The Fukushima Dai-ichiNuclear Catastrophe

— a personal & scientific evaluation —

Lothar M SchmittThe University of Aizu, AizuWakamatsu, 965-8580 Japan

Email: L@LMSchmitt.de

March 26, 2013

Sustainable Energy Lectures

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■ Invited Lecture in the course on Sustainable Energy■ Professor Dr. Damien Ernst■ University of Liege■ Systems and Modeling Research Unit

Tuesday, March 26, 2013, 9:30 a.m. (CET)

Part I — Human Failure

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Overview over the development of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NuclearCatastrophe and similar events.

■ Reasons for the Fukushima catastrophe:

◆ long series of human failures◆ very nature of human behavioural shortcomings (power, greed)◆ very nature of human societal structures (hierarchies, politics)

■ Reasons for other catastrophes:

◆ Three Miles Island: false operation of valves◆ Chernobyl: design of the moderator tip

■ Human behaviour cannot be excluded as an aggravating factor.

■ Technical, scientific specifications and necessities were overlooked,ignored, disabled or circumvented.

Part II — Consequences

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Discussion of consequences of the Fukushima events

■ Radiation and Decontamination

◆ Scope of the radiation and impossibility to remove it

■ Health Issues and other Human Suffering

◆ Cancer and radiation, psychological issues, relocation

■ Financial Burdens

◆ Decontamination and dismantling of the defunct NPP◆ Revitalization of the economy in affected regions

Part III — Personal Account■ Official Information vs. Reality

■ Living in Japan after the Catastrophe

■ Personal Pressures

Part I

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The History of the Fukushima NPP Accident

Earthquakes (EQs) in Japan

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■ Magnitudes of major EQs along the Pacific Rim where Japan lies:

◆ 1960 Vadivia, Chile 9.5 1964 Alaska, USA 9.2◆ 1952 Kamchatka, USSR 9.0 1700 J de Fuca Plate, Can/USA 8.7-9.2

■ Magnitudes of major EQs around Japan over her history (Pacific Rim):

◆ 869 Jogan Sanriku EQ 8.6 1498 Meio Nankaido EQ 8.6◆ 1707 Hoei EQ 8.6 1896 Meiji-Sanriku EQ 8.5

■ Comment from Politics & TV shortly after the 2011.3.11 mag 9.0 event:

”Nobody could have foreseen such a catastrophe.!”

■ Conclusion: Human ignorance, the unwillingness to do and acceptthorough research contributed to the Fukushima Dai-ichi NuclearCatastrophe in a major way.

Remark: Such EQs can occur close to any NPP in Japan. Combined with the(likely invisible) ageing and weakening of equipment and structure (alsothrough poor maintenance), the threat of massive EQs turns NPPs into

ticking time bombs.

The 2011.3.11 Great Tohoku Earthquake

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■ Scale of the 2011.3.11 mag 9.0 EQ:

◆ 5th largest EQ ever recorded.◆ Moved Honshu 4 m east.◆ Subsided the nearby coastline by 0.5 m.◆ Caused a devastating tsunami.◆ Many aftershocks (in particular, mag 7.9 aftershock the same day).

■ The Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP was cut off from the electric power grid.Thus, there was no emergency auxiliary electric power available forcooling and other operational tasks.

In the 2011 scenario, the fact that the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP was cut offfrom the power grid is a significant consequence of the magnitude 9.0 of theEQ itself whose

scale of destruction defies human planning ability.

Multi-failures of backup systems were thought to be impossible by planners.

An 2011.3.11 Aftershock Map

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Source: USGS. Red squares mean 3 larger earthquakes with the last hour.

Impact-Planning by TEPCO /1

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Impact-Planning by TEPCO for Earthquakes near Fukushima NPP.Reference: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Nuclear-Power-Plants-and-Earthquakes/#.UVPLFr84eMA

DesignBasisEQGroundMotionSs (acceleration) for Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP

■ 1967–71. Construction time estimate: 400 Gal (= 4m/sec2).■ 2008.3. TEPCO upgraded estimate to 600 Gal, NPP deemed safe.

◆ Corresponding to a mag 7.75 EQ underneath the NPP similar to the1994 mag 7.2 Kobe EQ underneath Kobe city.

■ 2011.3.11. The mag 9.0 Tohoku EQ yielded a maximum 550 Gal in thefoundation of Reactor 2 (Epicentre was relatively far away.)

Costly. Seemingly Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP had not been strengthenedafter 2008.3, in particular, since some people claim that a meltdown orsignificant damage in the first hour after the EQ happened in Reactor 1 beforethe tsunami arrived based upon TEPCO reports.References: [1] http://www.redicecreations.com/article.php?id=15412[2] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-witherspoon/a-lasting-legacy-of-

the b 2887464.html

Impact-Planning by TEPCO /2

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Impact-Planning by TEPCO for Earthquakes near Fukushima NPPReference: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Nuclear-Power-Plants-and-Earthquakes/#.UVPLFr84eMA

Design Basis EQ Ground Motion Ss for Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP

■ 1967–71. Construction time estimate: 400 Gal■ 2008.3. Upgraded estimate: 600 Gal.■ 2011.3.11. Great Tohoku EQ:

◆ On Fukushima NPP grounds: 550 Gal◆ BUT on sediments a few km north: ≈ 2000 Gal

Consequences for Nuclear ReactorsA massive EQ close to any NPP in Japan or elsewhere could easily exceeddesign specifications by a large margin. Such events are beyond humanestimates and planning ability. NPPs in EQ-zones need to be shut down.

Human Failures in Planning /1

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Human Failures in Planning for a Massive Earthquake.http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/24-hours-at-fukushima/0

■ 14:46. Mag 9.0 EQ occurs■ 14:52. Reactor 1’s emergency cooling system [isolation condenser (IC)],

capable of running without external power, turns on automatically.■ 15:03. Reactor 1’s IC is manually shut down. This is a by-the-book

decision based upon the fact that the cooling went too fast and put stresson the steel reactor vessel (SRV).

■ 15:46. A 14m tsunami overtops the seawall designed to protect the plantfrom a tsunami of 5.7m, flooding the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP anddisabling the backup diesel generators. With the loss of all electricalpower supply, the emergency cooling system IC cannot be turned onmanually (needs electricity).

Human deficient procedural planning aggravates the crisis significantly.

Human Failures in Planning /2

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Human Failures in Planning for a Massive Earthquake.http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/24-hours-at-fukushima/0

■ 14:46. Mag 9.0 EQ occurs.■ 15:46. A 14m tsunami overtops the seawall designed to protect the plant

from a tsunami of 5.7m, flooding the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP anddisabling the backup diesel generators.

■ TEPCO had a backup for the emergency generators: power supply trucksoutfitted with high-voltage dynamos. TEPCO’s Tokyo headquarters sent11 power supply trucks towards Fukushima Dai-ichi, 250 km away. Theygot stuck in traffic. The roads were clogged with residents fleeing thedisaster.

◆ How much do 11 power supply trucks with high-voltage dynamoscost.?11 trucks = USD 3 mill.–10 mill. (≈3-10 days worth of profit)

Human deficient planning (motivated by greed) aggravates the situation.

Big Tsunamis in Japan

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Magnitudes of tsunamis around Japan (Pacific Rim):

■ 869. Jogan Sanriku EQ, extensive flooding of the Sendai plain■ 1498. Meio Nankaido EQ, triggered a large tsunami■ 1771. Great Yaeyama Tsunami, 40m■ 1896. Meiji-Sanriku EQ, 25m (excluded from TEPCO’s analysis)■ 1933. Sanriku EQ, 28.7m (overlooked in TEPCO’s analysis)

Tsunami warnings carved in stone all along the Japan Pacific Coast.

”Do not build below this stone.!”

Photo: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/06/japan-tsunami-warnings-fr n 845818.html

Sanriku EQ Tsunami

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Destruction by Sanriku EQ Tsunami (Iwate Pref. Gov. (publ. 1933)).

Ignoring Tsunami History

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TEPCO’s Failure to recognize the history of tsunamis in Japan:

■ Height of recent tsunamis around Japan (Pacific Rim):

◆ 1896. Meiji-Sanriku EQ, 25m (excluded from TEPCO’s first analysis)◆ 1933. Sanriku EQ, 28.7m (overlooked in TEPCO’s first analysis)

■ TEPCO Analysis of the Tsunami Risk:

◆ 1970. TEPCO’s official tsunami height prediction set at 3.1m⇐

◆ 2002. TEPCO’s official tsunami height prediction set at 5.7m⇐

(based upon computer simulations.! of a source fault model)◆ 2008. TEPCO’s own research is published abroad and warns of

possibly ≈15m tsunamis. TEPCO rejects its own research officially forreason of assumptions which do not reflect an actual event.

■ Great Tohoku EQ of 2011.3.11:

◆ 2011. A 14m tsunami overtops the seawall designed to protect theplant from a tsunami of 5.7m.

Greed (cost savings) dominates reason. A human weakness.

Ignoring Construction Expertise

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TEPCO’s Failure to Recognize Construction Expertise

■ Newer NPPs: Emergency Diesel Generators at Tsunami-Proof Level highin the main reactor building.

■ Nobody at TEPCO goes back to the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP andcorrects the positioning of the emergency Diesel generators even thoughthe problem has, obviously, been recognised.

◆ How much does an adjacent building for positioning emergency Dieselgenerators at a higher level cost.?

◆ New Exterior Diesel Generator Building = USD 5 mill.–10 mill. perReactor (rough guess), max 40 days of profit for the entire NPP.

Greed (cost savings) dominates reason. A human weakness.

Reactor 1: Meltdown & Explosion

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■ 2011.3.11, 14:46, Fri. Mag 9.0 EQ occurs■ 2011.3.11, 15:46. Tsunami disables the backup diesel generators.■ 2011.3.11, 19:30. The fuel becomes fully exposed above the water

surface, fuel damage in the central core begins.■ 2011.3.12, 06:50, Sat. Core has completely melted and drops to the

bottom of the RPV.■ 2011.3.12, 15:36. Massive explosion in the outer structure of Reactor 1.

The concrete building surrounding the steel reactor vessel collapses as aresult of the explosion.

■ 14:46 → 06:50 = 16h. Complete Meltdown of Reactor 1. (fast)■ 14:46 → 15:36 = 25h. Explosion of Reactor 1. (fast)

Damage to Reactor 1 was most likely caused directly by the EQ not thetsunami (as outlined above in regard to ground acceleration). Thus, this fastmeltdown was likely unavoidable considering certain measures such as higherDiesel generators.Remark: 2011.3.11, Fri. The government maintained on TV, that the prime

minister flew per helicopter over the NPP and the NPP was safe.

Reactor 3: Meltdown & Explosions

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MOX-fuelled Reactor 3 (U/Pu-fuelled): Timing of Meltdown & Explosions.

■ 2011.3.11, 15:46, Fri. Tsunami disables the backup diesel generators.■ 2011.3.13, 02:42, Sun. High pressure coolant injection system stops. The

water level within the reactor starts falling.■ 2011.3.13, ≈ 07:00. Water level reaches top of the fuel.■ 2011.3.13, 09:00. Core damage starts.■ 2011.3.14, 11:01, Mon. Massive first explosion after 2d 19h in the outer

structure of Reactor 3. The concrete building surrounding the steelreactor vessel collapses as a result of the explosion.Re-criticality occurs: 2011.4.26: A. Gunderson, 2011.12: others.

■ 2011.3.14, 15:00. Major part of the fuel in Reactor 3 drops to bottom ofRPV.

■ 2011.3.15, 11:00, Tue. Second explosion in the outer structure of Reactor3. Wind blows inland

Remark: 2011.3.15, ≈noon, Tue. Prime Minister Kan declares on TV thatthere was concern and people should evacuate orderly.

Reactor 3: Re-criticality

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Re-criticality in MOX-fuelled Reactor 3 (Uranium/Plutonium-fuelled).

■ 2011.3.14, 11:01, Mon. Massive explosion in the outer structure ofReactor 3. Re-criticality occurs (a small nuclear explosion):

◆ 2011.4.26. A. Gunderson: http://vimeo.com/22865967

■ Note the fact and the way Gunderson was attacked for being ateacher and not a nuclear expert in various media, in particular, inpro-nuclear blogs. Actually, he is a nuclear engineer.

■ Plutonium (Pu) and other nuclear fission products were found faraway from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP indicating a heavyexplosion with high trajectory very different from the explosion inReactor 1.

◆ 2011.12.12. Confirmed: S. Fujiwara, Japanese engineer with JapanNuclear Energy Safety Organization, http://ex-skf.blogspot.com//2011/12/japanese-engineer-there-was-nuclear.html

◆ 2011.12.16. Confirmed, Cl-38: former Prime Minister Y. Hatoyama(Nature) http://ex-skf.blogspot.jp/2011/12/former-japanese-pm-hatoyama-fukushima.html

Reactor 2: Meltdown & Explosions

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■ 2011.3.11, 15:46, Fri. Tsunami disables the backup diesel generators.■ 2011.3.12, 10:58, Sat. Pressure in the containment of Reactor 2 still

remains too high. Venting radioactive vapour into the air.Major release of radiation in the environment and air.!(Release of more radiation than in previous explosions. Venting donethrough a high chimney between Reactors 1&2 which was later found tobe extremely contaminated. ≈10 Sv/h)

■ 2011.3.14, 13:15, Mon. Core isolation cooling system of Reactor 2 failsand water level within the reactor starts falling.

■ 2011.3.14, ≈18:00. Water level reaches the top of the fuel.■ 2011.3.14, 20:00. Core damage starts.■ 2011.3.15, 06:10, Tue. First explosion.■ 2011.3.15, ≈10:00. Second explosion.■ 2011.3.15, 20:00. Majority of the fuel drops to the bottom of RPV.

Remark: 2011.3.15, ≈noon, Tue. Prime Minister Kan declares on TV thatthere was concern and people should evacuate orderly.

Reactor 4: Explosion & Fires

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■ Reactor 4 was not in operation. No meltdown.■ 2011.3.15, 06:00, Tue. Explosion near Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). Possibly

hydrogen from Reactor 3.■ 2011.3.15, 09:40. Fire in SFP.■ 2011.3.15, 21:13. Evacuation of workers due to high radiation.■ 2011.3.16, 05:45, Wed. Fire in SFP found again.■ 2011.3.16, 06:15. Fire in SFP reported as out.■ 2011.3.16, 14:30. Water in SFP possibly boiling.

Concerns (then&now): Very Large Number of Fuel Rods in Spent Fuel Pool.

■ The Reactor 4 building is visibly very damaged and in a fragile state,down to the floor that holds the spent fuel pool.

■ Building is sinking.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/27/world/asia/concerns-grow-about-spent-fuel-rods-at-damaged-nuclear-plant-in-japan.html?pagewanted=all& r=0

Radiation Spikes /1

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Graph of Radiation Spikes vs. Reactor Explosions & Vapour Releases:(observe that many spikes of radiation releases correspond to venting)

Radiation Spikes /2

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According to http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/bild-751072-193266.html onehas the followingSignificant Peaks of Releases of Radiation(Measured at the main gate of the NPP complex. Up to 12 mSv/h.)

■ 2011.3.13, 09:20, Sun. Reactor 3, vapour release■ 2011.3.14, 20:35, Mon. Reactor 2, vapour release■ 2011.3.15, 06:10, Tue. Reactor 2, explosion■ 2011.3.15, ≈10:00. Reactor 2, explosion■ 2011.3.15, 06:00-11:16. Reactor 4, explosion & fire

Radiation Spikes /3

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Graph of Radiation Spikes vs. Reactor Explosions and Vapour Releases:(observe that many spikes of radiation releases correspond to venting)

Nuclear Releases and Weather

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■ 2011.3.13-15. Wind directions are towards the Pacific mostly (blowingtowards East). This protects Japan and, in particular, FukushimaPrefecture somewhat at the onset of the crisis.

■ 2011.3.15. Wind starts blowing South towards Tokyo.■ 2011.3.16. Wind turns slowly inland blowing West.■ Simulations (showing how much was deposited over the ocean):

◆ Nuclear dispersion over Japan and the Pacifichttp://www.irsn.fr/FR/popup/Pages/animation dispersion rejets19mars.aspx

◆ Nuclear radiation rate for a one-year-old childhttp://www.irsn.fr/FR/popup/Pages/animation doses corps entiers19mars.aspx

Three Miles Island & Chernobyl

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■ Three Miles Island (partial nuclear meltdown, 1979)

◆ Wrongful closure of valves was a violation of a rule, according towhich the reactor must be shut down, if all auxiliary feed pumps areclosed for maintenance.

◆ One catastrophic human maintenance mistake.

■ Chernobyl (full nuclear meltdown and reactor fire, 1986)

◆ The chief reasons for the accident lie in the peculiarities of physicsand in the construction of the reactor.

◆ One catastrophic human engineering mistake.(design of the control rods)

Summary for Part I

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Most of the disaster at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP was man-made. Alsoaccording to recent government-appointed panels and committees.

■ Incompetent plant design (tsunami height, EQ-resistance).■ Incompetent planning for emergencies (diesel generators, trucks and

procedures). Denial that multi-failure could occur at all.■ Greed in letting such an old plant operate with a second 10-year license

extension (40+10+10), and allowing MOX-fuel (U/Pu mix) to be used.■ Lax supervision by the government. The ministry for the control of the

nuclear industry was the same to promote it.

Part II

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Consequences of the Fukushima NPP Accident

Radiation Spikes in Fukushima Pref

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Radiation Spikes at different Locations/Times in Fukushima Prefecture.

Estimate Dosages 2011.3.30 – 2011.4.3

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Contamination around Fukushima NPP during 2011March 30 – 2011April 3.Definition: 1 Rem=0.01 Sv ⇒ Orange region:2.5 mRem/h = 6 chest X-rays/d = 25 µSv/h = 219 mSv/y = 0.219 Sv/y

Estimate Dosages First Year

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Estimate Radiation Dosages for 2011-2 around the Fukushima NPP.Definition: 1 Rem=0.01 Sv ⇒ Red region: 2000mRem=2Rem=20mSv.Maximal allowable dose/year for nuclear workers in Germany: 100mSv/5y

Fukushima vs. Chernobyl

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Nuclear Releases Fukushima vs. Chernobyl according to Scientific American(Nature):http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=fukushima-nuclear-planet-released-more-radiation-government-said

■ Xenon-133. (half-life 9.2h). Not absorbed in the body.

◆ Fukushima: 1.71019 Bq. Chernobyl: 1.41019 Bq.

■ Iodine-131. (half-life 8d). Accumulates in the thyroid.

◆ Fukushima: 1.51017 Bq. Chernobyl: 1.751018 Bq.◆ Many thyroid cancers around Chernobyl (Ukraine, Belarus, Poland).

■ Caesium-137. (half-life 30.17 y). Accumulates in the body like potassium.

◆ Fukushima: 3.51016 Bq (2× official gov. fig.) ≈3kg.Chernobyl: 8.51016 Bq.

■ Caesium-134. (half-life 2.07 y). Accumulates in the body like potassium.

◆ approx. same amounts released as Caesium-137.

Some sources say for amount of radiation Fukushima=Chernobyl.

Radiation Release: Fukushima

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■ Xenon-133. 1.71019 Bq. (half-life 9.2h). Not absorbed in the body.■ Iodine-131. 1.51017 Bq. (half-life 8.02d). Accumulates in the thyroid.■ Caesium-137. 3.51016 Bq, ≈3kg. (half-life 30.17y). Accumulates in the

body like potassium.■ Caesium-134 Likely similar amount released. (half-life 2.07y).■ Tellurium-129m. Max. 2.66 106 Bq/m2 (half-life 30.17d).■ Strontium-90. Max. 195 Bq/kg (half-life 28.90y). Accumulates in bones.

Roof of building in Yokohama; officially unclear origin.■ Plutonium-239/240. Pu-239 (half-life 24,200y) + Pu-240 (half-life

6,500y). Very toxic metal & dangerous alpha-ray emitter.

◆ 15 Bq/m2 in Fukushima Prefecture◆ 9.4 Bq/m2 in Ibaraki Prefecture◆ Global average in [0.4,3.7] Bq/m2.

Nobody searches for α-ray emitters like Plutonium-239/240. What ismeasured is usually γ-rays. The areas around the public dosimeters areparticularly cleaned (to lower the count). Some have/had the transformermounted inside in such a way that it blocks radiation.

Contamination in Wider Area

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Example Contamination Rates in mcSv/h: (safecast, http://blog.safecast.org;own measurements)

■ AizuWakamatsu City. 0.2 µSv/h = 1.75 mSv/y (normal)■ Tokyo/Matsudo. 0.3 µSv/h = 2.63 mSv/y (normal)■ Koriyama City. 0.6 µSv/h = 5.26 mSv/y (medium)■ Fukushima City. 0.7 µSv/h = 6.13 mSv/y (medium)■ Near Mt. Hiyama. 10.0 µSv/h = 87.60 mSv/y (dangerous)

Line: Dai-ichi-NPP ↔ Fukushima City; outside evacuation zone.

The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommendslimiting artificial irradiation of the public to an average of 1 mSv/y (0.001 Sv)of effective dose per year. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sievert)

LNT Relation to Cancer

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Scientific Evidence for the Linear No-Treshold Relation for Radiation vs.Cancer. This is the likeliest and simplest model, not a treshhold model nor areverse-effect ”little radiation is good for you”:Probability of cancer is proportional to received radiation dose in a collectionof tissue (over one or many humans).

■ R Muller. The Panic Over Fukushima. (a pro-NPP essay). http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444772404577589270444059332.html

■ K Ozasa, Y Shimizu, A Suyama, F Kasagi, M Soda, E J Grant, R Sakata,H Sugiyama, and K Kodama (2012) Studies of the Mortality of AtomicBomb Survivors, Report 14, 1950-2003: An Overview of Cancer andNoncancer Diseases. Radiation Research: Mar 2012, Vol. 177, No. 3, pp.229-243. http://ex-skf.blogspot.jp/2012/05/radiation-effects-research-foundations.html

■ K-H Do. The health effects of low-dose radiation exposure. J Korean MedAssoc. 2011 Dec;54(12):1253-1261. http://www.jkma.org/search.php?where=aview&id=10.5124/jkma.2011.54.12.1253&code=0119JKMA&vmode=PUBREADER

Health Consequences /1

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■ Example: Computation for Koriyama City

◆ Based upon the Accumulative Linear No-Treshold Model◆ Fact: 100 mSv gives a person a 1% (increased) chance of cancer.◆ ⇒ 50 mSv gives a person a 0.5% (increased) chance of cancer.◆ ⇒ 50 mSv causes additional cancers in 0.5% of the population.◆ Koriyama City: 350,000 inhabitants, 0.5%=1,750◆ Current Radiation Level: 0.6 µSv/h = 5.26 mSv/y◆ Assume: current rate is caused by 50% Cs-137 (half-life 30.17y)◆ Dose assuming exponential decay with hl = 30.17y after 30y:

>57 mSv ⇒ >1,750 cancer patients ≈ 500 deaths

■ Similarly: Fukushima City: 290,000 inhabitants, 6.13 mSv/y■ Consequence (according to this model):

Several thousands cancer deaths in Fukushima Prefecture.

Remark: Chernobyl caused approx. 800 deaths in Germany according to anexpert who gave a presentation in the German Embassy in Tokyo.

Health Consequences /2

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■ Suicides

◆ A resident of Namie-machi committed suicide by stabbing hisstomach with a kitchen knife to protest against nuclear power plant.(radiation level ≈200 mSv/y)

◆ A vegetable farmer hanged himself in the morning of 2011.3.24 inSukagawa City. It was one day after the government issued a ”intakerestriction” on some of the vegetables grown in Fukushima.

◆ Few others....

■ Other ailments due to stress occur too.

◆ Increased rate of death among hospitalised people due to evacuation(short term effect).

◆ Increased rate of death among elderly people (long term effect).

Decontamination

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■ High Costs. Estimate to decontaminate the City of Minami-Soma:

◆ 46,000 buildings (estimating USD 7,000 for a small family house).◆ USD 525 mill. using government-approved low estimates.◆ Half a billion dollars for one medium-size town.

■ Technical Difficulties. Cesium attaches very well to stone, concrete orasphalt surfaces (somewhat mechanically). Many such areas would haveto be scratched off one cm deep to remove the cesium contamination.

■ Technical Difficulties. Decontaminating the mountainous forests seemsimpossible.

■ Legal and Organisatorial Difficulties. Radioactive rubble resulting fromdecontamination has to be stored.

◆ It was reported that some radioactive material which was collectedduring decontamination efforts was simply dumped into local rivers oroff the road.

Remark: Since recently, zones with ≤20mSv/y are not exclusion zonesanymore but considered habitable. This is the rate for adult nuclear workers

in the nuclear industry in Germany (not children).

Economic Costs /1

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Economic Costs for Local Industries.

■ Fukushima Economy

◆ Coastal Areas: fishing and seafood (already contaminated).The nuclear crisis starting 2011.3.11 released the greatest among ofradioactivity into the ocean ever.

◆ Inland regions: agriculture (restricted).Before 2011.3.11: 20.6% of Japan’s peaches, 8.7% of cucumbers.

◆ Verification of radiation standards: requires significant resources notonly in Fukushima. However, people do not buy Fukushima produce.

■ Japan’s Tourism Industries

◆ Travellers stay away from Japan, in particular, Tohoku. (≈ −25%)

Remark: Only 132 food items were ever tested. 34 will be exempt soonincluding peaches, apples, and pears. http://ex-skf.blogspot.jp/2013/03/radioactive-japan-number-of-food-items.html.

Economic Costs /2

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Economic Costs related to the NPP

■ TEPCO Bailout

◆ TEPCO was bankrupt and was bailed out by the government attaxpayer’s expense for USD 10 billion.

◆ Public employees’ salaries are reduced in Fukushima.

■ Decontamination Costs (outlined above)■ Decommissioning the Fukushima Dai-Ichi NPP

◆ Three mile island: 14 years; 91t of fuel removed (intact building)◆ Chernobyl: after 25 years needs a second sarcophagus; 180t of fuel

which could not be removed.◆ Fukushima: 50 years for ≈350t of melted fuel in the 4 damaged

reactors.? According to TEPCO, the fuel sits deep in the concrete ofthe reactor bottoms. Equipment for cleaning does not yet exist.

■ Long-term Inhabitable 400km2 Zone around the Dai-Ichi NPP

◆ 604 years waiting time reduces Cs-137 by a factor 1,048,576 (gone).

Summary for Part II

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The disaster at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP has caused a huge toll for Japan.

■ Financial Burdens

◆ TEPCO’s bailout.◆ Economic Compensation for Fukushima and Lost Business.◆ Revitalising Fukushima.◆ Nuclear Decontamination of the NPP and the surrounding region.

■ Human Suffering

◆ Stressful Relocations for 100,000s. Discrimination.◆ Financial Hardship.◆ Deseases (e.g., cancer, but also psychological)

Part III

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Personal Account

Official Information vs. Reality /1

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■ Government Stance

◆ The Japanese government maintained at the beginning of the crisisthat the ”reactors are safe”.

◆ After it was undeniable that some nuclear accident had happened, theJapanese government spoke of ”partial meltdown” for a prolongedperiod of time.

■ Reality

◆ As outlined about, nuclear meltdown had completed within 15 hoursof the earthquake.

◆ It was known to the Japanese government experts that a full nuclearmeltdown had happened. Prime minister Kan actually feared that 1/3of Japan including Tokyo may be lost.

Official Information vs. Reality /2

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■ Government Stance

◆ The Japanese government ordered evacuations based on an ad-hocdefined small radius around the NPP which was later enlarged.

◆ The Japanese government produced experts on TV who assured thepublic that the ”crisis will be over soon by ‘covering-up’ the reactors”.

■ Reality

◆ Foreign governments urged their citizens to leave most of the Tohokuarea early on in the crisis and some even organised transportation.

◆ The Japanese government ignored the results of its own radiationdistribution simulation system (SPEEDI). In fact, evacuees wereplaced in harms way by relocation (i.e., they were placed in thepathway of the radioactive winds blowing from the NPP.

◆ It was and is ignored that the contamination near the NPP is massiveand will not be removed in the foreseeable future. In particular, theReactor 4 building (sinking) and its fuel pool with a massive amountof fuel rods are not safe in regard to a massive aftershock. Many mag6 aftershocks have already occurred near the defunct NPP.

Official Information vs. Reality /3

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■ Discussion of Nuclear Issues

◆ The major media (TV, newspapers) discuss the Fukushima nuclearcatastrophe with decreasing frequency. However, significant eventsare reported, for example:

■ The publication of an independent government panel that blamedthe events almost entirely on human failure, or

■ The fact that the cooling system for Reactor 4’s spent fuel poolstopped for approximately half a day due to an electric shortcutcaused by a rat.

◆ Statements that question the official narrative that ”everything issafe” are constantly labelled as ”harmful rumours”. The pressure notto mention harmful rumours is also felt at the workplace in theuniversity by this author. Even measuring radiation levels is seen asbeing offensive as it could start a harmful rumour.

■ Accessing Information via the Internet

◆ The internet is a preferred source of information where credibleorganisations such as ”Safecast” make their results available.

Radioactivity near Home /1

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The following shows a sandy spot on the parking lot of my home (apartmentbuilding) with 1 µSv/h radiation (confirmed with a professional Geigercounter). One instructs children to carefully walk around it all the time.

Radioactivity near Home /2

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■ Playgrounds: One needs to select playgrounds with care. Some have lowradiation on the ground (0.2µSv/h) in Aizuwakamatsu. Some have higherradiation (0.4µSv/h).

■ Sandy Schoolgrounds: Parents need to restrict outdoor play (0.39µSv/h).■ Certain Places East are tabu for family visits on weekends from

Aizuwakamatsu (e.g., Koriyama city, 0.6µSv/h and higher).In fact, many people in Fukushima prefecture have bought or rentedhousing in Aizuwakamatsu (0.1-0.4µSv/h mostly), and the breadwinnerworks East of Aizu, e.g., in Koriyama or Fukushima City.

■ Children consume non-Fukushima produce (milk and vegetables).■ Sushi restaurants are tabu, since the origin of the fish is never clear.

Heavily contaminated fish have been found. And fish can migrate tocoasts of other prefectures.

■ Drinking-water is specially filtered to reduce (mostly) caesium intake.

SUMMARY /1

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Nuclear Power Is Not Sustainable

■ Human Shortcomings

◆ Human planning/work/maintenance and its shortcomings is thegreatest risk for nuclear power plants, no matter how careful NPPsare initially designed and built.

◆ Humans perform greedy or lazy shortcuts for money and power. Thisis human nature and cannot be avoided.

◆ Humans lack the ability of consistent planning for hyper-complexsystems such as NPPs (or, e.g., the space shuttle including itsmanagement).

◆ Events leading to the 2011.3.11 nuclear catastrophe (mag 9.0earthquake and tsunami) were predictable.

■ No Solution exists for deposing of nuclear waste. Storing nuclear waste forlong periods of time is very expensive.

SUMMARY /2

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■ Finances

◆ Including the costs for repair and cleanup and final deposit of nuclearwaste, nuclear power is very expensive and not a for-profit enterprise.Whole countries are at risk being lost by nuclear accidents of majorscale.

◆ The nuclear industry, however, seems to act under the principle thatthe regular profit goes to shareholders while the bailout is supportedby the taxpayers and customers.

■ Human Hardship

◆ Operating nuclear power plants requires a relatively secured andpoliced society. Nuclear fuel needs to be stored and transported in avery secured and policed way.

◆ In case of an accident, humans suffer tremendous hardship:relocation, loss of work, loss of family, serious damage to physical andmental health and financial woes.

Ende

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Merci Beaucoup.! Hartelijk Dank.!