the future of development cooperation in times of crisis

Review Essay

The Future of Development Cooperation in Timesof Crisis

Louis Emmerij

Jose Antonio Alonso and Jose Antonio Ocampo (eds), Development Co-operation in Times of Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.384 pp. £25.50 hardback.

INTRODUCTION

How times have changed since the end of the 1940s and the beginning ofthe 1950s when development aid started. In those days the Marshall Planshowed that public funds could help in rebuilding a continent and put itback on a path of economic growth. ‘Destroy and rebuild’, early cynics saidin anticipation of what would happen again in Vietnam in the 1970s, inAfghanistan and Iraq today, and most probably in Syria tomorrow. But italso started a tradition to use public funds more generally to help developingcountries towards a sustainable economic development path. It is forgottentoday how novel this idea was which had not been seen before on such alarge and general scale. In earlier days private capital ventured to Argentinato build and operate a railroad system or to South Africa to invest in theexploitation of diamonds. The use of government money to stimulate andassist other countries in their development efforts — that was the new andbrilliant idea of General Marshall.

One can distinguish two parts in the book before us. Of the two JoseAntonios who edited the volume, Ocampo (with Stephany Griffith-Jones)dominates the first 140 pages, discussing the ‘times of crisis’, while Alonso(with quite a few others) concentrates on ‘development cooperation’ in theremaining 200 pages. The first part can be summarized rather flippantlyas times of crisis without development cooperation and the second part asdevelopment cooperation without times of crisis. That is of course onlytrue to an extent, but the two parts do stand alone without too much inter-dependence. The authors maintain that the crisis that started in 2008 is

Development and Change 45(2): 384–394. DOI: 10.1111/dech.12081C© 2014 International Institute of Social Studies.Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and350 Main St., Malden, MA 02148, USA

Review Essay: Development Cooperation in Times of Crisis 385

perhaps the first global crisis in history ‘considering that entire continents(Asia and Africa) remained unaffected by the 1929 crisis’ (p. 5). The secondpart presents a host of statistics that lead to the implication that a widervision for development aid policy is required (p. 13). Both parts are welldone and documented. In this essay, I shall concentrate rather more on thedevelopment cooperation side.

The early rationale for development aid was straightforward and relativelysimple. Economists had begun to focus on the question of how to start eco-nomic growth in backward countries. Igniting a process of industrializationbecame a central concern to authors whose work has been labelled by catch-phrases like ‘big push’ for Rosenstein Rodan, ‘balanced growth’ for Nurkse,‘unbalanced growth’ for Hirschman, ‘great spurt’ for Gerschenkron, etc.Poor countries very often face a gap between the amount of savings and taxesthey can collect, on the one hand, and the required investments needed to setthe economic growth machine in motion, on the other. This was considered atemporary situation because once economic growth got underway, per capitaincome would increase, the tax base would broaden and the gap would disap-pear or be replaced by access to capital markets, which these countries wouldgain access to through the growing robustness of their economies. Thus, hav-ing fulfilled its task, development aid could and would come to an end.

This rationale was perfectly valid but proved too simplistic in the realworld. The Marshall Plan was ended after a short number of years althoughthe OEEC (its coordinating body) was not. It became the OECD (the E ofEurope disappeared and the D for development was added) which is stillwith us today, just as development aid is, more than sixty years after itsbeginning.

What has happened? Soon after its inception, development aid turned intoa kind of octopus with many slippery tentacles. The goals it was supposed torealize multiplied even before previous goals were reached. In its first thirtyyears, development aid turned to eliminating poverty, creating employment,satisfying basic needs; it was set to stimulate specific sectors of the economysuch as rural development, fisheries, industrialization and housing. Later,the emancipation of women became another goal; environmental issueswere of course added; and later still, good governance was included inthe ever-growing list, together with fighting corruption, internal strife andhumanitarian problems.1

All these issues are important, no doubt, and the above list’s content has notbeen enumerated in a cynical mood. But it is clear that in this way, with ever-changing goals to realize and an ever-growing number of projects to monitor,there will never be an end to what was supposed to be a temporary policy ofdevelopment aid. After all these decades, aid dependency will become more

1. For a detailed review of the early theories of economic growth and the expansion of thegoals development aid was supposed to meet, see Emmerij (2002).

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intense in many recipient countries and aid fatigue will continue to grow inmany donor countries. If this is what the world community wants, then wemust continue with development aid on the same old path.

The Past Quantified

The book under review contains a number of statistics and data whichmust make us wonder whether the way we have described developmentaid in the past is the best way forward. In the search for an answer to thequestion of the impact of development aid on economic growth, one ofthe few concrete results is that aid turns negative if it exceeds 4 per centof the recipient country’s GDP. This is the definition of ‘aid dependency’,the dead-end of development aid. But do we realize that there are at leastforty countries whose proportion of aid in 2007 was higher than that, not4 but 10 per cent, and many more where it lies between 5 and 10 percent? These include countries like Ghana, Senegal, Madagascar, Sudan andZambia which receive development aid that is between 5 and 10 per centof GDP; the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Haiti andLaos, with between 10 and 20 per cent; Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leonewith between 20 and 30 per cent; and the pathetic cases of Afghanistan, thePalestine Territories and Liberia with over 30 per cent — more than sixtycountries in all (p. 222: Table 5.11).

But there is more! The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in-cludes twenty-three nations plus the European Union.2 Between them theyhave no less than 120 bilateral agencies. Furthermore, there are now morecountries that give aid outside DAC than within it; countries like China,Turkey, Russia, Brazil, India, Venezuela, South Africa, etc.3 These coun-tries do it their way and do not care about DAC norms — and for very goodreasons, as we shall see later. There are now more than 260 multilateralaid organizations and the share of the United Nations therein keeps falling.International philanthropy is on the rise with the Melinda and Bill GatesFoundation leading the way with more than US$ 5 billion a year. Inter-national non-governmental organizations (INGOs like Oxfam and CARE)raise more money for development aid than the entire UN system. In total,private development aid (including foundations, INGOs, churches and pri-vate enterprises) stands at US$ 60 billion, more than the multilateral systemand half of DAC aid (pp. 321–22).

An OECD survey in 2008 found that more than 14,000 donor mis-sions were fielded to the fifty-five countries that participated in the survey.

2. In fact, two new members joined DAC in 2013 — Iceland and the Czech Republic — whichmakes total membership of twenty-six at present.

3. Quite a few of those countries (China, India, Turkey are examples) are simultaneouslyrecipients of aid and donors!


Vietnam received 752 such missions in 2007, more than three per work-ing day (OECD, 2008a: 15). This must be seen in the light of the 100,000projects counted in that year. Is this really what we intended when we setout on the development aid road at the end of the 1940s and beginning ofthe 1950s?

Impact of Aid on Economic Growth

There have been several studies that set out to measure the effect of de-velopment aid on economic growth. Macro studies have persistently showninconclusive results, unlike a number of micro studies that showed that amajority of projects had a positive rate of return. This has been called themicro–macro paradox and many observers have been amazed by this ap-parent contradiction. But common sense gives us the explanation: if, say, arural project in a given country shows a positive rate of return, this obviouslydoes not mean that the overall rate of economic growth of that country willalso be positive. Development aid projects are many, as we have seen, buton the whole are not large enough to have an impact at the macro level, notto speak of the possibility that one project cancels out the result of another.

Development Cooperation in Times of Crisis contains a long Chapter 5 thatreviews many econometric studies of the past that have attempted to measurethe impact of aid on economic growth and adds several such exercises itself,using ever-more sophisticated econometric methods. Practically all thoseattempts have proven to be inconclusive and the few that claim to havediscovered a positive effect hit the 4 per cent wall. That is, confirming thatonce development aid reaches 4 per cent or more of the recipient GDP theeffect on economic growth turns negative. This is the real paradox becauseinstinctively some observers might have thought that more aid, more projectsand more budget assistance would increase the chances of a positive effecton national economic growth. This does not seem to be the case. It seemsthat the law of diminishing marginal return is at work here: more aid resultsin an ever-decreasing effect at the country level.

Many explanations have been given (econometricians never give up) forthe inconclusive results of these studies: data problems, measurement prob-lems, corruption, etc. The truth may simply be that economic growth requiresmore than traditional aid, like international trade, investments, a good tax-ation base, good governance, less internal strife, and so on and so forth.Hence, the multiplication of aid goals — albeit in a rather wild and unorga-nized manner — and the attempts of donor countries, like The Netherlandsrecently, to bring aid and trade under the same roof.

Does the absence of a positive relationship at the macro level condemn aid?Of course not, so long as projects at the micro level have positive effects. Thereal ghosts are aid dependency at the recipient country level; aid fatigue onthe donor side; and also the diverse conditionalities imposed by the growing

388 Louis Emmerij

number of aid agencies. Conditionality has been the plague of traditionaldevelopment aid of DAC and of capital loans of the World Bank and theInternational Monetary Fund. As mentioned, the number of aid missionsto recipient countries is grotesque, the conditions attached to aid and loanshumiliating. It is not surprising that many middle-income countries in Asiaand Latin America have built up significant foreign exchange reserves afterthe 1997–1998 crisis in order not to be caught off guard again. Some paidback in advance their IMF loans with the result that that organization mighthave gone bankrupt had it not been for the financial crisis that erupted in2008.

China: The Surprising Newcomer

The book under review is somewhat thin on the subject of newcomers inthe field of development aid and particularly the Chinese approach. This isastonishing because the way China is dealing with the problem of avoidingseveral of the pitfalls of aid mentioned in this article, and in the book, offersan interesting alternative to the way development aid has traditionally beendisbursed. China has adopted a global approach in its economic relationswith developing and other countries, an approach in which aid is a smallalbeit growing part.

Travelling through Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, one would frequentlycome across a Conference Centre, a hospital or a schooling complex builtmainly by Chinese workers with Chinese capital. Four years ago whenvisiting Samoa — a lovely and quiet island-state in the Pacific described ina famous book by Margaret Mead Coming of Age in Samoa (1928) — anddriving through the capital city with low-rise buildings, I suddenly hit upontwo striking high-rise construction sites. One turned out to be a hospital andthe other a government building set to house all government departments,compliments of the Chinese Government. I could not find out what interestChina had in providing these buildings to Samoa in the middle of the Pacific,but the Chinese are long-term thinkers.

China’s interest is obvious elsewhere and particularly in Africa. Its aimis to get preferential treatment for the long-term delivery of raw materials,agricultural products and commodities. That countries, and particularly bigcountries, give aid to secure the goodwill of recipient countries is of coursenothing new. What is new is the way China goes about giving aid as onecomponent of the web of its international economic relations. The Chineseare building roads and railway tracks, and taking care of other infrastructureneeds; they are stamping factories out of the ground, dams out of rivers, andso on. No detailed conditions are imposed. The one condition remains im-plicit. China seems to be the only country that is preparing for a future globalcommodity crunch by making friends across the global South and investingacross the commodity complex. It has developed a threefold international


strategy that comprises financial transfers (aid, commercial loans), interna-tional trade and investments. This strategy is applied not only to Africa butacross the globe.4 Cash transfers go to Africa but also to Latin Americanand Asian countries. In the field of international trade, China is already thelargest trading partner of Brazil, Chile and a growing number of other LatinAmerican countries. Africa has become the largest trading partner of Chinato the tune of more than US$ 100 billion. In terms of investments, Chinais all over Africa; in Brazil it builds steel factories, auto plants, telecom-munications installations and invests in off-shore oil developments and inagriculture.

Thus China gains access to commodities and the host countries get loansto finance infrastructure, development programmes and other projects thatcreate jobs with no questions asked — no petty conditionality a la WorldBank, IMF or DAC. In this way China has broken Western control overAfrican resource exploration. It has become, with its vast wealth of morethan US$ 3 trillion, the global lender. When I went to China for the first timein the early 1980s, the travellers cheque was unknown, financial transactionsrare, and development still at its beginnings. Within a few decades, Chinahas gone from a borrower to the biggest global lender and investor, and fromrags to richness.

Is China practising a form of neo-colonialism? At present, China does notwish to dominate any sovereign state — but it is after resources. China isnot interested in assuming sovereign responsibility or shaping the social andpolitical situation of host countries. It takes account of local views, it provideswhat recipient countries want, namely money, roads, railways, etc. But whatChina wants is oil, copper, gold and land. Central to the Chinese approach isdeploying Chinese labour throughout the world. Chinese workers camp onthe construction sites and disappear as soon as the work is completed. Thefactories they deliver are most often ‘turn-key’ projects. Once finished theChinese hand over the keys and that is it. Very often very little to no moneyis exchanged, hence corruption is minimized.

One criticism heard is that Chinese companies do not hire local workers.That is not quite true. In Africa, for instance, the ratio of local workers toChinese labour ranges from 15:1 in Zambia to 1:1 in Angola. Several PewReports look at the question of Chinese intervention in recipient countries.In the Ivory Coast, 95 per cent of those interviewed said that the Chineseapproach was good for the country; in Mali 93 per cent and in Kenya 90 percent said the same thing.5

4. As I was writing this section, the South China Morning Post of 23 September 2013 reportedthat China ‘buys three million hectares of Ukrainian farmland’. This deal of close to US$3 billion will give China access to 9 per cent of Ukrainian farmland, an area the size ofBelgium!

5. See, for example, Pew Global (2007). For more details concerning China’s approach, seeMoyo (2012).

390 Louis Emmerij

Looking at Development Aid with Fresh Eyes

In the 1990s, ODA declined from 0.33 per cent to 0.22 per cent of GNI.There was no peace dividend after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was noincrease in aid — on the contrary. In 2008, in the face of the financial crisis,ODA increased to 0.31 per cent — still under the 0.33 level of the 1980s.Robert Zoellick, then President of the World Bank, noted at the beginningof the financial crisis, ‘At around 100 billion dollars a year the net amount ofODA is of course a drop in the ocean compared to the trillions of dollars thathave been spent on the financial rescue in the industrial countries’ (quotedon p. 145).

Of the total of 1.2 billion poor, 300 million live in poor countries(25 per cent) and 900 million in middle-income countries (75 per cent).It is now generally agreed that the middle-income countries should lookafter their poor themselves and so development aid should go to the poorcountries — but it does not. For example, in 2008 Iraq received US$ 9.4billion in aid, China US$ 2.6 billion, Indonesia US$ 2.5 billion, etc. (p. 155:Table 4.2).

Development Cooperation in Times of Crisis suggests that a small tax oncurrency transactions (of half a basic point, or 0.005 per cent, that is, aroundUS$ 30 billion) could be implemented in order to gain additional resourcesto fund development while at the same time having desirable effects on thevolatility of financial markets. ‘This seems to be an idea whose time hascome’, the authors claim (pp. 100, 103). However, it is not clear whetherthe main problem of aid is the amount of resources that go into it or whetherit is the quality, the effectiveness, the number of aid actors, the lack ofcoordination and the great variety of goals it pursues.

There have been changes in aid policies such as more general budgetsupport, balance of payment support and commodity assistance, but theresults are mixed and conditionalities are still pervasive, albeit less excessivethan those imposed in the 1980s and 1990s. It also looks as if this has becomemore of a formality than a real constraint. There are many ways for recipientcountries to get around conditionality and donor countries seem to acceptthis more often than previously. This is referred to in the literature as theconcept of fungibility.6 Also, it has become easier to mobilize resources fornon-projects like technical assistance, debt relief, food aid and emergencyaid than for real development aid and programmes. Around one-third of aidflows goes to technical assistance activities (p.156), which on the whole paysfor people from the donor countries to be sent to recipient countries.

It is claimed that Africa has been doing well in recent years with an annualgrowth rate of close to 7 per cent. But that is not quite in accordance withthe latest figures. Africa as a whole had a growth rate of 6.1 per cent in 2005

6. Paul Rosentein-Rodan once explained this concept to me as follows: ‘When the World Bankextends a loan to finance a hospital it may not realize that in reality it finances a brothel’.


against an estimated 4.8 per cent in 2013. Angola’s growth rate declinedfrom 10.2 per cent in 2005 to 8.1 in 2013, Kenya from 5.1 per cent to 4.5,Nigeria from 10.5 to 6.7, Sudan from 6.5 to 2.2, and Tanzania from 7.8 to 6.9per cent. In contrast, Benin, Botswana and Ghana are examples of countrieswhere the growth rate increased between 2005 and 2013.7

If we take a longer view — and in spite of the decent overall but decliningeconomic growth rates — per capita income has not changed much since1970. Africa went through periods of economic growth in the 1950s, the1960s, late 1980s and the 2000s, but these were off-set by reversals in the1970s, early 1980s and the 1990s. Moreover, life expectancy stagnates, andas explained, it cannot be shown that the macro rate of economic growthis decisively influenced by development aid. Rather, aid dependency hasset in, as mentioned earlier. The ever-changing goals of development aidimply that aid is infinite, unlike the Marshall Plan which was finite. It canbe assumed that if all aid had gone into investments and all investmentsinto growth, per capita GDP would have increased substantially. This as-sumption is confirmed by the World Bank, in its World Development Report2000/2001: ‘If all aid that went to Zambia between 1961 and 1994 had goneinto productive investments, and if investment had been as important togrowth as initially predicted, the country’s per capita income would havebeen more than $ 20,000 in 1994, not $ 600’ (World Bank, 2001: 192).8 Inthis way, the original goal of aid would have been attained some time ago.Instead, aid dependency has become the order of the day in many Africancountries.

The effects of the financial crisis are still with us today and have been moresevere in developed countries than elsewhere. The role of East and SoutheastAsia in the ‘recovery’ of the Great Recession has been important. It hasalready been mentioned that these countries learned the lesson of the 1997crisis and amassed huge foreign exchange reserves. They were not alone: theforeign exchange reserves of middle- and low-income countries reached US$4.2 trillion in 2008. China introduced an enormous fiscal stimulus packageequal to 14 per cent of GDP. The world had never experienced a situation inwhich major developing countries were the only available engines of worldeconomic growth. But things can change very fast. The emerging giants havemet their share of problems recently. They did very well between 2003 and2011 with phenomenal economic growth rates and it was claimed that thesewere the countries of the future. However, this exceptional performancewas mainly caused by terms of trade improvements, capital inflows and realappreciation. These causal factors can rapidly change and they have indeedchanged since 2011. The buoyant performance of the recent past is unlikely

7. Figures taken from African Economic Outlook 2013 (OECD et al., 2013).8. This quote originally comes from the writings of William Easterly who was working at the

World Bank in those days. See, for instance, Easterly (2003).

392 Louis Emmerij

to return any time soon.9 China is down to 7 per cent annual economicgrowth, India to 4 per cent, Brazil to less than 1 per cent. In the meantime,Europe is still in the doldrums and the USA is growing, but too slowly.

In this global situation there are growing signs of aid fatigue in the DACregion. Even in The Netherlands, for so long a leader in the field of devel-opment aid, the amount of ODA will be cut by 25 per cent, about 1 billioneuros, over the next few years. We are moving towards a situation of shift-ing international assistance to such fields as conflict resolution, institutionalreform, disasters and humanitarian problems in general. This would suggesta shift in development aid, to the ‘destroy first and build up later’ approachpioneered by the Marshall Plan. Afghanistan and Iraq (and tomorrow Syria)are extreme examples of such a shift.

In these circumstances, it may be time for a reappraisal of development aid.The development finance landscape is undergoing rapid change. Developingcountries are, increasingly, more interested in acquiring investment, tradeand technology than grants. There has been a whole series of publicationsreviewing the development aid process: ‘Shaping the 21st Century’ (DAC,1996), the Paris Declaration on Effectiveness (OECD, 2005), the AccraAgenda for Action (OECD, 2008b), the Busan Partnership for EffectiveDevelopment Cooperation (OECD, 2011). Additionally, an avalanche ofcommitments and indicators have been produced by the European Unionand DAC, all showing an excessively technocratic and naıve vision of socialdynamics and hardly dealing with aid dependency and aid fatigue.

I think it is clear that the traditional aid system is coming to an endand that ODA in its present incarnation must gradually be phased out. Aiddependency and aid fatigue together demand this. Aid has been going on forover sixty years. The idea was novel at the end of the 1940s, and the goalspecific. That goal of bridging the gap between national savings and nationalinvestment needs through transfers of international savings has been dilutedby a continuous multiplication of goals, one chasing and often annullingthe other. The red tape around ODA has also become very cumbersomeindeed. There must be a shift back to economic development in the poorestcountries. This was the original idea of the 1950s. The time of assistanceand help is over and international trade and investments must take theirplace. That does not mean that humanitarian interventions, disaster reliefand conflict resolutions must now be abandoned, but that these must comeout of a special programme and financial pot.

Within the European Union, a growing number of countries includingFinland, Belgium, Ireland and, most recently, The Netherlands, have namedMinisters of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. Sweden has sep-arate Ministers of Trade and of Development under the roof of the Ministryof Foreign Affairs. On the whole, these are ministers without portfolio, that

9. With thanks to Ricardo Hausmann of Harvard University for this insight.


is, ministers without a ministry of their own. Nor is it always clear what thesecountries are actually achieving with respect to trade and investments in de-veloping countries, what their means are and whether these are importantenough to make a real difference. They are, in the best of cases, timid stepstowards the creation of Ministries of International Economic Relations thatcover the entire gamut of international trade, international investments, inter-national loans, environmental questions and aid. This means a ministry thattakes over bits and pieces from existing departments like Economic Affairs,Agriculture, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and others. I have been pleading forsuch an innovation for some time10 and perhaps its time has come. Clearlythe DAC countries cannot adopt the same methods as the Chinese; in theDAC case there are the multifarious agencies and enterprises of the privatesector which make life more complicated but potentially also more fruitful— if they can be guided and stimulated in desirable directions.

Above all, a resolute effort must be made to create a Department of Inter-national Economic Relations at the EU level which would have the clout tomake a real impact on the outside world. At the national level, the Ministerof International Economic Relations would replace the present Minister ofDevelopment Cooperation (and international trade). The money saved by thephasing out of traditional aid must be used first for strengthening and guidinginternational economic relations in the directions set out in programmes con-cerning international trade, investments, agricultural policies, environmentalpolicies and aid as worked out between the government, private sector, tradeunions and specific countries, and second for the creation of a specific fundto finance programmes covering human security (see MacFarlane and FoongKhong, 2006), conflict resolution and other emergencies.

A global Department of International Economic Relations only makes realsense at the level of the European Union; at country level, the financial cloutwill not be sufficient. At the same time, if the introduction of Ministries ofInternational Economic Relations with sufficient resources at their disposalat the national level is difficult, the necessary next step — the creation ofa Department at the European level — will be even more of a challenge. Itwill also be a problem to fund such ministries and the European departmentappropriately. Given the present climate of cutting and slashing, the tendencymay well be to cut the aid budgets but not fund the trade, investment andother areas sufficiently. But hope dies last (Terkel, 2003).

I have gone far beyond the contents of the book which was the startingpoint of this article. This simply shows its richness, interest and its powerto let the reader’s imagination soar! I can wholeheartedly recommend thisenlightening and well-documented work.

10. I mention this to avoid creating the impression that this recommendation was inspired bythe Chinese approach. At least chronologically, I have preceded the Chinese! See Emmerij(1984).

394 Louis Emmerij

REFERENCES

DAC (1996) ‘Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation’. Paris:OECD.

Easterly (2003) ‘Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3):23–48.

Emmerij, L. (1984) ‘Ontwikkelingssamenwerking op een Kruispunt? Noodzaak tot Omvormingvan het Nederlands Beleid en Apparaat’ [‘Development Cooperation at a Crossroads? TheNecessity to Reform Dutch Policy and Departmental Structure’], Internationale Spectator19(1): 121–8.

Emmerij, L. (2002) ‘Aid as a Flight Forward’, Development and Change 33(2): 247–60.MacFarlane, S.N. and Y. Foong Khong (2006) Human Security and the UN: A Critical History.

Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.Mead, M. (1928) Coming of Age in Samoa. New York: Harper Collins.Moyo, D. (2012) Winner Take All: China’s Race for Resources and What it Means for the World.

New York: Basic Books.OECD (2005) ‘Paris Declaration on Effectiveness’. Paris: OECD.OECD (2008a) Better Aid 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration: Making Aid More

Effective by 2010. Paris: OECD.OECD (2008b) ‘Accra Agenda for Action’. Paris: OECD.OECD (2011) ‘The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation’. Paris: OECD.OECD, AfDB, UNDP and ECA (2013) African Economic Outlook 2013. Paris: OECD.Pew Global (2007) ‘Global Unease with Major World Powers’. Washington, DC: Pew Global.Terkel, S. (2003) Hope Dies Last: Keeping the Faith in Difficult Times. New York: The New

Press.World Bank (2001) World Development Report 2000/2001. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Louis Emmerij was Director of the World Employment Programme of theILO, Geneva (1971–1976); Rector of the International Institute of SocialStudies, The Hague (1976–1985); President of the OECD DevelopmentCentre, Paris (1986–1992); and Special Advisor to the President, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC (1993–1999). From 1999 to2010 he was Co-Director of the United Nations Intellectual History Projectat the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. He can becontacted at e-mail: [email protected]

the future of development cooperation in times of crisis

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