsinvolved. On sea, the British would commandall naval forces. Napoleon further proposedcentral direction of both forces by someinstitution approximating a mutuallyrepresentative supreme war council. TheBritish demurred, preferring "cooperation"on land and sea, with no centralized strategicagency (see Figure 2). National prestige andfear of French military domination promptedBritain's posture, which never changed duringthe disastrous days following the Crimeanbattles of Balaclava and Inkerman, and thetrying winter of 1854-55 when adoption ofunity of command could have reduced thewearying attrition suffered by the Turks,French, and British alike. Napoleon IIIpersisted in his proposal, using a rationalemore economic than strategic, to which theBritish ear should have been more attuned. Hepointed out that England was traditionally aseapower and France historically performedbetter in land operation. He told the Britishthat if both pursued development of land andseapower concurrently, upon the terminationof hostilities France would have a navy whichwould appear as a threat to English seacontrol and that England would have raisedan army for which she had no further use.Traditional Francophobia prevailed, however,with the result that the war was conducted onthe British model of strategic cooperation,with the anticipated inherent prOblems.

In the final months of the war,discouragement and perplexity at the

50

shortcomings of operations conducted in theramshackle "cooperation" mode resulted insome second thoughts. The advent of thesecond Crimean winter and the absence of anagreed-upon strategy for an anticipatedcampaign in 1856 led England, France, andSardinia to convene the first combinedCouncil of War in late 1855. Present were thedominant political and military figures,recalled from the active theater. This couldhave become the genesis of a supreme warcouncil or combined chiefs of staff, but itsmerits were never tested, for even as it wasconvening the war was approaching itsconclusion.8 Russia, fearing active Austrianintervention, agreed to an armistice on 14March 1856. Forty-five days later, peacenegotiations were concluded, and on 12 July1856 the last allied soldier departed theCrimea

Whether centralized direction was acontinuation of the foresight of Napoleon III(always the advocate of supreme command),Albert, or Palmerston, is not clear. Perhaps itwas due in part to the obtuse influence of thefourth estate. The Crimea was the firstmodern war which received extensive dailypub I i c a ttention from recognizedinternational journalists at the scene ofaction. Such reportorial giants as William H.Russell of the London Times, William("Crimean") Simpson, artist for theIllustrated London News, and Alfred Lanouxof the Paris Moniteur, were in no wayreluctant to disclose to news-hungry readersany and all allied shortcomings, from majortactical blunders to the inequitable awardsand decorations policies. During the war,censorship was not practiced by either Franceor England, and on-the-spot military reformscan be attributed to journalistic intrepidity.Had the same pressures forged a firmercoalition in 1854, the war's duration mighthave met the expectations of the optimists.

Another early strategic issue was thedetermination of a suitable theater ofoperations. Why the Crimea, rather thanRussian Poland, Odessa, or even BalticRussia? The rationale underlying the BlackSea option is relatively complex: in an effortto enforce an 1854 ultimatum to Russia to

PROPOSED COMBINED COMMAND FOR THE CRIMEA(AS ENVISIONED BY NAPOLEON III, ABOUT 1 JAN 1855; NEVER REALIZED)

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LEGEND

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Figure 1

51

COMBINED FIELD COMMAND IN THE CRIMEA(ACTUAL, ABOUT 1 JUN 1855)

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NOTES:

BRITISH DID NOT ACHIEVE JOINT COMMAND; WHEREAS, FRENCH DID. FRENCH ARMY COMMANDER WASALSO JOINT CINCo

NO COMBINED COMMAND WAS EVER ESTABLISHED, NOR COMBINED CINC APPOINTED. THE BESTDESCRIPTION OF RELATIONS AMONG THE CINC'S OF THE FOUR POWERS WAS LIAISON AND COOPERATION.

THE STATUS OF TURKISH AND SARDINIAN FORCES WAS PECULIAR-ALTHOUGH THEIR NATION-STATESWERE FULLY SOVEREIGN, THEIR FIELD COMMANDERS WERE SELDOM CONSULTED IN THEDECISIONMAKING PROGRESS. OFTEN, THESE FORCES WERE PLACED UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OFBRITISH OR FRENCH COMMANDERS.

COMBINED NAVAL OPERATIONS WERE THE BRIGHTEST SPOT IN COALITION OPERATIONS. THE BRITISHAND FRENCH ADMIRALS DEVELOPED EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONSHIPS AND WERE NOT LOATHE TOSUBORDINATE THEIR FORCES TO ALLIED COMMAND.

Figure 2

52

evacuate the Ottoman provinces, the alliesconducted a joint landing at Varna, Bulgariain June. This operation, generally referred toas the "Dobrudja Debacle" concluded inAugust foilowing several inconsequentialactions, wherein allied commanders saw theirforce strengths reduced by 20 percent becauseof cholera and fever rather than Muscovitemuskets. When Russians evacuated theDanubian provinces, the allies faced threechoices: pursue them on land into Russia,strike elsewhere, or go home. The Turks,having held their own, preferred the latter,but other considerations influenced theirpartners. Napoleon III had not garnered muchcontemporary glory for France. Besides, heneeded diversion for his near-mutinous armyafter Dobrudja. The British noted also thatany glory, however shabby, had accrued tothe Turks in their defense along the Danube.France and Britain agreed that the Czar hadnot been taught his lesson and that thefortress of Sebastopol, the seat of RussianBlack Sea naval power, rather than the warmwater port of Odessa, would make a capitalobjective. In the cosmopolitan capitals ofEurope all agreed that the Crimean campaignwould be a short, brisk, and glorious militaryundertsking. Had anyone recognized theportent of the poorly coordinated, abysmallysupported, indecisive operation to come-onewhich would extend through not one, buttwo Crimean winters-he likely would havereconsidered his choice in August of 1854.

FIELD OPERATIONS

Several interesting facts about Crimeanoperations should be brought to light, moreto dispel popular misconceptions about thefighting than for any other reason.

The Crimean War, despite the romanticismconjured up by fictional accounts (and latermovies) such as "The Charge of the LightBrigade" was neither entirely aNapoleonic-type, wide-ranging campaign ofinfantry and cavalry actions nor a classicinvestment, despite the year-long siege ofSebastopol, a port and fortress city. Dividedinto northern and southern portions by itseast-west harbor, the city was more heavilyfortified on the north. The allies elected to

53

besiege only the southern half of the city,even though initial landings were made to thenorth. As a consequence, Sebastopol wasnever sealed and its defenders had access toreinforcements and supplies from the interiorof the peninsula throughout the entire war.

There were really only four noteworthyopen-country battles during Crimeanoperations, none of which exceeded I day'sduration. The first was Alma, occurring on 20September 1854, near the site of the initiallanding of the allied armies north of thefortress city. After Alma, the Russians retiredto Sebastopol's redoubts and the futurebattles-Balaclava, 25 October 1854,IIikerman (10 days later) and Tchernaya, inAugust of 1855, were all initiated by Russianoffensive endeavors to raise the siege. Noneachieved this result although Balaclava andInkerman nearly succeeded. The finalAnglo-French assault on the Russianstrongpoints-the Redan andMalakoff-occurred 8 September 1855, andcould, in a sense, be termed a battle; however,the French carried their objective in 15minutes, fOllowing 10 months of siegework!Unhappily for national prestige, the Britishfailed that day to take the Redan, theirdesignated objective. In a sense, the CrimeanWar was an admixture of dash, heroics, andGlan during brief periods of open warfarepreceding and interrupting the normal courseof prolonged months of tedium, exposure,cannonade, and debilitation characteristic ofsiege operations. As the casualty rates rosefrom action against a stubborn enemy anddisease, the British policy of "cooperation"became increasingly untenable. Theenlightened suspected that a better mode forprosecuting the effort could be found. Allieddissension on all aspects of operations wasevident from the initiation of combinedefforts, and continued throughout the periodof hostilities.

Some examples:- Prior to the high-level decision to move

the theater of operations deep within theBlack Sea, there was a three-way split amongthe field commanders about where to beginoperations. Fearing a much more rapidRussian advance on the Bosporus than wasactually achieved, the British commander,

Lord Raglan, advocated a landing in WesternTurkey, around Gallipoli, with a view tocommencing offensive operations to saveConstantinople. The French Commander inChief, General Saint-Arnaud, faithfullyrepresented his Emperor and demanded fIrstpriority for the Crimea. The Turks, as theoffended party, insisted upon an expeditioninto central Bulgaria to reinforce their fortressSilistria and drive the Russians from theEmpire. As we have learned, their politicalsuperiors reached an unlikelycompromise-the landing at Varna.

- Having experienced the inopportuneVarna episode and with no more Russians tofight west of the Dneister River, the alliedcommanders, in August 1854, faced thequestion of "What next?" The FrenchCommander, Saint-Arnaud, raised the meritsof operations against the Russian homeland,the salubrious Crimean climate and thepotential benefits of destroying a primaryRussian port, Sebastopol. With equal force,Lord Raglan pointed to the near-total lack ofintelligence on both the Crimean area and theenemy, the allied shortage of cavalry and siegeequipment, and the adverse effects of weatheron naval support, capping off his argumentswith reference to the "adventuristic" natureof the enterprise. The national governmentsdecided the issues and the combined forcewas ordered to proceed to the CrimeanPeninsula to arrive in September 1854.

- The landings in the Crimea commencedon 14 September, in the vicinity of Eupatoria,about 20 miles north of Sebastopol. TheFrench disembarked a force of 25,000 andsufficient tentage and transport toaccommodate all elements, completingdisembarkation one day iater. In contrast, theBritish required until the end of 18September to land a force of similar size,without tents or blankets (and it rained thefirst night ashore). Throughout the next 9months, logistical problems of everydescription would plague British operations, amanifestation of institutional dormancy for40 years, official apathy, fiscal,parsimoniousness, and lack of planningforesight on the part of British commandersand their untrained staffs. It is to England's

54

credit that by the summer of 1855 herlogistics system was so improved that itexceeded that of the French in magnitude andefficiency, due in large part to skillfulimprovisation.

- On the eve of the Battle of Alma, LordRaglan, a sincere and compassionategentleman but a tactician of no great repute,had no plan for the following day's initialencounter with the Russians. When GeneralSaint-Arnaud visited British headquarters tocoordinate the morrow's actions, Raglanwould neither acquiesce in a French versionfor the attack, nor could he offer one of hisown. He remained silent on the occasion. Theabsence of British staffwork, a function ofBritish institutional malaise and an offIcerpromotion system based more on birthrightand influence than competence, resulted innear disaster during the battle. Believing that

. the British would attack in concert with theFrench in conformity with his plan of theevening before, Saint-Arnaud moved theFrench troops in the morning against theRussians in fortified hilltop positions. Alas,no British troops moved until the afternoon,and then only in piecemeal fashion, whenFrench guns were in danger of capture.Fortunately, there was enough "coincidental"combat power to force the Russians from theheights.

- Following Alma, the allies missed anexcellent chance to initiate a vigorous pursuitand destroy the remainder of the RussianArmy before it could tske refuge in fortressSebastopol. However, Saint-Arnaud insistedthat the French were in no condition topursue without a night's rest. (But what ofthe Turks, who had not been committed allday?) On the morning of the 21 st,Saint-Arnaud was ready to begin pursuit butnow Raglan demurred, requiring 2 additionaldays to treat wounded, bury dead, andretrieve baggage. The Russians therebygarnered 3 additional days to effect awithdrawal to the outskirts of the city,improve upon already excellent fortifications,block the channel leading into the harbor, andprepare psychologically for a siege.

- The British picked Balaclava for a baseof operations-a small port about 9 miles from

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, "ow..<"..•3"

Generals Raglan and Canrobert, allied commanders in late 1854, vlsit French outposts before Sebastopol.(Note Raglan's empty sleeve; he had lost his arm in the Napoleonic Wars.)

the area of operations against Sebastopol-andbegan using a local dirt road as the primaryroute of supply. Very little thought was givento the likely effects of snow and rain on thelogistic route, for all were blandly assumingthat the war would be over before the arrivalof winter. As could be expected, byNovember the route had become a mire,restricting all but foot travel. The Frenchoccupied the bay of Kamiesch, nearer thescene of action, and began immediately tocorduroy, creating passable routes throughoutthe winter of 1854. Besides its shortcomingsas a logistics base, Balaclava was a desirable(and vulnerable) tactical inducement to theRussians. Had it been taken in October orNovember of 1854, it is not unlikely thatallied forces would have withdrawn from theCrimea. There was room enough, and lessdanger, had there been joint usage ofKamiesch; the French had offered to share it.There is an interesting sidelight to Balaclava:

55

in an attempt to escape the adversities of thedirt route, the British constructed the firstmilitary railroad in history during 1855 andearly 1856, running from Balaclava to thesiege works before Sebastopol.

- Personalities played a great part. Mutualaccommodation was not improved bydeveloping attitudes of hostility among thecomponent commanders or their subordinatesin the early months of the Crimean operation.For example, Saint-Arnaud's reputationamong the English was that of a politicaldabbler, alleged embezzler, and a commandermore interested in show and protocol thantactical accomplishment. Conversely, theFrench viewed the British senior officers asWellingtonian relics, indecisive and with littleinterest in, or at best intense ignorance of,troop welfare. Both the English and Frenchdespised the Turks for numerous reasons, realand imaginary.

- Attrition among senior officers deterred

the development of a common style ofcooperation which might have overcome theworst features of the system that was ineffect. None of the commanders in chief hadthe longevity to become accustomed to theircounterparts' styles. Saint-Arnaud, theoriginal French commander, died on 29September 1854 of a lingering illnessaccentuated by the stresses of Varna and theCrimea; his replacement, General Canrobert,elevated from division commander, haddifficulties not only with his allies but withNapoleon III. Following abrasive differencesconcerning strategy, he requested and wasgranted relief from command on 16 May1855, being replaced by General Pelissier,Algerian veteran, but new to the Crimea. LordRaglan, the gentlemanly but indecisive Britishcommander met his demise on 28 June 1855from cholera and acute diarrhea. His placewas taken by a self-acknowledgedincompetent, General James Simpson, who inturn yielded command to Lord Codringtonfor the final stages. The senior Turkishcommander, Orner Pasha, did not arrive in theCrimea until March 1855, although a Turkishcontingent had been present from the first.Admiral Bruat, French Naval Commander in1854, died in 1855. Thus, a union that wasnot particularly cohesive at the outset wasfurther impeded by the ceaseless parade ofpersonalities across the stage of the war.

In sum, there were few aspects of fieldoperations which were not adversely affectedby the "cooperative" format, itself nosubstitute for the elusive unity of command.The price paid for unrestricted nationalsovereignty was a prolonged war, duplicationof effort, unnecessary suffering, and anopprobrious waste of good men and materialresources. This albatross must be hung aboutthe British neck. Yet, in spite of theimpediments posed by ambitious ministers,in tractable functionaries, and astigmaticgeneral staffs, there were some bright spots:

- There is little to criticize inAnglo-French naval operations during thewar. The destruction of Russian naval powerwherever it was met; the successfulamphibious operations at Kinburn andKertch; the systematic reduction of Russian

seaport fortresses in the Black and Baltic Seas,all suggest that the land commanders couldhave profited from their naval counterparts'examples. The admirals did work withsingleness of purpose.

- In logistics, the deficiencies of theBritish and French seemed to balancethemselves out over time. By October 1855, ithad become a tradeoff situation-Britishlumber for French tentage, etc. Dedicatedsubordinates of both forces "made do" withtheir allies' supplies whenever opportunitiesarose to compensate for shortages.

- While command friction neverdisappeared in the Crimea, the veterans in theranks of all the allied armies had developed,by late 1855, a professional respect for thecompensating strengths of their partners asfighting men, and tended to overlook theshortcomings of which they had been socritical in mid-1854. In short, they hadlearned to get along, tied, perhaps, by thecommon bond of mutual sharing of danger.One observer in a later war expressed thisinvisible link as the fraternity of "them that'sbeen shot at together."

- By late 1855, there were some positiveefforts, admittedly sketchy, to institutionalizethe field aspects of allied coalition. TheBritish, French, and Sardinians entered into atreaty in July 1855 to create a standing mixedcommission to apportion the war booty(ranging from cast bronze cannons to barrelsof paint) of Sebastopol among theparticipants. The commission, headed byGeneral Pelissier, met at regular intervals to

. formally allocate the spoils of war among theparticipants. (The Turks, unhappily, were notincluded in the pact.) This act, plus thefaltering steps taken late in the war to achievea supreme command, demonstrated that theallies were slowly learning their lessons.

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The Crimean War had the potential forbecoming a general European war, involvingas it did the interests of all the Great Powersof Europe. That it did not is due to severalfactors, among them the restrictive state oftechnology, the reluctance of two of the

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"Great Powers" to become active belligerents,and Russia's unproductive search for an ally.From 1848 to 1854, Europe was arevolutionary powder keg and a major warwas barely averted, given the political climatesof England, France, Austria-Hungary, andRussia.

Napoleon III emerged as the most colorfuland influential figure of the conflict. Hisinterests and involvement ran from grandstrategy and diplomacy to field tactics. Whileevents did not always go in the direction heplanned, the repetition of favorable outcomesfor France in the course of the war occurredoften enough to suggest that he exertedstrong influence. Like Napoleon I before him,he had several qualities that made forgreatness. He possessed the vision and energy,lacked by the Bourbons, to recapture la gloirefor France. Also, he dictated the formulationof objectives and strategy and personallysupervised the appointment of senior officersto positions of responsibility to insureexecution of his will. Finally, learning fromhistory, he advocated a policy of commandunity, 64 years before another allied ententewould recognize its merits.

The war was given superficial treatment byhistorians and observers whose attentionswere soon after directed westward by theAmerican Civil War, at that time the moreinteresting. Thus, many Europeans eithermissed or ignored the lessons inherent in thedestruction of the tenuous European balanceas the rotten structure of despotism lurchedits way toward the 20th century;Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkeycontinued along their decaying courses;France vaulted into continental leadershiponly to be displaced in 15 years by Prussia,the only state which appeared to profit fromthe Crimean experience. As for Britain, onehistorian, John Morley, summarized thecataclysm in terms of English interests.

Three hundred thousand men hadperished: countless treasure had been

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flung into the abyss. The nation that hadwon its last victory at Waterloo did notnow enhance the glory of its arms, northe power of its diplomacy, nor thestrength of its material interests.9

NOTES

i. Captain Ingraham, of the USS St. Louisafforded asylum to one Koseta, alleged assassin ofAustrian Baron Hackelburg in 1853. The Europeanpress made much of the issue, but the outburst wasmore heat than light. Marx, K. and Engels, F. TheRussian Menace to Europe, Glencoe, minois.: TheFree Press, 1952, p. 172.

2. Dupuy, R. E. and Dupuy, T. N. TheEncyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B. C tothe Present, New York, Harper and Row, 1970, p.829.

3. An excellent account of the logistical aspectsof the war may be found in The Delafield-McClellanReports, the only official US Army report on theencounter. Delafield, R. and McClellan, G. B. On theArt of War in Europe, Report to the Secretary ofWar, Washington, D. C.: George W. Bowman, 1861.

4. Marx and Engels advanced the dubioushypothesis that British military shortcomings atmid-century could be traced to Arthur, Duke ofWellington, who permitted the military establishmentto decay, in order that no British commander couldemulate his achievements during his lifetbne. Marx,K. and Engels, F. op. cit., p. 202.

5. Gooch, B. D., The New Bonapartist Generaisin the Crimea. The Hague: 1959, p. 65.

6. Ibid.7. Guedalla, P. The Second Empire. London:

Hudder and Stoughton, 1932, p. 198.8. That the lessons of history were lost on Britain

and France is reflected in the reluctance of bothstates to subordinate their national sovereignties untilthe closing months of WWI, when adversity, and notvision, forced urdfied command on the allies. Agnew,J. "Coalition Warfare," Parameters, Carlisle Barracks,USAWC, Spring, 1971, p. 55.

9. Mosse, W. E., Rise and Fali of the CrimeanSystem, London: Macmillan and Co., 1963, pp. 4-5.11