The Govenmental Response to Hurricane Katrina

PADM 523 & 524—Summer 2011Professor Mario Rivera

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Federal Response

Regional / Mutual Response Systems

State Response

Increasing magnitude and severity

Local Response, Municipal and County

Layered and sequenced Response Strategy

Minimal Low Medium High Catastrophic

Federal-State-Local Relations and Katrina Louisiana Governor Blanco had requested “emergency

protective measures, [in particular] direct Federal Assistance.” The governor was frustrated that FEMA’s Brown wanted itemized requests, and that, in general, she could not get the “feds” to respond. Her appeal: “Mr. President, we need your help. We need everything you've got.”

While Blanco may have over-relied on a federal response that was slow to come, she also exhibited great reluctance to federalize the state’s response to Katrina, specifically in her refusal federalization of the Louisiana National Guard. Brown seemed to rely overmuch on the layered and stage-wise response to major emergencies envisioned in FEMA protocols and in the National Incident Management System.

New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin Nagin complained that federal officials “don’t have a clue

what’s going on down here.” He complained that Bush and Blanco could not come to agreement concerning the federal role (For his part, Brown blamed Nagin and Blanco for their disagreements). Blanco blocked Nagin’s belated compulsory evacuation order until that kind of evacuation became inevitable. The Red Cross was stymied by Blanco as well. She barred them from access to the city on the grounds that it was not safe to approach the Superdome.

Was Blanco’s reticence toward the President justified? Some see Blanco exhibiting the so-called “fundamental attribution bias” toward Bush, personalizing their interaction and projecting nefarious motives to him re ‘her’ National Guard.’

Limits on the use of the U.S. military The Insurrection Act of 1795

permits the use of federal troops on U.S. soil to put down violence. But the Posse Comitatus Act (“power of the county”) of 1878 forbids the military from performing civilian law enforcement without congressional approval.

Posse Comitatus Act—18 U.S.C. 1385 Latin for “power or force of the county.” The Posse Comitatus

Act was originally enacted in 1878; intended to ensure military subordination to a strong civil authority

“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.”

What is “direct assistance”? Active, as opposed to passive, use of military personnel; or if it pervades/fully subsumes the activities of civilian law enforcement; or if military personnel subject citizens to the exercise of military power that is regulatory (controls or directs), proscriptive (prohibits or condemns), or compulsory (exerts some coercive force) in nature.

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The Stafford ActThe Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency

Assistance Act (1988) calls for disaster and emergency declarations for events that overwhelm state and local capability. These trigger statutory authority and access on the part of FEMA to a Disaster Relief Fund to provide federal direct aid and financial assistance to render emergency services. Along with the legislation that created the agency, this Act authorizes FEMA to coordinate the administration of all disaster relief.

A Governor must execute the given State’s emergency plan and indicate in writing that the situation is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments and supplemental Federal assistance is necessary.

The Stafford Act A Declaration made by the President specifies the types of

assistance authorized. A Governor’s request is not necessary for the President to

issue an emergency declaration if the emergency involves a “Federal primary responsibility.” Such responsibility rests with the United States because the emergency involves a subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority. Direct federal action was therefore justified in the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in 1995, the Pentagon attack on 9/11, and the Space Shuttle Columbia explosion in 2003.

Research Findings—various studies Early presidential involvement is necessary for a timely, well-

coordinated federal response. And the President must have the counsel of emergency management professionals in order to make appropriate and timely decisions.

Former FEMA Director James Lee Witt predicted that “The emphasis on terrorism preparedness in the aftermath of September 11th, [and] the transfer of FEMA to the Department of Homeland Security may result in decreased emphasis on mitigation and natural hazards” Former President Bill Clinton argued that it should be “required that any future head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency have prior experience in emergency management. When a disaster strikes, that person [the FEMA director] becomes the most important person in the federal government.” However, the Directorship became a patronage job—hence Brown’s appointment.

Research Findings—various studies When it comes to governmental bureaucracies, bigger is not

necessarily better. Once absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA lost its cabinet level status and budget independence. Removing FEMA from the DHS and re-establishing it as an independent agency with a cabinet-level Director responsible directly to the president would position it better and give it the resources to accomplish its goals and respond to disasters – natural or man-made. In any case, moving it from the Executive Office of the President to DHS degraded its capabilities. Regardless of the location in the federal government, FEMA’s Director must have a direct reporting relationship to the President during periods of disaster and emergency declarations.

Kettl, Donald F. (2007). System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics. 2nd Ed. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.

Creation of the DHS post-September 11, 2001 Evaluation of homeland security responsibilities after 9/11 showed 112

different federal agencies, entities, or departments having some role in protecting and safeguarding the U.S. Highlighted the need for interagency cooperation, solid working relationships between local, state, and federal entities.

Consolidation of agencies and duties in a new Department of Homeland Security was considered a requirement for effective homeland defense.

Integration of threat analysis, information-sharing, and intelligence across Federal agencies and down to state and municipal governments was required, as well as a general increase in scope of Federal law enforcement role. However, the FBI, CIA, and Defense intelligence agencies kept themselves out of DHS and resist any exercise of its jurisdiction.

Subordinating the FEMA disaster-response mission and role to that of terror-response seriously weakened agency capabilities. Moreover, there was then an exodus of its top-flight officials.

Kettl

What processes and practices will improve cooperation, communication, coordination, consensus-seeking behavior, relationship-building, capacity-building, information sharing, integration, network management, joint operations, inter-operability, trust, and flexible adaptive approaches to disasters like Katrina? What will advance collaboration among federal, state, and local emergency management and other agencies, and nonprofit and for-profit actors?

Kettl

We need networks of horizontal relationships. We [also] need strong vertical lines in our organizations. Hierarchy provides the critical, unifying structure to the capacity of complex organizations. But we need horizontal relationships to put that capacity to work. We need to organize vertically and to work horizontally.

Collaborative Public Management A concept that describes the process of

facilitating, and operating in, multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations. It means to co-production, cooperation to achieve common goals, and work across boundaries in multisector relationships. Cooperation is based on the values of reciprocity, trust, and mutual respect. In these contexts, clarity of roles and responsibilities is essential, since these tend to blur in networked arrangements.

Collaborative Public Management Intrinsically, homeland security and emergency

management involve overwhelming challenges and intractable problems

Collaboration in homeland security and emergency management Personal familiarity makes communication and

collaboration possible; interpersonal contact occurs during working relationships

Strong working relationships build trust and enable collaboration. Shared mission, joint exercises are therefore essential.

Intergovernmental RelationsDefinition: formal and functional relationships between or among

levels and agencies of government Increasingly important. Why? IGRs and Implementation: The more layers and the greater the

number of linkages, the more complex and difficult implementation and accountability become; however, crises require ‘requisite variety’ or correspondingly complex responses.

What is federalism in relation to Intergovernmental Relations? Layer cake vs. Marble cake Constitution ensured flexibility in Intergovernmental Relations Federal system creates—guarantees—a system of IGRs Federalism as “middle ground” between confederation and unitary

system History of confederation in the U.S.—Articles of Confederation did

not work to create a viable nation-state.

Federalism Relationship between central government and

constituent governments Constitution not always clear on federal

responsibilities vs. state responsibilities, plus roles and the distribution of power has shifted, evolved

Key issue is who is responsible for what Framers balanced weak with strong central

government structure—distributed, fragmented power while requiring shared governance

Forms of Federal Influence Direct orders Cross-cutting requirements Crossover sanctions Partial pre-emptions “Unfunded mandates” (also found in State-Local

authority relationships) Dispositional conflicts arise from differences in

capabilities, authority clashes, and communications problems

Horizontal versus vertical IGRs

Capability/Enforcement How to increase likelihood state/local implementers act

consistent with policy No simple hierarchy of officials in IG system Complex, difficult Uniform policy statements are rare, can be distorted Conflicting directives are very common Policy ambiguity exacerbates coordination and compliance

problems How the federal government can achieve compliance

Norms Incentives Sanctions

Decision Points and Disagreements as Impediments to Coordination Each point where agreement is required Each point where separate participant must give consent

is a “clearance point”Problems common to IGRs and networks in general: Incompatibility of organizational commitments Different organizational preferences Commitment to other projects Lack of a sense of urgency Difference of opinion on organizational roles Resource and authority differentials

Joint Decision Making and Problem Solving Need a well-managed decisional process

Develop clear rules for who is involved, what gets decided, how it is decided, and institutionalize the rules—reasonably

Joint decision making is a challenge Importance of trust and social norms

Need interactive, on-going process that builds trust and personal relationships

Important governance mechanism that lowers transaction costs and promotes efficient resource exchanges

Builds slowly, is destroyed quickly, and needs maintenance

Allocating Resources Intergovernmental grant system

The one who controls the resources sets the priorities Hard to maintain a systematic approach to problem solving if

external funding agency changes its priorities frequently Distributional problems and instability, unpredictability of funding Grants administration and paperwork

Stability is important Facilitates repeated interactions Allows participants to plan and budget with confidence Reduces transaction costs related to finding funding

Need sufficient, ‘slack’ resources to support collaborative efforts Legislatures and agencies often allow little discretion If partners contribute nothing more than staff to attend meetings,

then it is unlikely the group can accomplish much

Institutional Design Avoid viewing conflict, duplication, and fragmentation as always

being bad—It can reflect competing ideas, stimulate innovation, technical specialization, economies of scale, and protect the interests of competing constituencies

Constraints on action, incentives for non-cooperative behavior Turf guarding, conflicting budgetary and statutory

responsibilities, competing programmatic priorities, etc. Asymmetries of information, resources, and power

Avoid a “centralized is best” mindset Tendency to try and manage all activities univocally By way of contrast, you could use series of targeted efforts

involving only the actors you need—this approach can reduce transaction costs, increase information flow, and allow collaborators to negotiate with each other

Accountability Accountability is a fundamental principle of public administration

Accountability for what? To whom? Internal vs. external, formal vs. informal Hierarchical, legal, professional, political, and ethical in nature

Accountability can be a “two-edged” sword Specific goals, objectives, and monitoring processes provide incentives and

structural frameworks for joint action Monitoring processes create peer pressure at the political, professional, and

individual level But there is a constant tension between organizational autonomy and

accountability Too much accountability in the form of control can create disincentives for

joint action Networked responses bring to bear multiple streams of accountability,

which may become analog of bureaucratic accountability problems—Where does the ‘buck’ stop?

Strategies for Network Governance Building Networks

Interdependent structures involving multiple organizations with some degree of structural stability from formal or informal linkages

Relations involve personal relationships, communication, information exchange, exchange of goods, services, or resources, and service delivery

Collaboration Collaboration is a particular type of network relationship Two or more organizations work together to deliver services and

produce more public value than could be produced when they act alone, whether at operational, policy making, or institutional levels

Strategies for Network Governance Need for Performance Management and Accountability

Systems Includes goals, performance measures, monitoring, and

reporting processes Used for evaluation and enhances accountability Steering, coordinating, and setting priorities for organizations

in a network Motivating network members to take actions that advance

shared goals, objectives, or policies Promoting and celebrating progress by network participants Encouraging organizational learning Addressing questions of competing interests and values

Improving Systemic Network Governance When viewed from an network perspective, you

improve management of networked, IGR systems by Building, enhancing, expanding, or changing

interorganizational networks Managing existing networks more effectively Maintaining and improving network relationships Altering, changing, or improving how decisions are

made both within and across organizations (integration and coordination)

Building new institutional or quasi-institutional arrangements that improve problem solving capacity

Networks can create opportunities Complex networked systems can create opportunities for

collaboration so as to Get things done (project-level) and solve joint problems Share knowledge, resources, funding Develop shared policies, norms, expectations to improve

coordination, creating new co-production capabilities Generate public value

Accomplish things that cannot be done when working alone Improve capacity to solve problems Stimulate organizational learning and innovation Improve government service delivery (efficiency, effectiveness,

accountability, customer satisfaction, etc.) Improve social capital/civil society