the future of cease-fire agreements in burma

8/14/2019 The Future of Cease-fire Agreements in Burma

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T R A N S N A T I O N A L I N S T I T U T E

NEITHER WAR NOR PEACE

T H E F U T U R E O F T H E C E A S E - F I R E

A G R E E M E N T S I N B U R M A


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Author

om Kramer

Copy editor

David Aronson

Design

Guido Jelsma

Photo credits

om Kramer

Printing

Drukkerij PrimaveraQuint

Amsterdam

Financial Contributions

Ministry o Foreign Aairs

(Netherlands)

Contact:

ransnational Institute

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el: 31-20-6626608

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Amsterdam, July 2009

M

ainarmedgroupsinnothernBurma.

Areasareapproximate,statusosomegroupschanged


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Introduction

Burma: Ethnic Conict and Military Rule

Conict Actors

Independence and Civil War

Military Rule

Cold War Alliances

The Democracy Movement

The Making of the Cease-re Agreements

The Fall of the CPB

The First Round of Crease-res

The NDF and the Second Round of Cease-res

Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)

Thai Pressure

New Mon State Party (NMSP)

Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)

Karen National Union (KNU)

Surrender of the Mong Tai Army (MTA)

Contents of the Agreements

Special Regions

Mediators

Break-away Groups

Militias

Goals and Strategies of Cease-re Groups

United Wa State Party (UWSP)


Pao National Organisation (PNO)


Other Groups

Leadership Style

Governing Capacity

Vision for Socio-Economic Development

Vision for Political Change

Abuses Against the Population

Impact of the Truces

End of Fighting

Reduce Human Rights Violations

Resettlement of Refugees and IDPs

Travel and Communication

Space for Development

Space for Civil SocietyLack of Political Progress

Expansion of the Burma Army

Corruption

The Cease-re Economy

Infrastructure

Trade and Investment

Mono-Plantations

Investment from Abroad

Logging

Mining

Drugs Trade

International Responses to the Cease-res

The Role of Neighbouring Countries

The US and Europe

Isolation

Prospects for the Future

The National Convention

The SPDCs Seven Step Roadmap

Khint Nyunts Fall

The 2008 Constitution

The 2008 Referendum

The Elections of 2010

Disarmament or Border Guard Force?

The Future: War or Peace?

Conclusion

Notes

Abbreviations

Bibliography

Contents

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Introduction

Tis year marks the twentieth anniversary o the rst cease-

re agreements in Burma, which put a stop to decades o

ghting between the military government and a wide range

o ethnic armed opposition groups. Tese groups had

taken up arms against the government in search o more

autonomy and ethnic rights.

Te military government has so ar ailed to address the

main grievances and aspirations o the cease-re groups.

Te regime now wants them to disarm or become Border

Guard Forces. It also wants them to orm new political

parties which would participate in the controversial 2010

elections. Tey are unlikely to do so unless some o their

basic demands are met. Tis raises many serious questions

about the uture o the cease-res.

Te international community has ocused on the

struggle o the democratic opposition led by Aung San

Suu Kyi, who has become an international icon. Te ethnic

minority issue and the relevance o the cease-re agree-

ments have been almost completely ignored.

Ethnic conict needs to be resolved in order to bring about

any lasting political solution. Without a political settle-

ment that addresses ethnic minority needs and goals it is

extremely unlikely there will be peace and democracy in

Burma. Instead o isolating and demonising the cease-re

groups, all national and international actors concerned

with peace and democracy in Burma should actively

engage with them, and involve them in discussions aboutpolitical change in the country.

Tis paper explains how the cease-re agreements came

about, and analyses the goals and strategies o the cease-

re groups. It also discusses the weaknesses the groups ace

in implementing these goals, and the positive and negative

consequences o the cease-res, including their eect on

the economy. Te paper then examines the international

responses to the cease-res, and ends with an overview o

the uture prospects or the agreements.

Introduction

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Burma: Ethnic Conlict and Military Rule

Burma:

Ethnic Conict and Military Rule

Burma is a very ethnically diverse country, with ethnic

minorities comprising about 40 percent o its estimated

56 million population. Te State Peace and Development

Council (SPDC), as the current military government callsitsel, ocially recognises 135 dierent ethnic groups

divided into 8 major national ethnic races.1 However,

reliable population gures are not available, and all data

should be treated with great caution.

Under the 1974 constitution, Burma is administratively

divided into seven divisions (taing in Burmese), pre-

dominantly inhabited by the majority Burman population,

and seven ethnic minority states (pyi-neh in Burmese):

Mon, Karen, Kayah, Shan, Kachin, Chin and Rakhine,

reecting the main ethnic minority groups in the country.

Te states comprise about 57 percent o the land area. Most

o the Burman population inhabit the plains and valleys

o central Burma, where they practice wetland rice culti-

vation. Most ethnic minorities live in the surrounding hills

and mountains, and practice traditional upland slash and

burn cultivation.

Neither the divisions nor states are mono-ethnic. In Shan

State in addition to the Shan population, there are many

other smaller ethnic groups, such as the Pao, Palaung,

Wa, Lahu, and Akha. Tere is a signicant Shan popula-

tion in Kachin State, and many Burmans live in the citiesand larger towns o the minority states, such as Shan State

and Kachin State. Furthermore, there are substantial non-

Burman population in some Burman areas, such as the

Karen population in the Irrawaddy Division.

In the new controversial 2009 constitution administrative

units have undergone changes, the impact o which will

probably only become clear once they have been put into

practice afer the 2010 elections. Te seven divisions

(taing) have been renamed regions (taing-day-tha-gyi),

while the seven states (pyi-neh) retain their names. In

addition, six new sel-administered areas have beencreated or ethnic minority groups. Tese are the Naga

Sel-Administered Zone in Sagaing Region; the Danu, Pao,

Palaung, Kokang Sel-Administered Zones; and the Wa

Sel-Administered Division in Shan State. 2

Conict Actors

At rst glance the conict in Burma looks extremely

complicated because o the many actors. Apart rom the

military government there is a myriad o armies and

militias, some still ghting the military government, others

having reached a cease-re agreement. Tere is also a host

o opposition groups based inside and outside the country.

Furthermore, many o these groups and organisations have

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tri-partite dialogue to solve the political problems

between the military, democratic opposition and the

ethnic minorities. All three parties have stated publicly

that they aim to work towards a democratic Burma, but

the military government has as yet reused to come to the

negotiation table, and so political deadlock remains.

While the military government has publicly statedit is moving toward a disciplined democracy3, it

reused to allow ethnic rights that could be explained as

going into the direction o independence or ederalism.

Ethnic conict is the central issue in Burma, and needs

to be addressed to end the civil war and achieve a lasting

political solution. Otherwise, the prospects or peace and

democratisation are grim. As a Kachin community leader

said: Without ethnic rights there will be no peace, and

without ethnic rights there will be no democracy.

Independence and Civil War

Te civil war in Burma is one o the longest ongoing armed

conicts in the world, and has caused huge suering or

the civilian population. During the negotiations or inde-

pendence rom the British, Burman nationalists advocated

independence as soon as possible. For ethnic minority

leaders, the key issues were sel-determination and

autonomy to saeguard their position in a uture Union o

Burma. In 1947, the Panglong Agreement, intended as a

basis or the new Union o Burma, was signed between

suered rom splits and actional inghting, ofen resulting

in the ormation o new organisations.

However, i one takes a closer look at the conict in Burma,

three main actors can be identied: (1) the military regime

in power since 1962; (2) the democratic opposition, led

by Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary o the National

League or Democracy (NLD), which won a landslide victory in the 1990 elections; and (3) ethnic minority

groups, constituting a wide range o dierent organisations

mostly ormed along ethnic lines, some o which have been

ghting the central government since independence.

Tere are two main orms o conict in Burma.

Tere is conict over what the nature o the state o

Burma is, and how state power (dominated today by the

Burman majority) rom the centre relates to the periphery,

inhabited by a wide range o dierent ethnic minority groups.

Concomitantly there is the struggle over how the state is

governed. Te executive, legislative and judicial powers are all

controlled by the military, and this is contested by all other

actors.

It is important to realise that the nature o conict is

dynamic, that Burma is a divided society and that con-

ict also exists between other actors, which can stimulate

uture armed conict and communal violence. People and

communities are divided over policy, religion, ethnicity,

language and education, regionalism, and economic disparity.

Since 1994 the UN General Assembly has called or a


KNUsoldiersnearborderwithTailand

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Military Rule

In 1962 General Ne Win staged a coup against the demo-

cratically elected government and created a one-party state

led by the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). Te

constitution was abrogated, all opposition put behind bars

and any attempt to organise was severely repressed. All

large industries and business enterprises were nationalised

under the Burmese Way to Socialism, the BSPPs ocial

doctrine. Burma was to become sel-sucient, and the

generals isolated the country rom the outside world. Tecountry has been under military rule ever since.

By this time, the civil war had spread to Kachin and Shan

State, where the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)

and the Shan State Army (SSA) had started armed up-

risings. Fuelled by growing dissatisaction among the

Kachin and Shan populations over the unequal position o

ethnic minorities in the Union o Burma, the KIO and SSA

were able to expand quickly.

By the 1970s the Burma army had developed a new

anti-insurgent strategy. Tis campaign pushed the in-

surgents out o central Burma into the mountainous border

regions, using the inamous Four Cuts strategy, aimed at

cutting o the links between the insurgents and the civilian

Burman politicians and ethnic minority representatives

rom some o the hill areas. However, the agreement was

inconsistent about the rights o dierent ethnic minority

groups, not all o which were represented at the Panglong

meeting. As a result, many issues were deerred or uture

resolution.

Tis situation lef the country ripe or civil war, which

started shortly afer independence in January 1948.

Within a year, the whole country was in turmoil, with the

Communist Party o Burma (CPB) going undergroundto ght the central government, which suered mutinies

in the army. Several newly ormed ethnic minority

nationalist movements, spearheaded by the Karen

National Union (ormed in 1947), took up arms to press

their demands or more autonomy and equal rights in

the Union.

By the early 1950s the war had spread to many parts

o the country. Te situation was urther complicated

by the invasion o Kuomintang remnants into north-

east Shan State, ollowing their deeat by Mao Zedongs

communists. Most o the ghting has been in ethnic

minority regions, which have suered both rom years o

government neglect and the destruction associated with

the civil war.


Ko

kangsoldiers

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The Democracy Movement

Since the 1962 coup several protests have broken out

against military rule. Te largest demonstrations took

place in August 1988, ollowing months o unrest, when

hundreds o thousands o people took to the streetsdemanding an end to military rule, restoration o

democracy and multiparty elections. Te ollowing

month the new military government, known as the State

Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), crushed

the movement, killing many protesters. Te Burma

Socialist Programme Party was also abolished, and

socialism disappeared as the ocial ideology. Since then

the military regimes main ideology has been Burman

nationalism, and its main preoccupation national

security.

Following the crackdown, thousands o Burman activists

ed the cities to the jungle camps o the armed groups

in the border regions. Tere they hope to receive arms

to ght the military regime. Tey set up new organisa-

tions, and joined the ethnic armies in a new umbrella

group, the Democratic Alliance o Burma (DAB).

In the 1990 elections, the opposition NLD led by Aung

San Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory. Rather than accept

the election results, the military established a NationalConvention to draf a new constitution. A number o

NLD members and members-elect o Parliament ed

to the Tai border area to avoid arrest, setting up an

exile government there.5 Aung San Suu Kyi has been

under house arrest most o the time since 1989. Te

military regime has so ar reused to enter into a dialogue

with her party. At the time o this writing she is held in

Insein Jail, charged with breaching the terms o her house

arrest, having allowed an American citizen who swam to

her compound into her home. Tere is no independent judiciary in Burma, and oreign observers expect the

military regime to nd her guilty and sentence her to

jail.6

Over the years numerous attempts to orm all-inclusive

nationwide alliances and united ronts have all ailed.

Te opposition has remained divided over goals

(independence versus ederation), ethnic conict,

and strategy (armed struggle versus cease-re versus

non-violent political means). Tere are also conicts

over ideology (pro-Chinese communism or pro-

Western capitalism) and economics (including the drugs

trade), as well as old grievances and personal conicts.

population (ood, nance, recruits and intelligence), and

accompanied by severe human rights abuses.

Cold War Alliances

By the 1970s two major opposition alliances had emerged.

Along the Tai border ethnic armed groups set up theNational Democratic Front (NDF), which maintained a

pro-West and anti-communist policy. During the Cold War

Tailand was seen by US policy makers as the last domino

against communism in the region. While Burma was

ocially neutral, policy makers in Bangkok and

Washington eared it would not be able to stand up against

what they perceived as the communist threat. Until

the end o the 1980s almost all territory along the Tai

border was under de-acto control o the NDFs Mon,

Karen, Karenni and Shan armed opposition groups.

Tey administered their own areas, and were given tacit

support by Tai authorities. Karen National Union (KNU)

President General Bo Mya once described his organisa-

tion as a kind o Foreign Legion or Tailand, guarding its

borders against communism and preventing a link between

the Tai and Burmese communist parties.4

Te other major alliance, the CPB, was supported by

China. Initially Chinese support or its Burmese sister

party was limited, as China maintained ocial relations

with the neutral Burmese government. However, relations

with China changed afer the military coup in 1962, and

deteriorated rapidly ollowing the 1967 anti-Chineseriots in Rangoon, which the Chinese government elt were

instigated, or at least tolerated, by Ne Wins regime. China

subsequently put its ull weight behind the CPB, and in

January 1968 thousands o CPB troops invaded northern

Shan State rom neighbouring Yunnan Province in China.

Making alliances with local ethnic Kokang, Wa and Shan

leaders, the CPB was able to quickly overrun Burma army

outposts and established a large liberated area encompass-

ing nearly the entire Chinese border. Te CPB succeeded

in making alliances with some ethnic armed opposition

groups, oering Chinese arms in return or political control.

By the end o the 1980s almost all border regions were

controlled by armed opposition groups. Tese groups had

established liberated areas where they had set up their own

administration. Te CPB, with Chinese support, was the

largest military opposition group in the country. It was

rivalled in strength by the pro-West NDF, but except or

a brie accord reached in 1986, the two never established

a military alliance. Te gap between them was not only

due to ideology (communism versus capitalism), but also

reected dierent geo-political interests between China

and Tailand (allied with the US), which continue until

today. Over the years, NDF parties were also angered by

the support o the Burman-led CPB or lef-wing move-

ments within their ranks, which led to political actional-

ism and ethnic splits.

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The Origin of the Cease-re

Agreements

The Fall of the CPB

Te major development preceding the cease-reagreements was the sudden collapse o the CPB in 1989,

afer a mutiny by ethnic minority troops against the

Burman leadership o the party. Te rst to rebel were

Kokang troops under Phueng Kya-Shin, a local leader. When

the CPB headquarters ordered Wa troops to put down the

Kokang uprising, Wa commanders reused, and revolted,

as well, a month later.

Te Kokang and Wa mutineers were dissatised with the

Burman CPB leaders, whom they elt were unrealistic and

stubborn in their policies, and they resented that the CPB

Politburo comprised almost exclusively ethnic Burmans.

Te mutineers elt ethnic Kokang and Wa soldiers were

being used as cannon odder in a political conict

between ethnic Burmans, bringing nothing but misery or

their people and their region. Te CPB style looked very

good, they said they were serving the people, says Phueng

Kya-Shin. But actually they destroyed the culture and

history o Kokang. During CPB time not one house was

constructed, and there were no roads or cars; we were still

riding horses.7

Some CPB veterans see the weakening rapport withChina as the beginning o the end. In the power struggle

in the Chinese Communist Party, the CPB had supported

Hua Go Fong and criticised Deng Xiao Ping. When Deng

came to power in 1980-81, the Chinese told the CPB they

would reduce aid gradually. Te Chinese also oered their

volunteer workers who had joined the CPB pensions

i they returned to China.8 Tis was another immense

blow, as the CPB had been almost entirely dependent

on Chinese assistance. Te normalisation o ormal

relations between China and the Ne Win military

government was also an important actor. Within a ew

years, China became a key strategic ally o Burma.

Feeling the eects o diminished aid, in 1982 the

CPB allowed its ocials to tax opium, and some

local CPB leaders becoming heavily involved in the

opium trade. Former CPB members say that by this time,

several CPB brigades started acting independently.9 In an

eort to control the situation, the CPB adopted a

tougher policy on the opium trade at its Tird Congress in

1985, which was strongly opposed by local leaders.

Te deteriorating military situation urther contributed to

the CPBs downall. Initially it had been successul on the

battleeld, but by the early 1980s there was little risk o it

marching down to central Burma and posing a threat to

the central government. Furthermore, most o CPBs

he Origin o the Cease-ire Agreements

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We rst established our army on 11 March 1989, says

Phueng Kya-shin. Ten we made a cease-re agreement

with the government on 14 April 1989.15 Te Wa concluded

a cease-re with the military government a month later,

on May 18, 1989. Te agreement stopped the ghting, and

provided or government assistance in health, education

and other acilities. Te Kokang and Wa groups would

maintain their arms and administer the territory undertheir control.16

Tese truces in northern Burma with the ex-CPB groups

had huge consequences or other armed groups in the

region, which had come under increased military pressure

rom the Burma army. Many o them had also relied on

CPB support or arms and ammunition. Within a ew years,

most o them signed cease-re agreements. Te rst was the

Shan State Army in 1989, now called the Shan State Army

North (SSA North).17 In 1991 the KIOs Fourth Brigade in

northern Shan State broke away to sign a separate cease-

re. Te Palaung State Liberation Organisation (PSLO) in

the northern Shan State and the Pao National Organisation

(PNO) in the southern Shan State concluded truces in the

same year. Like the SSA, these three new cease-re groups

were NDF members, causing surprise in ethnic political

circles. Most o the early accords ollowed ad hoc negotia-

tions in the wake o the collapse o the CPB.

The NDF and the Second Round of Cease-res

A second set o cease-res were concluded with other NDFmembers in the mid-1990s as part o a more deliberate

strategy o the military government. Tis policy was de-

veloped by Khin Nyunt, who initiated talks with the ethnic

armed groups.

Tis initiative ollowed a period o large military oensives

against NDF members along the Tai border (KNU, Kar-

enni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and New Mon

State Party (NMSP)) and the China border (KIO). De-

spite several important victories, total military success was

never probable. Afer the Burma army ailed to occupy the

opposition headquarters in Manerplaw, located in KarenState on the Tai border, it abruptly suspended operations

in 1992.

Te surprise announcement came afer General Tan

Shwe took over as new junta leader. A number o political

prisoners were released, and the military regime

announced it would meet with elected MPs and promised

to hold a National Convention to draf a new constitution.

Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been under house arrest since

1989, was granted amily visits.18 Repatriation was oered

to 250,000 Rohingya reugees, a Muslim minority rom

Rakhine State who had ed to neighbouring Bangladesh

during a brutal campaign by the Burma army o the

previous two years.19

Peoples Army consisted o highlanders uninterested in

lower Burma.10

Te internal purges in the CPB during the Cultural Revolu-

tion had diminished support or the party in the country;

and its ailure to use the 1988 demonstrations as an

opportunity to create political change also contributed to

the partys downall.

The First Round of Cease-res

Te Wa and Kokang mutineers pushed the CPB leaders

across the border into China and ormed a number o

new organisations, mainly based along ethnic lines. Tese

were the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army

(MNDAA) in the Kokang region, the United Wa State

Party (UWSP) in the adjacent Wa region, and the National

Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) in the Mongla region

in eastern Shan State. Te last group to quit the CPB was

the New Democratic Army Kachin (NDA-K) in eastern

Kachin State.

Sensing the opportunity to neutralise its largest military

opponent, the military government quickly sent envoys

to the breakaway groups to discuss a possible truce. Te

main architect o this policy was Lieutenant General Khin

Nyunt, head o the Military Intelligence (MI). One o the

go-betweens was Lo Hsing-han, an ethnic Kokang who

had been released rom jail in 1980. Once branded as the

King o Opium, Lo Hsing-han now played a key role inacilitating contact between the military government and

the ex-CPB groups.

According to a government publication, peace emissary

Lo Hsing-han rst acilitated contact with Kokang leader

Pheung Kya-shin in 1987. According to the Kokang leader:

Lo Hsing-han never participated in the cease-re nego-

tiations. He just tried to say something good about the

government, but he did not play any signicant role in

this.11 In March 1989 Lo Hsing-han inormed the regime

that the Kokang group had split rom the CPB and would

stop ghting.12

Similarly, Lo Hsing-han was the rst to meet the Wa leaders

afer the mutiny. He suggested to make a cease-re

with the military government, and told the Wa leaders

that i they agreed, the government would give them

assistance to develop their region.13 Te Wa, like the

Kokang group, had plenty o arms and ammunition but

little ood afer the Chinese had cut o aid ollowing

the mutiny. Armed NDF groups along the Tai

border also sent a delegation to try to make an

alliance and convince the ex-CPB groups to continue

ghting. Te Wa told the NDF delegation they could

send their representative to the Wa region, but would

not join the NDF because they did not want to ght

anymore. Teir priority, the Wa Leaders said, was peace.14


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other large-scale development projects, including a deep

seaport in Mon State and a connecting road with Tailand

to acilitate trade.

Military pressure rom the Burma army and the all o the

KNU and NDF headquarters Manerplaw in early 1995

urther convinced NMSP leaders that a cease-re was

probably the only way to maintain control o its territory.30

Afer our rounds o talks in the capital o Mon State,

the NMSP concluded a cease-re agreement in a

ceremony on 29 June 1995.31

Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)

Tere were also additional causes or the cease-res. TeKarenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) in Kayah State

made a truce with the regime in 1995. Te KNPP had

received several missions rom community leaders in Kayah

State, including Catholic Bishop Sotero, to persuade them to

enter into peace talks. Tey wanted to relieve the situation

or civilians, which had suered badly rom the war. Te

Karenni people requested the KNPP to talk, because the

situation was so bad or them, according to KNPP General

Aung Mya. Te Tais did not pressure us beore 1995. In

act at that time we had more pressure rom people inside

[Kayah] State. Some elder leaders told us we should talkwith the military government, and see what a cease-re

agreement could bring, saying we could always start ght-

ing again.32

cover or the guerrilla armies. Furthermore, Burma would

obtain oreign currency. Te Tais argued that the Burmese

government would gain in two ways: it would gain

Tai riends (the military and the businessmen) whileat the same time obtaining resources and access to areas

controlled by the dierent ethnic groups, acilitating

suppression eorts.28

Te rst indication o this new policy came during

the oensive along the Tai border in 1989 when Tai

authorities tacitly allowed Burma army units to cross over

into Tai territory to attack Mon, Karen and Karenni

strongholds, which had been able to sustain previous

oensives. Following the public calls or peace talks by

MI Chie Khin Nyunt in 1993, Tai authorities pressured

Mon, Karen and Karenni orces to make cease-res withthe regime. As a result, the NDF members along the Tai

border who had reused to join the KIO in joint cease-re

talks were now orced to open individual negotiations. 29


Tai pressure was especially high on the New Mon State

Party (NMSP) mainly or economic reasons. By 1994 the

Tai military and the National Security Council threatened

to orce ten thousand Mon reugees back into Burma ithe NSMP continued to reuse to enter into individual

negotiations. Te ghting was seen as an obstacle to

construction o a pipeline rom the Burmese gas eld in the

Gul o Martaban to Tailand, as well as blocking several


SoldierotheNMSP

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and will not accept the real ederal union and democracy. 34

In early 1994 an internal conict in the KNU led to the

all o its headquarters Manerplaw. A group o Buddhist

soldiers and villagers elt unjustly treated by the predomi-

nantly Christian KNU leadership. Afer emissaries ailed to

achieve an agreement, the group broke away rom the KNU

to orm the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA).

Te Burma army quickly oered a truce, in return orsupport and control over territory in Karen areas.

Pressure rom within the KNU over the mishandling o

the episode led to some changes in leadership and the

organisation subsequently entered into negotiations with

the regime. During 1995-1997 our rounds o talks were

held between the KNU and the military government. Afer

the last meeting ailed to produce an agreement, the Burma

army launched a new oensive, occupying most remaining

KNU territory. Te KNU subsequently changed its

strategy, and became a guerrilla army operating rom small,

ofen mobile bases along the Tai border. Most senior KNU

leaders now live in Tailand, and the KNU headquarters is

eectively located in the Tai border town Mae Sod.

Inormal contacts between the KNU and the SPDC contin-

ued, and in early 2004 KNU leader General Bo Mya made

a surprise visit to Rangoon to conclude a temporary truce.

Both sides agreed in principle to a cease-re, and to work

out the details together later, according to Bo Mya. Our

side suggested signing the agreement, but they did not

want it. We have to implement it on the ground later step

by step.35

When a new KNU delegation visited Rangoon to try

to ormalise the agreement in October 2004, their host

Khin Nyunt was suddenly arrested, ollowing an internal

power struggle in the regime, and the delegates had to

return home empty-handed. By the end o the year ghting

resumed, and the agreement with the KNU had eectively

broken down.

Surrender of Mong Tai Army (MTA)

Another result o the new Tai policy was the surrender

o Khun Sas Mong ai Army (MA). Te MA controlled

substantial amount o territory in Southern Shan State

between the Tai border and the Salween River. By the

early 1990s, the MA had ten thousand soldiers. By its

own admission the MA was heavily involved in the

opium trade but was able to buy goods and services on

the Tai market undisturbed. Tailand adopted a stricter

policy towards the MA and ocially closed the border;

and the Burmese military promised the United Wa State

Party (UWSP) control over any territory it managed to

occupy in return or attacking MA positions. Tousands o

UWSP troops moved south to the Tai border to strengthen

a small Wa position, and heavy ghting broke out. Te

position o the MA was urther weakened by an unusual

Te truce broke down, ollowing conict over logging

and accusations that the Burma army had mistreated

the civilian population. We made a cease-re on March

21, 1995. But afer that the Burmese accused us that we

cut logs and sold these to Tailand, says a KNPP leader.But the Burma army broke the agreement; they were not

supposed to collect porters and ees. Tey started ght-

ing on 3 July, 1995, and the cease-re lasted only three

months.33

Karen National Union (KNU)

Te KNU, the strongest NDF member along the Tai

border, had long resisted Tai pressure to enter into

individual talks with the regime. Te KNU maintains it

wants to reach a political agreement rst beore entering

into a cease-re arrangement. We want to make a cease-

re, with real peace, real justice, and real equal rights, said

a KNU leader. But they always want the KNU to surrender,


SSASouthsoldier

12


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under less pressure rom the Burma army or neighbouring

countries, had a better negotiating position. Te NMSP or

instance, under great pressure rom the Burma army and

Tai military, had to give up all its territory outside Mon

State, as well as some other strategic locations in Mon State.

NMSP army units were stationed in twelve permanent

unconnected pockets o ve kilometres in diameter. Te

Mon army was orced to accept withdrawal rom anothereight temporary areas within a year.39

Control over territory is important as it legitimises those

armed groups to represent the communities rom these

areas, to collect taxes, conduct various other business

opportunities including mining and logging, and to

recruit members and soldiers. It also provides more

bargaining power vis--vis the SPDC. Agreements

stipulate that neither party can enter the others

territory without prior permission.

Te Kokang group was the rst to make a cease-re. On 14

April 1989 we had the rst meeting with the government

and we made the agreement, says Phueng Kya-shin. Te

main points are to stop ghting and make a cease-re, to

have an anti-narcotics policy, and to develop our region.

Te agreement also stipulates that Myanmar would not

touch Kokang area, and the other way around. We agreed

on a peace line [demarcation].40

According to the UWSP, their cease-re agreement with the

government provides or an end to hostilities and the right

to maintain their armed troops and to administer theirown territory. Furthermore, the government promised

development assistance in the region, in particular support

or health, education, and agriculture. In return, the Wa

leadership agreed to be under the leadership o the

Myanmar government, and not to ask or independence.41

Burma army oensive and mutinies by some MA troops.

In January 1996, Khun Sa took everybody by surprise

when he invited the Burmese army to his headquarters in

Homong near the Tai border and surrendered. According

to a report by the US State Department, the agreement

stipulated that i Chang Qiu (Khun Sa) ended his insur-

gency and retired rom the drug trade, the Government o

Burma would provide him with security in Rangoon andallow him to conduct legitimate business.36

Several ex-MA groups made an agreement with the

SPDC to become one o the government-sanctioned

militias (Takasapha). Tese include the Nayai Militia in

the Pao region; the Homong Local Deence Force based at

the MAs old headquarters Homong; the Mongtaw local

Deence Force; and the Mongyawn Militia, all based in

southern Shan State. wo other ex-MA militias, the

Manpang Militia in angyan ownship and the Mongkha

Militia in Mongyai ownship, are based in the northern

Shan State.37

MA remnants reusing to surrender were later reorganised

in the southern Shan State by Colonel Yawd Serk back into

the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA), a pre-MA

orce that had joined with Khun Sa in the mid-1980s. He

later tried to make an alliance with the cease-re Shan

State Army (SSA) in northern Shan State, and renamed his

organisation the SSA South, to distinguish it rom the SSA

in the North. SSA South leader Yawd Serk wrote several

letters to the SPDC via the cease-re SSA North, asking

or cease-re talks. Te regime reused, saying since theMA had already surrendered, the SSA South could also

lay down it weapons, but could not have the status o a

cease-re.

Contents of the Agreements

Te cease-res are merely military truces, and do not

include any political agreements. Te regime insisted it was

a temporary military government, and thereore not in a

position to talk about politics. It told the groups to put their

political demands orward at the National Convention,which was to produce a new constitution. According

to a KIO source: General Khin Nyunt said: We are not

really a government, we have no constitution. Afer we

have a constitution, you can talk to the new government.38

Te negotiations thereore had a strong ocus on military

matters. Te agreements demarcate the territory under

control o the groups, the location o checkpoints, the

number and location o soldiers, and the location o mili-

tary headquarters and liaison posts. Cease-re groups were

allowed to open oces in the major towns in the region, as

well as in Rangoon.

Groups that were in a relatively stronger position, because

they were larger, had more armed soldiers, and/or were


The Special Regions

Following the truces, the military government gave theterritories under control o the cease-re groups a newtemporary status called atu deitha, or special region.Tese are grouped together by dierent ethnic minoritystates (the pyi-neh) and subsequently numbered.Te government reers to the Kokang region undercontrol o the MNDAA as Shan State Special Region 1,indicating the MNDAA was the rst group in Shan Stateto sign a cease-re agreement with the government.UWSP territories are thus reerred to as Shan StateSpecial Region 2.

Te KIO region as Kachin State Special Region 2,as it was the second group to sign a truce in KachinState. Te special regions are neither mono-ethnic nor

representing a whole ethnic group. Te Wa SpecialRegion, or instance, contains ethnic groups includingLahu, Lisu and Chinese, and there are Wa people livingoutside UWSP areas.

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Te military government initially promised support to

develop these regions, and created the Border Area

Development Programme (BADP), which was later

upgraded into the Ministry or the Development o Border

Areas and National Races. Te government has published

several booklets to show its achievements. However, cease-

re groups complain that until now little aid has come

through. Te NMSP received some developmentaid rom the regime, which according to one

author was a mixed blessing.42

Following the cease-re agreements, most groups were

given business opportunities by the military government.

Te NMSP set up the Rehmonya International Company,

which was licensed to import and export as well as

transport passengers and goods on dierent routes.43

Similarly, the KIO set up the BUGA Company, which

became involved in jade and logging. Te UWSP and the

Pao National Organisation (PNO) obtained concessions in

the Mong Shu ruby mines in Shan State and the Hpa-kant

jade mines in Kachin State. According to the UWSP, in the

beginning they were given special privileges, but later had to

compete with other private companies at market prices.44

None o the contents o the accords have been made

public, and almost all cease-res are verbal agreements,

without any written document. According to a govern-

ment spokesperson: Te cease-re agreements are just an

understanding, it is not on paper.45 Only the KIO has a

written agreement, which contains the ollowing points:

to make a nation-wide cease-re; to announce a generalamnesty; to have a tri-partite dialogue; to carry

out development activities in Kachin State;

and that the KIO could maintain its arms

until its demands were put into a new constitution.46

Following the agreements, all other non-cease-re

opposition groups were to leave the cease-re territory.

Tis included the All Burma Students Democratic Front

(the student army ormed by Burman urban activists

afer the 1988 uprising) in KIO territory, and exile

members o the National League or Democracy in NMSP

territory.

Te conclusion o cease-re agreements is seen by the

SPDC as one o its major accomplishments. According to a

government spokesperson: Te peace agreement is

important or the government. Peace and stabil-

ity are top priorities or us.47 Te SPDC ocially lists 17

cease-re groups, but there are dierences in goals and

objectives, as well as in their status. Tere are also

other smaller breakaway groups that have essentially

become militia orces. Ten there are various Lahu and

other militia in southern Shan State. Tese groups are not

included in the government list o 17 groups.48

Mediators

Mediators, or the most part local ethnic religious leaders,

played a key role in the negotiations. Tey served as

important communication channels to send messages

back and orth to the conict parties, and to keep the

talks going.

In Kachin State three mediators played a central role

in the cease-re talks: Reverend Saboi Jum, at that

time General-Secretary o the Kachin Baptist Church,

his brother Khun Myat, a businessman, and Duwa La

Wawm, ormer ambassador to Israel. Teir role was

important, says a senior KIO ocial, because

the negotiations took about ve years, and these three

middlemen had to shuttle back and orth between the

KIO HQ and Rangoon.49

Te role o the mediators did not end with establishmento the cease-res. As the truces are merely military in

nature most other issues were lef to be resolved

until later, and various problems had to be dealt with

along the way. During the time when Khin Nyunt was

the strongman, the mediators were direct communica-

tion channel between him and the armed groups.

Various Christian and Buddhist Karen mediators have

tried to mediate between the military government and

the KNU. Te rst attempts date back to 1994, when

Archbishop Andrew Mya Han visited the Karen head-

quarters Manerplaw to propose peace talks with themilitary government. Subsequently an inormal group o

ve prominent Rangoon-based Karen Christian leaders

was ormed.50

Later on a number o prominent Karen religious lead-

ers based in Karen State ormed the Karen State Peace

Committee. Tis committee consists o Buddhist and

Christian leaders, and was ormed to include Buddhist

leaders and people based in Karen State in the peace

eorts. People in Karen State elt Karen Christians rom

outside Karen State were making all the decisions with-

out consulting them, says a Karen community leader inRangoon.51

Tis committee has tried to mediate between the

KNU and the military government, and acilitate

communication. It has also made eorts to promote

peace among Karen communities. Karen society has

suered rom ragmentation and communal conicts, due

to decades o military rule and oppression, and the lack o a

common Karen platorm, which limits communication

and cooperation eorts between dierent communities.

Te split in the Karen armed movement between

the mostly Christian-led KNU and the government-supported Buddhist DKBA has urther aggravated the

conict, which continues until today.


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Breakaway Groups

here are currently six breakaway groups rom the KNUthat have made separate deals with the regime. Te rstto do so was the DKBA in early 1994. At the time othe 1997 oensive the Karen Peace Force, a breakaway

battalion rom the KNU Sixth Brigade, made a separateagreement. Most recently, in 2007 the KNU SeventhBrigade commander lef the KNU and set up the KNU/Karen National Liberation Peace Council (KPC).

Te KNU has been engaged in armed conict withsome o these groups, especially the DKBA. Karen com-munity leaders in Burma have made several attempts toaddress this inter-Karen conict. Some see it as a plotby the military regime to divide Karen communities.Others blame the KNU leadership or ailing to uniteopinion among the Karen and maintain KNU integrity.Some other groups still ghting the regime, such as the

KNPP and the SSA South, have also had actions breakaway and make separate truces with the SPDC.

Some breakaway groups rom cease-re groups havemade separate agreements with the regime, ollow-ing internal conicts over strategy, economics, power,or personal grievances. In Kachin State a group led byLasawng Awng Wah broke away rom the KIO in 2004.Afer rst seeking reuge with the NDA-K, LasawngAwng Wah came to an agreement with the Burmaarmy.52

Te NMSP has also suered rom ragmentation. Somegroups broke away in disagreement over the cease-reand took up arms again. At the end o 1996 the MonArmy Mergui District (MAMD), dissatised with thecease-re arrangements, broke away rom the NMSP totake up arms again.53 Following a Burma army oensivein May 1997, the MAMD reached an accord with theregime. A ew months later a action lef the MAMDto orm the Ramanya Restoration Army (RRA), andstarted to attack both the Burma army and the MAMDremnants. Within a year both the MAMD and RRA haddisappeared. In 2001 a small group broke away romthe NMSP to orm the Hongsawatoi Restoration Army(HRP), some retired Mon soldiers joining them. TeHRP was later renamed the Monland Restoration Party(MRP).54 Te Mon Peace and Deence Force (MPDF)was co-ounded by ex-NMSP members, including a topgeneral who lef the NMSP in 2008.55

Several nameless small Mon groups occasionally linkup with the MRP. Tey are usually reerred to by theirleaders name. Among them is a group led by Nai ChanDein. According to a Mon source, the Nai Chan Deingroup, like many o the remaining armed insurgentgroups in Burma, does not control territory. Instead, it

moves requently, relying on supporters and inormersin local villages, and superior knowledge o terrain.Te group supports itsel by extracting taxes romvillagers.56

Militias

Tere are a large number o militias in Burma. Accord-

ing to a report by a Shan exile media group there are

42 dierent militias groups in Shan State alone. Te

smaller splinter groups may have ewer than twenty

soldiers, whereas other orces may number up to twoor three hundred. Most o them are headed by locally

based leaders and many are ormed along ethnic lines.

Tere are various Lahu militias in southern Shan State,

while in the northern Shan State there are Kachin, Shan,

Lisu and Chinese groups. Tese include groups that

were ormed in the 1960s and 1970s to counter the CPB

invasion as well as the more recent breakaway groups

rom the MA.57

Tese groups, having no clear political agenda, are

mostly involved in business, including the drug trade.Te Burma army uses them as a buer at strategic

places in border regions with neighbouring countries

and large cease-re groups, such as the UWSP.


15

Lahuboyins

outhernShanState


18/44

Goals and Strategies of Cease-

re Groups

Te main grievances o ethnic minority groups in Burma

are lack o inuence in the political decision-making

processes; the absence o economic and social develop-

ment in their areas; and what they see as a Burmanisationpolicy o the military government that translates into repres-

sion o their cultural rights and religious reedom. Ethnic

minorities in Burma eel marginalised and discriminated

against and, in eect, the armed rebellions in Burma are

their response. Te situation deteriorated afer the military

coup in 1962, when minority rights were urther

curtailed. Decades o civil war and military rule have only

worsened old grievances and generated new ones. Indeed the

conditions o internal conicts and insurgency have

become so prolonged that many local ethnic orces reect

the characteristics and claim the rights o sel-deence

groups in a perennially insecure landscape.

Most ethnic minority organisations now reject separatism,

instead calling or a ederal state based on democratic

principles that would saeguard the political, economic

and cultural rights o ethnic minorities. Te key words or

ethnic minority aspirations are sel-determination and

equality. Te large majority o groups support the NLDs

call or a tripartite dialogue between the military, the

democratic opposition and ethnic groups to nd a lasting

solution to the political deadlock.

For such groups as the KIO, NMSP and UWSP the cease-

res are part o a longer-term strategy to achieve change.

While the goals o these groups are similar, it is useul to

look at the cease-re agreements as a peace-building and

reconciliation approach, and compare the dierent ways in

which the dierent groups have tried to use the cease-re

to reach their goals. All have had successes and ailures.

However, generally speaking, all have an ethnic nationalist

agenda, and, afer decades o war, have ocused on promot-

ing political change through dialogue.

United Wa State Party (UWSP)

With up to perhaps twenty thousand soldiers, the UWSP is the

largest armed opposition group in the country, controlling

signicant territory east o the Salween River along the

China border. All entry points into the region by road are

manned by separate UWSP and government checkpoints.

Te UWSP currently eectively controls what it wants as

a uture Wa State, and has not made any claims on areas

outside that territory. Te Wa capital Panghsang has grown

into a small town with modern Chinese style architecture,

shops, paved roads, and has a new border crossing with

China. Like other large cease-re groups, the UWSP has

set up its own governance structure in the Wa region, and

has created a state within a state.

Goals and Strategies o Cease-ire Groups

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19/44

to reach it goals through lobbying and dialogue at the

national level and local levels, at the National Convention,

in meetings with SPDC ocials in Rangoon and Nay Pyi

aw as well as in Kachin State, and through alliances with

other ethnic minority representatives.

Pao National Organisation (PNO)

Like the KIO, the PNO controls several unconnected areas,

located in the southern Shan State around aunggyi. How-

ever, in contrast to the KIO, the PNO decided not to set

up checkpoints and demarcate territory under its control,

separating it rom the rest o the country. Instead the PNO

has welcomed government run schools and clinics in its

area. It believes that developing Pao communities is more

easible as part o the government system.

Like the UWSP, the PNO has mainly ocussed on creating

space and promoting change at the local level or the Pao

people. But unlike both the UWSP and the KIO, it has done

so primarily by working on the local level in coordination

with government and army ocials. Te PNO has made

less eort to push or political change at the national level.

Te main political aim o the United Wa State Party

(UWSP) is to achieve the ormation o a Wa State, or a Wa

Pyi-neh, alling directly under responsibility o the central

government in Rangoon, and not administered through

Shan State. Te UWSP leaders say in correspondence

with the government they have always used the term Wa

Pyi-neh (Wa State), while the government always has used

Wa Atu Deitha (Wa Special Region). Te UWSP saysgovernment ocials have told them their uture status

would be no more than something between state

(pyi-neh) and district (khayaing in Burmese).58

Te UWSP has prioritized development o the Wa region,

and, as part o their commitment to the international

community to make their region drug-ree, has imposed

a ban on opium cultivation since 2005. Since the cease-

re agreement o 1989 the UWSP has ocially accepted

being part o Burma. According to UWSP Chairman Bao

You Chang: Wa State is an indivisible part o the Union o

Myanmar. As a minority autonomous region, we only ask

the government to grant us more power in sel-

administration.59

Te UWSP has rst and oremost tried to promote

political change or the Wa region which is entirely under

their control - at the national level through the National

Convention and in meetings with government representa-

tives. Teir political interests are mainly limited to their

area. Tis is partly because the Wa leaders ear they might

be used or the political gains o others, and because they

eel they lack the experience and knowledge to deal withbroader issues.60


Te KIO controls a signicant amount o territory, which

like the Wa region is demarcated with checkpoints on all

roads leading into their territory. But the KIO-controlled

areas comprise unconnected pockets o land, mostly

rural areas. All major towns including Kachin State capital

Myitkyina are under government control. Te KIO also

controls a long stretch o territory along the China border.

Following the cease-re, the KIO prioritised resettlement

and reconstruction o Kachin State. Te organisation

hopes that in the long run social, humanitarian and

economic development will lead to political development

and reconciliation. Te main policy o the KIO in 1994

was to nd a peaceul settlement or the political conict,

and to solve the problem on the table, not on the battleeld.

We still have the same goal, says a KIO leader.61

Te KIO has tried to promote political change or the

whole country, to build a ederal state on democratic

principles. It has pushed hard or change or all ethnic

minority groups and areas, its interests extending beyond

Kachin State or areas under KIO control. Te KIO tries


KIOsoldiero

nguardattheChinaborder

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20/44

communication and consultation between these cease-

re groups and the communities they represent, who are

being excluded rom any decision-making processes. Tere

are no other avenues or political discussion or organiza-

tion. Afer decades o conict and military rule, many o

these problems are endemic throughout Burma, aecting

all conict actors.

Te poor leadership is related to the lack o educational

acilities. Although the situation has improved since the

cease-re, access to education and education standards

remain low. One international observer estimates that hal

o the UWSP Central Committee members are illiterate. 64

Te isolation o the region and decades o conict have

urther prevented the leadership o cease-re groups to

learn about developments in the rest o the world. Te

leaders thereore ofen rely on the advice and management

skills o outsiders, especially rom China.

Governing Capacity

Te cease-re groups have all created their own health,

agriculture, justice and various other departments to

administer their territories. Many o the groups are in

eect a state within a state. Most o the departments have

weak management and technical capacity. Te top-down

decision-making process also prevents these departments

rom taking important decisions. Local administrative

units have little power, and ew are able or dare to take their

own initiatives. Instead they tend to wait rom instructionsrom their headquarters. Again, there are dierences

between the cease-re groups. Some, like the KIO and

NMSP, allow more decentralised power than others.

Most district leaders and their subordinates work on a

part-time basis, and responsibilities are unclear and poorly

dened. Salaries o administrative sta and army soldiers

are ofen low or nonexistent, and many cultivate their

own land to supplement their income. Te armed groups

have diculty attracting young educated members. Many

others who have joined are rustrated with their lack o

inuence on the decision-making process.

Occasionally headquarters has diculty exercising ull

control over local army units. In theory the political

departments have control over the army, but in practice the

army is more powerul and sometimes acts independently,

running economic and security matters ree rom political

control.

Vision for Socio-economic Development

Development is generally maniested in terms o the

inrastructure, such as roads, bridges, dams and hydropower

projects. Tere is little community development, as the

cease-re groups ofen perceive these projects as a threat


Te NMSP also controls a number o separate demarcated

pockets o territory in Mon State, manned by NSMP check-

points, located near the Tai border. Afer the cease-re

it had to withdraw all troops rom areas outside o Mon

State.

Te NMSP has actively promoted Mon education or

the Mon population in both NMSP and government-

controlled areas. It has also stimulated community

developments projects by Mon civil organisations. Te

NMSP is the only cease-re group that has internally

displaced persons (IDP) camps in its territory, which

receive aid rom international agencies in Tailand, where

the camps were based until the NMSP cease-re in 1995.

Like the KIO, the NMSP has tried to promote political

change or the country as a whole, by advocating or ethnic

rights and a ederal constitution at the national level. Te

NMSP attended the National Convention, but in December

2005 scaled down its delegation to observer status, in

protest to the lack o political progress, especially regarding

ethnic rights.

Other Groups

Not all cease-re groups actively promote political change.

Some o them see the cease-res as an end goal. Tese

organisations view cease-res as a way o lie, andappear content with the status quo, controlling their own

areas, and engaging in business activities such as logging,

mining, and black market trade.62 According to one NDA-K

representative: We want permanent peace and permanent

progress. Whatever government will come to power, we

will continue to do as we do now, continue to control our

region.63

Leadership Style

Cease-re groups, like all armed groups in the country, aremilitary organisations, run in military ashion. Tey are

essentially non-democratic in nature, and decision-mak-

ing processes are top-down, leaving little room or dissent

or grass-roots initiative. Opposition to the leadership is not

ofen encouraged, and has in some cases led to dismissal

and imprisonment.

But this is not a uniorm situation. Te KIO and NMSP have

allowed civil society organisations to emerge and work in

their areas, seeking their advice on policy matters. However,

others groups, such as the UWSP and the MNDAA, are

more authoritarian, and there is hardly any organised civil

society in their areas. Tere is little activity outside o the

UWSP and the MNDAA structure, and the population is

too araid to challenge or resist their policies. Tere is little


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21/44

local armers. Current levels o international assistance are

insucient to sustain their livelihoods. Tis raises serious

questions about the sustainability o the opium bans.65

Vision for Political Change

Although cease-re groups share similar political

grievances and aspirations, ew have developed aclear political vision or the uture. Most groups have

not precisely dened what a uture ederal Union o

Burma would look like; how exactly the central

government would interact with the states and divisions;

and what its legislative and executive powers would be.

Tis again relates to weak leadership abilities o these

groups. A major cause o this incapacity is the political

repression and isolation o all opposition groups in the

country by the military government. Te military regimes

restrictions on travel and meetings urther hamper the

development o a common strategy and vision or change.

Nonetheless, there are some exceptions to this. In July 2007

the KIO or instance submitted a detailed 19-point proposal,

with many concrete recommendations, to amend the draf

constitution.66

Abuses Against the Population

Tere is evidence o human rights violations by armed

opposition groups, but clearly not on the same scale as

by the Burmese army. Tis includes orced recruitmento soldiers (including child soldiers), orced relocations,

taxation and extortion. All armed opposition groups,

including those with a cease-re agreement,

depend on the local population or nances (taxes),

recruits (in some cases one male per household has

to serve as a soldier), porters (sometimes including

on army patrols), intelligence (serving as guides and

provide inormation about enemy movements) and ood.

In Shan State, since 1999 the UWSP have relocated tens o

thousands o Wa villagers rom their mountainous home-

lands in the north to the ertile southern valleys o south-ern Shan State, in some cases displacing the original Shan,

Lahu and Akha inhabitants. Te UWSP leadership says

the objective is to move poppy growers and impoverished

villagers to areas where they can grow other crops.67

Shan, Lahu and Akha villagers are ofen simply told that

their land is conscated and that they have to leave their

houses.68

Generally speaking, the extended conict has taught people

to ear any armed group that enters their village. According

to a villager rom Ye ownship in Mon State: I will never

support any armed group. I they have arms, I believe they

will commit abuses because o their weapons. Tis is my

experience o how armed groups have been treating our

people.69

to their authority. Tey also doubt the useulness o com-

munity development and capacity building, which they seeas intangible and ineective. Tis is especially true or the

cease-re groups with more authoritarian leadership.

Tis perspective is due to lack o experience and educa-

tion, and in many ways mirrors the development vision

and strategy o the military government. However, the

increasing presence o a growing number o local and

international agencies in cease-re areas has brought about

some important changes. o nance development in their

regions the cease-re groups rely on unsustainable natural-

resource extraction, notably logging and mining by

Chinese companies, which has had negative consequencesor sustainable development eorts in these areas.

While the end o the open conict has brought some

relie or the communities, the implementation o the

opium bans in the Kokang and Wa regions, once the

major opium-producing areas in the country, has

deprived the population o their primary source o

cash income. Te Wa and Kokang authorities have

implemented these bans under pressure rom the inter-

national community, especially China, and the bans are

strictly enorced. However, the Kokang and Wa authorities

have been unable to provide their population with an alter-

native crop or other source o income. Te Wa and Kokang

authorities have promoted Chinese investment in rubber,

tea and sugarcane plantations, but these do not benet


KIOsoldiersatthetraditionalManaoestival

19


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Impact of the Truces

End of Fighting

Without doubt the greatest advantage o the cease-

res is that they put an immediate end to the ghting,

and brought relie to local communities. Accordingto a Kachin development worker: Te one major

benet o the cease-re o course is that with no ghting

there is peace and no more bloodshed because o war.70

Since the outbreak o the civil war in 1948 many

people have died as a result o the ghting, but there is no

reliable data on conict-related casualties, estimates

varying widely. In 1989 regime leader General Saw

Maung stated that the death toll would reach as high as

millions. A more realistic gure was given by a Western

author, who estimated the number o casualties at ten

thousand per year during the our decades prior to 1991.71

Te large majority o civilian casualties are rom ethnic

minority areas, where most o the ghting has taken place.

According to a UWSP leader: Te CPB occupied this

region rom 1968 until 1989. During that time they

ought against the government army, so it brought a very

dicult situation to this region. All the young people had

to engage in ghting, and only the old people were lef

to take care o the arms and produce ood.72 Chinese-

style human-wave attacks by the CPB resulted in high

casualties among its Wa, Kokang and other ethnicminority troops. Te tactic was later copied by the UWSP.

Over the years the Burma army has also suered huge

casualties, many being ethnic Burmans. Te annual

conict death toll decreased on all sides in those

areas where cease-re agreements came into place.

Reduce Human Rights Violations

Te cease-re agreements also curtailed the most

serious human rights abuses in areas where the cease-res developed. During its campaigns against armed

groups, the Burma army has been accused o committing

gross human rights violations against the civilian popu-

lation. Its inamous Four-Cuts campaign was aimed at

cutting o the links between the insurgents and the

civilian population (ood, nance, recruits and

intelligence). Tese military campaigns, which

continue in non-cease-re areas, directly target the

civilian population, and have resulted in the orced

relocation o hundreds o thousands o people. Tey

have been accompanied by human rights abuses,

including extra-judicial and summary executions,

torture, rape, and the conscation o land and property,

all documented by independent international organisa-

tions.73

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government control was restricted not only because

o actual ghting, but due to ear o being suspected

o being an inormer or one o the conict groups.

People living in territory under control o the cease-re

groups can travel to the main towns, cities and other gov-

ernment-controlled areas. Farmers can travel to distant

armlands without ear o being suspected o supportingthe rebels. Cease-re groups can now communicate their

political messages to the population.

Te lack o communication also contributed to conict

between communities, and widened existing gaps.

Following the cease-res, a consultative process regarding

the political uture o Kachin State was initiated. Tis

process also aims at creating unity among Kachin

communities. It has brought together the three dierent

Kachin cease-re groups (KIO, NDA-K and KDA),

who sometimes have been in conict with each other,

as well as local communities.77 In Karen State a similar

process was initiated by Karen civil-society actors afer the

peace talks with the KNU in 2003 started. Tis initiative

ceased afer the temporary KNU cease-re broke down.

Te cease-res have also opened up communication

channels between the armed opposition groups and the

military regime. We can talk with the government, even

with the top leaders, and we can bring up our desire and

our ethnic rights, says a KIO leader. So they know about

us more than beore. Another point is we can communicate

with the urban population. Beore that we were veryisolated.78

Space for Development

Te cease-re presented an important opportunity to

reconstruct and develop ormer war zones. Most ethnic

minority areas had not only suered rom actual war dam-

age, but also rom decades o government neglect. Com-

munication, inrastructure, health and education acilities

in ethnic minority areas all are poorer than in the rest o

the country.

Not surprisingly thereore, developing their regions

became a priority or all cease-re groups. Isolated and

devastated afer decades o civil war, they wanted to try a

dierent path to political development. Rather than wait

or political change to come rom Rangoon, they wanted

to take the initiative and rebuild their war-torn regions and

promote change. One UWSP leaders cited three main

benets o the cease-re: People can live in peace, there is

no more damage rom the ghting, and the population is

proting rom development. During the ghting in CPB

time, there was no single brick building like this. Tere was

just poverty.79

Following the truces, some human rights abuses continue

to exist, as cease-re groups have been unable to protect

the civilian population in areas outside o their control.

Tese abuses are in a less threatening orm and less

requent. Tey include conscation o land, extortion, and

orced labour.74 Te most serious human rights abuses take

place in areas where armed conict continues.75

Resettlement of Refugees and IDPs

During the war many civilians were caught up in the ght-

ing and the counter-insurgency campaigns o the Burma

army across the country. Tousands o them were orced

to leave their homes and villages and ee to neighbouring

countries or nd a hiding place and become an IDP.

Afer the cease-re, China orced 20,000 reugees living

in the border area back into Kachin State. Kachin

development workers estimate that at the time o the

cease-re there were also over 60,000 IDPs in the Kachin

hills. Following the cease-re agreements the KIO

started a resettlement programme, receiving no inter-

national assistance. Local organisations in Kachin State

say the population movement stopped a ew years afer

the truce. However, even some communities near

Myitkyina, which until 1994 was in the middle o the war

zone, are still unstable and have diculties sustaining their

livelihoods. A number o NGOs and local organisations

have started development projects to rebuild the

war-torn Kachin State. Among the recipients are manyormer IDPs.

At the time o the NMSP cease-re there were about

11,000 Mon reugees spread over our reugee camps. O

these the largest camp, with 3,900 reugees, had already

been relocated across the border, as part o Tai

pressure on the NMSP to convince them to make a cease-

re. A year afer the cease-re all Mon reugees had moved

across the border into Burma. Te NMSP planned to

remove these reugees rom crowded border camps and

resettle them in NMSP cease-re territory, where they

would eventually be able to sustain themselves as armers.However, due to bad planning and perceived security

threats rom the Burma army, this did not materialise.

Until today 10,000 Mon reugees remain in ve camps

just across the Tai border in NMSP-administered

territory in Burma, where they receive basic ood and

health care rom an international consortium based in

Tailand.76

Travel and Communication

Te cease-res have also acilitated easier travel and

communication opportunities. During the war travel

and communication between the population in

the so-called liberated areas and those living under

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Development Foundation and Shalom Foundation were

set up in Kachin State. Metta Development Foundation

was set up by a Kachin woman who had previously run

the Representative Oce or Kachin Aairs in Bangkok.

Her request to start community-development projects in

ormer war areas was granted by the military government.

Initially the ocus o the organisation was on Kachin State,

but soon activities spread out to other areas o the country,including Shan State and Mon State. Te organisation also

responded to the 2004 tsunami in the Irrawaddy Delta.

When Cyclone Nargis hit this area, Metta already had a

presence on the ground. Despite a number o sta being

killed, it was able to respond immediately, and expanded

its operations quickly. oday it is the largest local NGO in

Burma.

Shalom Foundation was set up by Reverend Saboi Jum,

who in his previous position o General-Secretary o the

Kachin Baptist Convention played an important role as

one o the mediators between the KIO and the military

government. Initially the organisation ocussed on peace-

building activities with, among others, the Ethnic Nation-

alities Mediation Fellowship. Tis is a network o mostly

religious leaders, who try to mediate between armed

opposition groups and the military government. Later

the Shalom Foundation also established community

development projects. Te truce in Kachin State has urther

allowed various religious organisations, mostly Christian

denominations, to start development projects in cease-re

regions.

However, as mentioned above, most eort was ocused on

inrastructure. Tis development model is much like that

o the military government. Tere is relatively little interest

shown or community-based development. Furthermore,

cease-re groups ace diculty nding income to nance

the reconstruction o their areas. In Kachin State, both the

KIO and the NDA-K have resorted to logging to nance

road and hydropower projects. Tis has been criticized byinternational NGOs.80 Te UWSP has used the drug trade

to nance their eorts to develop the Wa region.81

But cease-re groups complain that although the military

government has been keen to extract the abundant natural

recourses rom the ethnic minority states, there has been

little support given to develop their regions. According

to NDA-K Chairman Zahkung ing Ying: We cut logs to

get money, so that we can develop things to build houses,

schools etc. Te Myanmar government is poor. Actually

they should support the people, but they seem to have

problems. So we have to sell our natural resources to develop

our people. We have to balance. In Kachin State there is

nothing but trees. We cut down the trees to get develop-

ment. Tis is our own right, not others peoples right. Are

the people who are blaming us or this going to help us i

we do not cut?82

Space for Civil Society

Te cease-res also created space or civil society organisa-

tions to develop. Following the KIO cease-re, the Metta

Impact o the ruces

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compounds and bases. No one could disagree that there

are now more SPDC military bases inside Kachin territory

than beore cease-re time.85 Suspicions about the inten-

tions o the SPDC have increased among the cease-regroups, who do not see this as a sign o reconciliation.

Te increasing number o Burma army troops has also

increased human rights abuses in these areas, especially

the conscation o land, orced labour and extortion. Tis

is partly due to the act that Burma army units have been

ordered to become sel-sucient.

Corruption

Prots rom successul projects have ofen gone to theChinese businessmen or to the cease-re groups rather

than to local communities. According to a Kachin develop-

ment worker: Te SPDC, KIO and NDA-K all mention

that the mining and logging is or the development o the

country, but the prot all goes to the leaders. Tey have

permission rom the government, so we say nothing. Our

villagers have no power, we have no guns.86

Te general population is only urther disappointed

when they see their leaders living in big houses and

driving 4WDs. Tey seem to have orgotten their political

aims o the past, and instead enjoying a better lie. Te

[business] prots o the agreements disappear in their

pockets. And their pockets are very deep, said one NGO

worker in Kachin State.87

In Mon State the NMSP cease-re allowed local organisa-

tions to emerge and increase their activities. Te activities

o the Mon Womens Organisation, which is linked to the

NMSP, initially were limited to the Mon reugee camps.

Following the truce, it has extended adult-literacy and

various capacity-building activities to areas in Mon State,

including areas outside NMSP control. Te NMSP has

been able to promote Mon National Schools, teachingin the Mon language. Te majority o the students come

rom government-controlled areas, where teaching in

minority languages is not allowed beyond ourth grade. Te

Mon Literature and Buddhist Culture Association and the

Mon Literature and Cultural Committee, which had been

promoting Mon literacy and cultural training programmes,

have been able to expand and systemise their activities a-

ter the cease-re.83

Following the peace talks between the government and

the KNU in 2003, several Karen civil society organisations

rapidly emerged. Te military has been very harsh with

Karen organisations, and no action-oriented organisations

have been allowed to orm, according to a Karen commu-

nity leader in Rangoon. We were only lef with religious

organisations. But since 2003, because o the peace talks,

Karen organisations are less harassed, and Karen organi-

sations really mushroomed. Some operate in the name o

peace, others are womens and youth groups etc. Now there

are more then thirty Karen organisations.84

Lack of Political Progress

Although the cease-res have brought about important

improvements in the lives o ordinary people, there are

clearly a number o problems. Te main shortcoming o

the cease-res is the lack o a peace process and political

development as a ollow-up to the agreements. Afer twenty

years o cease-res, the situation is still unsure, and there

is no clear sight o a political solution that satises ethnic

aspirations and needs. Te National Convention dragged

on or feen years only to produce a constitution ailing to

address the main grievances and aspirations o cease-re

groups such as the NMSP, KIO and UWSP.

Te dilemma o the cease-re groups now is whether to

continue along the governments Seven Step Roadmap,

participate in the 2010 elections, and become a Border

Guard Force. Te lack o political progress has disillu-

sioned the cease-re groups, as well as the general public.

Tis may endanger the cease-res, and some groups or

actions o groups may resume ghting.

Expansion of Burma Army

Cease-re groups complain that the number o Burma

army battalions around their areas increased afer the

cease-re. Tere have been many constructions o military

Impact o the ruces

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The Cease-re Economy

Te cease-re agreements had several dramatic

consequences or the economy. Te end o the ghting

allowed or larger-scale economic development

projects. Te uncertainty o the situation created illegal

logging, mining, gambling, drug and human tracking,

and other black-marketeering. Te armed groups stillneeded to nd sources o income to nance their organisa-

tions and armies. As the central government was unable

and unwilling to provide the necessary resources, cease-re

groups have sought other ways to nance these projects.

As access to legal trade and business is restricted by the

government, cease-re groups rely in part on illegal

economic activities. It is very dicult or all these vari-

ous armed groups to be involved in legal trading, because

it is all in the hands o the Burmese government, said a

ormer member o a cease-re group in northern Shan

Sate. Tat is why they rely on black market trading. Te

government is, in a way, stimulating all the armed groups

to be involved in this, because they leave them no other

way.88

Tere are also armed groups and other powerul non-

political actors who are beneting (mostly economically)

rom the current political instability in the country, and

the uncertain status o armed groups and the uture o the

cease-re agreements. Tese also include oreign actors

such as Chinese and Tai logging companies and drugs

traders, who see no benet in peace and reconciliation.

Neighbouring countries, especially at the local level,

have also proted greatly rom the political instability

in Burma. Chinese and Tai companies have been able

to play dierent groups o against one another. Further-

more, the weakness o the Burmese state and the

uncertainty o the situation encourage serious corrup-

tion at the local level by army and government authorities

as well as the local commanders o cease-re groups.

As a result, natural resources are being extracted at

low prices with large prots or Chinese and Tai

companies and authorities, with very little investedback into development o the area benecial to local

communities.

Infrastructure

Te KIO has strongly promoted improving and

expanding roads in Kachin State. Tese projects are

carried out by Chinese companies, in cooperation

with Jadeland Company, run by a Kachin business-

man. Te roads connect the capital Myitkyina with other

major towns in Kachin State and the Chinese border.

In return or building these roads, the companies

have been given huge logging concessions in Kachin

State.89

he Cease-ire Economy

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opium cultivation. Like most other business ventures, these

are set up with Chinese capital and know-how, the UWSP

providing the land and manpower. In the Kokang re

the future of cease-fire agreements in burma

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