the free aceh movement (gam): anatomy of a separatist organization by kirsten e. schulze

8/7/2019 The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization by Kirsten E. Schulze

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Policy

The Free Aceh Move

(GAM): Anatom

Separatist Organ

Kirsten



ConList of Acronyms

Executive Summary

Indtroduction

GAM: A Short History

Ideology and Aims

Organizational Structure

The Growth of GAM: Territory and Membership

Factionalization and Splinter Groups



List of AcroAGAM Angkatan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (

Free Aceh Movement); renamed TN

ASNLF Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation F

commonly known as GAM

Brimob Brigade Mobil; paramilitary mobile

COHA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement;

December 9, 2002; collapsed on M

DOM Daerah Operasi Militer (Military O

not a legal status

EMOI ExxonMobil Oil Indonesia

FARMIDIA Aceh Student Front for Reform



vi Kirsten E. Schulze

JSC Joint Security Committee

Kodam Kommando Daerah Militer (RegCommand); part of Indonesia's

Kopassus Kommando Pasukan Khusus (A

MP-GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Majles

Aceh Movement Government C

group from GAM established d

based in Europe and Malaysia; nsupport base on the ground

NAD Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam; off

province of Aceh since the 200

legislation came into force; also

special autonomy package as a says it rejects NAD it is not ref

but autonomy)

NKRI Negara Kesatuan Republik Indo

of the Republic of Indonesia)

OCHA United Nations Office for the C

Humanitarian Aid

Opslihkam Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan; s

operation launched in May 200

Presidential Instruction 4 issued

OXFAM British humanitarian aid organiz

Pemda Pemerintahan Daerah (regional gPolri Polisi Republik Indonesia (Indon

Police); until 1999 part of Angk

Republic Indonesia (ABRI)



Executive SumThe province of Aceh is located on the northern tip

Sumatra in the Indonesian archipelago. Since 1976 it has

conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GerakanGAM), which is seeking to establish an independen

Indonesian security forces seeking to crush this bid. At

conflict are center/periphery relations and profound Ac

from Jakarta. These problems date back to promises ma

first president, Sukarno, to give Aceh special status in r

contribution to the struggle for Indonesian independenwere broken almost immediately. Acehnese efforts to

strong regional and ethnic identity—derived from Aceh'

to Islam and its history of having been an independent s



viii Kirsten E. Schulze

understanding of its history, motivations, and orga

Consequently this paper analyzes GAM's ideology,ture, recruitment, financing, weapons procurement,

Further, it discusses the inspiration GAM has draw

successful struggle for independence—with respect

negotiations as well as its broad political-military st

explain the dynamics and ultimately the collapse

between GAM and the Indonesian government.Although this paper looks at the history and evo

1976, the primary focus is on the recent past. The fa

allowed the Indonesian government to explore aven

to resolve the Aceh conflict but also presented GAM

ty to modify its strategy and transform itself into

movement. In fact, since 1998 the Aceh conflict h

poses a more serious challenge to the Indonesian

have been able to increase their active membership f

their traditional stronghold areas into the rest of A

control between 70 and 80 percent of the province

ernment through their shadow civil service structufrom a small, armed organization with an intellec

popular resistance movement.

This transformation of GAM was the result of t

the impact of Indonesia's counterinsurgency oper

1998 (conventionally, albeit incorrectly, referred to as

zone); second, Jakarta's failure to ensure the imple

autonomy since January 2002 (coupled with the in

ruption of the provincial government); and third, th

ed by the peace process from January 2000 to May 20



The Free Aceh Movem

of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) enabled GAM to int

of organizational changes, recruit, train, and rearm, all o

ened its military capacity.

The key to understanding GAM in the post-Suh

movement's decisions, maneuvers, and statements durin

of intermittent dialogue can be found in the exiled leade

internationalization. Above all, this strategy shows tha

negotiations were not a way to find common ground wmeans to compel the international community to pres

ceding independence. For GAM the dialogue was abo

attention and support from the United States, the United

European Union. Alongside deep-seated suspicion of I

tions and cease-fire violations by both sides, which crea

dynamic on the ground, this strategy of internationaliza

GAM did not opt for a symbolic act of disarmament du

period and why it did not embrace regional autonomy ta

increased both its membership and its arsenal during ea

used every opportunity to tell the people of Aceh that in

imminent. Further underscored by the exiled leadersIndonesia is a failed state about to implode, internatio

long way toward explaining why GAM refused to accep

refused to lay down its arms. This, among other issues,

process to collapse on May 18, 2003.



The Free Aceh Mov

(GAM): Anatom

Separatist Organ

The province of Aceh, which today has a population o

located on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra. W

part of the Republic of Indonesia since its inception, Aapart from the rest of the country by its strict adherence

tory of having been an independent sultanate until the D

1873, and a strong Acehnese regional, ethnic, and arguab

tity. Acehnese efforts to safeguard this identity sat at odd

government's policies from the beginning. They present

the "secular" Indonesian nation-building project under P(1945-67) and an obstacle to the highly centralized deve

ology of President Suharto (1965-98). As a result, Aceh

have been fraught with tension throughout most of Indo



2 Kirsten E. Schulze

ed agreement that conferred upon Aceh special stat

This status gave the province autonomy in matters o

law (adat ), and education. The second insurgency,

the establishment of the Free Aceh Movement (Ger

GAM) under the leadership of Hasan di Tiro. Like t

lion, it was triggered by unhappy center/periphery r

removal of special status in all but name. But unlike

ed to transform all Indonesia into an Islamic state rait, di Tiro sought Acehnese independence.

This paper looks at the conflict since 1976—s

insurgent movement—and presents a detailed ideo

tional map of this Acehnese national liberation m

increase our understanding of its history, motivation

dynamics. Consequently this paper analyzes GAM's

nal structure, recruitment, financing, weapons procu

capacity. Further, it discusses the inspiration GAM

Timor's successful struggle for independence—with

toward the negotiations as well as its broad politic

and seeks to explain the dynamics and ultimately theprocess between GAM and the Indonesian governm

Although this paper looks at the history and evo

1976, the primary focus is on the recent past. The fa

allowed the Indonesian government to explore avenu

resolve the Aceh conflict but also presented GAM wi

modify its strategy and transform itself into a genu

ment. In fact, since 1998 the Aceh conflict has escala

ever greater challenge to the Indonesian state. By Ma

had increased their active membership fivefold, exp



The Free Aceh Movem

ruption of the provincial government); and third, the op

ed by the peace process from January 2000 to May 2003.

tors created powerful motives for the Acehnese populatio

together they combined the desire to extract revenge fo

the security forces with the alienation caused by the la

change in the everyday life of the average Acehnese des

decentralization and democratization. The third factor

for GAM to broaden its strategy of guerrilla warfare oinclude political elements—most importantly internatio

provided GAM with legitimacy and a platform from w

independence. And finally, the absence of Indonesian

during the 2000-2001 Humanitarian Pause and the 2002

of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) enabled GAM to int

of organizational changes, recruit, train, and rearm, all o

ened its military capacity.

The key to understanding GAM in the post-Suh

movement's decisions, maneuvers, and statements durin

of intermittent dialogue can be found in the exiled leade

internationalization. Above all, this strategy shows thanegotiations were not a way to find common ground w

means to compel the international community to pres

ceding independence. For GAM the dialogue was abo

attention and support from the United States, the United

European Union. Alongside deep-seated suspicion of I

tions and cease-fire violations by both sides, which crea

dynamic on the ground, this strategy of internationaliza

GAM did not opt for a symbolic act of disarmament du

phase and why it did not embrace regional autonomy ta




GAM: A Short History

In October 1976, GAM was established as the AcLiberation Front (ASNLF) by Hasan di Tiro, descen

Acehnese ulama family of Muslim clergy and grand

di Tiro, hero of the anticolonial struggle against th

until October 1976, Hasan di Tiro resided in the U

student and then as a businessman. In fact, di Tiro

Indonesian delegation to the United Nations in New

Islam rebellion erupted in 1953 and di Tiro decid

Beureueh. In 1976, he returned to Aceh in ord

believed was his family's historical obligation—

Acehnese independence.1

Since GAM's establishment, the conflict in Acehdistinct phases. During the first phase, from 1976 t

small, tightly knit, ideologi

tion of 70 men led by a we

prising doctors, engineers,

nessmen. By the end of 19

terinsurgency operations hGAM. Its leaders were eit

oned, or dead; its follower

pushed underground.

In 1989, after hundreds of its guerrillas had u

Libya since 1986, GAM started to reemerge in Acehits command structures in Greater Aceh, Pidie, North

(Barber 2000: 30-31), and the "Libyan graduates" tr

guerrillas on the ground. In 1990 Indonesia launc

(R d N ) i i d l i

Since GAM's establish-

ment, the conflict in

Aceh has undergone

three distinct phases.




Ideology and Aims

GAM's ideology is one of national liberation aimed "all political control of the foreign regime of JakaGAM sees its struggle as the continuation of the antierupted in response to the 1873 Dutch invasion andtion of the sovereign Sultanate of Aceh. Contrary historiography, GAM maintains that Aceh did no

Republic of Indonesia in 1945 but was incorporatedsoning is twofold. First, Aceh was an internationally ent state as exemplified by the 1819 treaty between tthe United Kingdom of Great Britain and IrelandDutch Treaty. Sovereignty should therefore have bSultanate of Aceh rather than the Republic of Indo11). Accordingly di Tiro (1995: 2) argues that:

Aceh has nothing to do with Javanese "Indonesia." T

declared war against the Kingdom of Aceh, not again

which did not exist in 1873; and "Indonesia" still di

the Netherlands was defeated and withdrew from Ac

1942. And when the Netherlands illegally transferred"Indonesia" on December 27, 1949 she had no prese

Second, the people of Aceh were not consulted onAceh into Indonesia and thus their right to self-deteed (di Tiro 1995: 12-13). These premises are reflect

ration of independence on December 4, 1976, whthe transfer of sovereignty "by the old, Dutch colJavanese colonialists" (ASNLF 1976).

GAM's aim as stated on its webpage in 2002 is tf h l f A h S i h




consequent focus of the Acehnese population on issu

urally taken up by GAM, which saw itself as the v

people. This position was reinforced by the post-Su

nongovernmental organizations with human rights, d

endum agendas that broadened the Acehnese inde

beyond GAM and broadened the argument for

"unfinished decolonization

transfer of sovereignty" to"the moral right to govern

hand, GAM had gained n

other, was forced to accom

tions. This is most obviousl

July 2002 Stavanger Declar

articulated the movement'

pendent Aceh as a democr

return to the sultanate—albeit reserving the right of

to determine the final nature of the state upon achie

Organizational Structure

GAM's organizational structure is divided into the t

and the midlevel leadership, troops, members, and s

As GAM sees itself as the sole legitimate representa

people it has sought to establish governmental instit

net, set up by Hasan di Tiro during his time in Aceh

was composed as follows:

Teungku Hasan di Tiro: wali negara, defense mi

commander

D M ht H bi i id t i i t f i

Thus, on the one hand,GAM had gained new

allies but, on the other,

was forced to accommo-

date their aspirations.



i S h l




to the panglima AGAM/TNA, then discussed with

who in turn discusses them with the field command

gan) and operational commanders (komandan opersions on strategy and tactics are made at the field co

The Growth of GAM: Territory and Membership

When GAM was established in 1976 its membersh

were limited. While there was already considerable Acehnese and possibly sympathy for GAM's cause,

into mass active participation. One of the reasons f

was the relatively secular nature of GAM (Barber 20

Hasan di Tiro, only 70 men joined him in the mou

well as popular support—vital logistically for the su

las—came mainly from the district of Pidie and parlage of Tiro. Their shared background was rural, from

were motivated by loyalty to the di Tiro family and

Jakarta. Some members, such as Husaini Hasan, had

who had been killed by the Indonesian security force

level leaders had a university education—di Tiro, DrZaini Abdullah, Dr. Zubir Mahmud, and Dr. Mu

been businessmen while many of the midlevel lea

fought in the 1953-59 Darul Islam rebellion.

After the leadership was forced into exile, GAM

phases of geographic expansion—in 1986-89 an

brought increasing members. The first phase started provide paramilitary training for GAM guerrillas.

GAM recruited on the ground, mainly in the rural

new guerrillas overseas for training. Malik Mahmud



16 Ki t E S h l




31). Once Indonesian counterinsurgency operations

tional members joined GAM—motivated by revenge

against the brutal treatment of the population by thTiro field commander Amri bin Abdul Wahab f

toward the end of DOM in 1997. He had already su

Aceh Merdeka since the mid-1980s and had been

family—in particular his uncle, who had been in Lib

there were some who had been shot, as well, and whewith full support from everyone. From 1998 until 2

jungle as a guerrilla fighter. In 2001 he was made fie

Abdullah Syafi'i was still AGAM commander an

deputy. Amri's motivation was ideological: "I realize

was the worst kind. Countries colonized by the En

tions and education. But the fact that Aceh has had nis not because of the Dutch but because of Indonesi

The second phase of geographic expansion s

GAM's push into the remaining districts of Aceh. T

the revelation of the full extent of human rights abus

this period resulted in a further increase of GAM marea of the first expansion. Again the primary motiva

the quest for justice. This impulse transformed GA

popular movement in these traditional areas. Most

first female guerrillas, known as "Inong bale ." Many o

because they saw their families brutalized during DO

are DOM widows and the daughters of martyrs."19

ed specifically by the violence against women at the

police (Brimob), and the TNI, violence that include

and humiliation. More critical voices, however, claim



The Free Aceh Movem



The Free Aceh Movem

share the same ideology. SIRA, for instance, established

1999, believes that "Aceh is not part of the Indonesian U

but the Dutch colonial government has illegally relinanother party, that is Indonesia." Thus "the only best s

dom and sovereignty for Aceh" (SIRA 1999: 1-2).

While GAM has clearly benefited from the attenti

Aceh conflict by national and international NGOs, it ha

subject of criticism by the NGO community at largAcehnese civil society. In fact, GAM's leadership in Aceh

ed. As Richard Barber points out:

GAM clearly has a prominent role in the Aceh self-determ

movement with strong community support in many distr

However, there is no consensus, as such, recognising GAMleader of the Acehnese masses. One of the key factors beh

relatively closed, undemocratic political structure of the o

Membership of the armed wing has long been accessible

leadership has been strictly controlled by the exiled elite o

tion group. As such, Aceh Merdeka cannot be seen as rep

but rather one element of the Acehnese movement for seltion. [2000: 63]

Factionalization and Splinter Groups

There has been much speculation about the extent o

within GAM. During the negotiations of 2000-2003, thfrom GAM on the ground not only raised the question

but also raised hopes that this factionalization could

Jakarta's advantage. At the same time, the talks also sh



and Daud Paneuk, who wanted to smooth the

According to Inside Indonesia: "The split became pub

when di Tiro 'expelled' Husaini Hasan and his assand Mahmud Muhammad."31 It then escalated into

in November 1999, when Indonesian president A

asserted he had held telephone conversations with G

to have been with MP-GAM. The power struggle ab

of Zulfahri on June 1, 2000, which MP-GAM attrib2000) and GAM to the Indonesian military (Barber

Although the conflict between GAM and MP-G

power struggle, there are certain ideological differen

factions. MP-GAM—in particular Zulfahri an

Malaysia—saw itself as more Islamic: "One of its spo

di Tiro and his European GAM as secular, alienated his long absence, too scared to return home or ev

media, and therefore no longer genuinely Acehnese"

however, insists that the difference with MP-GAM

Islam but collaboration with the Indonesian military

Splits have also occurred on the ground in Acehin the form of power struggles than ideological qua

formation of two very small Islamist splinter groups—

formed during DOM, had no real support base, an

their leader Fauzi Hasbi have effectively ceased to ex

worth taking a brief look at them. The key group

Mujahidin Islam Aceh (FMIA), whose main grievancnationalist ideology. This agenda prompted Hasbi to

ization in order to return to Daud Beureueh's Islam

pseudonym of Abu Jihad, Fauzi Hasbi published a n



with respect to both the conflict in Aceh and the d

link with the Acehnese population on the ground. H

since neither MP-GAM, RIA, nor FMIA has a signifport base, all three can be dismissed as serious chal

GAM leadership in Sweden. GAM alone has politica

ity on the ground, leaving Jakarta with little choice i

ing partner.

Financing the Struggle

Ascertaining the source of GAM's funds is no easy t

abundance of allegations that GAM has demanded

difficult. The situation is further complicated by two

GAM have on many occasions abused the situation,

ligence has from time to time produced fake GAM the government's policy of criminalization (Sukma

time, GAM has never denied that it levies "taxes" on

receives donations—although it rejects involvement

kidnapping for ransom. Outside observers believe t

other armed national movement, has been compelled

activities to support its arms purchases and, moreove

bers who are more interested in economic gains than

GAM has three main sources of revenue: "tax

tions; and crime, drugs, and kidnapping. With respe

GAM levies an Aceh state tax (pajak nanggroë ) on a

According to senior GAM negotiator Sofyan Ibrahimhas been collected since GAM was established by

more, it is based on Islam: "In Islam if there is a strug

now that Aceh is no longer struggling for an Islamic



The Free Aceh Movem



I have been asked several times for money by GAM. Fro

they demand 12 percent of the contract value. Most peo

agree with GAM, but they are afraid because they have gare asked for money and you don't give it, you will be sh

later—especially if you are a government employee. Or y

napped and they ask the family for money. Sometimes th

specifically to donate money to buy a weapon. It all depe

economic status.41

Villages in the vicinity of the Lhokseumawe industr

been harder hit by GAM's village tax, too, presumably u

tion that they benefit through either employment or dev

tance. After the signing of the COHA pact, every village

35 million to buy weapons42—in contrast to other villag

ditional stronghold area (which were asked for Rp 10 m

in new areas such as South Aceh (Rp 9 million).43 In thes

territories GAM has often resorted to force in order to ex

residents of Manggamat in South Aceh, for instance, alleg

the victims of a GAM crackdown on June 5, 2001. Acco

the head of Sarah Baru village, "the villagers were intimito pay money to GAM. Those who were unable to pay

tured to death and their bodies buried."44 Providing a

Indonesian military intelligence estimates from April 2

GAM received a monthly "tax revenue" of Rp 230 mil

Aceh, Aceh Besar, and Sabang, Rp 10 million from P

lion from East Aceh and Tamiang, Rp 682 million fro

Rp 77 million from West Aceh, and Rp 70 million f

and Aceh Singkil.45

Th d k f f di f GAM i f i



Table 2

Weapons Held

District in August 2002

Aceh Besar 94

Pidie 266

North Aceh 706

East Aceh 410

West Aceh 182

South Aceh 76

Central Aceh 83

Southeast Aceh 5

Manaf had undergone guerrilla training in Libya

AGAM, included training as a MIG-17 and helicop

ed a different, arguably more strategic, approach

response to the security forces' strategy of targeting t

structure, he introduced a four-month training progr

lished unit comprising both regulars and auxiliaries.

elite commandos were split into twelve "rapi

(McCullough 2002).

Arms The fighting capacity of GAM is a lot smaller than

gests. In 2001, most observers estimated that AGAM

1 000 and 1 500 modern firearms a few grenade l



The State Education System. GAM has also system

state education system, although it must be said th

party responsible for the large number of school buintimidation and killing of teaching staff. The Indo

(Brimob) and the TNI have been known to burn sch

avenge the killing of their members, out of frustratio

insurgents, in anger at villagers not cooperating, or si

on GAM. Similarly, contractors may have contribut

education facilities as a precursor for obtaining lucr

tracts. It is in this context that the following numbe

Between 1998 and 2002 some 60 teachers were

physically assaulted.81 Human rights activists in A

numbers are even higher. According to the Huma

HAM), in 2002 alone 50 teachers were confirmed mnied by the burning of educational facilities. Betw

DOM in 1989 and June 2002, some 527 schools,

teachers, and 33 official houses for principals wer

May-June 2002 alone, 27 schools were destroyed. In

the military emergency in May 2003 an estimated 18

flames; by the next day the number had risen to 24

of June the total was 448,84 a number that has risen

While there is considerable doubt that GAM w

these burnings, clearly GAM was responsible for

underlying motivations are primarily ideological a

practical. According to GAM, the Indonesian educdestroyed Acehnese history and culture while promo

of Javanese history."85 As long ago as the late 1970s, d

diary: "For the last 35 years they have used our schoo



The Free Aceh Movem

i Wh ? B i h l h ' ili



get in war. Why? Because it helps the opponent's military

is housing a military base within its complex. And the p

to Exxon tell us that they do not get anything from Extakes our oil."92 GAM believes that ExxonMobil's facilitie

not only as a military base "but also as torture camps,"93

ing DOM, and that the TNI troops based at ExxonMob

tinued to carry out "massive military operations" against

villages in the North Aceh subdistricts of Tanah Luas, M

Meurah Mulia.94

The Javanese . One of the most controversial objective

rilla strategy has been the systematic attempt to clea

Javanese presence. While GAM has repeatedly denied t

targets Javanese, the evidence on the ground is to the

equates Indonesia with Javanese neocolonialism. In mid-1on an offensive against Javanese settlers and transmigran

(Barber 2000: 32). According to Amnesty Internation

time, the pattern of GAM violence changed from targe

forces to attacking noncombatants as well. By the end

civilians had been killed and thousands of Javanese transm

intimidated into leaving their homes (Amnesty Internati

This scenario repeated itself after the end of DOM. In

the Jakarta Post reported that thousands of Javanese transm

ing North Aceh following harassment by GAM includ

extortion, and arson.95 Ahead of GAM's anniversary on D

more Javanese settlers and transmigrants began to flee Aviolence (Barber 2000: 101). The Central Java transmig

that since July that year some 1,006 Javanese had returned

lies from Aceh. Between 2000 and 2002 an estimated 50,0



The Free Aceh Movem

We mainly resort to ambush and hit and run We can't fi



We mainly resort to ambush and hit-and-run. We can t fi

war. They have better equipment and more ammunition.

some Kalashnikovs and M-16s but we have to use ammuPindad.

From a military perspective there is no way for us to

or for them to defeat us. We want to tie down as many o

as possible in Aceh. We want them to spend more money

ation. We want to exhaust them financially.100

The East Timor Blueprint

Since East Timor's successful bid for independence in

has served as an inspiration for a variety of separatist

Indonesia—including GAM. GAM has used East Timor

also as a key element in its public relations strategy, calinternational sympathy for East Timor could be tran

Playing upon the East Timor scenario, GAM first incorp

referendum into its political vocabulary. It also called

peace negotiations under the auspices of the United Nat

time the organization stepped up its activities inorder to provoke the Indonesian security forces

into a violent overreaction. GAM's calculations

were simple. Its enemy's greatest weakness has

been the lack of discipline and lack of profes-

sionalism that so tarnished the TNI's image in

East Timor and left Aceh traumatized as a resultof DOM. (See Sukma 2004 for a full analysis.)

Turning Indonesia's weakness to its advantage, GAM sou

the general situation in Aceh to such an extent by con

Tim

also

pu



The Free Aceh Movem

another agreement be reached. On December 9, 2002,



g , ,

Hostilities Agreement (COHA) was concluded.

The COHA pact called for the cantonment or sweapons, the relocation and reformulation of the role o

security forces, and the establishment of peace zones. It a

Security Commission under the leadership of Thai

Thanongsak Tuwinan, including 50 Thai and Filipino

alongside 50 GAM and 50 TNI. The first signs of tro

GAM failed to meet the February deadline for the ca

arms—followed by the TNI's refusal to relocate and then

the JSC through TNI-inspired systematic attacks on all

of Banda Aceh. By April the COHA pact was dead in all

to resuscitate it at a meeting in Tokyo on May 18, 2003

GAM refused to agree to Indonesia's demands of recaccepting NAD, and relinquishing its struggle. On the fo

19, the Indonesian government placed Aceh under

launched an integrated operation (Operasi Terpadu).

The main achievement of the peace process was th

Yet neither of the cease-fires was fully adhered to

by either side. In fact, throughout the peaceprocess GAM and Indonesia officially and unof-

ficially carried out military operations against

each other in parallel with the talks—not only to

increase their leverage at the negotiating table but

also because there were elements on both sideswho continued to believe in a military solution as

well as elements who were not interested in any

settlement that would harm their business inter-

But

br

"ne

p


Indonesia's position of "anything but independenc



p y g p

Crouch 2003 for a full analysis.)

GAM's overall attitude toward the dialogue thrmovement contributed to the impasses and ultimat

the process—though it needs to be borne in mind

was not the only factor. From the beginning the exile

portive if not enthusiastic. Certainly the peace proce

of its needs and served a number of aims. It provide

legitimacy as the voice of the Acehnese people—reco

the international community, but also by the A

GAM's status was supported by the structure of the p

GAM and the Indonesian government were the on

negotiations. Before discussing GAM's strategy of in

is useful to take a closer look at the views of some commanders regarding the Indonesian government

cessation of hostilities and disarmament.

IndonesiaThe belief that Jakarta is not sincere was a constant

ments and pronouncements from the beginning of Frequently cited "proof of insincerity" included Indo

ignate members for working committees, security fo

the Humanitarian Pause, delays and postponements

of GAM negotiators, continued security forces

threats to crush the rebels by Army Chief of Staff Ry

TNI siege of GAM forces at Cut Trieng in the preludgenerally nonimplementation of agreements.

In 2001, after the high expectations raised b

P GAM/I d i l i l d GAM




Indonesian security forces had violated the agreemen



Abdul Wahab claimed that dozens of soldiers had ra

Linge, Central Aceh, killing one and wounding five3, GAM accused TNI of being behind the attack of

monitors in Central Aceh. According to GAM spoke

"this incident was the work of the militias trained by

itary. Their aim is to expel international monitors f

no one can see what the military is doing."113

When the COHA was on the verge of collapse

placed the blame firmly on Indonesia: "The process f

of the Aceh conflict is in critical condition. This is

manoeuvres carried out by the Indonesian Governm

rity forces, the TNI and POLRI, because it does n

society involved in the efforts to find a solution to tit believes a vast majority of the Acehnese are pro-in

Autonomy From an Indonesian perspective, much of the d

around getting GAM to accept autonomy as the com

independence and full integration. While GAM agromy legislation of Nanggroë Aceh Darussalam (NAD

it also reiterated repeatedly that this could not be

NAD and that GAM had not given up its aim of ind

release on February 4, 2002, a month after NAD h

GAM stated that "agreeing to use the so-called N

point for discussion" did not "imply that GAM oaccepted it as a form of provincial government." It

for exploring other political solutions for the future

li i l l i GAM l l f i i d

The Free Aceh Movem

hostilities and all acts of violence. . . . It is certainly



accepting NAD or abandoning its sacred struggle for na

ence."117

Last-minute efforts to avert the total collapse ofmeeting held on May 17, 2003, in Tokyo confirmed this

(or perhaps because of ) Indonesia's imminent military o

GAM was unprepared to state that it accepted NAD.

Cease-fires and Disarmament

The beginning of negotiations in January 2000 was not athe conflict was over. It was not even a sign that the war

by other means. In fact, for both Indonesia and GAM th

sented an additional element in their overall strategy. Thi

toward explaining why so many of the cease-fires

Humanitarian Pause and the COHA, did not hold.

For GAM, reserving the right to continue the armedallel with the dialogue served a number of purposes. First

of force was a way for GAM to gain leverage in the nego

the violence Jakarta would never have agreed to

sit down at the same table with GAM. Second,

GAM felt it needed its weapons to continue pro-tecting the Acehnese people from the Indonesian

security forces. Third, if the negotiations were

aimed at getting support from the international

community rather than Indonesia, there was no

real incompatibility in continuing violence

against Indonesian targets. And fourth, dialogueand armed struggle were all just tactics in the overall ind

gy. Just as the dialogue could be used to internationaliz

ld l i f i l h d A

Just

be u

c

vi


use it for attacks, just to recruit new members and

I ' i l i f h l Th l d ' G



It's not a violation of the rules. The rules don't say G

train its soldiers."119

As it did during the Humanitarused the COHA to consolidate and then expand it

month after signing the COHA pact, GAM appoi

manders for some wilayah. GAM described this m

order to assure and to heighten discipline."120 Weapo

flood into Aceh—showing that agreeing to store thei

tical. Only one and a half months after the agreempolice intercepted a machine gun, ten assault rifles, a

tined for Aceh.121 According to the Indonesian

Ryamizard Ryacudu, "this peace has allowed them to

to 5,000 and to bring in more weapons. They used to

they have 2,150—M-16s, AKs, and RPG-7s."122

The belief that Indonesia was not sincere further

of disarmament as many grassroots commanders be

still required to protect the community. This position

Dawod's emphasis that GAM will not hand over

one.123 GAM also emphasized repeatedly that "not us

the same as "not possessing weapons" or indeed "suSofyan Ibrahim Tiba stated that "GAM still want

until the whole Aceh process is resolved," that "GAM

to use the weapons," and that "we will cease using

HDC to make sure that our weapons are not conf

was particularly concerned with the latter issue and ced that "there must be an agreement that the weapo

down must not be seized by the military."126 Moreov

iprocity: before GAM could start placing its weapons

The Free Aceh Movem

all view that the importance of the peace process lay in w

i l i h h I d i ld ff i



tional community rather than Indonesia could offer, it

that the disarmament phase never even began. Nor is once open conflict broke out again in May 2003, Sofyan

of the TNA stated that "the Aceh nation answers the ca

name of the sacred faith to protect Aceh sovereign

Mahmud, on behalf of the exiled leadership said that GA

fighting forever: "We have been fighting Indonesia for 2

are confident that we will be able to resist them. We hawhat they have stolen from us. They are the robbers

demand back our property that they have taken—with i

GAM's Strategy of Internationalization

The key factor in understanding GAM's attitudes, decisposition with respect to the negotiations is that GAM

process as central to its political strategy of internationaliz

internationalization as the only way to achieve indepen

dialogue was used to gain international legitimacy and ob

port for its struggle. It therefore represented a continuati

ing the 1990s to lobby the UN—efforts that included Hamissions to the Forty-fourth Session of the UN Su

Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorit

1991, and his submission to the Forty-eighth Session

Rights Commission on January 29, 1992.

From the beginning GAM's participation in the divated less by what GAM could receive from Indonesia

could receive from the international community. GAM

interest in the Indonesian delegation and its position. On


Acehnese independence. . . . Finally, I respectfully re

G t d b f th EU t i th i



Government and members of the EU to review their

"Indonesia" and to help Aceh gain back its rightful inTiro 2000]

According to GAM, the international community h

to support Acehnese self-determination because it c

transfer of sovereignty. As di Tiro stated in 1995: "

powers responsible for setting up 'Indonesia' in thmoral, political and legal obligation to effect an inter

election" (di Tiro 1995: 7). Not surprisingly, GAM

internationalization of the conflict will ultimately res

like solution. Only the international community

United States and UN—can put pressure on Jaka

pendence. As GAM negotiator Amni bin Marzuki exinternational pressure was crucial in getting Indone

table and "thanks to international pressure on the In

they agreed in Geneva to a moratorium on violence a

through dialogue."132 When the dialogue process s

press releases appealed for more international involconflict and continue with the dialogue process, we

human rights concerned country to act as mediator,

more power."133

The United States, in particular, captured GA

the same press release GAM stated that it was "ver

U.S. Senators' statements discouraging [the] militaIndonesian government in Aceh."134 Similarly, Amn

ed out: "What we need is international support. . . .

li h h U S S ”135 I F b

The Free Aceh Movem

mer foreign minister, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan. While each of

participating in a purely personal capacity



participating in a purely personal capacity,

GAM's January 2002 press statement makes itclear that this was not GAM's interpretation: "As

is well known, General Zinni is President Bush's

special mediator for the Israeli-Palestinian con-

flict, while Dr. Pitsuwan is former Minister of

Foreign Affairs of Thailand. The latter's partici-

pation was at the special request of the UNSecretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan."138 In February 200

rated further: "Zinni is the representative of the U.S. in

wise men support Acehnese independence, and the mem

will follow."139

Not surprisingly, internationalization became the GAM's negotiating strategy. Senior GAM negotiator Sofy

explained this strategy as follows:

It is based on three pillars: first the Acehnese people, seco

Indonesians, and third the international community. If th

want to give us our freedom, the conflict is over. But at thwe have only the first pillar and the third. The second is b

theory of cancer. If you don't cut it out it will spread. Bu

of the Indonesians don't see it yet. Regarding the third—

mation to the international community about the situatio

dialogue is part of this, too. Everything needs to be condu

of Aceh and Indonesia! If all three elements work, then than independent Aceh will be a success. The second pillar

difficult. We need to get the Acehnese people to influenc

I d i d h i i l i

Not

tion

k


of the foreign wise men—all aided GAM's strategy, a

latter in particular sanctioned foreign intervention



latter, in particular, sanctioned foreign intervention

tional monitors, which Malik Mahmud likened to grounds that "the operation had UN backing becau

ments sending monitors would not support it otherw

General Kofi Annan's statement welcoming the CO

commitment to resolving the conflict in Aceh peac

opment assistance pledged at the Tokyo conferenc

GAM's strategy of drawing in the international comOn the ground, GAM used the space created by

the Acehnese population not only that independen

that GAM's aspirations had the backing of the UN

misinformation campaign had reached such heigh

OCHA, Michael Elmquist, issued a public statementcerned to read statements by the spokesperson of

GAM is expecting the United Nations to assist th

independence."142 Even though Elmquist reiterated t

ported the territorial integrity of the Republic of In

make much of an impression on GAM. In April 20

had already collapsed in all but name, GAM negotiatreemphasized the importance of the international

important is the international context. Even with

still have Tokyo. The Thai commander, the T

Philippine army all know what happened in Takeng

erence to the TNI's involvement in the systematiJSC monitoring mechanism.)

After the Tokyo talks collapsed on May 18, th

ment released by Malik Mahmud expressed its "dee

The Free Aceh Movem

from the central government in Jakarta and the belief tha

ence will afford Aceh full cultural and religious freedom



ence will afford Aceh full cultural and religious freedom

nomic equality. GAM managed to survive several counteations through its guerrilla strategy, which allowed it to

ple for support and benefit from its superior knowledge o

strategy was further supported by the safe haven found by

political leadership in Sweden since 1979 and by its oper

structure in Malaysia between 1991 and 1998. After th

GAM evolved into a mass movement. This was the cumbined result of Jakarta's heavy-handed security approach

ure to develop the province, and its inability to provide

effective governance.

Post-Suharto attempts to resolve the conflict by m

force created a window of opportunity for negotiatioembraced in order to broaden its support base and inc

capacity in Aceh. GAM also saw the peace process as a

itself internationally. In fact, GAM's strategy of internati

ly illustrates how the dialogue became part and parcel o

strategy for liberating Aceh. It also goes a long

way toward explaining why GAM did not startwith the cantonment of weapons and was not

interested in accepting autonomy even if this

meant the collapse of the peace process. This,

however, is not the only reason for the organiza-

tion's reluctance to sign an interim agreement.Additional factors include the history of Aceh's

relations with Jakarta, characterized by broken

promises, and the history of GAM's relations

In

na

t

G


compromise was GAM's aim, the movement was suc

will lead to ultimate independence, however, is deba



will lead to ultimate independence, however, is deba

Another factor underlining GAM's lack of inagreement was the belief that Indonesia is on the ve

is on GAM's side; all the movement needs to do is s

last, but certainly not least, is the dispersed nature

exile, which further militates against compromise

Aceh's sovereignty is approached from a positio

absolutes as exemplified by Hasan di Tiro's position tis nonnegotiable. Practical incentives are few and far

di Tiro, Malik Mahmud, or Zaini Abdullah take th

Aceh in order to become mere figureheads in a region

a system they fundamentally distrust and deplore? M

Aceh, who could pressure GAM into an agreementfrom Jakarta as ever. In fact, the post-Suharto growth

significant sections of Acehnese society, like GAM, b

has nothing of substance to offer. So long as this is

mood, GAM has no reason to moderate its position




16. Tempo, August 4, 2003.

17. Ishak Daud interview in Jakarta Post , October 9, 2003.



18. Interview with Amri bin Abdul Wahab, April 22, 2003.

19. Agence France Presse , July 2, 2002.

20. Confidential interview with humanitarian aid worker, Ju


22. See, for example Jakarta Post , February 4, 2003.

23. Interview with Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba, April 21, 2003.

24. Interview with Amni bin Marzuki, April 18, 2003.25. Ibid.

26. Data from SGI, Lhokseumawe, August 2002 and April 2

27. Interview with Sofyan Dawod, April 19, 2003.

28. Interview with Zaini Abdullah, February 23, 2002.

29. Interview with Nasrullah Dahlawy, June 24, 2001.

30. Tempo, July 19-25, 1999.

31. "What Is the Free Aceh Movement?," Inside Indonesia, N


33. Far Eastern Economic Review , March 16, 2000.

34. Interview with humanitarian aid worker, Banda Aceh, Ju

35. Interview with Sofyan Dawod, April 19, 2003.36. Ibid.

37. Interview with Helmi Mahera, April 7, 2003.

38. Interview with Bill Cummings, March 19, 2003.

39. Confidential interview with foreign contractor to ExxonMApril 17, 2003.

40. Jakarta Post , February 4, 2003.41. Confidential interview with contractor, August 22, 2002

42. Far Eastern Economic Review , January 30, 2003.

43 Jakarta Post February 4 2003

The Free Aceh Movem

53. Jakarta Post , June 27, 2002.

54. Agence France Presse , July 2, 2002.



55. Jakarta Post , March 3, 2003.

56. Interview with Malik Mahmud, February 22, 2002.

57. Interview with Hasan di Tiro, February 22, 2002.




61. Interview with Amni bin Marzuki, June 24, 2001.62. Biodata of new AGAM commander in chief released by AGA

63. Information provided by Iskandar Muda TNI spokesman LieuFirdaus Komarno, December 27, 2002.

64. Data obtained from SGI, Lhokseumawe, April 2003.

65. Tempo, November 17, 2003.

66. Interview with Brigadier General Syarifudin Tippe, August 1767. Far Eastern Economic Review , July 29, 1999.

68. Jakarta Post , May 11, 2001.

69. Antara, July 18, 2002.

70. Bangkok Post , July 16, 2002.

71. Quoted by William Nessen in San Francisco Chronicle Magazi2003.

72. Ibid.

73. Interview with Amri bin Abdul Wahab, April 22, 2003.

74. Ibid.


76. Interview with Colonel Endang Suwarya, June 29, 2001.

77. Press statement, ASNLF military spokesman, January 26, 200

78. Press release, Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front, March

79. Press release, ASNLF Central Military Command, January 23


90. Interview with Bill Cummings, March 19, 2003.

91. Phone interview with Isnander al-Pasè, GAM spokesman



92. Interview with Isnander al-Pasè, GAM spokesman, April

93. Press release, Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front, CInformation, June 4, 2001, p. 2.

94. AGAM Field Report, February 8, 2002.

95. Jakarta Post , September 9, 1999.

96. Waspada, April 23, 2001; Jakarta Post , April 24, 2001.

97. Update IDPs, OXFAM, Banda Aceh, June 2001.98. Indonesian Observer , April 25, 2001.

99. Jakarta Post , September 3, 2002.

100. Interview with Kamaruzzaman and Amni bin Marzuki, D


102. Press release, Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front, C

Information, June 4, 2001, p. 1.103. Ibid., p. 2.

104. Interview with Amni bin Marzuki, June 24, 2001.

105. Press release, Aceh National Armed Forces, Military Info18-19, 2003.

106. Tempo, July 7, 2003.

107. Interview with Amni bin Marzuki, December 25, 2001.

108. Press release, Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (TInformation Center, January 29, 2003.

109. Press release, Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front, AForces, Military Information Center, February 7, 2003.

110. Ibid., February 14, 2003.

111. Press release, TNA Central Military Command, February112. Jakarta Post , February 23, 2003.

113. Associated Press , March 3, 2003.

4 P l A h N i l A d F Mili I f

The Free Aceh Movem

123. Economist , December 20, 2002.

124. Tempo, November 25, 2002.



125. Agence France Presse , February 7, 2003; Jakarta Post , February

126. Agence France Presse , February 7, 2003.



129. Interview with Kamaruzzaman, April 18, 2003.

130. Jakarta Post , May 21, 2003.

131. Reuters as quoted in Jakarta Post , May 21, 2003.132. Interview with Amni bin Marzuki, June 24, 2001.

133. Press release, Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front, CentraInformation, June 4, 2001.

134. Ibid.

135. Interview with Amni bin Marzuki, June 24, 2001.



138. Press statement, ASNLF/GAM from Stockholm, January 30,



141. Interview in "Aceh Rebels Want UN Help, More Monitors," December 5, 2002.

142. Statement by OCHA at the workshop on "Aceh—Peace and at Hotel Indonesia, March 12, 2003.

143. Interview with Amni bin Marzuki, April 17, 2003.

144. ASNLF, Official Statement on the Failure of the Joint Counciin Tokyo on May 18, 2003, and the Declaration of War by In

Stockholm, May 20, 2003




BibliogrAbu Jihad. 2000. GAM Hasan Tiro dalam Pentas Perjuangan Bangsa A

Tiro in the Arena of the Struggle of the People of Aceh]. Titi

—–—. 2001. GAM Hasan Tiro Sesat & Menyesatkan [GAM Hasan T

and Leading Astray]. Majles Penerangan Front Mujahedin Ac

Amnesty International. 1993. "Shock Therapy" Restoring Order in AceAugust 1993.

Asia Watch. 1991. "Continuing Human Rights Violations in Aceh."

ASNLF. 1976. Declaration of Independence of Acheh-Sumatra. Decem

—–—. 2002. Stavanger Declaration. July 21.

Aspinall, Edward. 2000. "Whither Aceh?" Inside Indonesia 62 (April-

—–—. 2002a. "Sovereignty, the Successor State, and Universal Humand the International Structuring of Acehnese Nationalism."


—–—. 1995. Denominated Indonesians . Address delivered to UNThe Hague, January 20.

—–— 2000 Head of State of Acheh-Sumatra President of Acheh



—–—. 2000. Head of State of Acheh-Sumatra, President of Acheh

Liberation Front in the meeting at Henry Dunant Center ,

Government of Singapore. 2003. The Jemeeh Islamiyah Arrests aCmd. 2 of 2003, Singapore.

Hasan, Husaini. 2000. Condolences on the Assassination of TeukuMovement in Europe, June 1.

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 1999. "Indonesia: Why Aceh Is

grounder, August.

—–—. 2001. Indonesia: The War in Aceh 13(4) (August).

International Crisis Group (ICG). 2000. Aceh: Escalating TensioJakarta: ICG.

—–—. 2001. Aceh: Why Military Force Won't Bring Lasting PeacJakarta: ICG.

—–—. 2002. Indonesia's Terrorist Network: How Jemaah Islamiy43. Jakarta: ICG.

—–—. 2003. Aceh: How to Lose Hearts and Minds . Indonesia B

Johanson, Vanessa. 1999. "The Sultan Will Be Dr. Hasan Tiro.(October-December).

Kell, Tim. 1995. The Roots of the Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992Indonesia Project.

McCulloch, Lesley. 2002. "AGAM Trains 'Elite' Commando." JJune 6.

Sayigh, Yezid. 1997. Armed Struggle and the Search for State: TheMovement, 1949-1993. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Schulze, Kirsten E. 2001. "Indonesia Strives to Restore Order inReview 13(9) (September).

—–—. 2003. "The Struggle for an Independent Aceh: The IdeoStrategy of GAM." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26(



Project I



The Dynamics and Management of Internal Conflict

Project Rationale, Purpose and Outline



Project Director: Muthiah AlagappaPrincipal Researchers: Edward Aspinall (Aceh)

Danilyn Rutherford (Papua)

Christopher Collier (Southern P

Gardner Bovingdon (Xinjiang)

Elliot Sperling (Tibet)

Rationale Internal conflicts have been a prominent feature of th

landscape since 1945. Asia has witnessed numerous c

insurgencies, coups d'etat, regional rebellions, and revolu

been protracted; several have far reaching domestic and i

sequences. The civil war in Pakistan led to the break uin 1971; separatist struggles challenge the political and te

of China, India, Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines, T

Lanka; political uprisings in Thailand (1973 and 1991)

(1986), South Korea (1986), Taiwan, Bangladesh (1991

(1998) resulted in dramatic political change in those cothe political uprisings in Burma (1988) and China (

pressed, the political systems in these countries as well as

tinue to confront problems of political legitimacy th

acute; and radical Islam poses serious challenges to stab

Indonesia, Malaysia, and India. In all, millions of people

in the internal conflicts, and tens of millions have been dinvolvement of external powers in a competitive manne

ing the Cold War) in several of these conflicts had negat

68

constructing national identity with specific focus on

relationship of minority communities to the nation-



Asian states have made considerable progress in communities but several states including some maj

serious problems that have degenerated into violent

the political and territorial integrity of the state as we

tural, economic, and political security of individua

conflicts have great potential to affect domestic and i

Purpose The project investigates the dynamics and managem

nal conflicts in Asia—Aceh and Papua in Indonesia,

southern Philippines, and the conflicts pertaining to

China. Specifically it investigates the following:

1. Why (on what basis), how (in what form), and ferentiation and political consciousness emerge?

2. What are the specific issues of contention in suc

these of the instrumental or cognitive type? If b

tionship between them? Have the issues of cont

time? Are the conflicts likely to undergo further3. When, why, and under what circumstances can

lead to violent conflict? Under what circumstan

to violent conflict?

4. How can the conflicts be managed, settled, and

What are policy choices? Do options such as nation, autonomy, federalism, electoral design, and

exhaust the list of choices available to meet the a

i i i ? A h i i f

ing the region or province that is the focus of the con

States, and Australia. For composition of study groups p



ticipants list.All five study-groups met jointly for the first time in W

from September 29 through October 3, 2002. Over a pe

participants engaged in intensive discussion of a wide ra

taining to the five conflicts investigated in the project. In

tifying key issues for research and publication, the meet

development of cross country perspectives and interactiowho had not previously worked together. Based on discus

ing five research monograph length studies (one per con

policy papers (four per conflict) were commissioned.

Study groups met separately for the second meeting. The

study group meetings were held in Bali on June 16-1Philippines study group met in Manila on June 23, an

Xinjiang study groups were held in Honolulu from Augu

2003. These meetings reviewed recent developments rel

flicts, critically reviewed the first drafts of the policy pa

the project, reviewed the book proposals by the principa

identified new topics for research.

The third meeting of all study groups has been schedule

28 through March 2, 2004 in Washington D.C.

Publications

The project will result in five research monographs (booand about twenty policy papers.

Research Monographs. To be authored by the principal

h b k l h d f h k i

70

Asian countries, United States, and other relevant co

Public Forums



To engage the informed public and to disseminate thect to a wide audience, public forums have been orga

with study group meetings.

Two public forums were organized in Washington,

with the first study group meeting. The first forum

United States-Indonesia Society, discussed the AcehThe second forum, cosponsored by the United Stat

the Asia Program of the Woodrow Wilson Internat

Sigur Center of the George Washington University

and Xinjiang conflicts.

Public forums were also organized in Jakarta and M

with the second study group meetings. The Jakarta p

and Papua, cosponsored by the Centre for Strateg

Studies in Jakarta, and the Southern Philippines p

sored by the Policy Center of the Asian Institute of M

ed persons from government, media, think tanks, a

matic community and the public.Funding Support This project is supported with a generous grant

Corporation of New York.

Project Director Muthiah Alagappa



Aceh Study GroupEdward AspinallUniversity of Sydney Principal Researcher

Harold CrouchAustralian National University

Ahmad Humam Hamid Care Human Rights, Aceh

Sidney Jones

International Crisis Group, Jakarta

T. Mulya LubisLubis, Santosa and Maulana,

Jakarta

Marcus Meitzner

USAID, Jakarta

Michael RossUniversity of California, Los Angeles

Kirsten E. SchulzLondon School of

Rizal Sukma

CSIS Jakarta

Agus WidjojoFormer Chief of S

Territorial AffGovernment of In

Sastrohandoyo WChief Negotiator f

Government othe peace talksAceh Moveme

Daniel Ziv USAID, Jakarta

East-West Center Washington

Papua Study Group

Danilyn Rutherford University of ChicagoPrincipal Researcher

Rodd McGibbonUSAID, Jakarta

Octavianus Mote

72

Southern Philippines Study GroupChristopher CollierAustralian National University

Abraham S. IAssistant Secre



Tibet Study GroupElliot Sperling Indiana University

Mark D. KoeU.S. Departm

Principal Researcher

Robert F. BarnesUSAID, Philippines

Noemi Bautista USAID, Philippines

Saturnino M. BorrasInstitute of Social Studies, The

Hague

Jesus Dureza Presidential Assistant for

Mindanao, Davao City

Alma Evangelista United Nations Development

Programme, Manila

Eric Gutierrez Institute for Popular Democracy

Carolina Hernandez Institute for Strategic and

Development Studies, Manila

the InteriGovernm

Government oManila

Mary Judd

The World Ba

Macapado MMindanao Sta

General S

Amina Rasul-

Asian InstituteManila

Steven Rood The Asia Fou

David Timbe

USAID, Wash

Michael YatesUSAID, Phili

Xinjiang Study GroupGardner BovingdonIndiana University

l h

Susan Shirk University of Calif

Di



Principal Researcher

Jay DautcherUniversity of Pennsylvania

Talant MawkanuliIndiana University

James Millward Georgetown University

Diego

Stan ToopsMiami University

Shengmin Yang Central University

Nationalities,

Other ParticipantsAllen Choat

Asia Foundation, Hong Kong

Chester CrockerGeorgetown University

Stephen Del RossoCarnegie Corporation of New York

Pauline KerrAustralian National University

Federico M. MacaranasAsian Institute of Management,

Manila

Christopher McN

East-West Center

Charles MorrisonEast-West Center

Dr. Hadi SoesastrCSIS Jakarta

Sheila SmithEast-West Center

Arun Swamy East-West Center

Barbara WalterUniversity of Calif

74

Background of the Aceh Conflict

Aceh is the site of one of Asia's longest-running int

1976 I d i i h i h



1976, Indonesian sovereignty over the territory haan armed insurgency led by the separatist Free Aceh

A range of local grievances—especially those conc

natural resource revenues and human rights abuse

to the conflict.

Aceh, with an estimated population of ab

Indonesia's westernmost province. Almost all Acehn

they have a reputation for Islamic piety. Most

employed in agriculture, though Aceh is also rich

especially natural gas and oil. ExxonMobil Indones

the Arun gasfields, is a major contributor to nationa

Unlike East Timor, which had been a Portugother parts of Indonesia, Aceh was part of the Dutc

World War II. It came into the Dutch colonial empir

ever. For centuries the Acehnese sultanate had bee

state, reaching its apogee during the seventeenth

launched an assault in 1873, but only managed to

(arguably never completely) after three decades of bi

Aceh's leaders, many of whom were ulama (relig

ly supported the struggle for Indonesian indepe

Many, however, soon became disillusioned with the

In 1953 they launched a revolt as part of the Da

Islam) movement which joined several regional Isstruggle to form an Indonesian Islamic state. The r

eventually resolved by negotiations leading to the

i i " i l i "

scale. A large student-led protest movement called for

independence similar to that granted in 1999 for East T

insurgency reemerged—greatly expanding the range of i

k f d h d



attacking security forces and other targets. By mid-1999,

territory were under the movement's control.

The Indonesian government responded with a mix o

military action. Negotiations between the government

duced two cease-fires, in June 2000 and December 2002,

held. In 2001, the national parliament passed a Speciagiving Aceh considerable authority to manage its own aff

share of its natural resource revenues. Security operations

ever, and the death toll in fighting and among civilians

Eventually, in May 2003, the peace process broke down,

gency" was declared, and security forces launched a large



Previous and Forthcoming Issues:

Policy Studies 1 “The Aceh Peace

Process: Why it Failed”Edward Aspinall, University of Sydney

Harold Crouch, Australian National University

“Security Operations in Aceh: Goals

Consequences and Lessons”

About this Issue

This paper looks at the Aceh con-

flict since 1976 and more specifically

the insurgent Free Aceh

Movement—GAM. It aims to pro-

vide a detailed ideological and orga-

nizational “map” of this organization

in order to increase the understand-



q

Dr. Rizal Sukma, Centre for Strategic and

International Studies - Jakarta

“Beijing’s Tibet Policy: Securing Sovereignty

and Legitimacy”Dr. Allen Carlson, Cornell University

“The Papua Conflict: Jakarta’s

Perceptions and Policies: National and

International Dimensions of the Conflict”Dr. Richard Chauvel,Victoria University-

Melbourne

Dr. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Indonesian Institute of

Sciences (LIPI)

“Southern Philippines and the

International War Against Terror”Dr. Christopher Collier, Australian National

University

About the Author

Dr. Kirsten E. Schulze is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of International History at

the London School of Economics.

ing of its history, motivations, and

organizational dynamics.

Consequently this paper analyses

GAM’s ideology, aims, internal struc-

ture, recruitment, financing, weapons

procurement, and its military capaci-

ty. The focus of this study is on the

recent past as the fall of Suharto

not only allowed the Indonesian

government to explore avenues

other than force to resolve the Aceh

conflict, but also provided GAM

with the opportunity to make some

changes to its strategy and to trans-

form itself into a genuinely popular

movement. It will be argued here

that the key to understanding GAM

in the post-Suharto era and the

movement’s decisions, maneuvers andstatements during the three years of

intermittent dialogue can be found

in the exiled leadership’s strategy of

internationalization. This strategy

shows that for GAM the negotia-

tions, above all, were not a way to

find common ground with Jakarta

but a means to compel the interna-

tional community to pressure the

Indonesian government into cedingindependence.

ISBN 1-932728-03-1

the free aceh movement (gam): anatomy of a separatist organization by kirsten e. schulze

Documents