the gcc–iran conflict and its strategic implications for the gulf region

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The GCC–Iran Conflict and its StrategicImplications for the Gulf RegionPrasanta Kumar PradhanPublished online: 08 Feb 2011.

To cite this article: Prasanta Kumar Pradhan (2011) The GCC–Iran Conflict and itsStrategic Implications for the Gulf Region, Strategic Analysis, 35:2, 265-276, DOI:10.1080/09700161.2011.542923

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Strategic AnalysisVol. 35, No. 2, March 2011, 265–276

The GCC–Iran Conflict and its Strategic Implicationsfor the Gulf Region

Prasanta Kumar Pradhan

Abstract: Continuing conflict, competition and rivalry have been a regular phe-nomenon in the Gulf region over the past few decades. Among other reasons, thetroubled relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Iranhas been one of the major factors responsible for the present state of affairs in theregion. The relationship has been marked by sectarian and ideological differences,clash of interests over the presence of the US in the region, concerns over the Iraniannuclear programme and territorial disputes between Iran and the United Arab Emirates(UAE). Efforts at reconciliation have not been very productive until now, though severalattempts have been made by both sides. If the situation in the region continues as it isnow, it has the potential to severely impact other developments in the neighbourhood. Itmay affect the unfolding situations in Iraq and Yemen; and may also have repercussionson nuclear non-proliferation and the presence of major powers in the region.

The uneasy relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Iranhas been ongoing ever since the formation of the GCC and it persists because of

Iran’s troubled relationship with the individual member states of the GCC. The GCCwas formed in 1981, by the initiative of Saudi Arabia in the tumultuous backgroundof the Iranian revolution in 1979 and at the beginning of the Iran–Iraq War in 1980 toprotect their own regimes from the fallout of these two events, such as the spread ofa radical Shia ideology and the unforeseen impact of the war between their two pow-erful neighbours. Since then, the relationship between the GCC and Iran has passedthrough many difficult situations and several issues that have cropped up to haunt themstill remain unresolved. Though the GCC is not a monolithic body and the memberstates often differ on several regional and international issues, they have shown con-siderable unity in the face of the perceived threat from Iran and on regional securityand political issues. The Iranian nuclear programme, Iran’s island disputes with theUnited Arab Emirates (UAE), the Saudi-Iran relationship, ideological differences andthe strong military presence of the US in the GCC countries are some of the unre-solved issues between them. There have been some initiatives by both sides to arrive atan understanding but not much headway has been made in this regard and thus tensionsremain. This continuing conflict has several strategic implications for the Gulf region,even across the geographical boundaries of Iran and the GCC countries. The impactof this conflict has been witnessed in neighbouring Iraq and Yemen over critical issueslike nuclear proliferation and the presence of the US in the region. This article seeksto examine the issues that plague the relationship between the GCC and Iran and toanalyse its strategic implications for the Gulf region.

Prasanta Kumar Pradhan is an Associate Fellow at IDSA.

ISSN 0970-0161 print/ISSN 1754-0054 online© 2011 Institute for Defence Studies and AnalysesDOI: 10.1080/09700161.2011.542923http://www.informaworld.com

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266 Prasanta Kumar Pradhan

GCC–Iran conflict

Ideological rivalry

After the Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini openly declared his intention toexport his brand of Islam and support the Shias in other countries of the region inorder to overthrow the neighbouring Sunni regimes. Khomeini declared that:

Our revolution is not limited to the boundaries of Iran. Economic and political difficultiesshould not compel our officials to forgo the principal task of exporting our lofty IslamicRevolutionary goals ... The true meaning of export of our revolution is to awaken the Muslimsand their governments so that they can change themselves and not allow their preciousresources to be plundered by anti-Muslim outsiders.1

This posed a challenge, both in terms of ideology and national interest, to the ArabGulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, whose claims to be the leader of the Muslimworld, as well as to remain the regional super power, were challenged by the newIranian regime. It also increased the vulnerabilities of other smaller Gulf Sheikhdomswho also use Islam as the legitimising force to continue their regimes and have goodnumbers of Shias populating their countries.

The conflictual relations between Iran and the GCC have also aggravated the exist-ing Shia-Sunni divide in the region. Iran has been supporting the Shias of othercountries and inciting them to revolt against the GCC regimes. There is evidence thatthe Shias of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have been funded and ideologically motivatedto act against their governments. There are allegations that the Iranian government isdoing the same in Iraq and Yemen as well. Any sign of Shia revival threatens to exposethe erosion of legitimacy and the increasing gap between the Sunni rulers and theirpeople. Ageing Arab Sunni rulers, especially the Saudis, recognise the ability of theyounger Shia leaders like Ahmadinejad who can mobilise the Arab street irrespectiveof sect.2

Iranian nuclear programme

The issue of the Iranian nuclear weapons programme has raised concerns in the mindsof the GCC rulers. At the official level, the GCC recognises Iran’s right to a peacefulnuclear programme. But their attitude changed in 2002–03, when evidence emergedabout a clandestine nuclear programme intended for production of nuclear weapons.This gave rise to apprehensions regarding Iran’s ambitions to acquire nuclear weaponsto maintain its political and military superiority over the Gulf countries. The GCCcountries supported International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts and consid-ered the involvement of the UN Security Council as a positive development to preventIran from developing nuclear military capability. So far as the sanctions are concerned,the GCC countries support diplomatic and economic measures to pressurise Iran buthave expressed their disapproval of the employment of the military option.3 If Iran issuccessful in developing nuclear weapons, it would not only shift the balance of powerin the region in favour of Iran, it would also multiply the threat perceptions of the GCCcountries. The threat perception is the natural outcome of the Gulf Arab countries’view of Iran as a hegemonic power and the Iranian eagerness to spread their influencein the region. GCC countries are also concerned with the possible environmental haz-ards associated with the nuclear programme in case of a mishap. The GCC countriesare particularly concerned with the Bushehr nuclear plant in Iran which is located onthe Iranian coast.

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Strategic Analysis 267

Territorial disputes

Another issue of contention between the GCC and Iran is the Iranian occupation ofthree islands, namely Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb in the Gulf, which areclaimed by the UAE. Iran claims that historical facts are in its favour and the islandsof Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and the northern part of Abu Musa were handed overto Iran by the British acting on behalf of Sharjah and Ras al Khayma.4 The GCChas taken up the issue seriously and supports the claim of the UAE over the islands.The final communiqué of the 29th session of the supreme council of the GCC held inMuscat in December 2008 says that, ‘It [GCC] supports the right of the United ArabEmirates to regain the islands of Greater and Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, their con-tinental shelves, territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone being an integralpart of the UAE’. It also appealed to Iran to resolve the issue through direct nego-tiations or through the International Court of Justice. The case, however, remains amajor thorn in GCC–Iran relations. To add to the worries of the GCC, Iran has builta port in Abu Musa Island. In August 2008, Iran opened two administrative officesin Abu Musa which, it claims, are for the purpose of ship registration and maritimerescue. In a statement, the GCC Secretary-General Abdurrahman Al-Attiyah ‘stronglydenounced Iran’s opening of two administrative offices on Abu Musa Island, whichbelongs to the UAE and is occupied by Iran’, and also added that the Iranian actionconstitutes an ‘illegitimate action on an indivisible part of the UAE’.5 The GCCfears that this will give Iran greater control over shipping traffic through the Strait ofHormuz.6

Presence of the US

The presence of the US in the Gulf has been the primary issue between the GCC andIran. Iran has been concerned with the presence of the US in the region and, particu-larly, with the stationing of its troops in the GCC states. Iran accuses the GCC countriesof inviting the US to the region and has also termed them the ‘puppets of the GreatSatan’. The presence of the US in the friendly GCC countries raises the Iranian threatperception and insecurities about its nuclear programme. The Iranian threat perceptionis understandable as the US military is present to Iran’s west in all the GCC countries,in Iraq to its north, and Pakistan and Afghanistan in the east. This obviously is enoughto create Iranian concerns regarding its own security. It is precisely because of this thatIran proposes an alternative regional security order involving all the countries of theregion, thus keeping the US out.

The US’s threat perception of Iran is based on the Iranian support to terrorism andits weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile capabilities. Also the US hasissues with the nature and behaviour of the regime in Tehran. The possibility that Irancould produce nuclear weapons is a US nightmare. It would give Iran an enormousstrategic advantage, threaten Israel, and fuel a nuclear arms race in the region with thepossibility of them being passed on to terrorist groups. As a result, Iran’s influence inthe region would increase immensely, undoing the precarious balance of power.7 Onthe other hand, the GCC countries are under the security umbrella of the US whichacts as a check on the growing Iranian power and ambitions in the region. The GCCcountries are also concerned with Iran as a bullying neighbour with a historical senseof civilisational supremacy.8

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Saudi–Iranian relations

Saudi–Iranian relations have seen severe bitterness since the Islamic revolution in Iranin 1979. The suspicions regarding Iranian involvement in the 1979 takeover of theGrand Mosque in Mecca by al Otaibi, the subsequent demonstration by Iranian pil-grims during Haj, the killing of more than 400 Iranian pilgrims in 1987 by the Saudisecurity forces during a protest, etc., have further damaged the relationship. Duringthe Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988, Saudi Arabia supported Iraq against Iran.On the other hand, Iran termed the Al Saud regime un-Islamic and openly called forthe overthrow of the Saudi regime, and criticised the Saudi regime’s relationship withthe US.9

The relations have been further strained because of ideological rivalry and the ongo-ing regional power struggle between the two. Saudi Arabia, which has the two holiestsites of Islam—Mecca and Medina—on its soil, has been claiming to be the worldleader of Muslims. It has also used Islam as a tool of its foreign policy to spread itsinfluence among the other Muslim countries. It is also no secret that the Saudis havespent millions of dollars all over the Muslim world to disseminate the Sunni Wahhabibrand of Islam. But the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979, which brought AyatollahKhomeini to power, challenged the legitimacy of the Saudi kings to rule over the coun-try and determined to spread their brand of Islam throughout the Muslim world. Thusrevolutionary Iran challenged the Saudi leadership of the Muslim world which it wasenjoying.10

Efforts towards reconciliation

Though there have been some efforts at reconciliation, they have yielded no sub-stantial results. The Iranian president Ahmed Ahmedinejad was invited to the GCCannual summit held at Doha in December 2007. During his visit Ahmedinejad pro-posed cooperation in economic, political and security fields. He emphasised that peaceand security in the region could be ensured without any external interference and pro-posed that a mutual security agreement be signed between Iran and the GCC. The GCCsecretary-general Abdul Rahman al-Attiyah also visited Iran in 2008 and focused pri-marily on expanding economic cooperation with Iran, as a precondition for broadercooperation. He also announced the formation of a committee for working on thepossibility of setting up a joint security mechanism with Iran.

Iran has offered to share its nuclear expertise with the GCC states as a confidencebuilding measure and to open up its research facilities to them. While the GCC coun-tries support Iran’s development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, they areconcerned about Iran’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons and the likely risk of envi-ronmental hazards. Iran offered a 10-point proposal for regional stability at the WorldEconomic Forum in Doha in 2007 which is as follows:11

1. Establishment of a Persian Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation com-prising the six member states of the GCC as well as Iran and Iraq in accordancewith Clause 8 of Resolution 598 of the United Nations Security Council.

2. Preparing common ground for fighting terrorism, organised crime and drugsmuggling, as well as other joint security concerns.

3. Gradual removal of all restrictions in political, security, economic and culturalfields.

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4. Development of trade ties by taking the countries’ potentials into considerationand conducting joint investment in economic projects to achieve a regionalfree-trade mechanism.

5. Guaranteeing the security and energy export of regional countries to securetheir interests and achieving a sustainable mechanism for energy needed by theworld.

6. Building confidence among regional countries in the nuclear field.7. Setting up a joint consortium for uranium enrichment among regional coun-

tries to procure nuclear fuel and other peaceful nuclear activities under thesupervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

8. Forging serious cooperation among regional countries for having a Middle Eastfree of weapons of mass destruction.

9. Putting an end to arms races in the region by providing resources for thepurpose of economic development and fighting poverty.

10. Making foreign military personnel exit the region and establishing full securityby the regional countries.

The Iranian proposals cover almost all the political, economic and security issues ofthe region. On the face of it, the proposals look like an ideal set of recommendationsfor regional security in the Gulf. But most likely they would not find acceptance inthe GCC countries for various reasons. The history of their uneasy relationship andthe current issues make the GCC apprehensive about the new Iranian proposals asthey may be another Iranian ploy to undermine them. Most importantly, the Iranianproposal of asking the US to leave the region would mean that once the US is out ofthe region Iran would dominate the region and become the most important player in theGulf. But the Iranian proposal offering to produce joint nuclear energy with the GCCmember countries is really a commendable move to build confidence among its Gulfneighbours.

Iran tried to ignore the existence of the GCC during the first few years of its forma-tion. It avoided dealing with the GCC as a block and preferred to deal independentlywith each of the countries.12 By doing so, Iran hoped to distance them from the USand engage them in bilateral political, economic and strategic relations. This strat-egy of Iran could not be completely successful but it has made a conscious effort tomarginalise the GCC and undermine the American influence on them. With the end ofwar and subsequent political and strategic developments in the region, some changeshave also occurred in the Iranian perception and strategy and it has started dealingwith the GCC. It has developed ties with the UAE despite the conflict over the islands.Iran has also improved its relationship with Qatar. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia havealso made some efforts towards mending their relationship but have not been verysuccessful.

Implications for the Gulf region

Iraq

The impact of the GCC–Iran rivalry is clearly visible in Iraq as the war torn countrygoes through a major transition in its struggle for peace and stability. Iran is seen to beattempting to influence various sections of Iraqi society and polity to gain ground inthat country.

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The US commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, in the past had alleged thatIran’s paramilitary Quds Force was supplying weapons that killed American troops andalso stated that the Iranian ambassador to Iraq is a member of that force.13 Petraeussaid, ‘They are responsible for providing the weapons, the training, the funding, and insome cases the direction for operations that have indeed killed US soldiers. The QudsForce controls the policy for Iraq’.14 Iranian officials have brushed aside the allegationsaying that there is nothing new in the American allegation but the issue remains aserious one for both the US and the GCC countries. But the Iranian concerns regardingthe signing of the Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) between the US and Iraq, whichallows the American troops to stay and maintain bases in Iraq for a longer period, andthe possibility of the US using Iraq as a platform to attack Iran still remain. Iran alsosuspects that Saudi Arabia is a proxy for US regional policies and is actively engagedin undermining the Shiite-led government in Iraq.15 Iranian leaders also believe thatAmerican troops in Iraq are part of the problem, not part of the solution, and argue thatin order to stabilise the country, the American forces should withdraw.16

In post-Saddam Iraq, Iran has changed its policy from confrontation to coopera-tion and understandably so because it has major strategic interests in the area and hastherefore made conscious efforts in this regard.17 As Dilip Hiro says:

The Iranian influence is exercised through different channels – a phenomenon helped by thefact that there is no single, centralised authority in Iran. The different centres of power includethe offices of the Supreme Leader and the President; the Majlis (parliament) and the judiciary;the Expediency Council; and offices of the Grand Ayatollahs in the holy city of Qom, and theirsocial welfare networks throughout the Shia world.18

A very easy means for Iran to influence Iraq is the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, for-merly known as the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),19 whichis a Shia resistance group turned political party, established in 1982 by the Iranian gov-ernment to oppose Iraqi aggression against Iran. The Council also has an armed wingcalled the ‘Badr Organisation’ with an estimated strength of around 10,000 men. It hasbeen alleged that the Badr Organisation is armed and funded by Iran.

The GCC states on the other hand are concerned that the Sunni Arabs have beenmarginalised in the new Iraq and that Iran exercises too much influence over the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. They are also worried that Iranians in Iraq mayengage in subversive activities against them and that the civil war may actually spillover into their own states.20

Initially, the GCC countries deeply mistrusted the Maliki government which theysuspected to be an Iranian proxy and the likely source of multiple physical and ideo-logical challenges to their own polities. This reluctance of the GCC countries to dealwith the Maliki government enabled the Iranian government to take the lead in thereconstruction and development of projects like the new international airport in Najaf,creation of a free trade zone around Basra and the signing of multiple cooperationagreements between Iraq and Iran.21

This was brought out clearly by Mowaffak Al Rubaie, Iraq’s national securityadviser at the Manama Dialogue in 2007 when he stated that if the member statesof the GCC became economically and diplomatically engaged in Iraq, they will getthe ‘lion’s share of the huge economic reconstruction opportunities’. In addition, theywould get better security because ‘we are fighting the same enemy’. Rubaie arguedthat ‘there was a symbiotic relationship between the Gulf and Iraq, and the national

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Iraqi reconciliation needed to be linked to regional reconciliation. GCC states shouldnot be worried about an Iraq dominated by Shias and Kurds. Iraq is a democratic,parliamentary, constitutional system. That is what you have to accept’.22

GCC countries are not only worried about the future peace and political stability ofIraq, but they are also concerned about the consequences of a Shia-dominated govern-ment in Baghdad. The GCC would be more worried if democracy was established inthe country, which would mean that the Shia majority would come to power throughthe ballot box. They see the Iraqi Shia community as a singular whole; most do notsee the parts that are secular, strongly anti-Iranian, and opposed to Iranian-style clericrule.23 On the other hand, they are also worried about Iraq becoming a weak or a failedstate as it would mean civil war, terrorism, Islamic extremism, destruction, warlordismand a host of other problems. Thus, for the GCC countries, security is more importantthan the democratic process in Iraq. A strong political and military leadership capableof ruling over all the societal and political factions is more desirable than the processof governance itself.24

Iran may want to empower the Shias and get the Americans out of Iraq, so thattheir own influence in the country would be strengthened and their security ensured.On the other hand, the GCC countries would want to maintain the territorial cohesionand integrity of Iraq under a strong central leadership. The Iranian President MahmoudAhmadinejad visited Iraq in March 2008 and met with Iraqi President Jalal Talabaniand Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and reportedly offered Iraq a loan of $1 billion.25

Ahmadinejad’s visit was the first visit by an Iranian president to Iraq. But the Iraqiprime minister has already visited Iran four times since he assumed office. Malikihas assured Iran that he will not allow his country to be used as a base for the USto attack Iran. He also discussed the issues of al Qaeda movements across the Iran–Iraq border and other issues of bilateral interest. Both the countries have also signed amemorandum of understanding (MOU) in 2008 to boost bilateral defence cooperationbetween them. This sudden improvement in the Iran–Iraq relationship since the fallof Saddam Hussain’s regime has made the GCC countries ponder over Iran’s hiddenintentions and their long-term implications.

Yemen

Yemen is going through severe domestic turmoil which could impact the whole Gulfregion. In the north of the country are the Shiite Houthi tribes who are fighting againstthe Yemeni government, accusing it of widespread corruption, and the economic andsocial neglect of the Shias, the growing influence of Sunni Wahhabism in the coun-try, and the country’s alliance with the US. The government has sent troops to counterthe rebels but has not been successful so far. The continuing conflict in Yemen hasnow turned into an issue of regional importance with both Iran and the GCC countriesvying for influence in the matter. Iran has been accused of providing ideological andmaterial support to the Houthis. In a direct attack on Iran, President Saleh accusedvarious Iranian bodies of supporting the rebels. Saleh stated that Yemeni securityauthorities uncovered two Houthi cells in the capital Sana’a who confessed to havingreceived $100,000 from Iran.26 Iran has categorically dismissed the Yemeni allegationand denied any links between the Houthis and Iran. On the other hand Saudi Arabia isbelieved to be providing the Yemeni government with sophisticated arms and weaponsto counter the Houthis and check the influence of Iran in that country.

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The Iranian influence on the Houthis in northern Yemen is alarming for the GCC.Houthi rebels attacked Saudi border security guards and infiltrated the kingdom’s ter-ritory in November 2009. Saudi Arabia launched heavy military operations includingaerial bombardment to push the Houthis back into their territory. Saudi Arabia gatheredthe support of all the GCC countries for its offensive against the Houthis. The GCCForeign Ministers meeting at Doha on November 10, 2009, expressed its full support toSaudi Arabia. The meeting also reaffirmed the GCC states’ support for Yemen’s unity,security and stability and lauded Yemen’s efforts to counter threats to its security. ThisGCC stance was highly appreciated by the Yemeni government.

Yemen is hoping for membership of the organisation and has got access to the mem-bership of some of the major GCC institutions. In 2001, Yemen became a member ofthe GCC Arab Educational Bureau, the Council of Labour and Social Affairs Ministers,the Council of GCC Health Ministers, and the Gulf Football Cup. In 2008 the SupremeCouncil approved Yemen’s accession to the GCC Standardisation Authority, the GulfOrganisation for Industrial Consultancy, the GCC Auditing and Accounting Authorityand the Gulf Radio and TV Authority. The Council issued directions that all necessarylegal and administrative measures be taken in this regard, and that Yemen would havethe same rights and obligations as other GCC member states in these institutions.27

Apart from the Houthis, the presence of al Qaeda in Yemen and the failure of thegovernment to check their activities has been a matter of concern for the GCC andSaudi Arabia in particular. It has been reported that the al Qaeda terrorists cross theporous Saudi–Yemeni border and their cross-border movements continue unhindered.This issue has been a worry for Saudi Arabia which has witnessed several attacks byal Qaeda, and other GCC countries where the group is trying to establish its networks.

Full membership of Yemen into the GCC is still under consideration. While Yemenbelieves that it has the geographic, strategic, human and security background commonto the GCC states, Kuwait has serious reservations regarding admission of Yemen intothe organisation.28 Thus, Yemen, poses a dilemma for the GCC. At this point in time,the GCC cannot accept it as a full member but at the same time it also cannot allowIran to increase its influence in the country, particularly among the Shias. It wants astable and unified Yemen for future interaction and their own safety and security butIran might have a different agenda for the GCC–Yemen relations.

At present Yemen is passing through a critical phase and it needs both the politicaland financial support of its oil-rich Gulf neighbours, including Iran. In such a situation,the rivalry between the GCC countries and Iran would only heighten the tension in thecountry.

Nuclear proliferation

The uneasy relationship between the GCC and Iran has prompted the GCC to developtheir nuclear programmes. In 2006 the GCC announced its intention to establish a jointnuclear research programme. This decision was primarily driven by their concern overthe expanding Iranian nuclear programme. Some GCC leaders are also convinced thatthe real objective of the Iranian nuclear programme is to produce a nuclear bomb. Theyare also concerned about the long-term strategic implications and aggressive foreignpolicy postures of Iran in the whole West Asian region such as Iraq, Lebanon, andPalestinian Territories.29

At the individual level too, the GCC countries have taken initiatives to developtheir civilian nuclear facilities. The UAE is starting its nuclear programme with the

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help of French and American technology. The Saudis are also in the race with USsupport. Other countries like Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain have made a start in this.This potentially could lead to nuclear proliferation in the Gulf as countries usuallytend to first build up nuclear programmes for civilian purposes and then subsequentlyupgrade these to build nuclear weapons. Though they currently lack the required highlytrained manpower and sophisticated technology, their posture and initiatives in thisregard certainly point in that direction. The mutual mistrust and threat perception ofboth Iran and the GCC countries have been responsible for beginning such an ugly racein the region.

This is also a setback for the GCC’s proposed ‘Gulf as a Weapons of MassDestruction Free Zone’. In its past summits, the GCC has called for making theGulf region free of WMDs, while at the same time acknowledging the right of thecountries of the region to possess nuclear technology for peaceful uses within theframework of the relevant international agreements. If confined within these limits, theproposed GCC joint nuclear research programme appears to be a sound initiative. Butthe attempts by individual countries to build nuclear arsenals in response to the Iraniannuclear programme could derail the initiatives of making the region free of WMDs.

External powers and nuclear diplomacy

At present the US is the most influential external power in the region and other bigpowers like China, Russia, and France are vying for their respective spheres of influ-ence. For the external powers, supplying nuclear know-how to the Gulf countries wouldbecome an easier means to exercise their influence in the region. Apart from that theinterests of the external powers also lie in securing energy supplies for themselves,selling their weapons to the GCC countries and having military bases in the Gulf.

The Iranian nuclear programme has in many ways shaped the strategic environmentof the Gulf region. It has to some extent prompted the GCC countries to go nuclearand the big nuclear powers have seized the opportunity to enhance their influence inthe Gulf. In May 2009, France opened a military base in Abu Dhabi in the UAE, whichis France’s first permanent base in the Gulf. Inaugurating the base, President NicolasSarkozy stated that, ‘Through this base – the first in the Middle East – France is readyto shoulder its responsibilities to ensure stability in this strategic region’. But an aide toPresident Sarkozy has linked the base to an alleged Iranian threat and stated that, ‘Weare deliberately taking a deterrent stance. If Iran were to attack, we would effectivelybe attacked also’.30 But in return France has signed an agreement with the UAE tohelp it develop civilian nuclear energy. The UAE has also been talking to the US fora nuclear deal for some time. In May 2009, US President Barack Obama approved anuclear energy deal with the UAE.

Saudi Arabia’s plans for a nuclear programme have been alarming because the king-dom does not need any nuclear energy for itself as it has got the largest petroleumresources and substantial natural gas reserves. Thus, it is believed that the Saudishave started their own nuclear programme to counter the Iranian nuclear threat in theregion.31 They are seeking the cooperation of their trusted ally the US and France inthis regard. During the visit of Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to Saudi Arabia inthe year 2007, there were talks about a Saudi-Russian arms deal and he also made anoffer to the Saudis to support them in their nuclear programme.

Kuwait has started talks with a French company for a peaceful nuclear programme.The two parties met in June 2009 and have decided to work it out shortly. In October2009 the Kuwaiti first deputy prime minister and minister of defence Sheikh Jaber

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Figure 1. Arab gulf leaders from left to right, Kuwaiti Emir Sabah Al Ahmed Al Sabah, QatariEmir Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Omani deputy prime minister, Fahd bin Mahmoud AlSaeed, Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz, Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, Saudi CrownPrince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz and Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, vice president andprime minister of the UAE and ruler of Dubai pose for a group photo before the opening of the GulfCooperation Council (GCC) consultative summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Tuesday, 11 May 2010.(AP Photo/Hassan Ammar)

Al-Mubarak Al-Hamad Al-Sabah visited France and signed a defence pact. MinisterSheikh Jaber has also expressed his interest to purchase the French Rafale warplane.32

Russia has offered to supply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to Bahrain. In ameeting in December 2008 Russia’s president, Dmitry Medvedev, and King of BahrainSheikh Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa discussed the issue of cooperation in the field ofcivilian nuclear energy between the two countries. Both sides agreed to set up teamswhich will deliberate on training the personnel required for operations.33 Bahrain alsoheld talks with France in December 2008 over cooperation in nuclear energy. Qatar isreportedly holding talks with South Korea for the same.

Conclusion

The problems between the GCC countries and Iran are deep seated but there is littleevidence of any serious efforts being made towards reconciliation. This means thatthe prospects for rapprochement remain bleak. The clash of interests and the scramblefor influence in the region and the lack of mutual trust have not allowed an amicablesolution of the situation.

The presence of the US in the region has been the major point of conflict. While thepresence of the US is necessary for GCC security, Iran views it as a primary securitythreat. Thus for the GCC the US presence is necessary while for Iran it is an evil. TheGCC cannot let the US depart from the region without ensuring their security and atthe same time they cannot rely on the Iranian proposal for a regional security frame-work because of the trust deficit. On the other hand, while Iran proposes a collectiveregional security arrangement in the Gulf without the US, it has not been able to winthe confidence of the GCC members. The traditional Arab perception of Iran as a dom-inating and expansionist power still colours the thinking in the GCC countries. The

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Iranian nuclear programme and its international behaviour in this regard are some ofthe issues which complicate the situation. It has further brought the GCC together inthe face of a common threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon and the GCC countries havestarted their peaceful nuclear programmes. In the immediate future, If Iran acquiresnuclear weapons it would result in the GCC countries moving even closer to the USas that would increase their threat perception. It may also lead to further strengthen-ing of unity among the GCC countries in the face of a common threat. Moreover, asthe GCC countries’ dependence on the US for security increases, it would prolong theAmerican military presence in the Gulf and may encourage other external powers tomake their presence felt in the region in the future. Similarly, the ideological rivalryhas not witnessed any substantial improvement between the two. Rather, the worst of ithas been reflected in the conflicts in Iraq and Yemen. Both Iraq and Yemen, which havelong been entangled in their domestic political and security problems, have also beenaffected by the GCC–Iran conflict. Supply of arms, money and ideology to Iraq andYemen by the GCC countries and Iran has further complicated the situations there. Asa potential flashpoint it is imperative that the conflict between the two powerful playersis tackled with prudent political and diplomatic skills with the immediate engagementof the parties concerned.

Notes1. M.E. Ahrari, Bribid Starkey, and Nader Entessar, ‘Iran, the Persian Gulf and the Post-Cold War

Order’, in M.E. Ahrari (ed.), Change and Continuity in the Middle East: Conflict Resolutionand Prospects for Peace, MacMillan, London, 1996, p. 80.

2. Mai Yamani, ‘The Two Faces of Saudi Arabia’, Survival, 50(1), February–March 2008, p. 151.3. Nicole Starke, ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation from a Gulf Perspective’, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,

Briefing Paper 3, April 2008, p. 2.4. For an analysis of the Iranian perspective of the conflict over the three islands see Pirouz

Mojtahed-Zadeh, ‘The Issue of the UAE Claims to Tunbs and Abu Musa vis-à-vis Arab-IranianRelationships in the Persian Gulf’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 8(3), Fall 1996, pp.601–626.

5. ‘GCC Slams Iran over Abu Musa’, Arab News, 17 August 2008.6. ‘Iran’s Island Offices Condemned’, BBC News, 3 September 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/

2/hi/7596339.stm.7. Nihat Ali Ozcan and Ozgur Ozdamar, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Programme and the Future of the US-

Iranian Relations’, Middle East Policy, 16(1), 2009, p. 125.8. Emile El-Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, ‘The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian

Nuclear Challenge’, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, Working Paper, May 26,2006, pp. 18–19.

9. Gwenn Okruhlik, ‘Saudi Arabian-Iranian Relations: External Rapprochement and InternalConsolidation’, Middle East Policy, 10(2), 2003, p. 116.

10. Saleh al-Mani, ‘The Ideological Dimension in Saudi-Iranian Relations’, in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi(ed.), Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies andResearch, Abu Dhabi, 1996, pp. 158–174.

11. Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, ‘Iran Unveils a Persian Gulf Security Plan’, Asia Times, April 14, 2007.12. Taru Bahl and M.H. Syed, Encyclopaedia of Muslim World, New Delhi, Anmol Publications,

2003, p. 211.13. ‘Iran’s Influence in Iraq under Increased Scrutiny’, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/

middle_east/july-dec07/connection_10-08.html.14. Ibid.15. See RAND National Security Research Division report, ‘Saudi-Iranian Relations since the Fall

of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy’, 2009, p. 64.16. Gawdat Bahgat, ‘Security in the Persian Gulf: Perils and Opportunities’, Contemporary

Security Policy, 24(2), 2007, p. 313.

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17. For a detailed analysis of Iranian policy in post-Saddam Iraq, see Kayhan Barzegar,‘Understanding the Roots of Iranian Foreign Policy in the New Iraq’, Middle East Policy,12(2), 2005, pp. 49–57.

18. Dilip Hiro, ‘Iran’s Influence in Iraq’, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3629765.stm.19. The Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq changed its name to the Supreme Islamic

Iraqi Council in May 2007. It removed the word ‘revolution’ from its name as that word wasbeing used in reference to fighting against Saddam Hussain.

20. Thomas R. Mattair, ‘Mutual Threat Perception in the Arab/Persian Gulf: GCC Perceptions’,Middle East Policy, 14(2), 2007, p. 133.

21. Kenneth Katzman, Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq, CRS Report for Congress, 2008.22. Mowaffak Al Rubaie’s speech at the Manama Dialogue on 7 December 2007.23. James A. Russell, ‘Strategy, Policy, and War in Iraq: The United States and the Gulf in the

Twenty-First Century’, in James A. Russell (ed.), Critical Issues Facing the Middle East,Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, pp. 184–185.

24. Ibid.25. ‘Ahmadinejad’s Iraq Visit Bolsters Iran’s Influence’, Christian Science Monitor, 3 March 2008,

at http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0303/p01s04-wome.html?page=1.26. Along with Iran, President Saleh also accused the Sadrists of Iraq of financially support-

ing the Houthis. For details see Abdul-Aziz Oudah, ‘President Saleh Accuses Iran and Sadrof Supporting al-Houthis, Iran Offers Mediation’, Yemen Observer, 10 September 2009, athttp://www.yobserver.com/front-page/10017230.html.

27. The Final Communiqué of the 29th Session of the Supreme Council of the ArabGulf Cooperation Council, Muscat, 29–30 December 2008, at http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php?action=Sec-Show&ID=290.

28. Joseph A. Kechichian, ‘Yemen in the GCC?’, Yemen Post, 11 February 2008, athttp://www.yemenpost.net/16/Opinions/1.htm.

29. Nicole Stracke, ‘Nuclear Development in the Gulf: A Strategic or Economic Necessity?’, IssueNo. 7, December 2007, Gulf Research Centre, Dubai, p. 5.

30. ‘French President Sarkozy Opens UAE Base’, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8067600.stm.31. See Gulshan Dietl, ‘Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Bomb’, Journal of South Asian and Middle

Eastern Studies, 31(4), 2008, pp. 48–69.32. ‘Kuwait, France Sign New Defense Pact’, Kuwait Times, 24 October 2009, at

http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=MTI0NTUwMTU2Mw.33. ‘Russia Cements Relations with Bahrain’, Kommersant, 2 December 2008, at

http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=-13676.

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the gcc–iran conflict and its strategic implications for the gulf region

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