UASSLEI ED.

COPATCSSIO I , -- f

THE GERMAN WEHRMACHT IN THE

LAST DAYS OF THE WAR

(1 JANUARY --1 MAY

~Jt1-YFE

Retrioted ClassificationRemoved Pew~

Executivye Order 1 IQ2

PART IChapters 1 to 4

r

&Y'r Ffi7tH.-T rT i

Propex'ty ofOff toe of the .C ie$

ilitary History'htfldrai Ref oreiou B i b

HISTORICAL DIVISIONHEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES BRANCH

'p7MS # C-020

LIBRARY

ACCESSI'P~O REGI

1945)

MS1 II C-020

THE GENOAN WEIMkCIIT IN. THE lAST DAYS OF THE WAR

(1J 3a.7 - 7 MY1945)

Professor Dr. Percy Ernst Sclkramn Maor der Reserve a.D.

PART I Chapters 1 to 4

Translators G. Weber'Editrs z R. Itw

* G. C.. YTaderedtRevier a Col.- V. 3s 40

Historical DivisicaHEADQUART

UNIh STATES ARE, EUROPE

No' officiwl Germ acout of W 'rldVr it I d xit; hosnvc , thinwardiay o th flr tomn aprbtst suh a rorw* The ririon

presentd in tV study is a day by c ay rart o the last five month'of the war as vieaed from' the Whrnoaht fligh nd , it was rprmd

by !r. Sohnm, offiil keeper ot the diary, ttier otrutnce viihbe ewlainn In the prefao.

Depit. repe tto , emnttndiotion, and errors,, the nterlal ise adliusbi. as a course. A few obvious istakes, espeotefy In

th desiv.tien of som fTite States wits hae been aorcted bor theeditor or poied ou in footnotes The serios researcher sh l,haover, cheek daa ot this kid against other soswcesp for it isbelie that othr errons reah. in t he nauript. Fe c ags haveheen made in the orrninaton or methe of twreuting th. matrial. Amr rigorous editing might he nd certain portions clearer but wouldhove UCrcitLCt the 'izpzes s of notes taken day bd'cly under thpressure of evets.

Tb. underscoringt of dates in th first half of the aunorit wasnot for purpos of supsesis, but to e a thas rsrr quiekly toselct mterial perta iin to a particular date.

The Review

?VY~~~~~~~~~~~~~ r,~tnt R . S99S909S

CtA~R14 i+rtr: csx{ Rr $t smrcra r~a f9712( aa , qv{,wsc"WA!7 7YZ!IflMY ... *. ** ***.*.***

I. Gee I . . . . . * * * * 4 * . . . . . . . * .2.w= tha nahrZe o Intqertefl.........

m1 UPU.'" Ccadftenefntt.. .....4. ~aes Taken in the t."t atd on the Yoraltte

Coast (up to I 1awch)... *a.***

6. The Oerall Orgaition.. . . . . . .7. flhvbsion of 13emin Area Into North e

"

* 12* 12

Southern Part$.* .4 * * * * . . . . . . . .

II. Sttureof9 th#eret *.*.....cuo

actal War ... ... *....

21

21

400t*"

NO Units.... 4

a 49*4a

It. W a tt# o *4 9 4 4* 44i *4* 454944 .a

2. .Arzmeat and Amwnitlon

5. rtor1'nI. * . f. * .

7a Rroad . . . * . .. .N8, Food. , , . * . . a

. fsmtonad Sam,.

* .

a.

4 .

*4i

*444444*

2.RSatenwith Newurls. ... . . . .. .3. ttflUoaI tveatn the Yalta Coutoronoe.

-1 ii.

A

I 9 99

a* i "*

49045.

44*44"

45944 f

# S 4

4*404.

46094a "

# 44.i .

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Z2P~~ 2.

Section 1.

k'..tx14F i- tt' tv44r :' A .. ~ s.. * . S S S * 9

0____ 9 5 4 * 4 0 * * t 9 9 4 9 * 9 .5 " *1 . tG

2. T InttaAOtu'to . * ** * * * * . *2. Wtt'hdraw.1 to the t ynge n-O t miton. . ".3. &rmebtein Navi fin Yebrar . . . .

4. ~?aztio.t PiztrI atm o Forces...

Se Fiitoi" .* speetee . *. "+

7. Lasses, Polays,* sit Pe4m)Cis. ." . .

9, hvm1 Qttio iteot h an tOfth

.C foegt Cas . . . . . . . . . . . ..

2. Theater Oownr'atrO * .......

3.T .ne Attaok end $abotag*. *.e.

1 5. . .Tnsfro R i.s..1 k....

CflR3.o

Section x:nA z . T ani -.""".".." r".

«2... . >

1. Qmnttes lCli A1 KUI (16 PDwibe 4 -1 am)2Opati RQWRD(1ttOmbr a* 13 Jsr)..

3. Sh t h lui (U -w28 Jsxmy).. .,,4 usw tn the Weststnhe one Islands

4.Trnster .of Tow to te Zstrn Fot,....5. The Ii aStt1attt on te Wetr frot..6, The ?terle1 Sitmtioe o.n the W4stern frot. ..7. Oontruteo? Prtfiftn s"" m

, u1o tof oet'tniei ... ...9. z nsoi1a..pt0Ur .*....e.....*

- IT -

oS

.9w.

. "

899090

9210

122

1

131691*7181921901",194394

1C 0 r ! Tr S Oeetc

V i oreo' vots Abr n.tc a c r 2,47

CR 4 rwte 4. fli SO! T "" . *' . , , .! . . . . .+ 0 . ." . M 280

1. Otangesin vsnonn" "1........... ".... 2802. Onere Sittntio at the 1~gin g of the Tear. * S

. Th. Inta trgcStuation. Z . .9 . . . . . 285

5. *g n Jeu" aM 7ony .. . . . . 2%56 U M n ug -s m . oabatt,. g. ... .. .... . 295

V T mSOYflS&S. ,, * *. *** * * * .. O. 302

sttin . ?tnMntttal ttuation. ....... . * * . * 302

4. The t tuatinbn ... ......f# *A 30)

5.i ThCrbieatWArtaeU ite .... 232%

6, 0rptm fo wprto ta i tgr(oenlnL~l~lL. ... . * . 3

2, Seery*4 ++ 4

2. vk R mry.,............. 347

0~n

I

casg rtr

U.

CHYE AIR R (Wit Niote

J~1 ~r 90090'

on tin va Wa)

* 9 *00999 t

Wi vi

. Carlosme iwn ten Est Apardia to thesi...

. The+ 'ie Up, tom the med of the Ruian"

I l e D s ~ j = MB r i h e ( 1 2 w . . a 2 0 J a u a . . . . . . . . .

4. reiningia of lhtn in the Zone fItro(21jo Of 2 atm v. (1 - .2 J* ). . . . . . .

5. 3sf in n of Sigtin o Athe Odor athe LireJad ary - 1 Fruary) .. . ". .*

4,. Couirsei of Fighting Aite the Fane of Budaper(12 28 Febiay) . . . . . " * . . . * , .

7. 0 TheOUs figb tingmo Af0 t 9o 6IL 0f Dart

7S. Tho Fighting inpfl. .......... ."

350

394

39'

396

397

1402

426

478

"0

591

6a

0 1.- V - 5 (it'd)

T C x (cont'd)

rfA, 'r %M ' "' fM :vr"s (2 Arl - I May 1945) . . . . .* . . 62~

Seo t I. n rttnn ot thQ ehr tn %n tont 3s "4t.*oy * *.. . * S * 6 £ 28

Stan 3

A. O aoLrfio"tl . 01t 9 . * * * f * . . .X * # 6513.Losses In Persone and Vartel. of the W*bnaot

co (to 31 Jsrnary 19k5) 65

s 'i ".

M& F al

At the haquarters of the ' ehrcht Operations 3taff aL eo-t-11e

'situstion enternco took place ever mimoing between 110an 1200

hmurs. !Tnder the leership of the detuty chief o'the bWehrwAcht Cpera-

tion Staf, a mber of eprs, neal all of whtn were Oew Staff

officers randg asssors, lieutenant ooes, o ool reported on

ther rpective spheres of activity, At the am tie, reports were

given concerning imprtant direc*tiv arind new p1"n ne, anid answers were

give to questions askdb the deputy chef.

Yefllowing this eonerens, certain ofiT e went to BOO the chief

of the Wehrscht &reratton $tf, (lenralobert Sod]., eM submitted

fueter revorts. The chief, together with the deut chief, the naval

seialist, and one general offier then went to the Thhrrs ha-

qnartes for the rrnnttin of the sitwationt reprt, vich began at

aprmiatel 130 hours.

$bttef repored there wer sbtantially the ease as to discused

at the erlier sitution corifrace. Inportent decisions made at the

'headquarters wr rePorted at the situtionm conferencea on th

followin day.

Tb. principal tRie at these disnsdcmsas th situation in the

thr e rnhs .f the Wre. t Qreat imprtance we give to informtion

conernW the nvmaur*s zxdintentions of the eney. 5hort reports were

_n p1

delivred on aurrly 1, organisrticrt, . mistrtier, and vwar econom.

P"'iinx, i th dbs urtw t cnd nokr, ai9 thyn itmezitty ,'fterwtrs

dicittdf t h ei t he mint kportat facts tiat were ditesd. After

a copy atfm natty had been p rep ,&, I had each sanarate item ct 'nut

and file sertey aeoording to " tore~ ad "theatrr ofT uar." Tis eft

the origin of the sc-cled situation book, containing the records wich

Igaw t the %.Ama. whiehvwerenrkod % -.7.'" A per of thi

teeia wa plaed in the g file "8-o," brtto A ugnt 1945 1

reclassifiod it in fie "H-77."

Naturoally t he nmot es inol 1 t wyj hin. mbti Ushd i n te daili:

coswqu of the Wbnoht. YFcnve r, myentries are umrevise at teluio

an items which were not pemitted tob rublihd..

Apat fro the citation bok, anl I orier to Main insight into the

broader deopnt of the sitution, I kept t aerarate notebook for

inter tion hich I receive from time totime thcrawh thd <ity chief

or specialists on th ehrwcht (3po ms £taff. This m tho of obta 1aw

in intonntion, whidt began inD and developedas tin v*at on, na

smething btwomasenen and itri.w, and pove lmitble for th

prpetion of later studes Unoasly at the begiwirig of 1945 1

wersred to diseotim thsprtin.O The only yotes do af ter thbat

were those of A, *rit were otit ut. sa epntly 11., and, of

29 Jn ary a 9 ?ebruar att*d to t heSitution Book (s-fl).

e rel1

As MAIn bee ictd t di iontitu the aaotrzt notetook a13 of

no umto according to topieot M thator o rq to na ab tt of

the J bpratftY .in, andbi to xns^iV certain thatt all. irnpott entriesi were"

set down in the orriginni wordim ;. This work t 4tivided between my:l 1,rt

37 ollaboraters, cli of whoa had receive4. acaei tr-iceng, but at the

sus ti Iotfli what they prer. This was the origin of In

sipei mstea cotained in the t e notebook (-War ar)for January-.

rebrtzr 1945, whic will h reeed to beiow as the !textracts of records."

During the final. days (20 April a May, 19A5, I continued to mke

totes, rartly concee with the fate of that hfl1f of the W ehrct C(tea-

tionsStaff which bad been transferred to t aoth9 and partly with the'

abstracts of those d oet t which were burneldner mysupervision a short

tic nrior to t he eaitulihtion

Wram th aboe, it follows that 1I tAPB may hve occurred durn; the

writing or dictati.n., ao ia.1y with regard to fipu'es Por the nost

prhowev, th vitiation book givea exact description of the. ptitk

IaussbtbternRIcO Coh durig the st mnthe of thewar. t

describes the o eattcn1 directives isue in the impotat ase n

repr re eiv.

!Jfotitey bo , th the vi iio book. and th ex tract of recors are

2 n A e e copye wn t e - -r n tm b m ba d r o e l e these ote as m a4 for the istorioal Pt .viw icm b7 the

author in 1945, el t~ a oor copy was inte. in rt')s after the first copyhdbieen lost.

M''arlli

d~a ly to the --tr dsttomy ?rneh off the Wehrmaeht. A.cxnr,; myth other

5owet , the ori s _1.b were twn at 7rhteagaden i rtor to s rs end

oft the war.

The aitratton book z tnrlJ inlau~ only th rrind to F rrUf 19/i.

AOr erod zi!'n fram bath ?scnrae include:

a.. )iortherr Area,

SLtuatto !ok: 25 Yemerry - I trh

Fxtraoteof t cords 1Marhest.My.

b. The st

itattat !ok I - 312. 4uary ('A.e note filed user

22 Awust 1945); 25 ' Pebrnry - I Mreb

!trat of Reeor: I 14re e. j7

a. The $otthvest.

SituatIon Do*0k: 25 ?.beur "I M arah

lxtrats of tooda: I Mreb - S a

4. The Southeast.

$tm woks 25 Ven a tae

Extnt of flw%8 I .{&r O Ma

.. Th.ast.

Sitwtiou Yook# .251 Y1r - 1 )anb

Swrims (See Chapter 6, Seetient I) I Mroh a. VA

f. uftnftta Navy.

fltation F so 25 eb rya7 f'roh

xtraat ofReore 1 ac - Ma2y (hre is little atrki

in ti s secotiton, t'linc the 'hr rnoht Thrths~ f w e? rzonsibie

off, for joint atf t re of the three .>rarchaa of the ~?hrt.)

"1 y motes rertaing to t ho fiw dy of the w~r (frvr 2"' AprU) are

frametary in~ to .h inmoowite 4t 'r o *x cz tunttOnS svntlablo 4

Oheration, Stat Sf. out, riat.outgiont orf the situatin 3till too . phce

bu .Ilter doet r ryTed tho notes which I t oo k cmrcsrnin: th:un.

In capiling the followtn inform tion, r actd as acollector of

facts rather than an ar h istoria. In each neoto the wnthd vas det ermned

by the sep and cig titmnoe of thexiustsn sour*e atri~l Pethto .rg of

mow iaking was added; none of the origin rotes Wers sw kple~ed or

coarcte by whbat was lsermed later or what etne to-my nowledg thog

other sources . T have tried to torn a moaic by piecin tozetber it- .

vJ~ua nota , a task which wnuV tie been more succsfl had not th

slalified working netbod- bees intr toed on I Zanwtry 194.5. Filitary

titles ae c!resce sthen in u v's have tsen rete, even, though it wouls

hate been simplIer to ..'ei meetily of Ettler, x ZriwQr, Coe W:,, eta, f !o-

evr, in this way the ttrirsto oxenfr Volu of the material has been

It is clear that this metalhasi disavantages: a sction will

be mere coule. than others, th reditng will be mr dif iott, there

vii , be in. eamotion of mtarial, tad Main pertinent tnfontion vii

b ftd.Wnthln the writer has felt it awe ispertant to ratai

the # mesthod thrua ut -the study.

The Author

1. -~vnthe fina zhs ttnie a hrced b

?ltler'e atteapt to retain the reins irml1 in his own bands. This was

illustrated by a !ehrr directiv isud on 19 Jarrry uwkiug all

oonwnden ac~ to *wl incluin division level reetentble for snbmitting

reports en ineni actin wptly enough for a oontr-orer to be

issud. Th. der applie to evary decision regardin a operto al

Mt, an attck by a division orlarger unit, an attack on a cabm

front by ore then a ctt t ptrol, ant any ithdrawl orretreat orthe

sender of a oetiio, base, or fortresa. The unnarnished, truth wen

di tded inall ports, -w enelmen of fa.ts was ftrbididenune

severe penlties. Itwery de w- pesnll responible for siutain-

lag un irrpted sips1 aiocs vin his speio bndqinrtrst

2, Te Bjh 'a ednree At thb begnig @f th Ards

Ofesv t o 16 Peaabr the ?uererIs heo strs weshifte t

is Been,1 al tb W cmht Operation 5taft w nvs m d into

In' the ta e)OR#sow ten NUnA orhEst of Sad ahim. tiswas thbe fe meego concrete structure denolishod by the Allies aftth war uner the terms of the 'Potsdam Ag eit. - tdiltor.

.EL:

a'rV 7

trrackza nmtr riedbr, nn2r 1~ d rl n T1 the .iddle of .Jsanur th

7uehrrt hs qurtr had bar t r 'Fterrd ~e? to Tr22x ' boe f at he

sitiation in th 7-at. The fThbrr, his chiief aide, the ch.e of the party

Chaneery e etc. imoved. to the CbenoellIery at thti Bich, wiale the chef

Of the _:ehreaht =itgh Cor-Anr an the chie Of the Wehrmtct rnpenton

Staf? ratured to tknfr offis rt tlern.T-A hem. The deputy chief and

theremainder of . 4th rict Opertio otff noted to Zoen .(ryah

Cam) nerTrin

Trot 140t 150 heru on 16 gao the Zos=e camp~ wan attac o

675 bomber r;1an escorted Wfighter . According to the ena rdio,

6,000 high nxplosive bombs, ewightng 2,300 pount's an 325 tons of

incendiary bombs were dropped. The e re ktld at Maylac Camp Iels e l hl i hrgt T h r h

taff was billeted A mubr of tnnrtry bamke were burne, but since

6 g to the euker ns not serita therea no interruption in signal

co caictions. Th. chief of the Operation i'ranoh, Ceetrl reb, was

ightly wounded bit ntwad to duty on the following day.

These qnr.tt were retained ati Ar9jj*J. that day a nart of, the

iihnb Operatio Staff accompnie b y th dopt chief, departed in

truols sa psegr vehicles. -O 22 Tarur Etle finily hd decided

tgo to R un Reain eleet of tin ce ht OTWrat±oUs statt,

together with their chief and the Chief -of t Woht Righ C e 1d

arriw at M$uervik on 2*I y (so Chafte 8).

4nrrs ostr ?rot.. were faiing ba , tz'et dtrrtcultios wre

aused by the fact that certain rect torn of the on.e of int rio bscre

operatinn ra a, ad Jneent ec ttons drawing closer to the frnt. 'The

Ar y (teral Staff tr0 that it 'be 4ver cntro'l emer aeh threatened

9 but this was in centr eltin to the dear to spre the

. lin ptio, as lng &so pUsible from the stIJJnd±9.B of lend

4. ~& aw7 nta'a the P.-100 tC- stM n rc..

"' 1e2~ thAy Ceea fltatff was 4ive tower off directive in1?U hrkre$se nd U1 for th prepentio of plarw for the covalct of batte

at for thbe occtruatten of fil~d forttflc ations. The arnm ntority he4

alsc be requested taOr U ehrkreiaeI 111#l al Xlt. The now Oryi a-

tip ;did nt chane the cathority or ftmetiom ot the .ete an& ationl

On 18 a anb e of' distert i n Whkrdis* I i i were Sub-

cwiute to the Ary

On the fsEfwiug flewe ma* d. with rpc of the )w

Ganesi taend the Opwatton 3Qf s.t Coat, whih bad recein a

schet dtrett on 10 Decebr 1944

a. the Opeton S'taff, et fiast um ra ib2 faonsrut

lu fief forttfiatam awl for cndut of battle inits natal

defence stonetThirty kioter dep.

ems

b. For 4h'.". seto or t eerenne Binrv xol1 by tir Armnonora1 'tsft, the Pmranian awl tinun nhes, th _s~~w Ste

Esat %emast ws ler entent for diretives ort the A rmy ttnvt. "tff. Cb ngea

ir tni autho e rity we*to be ordered by the eiwwxcht F# t hsrizaw in

acco-anoe. th to situa'ton.

Om2 aur th Wormwht High Coffimn sbrdna teA the co=nders

in Wtrkis. I and U to the tonery Olreup Gotr, Osnraloberet

!IJaRWCIt. In W~brkreis I the sham of ocmnad we rognird i accord-

anne vith a decree issued on 18 Janm r. Army Group Center iam not allowd

to interfere vrith the co wattent .n qnartering of remtaent trijsnIxg

units stationed in a ~ihrkroiu without the, apoval of- the coaner of the

R~1aent 7&nifl Rrmy.

On 4jj~wfl etni U, wes subordinated in all resecets to Anyo 2Group flatala

On 30 the 4ermaht fltgb Coz$ a onlirtted the oocnander

of ierkrets VIII to An row Center ocamanded tq oealoberst tchoerner,

For the aemuitamt al quartering of renae tnaining wdtn stto

is W ekts tlt th apon1 of. the cnder ofthe 1~p. aw trdintn

An bad to ho obtined

Osi..frkur bacrdan itsa propoeslof thellelrneht

in out an Pofl, sulited on 26 Jaury, the thief of th 'Weaaoht

0ig1 Coast: defir the spee of respontbilit of Any Group Onter

and the :eermebt rezwentatire for 1obemia and MorA.i in the Reih

MinIstry. This was done in view of condition developin in th rotcorte.

2 onwrs organiaatt of commnd in Werkrets I.

!43 AZ-02t SIJ)..

O b:zthe- chiet or thea >ehrnehbt tfigh Gtaa r eat the

&orsnd .S.lra t;,-izn3 vrtr: ily in wIIritin+.g (eUs~5 nLaf 4V with

ragaE! to the chairn of con i n 4ehrkreis 1t

a. The authority of th cor tdr of ehxri i TT ith regard

to the corruct of b~ t t 1* v s to bet e rid bl thin oniar of IL anry.

b. The tri of Wehrkeis EU was directly reaponf3bl to

the Wrr for the defs e, of the Ueioh eit.l. fo other tass were to

be aiind h hb the my Ooel Staf.

o. All troop nnitt, headquatrs, tuti oranzt tons of t ho field

foreer hie hadn been tranaerrod to the iWehrkns iore to berionl

attahsA to the i ehrkri onter.

4. The Webnh otmnd as cuoreas regionl counper, ws

to- asume responsiblity for nl miltar rights ant obllvte deiving.

herefrom in respect to other units of the Werioht and the Wfoen Z134,

e. Rienl ssst traini g its an af newy activated elements

of the ?eple eont Training Lm within the Workris were to rennin sub-

ordinate. to the oowdr of the Ula 4 ?mnigg . O rde

affeotiug tas* focs ware tobe itsded throh the dopat

th Rieps twi ;T iin Amy Th b t of towS hor reysrat

atoeltat of coibt unte .at algtmyert =nite of thergy

0*5th fteplaaot Tranin Arm as to bel-e di rectly

bthe: Ay GOneral Stff and the AnthRa

An.*

F--- ____ - -1

f'. Thrt crrsner of' Uerkr . t s cz to u~~g th Th V5 ?:7k

ivision to th4i -fne .aDo3 erli ; thcxw liy 7.t divts in wou O s'. tn~ <

subordin-mte to hk for growa corabst. ?or sir a defene the dioin was

to remniDn uodnaethe Lurtwjto.

the cwindrof '14hreisa 7'Xt vofl reeiv directives from th Nny

G eerl $taff/Arq High COmww~ with regenr t all preartons for theo

toeof the flelines

Cmu 15Thrw the Oper.6atSins 4 taf f Zes Go 5? t vats tcifysub-norinat t the Army" bnem1 t tft.

Orequest of thbe ooaer off {W ebrket i the chief of the Nfehr-

nttHuh Cos te. lg~f ordered a slight shit in the bovzy

betv~ lf~hrkri ZUb M$ Army flroip Victa . The sphere of ondof

the ehrmct iomnter of Vehxtret 111 vas aters4t coincide vth the

e astrn, nrthaetern, are$ southaatern seettcnoa of the mjor highvay

In newer to an incpiry 17the cu~at Opn 5tn '.tf the flw

Gemil Staff Oraisattn Brach Home Tortifiotn . sotton, reored 0p

!I cocrnn the c atrutio of road blooks in h a south

of Srli* The Cane of %Jhris U, vo a ctldt, wse

resonib for the cocstrtioan of obstace~s "*aro or m, in aeordtae

with inv to from -A ry Oru lt . Constnetion sea eaniM out

authority of the C er In The ~et brtrA& to rinba Cku &Adn

(but only that irt in § ehrkrnia ") an th d it o Ca Gai, ot twil,

Ytetr nstadt, aixi ttliinn, L'aloning to au rte r.

On 25 retur h deuty raet of te rehnnot Oprtin stet?

sulatte a aeomrawm conerning ouuit of oprtonsi the UeloluMd

fliht .are na of an enmy attack. Lafense was sontraliwad by the

stabri t of anOeation 3taff North Coast. Subordiamte to Opera-

to Ptaft rorth (oast nti parallel toeach other were the NayConnd

North tS n a corps staff to he cntitute by the deputy corps 1xn4

qiarten of ICoams Sine, the wmmor of Operations f~at North Coast,

the Reicabrer S3, bed already been appointed bytheWuerrt

Ar roup Vistda, the quetion of antbariy haA to be r-t

ttteultis also aroe* froa the Nav over claims of leaderhip. The

deuty chief of the 9Wehrot Operation Staff proposed the apotutnont

ofa fomer a' te as comd of Opention Stf North Coast.

6. ~aakc~ia& ga.An "operatioa area' a deis by

Are Regulatim on y,. 9041 di ct Ocist ithi the Zon of Interior it ha

this arathe VWo dIat ta jurisdioticn only over militry afte .

tat cotrol vetet itor ip to bat otlui thtrt

aserise by the ea the Reich Defense ul e in

aran e wn ith direetives receivenf the Party Chmanooflry an The

Knibtr of the Inter or. Zn the emntn zone (amot twenty klomt rs

*6 1102

ini de'r) ths , Whncht on rebie' e-rn@ mathorty ovem .h3 wmris°

the nalaitr aW the aich r etfonse Ccnatnr.

The' r l 1 t~bip bwen t he leohrtaeht, the Party, &nd the civil

*d z ittion d benr ea bIFThec bvr :chco or the F~esr, date

19 Setber 1944, oonoria co.operatton between the ehraeht a the

PttyU an opeticm1 area with the Zon of Interio A Seond orxer,

dm-0a1944, o ';meue the =gd autrty ina pttnt I

area withi the Zone of Interior.

Wthia the %zot of Interir the A et bd tvo dtsti g-h betnent

a. The sihr of atuthority of Thsm theater aders 1

thaoe arasi wih thy exrise ai.tafl r f e., tta

tin thi apoim Woon h cf o the '

b. AuthodWt of the, ado?~ of the rna t Tiltn Axt,

Zone of It rior.

a.* Special authority exercise by "cmuaore or mni defe

se, S... cst im t ;, tels in th North Sn anti the Rato

Se, adthee e.

The Ibi in wtd* he copt x Zn,' y Lzwones a A

OR an wn etan-ogr incte ivil 4WOtVautoft

A Ith us tm, a statemet weastse OUmuI ralattnulti

4th*the Rseh at o Tevautonf leam1

k (Ormrtions 4A' 7 orth Ooast)s

(1) e The erof the leplaemm twing Army

OemnreOKWWFT/Q (Yrt. 1 Zu2 r. 0116#4 g.7.v. P,.4. (Tireferencos as in fron tn. r.

YCQO4I

was als3o co rndc or' %r ntione :ta'r Thrth Coasts a: duai re snortity.

The staff was tacti o i y sWarint to t he l hrt =cht TII_ ComardA e4hrmtchlt

Operations t a f, regiocnally ettncl& t th o09uc e of the tepl nt

Training Arrsy, z.ad subsrdLnate to theWtrah in caortnce with £uhrer

flere ?(o. 43.

(a) 9on bloafightareat right Cki D k )

O .J anth border; left (G maer in CW wet) ltwmreo 3isa

(Operations Staf Wr oat$): squert . acenma e '4 nAireea point

insectio abcout six kilnetens south of ?iolmn; the line than

followe the vest tn souh boundarie of Qsu Weaz emz, excluding the

niopa aMrua districts of frets Oernbrac, W-ittlag, xa HeeL..

(h) Rltie area: right (Wehrree it): bory of

wase nis i to is 'X, lefn C ndr Damnk): ernm..r nsh

( ~ : ) A4flr&,t/O/ (9) 1r.001325/44 g.K4u.II.,

(4. aska thn. Not provtAed for, A loa

tion t .Sfllis in a..eof bat aeto was p =ne tr the

Oata ina with t'.t+cios from th. Party O lUry.

kg(itm Gesal stat).

()The followng areas were fully subrdnte to the

Army (lnea 3tIaff: Whrknie I, flU, XX; Wehkreis t: Pomoflnia;

"U..

t O.020 -5

"'ehrkcroie I: ajntnistrattve dtrio+t of' 1ranktrt -the-C , and:

A ngormsnde; Welireis 17 Kraiso Vhlsnzt 2ehnbr , Frit isfn, Atau,

L~wt, Pa' so, taenz, a!Jytrnwerda.

(OThe remaining areas of t ebrkreise I, ITT, and1

(t base areas not listtd above) wer tacticall sibordtn ate to the Axrty

(o) Te trof WJreis lBohptl~a4ovia was

subordinate to Army Grup Cent for .11 =tters pertaining to the conduct

of bzttle.

(4) The oomadr of lvhrcroi XI was subin ae to

the Army Generl Staf? for om, attans parazn to preparation of the

flb defense line

(2) r e, Ritght c ttisbourdry of . nsrin

hief Southea st; the roar bouwary7 wes withn the Zone of Xntoror, for us.

onl as billetingarea, erending along the southern end western boundaries

of Low Danubeo th* V=au iver, t. + floin the DueRmto

the ten buary of Vrkris XYU. Lofs- tb hii 80n

Nt., 001093/45 gJ. "v. 1.2,45.

01299/45 g~.v. 22.2.5.

7 tMmozo -XE-

(z) 2 itn~o nne'. fe ror ibxilt wa~s cerd

it tho ~Vchz uwhrer ts prent' -five co the faehrer Z or oraiz.n

etiowla. ,rsintno~ in the it, end hn th aa er acording to their

dir*cttvr. The C ne or in Chef of tfle t'ra( vae to give the initial

order for evition. We~apona were to he supkplid .in acoran with the

ttcl eatw tion, tlo approval of toet ihafuhr $ap lunls lade

pent actiocn es smu

(I) 0 * Webh$UWIR Xv:: . T= were full suberdilste

to the o for of the Repl at' 'ainin An.y. The C wri

Chie? for the Southwnst and fotet bad nc **=an authority in te

area.*

(a) Southnt: Werkrois VIZ (ntoh)g Wer-l XI

(ml~twg)noldin tla and fouth Styriw. In urgent cses the Luft-

w atculd he tferred to Wohoia VII.

Wbrkniy TVIU; Oat Upper ab. (y that vtfl ot of the Thumbs) i

%)etrkrois Zt .

vwo to6: rrtie frt the *et"t al otahst to amr

urteig aresou$ b authorit rt th tor OdChef Southeast

and outhin.

(3) Aubr,~ OlATS t/t (a) Nlr. 0al1/ g.:t. uIi ,

Ang, v. 12.9. u. 30.10./4,

Vp~% 47..

(a) U opntionildirect tve eet eisdb h

ehrtht !!igh C o r~texrctt Oper'tiorn Staff, ttirectives osrtdz n

torg aia tio ±pnotin~ the above v3Aoriginte wihth n

OOI tS~f Ci tnyGeea Stt was esponsible for sapl, trains

fmaotton of the serrios arms, All Ord eaffect tag oparational mn

were to be lastew ith Joint approval of the Thhaht ttt ghCa /

WOmh ta w xta.t. (oxtss/o, (i) fl2 .r 09159/44 g.v.

(2) . Owcwfu/wvtqa(wt

?tV '317t/ gJ. v. 7.9.

0=1700/44 go4. v. 29.9. 44

aawo/u4 g.. (tu. TV, Ant.) v. 9,.10, 20,10,44 and

(3 *Rottzwoog isle (Pant ma

ln)40 tsint a0 S*nat Wiht "" nt of lter sotl f ne14t

zrMLV ain disre bolb Lee (adtltne d ituet Ambo)a

Notooimn) a Dotaot Vset - Rhim flera pow*f f b~s e r (betwen l'lrknlee V t U) a Onbetsa wta

a G OUl!y beve 1Sain and Tzrtttbr atr

bondr .w Herb Ro oi 'fltt n e east oYeebg

VS 0e2w.O""i-

(Lake o nstcance) -.,. Gai boundary betten :aden ain 4;{j _ 4ust br2..

Fox h rust, Uhrolue 7, '+, er1a "t were wa o:litnrs te to t-he

tor tder in Chie ~at for all ztters .ttnn to the oMuot or

battlie. To prepare fr defense agains't enem air land1 ng, alleent

of the police, Reih Lbor Sertic, Orp~mn~tion Td, nfroercd and rd

olic, MVolers w sueodntdt the 4brreahaquartera.

QS/'t/Q 2 (Vaost) ,t 0021700/44 g.4. i. 17. Aug. v. 29.9., .10.,,

2040./,4, v.20.2.45.

(4 "WO0t(f Of??POI teeiblity was etntered

in the alita and the laic Defense Comssiouers inaccordance vith

di.rective from th !'arty Ghenclle'ry Any further plan eacuatin

'ro the Red and rem 3oeos ws forbidden., (ci exp anein ofths

tent n Cr/WTtQ 2 (Net) .r', ooms/u4 g.W v. 1..4.) Local

e"tcittof duo cobat action was permitted, hower, ad the chief of-

th ?arty Chaner va esensed special authority (OKW/Wt/Qa 2 (1)

r. =5wo/45 g.X. v. a2,4.45)

Ja the depty chicf ofteWenotpntis Stf

sivzttts to the chief of the Wbmh t Comn a . =and of--

srelaanitoushipe In each Wt si in th bat

and, Vest. T1is mabase a £rqet bthe Any envre S a4 the

sle of the Pepi 4 V ,gr o sr

Up, and Ut to it4t regard to cntsctien, o% fortification ei h

conduct or batte.~ The Arw gral Staff already bat pi it" directivet

i n X erkrise U and III with r eg a rd tothese timctraim, 0 'r ,i34f

the chief of the '-ehrtseht :Tlih Co~tat ts to i.so now regultions

for Xlebrkrese Ti an yil

on i.L Jawi the chief of the Wehrcht !fg COcnad subordinate

the oenner of ehrkrise 11 and lit to teAyOenenal Staff in all

nttra mrtaintng to conduct of bottle and construction of fortificatonsi.

For ostal deene Webtreis It weg ubrite to Operations Staff t*U

Cast. Li mtations.! authority it hrrisL wore prvided for br a

speial order (see 19 anar). Orders issued in WbrkreisI peran

to the eonoentration and owttaet of ebt and alit units of the

eceet Training ?An wore subject toapproval of the Army General

Staff and tin eandr. of the flepla t frming Army. Thee reorgains-

floe o e s did not etfbot the *thcrity al femotions of th. galiter

adthe Reich Def ese Cniseues

On 2f8 f Tn = rese feidanur, Qrtelsbrg, aw ERnburg vote removed

from the cosaud area of Wehrris I aw Wis tlps e flippen, and Strssborg

from the e% rea of Webkris XX, to be subordinated t r ru

Cntr This resulted in mar a nanwm are st betmg suboriaet h

onsatr of th. Iteplesseut Training fl

41 the ozd of 'r* he ste of em In th. last bad, dovlognd

in nt soy that th. acua authqrtty 4MN not eomrp with the rgom

athority, wreas in the West tide Va not th, ease. Arq' Group iettw

asindi.ow era. " p~an to s lt up the tir Reh' bete the

eO or in Chef leat and the Arw Genrl Staff was agai abaned 0

tta ~e n ith srevous asgnpb, Tditor.

n in c , t h e r e w o u ld hn v e b e e n t o o ir xn y e s n t i o n s to t h e ru l e . Th e -nyct c o e o x m l , c a t i e a f t e 3 a r , l s s o e f o

supplies. Instead, it was now planna to change the bondaries3 of the

territorial sutzlivimito correspond with the actua.l ptter of wandK.

On ?ield 1{rshfl ehsh suooede@ the flichsftehrar 15 as

c nder of Operations Stat? North Coast. The nov oramnder was direct

to oepeate, ciloely with Operations Staff Baltic. Coast, which was-

ott bye Oenraloberst l nen ntf the end of Janis, then b

Ge neralobert Strauss, and with the Cortder in Chief Wet.

Holstein an the northwestern corner of' Gemay wore occpied on

approrintoly 0 archb the 48Mt In~nty Uflision and the 2danal

'Division. t he panser repisomeat brigades " rossdutscbland" and U.Pc34.

hersn nfleO were incourse .f bein activated. The 325th Infantry flivision

(coer name for a reserve division) was withdrawn frocm fleuri.

On fl'3 the bouwYkry wen fixed between, the areas of Operations Staff

Noth Coast and the Co of r in Chief test. The Ucorib3o Coast was alarted

m 23 arh . On 13- the astaest i betsee Operatirn Staff

Nort Coast and An Orcmp ws established btwteen fopnber g end Vrda.

The area west ofthe Weser Itver s alerten. cnZnl

By apv otl the bukof the 430t Infatry Division band

raced Oldanbrg a rote to the. uS tho th fiavtr. The 490 Infant ry

Dith ica ws transpote by rail to the anearea,. The 94th I.nfantry title4

sam wiich ws toJoin AryGroup!, bdreached -the Aurich e lborst

araafter bating started mvemet on 2 earh (sic). Znthe matime, the

84th Inantry lvys ion bad. crosse the ?ci Fives.

VS #/t020 afl.e

O.about iri T re of ri to stf "lortli Cst"aaete

along the lower Woper Pivor, Those olent of the $ t Int'antry t i s t

which had already advuneod to the ~s ltvr were retined, while the 2

Niaval ivision departe to join Army Group H.,7.~~~ Pii Rom Rratnv Aren ttn Nther and g: lthen Part-; O

,flajrflthe Fuobr ordered the orbaiztio of two "outer" h aquatrs

(in view of .the diffiulties eneutered bythe central ad) for the

r f o upydmnsr iost r t t Ch e eSgnal Officer , fto. Ths headquarters were to b cob nd With those o

the Rteplaceet TrininAy in such a wy as to form the banes of Opera-0

tion Staffs A sD 7 (northern and southern areas, the stbismt o

fish bad already bee ordrd

12.LDr the task of etablsbu Operation Gru B (outhern ae)

was asige to Genrl flitter von Oiter.

ti. STRUT OF TWM WHAACD

a. Tb. bsti Shifting.! (foe on th lamtr=rnte s

set of rein! .ftter the brbthog at Ramne.

By.10 the fl h igtInstry fhvUo ha aledy bees

transerred to 9001o th 4t Tfaar fhiisa ad been shife to

the northeat. The 20th Ptee Difli bee vitbrnwn from th

noerthrnI tsube fronvt end transfe*rre . time Sfia, foflove afts

21 anary by the 1%tb 1'snzrsim'ton, frm lvakia the 10Mt Ight

The foflowing asetonal, ieldsm here beenso its significance, wscompled from souce mteria descrid in the Prefwc, and is thereforeincaplts aid shouldb suppleeted (Author)

r '7-320 ~22-

tntjtnr rvtston ca mve in t tho aidebroc are. in Zilesia. The

7I2thfa tnan ' riztan, which had been ttkoen. trnm the lower jeuse Vrrt,

adcomle Its moncoent. The 20th gnantry rivis in, int tMVt tim

rart of Utntent Azty, wsmoved to Col In 'i1.sia, to whic desia

tion the L05Th lolknrttleria Corras &.also being tasf re. torr

*CorringC wa for into the area west of Ltsnntadt,

vhf, ase 00wa Wop n* tei n s &sUo in cuse of being

transferred. The 24th Paio t)Iieio, which had been wtidanfo

RWW7i ns slowly " 4 to on~ iat' rut. Other moveen

Were in prgess from Coial (Army Grorp tHorth) to taag The transfer

of urits from the ?ifth ~Ar to )hnjry bad also bsgim.

was I ffeot

34t Tant' rivlinin

711th Inanr flvsi (from the West)

712th Infanty Divisi (arr'e is Ci+ws

1t49 aniy rmtcuer.t

i$-a anr frot Enotomtt Any)

it8 flute Cnp (s, 12th $S tzunr Dtrtd).

int Vae Corps (21st Panzer flvison, P5h nme riviiont

flovment of latter division torlstod (Autho).

-22-

YN 7 0-020

Vu hr Tor.t rigade

Artillery, mota, *an nineer units

401st, .42 43 45h,/th 7o1kr*A ril Corpo

17 t h, 1 9 th Yolk reieotor !1riv de

wosecia engineer staffs

Six fortress otnntio atr gude btatlion

One aswmAt boat oommnny

'?u bridge eolum

3Specia1 ld ? olioe (7omw StaIT

The are. picture wes as follows (up to 29 Janur):

$Stgh tnar Army. (from the Vest),# erpisis tan corps

356th Iufantr Pivi.ionfrm the Soutwet), elmet of

To the ar7nft ztcoahe-e -otbwp:i

Iib srtct Brgd

Futw Infant Rrtade

21st Nnn fli! tic (hrers as *f 31 Jasr)

25th. s, air rivisia

91Ei MA

fC.20 Ok

163d, i~~r T.'fi vLen (en rs t tovh tmr.rS

169th Infantry tirion (en rout*)

Fouar divtrttons

fly 9 Febrary th following vit had been withdnawn trom f Pe i

tanse Pittton 'Qiostt.in

!4ajor elments of the 232 t tanssr Reserv 7'ivisi

Twongient ofthe 166th tfnr tik

The vreasn tranfe ri units to the Xttt during the pariod

j ~~(break--throuh at tkrnv - vr) as Indicated y the

followin, recorded in t Situation !aook "mdr4$4oh

It wsplanted to tnzse fortyot wo units to the Uastorn Wiot,

with adfttonsl transfers after 1 Vr eh (see elow), Of then, thirty-

three units had been trnfere by _~,j,, ,,

(I) ~ Cro(oi s 83C Infantry Pittston,

4th Pansw iv iin, 3ad Infantry ri mio, 277th Inanr DAivso-

33 Ps"W ridsovnn, £ 03 Vener D iviio 'Nederlm,"

Inftz7 ivii, I$ls tnnr iiin,94lfar Dvso alt

Airw Cru lst*1 23t Infantry -Division (to Ater lo).

(a) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ n zDczj~fh ~ 1 1) Inatyflrsm

rtsnm (forely lot IarI Infntry Pivistzd

-2t,

Division, 37th Carlr ri1visiot '(latter unit to a rmy tGior oth).

(5) rr . Mh1ctst~anr ln 275th tnfantry 1ivision,

1.irt~iens 11rsark, " tobit, 'erlin' (t r r from Flensburg

ordersd on 11 rebriry), raner ivision 3otarbogK and "Eties te. After

1 ?4ercht Pasw t Diso ueoebrr and the Pot ranr Pk esou.

(6)~ ~ ~ ~~~h '.oi th C ie Chp et 711th 71Mt Infantry'

DriisIen, 76t olks, die tDivisionz, 25th 1'enswr eder Division,

21st ?anzer ri ision, 10th 53 ?zo °'iflflo n, 27th Thwhrer tIfantry a

ftshrer $soort Division, 29th 3 olteer Viiio (afl toAw3ru

flstaa) let, 2, 9t, Ran 12 53 ifn Pise (to fly Oroq, SontJ4.

(7T f t "is 36 f n rY-m d i iv bion, 16th 23 anser yrndter Diitsion,, 715th Infantry Division (all

to Army nnp $Soth, but the latter d~vso not until aftr 1 March).

Altogsther, forty*t-p l 4iiion were transferred byI Marth and three

avtsous after that dt,

On c a roiately 10&n the toflovie uits wie tnfnnw to

sn Vtsrtfler Cowp

Yd anlry !rigad

20th Nnsr tifli (frtym n tris ary arrive)

Th. 24th aor Dvision wa en route, and asto be ex'e d pith the

20th Pazr rt vtsion within the Este guot.

On 2iL r4 hiny $r-our §outh (cnot int~ittn t th ~ner r)

b. The Tlorth

(1 ~"tr Viom -urea uitr r of 1944 tv3o. fekw

forc were it lrw fro 7vi a Ft4 ?ian :

19hInfantry 7i vtion

196th Ifantr Diison

2691ti Ifantry JI'ito

560th Volkegmnadie tivisiou

710th tn antry Diflon

Panzr Di rision 'Z orwayr (pesone1Ali3)

Aroma h wdo 194 the 24 *ntk iito t h 6th aS Vmant

Division were onrot to the Wstsrn fot. The 169th Infantry t4tisimn

h a alaybeen orderd withgas for transfer to the ast. Th. 163d

Infantry Phytiien wa also to be transferred tothe 3ast, an6 the 199t

'nanti~ Division wes ordered to Denrk tor rerznisation inate the

45 Infatr Divsin 1 the gintgOf Hlan this division was alIso

frout, to th ten !'rent

It flbrtwy tht ffollowing unte wr still is the hirwfl irs

14t Inatry tviio

2th(60oa) Inatry DivIVWs

230th Iantry tiuin (ne aoi the withdrawn.

129th Infantry ti dion)

27Otht Inrntry rii

C-020 e27e0

6th Mounan rivinion

The foflovjM units were being tnnsfhrrc! to southern 1'orway or

hd alndy arrived there

274th Infantry fti sio

280 Inantry Division

7th ountai Dimiio

The machine-gn ski brigad.'

fThsr. }lirae "orwat

The 7th Moutain Division an the 194th Infantry Uiviion were also

withdrawn, the foer divie ion embarking on 20 Mao. The avac gnr

of tb. 194th Thftazty Division was at Mo on7t Mrch.

(2) * 7. the following iits had been

withdnra for trasfe to the *?*stt

PNser Division lolstein* (without cadre prOnnel)

S troy olesnts of the 232d pannr Reserve flivision

to rgiments of the 16th Infantr ~~iov

At th.a of Marc the 16t Ina try fLio, wiic badom again

been Wht wp to ful stremt after tin vitbdnwl of tw wft

wntnafernd to Any Gnup N, with at teninte4 Wy 1 Apr1. The

' 5th Dt~isDsn wes witsn at fth saetne h te 321th

Resen vlrui wes prerin for tresfer

(1)Thnanstoth nst by 13 Jnwyth 712th

nfantry Oiason (lower teust) an the 269th th£ ksr ~ir Dl ivisio

(ireeenth AnQ) bar! reeeivd eror far transfer to th Last.

~~tween' .fl ad tefiin~ units receive transfmr

ordcs

Sixt PaserArsy(tw raserreadlier headquarters staffsan the 1st, 24, 9t and 12th S' Psurer iiviston)

fTehrer Escort BrigsdeFuobrer Infantry lrigwade

21t Panr PWVs io (or issue on 51 January artransfer of the Panzer Loa'r Division bad en geleled).

I acdtion tothe obey., Volka artilley corps adari tye

of speclel twit were also transjferred (See Chapter V.*D7 i3,; ia the .C oanmr inChief west had transferred fourteen

tits to the t{actsrn frnt, ocrie for ten of which wer ismudb

22 Februaryt

Wt, 24, 9, ard12th S' Panzer ?ivisions,

fl2th Infatry flvists, 269th Vokgren.der Olie25th Pansergrenadfrr Diisiec, 21st lmar Dimt teon,

two ebrer briade (nawhtle reorgsntzed into diflaatn),27h id28 55 Voluter Dvtuiim (use ems).

Us aamt A Chf Wt 414 tot transfer =nIts to other.

seafls ofthCstrFot.

# e29

A

(~) rasC~e Vtft e .i Th ?c51tonL n .,5 ct.

t'he' nth = ituntnirai .° iL e ware trtnsferr&a, from' aorwy to the ° Wete

Fot. 'tt nt4were en route byI 3an ry.

The I6th tntrntry ~1jv stemo wae tmsterr& from t erk tr 2r

Grou !, 'with mrient t-ermrntiv by I : hAI.

d. the tathet.

3.56th Ifantr Pivision (orders on 24 January)

16th "nter rirbk (Orders o I !emeury)

715th Ifants PIwision (orders on .r o)

(2) gf~~ h Sfl9 -5.The 71th Infantr flir

uin bad arrived from tenmrk by JauL Vr. Paht t~tali vexa

reoeived (ron the Weter Frnt (see 'lapter 4)

a. oh Southeast. Af tar the bak -throgh at arar, for .a

time no units wee traf rrd to th Lastr front. On10 Thbruary the

Somuet in Chief "outhast noeire4 word to neoet the transfer of the

297th Infntry ?ivrio, the fLLftvaffe Fiel Division, .. 1h Ot

Lih aty Diiin If ponsbe t3eO is Chief Sotes

was toretain the let; Wnntab .DiO and the 73 Keutab- Disi.

asaign.4i the 7th 35 tVmai ivision

tthe Oasus~er in hi4.f Sotbt for Ioptent n a.The thre

fit-taeatnuord division we also nt in t. tha.tfor the

deene of Croti. "This disposition remained in stfot.

5..020

Ater t:.4 ori F R arh J& Lhht >fp~ ' tio yy y{tyLs

traf rrr& V.w tk -oc Ridt a ~nz (r §u;; South ), which wao- ~ing

At the bc'tntdng of tail tereweestfLi krn 3vio i

Croatia at thr'ci iTtria. T1he foflUwng CO- headqurters were

employed Us CroWt:-

li Mountain Corps (Thatee)

xxxx'r Corps '(eastern area)

1CX Corpn (eastern area)

17 (Cossack) Corps (Drava Itier)

With re.r to ro raiza tion of co d~m on 10 Aprf, see Aptr 5 uu or

date of 11 Aril.

Te 11 Light Tnnrry tiviton , 7 with the exception of two trains,

had, dartdb 13 Aptfl.

The follwf 0wnza-Ca" a t mtt were stil in the t ate n

3734 Thrtr ivisien (em route -to f.lbe439t D v ai n a S r j v)7th

f h tr f ti ri oc (northwest o tf W aao)

The ffoig ra a nt were empoyed at. Cr t Corpet

2A Ctin ttatry Division, 1t Croatian Rserv Divsio, the W's,

Apparently a mistae by the author, tn es Gsrmn d iictiswre notesgae vtth Rlownn nirnla. lio ?d Light Infantry P ivielon in liited inthe Garman Order off Battle, (&l1itor)

MS 9C.a2O -1

Ghards, all in the ?actb area); TI Croaton Oorrs: 5th ant 9th

Croatian tnfantrr !tviziens (all rre araiovo); .T C roatian G.orpa

7th an 14th Croatian inf'antry rvivi lion, .(al near Pred); 12th and 15th

Orocttan Infantr Pivisites (near Pobo); 3d and 11th Croatian Infantry

riv isions (behind the anot in Pal tta). Al thes units were of lo

cobat value,

2. Reornntatinn of Ol n ottn of New tits. O 0 sfa

etinvtso of two ne0w Yolk atiller corps for the Eatern Frnt wRs

ordered. On aprottly 25 anur the Fuebrer ordered the activation

of an antitank di1vision, condesting of ntxr battalio ns, to beemployed in

emi :mits against enem taks rather than in a large closed frot.Thi division wldbe sup bprted by the biyle detachents, edy

lntsrnte ad equipped with armorepiercing wepons, already in course

of actisatiosn. At ths end of January a Division 'Thnrlin" ws activated

by the training school at Poeberits.

On" 1reb rur the following units were being activated or reorganized

(sight divisions., tb rty'eo+m1 ve)s

533d Ifast flfaio (1 Wsy)

264th InantryDviion (15 Wy)

8th Inftry tvisin (1 Jm)

16fth Inantry Division (1 im.)

361st Infrtry Divizion (~Ju.)

Pate aottvation ta to be competed (Author).a

e32eCe., -OO

'Three aeditiao 1 untt' we. cr coure oC r:.or tnit ttofl r? &0tAV t0

1671d T't1 16 1)t tnnr t v io ct nt coawletion unortsin; 275th

infantry ?tviaslon, to bet a ctivnted by 25 VRebray

to benewly ao tvtdar the 2d Cavalr Division (26 :ay), aa the

Thabrer soor .s tfntry "tvisns. Aftr the eMd of Jaiua large

ftoms from the ?ay ye tnnfere4v to t he Arm, a lt ho ug h thy remnd

o rgnise it nnal regntzrts &rnl d sr one. entufly there wereto

The mnbe of prsn o ssea tgve to qmr units of the Ftptmnnt

?rtbu Arm drop 2t 065 mn during the penal from I Juy 1944t

16 ebrar 1945, At the end of which the strnth w.e as followt

Thtwnrgr.rn te 57,782

?anser16,767

Tnzer 1econaisanoe 10,412

?aznorjngor (Antitank) 25,357

Total 1246

Byr thetOU C Obmr t ?0t V d n Dtvstof sttne

a te apr Rtie, )md been reorganised into the 106th Infanty fttcten.

Th fll3r M. w r untts 'a~ c { ,1.: &~ tht V~ie--.conT. Y trcjf.9Gp +i}~ flit,3a 128 ware'Jppe

1 .. wvi. \?%.."Vr

hino -dlv 17 ions

UcilardI dtvisicrn

Denmark Idvso

± otal c ifa n

One divisio in Ro1an4 anM two divisio in V itr were rehabiitted,

adi on. navni division in Uollamd was activated. of adition,tb Fuher

Jeoort !itgde and te ?ulrr Thfantry Fjiae were reoranise into

On2 er a a decree of t he r ordered the trrdite actve-

tioa o e i fa n txtry 4iis in Weh reis X (burg) for assigiaft to

Are (map Vistel. Hownver, the Wehrwroht Oerations° tf fnrsd tint

as a e t the trsining Oact7y of the Rtpepia t ?rna Arm ightbeS Nrthr dnrs fer having airay be e n d bytevitlidraisi

of b 18th a 19th- Inatry DiIsion in Auta, 1944 Not ai tmuld

this nat' ni th Seilead flgh ara bat the e atC is

Mhef Wit. wold not receve the two division. pndst t fr Vhrkrl 4

Is a lette to $Utlorvs tlh aide, the chief of the Wehnot Opeation

Stff ;rotaste thet, op inci 1e, such onler shonl1d not heissed wit-

out his ocvent,

WI g,3 _302e34lte

On aproxintel7 9 rch the cern'fde of tht h pacement T raining

Any re lease siX field construcon divisions, $r of which iwere assigned

to the s:tern Front and two to the Bantamter Front. The number of releasable

march battalions was thereby reduced.

On 12 parch the activtion of' a Division "Hamiburg" was authorized ,

utilizing already existing units. The organization was to be comiteted

by 15 ?r*h.

On .as the tebrer issued a decree tbrowing all home forces into

the front-Urise fighting (movements Wtgoten and ostg oten).

On 2i gh the "Thuringia" unit had already departed for the Western

Front. Panser unit "Franconi&' began leaving Stuttgart on 28 March, while

Panser unit Wes"tpslia " was ready to depart on the B dae .

n addition, three divisions e~oth were activated from the cadre

pesonnel of' the Reich labor s-ervic and from the training schools.

Dy 28 March forty-three trains had been dispatched, twelve of which

bad been assigned to the eomander in Chief West. From the training units.

72,000 san (without tanks) wr mved by foot to the Western Frot and

96,0an ithout teas:) by foot to the Eastemn front. With the otter

forees c the total umber of s sent to both fgronts was over 2OO.

A Vt r' o b ly as laned, At the begiing of

April the acivation of- uoarmieran divisions wa di niu& ComnA, plebis

of the six ew divisions as to be carried out with the g test possibli

speed, with the area around tuneburg provided for the purpose.

t4 -0 c

3. TotWr,

Y,. r 'Ge"' . ix a e*3 4 x ,' %rZI1 fkP {z tbca' tt *~ 2 1.'c ,>r'fJ-crT t

'~tanrs~ deresi d&i / Te:e 14 tI" t% (t)

Sand poiee in thc x 'Ttro ;r o- rcnrrt: sit

q niifie ien roJezseIf ur ttiy t thy: front.

Teree ot 10 A.ebn Ga144 ra o1 the cRn~t'm aT0 n r r I ~ 4 wedu

fil Cfr~r te et to-nir ag t thrre 1nvnt 0i tk ?r4cp ne

erit trin n A n X y . O a l t t g 1 s-o i 1 ' " 1 t ' ' v r - M mn l P A 9 a r ± e r v f o , th ?4 o e hw p lrz i o te n t u r t

4a 2 ~6

(in anw an order by the chiet of t hi .' w$ i. etmht Ih Zonfr.ii1

decreed that Lnltes of the ?eich abr Ser-vtoz worea to beoraidcred

awflablo for cowbt in view of their rrefloua comtwtont vit n the

fraeeor of the Webnncht.

On ?Z anary the chie f of the Orgrisattot x & 3 sbmtate tc~ th

deputy chief of the Wemrraoht Operations Staff a report dlat 23 January

concerning a discuston at the 'Propaganda Ministry on the subject of total

tr, as fofor

(1) The tuftwaffe would ees 112,000 men by 10 February.

In recent days, 42,80 men had bean released for ooc ttrsnt 4ith the

framework of the AnM; 740 followed later. All of these troops rainedn

ora nizstonl~r ithin the Luftwaffe.

tadition~ 5,300 air signl coestmtcatione perseonl from the West

had been transferred to the Art. Within a short period,. the Lnaftwffe

also activated 100 clse bt tank destroyer units.

(2) The t..eplaca t Training Arvs bad, recently transferred

at lenst 0,000 -n to the Este n ot. Over and above the noral p

tow slasset and rehabilitetita of. the field foros, 56,00 additienl

tropi rstransferred. ry 31 Jaur en 1 Ztray 13,60 q ufe

an in flS clawsU 190 and you age classes vu4 bereleased for

oosdmnt &t the begirmiqg of )trmh it wes plannet release en edi

t nt 1 3,60 urn Of 33,00 umen *ae class 1906 qualiie for eervtn 1

the $e.laeunt training 4n had released 30 percent withouat watting for

their replcwnete

tj 34 200 37

(3) Since t ha n of 2Novenibr 194, 10,00 mien hd been

trm-ero'to tbt field fo s~ troug thc 10r 'xrzn re:Attion.9

a t'uthr red uct ion in tMx nabr o f men a ss i e to su n ra ilrod

u nit , an a Mdttioal 20,-00 men were wtdo aniabo:h. Bylevying older age

chassea as rep1 ac ene, two .Vuther groups of 20,E0 men each were released

in Februarzy an Mrch.

(4 Thw Navy ha al reay traferre t the ?trsq 20,00 e

from the forces under the Grand A dmi.a, Denmark,, 3,000 mn from a Navy

repl : t regtmet, 1 ,000 men from two hyartillery btolione, and

1,090 am which had been pla.odt at the Army's dinponl in East PArwussa

(5) Gains though economizing in accordance with the Thebr r'

decree of 20 January 1945 (errtion of Crtificates of ndispeibi iy-

toea class 189W awl piuger) could not yt e etmtd byth. branch~es

of the W eraoht. Secause of the ni urozua levies, only a mego? result

was expected.

(6) As a result of the total var, negotiations were mde with

the A aw to l sute to aceerate the remeise of tree month quots i

#,00a each, :already ordered bythe luorer in ordr treles

160,000 de duin the ooue of ?'enr

(7) The proble of sieuring auffiotent ainhr of af n,

Vhich aos~e with th, inorease in combat M*1, we emn by th Army.

?ropoeaA r to be submitted by the ebnnaht Oporaiome taff

dUgenera reduction in the ngmber of e assigned t non-combat dut

ThrclUng norsonn nlr.nned for transfr' to the r.yths pzr onz o

Are C)z]s 19%6 a&nd yo'mger qualifiedftor active sntoie 417,000 m

Age C]has 19054'9c7 not qualified foractive sarvtce (liite ser'doe) 2(l,OCx)

Age C1ass 190 and younger conition-'all qualifie for service in field

and/or labor servic ( Aro:.) .2 .0

950,00m

?roprtioml distribution was as tflo i

Wester Fot 26.3 porsent

Norway 4.7 percertItaly

Esstern front 17.8 percent

Sotheast 7.3 pert

Courtan 3.7 percent

The Reich (proper) 33.5 pecent

On . 2isn tb We tt Tigh 1 , implemntin the second

d aeoeooomg totti war (Wehvmeht vomatrilartee), datod

29 Rveber 1944, Fned regultipn with Amena an IV. Ann111 UT

wes issued cm 2. Yebnry end Annex It cci 16 ?eru'.

On 2~am Jn MOrer isuem b th. Wehrnot .High b m dcee4

that plice an ecurity forcs an duty at the front, fighting partisans

in the rear ar e, or protecttn the Zone of Intirir were to he niered

1W I

A ri 20e3c

a~bim', on active sordo03.

b. 2nomn 'e 7 l r In. remt 1. Ithe'

eornnmdor off the eaaotet Tdtip tr, on J25 $Tnay the Wehrmaoht

Etih onmn4ordered! the 6,YW) untreind men of the Paioh Mber ervioe

ompl.oo i n ehrkreis I ( Ao Cla 1928), togth-vv with their? t.Ths, t

t.transferryd, as soon as possible, by saea to the ftola nt Training

Ar~.

the Wshtot HX.. issued tsrrdecree

concerning tespyent of Ago Class 19fl6 in the activation and re tbl'

tefon of cobt-wvorthy units. Rep wrar tnin ias to be ensuae pedr

Is ease of sta ir 1andigs, Age Clis 1928 of the beiob abor

Servic ws to b release for coabat duty in aseorlance wit an ardor of

6r Yury.

on itU anr the Wehmot Qpermtiono Staff/Or~aation twao

(in reference t am Ch 0K 1 fr4345/45 g. v,.l..4 ) informd the !iaiiy

supply en .dltati ont~ .+s fficb that by Wider o the ?Nwbnr th a's

shae in Age Class 192$ mUal be nLuc by 5,00 dnaftsa and 10,00

wolFmtnn.t loreoe, the C em~r In Chef of the Nv bad alrnfly

agreed t dei sa~re of voute in tint egr olas an adiimZ

l0,0m usa In fvor of the Arm. Therefore, the avyt a share in A. Cls,;

192$ tti1ed 10,000 n

MS fi t-020 -40-

aemradu o to hrnahtOnz~ttnstattf~ra ~to 'rane

wrertatunnse to Age Thasa 192 inclwle thn ffoliowtn:

1. 222trsa~h

Qualifie or conditionallyqualified for acttv'. es.i

T waily unw.f14

3* 7

!fnrole4,Not yet earollid

4 Re jv b the ArM

r Fm the NvProm the Lufwfferom the W. nS

Total

5. ig 4o tp it tont fo the

etch lt' Erv t f

29 aya 21 F*rUr21, Veary .10 Mar10a2N anhb

3.3000

30,E0

550,E0

too,EOQ45,000

285,E0

7,00

(tranafer fromLuftt and Navy)

(3s,ooo 22,x0)(0 , 0i,oo)

475303,0

8100

019 hkmf th chie of the Oratt Rraaoh Whrmeht Operaew

tics. Stf reotd tat the 1'uehr ad. chaned the dstrLbutto ofAg

Clas 192# as foflova

edm

Prt CC)

Of the mzbr &s l" n to the !t7 9 237,500 were vsutr Alln

p e rmnel assigne t the llavy L uf t waf f e, nd Wtffe at $ 3 we volunteers

e. The 'Votleetn. On a0 th chief of the Whrmcht

Hih ad exp laind to nbodit rteatre at pipoe of

the Volutrs

1On 02 twenty-tw olketnr btuansa from Ouiad nqlao.

nine from the Woatrk, and six from the losel. were comtted, The *hief

of the liebrwaht fligh C a reqnto from thi u~wder In Ohio? West

&. repart onthe rele o. Volkustuna bttalions,

On l9 a tmr the W ot Operations Staff/Ognlain T!rn

directed that immdiately, at Vhsi aonluio of a cmt aotion, dispersed

oebr of the Volksttt wore to beretue to their or 1m wilts,

,26 the 1hret Qprntton Stff isue a dewr of the

ther ccmthtaent a the YoVhsstiu. If £ aesbat stat

o fr ,02edb olkauturs, art, sa np~ma i si diint

suite at the f2 Anq mid cat g sof brirdasio ens to lbe

On 1 i the Vebmucht Operations. taf/ bate rec

ordered that ale civlian workers of the Wehnrtet were to be roldi

the Volksturm.

A, 4 1- 00S~

matrnlttd a tdeyd msssql frc tr~y trc' A to tire dvny chief of the

Wsrtmcbt Oprations 5taff regarin a psiiitio for eor tment of -the

Volksett I t ias snugote that asecial gaops eupied fran the land

e rganised to cnuc vrtis r-no iartaro in the eeny rnat.

On the vase date the depat chef @f the 14 cit 0Ortin staff

mntitted~s a etiate of th Vlkastun sent at10 ?enr by lw OrcuV

Ceflr tothe Ar'q ugh c*=d/Arw Ginrl,3~, ccwritobit

UoSM at Vokt tits bad not prond ttub ipobat. The

tomaer of Ay Gr enter propoed toincorporate V7olkesum nt

into $lant of th Wield nyfor uspleyMaet in~~ Thi &ntrritor within

the Reic", as setit dette asi twra arems, ow to construc fsiel

fertiftia . *When, fthtis in famar area, a l Volknitursm ts

cool also bec tte against the a flns vad rer

d. Pertre.~es and 'Field Forifctions. On De. the.

che * h MW Gee # $t potW out tothe chief ofthPay

C.sl*n# Rathleltr Znam that inadt at subso V il we be

the defasi.valu ofp fctfalnadthtte m o

be repired wNg to thesotgeo ao, a1echltcatomg o e re air at *f the fortUM1mor Coral.

obert Cudria pdsd that the rPair of the ftrt iiatma, which hat

ba wbit undor supwituio th Party, eawipo to theanpts

district (ri) clea that an orginif? offier be ansigned as

advisor to the staff of eash t oul. O the We ct

,rrr;..

4 e20e3

OrerLionr' -'ta'f sent this rroposal to tho ~ eichlettor, u ~est~ng tat

it be eiot' In 11i wet theatervs.

In acordance with an order of 'the Yehrmacht 'Nigh Comrxand, on

25 ianry, the deputy chief of the We hracht %lerations ;taff 'lirected

that suppltes bebuilt up 01n the tela and in the naval tortifioations

zones desisnted on 4 tocemaber 194.1 b the Weacht O ntions Staff/

Orgnisation 1noh. Thi directiv e wa to be eecuted unto? supervision

of the Army Onerl Staff, 3upy n Administration !ranh.

On Jaa- th Wehrnot flub 0 r4 ismue a ane to the

reguation iplementing th ruebrer decree regardin c rd authority

of cut-ff unites The nnex Aoo.rtd. all previous orders ro iln

fortresses, Isand fortresses, fortress ares, fort ie places, and local

bases or utrongpoints. The. following was Inluded:s

(1) Definition of tam t frress; rortres C rder;

Dofense Area; skeial Case of fortress not fuly cons trutd or develope,

under the a rder of a detfinse area; 'Local Stronpoint (teded ty,

'Th Pubr would personally designate certin arms asfortresses

to hesrnl defe. and wo .mapint fortress d ,bae .

tb prpsals.?f the -var theater eenrs, the chief of tl r Qnn

Staff 'in the 1!s, m the C111 a of the elceat_ Trainin %

the ton of the Zterir. b Fsrr would also detean flethe~rth

Special R~egulatioms should beput into effect, incse of i12uficient

d efenserreratione.

-43..

CEO4 gins" a

(2) hake an authority, of' fortress oinanes durn?

prenaratonfr corbt sn actual fighting. ?Fortrezi eota re were

Personadly responsible to their arwy ro m. c drs for Ct 133 .?_i

assigned nisetIonw itnflxibly ani unco:ttionally tothe very end. They

eouVd be re se froms their duty only y the er of the ar

th;ater, upn approval of the chief of the Any~ General S tfl aw. h

rotau or er. were to be given only by var the ate r

eon or in the 't by the Ary Gene.l &tft, in acteanee with

Fubror Dtnoctio c~. fl and ith regard for the laet Octwt lessons.

(4)adf tmo grios Supply of fortmeses was to be cnucte in acoordane

w i th tb* directions o f the Army General Staff, uppl and Administration

Drnch, fpr supplying the eastem fortresses, dte 26 October 1944,.

On 22 ZP rn the Woehrmacht Oprationts staff issued a Ferer. door..

pertaining to al fortifiation gerrntly tuder construction, in>imling

mete likely thire qut deterioration, torttfinatieas we onyV r by *"e ihntenrfto be oaatrewe

vhe ncuidfortifloatioss wer to be ipr d depd+ upon th

n abflt flbrrcret rni work.

4. ~is'leus $ess Th haqurters, of the Chief of Army

Tquiuaat, until then cobine with the Co uidr of the fleplaeoent

43 -020 w.4$m

tranin ; my, was dissolve by a ruerer dcrr of 7 awy The rem~in-

lug unction.'; were -a sgned to th4 chief ofa th Arm otakfC of the eor

mcht High Qmnd,, Oncrl hahbh, who inthis cpoity was k. 'atl

subodinae V he Tehr r n Geea ilubl was thereby owde responsible

for the furthe~r co-ordination o' astent roductioni. (See below uder

SApril.)

Or the Uoetoftwehnoht Hb wdreovattentioc

to the Yuehnr's denn that provisions of. the Geneva Convention eadn

vehic mrkedwith the Red Cross be oberved.

On 6 the Army Parsoznl Qffioe orderd. that officers could

nlonger bediniand,. Officers not suited to their rank weret be

t .o in lesser grades. Offto rs wewe i thjt nee, to be rappointed

In s lower gae officers gmalty ofcris were to serve as nor lsitd

officen.*

on 24 esrnr the Wobmot fit: C - ordered the orga.ition of

a straggler interception s ervice, uner the cow&Aon% of the obstacle

line. The Webet polie forps had dlear been oooldats Vnlet -n

udr, within thes Wrncht.

On20 3Obr~p ttiebrer ?rmnk ws aulpd tcot Oath

lug and sply inldn thn distribtesa of r aw ateriali. A , *m 2,Wq + b

our detals, which were oondnted by one officer and hi jcrisdictien

over both ofiers adenlisted mn.

CsO2O a.060

Ct } :f the Arm etatf attch to the ehrnnoht YF~ C xx

wecmbined vith the 2hnOht Crano O fioe (crr to 7 Janury-) ,

The latter agency wa reseotrntble for wnttons 7upply muianc of pro o-

to faclties, e. The former chief of the Ar~ stat?, General Puibis,

-now receive the title '"Chief of t ,hzncht .sqntpment.

Ierous measure wore take to dis solve al ant hadquarters

which had becoe s suerf luo, ad to utilise the released personnel le

Ill. WAF !7GNOY

1. :After the Ioe of Upper Silesta, Thoc Mianter Specr

pointed out tht the war economy bad now been redoe to oriqfrter o

its rembr capacity, and that the 1nwividai brne would beaftected

in various isys (et dsteL 29 aur).

2. Amamet en MA ttiM* With regard to the axaswdtton sits

tdo at the beinnin of the year, the Weacaht Oprations Staff/Supply

iflauoh tssuod th following statement on Whie deliveries t

the Wetr ront bead been adequte, thoutpat of asmitios was dr4ppin

tthe point wr eere ittwui wrthee ecd Lec

Kb~t 4wbd dnw ra ttention I to this foureks beoe

nJaury195tbprzto of tabs, gays, and tis s

i~ s r t 2 6 m n h w t ir 'l52; assault g Ii'. (L 4 2):t 379; asa ult hovitw s (t go el 4 4) 63; assault

s fl (t 4S); s 3; agdpnsr (Yoeoel 38) (I. ) 4; Jsgd:ftb rt

--d6.

Ge0zQ -47-

Light field hswitzer s belsfl ,2%,XsIav field holtter shells 194,50

Yro 1 un to arc (omnth period ) throe an! onasW~f nilio

rifle ad been lo-st. Ear and automatic vpon were it su short supply

that in!'brwtry it ws necessary touse stocks assigned to Governam

office and non."itar organisationa. 71w LttWaffe an Nav wore U*a

able to rlease further stocks, an could not eve arm their own- uswl-

ctivated gr=antforcs. I a dirootivn to the G'nleitora on 184 trch

asichaleiter Rormnn ordered that the - 'istu." whicbh had not yet been

noot .into the hinact, was to turb over its amn to the Webraot.

Aan l reur for *atitank guns T7po ,' ed teak rae

Type 40 aM 42 a mutd to 1, 593,W0 rot, according to a eutt

dated 18 robrury. Janury prodtion totaled 367,000 rotuila.

PneEII s 1) 49

Anault One 28?

Jsdpscu 38 3

toa 1075

Thei authr pr l~ reern~ to the Vol#ks , since no Wehrtt i"kn on tO havm eritsedltt.'

d~ ~..020

Past 1555'pest 67.$uthvs 22

Tots 1 164

ispite of &iticuties, ?ebry production indu'5ed 25,0M0

mahe gts and 20,00 250000 rifles, inaddition tothe apodatel

1,20 atank. At this tie, hoever,. the reuctin is a=mmition Output

became critical, Duing th last quarterly period 4,41At trains of a i.

tin hd bo ie iptche , wile at present roution bad falle to $ e 9

trains per dy.

r in the ntight of r conference was held concerning the

dhi.d.tion of tanks and~ other pbls,,.

M.o{tpr 7,hietsp s. Within the first tor days of Janury, Ceerl

inisoh comleted the task of organisin~ vehicle capcit in the '4est

At the end of Jary it bawre ncessary tofrnish trnck capacity

for use by ri trtt &tl, lthough it wa considered doubtful that

ufcet caacty cudh rotd

4 t~oree. Nnse of th rtuia situatcna in psnl , it bnrs.

nenryt the nipply of es. On istdeow" insuet

hy t ahtah Co dredundtbe ubrothnw aztorseb

tabs of wrpniatton and ordnrd the release of those in exet of

authoriaz strength. bitn stk wer as fellows

IC jT -49'-

Navy$ 1556

42, 247

Rterlseient Thiinli&Amy

Afl14 Fled Q2ce3,69

oroe Zoneof Interir 134,8

fune 36,319Organisatio Teeth 16,E8?etch labor $ertoe 4 2a.-W

Vital 1,136, 1

TrainingArt

200

Pkeuirome nt ira theZone or Interior

were suppied to replacerelease motor vehicles.)

(rtrn at the frontandcotlunlreie

reports an ser toentads an aoewate ao~oomt

51 ;2t, l' Th mos riclpoblema was in th e shortage of

ful ua 'sta of the ntim eet h he fteS l rech

of the 1$ itot Opeto nse Staff gav out the fofloign oraton o

The tol sitwtion m become nc singl more asrious. With the

oeep t io of tbe plant at Poelits, anl of then 1rgd plt ad t eoriy

steped rodotis ince the attacks againt Brig on 29 e: 30 PonOt

tO potat o enlist plot ha also been toted toshut dewn, he

gas l tuatioa had to be ocutderod e ritinl. NothiM nifl be dons

ether. the to dem rots large tiens.o th At. Psergendiet

wtswudhv to:nv on toot or i v biyce. Only the Pne iiin

wore to remai fuly motorizd tot stgesin ha4 ba proose bbr

and vet already uder disusion by the Arn flno Staff.

9

-V C-020 -0

On acar 194the VAPQQ j Drm cint& ct ina maao

rrnu to tl Xornah g Gomi that thle ur-y ~ ftiel in Jannydsreeieduponthe ydraing12

edeoned hegrainplants running in aecor~ane with p' aned

,1eventy-for percent of the tal smout of atronft fue w

produed by the plat at ?oelts , whil from 31 pescet to 35 peret of

Dieel oil ant nhc gusolin e prodLucdIr the. plants in flofl,

Magdbur, Zoits, Letondor?, an coiIn centrl Geny. 2m cideor

to pnodo 7,00 cubic mtre, as 4 ato by the Werot erratic

Steff, it wes first necessary to protect thoe pints.

tJnuary It was plane to produce 34,00 term of aireft fVel,

25,E0 ton. of which 's to be produced is oelits. Produotion of whice

psoline rad 76000 tons, $3,00 to or *0,00 cble aeter were

slloaated to the Whmet. The Weoht Operations Styf dated an

output of 27,00 cubic meters durin the first ten days of Januar, dring

which time prouction riett nl 12 6,00 cubic mtors,

It v.plae to produce 04,50 tom. of De4.11, 60,00 to

of which wuit be all oatd to the w b he-s

h~nio, th ea output of 27,000, ts,

Aeorig to a alu11-1m dte set to th' wtmat

igh C mSbythe Zaooso bec/i Sectio Naystain fib a, th

poetlit metin 4ea for, fwi production ba erased sea-

sidr bly sinc 31 Pecebr. i attack duig the period 29 Dfler-

1 January and interruptions in proeton at the nodb~s antie +gerg

Germn trmsis wfl,*ierwe rke1 "

hydrttug1 'Tnt ha rsultsd in va. o in rodwtto that couVd te

copeetad. for only in * st. ?Pr owior. ot vedocle gaslin adc eeln

by 1300 tomt,# reducing the aeectd output. to only 50,00 ton (63,00

cubic mters). It had been possible too up for tho~ shortage of

14,500 tons of .Piteel oil.

A o dunddated Q I to the erncht igh ndr

the toono Rnnc Mineal 0±1 Section statff that arrft fu ino

loge bigpoue, sine th, plat at ?oelits bad not bee in oe*a-.

tipn since 23 Janay The panne predcton figbr *f 34,E0 ton of

aircrft fuel in January wae dropped to 14#0C tos, although no re than

12,000 ton could actually kepcted,

00 1945 the Wbraoht h9a a fmel mern of 140000 toe

Thrse thw tons of vehicl aoiew lost thoh th air attack

against Zits on 16 January. Other plants also showed a drop in praluotica

resutit from air attacks against cetral O0erwxq, although these loses

could b ado tp. The less of Zits and Len .ade it necessary to

restrict allotto of Diesel .14. Diese oil proucton for the Wbbrnoht

is anr we eate to rech 1,50 tens, o t s

.t 22,E0 on I anary and 22,0000 to on I ?ebssry

Zna ernm of the W ormh Opetis Staf, Spl

dated sulmited cc28 Janar7 to the chief of the Velraht,

High. * h ooi Brat* suiztto the fofluuing firsrad

tug the fuel sitation in TFertrys

a~ A 'irortt fuel nroduotton was atf'eotdb tht lo--a of the

40,03 tons. loich 1 hlstr Speet, hoever, etints that prdcto

wouldl reach only 9,000 tons. Twservs of the ;tohrfact H!igh Comnnd

amonted to 12,000 toti, wIth an additional last rserve of 8,000 tons of

unleaded aircraft ful, The W ehrmct Opertion Staff proposed placn

the entire output of aircrft fuel during ?ebruary at the disposal @t the

Luftaffe Nigh. C

b. Als t af the larger plants producing whle gasoline had

likewise stopped production, although most of them wee yzace to rem

proucion in Februar providing there were no Wirther air attacks, A

furtber di fficuty uas in the iIck of tan tucks to fcilitat, delivery.

Raers of whicle gaoline Iteid bythe W ohrht Nigh Cv- er

to be increased by24W0 cubic asters, 1r+ duotIon tobe alocated to te

Webrmaeht for Wbruer was canted at 39,E0 tons.

The largest possible allocation of ':i.. oil to th o ht was

estiate at 50,E0 os

a. Oin to the uneetaiaty of pwodtatioa, e t ts ith ngafl

to transport Awol could he made only. for tErst tea dea s Fe r,

7)rtcg tit peidrqlnasfor vaoi ga, l totalsi 25,08 ahio

, e pouto noee U,0E cub metes the rserveS held b

th V~rot HighC wes to be ims 'db 2,4C ableete

Re ofor tAsel. oil amuted to 60,O1 tonse, whil only 50,50

ton were allocated. O the riesel reserve of the ht

M

tt C -020

in53sr

Ciig Ocaarw ' 2,50 1torn (i t'b~ the re -nlvddowdt

ap'oxt ttly 14,TV tornm,

Output coud be boed only tr rtsing the produotton of the

Cnie oil ?rosan combino awd by using Uun ritin ._owotn.

tn a me uadi dated 313 nsr from the coanomo tranch to the

hifof the b g lth olwz la o 1wt

the PoerurT fuel supIy ws *e forth:

(1) on 16 Jantir outpuDi t of aircaft fuel awtat

to 20,00 'tons (con en. with Wehmocht Stf*Operations StUSpW fnoh),

Inconsequence ofsubsequent losses, heer, only 9,500 tos a to be

ezpeted.* The o~bmht'e reserve WBs 20#000 tone.

()Vehicle gsoflt prdcto Bst ech 42,00 tone

in the Zone of Iterior, 39,E0 tons ofwich was to bet f or use bythe

Vetrcht. Mhs ww the pplawmd proeton as of ~6Jammy. flowever,

as5 S OoueUrlf of 4 e+caed production oap sity, only 33,800 tons

(48,eoo cubic meters) as to beezete ?wPobablo Vehrscht reseve ca

20 Vesbrmney wlt be 240 citfers.

the Xtsbrachta tot"t

s m of Diesel $ stood at 22,500 t~ so, a I 7e0w

.t 1400 toms, SM t the at orftb= N l000 ta.

O9 the Vcheht Opatione "tffSupyna sulaitted

a mmramtu o s. a meutho of producing liquid fl al. it a conferene

" gyn.

.5tsEXa~

wtth thc' chief of -shzrncht etinsporation c 7 Thtorutry itt s ]mwd

that for -th qr t year a nw nmthiod har L&n kiomun for obta tntn-P IL

fudl from woo, although n o ractical sts ch ad yet been taken towardo

o uction. it was report that one cubic meter of woo s surcknt

to produce 100 kilograti of coal (J ete ike e) for use in teotn

penntors or frost 20 to 25 liter of gasoline engine fuel.

On S & the tief of the Wieracht, Nig b rid sent a letter

t(aulits Hater, asking his t sport the deuty vh had been sent to

his district ineetin a trial plant toproduce 1, 000 liters of synthetic

gasoline daily.

On flr~flthe chief of. the Wermet Operation ttaffp acting

oorders of the chie of the Wehnct Nigh 'ow t~, ordered rigid limte-

t4c of l K air cin. The Luftwatte vas to be ew~itted only in doci-.

sin areas, an than only when no other means wore aala le. Spply by

air wetob tightly t erestricted. Th. Arm was t aep r with tt*

directive by w ruetin air support only when absolutel necessry

On f Lbw~ the deuty chie of th t Operations Pranch

submitted a report free the Supl Wrih t hy Webrmnht Nigjh C

4*4m with t he suppl of to twt n*rh A. td o h reprt,

nf l ne plets Mdbo foredt stop produtiom a a mosultofn t

air attak. 'It wou only be pesaibi. to mesue produto n the erAd

fa)hh, if at &LI, so that thlirgst pr of th ntk.'s output woVu

bprodud during the# lst ten daysi Swyer, experience bad show that

th would either sucoessfully preytn the plants from reuming

~5' e.55e

prouct oo or wald ae *to then ohrtlrrrr they wcre cnxr'3 ti

oil rrtiua tn rn ' to rn c'1c 26,C Y-'A o It tcch -" marrluto

wa rumttnsz eff iitly wader militr tmne "ront. Inspite or fequerr

technictil tter rpttons, the three renmting nknmtn ere troduoi1 ore

tian t10,X rabt mtorsf goino 11y. hat te ouxput of aircraft

fuel was exote to be epecally lo

(a), Proution of afrrft fuel in March as npcttsd

torahao3b *the tirnt ten days. b ?h ~r~aet rsov e too a t 9,503 tons, all of

which would probably b laimed byth Ltufwafo.

(b) Production of jae olin in th Zone of Interior as

flt12ted at 49,3300 tons, 4*3,#0 tons of whch would b allocated to the

lehwaht. wuing the tint ten days of March the se b t was to b

be allcoatd 15,000 tons.

t'roduOtto. of Pieel oil Is the Zono Interior as estiwtM at

63,000 -tons; 4,00tois of whieb, wld be used bythe ~thrinact. The

ebruiht was to 1* ll o 14,6 tons drin th first ten days in

A further d flelt was in. tae Not that raywst bgin. rne~

la g upies at tbe lest isthe ," .st tndays of )ah, 1! ft 4 for that

purpose cold not e lesed inMach, tk h retnus hn

ao untin to 2,000 tee voult han t be wed.

?equrueata of the Wehrmncht durinrg th fist ton days inrZae

ware as followsa

ter j, used in te oGanan oezt' irfrto monhl tonage.

KS Ci -020

15,003 cubic mtere 3,000 ui te

Wohneht force witadn Zone oInterior, inolxeinsepQ4I

.21 1."ton az4 lZ.n ,700 1,450

(c) 7rrslb suote of snoto veil. fuel.

Q ~i) Dacss1ting the firt 10 dtein tlrch

17,400 cubic netos wore required, while output vA only1 15,300 cable

a.oiz Owing to prdutio faflurn., the Wehnoact p rti=n tf

propoee# alloction durtnr the first tern das of the -month of only 2,030

of the 7,300 ctic nrt assigned to the W ehrrwaht forces .in the Zone of

Tat.roar, The total ulloa tio possible to the Chief 3uply at Ad attw..

tics Offleer for use bythe fiel forces wes 13,00 cubic meoters (15,3

less 2,000 cubie mters). In agrent with the Chief lupply at4 Mbinistse

ties officer it ws 1ieoideti not to ongo the allc tions agrem upon for

the Wst, Southeast, .a d Sethwezt and to out the nme zry 2,030 oi

ete frot tn eomil for the tat, A suplus )wcditetio wwl h

he set tothe tty

(V " Pe4 Oils tn the first tea days ofMrc

th *4 wealeet~ 12 ,00tr (14,09 cbic ) f ftenl

a11, wile taI amout to 2,700 sable meters

no b e Vsr M 1A m$ Sipply .hrna prpoe th fofloving cutat

UTarm has iset been i cntilied. (?n4itor).

:& £C..020 n57a.

+"?vy 30,039Y ti are,As e r: tt vp.XF tesm (10 or "' lirir

tie EipysSttntttor . eors

Fiel Thes tleas t ,t00 etitrtr

Z*ofItros,401rrfirs teitr

Iaddition, the Fcoao lirarh submitted arport onthe ovrn

Fl Mtxat for p ittij W ott reevsad tn

psi e 1 emm* The 1,eomle a no was mo' also x ted tn .tt

* report on the mret oapsdtl of oruo oil refineries an o u

palatd for inoradn production.

6. TMe coal .prole was no less aerias tha that of rotor

fe,(.also notio on raloa) Since the mvwto a.fo

Upper Cloia vas diftimtlt, it was ees toills eoltste

D nhr. Ths yw aspossible only i fI trvti:t o frmtatp e t r t *ania i ra t r pot ation c t inued t o m -

tit was nt w een. Thsinvolved th iptctigof 3,~X rail cars

swuM, be delvee. tetwas swat topeaet t h 'S

atmm the Reich, Coal (ftn. an .13 cl stocks ter

W WsnI$ operngs in the thlteSe AMtoth USn M s te t. Sn wre tiad.9

tottaC ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ h er~~tffhh~aieai~ft of the

hidTrnsortSn~o. Gnral tep, "oi of. theZosaBeh

16 The rcrdi 1944 tad bee20,000 can dafly. (Autor).

wat3 mointed 4ehncot Coriior 4?or Csfl or2 Try. Th cal

ettmtior beomr worse after the YSaar n irlt in te itdle ot Jantnry.

ln~y now dropped from 9,500 t 6,0OO car daily.

a. Tht rf ernoe to rail twtti. On ~the ganeral

tra tto -u volved 2,100 trains~.due largey tothe critical uta-,

tiem in th E~st, With the Ios of U1pper Sioi twith seious bomb

dimge i the &hr, the conumption of coal w redusdb 35 ' rcet.

Throug trains wi's no longer ruining after 2Aza.flrig the next few days, t wether ittterruxtei the enmq air

raids, and tif 27 Sanusry both t. col arn mtor Nwet# dito slightly

i;prove. Ifros the Rtlr district, it w osil to dispatch 2,000 ars

rather thin only 9,000, vhfe from Upper Zi1uia 1,60 cans ri' disyatold

in the direction of rits. fly 31°; the rail. sitaatiou ha M tl

frther improed , but by the middle of 'elerr train from the Rthr'wicho

ba been rwning at the rate of 13',>0 cars daily, drop to ]Use that

10,00 daim. The conition of the taeks ws not 'te only ans. for thi

de oom On 34 at - Genel Stapt, siudttid, reports on this

antter to th chi t f th

Aftr the attacks en Dresdea it ottbus the sitution gw eve rs

es The supy of roabl. lonttnes -was peial low O

104 Iooamtn vaerpre ots at day aloe.i If pera.

ties ware to onm, and i indut reeve 25 pert and public

utilities MI ercent of their r e ts5 36,000 cars woudb necessary

143 # fl-OW -59-

to r~ttain rai tratnortaton at its proent loo i t tbr } tioh

territory, . onl 2%C a~r lne aflblu, thO o~zatl of1f iniwtr

would drpt 10 peroent, wbietrd S ean a3.~st totel stoppage. Iatoer

not evn 28,E0 cars bdbeen andlable.

Since rflira .ds now used 50 percet lignte, coal -hid to betken

on every 70-80 kiliaten rather thin every 200 kilomtr. Mother dine

advantag, of ligite was that it ite srks

on omW a 8,O0 an wre diptch.fo t ~wa

3,0040 oars from 'pper Silesaj the total unb of cars fro al

areas was 26,0x0-28,00

As a result of haydamge to the switch yards, switeling fietlities

.b , ; tad bs reduce t 40 percent of mcml, While the Menat

of oa frm erining disrc oao Upper Mhasta bad incresedt

2,500. to 3,500 cans daily, the nit of sn from the Thr bad dropped

from 8,00 t 3,700 daml.

1,.r outrsasr. On . the Thhrr acr rd BeicaMiiserSprtorgne a tnfti staff for the prupos e esihg

teentir tasoatio sys on a priority basis. The staff vas to'

tilt a seos5ary m. orpi ing eM nres lv

Os e ' si it te Spec ceive a de aile dtmtv a

thedsri i of" a atin spas, accodin tma r~e prtoa

to na torecine first priority. At the eci ing ftte h

following ordor of rec+alen s w estas:

0059-

(3) "ood

Ministry

(5) Pofuge(whicah inractice iitml had t the mv t

or rby train would be st~ogy )

Thcnpt for po uoto of amcttin, mhic contine, al'trdo

tion ws nov liutdto the rAesbly of existing parts.

?wo milli o kr were prouAed to repi the railr traffic

netvrk in additio to 180,000 regular railroad orrs and the techn a

emrgency venonvol wdy availttbl, 100,E0 ar pIseWIRM wre arhed

to th Wrious work site.

0. ~ At a confe eco of Ttdoh uder-sceta.tes (a report o

Bhch was writteb Colnl (O') Poleok), aout of 25 percnt was conidered

ioevtable after the expiratio of the current food rtio card period. An

equal ration was to sufc for all except the f iig troop. Oat heaviest

t~tr, At thi tme th fo citation in X exo tLer 3inaa

aIed rttal. A4 s nteut of f ills in ths areas,

reulin te bash e 2. to the ista ofl p n VTs a e

stbs n IA b = t ct Rt s adf m to-m f t *t Re a r, *i a cn feree. on th food sitnt ta-ith th

*duty objet f the 'Wehrmacht Oprations Staff. 15i jjj3b thedeputy

-1-

chief then sutaitted tothe chief oC the Wehrct fli h Cotwvnnd, thrcug

tbr7 chief of te (I rst t n f:t Ji~ ov~ op nioiwv dog-Aher

With a mxondu b o 2oslr &ni t surrlosontar comen t by the Wjehract

(te.ton $taft. iTM dep ty chief' f tiw 'eriroht mra tionti Staff was

of the following opinion

a. The Reaich Minister for Thod and Agriculture end tk chief

of the :Arw Adninitratioa Office shouald submt reports on the food sibt-

ties as soona possible.

b, P*on fo+h 'a cht, -except for froritlins soldirs

an the working ppation sho44d be equal.

o. The good physical condition of the tront34ne troops shoulyb

guranteed during th. next few mnths, slae* this period would be declaim*

for th. ho o etbewr

4. The physicl strent of foreig labren houd be ststained

only so far a s absolutely necessery.

e. Gomtries .till occupied, eipecially T'mnrk,, northern Italy,

and Croatia, wo to be exploited t e ulest sibl extant,

t4 Raton for the pultion of trritories stil oeid fl

tbe Cms would ave to correspond to te f the Gez'ms popmulio.

9,il t-a~mten at S .5[ The aicutiooftnorswhc

vet ob ivnn a the alveg. of geo fr thm areas von* not

actal resonibilitieso the Wernobtj although the Vsbmaoht a~s

610ithoia . the solution otheprbm, for whic, howevor

tb*e,. soon seemed to be no reedy solution.

C.T40

9 GemO2

~t ~ J itwasIsanedthat vr~ Grouts Center had suitn~t

a pr Csa th t t.ry Chso~e .n3teneaeViekwmtt

in a ata evacwtiona the population, ,trtl and nemhmnery trcm

an area thir ktloxtess In depth vest ot the 2ser.

C 8.A the depn~ eit o f the. eht Ctpctioa itaff

siabmittMd £ report d with the a m f retgs, accordigt

which 30S5OOMQ penn vr in ao nt. To guide, Ne*d,ad

+ Wthen ern $EV ttaxed *.thetorw ard g~ -agencies.Ct the t! of the WI. igh stated that

ar~y fute waatton of Slies, the sarthe Qau or Last Prussia wonld

serious tidager the suppl and inrityo pgnhtin atremaat

in . qtr evcai or dipring sm woudb nefr

with btrpsn not ony would interrupt presnt s but wo~1

ed r thet rqti artoring ara, which were red rm ,

Morove, ay ddtta evcain would ama subetin tmy a t

bror and cold an to the er of being overtaken, by one tanks.

Therfor thethi! oftheW tdighCed foUwse

a. tacaer partial na0tte vet otirsobhtsal

otto be onuiAered.

b. In Siiai ther was to bo n evautio f are oete

thit kvetnwst of the an.

*.s Local suetI' =adi he#ad r r

t VTraniAr wan not to bes evausted wunti a oerafl

vitan had beet evct

gS 0e2 -

dci. eiur of civilian veioe~ by 'faoV Coresi cabh t

arnas was for bI i:na

o.Fortress cnemindero wae to support movnonta accordi;to

plom. Comnbdens could declin ad.mid o ci' saoted przsonno only

Twhet their fortresses war itoat with the * This provision

ap: es~ a~ yto the forte s ci rsn and Kuetrin.

04 2 p nb a, b , anid oae eindet by lretive

Doretive ismudb the chif of the Paty Chancellery perann

t l savc of prt left in evcaid as wre declare valid for the

W~b onaceording to istructions of the chief of the

vamaot Cohnw to the a of th three taete of the

Vtwmcht atn to the fleibsfrelwer 3$., Sainag. s ean ware to be we

taken only when the ilitar Lesdon as net thereby prejurliced. The

mme. and difciblie of the troop to be onsidered more freortnt

tin the salvaging ofmteiel

A+ digto a ;dabytheupfy on aeoefennat

th -mto Ktie t r ti- results of the wr a

lhtsg lina tet th. ta moat oefleittsad nm

tan 80,00 to > wo The Wh13meht evnutl reuie '000" to

Kisitry pised cvil stock in e d easte sone at the disposal of

1? A nation-wide collectioso clothnms n material. (Miter).

-63-

~' CeO2O -64-

the troops. Wir tha purpos th~ ZYcnor ios Mlstry atine Vie

Carn Jhie at thrs 1 tional ioc hltzt !Pu2A :C a Aaoeation to

the !fnamoeControl Office.

On rbrar to hief of the $ohnnoht 'ihCo~tsnd ordsred tivt

the ary gruswe to supot the onox tioo a le I'Iswbers of' the

Reic Tabor iServio, of yotsesonhzg onfarms, and of thou. sent to theydi te lt ts

With rfemmne to the order o 28 ternary fobiddin eneution of

miflary os~qrtrn from emldangored eastern .sa, the Wermoht High

ii ordered on that toreo neation no uravoidable, the

bmonhns oftet and the Waffn S~ were to saknt secil applic-

.ic to the Whmoht I C ,. Operaton ;Staff'/Op atton Rr

(cmare with 26 Yetrwtry).

On the chief oftit Wehraoht flig Condthe chief of

the Party Chincellery, and the elgat. Gneil: in car of lbor enpply

issued ng*tio for the . i oable-odied vte in the ctvfl setor

F en te tress,

the leof goods lot by the a t ien te a , The r-

Sore se forth fofleed th princlple l~i dow o17 Jausr Iy the:

at shrte 0)11m prootir for service In the Wehaot.

aa, wr

tCe00-5

On 5 hbnr the chief or tb :%hraoht Op attons Iytau, Supply

Lrtncb, Colonel (t1i) Poloek, subt tt& z re port on co P ronc of tiner-

seoetries floptr,*' Relcko7 and ritzyngo, and repreontativeo of the

14nitrie for Tinnpotion, STustice, Ar~ants and War Poutn, and

Public Welfare c nonig enc ito and the m nt of reT'gw

1i) nSilesi hre wre 500,000 refugesityl to b

eettdfo the flroberg and Goorlits

Prior to the a4. eda, ket !'rassi bad about 2.3 illion

Enabtents, the present distribution of which wes as fofn t

tnsg area 320,00 persons

0torara of 1n 1,OI

Tot&1 1,360,E00 so

Of the reisinin 940,00 eon abmt 500,000 were serving in the Wehr-

mah, the Voikatrm,, eta, The balane of 4OO0C0 had stil to b

nated fro 'ft Prints, Of t h*ee 135,00 WSre at Koip g,,

*0000 In ithe ItttlsbZrg triangle, .M 400,000 i

en tM 320,0 psns r last PrnsU by ate.o

(a) Devt a Edneti y Robu4ter fttmtit thentbe eqe ntt. enouteI h at (amq ertfly fir e to b

andS only by looa l t diem n), an essintian of. the ar faotm

themajor. Ango n ofensi wa nwder conidention. Snob a mn

metwoud hveinvolved from 800,000 to.1 t,OC,0 pe~rao.

-65m

143 C 0-20

Woen withthet tn fr 'fsruoo frr th £aat, thare were tfl

cra'teortag fao1tte eetsmt or th°a Tci for between one ,.m tw rifion

persons. Th joulntio vin .oxt to be roquosted ani not oreret

maute. heconfterence tttbs die c'±se the food si tto and the

attit'teand nrle of the raynitou

(3) Cowsideration wa nlo give to the dinsolution of

54v hnqarters e#t office of the un]. th alinitrattos or eh ot ae ewe h osadt t fof the

Webwehtin rascosrie bythe eq~andto he rulstb oftheir

aeodtd e it the Wehnzot, 2011te% topr"

tices Staff., Organisation tranh (t) submitted arsrport onthU subject

to tedeuty chief ofthe V hrait p tin aft and to the te

brancli of th W alt, in order tobgn neaimnton of flprw

-11w nb Mt~ 19 * asnt0 *=oreno n held to disas e nfg

probe, which nov abrced $,350,000 penn. ?toititt were tJner

secretaries Kloper, Dr. tukkrt, Tteo Oansmel, fl, fr "itag,

n4 olnl Po~sok as wtsontivs of the t Rg wmM ~~

mut OpratUo Staff. It wan reported that t smto u u

Prssa af pebb be coplte witi tw ua"A wetb6

m ver t to e anted a -19w. a 'rsx. ZpersdLoe

snn.- *fl antc ttUMo th sttep ad5 the Prottotes

~iwy wie n ~e w e was a serlosbo t with5000

Sfeiastfltbb ob~ed. Zbatehelph~d tbeuztndto the

500,000 pepe Wieat. Son and the 400000 people bhmle s a" rn.

flai

of air att.0k3 cZrcac ziC Z itz. *in I'ter. axt provie ioi were 2aWie

to crznrtcr 150, C E) Zata-4ri ?e:fuage Ia w thrn Kb chewi, Jutlaid, ad

()The ev~wtion of personneli zi Dftriel frc th Etau

was also diuaad, alonzj with posstbilitiwa of dnliting rwle refugees

from the an itoU the Wehrm~oht and the IeihLao Serice.

The dime, draftod a it Opontiona Staftf 0in agomt

with the ray OhawsIeltv 0 proasue for furtye evamtie

no DO lc r appibl#, sine the iLCS rWe t Row coidared a

cetrzied cotrol fraa Berin imossie .in view of the fasangingl

hitnattc. AS eoawc of Am Grou Vit, the ieeoaerrs

strollod owmcation 5*his terrtor, while Ate Gru Cner to

m te its stiat, of thesituatiarn to the r"sonible Gauli*tara;,

wh wol then begin ewewton. Thtori was to be reowe -only aftr

a pertial eneutton of woen end children.

On 20 e a coaferanco of siletu at the ?arty Camfneelr

rulte te of wa%1 refugees. The Wsnht Opertios Staff

Organintioa perticipated '' order of the ttt of th waV h

Wihreadt the dieoitiox atho lave o 89 to ottelals

Is t. evet of figt ta lrlgn tom t1ol ClmoflU dotae an

20 t t nl ,eoatbzg ordr stated that thq1OIr 4rasi

the ,~ty Th posblty that ~rlt sig.t be enicrelod oreven ip

0-02 43..

ingoun .'''ghttng hd not yet been discrsaed. The departure of womn

ad children was permitted but not ordered.

On 21F rorw the Wah rnacht H i gh Coin issue di r etives for

dispersal air! evauaion of prona in the 'bt. Only the & atrs end

Reich Defense Cosissicuere von to. be re Bible, accodgt the

directives of the Party Ch nllery. Nether eystmat e*mtot of

prso from th fld n Oman Zones viet to bedisootimusd Ahls-bodi.4

tie man skied workers Yore to be ± m te d tr all crcnstanon,

An order of 22 ebu state that th critia s itntio with

remr to replaoent personnel ads it necessary to emist all s it

bodiead men fro o eit aroe ot th Reh ad from dktrita4

by airattacks. Thseunwretobe pattnto aetivoswvi, ino ofar-

as the wore not idise sabe in the civil sector, Th. regulations o

w-re supp4a nted an follow (Be. i)a r(a) AU able-bodied men in Ag Clss 189'7-1929 wer

tregister lael with the loeal district Part chlat, who wol

theu subit roto the Wweht draft boards.

(b) Ia the areas of each erq pt rqiatm-

tic Ab ee out by te leal Sntnepti eSt g i

(. slrttu isit or 4ft boad.w

to cnduct .w lnis of persose 4 d ieomal for dn al

war missios wthin the Zone of Ite#rior. In tinamm areas of the

sr. groups, decisions as to indfr bflty were to bemade by the

+r6800

A r4MS C2Z

V hrris eo iner Those nersonn bsing noo to the rear as part of

the sy titc eva*o'wt.tien wre to k~re tsre4 in the:biteraertion areas,,

(4) Ae l cass 1 9 2 was a s sig n ed to the Reioh Labor

Serie for -syatctio traiig, while other age olsae we asigind to

trining units of the arm groups or to te Replaeuent rining Army.

() :ge Class 1929 we ailed up on sohedule.

As n ut for deciin concering idisenbfi ty of poen on

in in the 7on of Interior, the chief .f th Oratapo Branch on

24 e distributed instrucotious date .6 ?ebrwy received from th

relegate General in charg of labor suppyY

Dy order of the W hrsoht RihC . , Wehrweht Opations 3tf1

th. deputy chie of the W a cht Operttos tntf isedods dated

p6 ?srun to evacuation of Wahrcht hedqare

from area of the %ieh threatened by the

(1) L the E~st evecution within army grop

it areas was t be dependent upon coent of the arny group conier

as the highest area poss n esi Wesot authority. In the Vest.

eva tio1 a to be ecutrofldb the C ndew in Cief W..t itbi

COaSa urea.

svaution tothe rwar wa e fobidd.

()OaIr the -mss of. the three smoht_

brnches were authoriec to rqet excceptios,'hich in turncol only

o*d concerning a list of occupation in Which there Was ashortaes of personnel.

143 CO2O

be granted, by the F'uehrer. equests were to be sutbmitted through the

~ehr oht t er tion~ $'ta 4 to th ch&ier of the ehrwrtoht Iligh '° nnd,

who would the1 ni' the consent of -the F'uohrer. The F'uhehr 's decision

would be turnied through the 'Wehriaeht lligh Comnm2.d, °Wehn#cht Operations

Staff to the a p rinate army group ozmeer or to the Co ander in Chief

pest. The decision of the Fruebwer vws binding.

()The 1'ueh2'er issued special directivs valid

for the Mehruaht High Oommnd and th. high tomnde of the three branches

of the ehracht,

tvacuation of civil government offices in the Mast and West was

regulated bydirectives of the Reich 1inistry of the interior dated

l t r1 and 2.'emLI2 /.

The eiohsf ehrer 3f~ a.represntative of the ~arrfor organisa-

tdo of ndtonl rsistance in the at was responsible t or the ea 'tiorn

of civil ian. Together with the chief of the Party Chancellery, the

Reiohsfsehrer S issued the necessary orders and directives to the gopeasar=y

For the sot, te4irestiv o the Iehrm oht High Camn, Wehx'uat

Opration Staff daUted we an=,1lidit

Oa~Lfrkjr the Wbwme*h+ Qpratione, $tff, ~ipp1r Ldidsfitrt.a

Blrach submitte a umandin on the oonfoee of a drmertawbu h.ld

on th. se date, in wuhich the foflow we reportd#

am D-

y~A ..Q efle-

()There were 152,010 ) refuges in Tts

T'rum and 400,000 froma'~ z ag :Ie$t *nij rtll fr. tyse*

($With regar to quartoriu~j retusees in

1)orark an the Protectrt, the Reiohsfuhrer 55 had decided that t

least 300,000 persons were to be a .dt"c to the tatter area. These were

to be qtmrtorsd incaps or with rnan f ilies i the borier awas.

(g) he mtter of stoppin the population

. tfroth.Zstwasto deidtlponbetve 5 1 SanlQ roh. After

1 Jun 19k5 there wol no long b. any horse fodder in the 1.±oh,

A) 253pereent out in the food rations toe

effective Ldately,4 wtb a 35 porent out to foflo on 9Arl

By fl /4000 refugees had been enetate by wter from Esot

Pri . n addition, 2400 wounded were witing at Koenigsberg for

transportation. 5ew thousand wotmdet had alrea been ecuated. On

320,E0 ore refuge were in course of eato across the-

1'rltic Sm, By jg mbMr the tlay had ea cute 140, 000 refugees a$

28,0 wom ed. Thse figrs roes that by *. 134, i 78 refwe

bdbee 260000 ahwlm s r" by

11Wmri 740. This rnsult s ae bttleek ~t wi eo, Vdlr'

en 4,00rfge er ahrd

lbf. atyr mjor less of lif aecured e th etsn WLh1a

bs tlef' with 5#50 pwem m board, we sun on= o

sip te passe grs, 3,W)0 were refute Only 800 persons were saved.'

4 002 -a72.

10,170 soldiers, 4,3 tv1ia. k riw the prto. from Thnxn.:y te

4 April 39,959 soldiers an 6,95 honses were wve from eas to west

across teIit.Inthe u er eic 2,045 zen were aoved to Arn y

*OUp Gouland , ad10,524 men, 19,000 horses,, and 7,016 nhiolss were

moved to the sth.

Wiring the period Ii r 243,000 persons were encated from the

Eel peninstflt9s,*,000 wounded; SI.,00 refugee, and 66,000 soldiers.

1. ,~gjp4fka y the middle o' Parch an Elbe Line With nimeron

bridgeheads na to be established, construction of which was tobe started

i Doh bysecuity fore of the ?p laewint ? ng Anq. A Mc4la

Line was tberecoennitere.

Reports on the fonton of partisan units in the roectorat had

incheaed, but bythe middle ofMarch it was not yet certhat thse

2. TtelaOm With Zeutrals

a.m 'witu s. At th beining of194$1 thereat taofAls

presure o pn a $is Aeflvettee to Gas and the shpa ofseSt

ftaly. Ost 1ntdSae t ea a no .l Ovtnrlat

stating thtrea~tio betwe the two countrieswolrel

althEg it ws hoped that deliveries to Ciemny ould4 be stee (se

COapter 4)

b, Sweden (a Chapter 2).

W 4 C%.20a3

710P1st~ l"nts:T'eb aPi orfnrerec,. tt 1h b ininr of

t r t w~e antrottnori tlr- ' rscir F . w V ":' :?t w th

Churchill aw then nroceed' with him to a. conferrne with 'tQLns. W'riting

frorn Athens, -Churchill had Dotnted out in a letter to Rooseet' aw

?Italinr that in principle the sittu tlors tr the lihtre .ted areas should b

clarified e dJntr it was anounced that the first mieeting would

take pl ac si n F!agaon 20 Ja . On 2 'er tr itws learood that

the thre leaders had. been in conference s ta the 'r eu day. An

official scmquo stated on jf rte that the meein took plane sa

where in the area of the flack Sea. At the ewie time, It was announced

that onthe otccasIOn of the conferece the three general tvafe had neottwn

ate with each other for t -ftrst tine. Apart from what was reveale by

had taken place at alta, arC had been. preceded by a meeting of Churchall

an Roosevelt at ,alta, T'ollow&i this, Churebil and Eden had net Gen n

Alnaner, the Btitish ctmuser in Italy, in 1thono.

As Geea do Qanfl had d9olinidtbe invitation to Camr, abChril

had refue a ocunt4nri ttto t Paris, the* tenion bee francen

th u..Auria ws clearly visibl. Itt was leaned that theFrs

Wfl angry si @oesin ad to Sali withoet ter conent.

r- t a/j

?W& c" rw~jtr AtA tJOWAY ANT U"!Th1C

It.'lti 4it 3ton After the vitbdrenal of the Twentiethl

Mounin kryfrom Fnland awl the catablis mt ofa shorter front, Whtaa

took adantage of nral onditions, itt inte.e to ithdaw as seq

trope as possible bywy of P rt, These tores, now a3804e in Noray

but nolonger rqre there., were to be employed as reinforcements on the

Iaten mo a e r r n s at cans long foo m ahes had to be m vde throah n w stad t ice

porer to reach the rirods. tiittcties resulte from the faer of

troops acrss the fiords, while further delaye were caused by the poor'

.oneitioa of the railroads, the lack of coil, and oc aaiuwlly by nbcag

he lon distane and the atur of the terrain to bovee weul have

*ose muh tin evn under nrl tamns wuit .cnequtly, 1

masures had tobe adapted to special onitions

In spit of nob dffioultias, it wes posble to wtMnv a ecniea

nmshr oftroop f o fn and to U no -fotA

r th itakto fek end th btrefe of bedw ere n affle o theperiod Jannr..Pobryr, wie for the peio Narcbwprfl only the ittoBook na ailable (Author),*

CAM02 e075e

untfl tho en of 194L the folloing~ units were with rdwii: 19t Thfir

viton, 3.6hItnr ivision, 5t:0h 14hsgren'vIr a ''vv: Ln, -Thith

Infantay Division, ant the Panzer Thvilo "ora. The T ltter d vsion

vitrow withtxrnt nm an equipaont. Arochn the end of the yfir, the

24 im~n flirision anc the 6th 53 toan ')vid were in the course

of being transferred. An order wen also 'give t wihrw the 169th

Infantry tdin.~

Ow ., the uder in Ronmy,-Gsueral von Nttenhoret,

w sucdd by the ca ado?, of the Tenteth !4ountain Army, Gnlai

obere Rendult. Aft 2 a g: , Generaloborat Plndli w de irntd

o ider of the nWeri ttot .lrtat Army and Tar Comlrer 1{orwey

On n the asw tinter oaa~ r reprte that the dockyirds

could tnt be proteted spint sabot, in ea dne with anorder of

19 Do r, dhe tothe Ine of dq to securit forces. The comnutr

repeated a preos requaest toretain tb. 169th. Infantry fivision. Waen

this r quest vsdeclined on 'Jjp , the orerrd the tranfer

been gie of il nvw to n hy u incma nthe preioa request foradtil

fotes, to detasntiatrsnft unitsfree brwffr the protection cfthe

Sowat J odt$, who .4m a the Jarv fret, Balmw ffr t

0Rsfi ms o ilpa~ wuld toll~w asm th ocy r oe &U from innd to not'

A enfor orp with a eorps.type staff *4zwe by an armyo r (itor).

W #030 s7r

Sweden, Thbe snow tuna ] that had btenr built there Wiar' d sroys at the

b rir'nin of " Janunry, rikg x1 lorr' :tretch of tho road t usae :hlo. Te

Alts airos, Wyin ahea of the front, wu' also destroyed alth ough the

field rai n e ocunioi totr the timeo being by four fighter forrnton.

P Iso at the P it alrirow were 12,00 cubic moters of 'salvaged goods and

300. actor vohiciop. Co pieta evaation wes not expected to be rrried

out wif th enmd of January,

a'reas int frt ofth. arisiarde position were abandoned and on 341 f

th northern setion of the Koriiando positionva weoope. On? Jannr

th eney (nt Finsh D~iviion) opened with artillery Are on the tin

The plne sumrine attack~ onIola Boy in the e "e rear are -hid -to

be eaood on fl0 m for technical r.osons (vibration affecte h

oil coquits).

The further wtthdraw l tothe rilpis ja.rv (3ezaerinr) line boron n4thutu new poition was ready tobe ocouie a3 n~ .. M

ws to be held ttf Sring. Z that way a f strip . Finnish ternrttv

-is u baids, thefinal poi .on that bad -boa prpare wes th

Lyng (laer. line, vhio wes occupie o

Aecr ism in, ,the Alto Fird was evstdo S Rovs

bttalion, vhich lad arrive 'b ater a sort tin befor, a a fu hnred

menfro ie now advanced into this ares (Krknes, P r iod,,

.-76-

*F O ~wVa

the nde contact only with afe Xcrema tz n toc troops Ztghtig

on the Ci r nEf si 43 with whon: they exchra h ot3. At thisU tLiu-e tber.

we r roprts that the kwssians h aerfly vitbclrnin their forces from

northernk Finland,. on 3 'a h fist enoznter took- place with

enemy force at the Ponagr ford,

3. btfu~lnkin ?okrsrv Hmefoot, which ad been hal

ahead of the frit, w e evcate on V.'F ITo the are north of

?tarvik, was now exercised byAnmenbteluzg Iark ( bops dy4

qnrtrs, ZUX Corm) towhich corps headwsarters of LU. Corps was sub-

or&Lnatod. Th, Senrn line and the psses to rrn $vtan war.

deended by the 6th Nountain Plvisiwn awlm pm reinforced greier brigade

facing t.the souhest. Thema position w e hedb th reinforoad

210th Infantry Pivitn. After the vtthdra. of the 1thInfrtry ri-

ston, the Lyi positi wes tke over bythe 23C th Infntr Ti.viio in

th sectn half of Vebruary. Th single recinnt ahead of this line bad

adane ski patrols to IMo orengor' ,ord. bebind this rogisent was

battalion,

ft, eorn south itlarmi weSb of the UI Corps,-

Suhor. ttd tothis v e he U40tb Iztr Pivitulos

fotrss brisd ealysti the aoam Zes. Trther to the sot

vw s the ZJ t I fantr Division , .T u. a t ota of fi ve divisions w re .,1y d i h s a e ,

143 .t 00K

sn ha n&dl of Xareh the L11th Div Isio, ;"ts ff for 3.nooitl i m kr~n

assixz ccx=zzn over ths<. souith-'r 30tor -s 1 '- as the te 1ish arontier.

A ja.enzt ts thi arem, the headquarteru off XV Cor was incoyxr< of

the seuthtwn o ej sn tsrritery.

4. as tl~ a. j oft 'r At the end of 1914~ the'th Y o'f it i i ii o w e tr n fe rred to the e stern fr o n t, no at b eing

-*= l t d . ~.T et t i n v s o er 1 t a sf r d

.to the WestoenFrant on OS T a rnlebrw ttb lk oftbis divi-

sin wes in Dmrk after heing ceff.lote the aovnet by water, Reginn

on f1l ' the 163d Infantry Division was to betransferred to the

i.astrn fot. After a Thrther order was issued on l2 er. to expeite

this traser, the division arrived intb Oslo area at the en of the

mouth. Th. 169th Infant Division, whkh was also to betransferred .to

the Vstern Piont, was evacuated by water at the erxd of February. O

21 Janr the 199'h Ifa.ntry rivision wa ordered to T=-rrk for co nseolda

tion with the ti Infantr i.vision C ebracht sigh Co reerve).

Unne Corf rutX (Mortin) Coaps as orderdt the wet aM4 then. to

the -.w troutb. t I~ ob water ofthis head quatr

was coqata b

Als e rant yore antiaircraf and sal atettits 1

tie bttalions, on 4rsupor doaceete egecnao

btaiS~j wweox's Oalt=isVb tIMf0 Yt11Uge

quarters and uits inForay were consolidated accordingly.

Anrientation visit by the dpty chief of the esehrscb Operation

beousoof'the dev1oin to.tution.o

oar the0 rroteetio of Pauthr Nory the 7 r ~iottainJ ision art

M.achine-nSki Erigade inhsW wore trazrforrrd. on 25 JAnuor the

order te vaOcate the X X M-ountain Corps ws resoinded. tt we ntendwi

tiat this cp s, togethr ith the beadqiarters of LU ors would b

. l oin the eain force in- searn Nay, consisting

of te247th ad 28b Intaratry Di iion, 7th PMuti DiiinPn

Brigade 'WMorny," ad Iah e k Brigde '1'isadM."

In Febrr, 22,00 menwo transported to the south aM 6,000 men to

th north The firt troop titnsport .e loot on 4shByr the bein of *h the 7th Motain Dtiilon, no rrkm

for evacution t*oDennkrk,* hod begun it. narfh to the south. By 20 Nre1

this division w. .tstrg for u"mt by sa., The 199th Ifntr ritvt .

nice we delye h novdrite at the eginning off March, one 1',.

foredfo the 169th infantry Division wes aswablm in Oslo at theed

of Moareh. by wtr wasbogus on 1 zi bty JUit wa

notyetdecde wthe th Zaupfgnpe as beoa to theWat or h

of the 194th anaz iiinrrivSd at oa

whie uis arivd towaf the mitdfl st Aprl. Al'hi g

) Atenloelyassgnd to ao in sit uis ofvrious 4e(Mitr)

r Y -020 -W

shp were rwaoateclly danwged or sunk, no rijor loss of-life resulted,.

Acts or saota e also oco'.rred withoutah chuig the sittiton aignifloatty.

Mines laid inthe OIslo Figr cau ed a temporary stoopge in shipping which

resulted ina bmeklog oi fifteen tousan Mon.

5. Q~mg j-n0 C d Oe.nerloberst 'Red'lic bavrng been trnfen'ed

to the Estn Yrcrnt at the edof Januryj he ws succeeded iIory b

General der Qebirgetru pe Boebmo. Genral %tebser emained as enue

of the twentieth itn Arm n Theater Cm c ni h

capitulation.

The iatch Cosslssioner, auleitr Tertoen, who had prevously ase

to be assigned his ondefense area, again repeted tis request, bat was

reeud bythe Weo ht Operations Stt? The rest was not se-

quetlyepoe./

6, NrbrP~eo~st.At the begining of March the attitude of

th. brahes of the Wermeht with retard to farther objectives in ?4orway,

was clarified within the Webnzoht Opsrtioa l $ stff.

a.. Because of supply imlis and. te lak of shpping spae 1

the Navyr ske thit the occupied territoy bedeesed, At the same tins,

the Wav ws relnett to lose the nbmrine baye at tr a aSNavik3

tuck wrs Inst edngre,, sipc th reamin bates voiU etusety

-be r~e cowed. A withdnaal would also sm th. les ofinpas

interie end the posibility that the a lbas wovid be advensed.

bfcnral and southeastern Noray were given p, stftarins wfrsre would

have to be abaiened in pratce,

W 2

pert of N oruy in wlgthlh ti.' ' r'etie Circle for fez-" that farc03 thero

woud no longer beable to receiv&' nuplisa froa the hoelarid.

Consequently it was proise to consider the abaoM n t of northern

Nosry awl to consl the Fourr a to whether the area Tryo - hisrvlk-

Bidos should bo entirely or only prtly encatod.o

This resulted a pa I by t re nct Operation. Aatf on

Lfr&s to ltl abandon the Lyne Psitio and the n

area t occupy the Pri oition and to ms Turther preparations

for a ithdawa behindi the Vu~4 position (north of Nae o),T retreat

sttll fuarther was not oonddred ad iole

The Minstry of. r saAWrPouto eo on T,~a

that crtain stra gc terials cod no logpr be shipped tos~ny

becaue of transportation difftculttes, It was consiered particuarl

innortant to su ly the area eroini Bergen

Inepnent of thee considerations, anorder nos issued on 12 rertar

to stop shipments to Noray of all toad, coarse and hard gmrabwd Tdd.',

at anition At th sam e i, supplie sufficient .foar sern mnths wrn

tbetnnsterre fre soahawa central orway to the neorh,

te cnot JOpertons Staff recoi epr fo

the twentieth A rm e s Aling with teevaenatio of-nrhr Norway

b 4l(Opmticu ). bi pin w fl b the W tbaoh

Operaion rulff beas of the shorte of coal and the tapoes Mit of

C10O2O $2

sun1ying this area. Wit t he a cet ion of the tfotan tb.iheries, the less

of' nortvirn Eorws wo'.uld not ses rloufl.y if x' ot t Grm=raa eonoay.

These roor ts wer su b mi tt ed on I ernv by the deputy chief to tti*

chief of the Wehrvnht Operations Staff. The deputy chief stressed Tt

for rolitical reans it was tmrtivo to retain isarvit, Wo praooe4 a

withraa to the Oratagn Uris, thser relaeing one Infantry divisin

and- three infantry kripdns for enwa t ton, hbis operation was eetited

tolst two moths.

On2 the r sanctiond the plan of the Twentiet seutat

Arm for the conduct of war against rinla-ne.

General 3o41, cer of nreobtsilim g Narvik,, arrived fr m the fielda e a

g r er> o i i i w s "ie 5W

mrsorere bfor the bginning of spring.

On TAmh ~ Iap awl we econotered from the air, ;after a long period

during which there bad been no obsertion, and it was determined that oe

ai r os near Wiricen se occupied.

On I .an operatio wes carried otagainst th isle fSrs

whia b . been capied by th forteen dasbefore tsva n

airplane dr detroy. Otherwise there ta . combat aotfl unti the

midl of April.

On sron Rusa unts were sighte in the ares of 8taug.

it, wes not *lea vwtheor thi indicated prfrt onsfr a lting.

O wather planned wit*nwl from the arh oteornr of

giland wes carried out.

is" A C-020 3

7. jlses be? ne ,tiieci A tnorr atop a of' nub

my tratnmwtrtof r int~ when abrl' , 33 inters in lgt, was blow

up nerr, Ietdt on p,On'3' tnar 244 toe of' oil adgrease Trmoo e& in Osl were

destroye; of tis amount,, 55 to bed beong~t the Wehraot.

Shp iaes for thpridaJitr - 5 ?ebnr var a folovue

%my Actios 29,8? Oros i.gister Tons

10,453

Othe Army Good 530

Ct Isnn n oe anpor vess (7,0 Orss egster Teas) er

tag 12,000 tone o or v t.

aardnc. with usoder of 9-QJIanmZ. 13,00 men wee detache

for thb protection ftedockyards. I order todecrease the danger of

inth. pert, th Twentieth ?4owtat nr pr -their

mutiof athfipping points. On th doers wet. attarhe farth

On 2fJ& j the W tmt igded t .t # the sealshorae

fldberde by drvi a stok frs *orny TrwmM , m

Ieish 71w tonr tnprttion sceueas ordered to e iatted.

.0834M

C4 e20 aS/rb

!}oever, on 11- J" .r the mgiber of sdpmnt por day wa0 out from five

to two.

1 'ems the theater cote~r reporters that onI ebruary eoel

istocks Ira Iorwa had awiounted to 180,00 ton. That maonnt, togth'n with

the 30,000 tons proise fr'~ nark, wauld be usef4 up bythe end of

Parch. Perhaps the col suppl ollbl out through tprl but by Yiar

the stok wol be copetl gal At least 97,000 tons of cal worn

needed in Ws. flntfl that time 73,000 tos bad been applied for ontbk,.

a -fibur wich the slht Oprain Stafft? iee sufficient, O

eV b the liavy u1gh Conrdmand ed that tw odiate meses b

taken adpointed out that the ordered shi ftin of col mtoks to the

north ins dangerous.

At th beinn of $arch, the Reich Coesaioner tow Sea Trnpra

tic, Galeiter R auftes, wated to sto shipping to )Wormy because of the

coal shortag;e. This desire ws opposed by the W ehrmaht U1g Connn. At

one tine, 2,00 tons bed been successfully transported through the Dort -nd

besa, although this ha lasted only for a priod of 4 - ees

-Stnce a eaber of vsesidb s ot# six additie m hps ret

be wide aaiabl at the .Md of Mars. On~twnr ship ve

lest and w esl (set trciport$ bad to be beached, On 2Jf~tn..

wer damge. )uln the nigt eeof Lkrf a ocvo was attackdbte

destroyer at perhaps one cruiser. Onis destroyer was sun an anothe

was set afire. There were no tnpetnt losses

t3 r '2O?, ~ ~ - Thes'neWoeet ie, orgnizd reoiatance va felt until

the end' of February. tUp to thatl tim,, seventy eney nita ha b-lon _tde

as ist .The doriyad, for layin manes, r4n for supplying this resistance

movnt.

On 2k February an order wes isuel to combat the r esisance mvaent,

widh at that tine wns beings spplid k air. Th theaterc

?Dtdthat sutable teasue ma aled:ent'nadta nff

Februry 1U9 dropped aerial delivery =wits wore seized; but as long as

southern Wersy is not occupied by stronger. orcs, no further measue

cou3 betaen.

By 5 teh it wes observe that the hnw ad been suppcarting the

resistane moeent sine 23. 0 & with a vtr of sixteen plane

each night (excepdn in bad weather), eah dping two- an on atto

of uiwolies. Thi amounted tofive hundred tons, and indicated that the

eney Was acting syastomttoafy.

9. ' ava erqjt ns Anthe Nogrth rdoff t flo ,,I

Jawaf the buk of the submrine fl..t bdbeen withdrav for repairs.

Ofyafew subrin col he eplord against the oozwuy to

In the a1 of' Febr en attack wa made inet a oar of 17 shtps

10 of, stal %w destoe,9,0 t. fgaoieeo let. 7.11ewing

ts coton ansother convo w muoeeeful attacked, Whe the su rie

sa doI 4 o fWther ag, te Luftwaffe attacked an etredo

cruise, one destroyer, and one emrtfl frighter; one cruiser, on destroyr

~tr~ <-.020

an 5,1X'0 tonsc were prokl y de trze1. yn :.. tten I7,M) tom were

tranprts totaitn 52,CYrX) tone, tvoe destrrs 4 oe scort virssf,

O n 26'L rch two suiirtiez zade otsct with TA con vy a s:hort 4istnce

from " I, one destroyer amd one titberty ship were sk and foir

othe vessels were it by torpetoe-s.

Th an. Ias repatedly attaeked with success oft. thes Nozwgkfra 0oast,

Os J on 4, Oto feighter we deetro~s an tscd fright

of 8,5CM% tnt narrfl gcoal wes set aftre. rew tuwrs e o craft were

cordted one attackec being ade in Noemer ad December, Other

attacks ere mde b , rrtebsd 4a nes. Two enmyW cruiseres *aea

att. o 1 on turned any after ben d1y hit. On. Osma

dsetrMcer nos damae

It bee d r tt the enm was flying benntb the Ormn radar

bean, it eted attacks wre made agaistthe; auatrio base at ilergen but

noserious damae was caused 081 Theiso rd was made temprarfl imps

able bya ss Contmae rising .et the bockae toGtbogb

mwehat ship cnNl nt be preted. th. first onay air attes agaist

no bee deeriu$ the po blte ofent 'a lain i ? r hdt

W t I = s ip s y o sr AS p p in g eig h t io fig u re d in G ro s s Z os .st r T o n s (A u th o r ).

be considered. Ztrsv Tortilaioaw were eownstracted, and theee were

inprove even afte-" t7 e ivao fon& hnce in or'er to c nntrhoeth

weakening of Taiah del'enses by top tran.ferr;, 'Yor flmrkr, uased f'or

the activation ,of new units, not only gave u the latter ona current

basis but was also constantly betn : wkne ftarther. However, it ws

possibl to wihrv forces from rTrnmrk since the units being transferred

fro ?4r thruh Frnrk could lately be a avaiable in ese of

7cr BomS. tieano attack agabnat the northern area as 'otrete,

but hi assumption ws abanone in 1943.#I the ennt a landing should

battepted, howre, this area comndr would befumtte, according to,

a statent of 27 3anr, a crpe hdqates . At the se tim, at

order ws given to defey oenae to the last bullet.

An the tropaganda Mnistry had mintaao ha there wtre s tinl

24,00 soldiers fit for ative service in flemark, the W ehraot oonnder

the issued a re ot whic was passed on to the mainistry on 1 mfl

according tt° which the str nth on flj61Mgq. was as foflwsv

- 12,00 (1914900 of wh were fitfor reguar serie

Oratwto t 1,200

AL mnat o-1:eif oT the =en fit fo aotive sorric orre~ rerit (3,3 O),,

Th roore only 55,SX) men were actmrfl . c. t t fr eor t ctt,

A ddition.a strth incbriod the foil owIn .;

2 moutain divisions, in transit tothe south 15,00IQ coast artilleroy divielon 31,0

Convleseents 40arpeters, railrod ryarsonnol, e. 7,000

Officer Canidae Schoo 1,400,Cad". of th Rtep~asento Trinn Army 14500Others1,0

By the m1 of Vebry total strenth' am ted to172,00 mn

of whiob 107,000 were Anmy personnl, before-transfers to the fast..

(79,090O men vwre ait for reguar service. )

,8OE he4W been release15....me receire

Tbiu conetitat a weakening of 23,000 sec

Acorrinrg to ani ordr of 0 22rg~. 20,010 men (16 arch bettaion)

were to be withrawn; these ae were to bereplace by anequal number

detached from th avy,

2. beter- 0 fe rk. In Jfnm th theater smner. it.

N.mark, Geneal. o ank,w replaced by ttre finerth

14 th ArMy, Cenobet iadam Geea nhuce s bean,triod by o raid *a tod gilt of irgttlrii. Wit tin

ss mtio et' this ve - , Oennlorst Li a have i ot.

US esusudr of OpraionsStaff Stio C s.-

On b the theater conder received an order giving him the

n twoitvo'a ry rdr

_ 6 0-020

3. .rL >~. At the beg-tnning ot harch a nwbar ofAs vte

3eholS wtrc mwve to renrr, irek.1ircr the ; alrr wehsol at ;rarmpnt ,

the o f ficer "candidate -- nonni tioned otfi'ea~r cehool at Thorn., ant the

O*J sonominiaionod officer schol. This increased the number of pes 1e

in Denmark but did not inete the coabt etre ;th of th forOS

stationed there. It wa sie ctd that by I.ia the 160th and the

166t Igantry Diviutons would bare renteh tf0l strengt. The 232

Wiser Reserve Diviso, whicah .t that tit bad only twent tanks,

tesI and UT, rney for aton, wsa also .ted to rc flli

strength.* The 264th Inantr ivisin vas to be retivatd b

Consideratio was 4ives: to e9=ading the snizet (thea

consisting of 44 battalio ns) to brigd statfh.

By the idl, of Marsh the foflowing troop uhis were stationed

West Coast 166th Inens Division160t Iantr Dividion

)ortp t 2)24 ?aunr Reserve Division

North 325ft Reserve Divisies264t Iteaa IDiviin

Loet I1At nhatr7 Divse

Zns 325th Rescv. Dvision .(trastnet

A at conistin of penonnl reruit frot lat.rmuaemcountris !dto)

6~ 0-020 -.90u.

During, the ;sec half of Varch it was nlar&yt move one rezimont

from each division -quart red in Perk~h t.: t ho south% into, the area nc4

then occupied, the 166th Infnt r livisio was tra:nnferr&6 to Armiy

Croup H; eight tr'ai had already departed bvy 27 March. The 325th ate

32th iserve Pivision yere nov also ready for wovznent. The transfer

of' the 166th tnfantry Piitston and the 325th !Rves rtviston eas completed

4. Atar en S 7abottve, Copenhabgen vwe bombed from th. air

Sabotage wes harmful, prticularly as it interrupted t e- railroas,

but its effets reined limitsd. O L '1 fl the theater cmue

wes infoe=d that the ftebrer exece everything possible to be to

prevent delay in trnlporttIVOr rflltiTs sabotage.

5. Tru r ofaewn~fte to teani. The catastrophic events

in the Wsst ma it ncar to channel large nbers of refges into

the 'anieb pot, since the north GCoan ports had alreadybeoeor-

crowtid. on cder :ythe ?sehrer was issue to that effeet on V Lm

Th Ibah Operatin $tatt' received word on &b that the

tMizstry of the nterlor deskre to seed 30,000 and later 100,000 refugee

to ur k Privnte dwelling were not to beutilied as billets. A

rePort o this atter was sus tttd by e elgte Geini r. Best c

-1-"

iii. 01%+A -. SWfE! RIMI!

At the bennng~ at the yr Wore a no .rdtixtion that wee

would enter the war. But as the Wehrirtct Oerrtie' *-tatf thoaugh t it

possible that the eneis might begin opera ticn a gains t the northern 1ra

in which Swede might be involved, the irt worked out a. ttWy bam on

such a situation. It was ea-ved that- &flid success in the *-ost migfht

b e a g t -t t e ; r a n O f n i e h t t e e = f otmig h t b e s h if te d to t h e n o r t h . e e M d o n th is a t u d y, th e t- . h r ch t O e -

tis Staft' sreared a directive to be leand if sween entored the waer,

However, this work was net continued. (y ebur the W oht was

inornd that the entry of Zweden into the war at this timn no toab .

A sijor anm attack against the northern aa which might draw 3weden

into the ae was not cniderd likly. Th. J'uebrer, tbeefore, did not

wish any directvs to be issued ,etintng to a state of war with Sweien.

The mtter was to be ven only theoretical oonsiderntion by the Wehmeht.

Reltion with Swede n subsequently grnw worse.i the milie of

Peber the Onesn Wmtary attache defined the atttw.1 of & Wdn toard

osa as "untle.

In the middle of Snuary Swede had protested that Oemnrq bloce

of th Skemk Iutferd w4th the Swedish fih supply At thebe g

of Ntnsry* Swede isformed Gnythat Fiish shippigbdbe

tranefsfe df the Oul of Potbula to the r of the AelaS Islands.

Wootation with Osrny resultig fro this enwe were referred through

diploti cannl.

4Ci., 0e234

I. TVru I AfWzi3 VFwth AtA 3UJtAE )U O" JIM.Il, IL DZC!2WR " 194k -

in Otis West was inor by orier on15 Dleese as to vhioh heavy

btterie would beassigned his for th. heavy righting o. paetd around

fLogs. On16 December th. r ondr in Chief Wet received liessag.

Vo, 11W21 and Top Secrt Usng. No. 25 onoo n the lover )4euse

the ortb in Chie et received anorder trn h

Ftwr that the Fit? t Ay shoeld rain frot attack, as the oppostag

or reasons not knnwn to the mnuthr, all entries metiinto theWest it the tuatioJok are aiun for the perio 16 December 194 A31 Larnn ry 1945 art for te latter parts of Yebrtry and kwil. The Extraotsof ecordsexten onl to 28 Yabruary; hoeer, thse are in geater detailalarlyt for the tieig ntriai in the SitutionBec(Aut'o),

2 compare vith 300ssjngest sbmitted tothe Eiotortoai Ttvlsios b thwrite at the edof 1945 lnd on records used here and on note* and-

ut taat of th oosend A ehort study .entitystheSEofsiptodesqgwtswrtten by hauto'erin t ff1of 1945A

is asm oa Li with the Rttetes Diviuton.Stag. a arge umsr of etbeiat stWLinhv been writtena s

the iwts snored In, at since the prsn work sutiers from the above-mentioned emama, th enther has retriced his eftrt in thi chapter

to retio thewrigo his .ztnes eve in this form they ilcenriate firs fonadtioc of data and fasts for fut ste (Author).*

e:

U$2 Z-2 e93

enem forces were ansed in such atrenz-t tt there woul be no chane

of succmmn, enr iS part of these forces were to sdthra. Th ri 9th Patter

t visOn an the 15th ?}antergr .ter t ivtio were to be transferred at,

oce to the area fllanketnt . S tadtyl em Ahrdorf' m there placed at the

dispoSal of the C°04 to reinforce the northe rn flank of the t irth ~anzor

Army. °;rev ations were to be mde f'or. the withdrawal or O2i trop from

the area, of flfteenth Army headquarters. The !tifteenth. Arm e ordered

to hold its nnnnt postion. lb. 'eeth Art 'a oada rapidly

arid, by penetrating deep Into the enem rear aW then turning award the

south and southwest, s to fris h flank !rototim for the !"iftb Parzer

Army.

In the evenin of' l8 gie the Comnde in Chief West o dd

Arwy rop Ii(in oonsequem of resent mo'emnta of' the Uritish 21st Arm

Group) imoiatealy toct th measures nrovi dd for on16 r eweber in

order that the attack plan& for '?2 Doesber could be carried zeross the

Mouse within twenty-four hours ad without wxrin to the erawoy In order

to insure surprte, al daylight aowmments uwr prohibited and no advanced

noieof the attack ws gives. n order to deiwie the* enemy, deceptive

saat were n.toard the east. Ifthe att'ao we sueeestul, all

available nIts of' the ?venty.fif Ary wer to follow ame the Mo use

o=ly secuit fores vwr to be left at the Mose Man %Ia tive . The,

contal defene a.K not to be wekid

Obwrkmudo Per W .neht -* Wehnct Himh Coa nd.

-94-

On 19 re oitrter the !trer'se Infanr Erigae sp~da the

disposed of the ~C rg~er In ?he tent for co tatzt with. the et

Array. The Fnhror ordered a study -of thet situtition to deternine whether

the 34 ' ~a~rgradir Pivion sho-Ajl$ b ooixr tteid att 4$: ohau nginet

the enda fcoa oprposing the 277th an-rr tvhir

th e exeienes of Array Cirozp E on t ws firet day ot the offensive

hdieate that th wy hd' no cntinuou mart line of rnitanoe but

van holdin a serien of stronpiotints to a derpth of' 4.5 tflozee. The

en estxrity torme were suppose to withdrew, but in mnasses did

not succeed in doing so. Vn entanglemetts an?" mine fields were enplowe

to a large extent. I the vicinity of each atrongpint, four or five

tanks wer held read to laimeh a eounterthruat. FU striad reseenn

wer, hel further to the rear.

On 10 spooi instruiotns wore issu:ed eenernin the trit

tet off the civilian por latton ,the e~tlstrntlor of' the newly eaupied

t rrtory, and the hantdling of prisomo of wr, A aroebl fnorton

lmaflet vas suppie to the trops. p princsple, our own attitude wes

to to determined by the raction of' th, ivilian poultatin. elation

with civilianr as usually Teatiend in a couwxiatioe son, were tobe

anS d In thoe arease of Hll.n, flelgius, and tinbmzrg tick wore

unocoupled b~the enm, the tone acenoie wuld again take ever the

edmiistration (Reich COdesioer &eSs-Tqwrt and hett and Gulitr

Stmo). wo new qtitry admiitrationw again Instal e,

V$ 0SG-020 a5

On 22 teorr %ernl risenhow er ied c r oo ,ation in whIch he

st's9t& that the 4tIrrnn had %"~x rrn'ythinr~ ? on :oflC e'd2 le sMair.

furthzr th t it wuld not be eouh waly to bent ba& the ofon lye;

the war must en only in the eriy's firi 1 ll'e t.

In order to rtrain f 'eocr of "~cto- n t t ht Aing of t_-.e: VIxh

?anzer Army, on the een .n:g of 21 reibrthe C1_ =fit~or in Chief lost

e terd -that the situatio at Wi'enborr b. straightened Out as soon as

posible. 'The d sergreder '"&vit on .r' the 12th $X 'nser !tisin

were to take part in the advnce with the othr mobile znits. it. 7 Ith

was to be orr and brldxrahtwde wre to be forne between FIhy ra9 rtvet

as nnidly aspoe ntbln. The r 0 jm in Chit ef t 'oat pond out thwt in

the north protection shuld bebuilt up 15-20 kfl tmas ahiad of the

4fllltrass; this totoe should thbe tuhe south in oraor to link

up with the Orsehols delfense line.

O 3 rse r the 9th "n er 4As3on and the '19th -lnzerj re na ier

'1vision were ra from the OrWV reserve and nmds'ned to th4 Ccniwner

i"n Chief W..t. The 9th aem! 167th Volkgrndier !Y isens were to bew ;teI e ~we an h .h}n Dvso

veto to be aale ad rehabilitate. ?eaployaet of the el ola

gr idir aivisiens wse autberisod an 26 rcembr.

An est tt of the sitwation by the Wshrsobht Oprntioes staff, apprmte

bthe Fuebroran the ooadr in Chief West* showe that th ty

:aiars of' sotorisd transport, from which a1 anial transport andmrching colams arn nonwlly barred.

-96

eploed /,-S divlslorn in a cmtonttackfo the souith, that a unifor

effort wns be tuig .nrert,& bet en flinant awl- the area eait of ? atoMa, and.

that the coutt.nat ok betwe Aavelot snrd 14conschau tad come to a stand-

still. The let flankt of the tt T~n r ::ray wan now free to Move. Tihe

Fifth Army hoaS a Rino t t hs north nsouth without adequat. flank

protecetion. The Meventh Army eeresoo a lcal crisis. The inteked

thrust across the Mimst the norest apsered to beo still possible.

foever, the Gra foroes wold have to hol their efow on te &SWe end

destroy the enemy ositions btwen the Girthe an? the t euso north of the

line ?4rche - V-iat.

On tj ee br the C rider in Chief vfest entere that the intended

fom tor of a brill moed! at Tu=ren, plaited fr29 1)'e $r would net

be a~ttempted sinc;e, in his ow~n opinion ndtint of the Fuhrer, the losses

ivon3 pobably betoo high. Istoad, an order was given to bring forsard

al avtlable forces. The 3140th Volregrnadt Let "ivitn, held as resarwe

'a to avnce toward :Manerfel.d, and two additional division were to be

do availble The Canndv. in Chief W.*t agreed! to transfer the IVII

Corp to the 33.fh ranter ArM,. The fift i'anzer Aray wes ordered t

pivot tothe northeast an to attoir the enemy roar east of the iIuao.

The two V olkseadie divisions released from the OK reserve vone plan4d

at the dispsal of nsvenfl Army.

Thes fobw ObaqgeS in oowaitaent Vefl notedi

19! Pe is Two w tor' Bed tye bridging couns etotransferred from Uipper 1tin to Army Group B,&

U'nits of ap rxitely coman se.

?s CJ 72

2C) D eeobrs* Ygtae fr t tre ascignCl to te Uavy.

23. tknrter $Applioi'tl o to rcinrarc Any Ur oup tpper hinwith on dvisio was re und. 'li 2d ParachuteDivision vaset zitted.

22 Drerntr: fli 23i4 Pazzer ir 25n,' rt ?&zrgrmwierDiviion an th 17h VsenergenaierDivisiomvDint ,te1t 'z e i' r itated. tri La1 battalion of the

20th turtwd 1 Yiel Dvfon wae assigne tothe C xr in ou..r at

23 eebrz Request to ensign three otain i auktbattalion toth Upper hine vas refuned.

24 Densbera The 344t Int ry Division vl rnhbilitted.Cniatmerit of preotnc o CoraIor its Cii. Wests12,000 men each on15 nd 20 January (3,00 n"rom soh lev Tr ect itait w ith the armred

The 9th Assalt Gu B~riad was smploped.

Cntwt of 5 Wshrmaeht signa tipws#.

Tenty.-two fortress oontr tion o~at weareemplqye to instract the people lotted Lor trencheontrutiua

25 IDewmbers Two preone replacenent transfer battalions Wer5R5]4)WI for the fotro am t units. h553 Yo kgnir iviso was rehabilitated.

26 Deir The planned 10 percent ac'ut in tk. strength of AWrop S was postponed until I Pcbruaz.

At th begimding of the you, the eney wat f rcd to dinontime

*ttpts to bra thruh tSchta in the Sear Pa tiate. haf of

th oppoi g fores wtre nom -eestttt d aainst Any Gry 1. In thi weyp

the seq s in establIshing en unterrupte dofenai frit.

Attacs could. the be direced against the StpI7 lines and the deep

flna. of Arty Gnwap a/

?t'aehrer -directive of4 January.*

s?' kCeO

On Fbrzssr at 2015 hrsa telehn message wat receive accord-

igto which the Cm r er in Chief tat hw5 order& Aryroup Pto

cntima the attack in th M~sone area and, It6 poaile, t re-e tabiih

the encircleet, be. to attack either from wnst to southeast or from

southeast tonorthwest. ?army Group re',orted- that t hs eeykdren

whle mede sevnnl penetrations an was atttng tocut off thi salient

southeast of 1*tomn h arem rosinin ws too marrow toallow another

mobile force to enter. Yield Mrshl Mdel, who wes on the spot, replied

that th. ordered cowaitcmnt was not fasible owing to the 'a strength

and the unfavorabl terrain. It was sugeted that the terrain north,

northeast, and east of Dastogne wes more favorable to the zaoveig of

tanks and, futer, offered the possibility ofsurpise. Therefore, ield

Narbal Model pimne to ata rom the north with the 9th WSPaice

Division, from th. notEast with the 12th. isier Division, and from the

east with the !uere's Infantry tirigae. This Ia was apoe by the

Puebror,

On dA z the C er inChief ~4st a nnon at the insistence

of the Ynebnr that the ort aflyplnned operation no lone ba sy

Inp of suces since reta s!of the esyforce ware now onna-

trate sp t Ary Oroup . terr, Awa Oru S as ordered to

sotin to tie up and destroy asanW the saw as posil~e iii order

to support nvoperations on othercionw of thefot he captged

gromi as to We held ad the onter to clean up the citmation around

Plton wes .t * Since tM enm was expctd to ttack soonr or

ttCeO

later, the front held by the 7ixth anzer 'r y vul$ have to bereinforced.

Spoo i atte nti.on an to be l? the~ ax"-t. w i3fr

.o 'rtoa

snceuy encirclement. In add! ticn t all other ae 'aUra, the defense of

the fhestll wr4Ad have to be continually strerw'th eez.

On L Janinry another Y ushrer directive wacs issued conoerning' the

oew uot ofbattle. The Connnr in Chief West wes ordered to destroy

the Agl, o-A.eien armies inctividually by suden attack launched in rapi

eucenon, The order in which each sector was to be attacked would be

determied persorally bythe 'fiorer. The initiative was to be0 retained

under all ofraunstanes. Ary Group tipr Rhino we to participate in

the operation byattacking north of Sltsbeg and towrds the northan

nrthwet from the area obcuie by )iaoieenth Army.

Arm Group B wes to tie up the opposn a forces, destroy the

enemy at Dastogne, stabiliser its position, and build upa strong souther

front,

Army Grp 0 wa to continue with the execution of Ooeration YO0RDWD4P,

Bhch lad as its objective the destruction ofthe snowy forces between the

loverW Voags- mutain a the fthin River and the cpture of the westeni

mountai outlets. A breakthrvouh to aver and the blocking of the road

Savent* e Sen'abn'g were perequisite t h next operation or, in ase

the enemy a bould dtbdwa from the ame tauterboug a itche aHgunn

for C gigthe directilon of the attack to the southwet.

Ai Grou l'vpr Win we to establish a brdghead north of tlrasbor

and, if possible, conne ct -with the Nineteen th or rst A~jl ors even to

k~ >tnOZO

ooctw the wester. outlett of theceta st. mounttn ,.5If th ewnezty

withdrawal idei this poasible.

The new forces assigned to Arsm Gtrou0 were to asanbie north Pr4

east of $;;'aarbruockon.

On 82 Jary a ne ubrer di-rective on the cnuct of onetions wnn

isud. S ince the slow but steady succm of the arcenet th .ith

Panse Arm had nd*posiGttin in the stern part of' the salient

untable, ermission wa given to withdraw as fr as the line Domham "

Longeh~ (west of t !atge). When this ws .discovered, the orii

nfl objectives of the eayattac wowzldo1onjer be temting. It was

assumed that the easy's xain effort would then be shifted to the east,

or o- an this appeed mote likelys that tn or twelve divisions would

bet wihfawn in order to be cittted against unrotected noation of the

:front order to avoi this possiilty, anti to retain the iitia tivre,

strong forces assaigned toArmy Group 1 wowl he to be it iatel o-

leased. Tho e Nber, therefor, ordered the withdraw l of two pannar corps,

four mtorstd divisions, two Vo1k artflen coerps, end two prjojetor

brigades. I effect, tis we th entir stdegt .f the Sixt F'nser,

rAm T.mponarily these fon.. wore shifte. northeast of t. Vitt and

east of Wis whre anm fltacs wo. e xp oed The mission ofArmy Group B

rei d stt

On t hoe om firmly reseted his order- to imdaeyvt

draw the U 8 ?uar Corp, comprising the it, 2d4 th, and 12h$

!'anser Divisions, t tits roar of Army Group G for a short period of

Af P §,3 1Ol

rehailitetion. The ' o rder in Cht . e t wrts ta ns by strict

order that these units were not to tn, co tttd f i t % rt fbrhtin

which would delay their asqctbly

2. ~ ~ n Onrtio Qr P e Cansr t atr trhorn Alsace

(21Decmbr ' 3JxunThe evacuation of one~niy bridgeheads en the

Saa aivur mdo it appear Likely that the aow frorsi this area had

been waened and that further 'mte might vnb vitbdraim. .002

p~~teC einChief net ordered ".rwy Group Qto take advetage

of this situation fiy prasdn forward locally aind by preparing a surprise:

attat to reigain the St vernegap. Strict secr'ecy wes ordered; the ic end

ing wtthdrsal of Army Group I) wes to begiven as reason for the vreparan

tiora

On R2 Pepe the Puebrer ordered anattack bytwo pmr division

and thre infantry divisions tnm the 1itch. area towar the acuth araint

the rear of the ends forces holding tor area, aromad Wisemboiw . Te

Luehror eeteA this Dnto otter greater success than an attack frye

the Voegee briojewad where forces vmit first bano to be scrovd forwrd

into the Zn t ati, moativity wsordered along the entire

front in order to dentsv and tie the aw femes.

tUpe receipt of this diretv, theVa Coaer In Chief Wjest acordingly

oaned his ottle of 21 Neatmer. Reftt ore aneunation to

determine wither .th front ou be admed with local force frcs the'

Onhols switch -position incse the left flan of the Third' 'rsy s hould

sake heaway. You infantry division. and the tort divisions were

-101-

I-0 # CW02 1-

n ow deinted for the as at mginnt the s=Avern trap, which wna nianned

for tf rat weep i JrJantrry. Thoe intentton~ woro ooarunoate ts h

coimander of krwy Croup 'kqrxr Rhine, who w a rtiss to tsuppor the

attack bs taging locniin' raids and et -d trhinz brdee rth ad

south of ' trasbm'.

C2.flcba a dioio took place with. AnCeop C. tn accord-.

anewith the .now remultion on noo etr issudeo 25 Decebr, the

new operatio was given the cover name M)ItJM)% Any Group ) reporte

that its objective wa to oeocxpy the ae gap i Wirer to destroy the

enemy in northern Abae and to mae cotact with the rmeteenth Anxm'.

'tw attack groups vore to be prepaed for this pwrpoaes The Ifirst group

was to attack southward, east of the Bies [iver, in order to penetrate

the Vagint tine near forchadto join the right flnf the a e aand

attak grup for a assault against rhPbcurgw~ The aon erou was to

advance east of Titche in several spearheads an far as the inek cknberg.

Robrich in order to join tjte firsit group for the dvnc on t'bboiw ar

Sevesnt or west ofthe muts according tote sitnation. The

21st Passer Division was to be enntrat& est of fltoh foroai t

othe atta' 4vlo . T 2St .vsrgndter rinsio was to be)zl

in rere souhat of twibrueske fr w w e it could be asuigaed to

either attac rn. o decive th mw, anettak wes also plane fr's

the chols switch posItion.

OnArmy Croup 01 was fon ttth ubrhdd"

th right attack group to admnc sidtly to th =rin rod ?balsbou'g

.. 102-.

K; 4 -2 -0.

-Vernle ovor& agmnt t.tta&fo Laa a& the ts.This -made it

nesaosary~ to shirt the rigt h"fla nk of th :TZI ori wetwr V the1

Pls Thver near 1inebrueken and from there togan by way at doefing

the hih road leadino south from ~orbh. fly order of the 'ueh rer, the

atta'° acros the Rhin wa"obgnfry-ih'or fe the beitin

of the offendnv to the 'north. The plant divrriomry attark from tS;

Orchols switch position ws not to be cards)d cit.

With the vitbdnwvl of further .neq fones, the .hner catered the

attack to bei at 2300 hours o 31 Pnabra. Amy Group Upper ~1hn Va

not to attac ttl the armore serhe of the main offezdn a

reached t4e asten cutlets to the Voegs Xountains in the area $nre

tegailr. by reking throu~b the oneq front &ang the Mtine north of

Stmsbong , Ar Group Upper Phitne wes to Join the fore advancing east*

ward from the Vosges outain in the ?t au - Icrutth ector.

At the ar time, Army t~roup T rpt rhin anrw ed that the 533 Yolks-

grenadier rivision would enlarge thet bridgeheds on either side of

Oabh.ty In oDer to ran ont localised ttacksi from the notern trac

ot th Nineteeth Army and tostagesa strong attack with on battylic

turther to the south. fn attack with no.distant abjeotiws alog h

nrthwestern section of the front wa)A not bposible before 3 .Jaary9

uinee an addtional infantry division voul tat, to be mae avafla ble for

that pcrpe.

On * the Wehraht O~tios tt coletw the drat o a

further operin to foflew opertion ZNI),which invlved pln for

YS iS".OO elO4-

the destruction of fiur to fti r et ditvkitoz htweer roraoh arid

(in Vt* Jaar the om ir of' A roulp t'per Rhine, efter having

received & warning order on 2 Jmnry, wam ord.er& to a.Aack during the

night of 5 January or, ifthe s ituattn nermttd, dul the d my. The

comn er van Surher instructed to prenare all a liable forces of the

Itineteeuth Anmy to move north ainc notwst to establish contact with

the flintrmy

On 6 Janur the deputy chief of' the b'efmot &ration -Ctaft, wh

had drive to the headqrters of Anmy Crou 0, renorted that part of our

infantry torn.c were bady tihauste anc that the eney north of Wingen

ha solgaudterpr hand,. It apired that th. ene. intended to

hold lover -Alaso, and to secure his position bhbiM the Kaginot Line.

Therefe , it was tmpoible to coantinue the off esIin lower Aleece

without relnforeczentc. Th suces of the opration dpoied solely o

the progress of the xXr 'anser Corps. If no break-throug were effect,

a nw decisiou woad have to besought ly th mlyent of all avalable

forea in the area aourd eaut

O7 Jaury th flaebnr ordered AnyW Ordu Upper Rhne to.eolits4'o

inul e ce o b r~ie e d and y p l i g sa g p es s t t by n ploitm the success gained at Rt at u

t hroug h comttg th 269 ntnt Dithton against offbd.

The fofltring mits newly assigned to reinforce Army Group 0we e

schetaled to arrive as idct e

I# C>4220 -1

l0t 3Cx')le r jtjflj!f by 13 - 14 SS.nary7th nrti.e, ltvlni~I byr 12 -13 Thnuar

p7t d Voksrn b .ivid (not vrot under orders)po sby by 15 Tazuairy

Artillery rear.torweis by -3 9 Jaryd" 11th 'kizor Th Di vi"on (bnditely tari ale )

lot Pegiment, 2d 'ountei tnfmntry 'iAloion by12 January

In hts visidt to thia front on 6-7 Janwarry, the demiy chief o h

Werwcht mOrtions tiTf gained the lzpresuion thet troop morale was

go, in spite of ;ret thyutoal strai an the soprtority of tiAmy

materiel. After .the til shock of ,our off"esv, the enem's remltt.

onehdconstantly tncreetsaed in stritM Meault troos reatedly

attckst3 the rknm auprty inet trufgh gaps in the front ine. :pile

the orstmn forces ie to fight continously, the enemy sm al-ayn able to

relieve the front line troep~r vith fresh force. Th tsrmats to the aea

ever which th offensiv was launched was not conducive to quick mo wt.

Continued flttingi for heights am3 vilaes steadily depleted the (errmn

forces$. Constant esure to the e1eron tsntrat.ned the troops tothe

ut t Th i e t d n e i i h i p w r rsatedt eiqu s period of training i the F la eao t Tnaiatg A y , a n! to the lac

of elder wef;ltnind stocnedi offie a! Wn' and. battalion"meofl f. ante3 ntr Dimiio, for ,"s o= battalion

tied been reduced to 15 am and another battalion to 6o me.

Owixg to the neril lnwss othe Oem.forces, ettacia were

lamehd in sucb a wy that th combat actra were constantly enlarged.

This wae necessary the withdrawal ' akvance uits tomop up pockets of

x -105 .

1 .#a CO2Oel e

reistanc in the rer Teplaonient!. were required for ech:r nw attack,

Te artillery wns rot only tnideqimte in ntr' rgth but ano lack-ed :forward

obecrwttion- posts aW! radio equ4tent. Sup plies were available but were

difficult to bring forward because of the lak of transportation facilities.

70annr units needed erare rarts which took a long time to obtain.

In his directive cmJanuary S for the continuation of the fighting,

the Nuebrer again ordered Any roup G to tie upthe enaq force in aid

northwst of the "Voog stains aid to force a breakwthrouh south of

Wismnbourg. The objective was the same; to roach the Savrn gap aix! to

destro the era myforces between the lower Vosgesand the Rhine Piver,

"With the noception of the 11th Paner Division, all awsi~able forces

ssigned to Army Group C were to be cathed. By means of a swft thrst

bthe IX Psnws Corps by way of Stle to erwfer and the simultaneous

attack of the 25th Infantry Division in the dirotion off Ztm f.r, it

was hoped to coplet. the cllape of the anay front north of iiguaa.

The 'nth Parachute Tivision would be wapieyed either behind the X~f 'o nse

0orps or together with the 256th Infantry flivihion, to ope the n taia

pas..i the southestern Vosgs xmutins,

Cotact with the bbig h e by th XW 55 Corps asto be estab-

fUkeb adweneing the 10ft IN' Paurw Division ast ~of the Ilagmuea

Foret. From then, a spearhead we to be 6 irooted toward the !sven

psasee. In crOe to ooetapy the weto outlets to the lower 7ogs ait

we enidered nesery to *owit both the 26 Mountain Thiiion and the

6th S5 sotain Division. ehebr or not the northern flank of the

-i06-

9 C0020 e107

intonth Army was to attackz Vosefr wouVs be detrmnes after the

s ituation had further d ovlcspe4.

On 9 Jann a maesnge from the c. ider of Army OroupB, Ceal-

o b e t J sl e k o w its , to th e Co ~ u o r in Chi me se a t w a s re c e iv e d b y th e ihr h t O t n ' f . A c I rg t o h e ao p ord r

Oprtion NOrnw1ps, after initial succes, bd ,om to a standstill for

lac of sufficient forces with which to nop u enemy resistance lxthe

rear of the advancing cc mo bcuse then were no replsceents for

the .loses suffered bythe spareds themselves o long as the m is-

ti in e ndwith the Germene, the enemy ba bad t withdrew. I owerer,

once the enemy had recovored from the initial shook of the attack, the

advantages of superior mobility, better trop atd equipwmt, sal ai

superiority hdforced the G xus to resum the defenive,

An emergency measure resulting from this situation, the eaitment of

the flXXX Saze %rps in anattapted advance through the Wisewbourg

depression, did not gai the desire effect. It was only possible to

exe the other frots so l og as furthe eney roe were withdraw

from opisit Aw Go ?S nd as lag as Any Gru0 retainedte

inititve. This latter rrqisItewl be oMtined only if all antil.

able forces coud be atesd within a narrow area. Itthe situatica

*h the .su I the sren sasw Wtseu igtdcide t

reee the et sine, in hih e serousl m Md result, it

was the opinion of Ar Group 0 that Operation 2A1&ET coldb successful

tactically and strategically only if the enoW in the aginu area were

.. 107.

MS tCOZ)

defeated. Tento , It vv& judgd nece sr to cntizn the operatdon

in the Trier Tl.tt eector ar to employ 1li availabl e stregth to force

the sees btwt:en tngwlor an Y±.derront. An attack auVc then ote

launched aainat the line btvee frath ad a~e a sportd bythe

X17 35 orps an fresh fores from the Qsedor! bridgehead.

In order to ocupy the enemy fore and to divert attention to that

area, the attac us to be cntine byPI auser Corps along the

nort iwatern tring of the Pagu Forest. The oatlets to the Voeges

uow italm cou ld then b oc u ied by th c om i e assault of the 256th e d 17 o ai i i i n , t e 7 h a a h o n h

6th .3 ount Division. The attacit against agunu could be mad by

the 10th ard11th 85i Paner .liuonms.

Attn success at flagteau, all further operations would have a sound

basis both vest of the Vosges an to the east inthe diection of Moisheim

Sawen. i prepantion for Operatn %A$RT,.

Arany Oryo B asked whether or not the forces intended for that open-

tios sculL fist beused for the tersiratica of Operttan NOWflfMfl

If plate inepedtly ofOpertion NWIiD, .it as cnsidere that

thone offnsaiw (ZAflRZ) wua r r at lenst for fresh infantry,

divisions for the assault against Searalbe - asrwioa, and as add tti

division to support the bttlemusr 361t a 25Mt -Divis in provid-.

tug flnk support. e. this, thrut would used at lastoe

hWired assault gns an tanks in order tocombat the French 28Armored

Jivision and the armored units of the 1.3. 45th and 36th r~ivisiens. The

IC#C- 00-19

attack northrs frot the area south of Sarbruecken woud requir at

least two or three pase divisions and two infantry di vlilons, one of

which would have to provide flan protection along with the 19th and,

347t V'lksemdir ivi.sions

This meant that three infantr divisions and two to three ynzr di vi-.

aloes would still be required. ny tree divisions, the 10t Sr Pansr

Division, the nith Powxe rivision, as4 the 7th Parchte Divo n, were

faly reay for action ormr divisions, .the 6th 88 outint iviion,

the 21st Fanser Difvision, the 25th Panwergrenadiw Division,, and the 2d

$8 Vesatah Ulvision, were attle-rwon fro the previou ftghtiag but still

capable of being omntted.

T1 decisiv, blew was to bestruck from the Voages Motains towads

the Saw River, with a secondary thrust towards the thatfrom teare

south of S aarreckeu. If the Easter pincer moeet wer not successful,,

the latter thrust would be ineffectual. The abovo-aentioied divisions

would therefo have to beused to close the pincers at Saalbn. If!

those forcewre not available, the aim thiut would th en to. be mad

from Sawfrenek towards a in Sasrlbe ittolm, with the am effort

en th. right, at with a sai coe r-ince unnt pined from th

EAsrne metrtwrs the stor Setton a Vlttrin,. 4th the

a le i igt the be jmuible to push eatad twrds the Veg

as fhr as R ang At the sass tyme te ea ster tof y ba to

bokthrough the agluot Lift at Yittrlami order to establish the onre-

-4.

C-O.02O ils

othse pnthe Chiet of' the tyesrmoht Co rations ttfP st.rifled VAa

Menhlthe attn ck of the XXf Corp n'r .ittehoffe n had oozu,

ton s tandtil an the 'eeffy min effrt had been shit to thnt

sector. On r~j an er~ler of' the !ruhrr (effective at 0245 hours

ont 12 January) directed that the 7th ?a'rachte tivislon, reinforced by the

3th aM 667th ktflt Gun Drigades and the 1&tC $3 Pnser Division shoul

tted as soon as possible in anattack; from the area Toretfeld-

Mrimt tewrle !rusohelm by way of Roeschmwg in order toestab! bi a

coteotion with the 53d 'nfntry rivison. rgaig ground to the west

bywy of fleahwiler eM. adivancing around the sou ther side of the

Pa im Forest, linking wp with the "?irst Aity(6th SZ Vontin Diso

aM 56th Infantry ttv ton) and then advancinL the direction of

Zinmfwle ad t?iederbronn, the att Ac wes intended todestroy the entr

forces north of the Htgenau Forest. It the thrust totara rrzsenheim

were aeesMf the bu of thA 2X~ Panzer Corte wou2 have to follow

te a line or advance, ntil them, te corps was to feign at coinutta

tie of the attack against Rtschttorf by tereptio of atiler

bebsrdumn1t awd assault raid, Bnfl units of the 7th ?araohute rimiio

o m asn o emloyd, but not e as to prclde their eoiuiat inthe

mels attc fro itel toirds the south.

a supplemaary order wsi aue oedu to which tin

forces attackig from Thrtofeld e itriai towards P2rasnl were to be

assigned to 'I anzer Corps, which in turn was subordinat to th

W3 0-20EIl

eondrof Ar y flaup Upper Rhine., The C 'er in Chief eat wlw- to

assin a z.ny Tig'er t k-e troyere as newsible tt the 7XZI Panzer Corr s.

The 21st Parser Diwiision and the 25th -P.nergrenadier Divisio were to b

move forr as soo as there vae an opportunity for their eo~rttrnent. inr

order to exploit the bredthrough, the at ~ok would not bestar'ted uti

sutticient foroos were avalable. The attasc was to be carried forward

swity, but withiout ezhraeting the tripi the assault divisions.

23. Si t oterf~ ,24Jwr..~ anr) O iw

the~en had orderd the vtdrawsl of the 6th Paennr Ait in order to

resist a possible eoney counterattack. At the sae time, th. dai lin, of

rm istnce was ithdrawn to the line roma - togaa (northwest of

satop). On1 January the ude in rkdf est received prmty~iont

from the Ntebrer to p4 1l back the salient as far as the lin. Ch rinart -

(east of Roiffalin) - tksury and th olf min lineo aitane south of

Lonfy in order to avo turthr loss to Ay Grou 1. Rouffalis

was to r m pner Barmen art.llory tire.

On an order wes ised dircting I and UI ?enusr Corps

to vitbdnw into the area ot the Oi aIn Chief Yest for a abort

ptted of rehabilitatian betaee 20 and 30 ony.

On 17an order BeStdudrtc, as of 19 Jamary, tho

Nineteenth Aq we to be attach also for adinittin urpose toth

Coni l~pper l mt

Onf.A M the Vehrer ordere the Caller in Chief Rtat to

rsmbl the 'Sixth 'Danser ry hse q tror together with the Netbrer's

0 1-

tn'nts d R brr' v hor ?rresi thc area ? .untoen - 'Praam-

't brt - Adonu, where they vS '3 astiigno t:i tbe (Wrsorvc. The

rehaittion of tee unIts, the, order for which had been given on

15 Jwrny wol be carried out in this area. After eon letimr its

present aistion, the 11th 'anser iieio w&s to asuenbie south of

;..rreoug.

on20at 0205 twin t he Cwnder inChiec West wediusted

to prer for th moset of the entire Sixth ?tasr A (teur S

pasm divisions and two ?uairer brigde) to thxo cats' front. f fia

deebio was to be uae ikthe afternoon.

2n the vane day at 135 hours anorder was issued for the inznedit.

transfer of the I 35 Pangs Carps (let end 12th SS anhr rivisian and.

orshedm rr troops) to the Easer ?roat by way of Berlin.

The Western Armes Isrenc t}tilr rrd leeet umitted a

std on 20 3anuary on coesible plas of the >4estern Powrs up to I ay

1945 in *L* th eney situaition was t-oafib as rollins The enemy's

ploan to attaek east of Astern and betwe tasb g awl the Rhine Riyer

had beer. upnet by th. o ffoniw in theArnm Is order to aLvoi

the posblitr ata flask attar: spiut Ana, the es ol is

tr o mstblisb the foge frt It we ot ezoad that the *msw

voU puh oninto the dlfftinlt terrain of the SUet regon Efft~s

sih atb ast m t.t " mthe sitation inteotlying areas of the her and the satinate. ?elou

mar that, prepraio, woul besde for a decisive attack sono tin Maty,

t!5 9 C-020 ef4

the exact tiatoj of trhtoh wuld be &atermtnd b y ait an grw orw ltio.

The P:ttsh had av ifl.ble twenty-two divionc sirze units am by A7

would rrbbly hirro at least twety-"ive. The Amrican. bt9 available

fiftynone diisions, vtric by 3Ny would s ' ixtycin to seventy-

five div ions. !by the .t. dat the e~rnh we'dhave available eight

divisions. T.his ent that by IMay the enemy would be able to cowit

from 108 to U1 division, tta of the evontyseino divisions now

available. The objective of the attack could only bease .

On hrs Umussert u e was namd deputy cw

sander of t ra Group ppr Rhtn aftar th tong com~ r, the Itetobs

ruerr S$ (neinrioh st1=ter), had aaue oocrn of Arm y Grop Vistula

on the sera Frot.

2n2j per- new direotiwe wa issnd The bilsh attaCk south

of Roermond th Amrican attacks agmaint the Ardonne bulge the bard

fightgi lower Alnas d th Frech attack inthe upper Vosges were

calculated to prevent the Ceryan from employing their meses, ad

thereby to haste n th nuoes of the ..d J ad to fla about the total

collape o the Uenem dewie ytm Therefore, the fdeoid to

begin pmepetiost itrcept te Rusins at -to strt atwtak

cte Wstsn rot as order asginto vlbn h t h s r

b qr t~n twferrbiae, n. nfatry or Ylkgedr diitos

tw Yolks artilery ,arnd beel ria g io uits. Them er inte dt diove th.te r aRhinet% b

forces aeigmK ther. to Pry Orou t. The C or in Chief Wit wsto

desienate an aprrorrata time for ths ch.

0-02 artflr

An order was receivey the Co mnd er ina Chief ee*st to regznup his

foce in the nortb) and centr of te '.esterwn ot in acoerrThnoe with

the prbbe intentions of' the snoty to attack the Thmb distr°ict and later

folland. The high ground west of the Cure Flivr was to be given uponly

wader rressure. If the enemy iaoved 'st orser forces north of the Ardnn*

te Ylfth PanzwAr would also have to be shiftdt the north to

strengthen the front orposi t te ene' point of mau effort,

Ithe Vosget n on the upper flhn the attack eho* be ontiniod

at first retaining the originflly ordered objectives, asonrg as there

was any chance .to destroy the enemy north of the lie llaguemu - Stes

oto force the enemy's withdrawal beyond the Svrno passes and to re-

establish contact with Nineteenth Any on 'te ridge ofthe Veers.

The Luftwaffe wns ordered tosupport the PoiMrer in Ottef West by

oo itng late-ndal bm ers tast enemyheld territory, with Antwerp

as the focod oint. Diroot air supprt was to be gven the Army only b

Luftwaffe foswtions whih wre not snitable for ccmaitraent against

Antwrp and the only so far. as the atra ie sit ao peratted. Tighter

fcmtie ware to protct th rar o et 1 e.T -irwings were to be traserd to the atr Front* Unite of the Ut flak

Cop were to poetthe Six*th M Pasr4u its preparations fr

deprtue edware thea to sco teAnyW to the bat4 honm a

otarof thtetomp nrtapim. Dy ie at

IspBasic we to be given flat th wit nwis forceswre bfein transferred

to oiln or lsaee.

ns r ell5a

On J~u at 1230 hors the Oomrer in Chief !o t reported as

follow conoernir the fore oing directive: At p resent, an eln y attacok

againt the "\rnty- Tifth .Mt~ was still Wproa ble, Withi a short tin,

however, the sntywou34 resas the attack against Colo gne which had been

intarrted In roecember, this time with the support of the Britishe ooi

Ar. An attack, wotldk also be wade aga-lust the wostern front of Arm

Grop U. For thi effort th . bu ad availble about twenty 4ow divi-

aton type unts atd abo at 2,50 tanks. After, the end of Jnary, an

ewm attack directe at the gap of the Iloell. ?River was poesible,

In lower 'Alsace the enen 1d withdrawn to a line ranning fromn the

Saveme pae to the ahin north of StrassBourg, although there was no

n eesity for thds othr than to conserve forcms for comuitmet on another

sectr of the front, perhaps ner %mrre.ok

Germn defensive masures were as follow:

a. Army Orop 11 ein foret. by the 361st Volksendtor

t'ivsion (which bad been rhabilitated near ?wfeone pansergnnadier

division (to be. moved up by Army Gamup E): and the 655th Antitank Battalio

(0n); and If oaibe, byone infantry orVolkga adie r divisio from

Alsce. ArbGopI ol old a popition I the rear of teprchute

b., D: rop8 After the idtbfrnwl of .3 wits and vehicles,

data..e of the line Rar 'idas - Ktetok a et of Krinklt e" vet of

Schoenb OwCue ser Westnl.. Pore released (about tiwee Volkse

grenadir dvisions, three motorized units, the bulk of one Volk artiller

143 4 C-020

corpw, aRd the Yolks projector brigades) were to be shifted to the Aachen

sector. Tho disponition of forces would then be as followst

(') fifth Paenser Army (to be designated aG Group htur) from

the right arm group bouiafry to but not incl din Pueren; to the rear

(as army group reserve), three mobile units of the XIZI Panser Cops.

(2) Pttteenth Army (to b deignted as Group Eifelsm irh)

fr or to but not in ding the itl~au castle, with focal pint at

() senth Army (to e designated as roup tielc4outh) frao

the R'lueland castle to the loft boundary of .th army group, with focal roint

at fiier (cositttuont here of d Panser rivsion as army group reserve).

a. rmy Gru Ga Continuation of the attack in lower Ase in

order to reach the line Ingwler - lfllsedt, and If possible to reach

Saverne. f'ctsbbly these forces would not be suSfioient to siks cozitact

with ?ineteenth Army as intended. t'pori conclusion of the attack, two

mobile divisions were t be thdn wn from omlqment as reserves in the

Sssrbrueekon area. ne ts dsed division w to remain betn Trier and

Orebls.

4. Arm GruA p O upper Rine, Co-rdiratiox of fighting with the

advance of AM 3rou 0. Army Group 0 to as atw aftr oupa t

of the li ageler f lflstedt.

A s sfu defense it the fourth battle for Aahein dpeMM upon the

Geas ability e shift mobile its as qae 1 3 7 possible to that ara.

Ciwig to the serious shortae of fuel, heweer, this ould e de. only.

after e;utahxvad units 'had atlready arrird inthe entraixnt ar a. S-now

dri C't an the rscess ty of rnving at night werep expeote tc delay the

moeent of tb Y izth Panor Army.

UntIl 3 7 ebruary, eight ryund of' anzunition nor day fo ahgun

would be air. iable for light field howitzes and tive rctznd for heavy

figl bowtboere. Consequntl, only one-third of the amount of a muitIon

=sed in Vecaber would be available now, whnartilley wes a decisive

factor.

Fuel consmtion for units intranit tothe Zatern Front would

aont to abmt 4, 50 cubic mters. 7cr movements on the ee rn Frc'ntanother 1,00 cubIc meters would.b needed. The fighting in Alsacee and

the subsequent regrouping ins -exeed to cn us at least 1I50 cubic

Meers. tqirwts over and above the 2,000 cubic meters to b use du~a

lag the last ten days in January, amone to 1,000 cubic etrs.

hao nnel rsplae ent were insuficient an led toa seriou decrease

in contat strength. tocal re 4aomeflts wore trocured by taking over asu-

rity bttalioans from tin 'el area. In spite of such locald efforts,

the la*t of replacements bad now beecas a vital atter for all of tn 41*1-

stems, Suffienet saer.!taksa assault 'g vwr also essentisi-

in view of the large, amer of tanks (3,300) ftic the aasq' held reedy

for c etant. Uinls addtional strength arrved in tie, an an beak-

through to the Rhine coud so be prevented.

All ants designated fort transfe to th Fast had been vit raw from

the Wetrnn '~rt with the exception ofthe 9th 53 Nnser Pivision. The

MS CaO2O ll

osr,ider~ed sc' andti Pi5 ovs; ilnatn for trenzzhr. The lit; PaIr ± onwas also urgontly neai, The owand er in Chief k est sugeste the

trZ^fl4f'aT of the Panzer Lehr Ptivtsion an te 25th ra.n rrenader jyjie#

,oin and Purhqr sutes r zt t 18l9tb Infantr iisnb tramsfhrred

once the crent tighti1ng bMd eded A report woud besubmitted later

concerning the txnnfer of the 1lks artillery c-orps Of the ton bridge

ocastruottan uite scheduled for transfer, five and on-athad already

deprted.

The Coiratdor in Chief .#t issue a detaIled report on dec{piv

After the departure of three wings, the Luftwaffe was s than ever

able t. deend the rc ar .ares. This was certain to result in the farther

destruction of seupnl y lines and in a retrconsnmption of fuel.

The Corsnder in Chief Ut-est asked for an imnzsdiate decision on the

foregoin report of 22 Janury, in answer to vhich "a. directiv was neceived

on the folridng day. _While the dtspeiticn of force vie apoved, th

bumiry bet ween Lrq Group TwsdArty Group W@14#Orth was to b hite

to Urn south since the enem' sin effort would prob~bly bedirected at

that peiut. the sector 1Wosl gap aOrchols defense line ve to be rein-

fore by infatr troops from AiGru . Owlg the keakdovs

production, the supery of ammuition oct43 nt beicr aed. Rnnffs were

to fe Toed byutilising fores from less hard-pres se ators of the

ellEhl's.

-1141-

front. The demand for .4, 500 cubic meters of taol for the units tr nsr

forrtngk t'the r ate.t jdre t t* . "aul cons;uro nt to he-

lowereil by rkeshlf ',easures B~ach as the use of trailers and the cdoy.-

lent of horse-drawn vehiolos. A rrrised, rentals Et icn a to betmcitted.

The uite which h Md beer. swfged for trptnsfer to the n st were accepted,

with the ezeeption of the 1$9th Infntry flhviston,. Th.e requfired division

would haeto betken from the Wtnrt Arm7.

On U Jamara new Fuehrer d irectiv ws" issued. Gena bridgeheads

at the Pr would have to beeliminated before the e ney could begin an

offensive ast Cologne and the !-ur dIrtriot. Theer, the right

win of Army Group T would have to defend itself as long as possible

forward of the lbw River. The defense of these bridgeas wrruld fore

the enem into new attacks end regroupings which would consume further

time.

?egtnning onthe evening of 24 Jarnasry, the I 05 r aer Corp was to

b. transferred to the Vienn area as Of reserve. The corps was to assemble

In the area Vienna a. Ujenr Wunt dt e. Ooe.*wg -Bratislava.

25 L&Entbe eo n COhf at reoeived areply to hts

request of 24 Jeax7. The ponsibility ofbrinn forward iio i

fue be been .iiaaned The orde pseiateyt transfer on infant

divisiaon Army 0roup 0 was cancelled. In addition, the 3Ine prpo

by the CaMer in Chic? Vest was tob occuie only uner stron en

pr wue

?;. C 0

7h4ery had establIshed a new detenso front tflon the Moer an3

:oth t rera . 1nc8.e t; ont rution of or ow nttk wol ti sw

forces tualoh were at that time schmbdled- for tmsn sr a~s reserves to

futur sin defense psitions, the ?herr ordered cn 25 Janunry the

cessation of a ttaoks in the lower ' oes and lowr laoe. Tr-oans

were to be arrid out Ixmnedatel in reeordsnoo with orders received

by the odr in Chicf lont. W oet in. importanc Wt' thn tranisfer

of the 25th 'anner rdier "i visiort to the mtstern Front. The 6th 3

Yautain Oiriion was to be etploy~d in the noutains.

on . j n a directive ws to bay been sent to the :frt Panzer

Any7 in order toaccelat its flow withdrawal, but it was never signed.

Ormfxe= , ithe afternoon* _the t oftn t wind

rhef wt onthe situt reports was rcie.Th. winter fighting

had rslted in ert avene losse of 4e-0O0menin the 'olksgndifr

divisions and 2-3,C30 enin the panzr an pmsergrnaier divi.ott.

The it Pantry had been badly veakened. 'vo after each Volks nier

division had been replenished with about five hWired anin Janmry, only

fou or five battalions bad. aeta2 bee b ht upto st rngh. Purw

loas woldma that several division wld .ist of only a fowhnin '4ur troop., *nsts their ariler ar suBpply uitis woIu

beully intact, A rerrzatio as urgsitly reuied. Isite of.

combin-ous ad transfer rpla to wete stil necessary The tryqi

bad been taxed t their apacity bythe Ardenne it i, AM all "meesures

had already, been taken for providing shot perid of reailitation

P C--0O2O 11

Courses of ins~truction had been increased to counteract a growing decline

in trainingt. The requirements for 1'a&d weatpons, sew,-aitomtic rirles,

and heavy antiaircraft guns had increased. NIow that tanks and assault

guns Were- again being supplied to the hest, rather than to the .et, the

su"^ply of spare parts had again become of great importance. The condition

of the hore had deteriorated, althouuh tre was sufficient fodder.. The

clothing situation was serious.

on 27 J nuar an order was issued for the transfer of the 25th Panzer-

grenadier Division and two ,uehrer brigades to the Tottbus -- 1'arkfort on

the Oder area, and of the 27th and 28th 58 Volunteer Grenadier Divisions

to the Protectorate, in that order. The Coimander in Chief West was

authorimed to withdraw from the thinly held Ill River line to a chard posih

tion between the Ill and !Rhine flivers and behind the Rhine as soon as the

defense was prepared. A ferry would have to be operated in addition to the

bridg, at Rreisach. The construction of a cable railway was to be considered.

A further order assigned the above-named units to the Army General Staff,

with the 1Fiebrer reserving the right to order their assembly and commitment.

on the ssmo day, 27 Jarnary, the Commander in Chief West was informed

of the J'nehrerts permission for Army Group G to assume control. of the seater

held until then by frm Oroup Upper .hne. The staff of .rygroup Upper

Rhino was to be transferred imeiately .to Army Group Viat l.I reply to

the request of the Oomn rder in Chief West, the Fizebrer approved the with.*

drawl of the right wing of the Nineteenth Army. At the same time, the

eo~nder in Chief West was to examine whether the course of the front hold

?A O 0 12

by Iitee nth Army coc3 be troveb advroinz the. wriin Uin of resist.-

ance to the line o'h1ettstst -"rkirob a- Cal tu tonhotiz xa Us 7alttn.

For this purpose the 6th 2 Muntain ttvbsion would bemove. up.

n2? Janur the Comin~der in Chief' w.ent red that three r' a

nent and two light cable mail.ways were avat hble over the Rhine, and that

furtther oqinet had been a's1ined.

An order for the ewtic of the motorized forcan wes ibsed -on

20 Janear after the let, d, sd12th SS$ Panzer Division had anreoy

been puled out and the bulk of these units nso east of the Ous River.

The mroh had beer celayed by lack of fuel, air attacks, b Wather, and

poor roads, and bed been further postponed b a short rtabiltation. Onl

th motoent of the 25th ?ausorgrmadie Division proceeded without inter

rption. Te lose of time. woulA have to be opa ted for by aflowing

no tine for rehabilitation after arrival in the new assembly area.

4. Yrtreaees9 _bn th .#' aMen on the -ChamnnelIg n's During January

and Febur no mjor attackz were wde, although G en raVa were carred

out in as -effort to bsores suples

Th. e nsuation of theU cvlan popualation wes sontiue. At the

binn of the year there were still $,50 perso atLoettren

original popultion of 55,000 person. Another 15,00 perons were stl

in Rasaireo where teterritory bad been extended. rvauation was to

bein on. 1 Janury. At La toohelU thee were still 39,50 from an orgi-

na 43,00 p rso. Powr, wood, and ration= were stfll: furnished by the

enetw. t t ronde.4?ort 6,50 person rsined from the origiel populw-

tion of 21.0-70 pars ons.

1s .~ y -020-23

Ocasionally it was possible to suprl1y the fortresses by means of

small boats from the coast of Sp~ain.

ix. ft I; TrAT MF~1 n1T PT! W'~I~E TIT,'~ (30 JA L1.ARY -

2il FPN~A~r)

I, The VAin ~rnt g, (Army Group B and ° ry Group G) A'rmy Group

Patton vas not expected to form a reserve force; apparently trasit personnel

were being, ueed for that 'repose.

On I ebrxr strong en~ attacks against the ?ifth and Fifteenth

Panzer Armies (Army Group B) were continued as on the preceding day,, al-

though not in like force. The Fifth Panzer ).my was forced to withdraw

into the area immediately in front of the yoatwall. Reserve were still

being transferred but progress was gnerely. slow.' Tb. Fuhrer's Infantry

Brigade, however, had already reached the Rhine River.

In the sector held by Ary Group G the enemy had widened his salient

in the direction of 3relsaoh, forcing the Germans to w itbdraw. The great

bend in the front still had a diameter of thirty-two kilometers. On the

southern secto of the front Uthe tas only localized fighting.

on 7 b ~ a decision by the ) t zhr ws transmitted to th Corns

wader in Chief Wst: Although the First AM .frot h4d been, onidersbly

weakened by the release of the 10th and 21st SS Panzer Divisions and other,

units, It ws still stronger than befo r the Gemni attac 9 Troops occupy-

ing sore stdogl held sections of the front were, to be spread out end

0JI8 troops were to be utilised ira order to coensate for the lost personnel.

123-r

V 0320 14

Later, the 11th 'nzer' t iion was to 're nhiftd trw the mnost ennBred

sector of the front.

Ith sectfor betwen Ilonaohu sn 4oissrmiaoka, the *s ettall ntill1

served as 4 line of sup ort, ahle north of o4)5$hSu it i00s lackig. This

ade necessary the shifting of reserves to the rear of Fifteenth Army(,

Fuel could be rroidd only for tanks and artillery (in accordance with

deer of the F trr as noted MyCieft ekrsoht Opention Staff ).

On 2 eb~'~ enem intentions were dscloed Wthe transfer of

another division to Lisa... All of the midget submarnes had returned

but without success. The enemy now pushed forward btwee the Yati an

the t a rivers. strong air attacks were carried out against Arm Group

B. Attacks continued agaist the left wtnj of the fteenth Army end the

Fifg ?aenser Ary, forctng at wittbdranl near Wsnsehu and at seven], other.

points. All along the front the enemy had advaned as far as the outpost

area of the Wetwall, It rermined aquestion of whether the enmy woul

stop or attempt to nen tnte into the Westwl,

I the sector )teld by A Group Gthe had fored a salient

extendig amst t I B einedh. To the eat there was a Germ alient

in which the 70$th Isiatry Division. fought, h aced up by the 24 Mlo na

D v sott e atl23l5ho rs the Conae rn Chief Vest report thit,.

in the sectr MR by First Army, fourteen fuleeydivsions (not. olt!-

lu strdn GH forces) wore fced by thirtee a one-half badly weakened

German divisions, the CJ troops of which had been sharly reducs by

,.124..

Q -125-

transfers to Army ( -r ox . h v et om, the 11th ?an o TNi~ten could not

*a siftd btn th~ rost andangre secttofl off the 7rrtt Army f11ront

ntil after the a rrirf of t'he 256th Volksrensdier T1,iv-sion at the

Orchols switch ridtion. ~t lesst tn ttys wrfld be. reqaired for thi

movneet, The troovnz hot-ing ti~ oooupiet eotrn coul not be

spread over a mrater area. In ehiftiwn ressrvss to the rear of Fifteonth

Army, whic received preference end .nnterrupted tononal suprviion b

the C o- r in Cbief Wet, fuel was mmvalable oven for tanks eansrtfl-

lery. Thet lack of fue, nov Increased by the ccnrniton of tfel in oving

S3 divisons, seriously hndicaed .11 easrro takensb the oomar4.

On2 n an intercepted ritieh reite inessavy rprtd that all

or their. ehicle were bing~ue to supply nnuition,~ The hS. B..

A rmo r ed Division wes tras ferd from the lel switch position t th

Lieg area. Lively artiller firs continue in the seator held byArm

Group ii, either a a means of deception or in prepartie or re ett'ok.

7n movewmts were carried out in the Roe . due - !tlich area.

Farthe fightin for the Weet.al resulted in several pmeationsm. The

enq wes aided ood wear e cosqet heavy air support. It wes

n"a eosay to comatt cu eiet of th 12th Velbgremir Division.

Re fight~csre at Trrat and. to the south, Torooo were with'.

draws from the estnfl is order to save strength. ?h. 3d Parachute Divi-

sta we vtthdn to be uwed sea resere fore*,

Loahia e fightin took place in ths entor held by m frt JAru (Army

Group ). There wes heavy fighting only whore the front followed a bead

in the fuse. After the lose orColen, the main line of resistanc rn

C? P020 l&.

easwrlalovg the r ld Souathwest *r thr :hie, the enarrys

reruted inthe nrxc: ot' the It z tinor Plo ts, 'Alinteeanh Artj now

numbered 74500 men.

?ightngj on the southern front was wetker.

The enemy press announced . vinjor attac?' a Tht the heart of&oaty

in prepairation for which trmnches in the frnt wore to beuzade.

O4 IDSMaL th American were reprtd to have teen mking rapid

prgrss intheir concentration. Aceuntera.tt ok was considered in view

of the importance of thRXoar - Tirf dams. It was important that the

onsy be prevented from floing the earroundng area, At the same tme,

our own mesurs in that direction, if taken at a strategic time would do

much to banner the en.w's moment. Attacks continue along the Weatall,

while action it the south we limited to localized fighting. !rsite

enas air attacks, the situation with re 'ard to brtdg-r reined unchanged.

The bridge at faunheim wes even in use again. Thle bad weather was expected

to oontinu40

In the sector of Arm roup (I a countorattack was launched agafint

th section of the frost running along the ben in the hine. A tense

sitat.on fores the 3ermns to giv, ground in the sector held byJine-

teet Army. Onl a thin tine as Md in the Ver after thwidr i

of rforcs tere.. An enemy enetration as made north of )4ulhus.

on 4y ~ the Coane in Chief We t as ordered to express hi.

opi non an intended adntce of the main line of resistance bet weed

Beckinge and F-crbah designed to permit the sheet iron works at iflinge

f

-127-

to resme operation. These wks wore of sneotal inportance to the

Gn'man war conomy bocause of the ieVe1ormant, of the sitstior in the

East. Three divisions were avdl at:xle for the above nurpose after the

ithdnrawl of the A& lsaco bridgBehead.

On 7 retr'y the 'Comnader in Chief '.vest reporte thit in his

opinion existing conditions did not warmrnt the advance of the mnln line

of resistant., In view of the tnpewing enemy attck aainst the Rhine

Palatinate, the divisions vithdrawn from the Alan. bridehad as well

as the 11th Pnicr pivision wold be needed there. r ersienmtra oeblig

and the chairmn of the to srmmentc .ion, Oberreiohaleiter Rlher shared

the opinion that it was better to maintain the present situation at the

frnt, since the sheet iron works was a till. capable of limited prodution.

On e ebr nny tbraefon, the Coisader in Chief Wt was informed that

the prposed attack would be postponed.

Heavy bomts dropped on Ijmuiden in Holland on 5 February did only

little damage. On 5 Thbrustry reconaiesanee ls penetrated sight to

ten klo m fers into the Dritish hes but did at notice ny preparations

for ettaek. For that rean, .an ofnsuive against Holland was tot exeted.

Furthr American ite or m eva into the Anaw area. The .$.. 85th

Infotry Division as brought foand. Into the sector opposite First amy.

An attake by forty American and Dritish divisions was epcted. iThe'

etm appehad a. far ts the rf dam and reached the oatudrt of Sched

The Voglag seth. wilost. Generafly, combat was localized. Germnan

An honorary title conferred upon distinguished financiers.

T C~~~g~

swumreserw units were teing shifted. * he 16th "ne rtv'is ion moved closer

to the k ry C'rour bo'.rndar, while the 15th "~nvreresdier nivision LoU

back forty kilmeters to the south. The heaquarters . of, the It I Corps

was do available as an operations staff for the AMy Gou. Ad joinig

to the south, the headquarters of the mxvii Carm, the Panze r *w ii-

sion, arching from fttbr to ankenheb, the 2d Panzer Division Fuic th

9t Paser Division, situatednear a~heid, ware arted. The 3 n

5th Paniear fuvsion #rm u from t he rear.

i the# §eob of Arm Grouy the Ger a force were withdrawin in

the face of further endm attacks. The eornitment of the U.*S. 12th Armored

Division against Ilineteetli Army in'flnted the enem's new interes in the

s tern sector of th. f ront. nmy ponetntion were also ed near Nieu

1ressob. Two village were lest south of Colaer. The 16th 7Voflgnadier

Diviin bad been withdrawn fro the 17osges mountains. The southwstern

secti.on of the bond in the front h ehortsed. On the coast, Punkirk and

Lorient were bombanded by artillery fire.

Th. two Fiwhgr bigades aml their assigned units were reogaised

.1to e dtiuIoas . hevy antitank battalions that hdban mado re

were asse toAr Grou 13.

Dy Ls the .numq as still net ready to attarh* The U4.. Ninth

Army' ba e abrdite Eto ) erb1 Unt t~ th aag of this measure

wns net yet o1mr. .ES 10st Airborne Division asaparny employd

t . I i , b g n in h a g r s anda as brcsa at by l audse keer to the effec that Genny sh rd b n

VS 4;g C-020e19

together in comon cuse ith the Anl .o-Lerioasa atanst the Ihuaians.

In te * zy Groen3 area, further- enem attacks yizrnseei tho Germans

back V the wtern outskirts of Geuaw and 5chleiden. The shifting of

reserve was progressing wel; the reaorve forces assigned to Arm Group1

had already arrived, while those of Arm Group 13were still in transit.

In the Army Gop sector at the bend of the Rhin the now mai line

of resiatanne bad been reach.!. The shifting of turdts to the 'sen Front

stiln coata d. In the En tncth Arty sector the ener had united hits

tank spearheads bya thrut south of Colmar and tohaws the north fra

west of ?lulhouse. T b. bulk of the 16th Volksgea dler Division had sues

eoded in crossing the I .4ver. 'From there, the vain in, of resistarwe

was wit .nvnw to the Rhine - thes aal. Th, bridg, at W~isohn

completely desoihd

On k ja r1 the Commnder in Chief West subaitted a repmtb the

c ntis? of Army Grou 33o the reasons for the lon of 7Toges Castle

and the high ground near flreiborn. It wan .xp ~ine4 that a skillful night

attack bad been do against a thl held Geimn security line. aDy aoid-

la artillery ad tank fire, the e em had penetrated as firs the Gersa

p poitio and rear bnset. Lack of fuel lad prevete the rapid uwn..

meatof nsorvs to restore the situie. The C or in Che West

agretd that this stback w a not te re sult of, negligence bythe rd

lan action at this tie s not effective eying to bad eather..

On Lfr n th bouwlry of the Amrican Ninth Anmy s shifted

further to the north, indicating that aene thrust was Ii nent. Gensual

-1,29-

1t3 1-2 -130

tad~er' armty was to provide cover, An attt&o wtas ade smuth of the army

bowztary. Yirhting oetinu& near wcndtnrth oi the 'u afly dan,

The = nser Lehr tivision occiio the sector near a oioo where the ene#my

as repulsed. hn the Schneeifol the enemy conttnusd to press forward anti

the German withdrew to a nov amn line of rartanco. The situetion was

unfavorable owing largely to the small 31z. of the Oem force. The

elrn 5th Parachute fltvieion turned off towards ,rm Attempts to tie

wGrn reserves ad bees suoeesfrfl. The nweto eevsit

Juelc . Pusnn area had been delayd Ntd weather permitted transport

to conti nu during daylight.

It was interded that eneraldiral arcall was to sunervise all

t raffic movement in the West. After the order had bensigned by the Chief

of the 0KW, it westopped because of the personal opposition of the Corn#.

nantier in Chief of the avy.

After a. long lull, aknother attack was ao in lower Alsace RfZainst

the sector held byArM Group G. righting continued near Portach. The

vtbdrawal of liineteenthk An to the nnat we carried out with fair

suces. Oupo still roaind in the fonard area. Attacks arw

Neu treisset were rem.ee. Sufficiet tr~ge equi st wa available.

Th. fortress of tne t we unr stroa artllery tire.

a meeta ing was held to discus prepration for th

impending dfens, as revred bythe C orin Chir ef Wt. th eet

wes attnded by the ev of Anmy lrouqw Ul &nd 13 ext the cowandors

of the 'Fifth and Wjftnt Panzer A&rmie aw! of the pratute snry.

.O..

#Z CeZf41

Tj oriculr attention ws aid to the srio w lack of'. uel. which preoted

th rapid svcent of ronorvea, the d ere'o coribt strength :]P Anry

CroupZ the fats~e conition of the troep, am' th g'rnerfl drop in

Mia,. It was r-Atrod out that every -office Rn enlisted m uat beo

mae to realte the serf'Als s Ituation at ho and in the ;a t and)t

ire r~noea of holding out Uatfl the ed

On ft hbruarv an intercepted radio assagBe made it certain that the

Anris teea twere -concetratng their main effort near fliera - Aulich.

Sinee thze Ditish were mo careful to aint ain radio ditciplne, nothing

*oilAb learned of their intention * nr peration originating in the

E~ohmal islands could not becompleted owing to weather oitions.

Ta Cnglend 250,00 nan were organised. into new division., adding to

the fore divisions already tiere, They would not beready for actio

before Jne.

The AMricn Ninth ArCr bad concentrated, although soe elements were

still missing. Locl reserves appering in norther lsaoe indicated the

begining ofe ajor opeation. The disecoed forces in Alsaca ba rb'

ably already started to withdraw.

to the sector bold bvy Armo Grou fighting cotimd at Z.eaddt at

ite cbceeei where the main line of risa e ha benpse back

t teasern line of the Wetwel. I reiner eng.o

the Wiot. Th 21anser Divisio wes tied up by the action

&t Ar roup 0 the sitiatiec near rorbe a straightened out apgain.

?ightin contine .+whr the fi'ont turI2d at the Rhine. . rineteent

St 4)2 12

Aywithdrew to the ?AnlIt caa while the exnmy rt ooe hesitantly.

Trr trio across the, ?ieuburg bridge proceede wt t diffitflty.

Om3-9 gbr the J*2-* 11 Corp attacked slone. . Fri th save

over their seotor east of Rerr to the Amrioatw, thereby relwdng

their XU Corps, and leaving only on frittsb corps at the f ront. L!vi.

denty major attack vis to taks place oth siloe of Venle. The

ffurther oatmt of airborne troops at the f ront ado an air ladin

improbable,.

n the Army Group 0 sector the . £7 Corp. was being disengaged.

:Since local reserves were betng employed in the Tint Army r ectr, it

corned possible that te XXt Corps would ke nontnated in the aguemu

area. It is also possibe that the Trench di iin would be used to

attok the Girond fortresses.

After being assigned the headquarters of XV~t SIS Corps, the like-

toecuth Arm assumed co over the Upper Rhines.

An enemy raid against IJwide pierce the btnaer with pecil bs

r re am s o f dr to shipping wern recliWd.

At Cnbsr, south of Ryweet, the meicanmade en attacok betwes

the $ee ad the W. ie, driving a wedge through the ii.. to a

depth of 5 kiters+. Thanp at task s made saw the 84th

WIntry Tavisie. Sinc ne reimet of the 6th ratnate Divisiobd

been brougt forear, reserves were anflable. Zverythisg w quiet in

the sectr of the 'tfteenth Ary.

per measures carried out at this taim, se under 12 Fobntry.

-I.,

I A' 0m2

Ithe Army Group , see r _lOhJdt wn- 1ost av the eney rivnoed

two kilo ete-s 9. t 08MK hours at order w i o'-i, to ':how w the It

Valley am. This actin ws eirmeoted to f'lood the e~re for from ton to

twe1ve days.

On 9 Terayt Co ade in Chief -etriorte ait 2315 hours

that the irmpeudtn enway offensive wuld not platit the use of foroes

to reain lot sections of the W'twll. A redistribuitio of foros

wori2A only enble the enemy to gain around at other pot *a The mi

goal ws to prevent an enewq brk-thro .

'the C - ner inChief N!est ased for permission to m~ake necessry

lool corrections .in the frnt a~nd to order short wit daw3. in order

to reaot quicayk t any gimer eituation. The bnolr ws assured tt

this would occur only when absolutely necessary in order to mintain the

cottity of the front. n l tter atotun~ operations, it was

understootd that the perissio of the Y ebrer would benecesr.

Othe eavnntn of 10 '.bra ry the Condoi Chief Went receive

word that the f&ehrer had meated bin erission to umeke liited ajust-

sent* in the front line but that he w3s not alloed. to evacuate may t'

or -foititioatioe. *Tbe enaW my beable to apture a town or. a line of

Viners byassault, but these may nem be tvouae aeept by order #

the P eawew.C On 1 Nbwuaw te C we in Chief Wet Issued an order

tthis effeot to the army gpou esindrs.

On I r the oews penetrated the socond Westial in in the

neeifel. The 2d 1Panser Tivision was otted there, while the

-134-.

324th Infantry 'ivinion. was tshifted to the ntb near DT~nsheidt where

the s tzation was similar.

The withdrawal of army. Group 0 across the Rhine hsd now been

sanctioned. Yost of the armiy's heavy equipment had already been moved

across the river.

The prsence of the French fleet at Touilon was ascertained.

Ahy Group T pwerermitted toe'nut. the bridgehead between

1rgstein and asenfeld. In cking this decision,, the Cemander in rhef

WEst considered that the inceted ground at the rear of the bridgehead

mght make a later cincuation more difficult.

On ,}) Femsn two. : iti h divisions attacked east of Ni jnege. Three

di vicious were held in reserve near Venlo, Probably the enwg had an

additional three infantry divisions and three a~rmored divisions. Fifteen

enemy divisions were moved into the Aacohen area.

Fighting continued between the reuase and amhie ?Livers where saturation

bombing destroyed soe of our heavy guns. Fifty to sixty enuia tanks broke

through the line west of Cle've and other forces penetrated into the IReiche-0

weld. F'ight continued in the Sobneeitel and along the Sauer River. The

German torces wre now pressed back to the prepared defense positions. An

attark was made near Ifalental, while north of 'ruem the situztien grew

awre serious as the en w pessed closer to the road. Heavy fishting wasreored at ohtemeaeh.

On the :r~ Group 0 front the 1. ZX Corps was being shifted to the

area south of M~uhoue. Girmn supply trains were :harassed by air attack.