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Introduction

The aim of this article is to investi-gate the possibilities and requirementsfor using military co-operation tostrengthen stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina.1 The focus is mainly onthe possibility of establishing a PfP co-operation with Bosnia since this forumhas proven to be useful and effective,for instance, in the Baltic states. The ar-gument is that one common profession-ally based2 military in Bosnia will remove

The Democratic Warrior:The Future for the Bosnian Military*

By Peter C. Alexa and Michael Metzsch**

many of the concerns that are prevalentin the West when it comes to the futureof Bosnia after SFOR. Bosnian militarythat only obeys orders from a legallyelected government will decrease the riskof war that is caused by disputes betweenthe ethnic groups. Therefore, this kindof military could - in the long term -operate as an integrating factor in Bosnia.Hereby you avoid military which isclosely related with nationalistic opin-ion in the three ethnic groups as hasbeen the case until now.

The country is still suffering from thewar which has lasted for three years andcaused death of about 250.000 people. Fur-thermore, the country is still divided, andthe geographical division into two enti-ties including three large ethnic commu-nities leads to many problems in Bosniansociety: the economy is poor, there is ex-tensive corruption in the public admin-istration, and hate still prevails betweenthe ethnic groups. The country�s policyon stability is furthermore dependent onthe presence of the international commu-

* This report has previously been published in Institute for International Studies 2003. The research behind the article is financed by thedefence and security political studies at the Institute for International Studies. The report was translated into English by the editors of the BalticDefence Review.* * Peter C. Alexa is a member of the scientific staff at the Danish Institute for International Studies.Michael Metzsch is a former intern at the Danish Institute for International Studies.

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nity and NATO�s peacekeeping forces,particularly SFOR.

In the article the empirical data is gath-ered from three different sources: 1) lit-erature about Bosnian history, 2) factsgathered from the internet, 3) interviewsmade in Bosnia. With regard to the latterthere is a considerable difference betweenofficial and unofficial stances amongst theinternational community in Bosnia. Thusthe information from the interviews can-not be accredited to one single respon-dent and hence the interviews will alsoserve as background information.

The theoretical frame of the report isSamuel Huntington�s theory on civil andmilitary relations. This frame is chosenbecause the theory illustrates quite sim-ply some problems regarding civilian con-trol of the military.

The report comprises five chapters. Inchapter 1, the latest developments inBosnia are taken into account. In chapter2, the theoretical approach is set out withemphasis on the relationship between civiland military authorities according toHuntington�s theory. In chapter 3, it is

analysed to what extent there is a needfor changes in Bosnia�s officer corps, andin chapter 4, two suggestions on how toimplement the changes.

1. NATO�s role in Bosnia

Since 1995 NATO has had between12.000 and 60.000 troops stationed inBosnia-Herzegovina (in the remainder ofthe article Bosnia-Herzegovina will be re-ferred to as Bosnia only). These forces hadbeen the international community�s guar-antee for avoiding a repetition of the civilwar that in the beginning of the 1990�sled the country into chaos.

After 11 September 2001, NATO�s fo-cus is no longer on the Balkans but onthe international fight against terrorism.This is one of the reasons why NATO hasan interest to end � or at least to reduce �SFOR�s mission in Bosnia so the forcescan be used elsewhere and with otherobjectives. Winding up SFOR is also inline with the general aim of the interna-tional community to gradually hand overresponsibility for Bosnia�s fate to the

Bosnian people.3 However, no one be-lieves that NATO will leave the countryin the foreseeable future, and thereforethe question arises as to whether it is pos-sible that NATO�s involvement in Bosniacan take another form. The obvious an-swer would be Partnership for Peace (PfP)which has developed an even stronger rolewithin the activities of NATO.4

The purpose with the PfP is, amongother things, to increase the transparencyin national defence planning and budgets,to secure democratic control over thearmed forces and to develop the mem-bers� forces so that they can cooperate withNATO forces (for instance in peace sup-port operations). However, such coopera-tion is not possible at the moment sinceBosnia � together with Serbia andMontenegro5 - is the only country inEurope that is not a member of eitherthe PfP or NATO.6

So why is Bosnia not a member of thePfP? The answer to this question is partlyto be found in the country�s constitu-tion, which is a part of the Dayton agree-ment. The agreement�s distribution of

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competences between the entities and thegovernment meant that the entities wereentitled to � but not committed to - cre-ating their own military structures. Thismeans that since the end of the war Bosniahas had two ministries of defence andthree armed forces, which in relation tothe PfP is unacceptable for NATO. NATOonly wants to cooperate with militaryforces that are assigned to sovereign statesand not with different local military fac-tions. NATO�s Secretary General GeorgeRobertson has often said that the primarycondition for a Bosnian membership ofthe PfP is the establishment of one gov-ernmental ministry of defence and onecommon structure of command for thearmed forces in the country (NATO,2002a). The development towards this hasso far been slow but during the last yearpressure from the international society hasincreased.

Probably as an attempt to satisfy theinternational community, the Bosnianpresidency decided on 4 September 2002to reorganise and strengthen the Stand-ing Committee for Military Matters

(SCMM). Earlier SCMM consisted amongothers of the entities� defence ministersand chiefs of defence, but these are nowin a sub-committee. Today it is theBosnian presidency (one from each eth-nic group), the presidents of the two en-tities, Bosnia�s minister of finance, andthe chairman of the Bosnian council ofministers that are members of the com-mittee. With the increased decision-mak-ing powers in the SCMM the move canbe viewed as the first step towards a jointministry of defence. It is still uncertain,however, to what extent the three ethnicgroups really want this development sincethey have widely different interests thathave to be safeguarded in relation to apotential PfP-membership. Furthermoreit is difficult to get an overview of theinterests because the UN High Represen-tative (UNHR) and SFOR possess the realpower in the country. Statements fromthe Bosnian leaders have to be taken withcertain reservations. For instance the lead-ers will often protest against the UNHR�sdecisions although they actually agree.They do so because in that way they can

demonstrate courage to their respectiveethnic groups at the same time as unpopu-lar, but necessary, initiatives can be car-ried out. Moreover, there are reports say-ing that the ethnic groups unofficiallyhave asked the UNHR to force throughrequests while they officially dissociatethemselves from these requests. Con-versely, the extensive powers of theUNHR mean that the leaders at other timesexpress themselves more positively thanthey are in reality in order to avoid theUNHR setting them aside or even remov-ing them7 . In other cases the leaders seekconfrontation with the UNHR, which in1999 led to the UNHR removing the presi-dent of the Republika Srpska (RS), NikolaPoplasen (Chandler, 2000: 201)

From statements it can be noted thatrepresentatives from the Federation havenot said anything pronounced about theSCMM as a forerunner for a unified min-istry of defence. The Bosnian-Serbs in thebeginning expressed considerable scepti-cism towards the idea. Zivko Radisic �who at that time was the Bosnian-Serbianmember of the presidency � stated on 21

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August 2002 that if one defence ministrywas set up it would favour the Bosniacsand the Bosnian-Croats who preferred asingle state rather than two entities (RadioFree Europe, 2002a). The day after, theBosnian-Serbian president Mirko Sarovicfollowed up on this remark by stating thatBosnia ought to become a member of thePfP but that the RS rejected the idea of aunified ministry of defence (Radio FreeEurope, 2002b). Therefore some of theBosnian leaders� final goals are still thatthe RS can secede from the Federation andinstead be integrated with Serbia. Becauseof this they still fight against initiativesthat lead to the present autonomy of theRS being decreased.8 For example, priorto the election campaign in 1998 theBosnian-Serbian party SRS cooperated withits sister party in Serbia, a party that pub-lished the magazine �Greater Serbia�, whichwas distributed in all RS (OSCO, 1998).The question is if this resistance will bemaintained - two arguments favour a pos-sible change in the Bosnian-Serbian stance.

The Orao case

The situation changed after it was re-vealed � with huge media coverage � thatthe Bosnian-Serbs have secretly sold partsof weapons and provided services forSaddam Hussein�s regime in Iraq. It is,among others, Yugoslav dealers who havesold the materiel, and it includes a longlist of military equipment such as smallarms and aircrafts - also from the Oraofactory in the RS.

The interest from the internationalpress is probably due to the focus on apossible war against Iraq* but for Bosniathe case might have consequences forpeople who have not been removed fromtheir position (for example, the depos-ing of the Bosnian-Serbian defence min-ister and the chief of defence) (Radio FreeEurope, 2002d). Many observers in Bosniaare of the opinion that both the UNHRand SFOR will use the case as an exampleto demonstrate that at least the Bosnian-

Serbs have not managed to ensure satis-factory control over the military and itsauthorities. Therefore the case could beused to strengthen the government�s con-trol over the military, and it could be aforerunner for a governmental ministryof defence. Two facts, in particular, shouldbe taken into account.

Firstly, the case is very clear. The saleof weapons from Bosnia to Iraq is a vio-lation of the Dayton agreement whichcontains a passage saying that each weaponsale has to be approved by SFOR. More-over the sale is also against the UN-sanc-tioned embargo towards Iraq. In addition,the Bosnian-Serbs were also caught in theact and did not even try to conceal theirguilt.

Secondly, the time will come where theinternational community with the UNHRin the leading role will launch a plan tostrengthen Bosnia�s bid for the PfP. Theplan contains among other things an es-tablishment of the three �task forces� -each being led by different international

* At the time of writing this article the hostilities in Iraq had not broken out yet (editor�s note).

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institutions. Thus the UNHR will be re-sponsible for a task force concerning theestablishment of democratic control of thearmed forces. The OSCE will lead workto ensure transparent budgets and increas-ing economic control in the country, andSFOR will guarantee that uniform andNATO/PfP compatible doctrines and regu-lations are established for the armedforces. It could have been expected thatthe RS especially would resist - question-ing whether the Dayton agreement makesdefence matters a case for the entities. Butsince the Orao case has demonstrated thatthe government of the RS has not beenable to or wished to execute effective con-trol over the actions of the army, it hasbecome difficult for the RS to lay downarguments against the plan set forth bythe UNHR.

The chief of SFOR has furthermoredeclined a request from the RS that SFORshould lead the investigation with regardto the sales of the weapons. He said thatthe results from RS�s own investigationwill be checked, and only if SFOR is notsatisfied with the results, will it intervene

(Radio Free Europe, 2002e). In this waythe RS is pressured to carry out a thor-ough investigation, since SFOR has notlaid down criteria beforehand for the mea-sures that the RS has to take.

Economy

The other main argument for a pos-sible change of stance is the economicburden in relation to the maintenance ofthe three military structures in Bosnia9 .Because of the lack of transparency in thebudgets and the accounts, it is difficultto decide how much of the country�s GDPis actually spent on the armed forces. TheOSCE estimates that the figure is about8-10%. In comparison, Denmark spends1,4%, USA 3,1%, and the Czech Republic� a country that is restructuring fromWarsaw Pact standards to NATO standards- 2,2% (IISS, 2001: 19, 50-51). The vastexpenses for the armed forces seem to beout of proportion with needs, since thecountry in reality is under �protection�(or occupation) by SFOR. One can arguethat SFOR at some stage will be with-

drawn. However, even then it is difficultto see the need for an expensive territo-rial defence. It is only Croatia and Yugo-slavia that geographically and historicallycould appear as potential aggressorsagainst Bosnia. Croatia is, however, amember of the PfP, although Yugoslaviahas only just applied for membership. Be-sides, both countries have expressed thewish for future membership of the EU,previously hampered by the domestic re-sistance of the former nationalist leadersFranjo Tudjman in Croatia and SlobodanMilosevic in Yugoslavia10. Neither NATOnor the EU will accept aggression fromthe two countries against Bosnia therebyrisking a new outbreak of conflicts in theBalkans.

Of course, the three groups in Bosniarealise this, and the question is whetherthey do not primarily look at their mili-tary forces as protection against the otherentities.

Since economic assistance to Bosniacannot be continued infinitely the threeethnic groups seem to have realized thatthere is a need to reduce the expense of

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the military forces. So far some cuts havealready been made so that the armedforces in Bosnia were reduced from anestimated 430.000 in 1995 to about 34.000in 2001.11 It is also possible to make re-ductions by giving up some of the doublefunctions that exist today due to the two(three) military structures.

Areas such as management of the bud-get and administration of the infrastruc-ture could most likely be more cost effec-tive in a common structure. That is whyeconomic realities could push forward theidea of a unified ministry of defence inBosnia. An establishment that within theforeseeable future could lead to Bosnianmembership of the PfP.

2. The role of the military

Whereas most countries have singlemilitary with a monopoly on the legiti-mate use of force12, two defence minis-tries in Bosnia, three armies, and SFOR�spresence demand considerable resourcesand cause an untenable security architec-ture. Even though the armed forces have

been more than decimated from about430.000 men at the end of the war, themilitary�s role in society has still not beendefinitively clarified. If SFOR is going tobe withdrawn from Bosnia and replacedwith a PfP-cooperation, it has to be guar-anteed that a reliable civilian control overthe armed forces has been established. Howdo you secure civilian control over thearmed forces? In order to answer this ques-tion you have to define what civilian con-trol over the military forces is. In The Sol-dier and the State, Samuel Huntingtonequates civilian control over the militarywith minimizing military �power�, in otherwords the officer corps� ability to possessauthority and influence the society (Hun-tington, 1957: 80,86). Huntington describestwo principal forms regarding civilian con-trol of the armed forces: subjective andobjective control. Subjective control is anexpression of different civilian groups ex-erting direct influence on the decision-making process in the military. However,since different civilian groups have differ-ent interests � and thereby influence themilitary in different ways � control over

the military is dependent on which civil-ian group is most powerful.

Objective control is derived from aprofessionally based officer corps whichonly deals with military questions anddoes not have its own economic andpolitical interests.13 The aim of objec-tive control is to get the military to actunconditionally as a tool of the state (Hun-tington, 1957: 83). Subsequently it will beargued that a professionally based officercorps can play an important role in theestablishment of such a new state as Bosnia.Since the Second World War there has beena close connection between the politics andthe military in the former Yugoslavia. Aconnection that was clearly demonstratedin 1974, when the officer corps possessed10.8% of the seats in the central commit-tee of the Communist Party (Allcock, 2000:270,387). This inevitably influenced thestates that followed Yugoslavia�s dissolution.Since the start of the war there has been amix of military and political � primarilynationalistic � interests, and it has beendifficult to distinguish between politicaland military issues in Bosnia. Thus, if you

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apply Huntington�s terminology there hasbeen a form of subjective control over themilitary with the nationalists having thecontrol. But subjective control has, espe-cially in a country like Bosnia, had seriousdisadvantages.

Firstly, civilian control over the forcesresulted in several atrocities during thewar14, and, secondly, there have been sev-eral examples of corruption, misguidedcontrol of the economy and absence ofcooperation across ethnic borders.1 5 Sincesubjective control � seen from a democraticwestern stance � has not been effective inBosnia, it will be natural to consider theestablishment of objective control over themilitary. The problem is though, thatobjective control � besides a professionalofficer corps � requires that a state existsto which the officer corps can be loyal.This precondition is not present in Bosnia.The question is, if it ever will.

The Military as an Integrator

Huntington sees the state as the pre-condition for the establishment of a pro-

fessionally based officer corps. But, onthe other hand, how can the establishmentsupport the creation of a new state inBosnia? The main argument is that jointprofessionally based military in Bosniawill remove many of the concerns thatpeople in the West especially have forBosnia�s future after SFOR. Bosnian mili-tary that only obeys orders from a legallyelected government will decrease the riskof conflicts developing into war. Thus,in the long term, the military will workas an integrator in Bosnia instead of be-ing connected to the nationalist circles inthe three communities, as has been thecase so far.

Secondly, the military can work as aforerunner for other areas that could betransferred from the entities to the gov-ernmental level. The decentralized healthand social security system and the educa-tional system constitute � as the entities�military forces do � a heavy strain on theBosnian economy, and probably a con-siderable amount of money could be savedin these areas. So far the Bosnian-Serbsparticularly opposed a transfer of these

areas to the government, but a successfulintegration of the defence area will in-crease the chance of reducing the publicexpenses - also in other areas � in a coun-try that spends 64% of its GDP on thepublic sector (The World Bank, 2002a).

Professionalization of the military

So what is characteristic for a profes-sionally based military? According toHuntington it has two characteristics inparticular. Firstly, it is politically sterileand neutral to the extent that it only obeysorders from the government (Hunting-ton, 1957: 84). Secondly, it has a highprofessional standard. This combinationwill ensure that the military can solve itsprimary task: to protect the nation againstexternal threats. When it comes to gain-ing a high professional standard, this cantypically be achieved through developingeach officer�s skills with regard to carry-ing out still more complex military op-erations in line with their career ad-vancement. In this aspect, an officer canbe compared with a surgeon whose pro-

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fessional competence gradually increasesthrough his career. However it has becomemore difficult to achieve a high professionalstandard today, since the officer beyond hiscompetence as a warrior also has to attendto the role as a leader in peacetime. It can bedifficult to achieve professionalization whenit comes to political neutrality.

The military�s role as the society�s pro-tector can lead the officer corps to seeitself as serving their own understandingof national interests instead of serving thegovernment. Therefore it must be a re-quirement for professional military thatan attitude adaptation is made in orderto ensure real acceptance of a legitimategovernment�s right to define the inter-ests of the society.

Thus, a high professional standardcombined with political neutrality willonly be achieved through a goal-orientededucation and a change in attitude so thatone not only focuses on purely militaryconditions but also on the officer corps�attitude to the surrounding environment.Seen from the perspective of the objec-tive control of Bosnia�s armed forces the

education should be targeted at develop-ing the Bosnian officer corps to be

- skilful warriors who are capable ofplanning and carrying out effective � seenfrom the perspective of NATO � militaryoperations in the whole spectrum fromsupporting civilian society, participatingin peace support operations to partici-pating in war and

- democratic leaders who accept the le-gitimacy and authority that civilian soci-ety exercises over the military forces in ademocracy.

3. The two roles

Future military cooperation can thusfocus on the two roles that the officercorps can play in Bosnia (the role of thewarrior and the democratic leader). Thetwo roles will be elaborated below. There-after it will be discussed which problemssuch a process may face.

The Warrior

The role of the warrior is the tradi-tional function of an officer. At the same

time it is the role that justifies the officer�sduty as an independent profession. Hun-tington, for instance, writes: �It must beremembered that the peculiar skill of theofficer is the management of violence, notthe act of violence itself� (Huntington,1957: 13). To describe this role the focuswill be placed on three factors in the cycleof warfare: doctrine, technology, and or-ganization.16

Doctrines can shortly be described asthe thoughts behind military operations,and so far they have been aimed at tradi-tional territorial defence. Naturally, thishas partly stemmed from the Yugoslavexperiences from the Second World Warand partly from the civil war that shapedthe present Bosnia. From a PfP perspec-tive the Bosnian doctrines should be de-veloped in order to meet �softer� pur-poses since she does not face any directexternal threat. This could, for instance,be participation in international opera-tions and support to civilian society. Inthis way, the Bosnian military can beemployed in peace support operations andthereby contribute to creating security

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elsewhere in the world � and maybe gaina better understanding of the conflicts inBosnia. But the doctrines in the Bosnianarmies are very centralized. The army inthe RS is still marked by the doctrinesthat were applied in the former Yugoslavfederal army (JNA). Those were similar tothe doctrines in many of the former mem-bers of the Warsaw Pact and caused con-sequently the same weaknesses. The differ-ent services operate mainly independentlyand because of this the possibilities ofutilizing possible synergy-effects in the op-erations of common services are limited.Furthermore, a high degree of centraliza-tion means that each leader has the possi-bility to act autonomously to a certainextent. On a few occasions centralizationcan be appropriate but often an effectivedecision-making process is hindered be-cause information has to pass many lay-ers in the command structure before adecision can be taken. The decision canthus be seen as limiting the initiative andresponsibility of the younger officers, andthis is a problem in missions such as peacesupport operations. In a tense situation

it is the sense of occasion and the abilityto use your own judgement that are twoof the most important qualities. The prob-lem is also pervasive in the Federationsince many of the officers in the Federa-tion � especially the older ones � also re-ceived their military training in the JNA.However, the problem is alleviated a littleby the US-controlled �train and equip�programme which after the war intro-duced the Federation�s army to western �especially NATO � doctrines and formsof operations (Boucher, 2002). Due tothe war many � particularly Bosniacs �became officers without having any for-mal background in the military and there-fore they are not influenced to the sameextent by their time in the formerYugoslav army. It will probably be easierto influence those officers since they donot need to be �de-programmed� fromthe JNA thinking. In the technologicalarea there is a similar difference betweenthe RS and the Federation. The army inthe RS is still equipped with weapons fromthe JNA time, but they are outdated froma NATO perspective. It is not a vast prob-

lem concerning small arms but when itcomes to more complicated weapons theyare only interoperable to a small extentwith the weapon systems in NATO � andthat hampers PfP cooperation.

On the other hand, the Federation hasreceived a large number of American weap-ons including tanks, antitank missiles andM-16 riffles. They received the weaponsas a part of the �train and equipprogramme�(Jane�s, 2002). With regard tomateriel, the Federation is therefore bet-ter equipped to participate in future peacesupport operations but at the same timethe armament also reinforces the Bosnian-Serbian perception of a threat from theFederation�s army.

Both entities have vast stockpiles ofsmall arms. These are designated to mobi-lization units in case of a crisis, conflict,or war. But it can be disputed how neces-sary it is to retain these stockpiles. Thereductions of the armed forces that havealready been undertaken and the limitedexternal threat make territorial defenceunlikely. Therefore there is a possibilitythat the real purpose of these stocks is �to

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be ready� in case the conflicts betweenthe ethnic groups once again flare up, andit would probably suit the internationalcommunity if the weapon stocks are de-stroyed before SFOR leaves the countrydefinitively. Since the beginning of the1990s there has been a considerable illegalmarket for weapons, and therefore onecan argue that there is a danger that theweapons will be used to arm criminals andrebels, which of course does not help tostabilize the country. In worst case sce-nario the situation in Bosnia can developinto the same situation as was the case inAlbania after the �Pyramid Scandal� in1997 where people broke into stockpilesof weapons and stole hundreds of thou-sands of small arms weapons (Hansen andMetzch, 2002: 10). It not only destabilizedAlbania but also spread a huge amountof weapons to other unstable regions inthe Balkans such as Kosovo.

The organisation of the armed forcesin Bosnia still reflects the situation im-mediately after the war�s ending. Besidesthe aforementioned division of the armedforces between two entities, the Federa-

tion and the RS both employ a corpsstructure with four corps each. It is no-table that the structures have �survived�the intensive reductions in the armedforces in Bosnia: when one takes into ac-count that the total military force is go-ing to be reduced to about 13.200 (theFederation) and 6.600 (RS), the structuresseem to be out of proportion with therealities on the ground (Fitzgerald, 2001).As was also the case for the depots of weap-ons it is very likely that the structuresprimarily are kept as defence against theother ethnic groups. Thus, the two enti-ties have theoretically an opportunity tomobilize 250.000 men in total (IIIS, 2002:67). Besides establishing a governmentalministry of defence it is likely that it willbe necessary to break up the corps struc-tures in order to adjust the military struc-tures for the PfP membership.

To sum up, the Bosnian forces � espe-cially the Bosnian-Serbian force � facemany military challenges in relation toadjustment for PfP co-operation. Theadoption of and the adjustment to NATO/PfP doctrines ought to be combined with

the acquisition of weapon systems that arecompatible with NATO. In addition tothis, an attitudinal change of the former/present image of an enemy should resultin a break up of the existing corps struc-tures plus destruction of the depots ofsmall arms. In the case the weapons in thedepots are destroyed it will probably notbe possible to equip all 230.000 men inthe respective military structures� reserves.Therefore the internal threat connectedwith total mobilization will decrease con-siderably.

The Democrat

A democratic officer corps is a corpsthat accepts the authority and legitimacythat underlie civilian control over themilitary as an institution. It is both themost difficult role to define unambigu-ously and the most difficult to measure,but at the same time it is also the mostimportant military parameter for a futureBosnian PfP membership. The problemwith �democratization� of the officercorps is that it requires corresponding

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democratization concurrently taking placein the Bosnian society.

Huntington�s perception of the mili-tary that is isolated from civilian society(Huntington, 1957: 16) does not applyto Bosnia, where officers � as in Denmark� do not live in the barracks. The officersare thus a part of the civilian Bosniansociety, too. It is difficult to imagine thatthe officer can understand, accept andimplement democratic initiatives in hismilitary unit in the case where the rest ofthe society does not develop in the samedirection. This applies especially after awar - a period where the military�s rolechanges from being perhaps most impor-tant component of society to being inline with other public institutions. Be-low, three factors will be looked upon withregard to �democratization� of the officercorps.

Firstly, the officer corps has to exer-cise general respect for human rights. Thewar in Bosnia was marked by units beinginvolved in some of the most brutal out-rages against prisoners of war as well asagainst the civilian population. Some of

the outrages were committed by more orless self-appointed militias whose person-nel typically is no longer on active ser-vice in the Bosnian armed forces.

But other outrages � such as the massa-cres in Srebrenica � were allegedly com-mitted by regular army units which wereunder command at the time of the crime(Sell, 2002: 232). The International Crimi-nal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in theHague ought to be a visible proof thatcrimes of war are not accepted by inter-national community. It has therefore con-siderable significance when high-rankingofficers from one of the three ethnicgroups are convicted of war crimes � Gen-eral Radislav Krstic who was charged withbeing one of the leaders responsible forthe Srebrenica massacre (Guardian, 2001).However, the strongest signal will be sentif the two main suspects, the Bosnian-SerbsRadovan Karadizc and Radko Mladic areprosecuted in the Hague. This will indi-cate that in the long term no Bosnianwar criminals can escape prosecution. Itis also important that none of the ethnic

groups gets the impression that it is onlytheir country-men who are being pros-ecuted. Therefore it had an immense sym-bolic significance when the first trial forwar crimes committed against Serbs wasconcluded in November 199817. Similarly,it will be of vast significance if Croatiadecides to extradite General JankoBobetko18 .

Besides the deterrent effect that theInternational Tribunal has, it is also nec-essary to provide the officer corps withbasic education in the laws of war andinternational law in order to ensure demo-cratic development. The mentioned top-ics not only increase the officers� knowl-edge but also change the behaviour thatofficers show in the daily life. Thus, theteaching should not only be theoreticalbut also be a part of the daily service aswell as supplemented by exercises. It is cen-tral to the extent that it is possible forthe respective ethnic groups to work to-gether at different levels in the military.Thus procedures and rules must be estab-lished to ensure that promotions and ca-

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reer management are entirely based onprofessional qualifications and not onethnical affiliations.

Secondly, the Bosnian officer corpshas to be taught to manage. Even thoughthe expense of the military will properlydecrease in the future, the armed forceswill still be responsible for the employ-ment of vast resources. To avoid repeti-tion of the situation in March 2002,where representatives from the OSCE�smission in Bosnia had to put pressureon the RS�s government to limit defenceexpenses, it is necessary that the leadingofficials � both military as well as civil-ian � show responsibility toward the lim-ited resources in Bosnia (OSCE 2002a).This can be problematic. More than onesource in Bosnia mentioned that a no-ticeable �kleptocracy� exists where pow-erful persons misuse public funds fortheir own benefit.19 Corruption is there-fore considered as one of the main prob-lems in Bosnia. The World Bank made asurvey which documented that more thanhalf of the respondents (from the ethnicgroups) had the view that corruption is

widely spread (The World Bank, 2000).Another survey from July 2002 showedthat one fourth of the respondentswithin the last year bribed both a doc-tor and a policeman (Transparency In-ternational).

The OSCE has tightened up the re-quirements regarding transparent ac-counts due to the carelessness withtrusted funds but it is estimated thatmanagement of the resources will still beproblematic in the armed forces. Sinceofficers in general are badly paid (NATO,2001) it is difficult to imagine that theywill voluntarily give up the benefitswhich they traditionally have had unlesssuch a renunciation is followed by a simi-lar rise in salaries. The problem is thatrises in salary either require more re-sources � which is unrealistic in a pe-riod when the defence budget is goingto be reduced or a heavy reduction inthe number of officers, which of coursethe officers are not interested in either.Thus, since bigger increases in salariesare not realistic there is no big incite-ment to economic integrity. At the same

time, the older officer�s almost unre-stricted power over their subordinatesshould be limited. In the former membersof the Warsaw Pact � plus the former Yu-goslavia � the leaders could treat subordi-nates in the way they wanted, a problemthat still exists in Russia, for example. Thisis an impediment for the development ofresponsibility and initiative of the youngerofficers and at the same time it means thatcounselling and reporting is controlled bywhat you think that the chief would like tohear instead of what you think yourself.

Finally, the connection between themilitary and the nationalist parties shouldbe removed. Since the war, close ties haveexisted between the nationalists � on allthree sides � and the respective armedforces because nationalists as well as themilitary have seen themselves as protec-tors of their respective ethnic groups.Whereas such an association was naturalunder wartime conditions, it is, duringpeacetime, an impediment to effectivecontrol of the military. If the officer corpsis to be loyal towards the government itshould not at the same time have com-

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mitments towards various parties orgroups.

The question is how you break thebonds that among other things are cre-ated by war with great sacrifices such asthe Bosnian are. There is no clear-cut an-swer, but basically the self-perception ofthe officer corps needs to be changed sothat the officers no longer see themselvesas protectors of their own ethnic group.In the current situation the guarantee isgiven by SFOR but the officer corps ismore worried about the time after SFOR,where the security guarantees are unclear.It is therefore of utmost importance thatthe international community develops asecurity system which protects all ethnicgroups against military outrages. Thuscriteria should be made with regard toSFOR�s withdrawal for when and howNATO can intervene in Bosnia to pre-vent possible acts of war in the country.The end is, of course, that the inclusionin western structures will contribute tocreating an internal stability in the coun-try thus making NATO interventionneedless.

4. Socialization andintegration

A broad and intensive process of edu-cation can thus strengthen the integrationand democratization of the Bosnian mili-tary. In this process it is not enough toimprove the existing officer corps� knowl-edge concerning the issues discussed inchapter 3. In reality a change in thebehaviour has to be forced � a change ofthe skills and the stances that exist at themoment.

In connection with the Baltic states�preparation to join NATO a lot of initia-tives were taken in facilitating the pro-cess, a process that the Bosnian officercorps also faces. It is problematic though,to apply the experiences from the Balticstates because three important differencesseparate the two situations:

- The Baltic states really wanted PfPcooperation while Bosnia is more or lesspressured into the PfP.

- The Baltic states did not agree oneverything � and the projects were usedas a means to establish the national de-

fence structures - but they did not feelthe same hatred as certain elements in thethree ethnic groups in Bosnia do.

- The Baltic states had (or perceived)an external threat from Russia. In Bosniathe threat is instead internal.

The following paragraphs will focus ontwo initiatives that seem particularly in-teresting for Bosnia: a joint defence col-lege and a joint peace support force.

A Joint Defence College

Establishing a joint defence college inBosnia, similar to the Baltic Defence Col-lege (BALTDEFCOL) established in Tartuin Estonia, would promote some oppor-tunities to integrate the three ethnicgroups. Below, three possibilities will beunderlined.

Firstly, it will give the officers fromthe three groups an opportunity to makecontacts and friendships across ethnic af-filiations. Since classes and groups etc.would be mixed across ethnic affiliationthe students will quite quickly be depen-

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dent on each others� assistance and help.This can be encouraged by emphasizingproject-oriented education where no onecan gain success without everyone havingcontributed to some extent.

Secondly, similar education of a year�sduration can in reality change ways of think-ing, particularly among the younger offic-ers, if the officers are removed from theirrespective units. The students should beforced to be proactive and, among otherthings, be evaluated on their ability to takethe initiative. In this way they will be en-couraged to be critical and take part in dis-cussions, which will improve their abilityto formulate independent solutions to com-plex problems. Furthermore, they will learnthat one single solution to a military strate-gic problem does not exist. In the coun-tries that were members of the Warsaw Pactmathematical calculations were emphasized,and these calculations could determine fu-ture battles. This way of thinking is one ofthe first things that the BALTDEFCOL seeksto change. (Kværnø, 2003).

Thirdly, the officers who take a courseat the joint defence college should be re-

warded financially as well as in respect oftheir careers. In this way it becomes at-tractive to apply for the education, andthe best young officers are attracted toapply for the course.

However, there are also problems withsuch an establishment. If you strengthenthe younger officers� career it will unde-niably be at the expense of the elder of-ficers, who possess the most influentialpositions. Most likely they will � con-sciously as well as unconsciously � be inopposition to such a threat against theirown positions and argue that the youngofficers do not have an understanding ofthe war�s causes and consequences as theydo themselves.

At the same time there will be a lot ofpractical problems such as the geographi-cal position of the college and decisionsconcerning the distribution of the keypositions. Probably one will have to dis-tribute the most important posts betweengroups so that the interests of all groupswill be considered. Such a system alreadyexists in other places in the administra-tion in Bosnia. When it comes to the po-

sitioning of the college it will not be pos-sible to continuously change the positionsince a duplication of the facilities wouldbe impractical and economically unsuit-able. However, the college could be placedon �neutral ground� near one of the in-ternational organizations� establishmentsin the country such as the SFOR head-quarters.

In connection with the establishmentof such a college, Bosnia can learn fromthe experiences that the BALTDEFCOLhas had, for instance, with having experi-enced officers and instructors from theWest to introduce the officers from theBaltic states to western military ways ofthinking.20 In the same way, a joint de-fence college in Bosnia could be mannedby western instructors in the beginning,and thereafter the responsibility could begradually handed over to local officers asthey become educated. In this wayBosnian officers would be urged to in-volve themselves in the project, in con-trast to a situation where only foreignersrun the college. The BALTDEFCOL is fur-thermore already educating Bosnian of-

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ficers who could form the core staffing insuch a college. The advantage among otherthings is that the BALTDEFCOL has theexperience in educating officers who havea �Warsaw Pact way of thinking�.

A Joint Peace Support Force

To build up a joint Bosnian force thatcan be deployed on peace support opera-tions will have three advantages.

Firstly, it will help to integrate the dif-ferent Bosnian forces and thereby furthercontribute to the socialization of theseforces. Secondly, Bosnia will in this waycontribute in a positive way to maintain-ing international peace and security. Par-ticipation in peace support operations willalso give Bosnian officers the possibilityto experience other areas of conflict inthe world. This will give the officers an-other perspective on conflict resolution;a perspective that they might use to gaina more objective understanding of con-flict resolution in their own country.

At the end of 2002 Bosnian participa-tion in peace support operations was lim-

ited to the posting of the UN observersto the UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea)plus the preparation for posting observ-ers to the MONUC (Congo). It is posi-tive that there is an equal representationfrom each of the ethnic groups in thecountry. This indicates that the threemilitary groups actually are able to coop-erate.

One can argue though that it is a weaksign as it is only a few observes and all areposted as individuals, and therefore therehas not been a need for cooperation be-tween the ethnic groups. Normally, theobservers from the same country are sepa-rated to ensure multinationality in thearea, and therefore the officers only co-operate to a limited extent. Furthermore,personnel who are qualified for service asUN observers are perhaps not typical ofthe Bosnian military. Among other things,the requirement for English skills meansthat it will primarily be only younger andwell educated officers who will be em-ployed. According to representatives fromthe international society as well as the Fed-eration, young officers are more positive

towards cooperation across the entitiesthan older officers are, but individual ser-vice as an UN observer does not requirecooperation between the different ethni-cal groups.

It has thus been more difficult forBosnia to set up a real military unit thatcan be deployed on peace support opera-tions. The build up of a logistics com-pany with about 60 persons has been onits way for two years, and no unit hasbeen deployed yet. According to severalrepresentatives from international com-munity, the problems have mainly beenfocused on ethnical balance as to num-bers and on conditions concerning com-mand. The latter is made especially visibleas the unit will have an international chief,which can be interpreted as an expressionof the groups not wanting to be undercommand from one of the other groups.

With the UNMIBH (UN�s mission inBosnia-Herzegovina) as a mediator, an ac-ceptable structure for the organisation hasbeen found, and the need for such a unitin one of the UN peace support opera-tions is avaited (NATO, 2002b). The prob-

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lems with setting up the logistics com-pany might indicate the problems whichmight arise when the entities will be forcedto increase cooperation. The problems canbe expected to increase along with the de-mands for operational complexity wherethe establishment of a transport company,seen in a military context, can be said tobe at the easy end of the scale.

The deployment of the logistics unitwill contribute in a positive way to mak-ing the Bosnian military interoperablewith NATO�s forces and improving co-operation between the different militarystructures. It will thus support the devel-opment of one Bosnian military whensoldiers with different ethnic backgroundgain experience in practical cooperation.The project will also legitimize and makethe Bosnian effort in living up to theinternational obligations visible in thesame way that has been the case with theBaltic states� build up of the combinedBaltic battalion BALTBAT (Brett andMetzsch, 2002: 3). Additionally, the expe-riences from the BALTBAT shows that theadministration of the project helped the

Baltic states to establish new defence bu-reaucracies and encouraged the develop-ment of a culture of democratic controlwithin defence structures (Brett, 2001: 5).

Because of the experiences from theBaltic states it is worth underlining thetime perspective of the project. An im-portant element in the project is to en-sure that Bosnia, independently of part-ners, can take over all functions in thepeace support units and that the exper-tise will be transferred to the remainderof the Bosnian military. The equivalentprocess has shown to be prolonged inthe Baltic states, and there is no reasonto expect that it will be shorter in Bosniawhere the conflict of interests betweenthe different groups is more tense. Afurther development of the concept to-wards a build up of larger multiethnicentities will probably have a long termplanning timeframe.

5. Conclusion

It can be argued that the creation ofobjective control over the Bosnian armed

forces will contribute to stability in thecountry. The establishment of such con-trol is estimated to take place in the formof three initiatives.

Firstly, the existing military structuresshould be changed. The corps structureas well as the big weapon depots are esti-mated to be simply destabilising theBosnian society as they lack an externalthreat that justifies a mobilisation baseddefence role.

Secondly, smaller, but well educatedand well equipped units should be estab-lished. These units ought to be capable ofparticipating in peace support operationsand supporting civil society. The unitswill thus be able to make a positive con-tribution to NATO/PfP involvement inareas of conflict.

Finally, there ought to be establisheda joint defence college that can providethe Bosnian officers with a common pro-fessional frame of reference across ethnicaffiliation. By establishing a joint defencecollege and peace support units the expe-rience from the Baltic states will prob-ably be used. It will be beneficial to estab-

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lish cooperation between a joint Bosniandefence college and the BALTDEFCOL -a cooperation where the BALTDEFCOLcould function as a base of experience.

None of the above initiatives can be car-ried through either quickly or withoutproblems. Problems with doctrine, technol-ogy, organisation, education and other is-sues should be solved assuming that the willis there. With Croatia�s and Yugoslavia�s eyesfocused on the EU, one of the most consid-erable hindrances for integration in Bosniais reduced, namely support from the twocountries to their ethnic fellows.

The decisive factor is whether theyoung and progressive officers succeed intaking the leading posts in the armedforces. If not, the process of reform willbe particularly difficult.

One can make a comparison with thechicken and the egg: reforms will requirethat younger and dynamic officers takethe lead, but this is only possible whenthe process has already started. Thereforeit must be the international communityin Bosnia that acts as a promoter and cata-lyst for the process.

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1 We would like to thank the people who helpedus to compose this publication. This applies toall the employees at the Nytorv-department forthe Institute of International Studies (formerlyDUPI), particularly Kenneth Schmidt Hansen andMikkel Vedby Rasmussen for their advice andguidance. In relation with a study trip to Bosnia,we would like to thank Carsten Svensson andGeorg Güntelberg for invaluable and professionalassistance. We would also like to thank OleKværnø for a constructive and positive reviewreading as well as for input regarding the BalticDefence College. In addition to this, Bent Hansenhas done a tremendous work in proofreading.Also, we would like to thank Anni Kistensen forthe printing ect. All have contributed to improvethis paper. The responsibility for arguments andthe remaining mistakes and flaws is solely theresponsibility of the authors.

2 The concept �professionally based military�is applied as a term for an officer corps that hasa professional and social sense of responsibility.The term is not the same as �professional mili-tary� which just express that the military use per-manently employed personnel such as conscripts.

3 For instance, expressed by Lord PaddyAshdown, UN High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina in a speech to the Security Councilin UN 23/10 2002 (OHR, 2002).

4 In the Alliance�s strategic concept from 1999,PfP is thus one of the five core functions of NATO.

5 Yugoslavia has applied for a membership ofthe PfP on the 24th of April 2002 (Udenrigs-ministeriet, 2002).

6 Besides the microstates Andorra, Liechtenstein,San Marino, Monaco, the Holy See plus the is-lands of Malta and Cyprus.

7 This is the way that statements which are infavour of independence or territorial separationof the country or are referring to provinces assovereign territories as unconstitutional are lookedupon (Chandler, 2000: 120-21).

8 That some Serbs still sympathize with thosegoals the second round in the Serbian electioncampaign in September 2002 showed, where theYugoslav president Vojislav Kostunica during anelection meeting in the Serbian city Mali Zvornik� apparently to please the nationalistic voters �described the RS as a part of the family that wastemporarily separated from its Serbian mother-land. Subsequently members of the party ofKostunica defended the statement by saying thatthey did not view the statement as controversial

162

but rather as a goal that they strived for (RadioFree Europe, 2002c).

9 According to the OSCE Bosnia can only fi-nance the maintenance of about half of the presentforces (OSCE, 2002b).

10 The Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica andthe Croatian Prime Minister Ivica Raca stated inthe autumn 2000 that their states would apply formembership in the EU (BBC, 2000: Racan: 8-9).

11 In 2002 there have been made further reduc-tions cf. page 17 (OSCE, 2000b).

12 According to Weber, the modern state is anorganised power that within an area can claimmonopoly of the legitimate use of violence as apolitical means and therefore has gathered thematerial machinery in the leaders� hand (Weber1971: 8).

13 The article will only focus on the officer corpsand not on the non-commissioned officers and onprivates, because partly it is officers who take themost important decisions in the military, and partlyHuntington sees the privates and non-commissionedofficers as practitioners of violence and not as offic-ers who control violence (Huntington, 1957: 13).

14 The most mentioned of these is the massacrein Srebrenica, where Serbian militias attacked andkilled about 7000 Muslims in an area which wasunder the UN protection (BBC, 2000).

15 It is, among other things, claimed that it issome of the main problems for the implementa-tion of economic reforms in Bosnia (the WorldBank, 2002).

16 A model to describe the coherence betweenthe military organisation, technology (such as

weapons and materiel) plus the doctrines em-ployed. It is assumed that the circulation is dy-namic and therefore a change of one factor willcause changes of the other two as well (Nielsen,1986: 959).

17 Two Bosnian-Muslims and a Bosnian-Croatwere thus sentenced to many years of imprisonmentfor their role in a terror regime in the Celebici campin central Bosnia in 1992 (Ritzaus Bureau, 1998).

18 The now pensioned general was, during theYugoslav civil war, at the top of the Croatianmilitary command and is charged with havingcommitted war crimes against civilian Serbs inthe Krajina province in Croatia in September 1993(Guardian, 2002).

19 That is, among other things, the reason whymany initiatives have been taken to fight corrup-tion in Bosnia, such as the Stability Pact�s anticorruptions initiative. Latest, the Bosnian ministerfor foreign trade and economic relations AzraHadziahmetovic, together with the World Bankand the UNHR, introduced a plan for fightingcorruption involving the civilian Bosnian popula-tion (OECD, 2002).

20 The first officers were fully trained in 2002,and the College has been evaluated by the UKJoint Services Command and Staff College with apositive result (BALTDEFCOL, 2001).