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The Fraying Cartel:

An Analysis of Defections and Disunity in the House Republican Conference

Matthew N. Green

Department of Politics

The Catholic University of America

May 27, 2014

ABSTRACT

The chronic divisions within the House Republican Party since 2011 are legion. But are they

merely the function of ideological differences, exacerbated by pressures from outside interest

groups and the Tea Party, as many claim? In this paper, I argue that at least during the first

fourteen months of the 113th

Congress (2013-14), the most evident splits within the G.O.P. have

been caused by varying constellation of factors, contingent on whether the issue at hand is

related to the party’s organizational, procedural, policy-making, or electoral authority. More

generally, these splits and their causes demonstrate that the decision of an individual lawmaker

to be loyal to her party is a function of her instrumental goals, her attitudes and philosophy about

party loyalty, and to a lesser extent her roles and expected behavior within Congress.

Prepared for presentation at the NCAPSA American Politics Workshop, Georgetown University, June 2014. An

earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2014 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting,

Chicago, IL. Thanks to Greg Collins for helpful research assistance; Greg Giroux of Bloomberg News and an

anonymous House leadership aide for useful suggestions; John Sides, for agreeing to post my early thoughts on the

subject on The Monkey Cage blog; and the timely and thought-provoking social media comments of Scott Adler,

Larry Evans, Sanford Gordon, Jeff Jenkins, Greg Koger, Burdett Loomis, Jason Roberts, and Steven Smith in early

2013.

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Damn your principles! Stick to your party.

-- Benjamin Disraeli1

Right now, Jesus himself couldn’t be the speaker and get 218 Republicans behind something.

-- Rep. Patrick Tiberi (R-OH), February 20142

The House Republican Party is, by many accounts, deeply divided. Since 2010, when an

enormous new class of G.O.P. freshmen arrived in the House chamber, the party has frequently

found it difficult to maintain unity on high-profile, high-consequence votes, on strategy, and on

issue positions. The divisions were exacerbated after the 2012 elections, and Speaker John

Boehner appeared unable to maintain control of his party for much of the following year, leading

to a shutdown of the federal government that became a political fiasco for the G.O.P.3

Defections and splits within congressional parties are nothing new in American history.

Our relatively decentralized electoral system gives party organizations only limited ability to

determine who gets nominated for office, and each major party serves as an umbrella

encompassing a broad range of views and ideological beliefs among candidates and the

electorate. Not until the late 1970s did parties in Congress begin to reassert the kind of strong

authority and influence that many observers today take for granted (Rohde 1991). Nonetheless,

the degree and scope of disunity within the House G.O.P. over the past three-plus years has been

remarkable. More than merely refusing to vote with their colleagues on particular bills, members

of the Conference have voted against their leaders on floor rules, developed their own legislative

1 Quoted in Eigen and Siegel 1993, 479. 2 Quoted in Costa 2014. 3 Journalist Robert Costa opined that Boehner’s problems in the 113th Congress began at the end of the 112th, when

his plan to avoid the so-called “fiscal cliff” in January 2013 was rejected by his fellow partisans, forcing him to

bring a bill to the floor that raised taxes (and which passed without the votes of a majority of his party). See Klein

2013.

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strategies in conflict with their leaders’, and even opposed their party’s nominee for speaker.

The result has been the lowest approval ratings for a congressional majority party in modern

history, a party whose members, as Congressman Tiberi lamented, seemed to agree on little and

whose top leader many observers have given up for dead (e.g. Cillizza 2014, Kane 2013b).

The conventional wisdom is that the House G.O.P. is deeply split on ideological grounds,

with stand-pat conservative Republicans battling against ultra-conservative “Tea Partiers” (e.g.

Associated Press 2013).4 But this stylized account appears too simplistic upon closer inspection.

Members of the Republican Conference have demonstrated varying degrees of loyalty,

suggesting that the party may be divided into more than two camps (Binder 2013a, Klein 2013).

Allegiance to the Tea Party—itself a more complex entity than many commentators claim—is

hardly uniform among even the most conservative members of the Republican Conference. It is

also unclear that ideology is the only, or even the most important, cause for intra-party divisions

(Green 2013). For instance, some of the most rebellious members of the Conference like the

Libertarian-minded Justin Amash (MI) and the iconoclastic Walter Jones (NC), cannot be easily

pigeonholed as far-right.

Exploring the recent divisions of the House G.O.P. Conference can accomplish more than

just shed light upon recent events in Congress. It may also help us answer two bigger questions

about congressional party politics. First, if we expect contemporary majority parties to be

durably united, with decision-making power and the allocation of collective goods firmly

controlled by their leaders—or, as Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins describe it, a “cartel”—

4 Previous intra-party divisions in congressional history have often been based on regional or economic differences.

Some have noted that the House G.O.P.’s most assertive conservative members, as well as larger Tea Party groups,

tend to be disproportionately from the South (e.g. Lizza 2013; Skocpol and Williamson 2012, 91). But the most

rebellious Republicans not uniquely southern, and the Tea Party’s tenets are less obviously tied to a particular region

or sector than, say, those of the Populist, Progressive, or States Rights movements which once divided congressional

parties.

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under what conditions does that unity fray?5 Second, what explains patterns of disloyalty—

some lawmakers rebelling against their party while others are not, or against certain spheres of

their party’s authority but not others?

Generally speaking, members of Congress express loyalty or disloyalty to their party for

one of three reasons: it meets their instrumental objectives (their goals), it is expected based on

their position in Congress (their roles), or if they embrace or spurn party loyalty as an end in

itself (their attitudes). Ordinarily, the broader political environment encourages party loyalty;

but if changes to that environment undermine the existing authority of the majority party, the

opportunity, if not incentive, emerges for individual lawmakers—depending on their particular

goals, roles, and attitudes—to rebel.

This “goals-roles-attitudes” framework for understanding the causes of party loyalty

helps explain three critical features of the disunity that has plagued the House Republican Party

of late. First, G.O.P. rebellions have been permitted, if not encouraged, by sizeable shifts in the

political environment. The rise of “super PACs” funneling cash into congressional campaigns,

the sudden organizational power of the Tea Party movement, a weaker and more divided party

leadership team—all of these developments have not only shaped the goals, roles, and attitudes

of some lawmakers but have created an opening for would-be rebels to exercise greater party

independence. Though events during the past few months suggest that some of these changes

may be less than durable, the present environment nonetheless bodes ill for the future of a

unified House Republican Party with enough political authority to competently govern. Second,

the party’s disunity has not simply been ideological. Some G.O.P. rebels may be especially

5 A more common assumption among scholars is that lawmakers will not act in concert, and that some other

factor—such as shared policy beliefs or party leaders employing tools to enforce discipline—explain party unity.

But if we assume that, especially in today’s polarized Congress, party loyalty is a norm (whether for political,

ideological, or sociological reasons), then instances of party disunity and rebellion, rather than unity, are the unusual

phenomena that beg explanation.

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conservative, but others appear to be resisting their party because their districts demand it,

because they fear defeat by a credible primary challenger, or because of their rebellious

temperament. The multiplicity of reasons for disloyalty greatly complicates the ability of party

leaders to reestablish their authority and avoid costly political disasters like the government

shutdown of 2013. The final critical feature of the Republican’s disunity is that it has varied in

severity based on whether the matter at hand has been associated with the party’s ability to

organize the House chamber, set the agenda, enact legislation, or influence election outcomes. In

other words, some Republicans will only challenge their party when it comes to passing

particular bills, while others are willing to go so far as to reject their own party’s nominee for

speaker, a far greater transgression. The essential point is that this disunity is not merely a sign

of symbolic position-taking but, more ominously, what the journalist Robert Costa called “the

collapse of institutional Republican power” (Klein 2013).

The Party Cartel and Spheres of Party Authority

Political parties in Congress have at least two central goals: to win or maintain majority

party status by winning elections, and to influence policy (Smith 2007, 25).6 To achieve those

goals—and, more generally, to ensure the smooth running of the legislature—majority parties

seek political power: the capacity to exercise sufficient authority over key spheres of political

activity and outcomes.

Over what spheres in particular does the congressional majority desire to exercise such

power? According to Cox and McCubbins, the most important power of a congressional

6 The discussion henceforth focuses not just on congressional parties in general but on the majority (House) party

specifically. Though it could be extended to encompass minority parties and to the Senate, the House minority party

has a slightly different set of goals than the majority, and—perhaps most importantly—lacks the formal authority of

the majority (Green forthcoming).

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majority is agenda power: the right to decide what matters are (not) debated and voted upon in

the legislative chamber. It is this power, they argue, that makes the majority a cartel—

specifically, what they call a procedural cartel (Cox and McCubbins 2005). Another dimension

of party power is the selection of the leaders of the chamber. A majority party with this power

constitutes what Jeffrey Jenkins and Charles Stewart call an organizational cartel (Jenkins and

Stewart 2012).

To some extent, the term “cartel” is a misnomer when applied to congressional parties.

This is especially so with respect to agenda-setting power, which has varied for parties over time

(Pearson and Schickler 2009). Even the power to select the leadership officers of the legislature,

while largely unchallenged over the past century, was far from sacrosanct in the early decades of

congressional history; in the words of Jenkins and Stewart, the organizational cartel “had to be

built” (Jenkins and Stewart 2012). Parties in Congress may possess or seek greater authority to

shape the agenda or choose chamber officers, but it is far from obvious or inevitable that their

authority will be monopolistic. Indeed, the history of Congress suggests that that such authority

is, as David Rohde has put it, conditional (Rohde 1991).

More importantly, by identifying a second type of party cartel apart from the procedural

kind, Jenkins and Stewart introduce the possibility that majority parties exercise authority over

multiple spheres of activity. In fact, to achieve their collective goals majority parties may seek to

influence at least four7 important facets of legislative and electoral politics. These four, in order

7 Other potential scopes of authority for congressional majority parties include the distribution of information

(Krehbiel 1991, Ripley 1969, 7 and Riselbach 87), relations with the executive branch (Riselbach 87), and the

attendance of lawmakers (Ripley 1969, 7; Riselbach 87).

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of most to least cartel-like in terms of the actual control exercised by contemporary House

majority parties (see Table 1),8 are:

(1) organizational authority, or the power to organize the legislative chamber, primarily

by choosing its officers, though also possibly by shaping the chamber’s rules and

selecting committee chairs (Jenkins and Stewart 2012; Riselbach 1973, 87; Ripley 1969,

6);

(2) procedural authority, or the power to set the legislative agenda, which in the House

includes the ability to pass previous question motions, write and ensure passage of special

rules, and block discharge petitions to force bills from committees (Cox and McCubbins

2005, Jones 1968, Ripley 1969, 6-7, Riselbach 1973, 87);

(3) policy-making authority, or the power to pass particular bills or legislative measures

desired by a majority of the majority party and/or by majority party leaders (Jones 1968,

Ripley 1969, 7);9 and

(4) electoral authority, or the power to determine party nominees for election to

Congress, if not who is ultimately elected.10

<Table 1 About Here>

8 The party’s organizational cartel power became firmly established in the 1890s (Jenkins and Stewart 2012, x),

while its current procedural cartel power did not begin to develop until the 1960s, when new rules changes gave the

majority party greater control over the House Rules Committee. The governing party began exercising greater

electoral authority in the 1990s and 2000s, when lawmakers were compelled to contribute to the party’s fundraising

arm and leaders began favoring certain candidates in party primaries. Charles Jones (1968) was one of the first

congressional scholars to note this distinction in different scopes of party authority, distinguishing between what he

called “procedural” majorities (which organize and sustain the operation of the House) and “substantive” majorities

(which decide what bills to enact). 9 Cox and McCubbins (2005, 6, 32-33) argue that policy-making authority is relatively costly for congressional

parties to exercise and is otherwise less important than procedural authority. 10 This could also implicitly include the ability to determine who is eligible to serve in Congress, forcing morally or

legally corrupt incumbents to resign or retire. Congressional parties do actively recruit and train candidates and help

fund campaigns, with potentially significant effects on who runs and who wins (see e.g. Lawless 2012, 155, 180-

184).

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To exercise maximum authority in these spheres, the majority party must usually be able

to command a majority of House members to act in unison or near unison, whether on a vote for

speaker, votes on special floor rules, or the opportunity to sign a discharge petition. Though that

majority can come, in theory, from a mix of lawmakers from both parties, in practice the

majority party and its leaders are doubly constrained in how many legislators from the minority

can constitute that mix. First, if only a minority of the majority party follow their party’s elected

leaders, it implies (though does not necessarily mean) that those leaders are failing to act on

behalf of their followers’ preferences.11

That implication has become more meaningful to

lawmakers in today’s strongly partisan Congress. It the early 2000s, House Republicans

informally adopted the so-called “Hastert Rule,” requiring all bills to have majority support

within their ranks before coming to the chamber floor. The frequency of “majority rolls,” in

which a bill passes over the opposition of a majority of the majority party (Cox and McCubbins

2005), declined in the 2000s, as can be seen in the solid line in Figure 1. The other constraint

facing the governing party is that fewer lawmakers from the minority are inclined to help it

exercise its authority. This has long been the case with respect to the electoral authority of the

majority party, and it is usually seen as apostasy for any member of one party to openly assist the

other party win elections. But in the contemporary, highly partisan House, only a handful of

minority party members have been either willing or permitted to consistently cross party lines on

other matters, including procedural votes and major party bills.

<Figure 1 About Here>

Taken together, these two constraints can put a real squeeze on the House majority

party’s ability to exercise authority, potentially giving effective veto power to a very small

11 Although, as Greg Koger and others have noted, doing so may serve party members’ individual electoral interests

(e.g. Koger 2013).

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number of lawmakers from the ruling party. To be sure, at least until recently majority parties in

the House have been able to command considerable loyalty from their members—or at least

enough so that its organizational, procedural, and even policy-making authority has been

relatively concrete.12

That potential veto power of a majority party faction emerged as more than

merely hypothetical after the 2010 elections, however, when consistent party loyalty from all or

even most House Republicans could no longer be assumed.

But how badly divided is the House G.O.P.? Dissenters have yet to establish the

organization and durability of a genuine party faction, though a small number have recently

formed a “Liberty Caucus” that could ultimately emerge as one (DiSalvo 2012, Hohmann 2014).

And to be sure, the overall degree of voting loyalty of House Republicans has been quite high—

higher, in fact, than it has been in decades, and certainly higher than the voting unity of minority

Democrats.13

This has led some to suggest that the hand-wringing of folks like Congressman

Tiberi are highly exaggerated (e.g. Sides 2014, Weyl 2014). However, aggregate measures of

party loyalty mask deeper divisions that have eroded the foundations of the G.O.P.’s authority.

Republicans do find bills they can agree upon, but primarily because party leaders have carefully

chosen to bring as many unifying measures to the floor as possible—often symbolic ones that

have no chance of becoming law, like proposals to defund the Affordable Care Act (Weyl 2014).

Yet when circumstances have forced the majority’s agenda-setting hand, intra-party defections

have often caused leaders’ bills to be defeated, required leaders to seek votes from large numbers

of Democrats, or led G.O.P. leaders to pull bills from the House floor altogether.

12 Relatively concrete, but not absolutely so: moderate Democrats, for instance, occasionally challenged the ability

of their party’s leaders to enact legislation in the 111th Congress. 13 According to Congressional Quarterly (CQ), the Republican’s average voting unity in 2011 was 91%; in 2012,

90%; and in 2013 it reached 92%, the highest recorded percentage recorded by CQ since it began keeping track in

1956. Similarly, a record-breaking 35% of all “party unity votes” (in which majorities of each party opposed each

other) were ones in which Republicans voted together unanimously (Congressional Quarterly 2014).

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Voting data since 2010 illustrate this dynamic. In the 112th

Congress (2011-12), for

instance, the percentage of recorded votes on amendments or bills on which the minority

Democratic Party “got its way”—that is, defeated or passed the proposal, contrary to how a

majority of the majority party voted—increased from less than 3% to nearly 12% (the dashed

line in Figure 1). After 2012, Hastert Rule violations (i.e. majority rolls) have also increased in

number (Guess 2013).

A focus on recorded votes also misses the other ways that Republicans have dissented

from, or even undercut, the authority of their party over the past few years.14

House Republicans

have openly rebuked or challenged party leaders; derided their colleagues as RINOs

(Republicans In Name Only) and members of a “whiner caucus” who could and perhaps should

be “primaried” out of office (e.g. Parker 2013, Trinko 2013); introduced and signed discharge

petitions; refused to contribute to the party campaign coffers; and developed legislative agendas

and strategies rivaling those of their leaders.15

In the next section, I discuss the principal macro causes of this disunity, and then delve

more deeply into the theoretical reasons for an individual to either follow or rebel against one’s

party. I then test those individual reasons for several votes and other actions of note in the first

fourteen months of the 113th

Congress (2013).

The Macro Causes of Disloyalty

14 For instance, Tim Huelskamp (R-KS) has been one of the biggest trouble-makers in his party: voting against his

colleagues on several key votes, harshly criticizing his party’s leaders and fellow Republicans, and even helping

organize a campaign against Boehner’s reselection as speaker in January 2013. Yet one would never glean such

rebelliousness from his aggregate voting score: according to one analysis, as of March 1, 2014 Huelskamp had

voted with his party 90% of the time (OpenCongress 2014). Or consider another Republican, Tim Griffin (AR),

who voted with his party 96.9% of the time (making him the 7th most loyal Republican in the Conference). That

interparty loyalty included votes against majority party bills on several occasions, leading to majority rolls that

arguably weakened his party leaders’ authority and reputation. 15 A majority party’s authority can be undermined by actors and groups outside of the House as well as within its

ranks, as I discuss below.

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Each member of Congress has her individual reasons for being loyal to, or refusing to go

along with, her party. But major changes to the political scene over the past few years also

created a more hospitable environment for dissent and disloyalty. These changes have been of

two types: internal and external.

The internal changes were several. For one thing, the majority party had a weaker

leadership team. Speaker Boehner seemed to shy away from using aggressive means of building

coalitions; a G.O.P. ban on earmarks denied leaders a valuable coalition-building tool; the

ambitions of the majority leader, Eric Cantor, made it unclear whether he was working to help or

undermine the speaker; and the majority whip, Kevin McCarthy, was relatively inexperienced

(Drucker 2013, Kane 2013a). In addition, Boehner’s initial advocacy for a more open legislative

process effectively ceded some of the party’s procedural authority to rank-and-file lawmakers.

As former Chicago mayor Richard J. Daley once warned, “You run the party or the party runs

you.”16

Furthermore, the nature of the 2010 election and the huge number of freshmen

Republicans it brought to the chamber created circumstances ripe for disunity. New members of

Congress are unfamiliar with the institution’s norms and practices, including norms of party

fealty and deference to leaders. The 2010 election, fueled by the rising Tea Party movement,

could be easily interpreted as a mandate for strong, activist, and uncompromising conservatism

and total opposition to the initiatives of President Obama. Its strong anti-establishmentarian

flavor encouraged many new House Republicans to openly distance themselves from more

established figures in their own party and disdain the use of helpful leadership tools, like

earmarks, to enforce loyalty (Draper 2012, 49, 81; Smith 2007, 28).

These two sets of internal political changes should not be treated separately. Steven

Smith notes that leaders possessing “strong personal bonds with colleagues” are more likely to

16 Quoted in Eigen and Siegel 1993, 478.

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earn their trust and loyalty, but such bonds take time to build with new members, of whom there

were many after 2010 (Smith 2007, 57). And passive leaders are less likely to successfully

enforce existing legislative norms or encourage their adoption among new followers—

particularly those who are openly contemptuous of authority—making it even less likely those

followers will defer to their party. In short, the weakness of House leadership and the anti-

establishmentarian tendencies of new members probably reinforced each other. 17

Externally, a number of important post-2008 developments encouraged party rebellion.

The conservative, anti-orthodox Tea Party movement, whose (often passionate) followers view

the country as veering dangerously away from core Constitutional principles and providing too

many social benefits to the undeserving, pressured many conservative lawmakers to vote in ways

contrary to that of their leaders and more traditional Republican constituencies (Skocpol and

Williamson 2012). But more than ideology, the movement was about ideological purity,

disdaining compromise—within as well as across parties—and pressing for absolute party

victories. The power of the Tea Party grass-roots was further augmented by the conservative

media (notably Fox News and conservative bloggers like Erick Erickson) and new national

organizations such as FreedomWorks, Heritage Action, and Tea Party Express, which amplified

Tea Party rhetoric and sometimes crafted their own messages to Congress (Skocpol and

Williamson 2012). Some of these conservative umbrella groups, particularly Heritage Action,

pressed House Republicans to adopt the doomed strategy of forcing a government shutdown if

President Obama refused to defund the Affordable Care Act (Ioffe 2013). A number of them

17 Endinger (1964) observes that in general, political leaders and followers tend to influence and shape each other.

Conditional party government theory would predict that the causal direction was one-way: that the increased

ideological diversity of the G.O.P. after 2010 made party leaders less eager to enforce strong collective control over

the legislative process (Rohde 1991; see also Cooper and Brady 1981 and Sinclair 1995, 17). This argument

assumes that party leaders are willing and able to change their legislative styles in accordance with members’

wishes, since both Boehner and Cantor were already party leaders before the 2010 elections. It also considers only

the ideological diversity of a party, not diversity in lawmakers’ legislative styles or attitudes towards party loyalty in

general.

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were (and remain) openly skeptical of Speaker Boehner, to the point of suggesting or even

advocating his removal or electoral defeat.18

In addition, the 2010 Citizens United Supreme

Court decision made it possible for these newer groups, plus more established conservative ones

(like Club for Growth), to put vast amounts of money into primary campaigns through so-called

Super PACs, offering electoral support for like-minded Republican rebels and challenging

incumbents who dared to defy them.

These conditions, both internal and external, established an environment in which

Republican intraparty defections were more probable. But they cannot explain patterns of

disloyalty—why certain representatives might have chosen to defect from their party on

particular votes or against certain spheres of party authority. I turn to that question next.

Individual Reasons for Party Disloyalty

On what basis does any lawmaker choose to be loyal or disloyal to her party?19

She may

do so for instrumental reasons, because it serves her political objectives; because it comports

with certain expectations for behavior based on her position in Congress or the terms or nature of

her election; or because it follows from her personal temperament or philosophy of governance.

In short, party loyalty depends on a lawmaker’s goals, roles, and attitudes. I elaborate below.

18 Dumain and Fuller 2013. The groups that most openly endorsed Boehner’s removal included the Tea Party

Leadership Fund, FreedomWorks, and—after the February 2014 vote to raise the debt ceiling—the Tea Party

Patriots and the Senate Conservatives Fund (Boyle 2014, Levinson 2014a). Cox and McCubbins note (1993, 132)

that ordinarily there is unlikely to be much conflict for a speaker between maintaining majority status and remaining

speaker. But Boehner’s pursuit of policy compromises—in order to avoid catastrophic outcomes (like the

government shutdown) that could damage his party’s reputation with voters—has in fact encouraged many House

Republicans to openly disdain Boehner and even try to remove him as speaker. 19 A considerable amount of research has been done on the influence of congressional parties, particularly on

aggregate voting behavior (e.g. Nokken 2000; Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007; Jenkins and Monroe 2012). The

principal research question of these studies is whether voting loyalty is due to ideological agreement among

lawmakers or to parties imposing discipline (e.g. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Krehbiel 1993; Young

and Wilkins 2007). I take a slightly different approach, looking at other kinds of activity besides voting and

considering whether additional goals (besides electoral and policy), plus expectations, norms, and personal attitudes

towards party, might also explain the decision to stand with—or oppose—one’s party.

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1. Goals. The idea that parties are created and supported in order to help their members

achieve their goals is what John Aldrich called the “rational choice” account (Aldrich 1995, 21).

This instrumental view of party loyalty assumes that lawmakers will follow their parties “to

achieve their ends” and when it is “in their interests to do so” (Aldrich 1995, 21). These goals

are often, but not necessarily, made salient by party leaders exercising methods of “direct

influence,” such as offering plum committee positions or help raising money for lawmakers’

reelection (Smith 2007, 49).

Parties in Congress are particularly well-equipped to help lawmakers achieve a number of

their objectives (Fenno 1978). One of them is reelection: parties can reward their most loyal

members with scarce resources and endorsements for their next election, plus a positive party

“brand” that they can run on (Aldrich 1995, 22, 23-24; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 109-122).

Legislators interested in achieving a second goal, policy enactment, usually have a strong

incentive to commit to their party, because its ability to “control floor business” means that a

lawmaker “must come to terms with his party if he desires success in pushing those bills and

policies he favors through Congress” (Aldrich 1995, 22-23; Ripley 1975, 200).20

They may

also “naturally” support their party because their ideological beliefs closely match the legislative

agenda of that party. A third goal—to gain and keep power in Congress—is also easier to reach

if one is loyal to party, especially since party leaders traditionally determine how positions of

power are allocated (Aldrich 1995, 22; Smith 2007, 58). Finally, the goal of winning higher

office may encourage loyalty for the same reasons as reelection: the congressional party can

lend its brand and resources to lawmakers in a senatorial or gubernatorial race.

20 Of course, getting legislation enacted can also help lawmakers get elected or move up the leadership ladder

(Sinclair 1995, 10-11).

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But it is also true that loyalty to party may do little to help—or even may hurt—a

legislator’s pursuit of her personal goals. For instance, if an incumbent’s constituency finds her

party’s reputation abhorrent, or prefers a maverick-style representative to one that sticks to her

party through thick and thin, that legislator may find it more electorally advantageous to spurn

her party. Similarly, if a legislator is seeking higher office but her party is unpopular, or if she is

in a competitive primary election and wants to distinguish herself from other candidates,

eschewing party may be the wisest strategy. And if the lawmaker has a policy objective that

differs from her party’s platform, partisan loyalty may be of less utility.

2. Roles. Legislators may also choose to be (dis)loyal to their party because of social

expectations—the roles they play in Congress. Little-studied today but arguably still important,

roles and the expectations that come with them can help explain behavior that seems less

obviously tied to self-interested gain.21

Representatives first elected in “wave” elections (or

endorsed by certain interest groups) may be expected to pursue particular political outcomes,

irrespective of whether these outcomes comport to their (or their party’s) platform or agenda.

Because they are in positions of authority, party leaders and committee chairs may be expected

to support their party, even if their leadership job is not seriously in jeopardy for failing to do so.

And majority party committee members are expected to support the product of their committee

when it comes to the chamber floor.

When it comes to measuring roles and expectations, it can be difficult to distinguish them

from self-interested goals. Legislators in positions of authority may feel compelled to vote with

their party out of a sense of obligation, or because they see their chances of keeping their

21 Earlier studies of roles in legislative politics include Davidson 1969 and Wahlke et al. 1962. For a more recent

treatment, see Green 2010. Binder hints at the importance of roles when she notes that the “Hastert rule,” though

not a codified rule, is nonetheless powerful because it is a “norm” that “leaders are expected” to follow (Binder

2013b, emphasis hers).

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positions as contingent on demonstrating fealty to party—or both. Accordingly, variables used

to operationalize role-based motivations may also capture goal-based ones, and one may only be

able to infer the influence of expectations when analyzing the motives for voting with or against

one’s party.

3. Attitudes and Disposition. A third set of reasons for individual lawmakers to be more

or less loyal to their party is related to their attitudes, temperament, or personal disposition

towards party loyalty. Some legislators may hold loyalty to party as a core principle, along the

lines of Disraeli’s admonition quoted above (Davidson 1973).22

For others, party loyalty is less a

consequence of dogma than a desire to conform, especially since “failure to act with party may

be met with antagonism” from one’s peers (Riselbach 1973, 88; Smith 2007, 49, 56). Some feel

a “strong psychological identification with” their party, finding within it “a sense of belonging

which may be expected to translate into a feeling of loyalty and a desire to help the party”

(Riselbach 1973, 88; Smith 2007, 56). Those who prefer confrontational, team-sport politics

may also be less inclined towards party loyalty than those with a more compromising legislative

temperament.23

Measuring Possible Causes of Disloyalty

Over the first 14 months of the 113th

Congress (2013-14) House Republicans

demonstrated an impressive degree of disunity, challenging their party’s organizational,

procedural, policy-making, and electoral authority on a number of key occasions. For each of

22 Davidson found that, in a sample of congressmen from the 88th Congress (1963-65), 19% fell into the category of

“maverick” (Davidson 1973, 150). 23 Note that these attitudes should not be confused with ideological beliefs: as Senator Richard Lugar put it upon

losing his primary to a Tea Party-endorsed conservative Republican, “one can be very conservative or very liberal

and still have a bipartisan mindset” (Lugar 2012). Other (usually older) studies of Congress have identified different

styles of legislating at both the state and national level (e.g. Barber 1965, Ripley 1978, 14-17).

17

these occasions, I use regression (probit) analysis—or, for cases in which few Republicans broke

with their party, partial correlation analysis—to test the independent effects of goals, roles, and

attitudes on the decision to stay with or depart from one’s party. For each statistical model I use

a series of variables, listed in Table 2, designed to estimate those goals, roles, and attitudes.

<Table 2 About Here>

Some of the variables testing the importance of electoral goals capture voting behavior in

the previous election (variables measuring district partisanship24

and the percent of the vote

received by the lawmaker in her last primary and general election), with the expectation that

these variables are strong indicators of the electoral landscape in 2014, while others attempt to

estimate the future landscape more directly (the dichotomous variables measuring whether Stu

Rothenberg categorized the incumbent’s seat as only marginal, or if the Club for Growth openly

endorsed a primary challenger against the incumbent). Note that a more conservative

congressional district could encourage rebellion because of the preferences of constituents, or

(also) because such a district is ripe for a strong primary challenge. Also note that I include a

variable measuring net spending in 2012 (logged) for vs. against the incumbent by conservative

political action committees.25

This variable (plus the Club for Growth variable) suggest the

degree to which outside groups may try to intervene in the incumbent’s reelection, a concern

which many have claimed helped encourage (or discourage) dissent in the 113th

Congress. A

summary of the total amount spent on House races by the largest of these groups is in Table 3.

<Table 3 About Here>

24 Some have suggested, for instance, that the G.O.P.’s biggest dissenters were reflecting their districts’ strong

conservatism (e.g. Lizza 2013). 25 The spending variable includes all expenditures by the highest-spending PACs to either help or hurt the incumbent

Republican. These PACs spent far less money than the parties or candidate PACs in the 2012 but nonetheless

garnered considerable attention (and worry) from electoral candidates. Political non-profits (e.g. Americans for

Prosperity, American Future Fund, and Americans for Job Security) were also heavy hitters in the 2012 election, but

they spent most of their money on presidential and Senate races. For more, see Magleby 2013.

18

The role of the Tea Party in influencing elections is also measured with two variables: one that

captures the number of Tea Party members in the district as of 2013 (an updated version of the

variable used by Bailey et al. 2012), and one that measures whether the incumbent had been

either openly endorsed (=1) or opposed (=-1) by a Tea Party group of any sort in 2010 or 2012.26

Finally, for votes on bills that have particular relevance to certain districts, one or more variables

are used to capture that relevance (e.g. for the Hurricane Sandy disaster bill, if the lawmaker’s

state had been affected significantly by Sandy).27

Policy goals are estimated with several variables, including whether the lawmaker is a

member of the Tea Party caucus (which arguably carries with it the embrace of certain policy

positions) and if the legislator serves on the committee of jurisdiction of the bill being

considered. Some variables measuring electoral goals may also capture policy concerns (e.g. the

number of Tea Party supporters in the district, or if the bill is salient to the district). Ideological

leanings may also translate into support for, or opposition to, particular policies and the bills they

represent. However, measuring ideology is tricky: the most widely-employed measure of

ideology, NOMINATE, is problematic for measuring vote choice because it is derived from vote

behavior and may merely capture degrees of party loyalty.28

Following Bailey et al. (2013), I

employ different models to test various measurements of ideology: the first uses dichotomous

variables for membership on either the conservative Republican Study Committee or a moderate

caucus (like the Tuesday Group); the second uses generated W-NOMINATE scores for votes in

26 The former was collected by Devin Burghart and Leonard Zeskind of the Institute for Research and Education on

Human Rights (http://www.irehr.org/the-data); I used an application programing interface from the Sunlight

Foundation (/districts/locate) to match latitude and longitude data with specific congressional districts. The latter is

taken from descriptions of lawmakers in the 2012 Almanac of American Politics. 27 I do not include certain district measures that others traditionally include in analyses of roll call votes, such as

region and percent black (e.g. Bailey et al. 2013). On the possible role of local racial attitudes in the government

shutdown of 2013, see Tesler 2013. 28 For a more detailed critique, see Lee 2009. More generally, these and other kinds of measures necessarily capture

“expressed” ideology—the beliefs that lawmakers demonstrate through voting, caucus membership, and so on—and

not their “true” beliefs, which may not be the same and which, needless to say, are extremely difficult to measure.

19

the 113th

Congress through February 2014; the third uses W-NOMINATE scores from the 112th

Congress, which are more complete but necessarily exclude all freshmen members in the 113th

Congress.

Four other variables are employed to measure the degree of commitment to the other two

lawmaker goals that are hypothesized to play a role in shaping party loyalty. Power goals are

captured by number of terms served (assuming either junior lawmakers are more likely to be

without influence and desire more, or senior lawmakers are more likely to have and be eager to

keep their influence), if the lawmaker is in a leadership position,29

and if she is a committee

chair. The higher ambition goal is measured by a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the

lawmaker has or will announce a campaign for higher office during the 113th

Congress.

As already noted, roles and social expectations are challenging to measure, and estimates

of such expectations are, for the most part, “piggy-backed” onto other variables used in the

analyses. These include seniority, since past studies have suggested that senior lawmakers feel

less supportive of their party than junior ones (Davidson 1973, 152; Riselbach 1973, 88);30

serving as a party or committee leader, which may carry with it an expectation of greater loyalty

(Davidson 1973, 151); membership in the freshman class of 2010, a potential “mandate”

election; and having run for office with the open endorsement of one or more Tea Party-affiliated

groups in the past.

Six variables are intended to capture legislators’ personal attitude or disposition towards

party loyalty. Prior service as a legislative leader at the state level may indicate a greater

sensitivity and awareness of legislative norms, including party fealty. One dichotomous variable

29 This includes the party’s eight top elected officials (speaker, majority leader and whip, etc.) as well as 15

lawmakers identified by news stories or other sources as being deputy or assistant whips. Of the latter, three (Reps.

Bilirakis, Cassidy, and Stutzman) lost that position at various points in the 113th Congress due to voting defections. 30 But note that the seniority variable is correlated fairly strongly with RSC membership, so it is possible that a

statistically significant coefficient for the latter could be masking a significant effect of the former.

20

measures whether National Journal’s Almanac of American Politics describes the lawmaker as

“independent” or a “maverick,” and another measures whether the Almanac describes him as

open to bipartisan cooperation.31

Since loyalty often follows from having close ties to party

leaders (Smith 2007, 57), a measure is included of whether a lawmaker is a known member of

Speaker Boehner’s inner circle, according to the Almanac or outside news sources. Finally,

since the Tea Party movement emphasizes ideological orthodoxy and avoidance of compromise

as well as ideological conservatism, the variables measuring open opposition to the Tea Party

and membership in the Tea Party caucus may capture one’s disposition towards party loyalty.

Explaining Patterns of Party Disloyalty, 113th

Congress (January 2013 – February 2014)

I now turn to a test of the “goals-roles-attitudes” model for various activities in which a

number of Republicans challenged their party in each of its four spheres of influence.

Rebellion against the Majority’s Organizational Authority. The most blatant example of

rebellion against the G.O.P.’s power to organize the chamber was the refusal of a dozen

Republicans to vote for John Boehner as speaker at the opening day of the 113th

Congress. It

constituted a significant violation of the House norm that lawmakers unanimously support their

party’s nominee for speaker, and it left Boehner with but a slim margin of victory.32

A list of

these dozen Republicans and their vote choice is in Table 4.

<Table 4 About Here>

31 Data was obtained from the biographies of each legislator in the 2014 Almanac. To ensure the “maverick” label

was not earned solely from voting against Boehner for speaker in January 2013, it was checked against biographies

in the 2012 Almanac. Nine of 13 Republicans had been labeled “independent” or a “maverick” in both volumes; the

other four were freshmen in 2013 and thus not in the 2012 Almanac. 32 Boehner received 220 votes, only six more than he needed to win. As is customary, Boehner refused to vote for

himself as a candidate. At least one Republican, Michelle Bachmann, initially withheld her vote, choosing to

support Boehner during the second round of balloting. Journalist Robert Costa claimed that as many as “two dozen”

Republicans were “talking about getting rid of him” prior to the vote (Klein 2013). It should be noted that such

rebellion has increased in frequency in recent years, plaguing against Newt Gingrich in 1997 and Nancy Pelosi in

2013.

21

Is there any sort of pattern among these dissenters that might suggest general causes for

this remarkable display of rebellion? One journalist suggested that their dissent was due to either

their strong conservative ideology, having received electoral support from the conservative group

Club for Growth, or negative attitudes towards leadership (which included Republicans who had

defeated an incumbent Republican in a primary, had an independent streak, had criticized

Boehner in the past, or had been among the four Republicans whom party leaders punished by

taking away a choice committee assignment shortly beforehand) (Blake 2013).33

For this particular case, since almost all House Republicans voted for Boehner, most of

the explanatory variables correlate perfectly with a vote for Boehner’s candidacy and would drop

out of any regression analysis. Instead, I calculate partial correlation coefficients for the

explanatory variables, with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the lawmaker voted for Boehner.

(Variables measuring prior punishment by the party and defeat of a Republican incumbent in a

primary are included, while tendency towards bipartisanship is excluded since it is not relevant

to the speakership vote). The results show that ideology does not persuasively explain this bold

act of party rebellion. In fact, negative attitudes towards party leadership (deriving from a prior

punishment by the leadership or from beating a GOP incumbent in one’s primary) are the most

strongly associated with a vote against Boehner and are also statistically significant. The goal of

higher office—measured by a future run for higher office—is also associated with a no vote,

albeit less so; and, in one model, membership in the Tea Party caucus—which could capture

either policy concerns or attitudes towards party loyalty—is also associated with rebellion. In

short, attitudes and electoral ambitions, and to a lesser extent policy preferences, mattered.

33 The four who were removed from committees were Justin Amash (MI, from Budget), Tim Huelskamp (KS, from

Budget), Walter Jones (NC, from Financial Services), and David Schweikert (AZ, from Financial Services). That

punishment may itself measure those lawmakers’ tendency to eschew cooperation with their party. “These guys are

clearly not team players,” said a Republican leadership staffer after the punishments were meted out (Thorp 2013);

another explained their selection more bluntly as “the asshole factor” (Allen 2012).

22

<Table 5 About Here>

Rebellion against the Majority’s Procedural Authority. There were a few instances in

2013 when members of the G.O.P. openly revolted against their party’s procedural authority.34

The boldest approach is to sign a discharge petition, a procedure that forces bills from

committees and onto the House floor. As of mid-February 2014, six Republicans had signed a

discharge petition (Petition No. 4) proposed by Republican Steve Stockman (TX) to create an

investigative committee to examine the 2012 attack on a U.S. consulate in Libya. Though few

Republicans would likely oppose such an investigation, pushing for one without the support of

party leaders or committee chairs was nonetheless a way for more rebellious Republicans to act

out of accordance with their peers.35

As with the vote for speaker, the lack of variation in the dependent variable (signing the

petition) requires the use of partial correlation rather than probit analysis. Employing such an

analysis, using caucus membership as a measure of ideology36

(see Table 6a), suggests that those

seeking higher office were more likely to sign the petition, as well as those who had narrower

primary victories in 2012 and received more funding from outside conservative groups.

Electoral concerns, in other words, seemed to have the greatest impact on the likelihood of

rebelling against one’s party in its agenda-setting capacity in this fashion, but not one’s roles or

attitudes towards party loyalty.

<Table 6a About Here>

34 Three instances not analyzed here: votes by a handful of Republicans against floor rules in February 2014,

because the G.O.P. had failed to bring a flood insurance bill to the floor; secret strategy sessions held between Ted

Cruz and a group of House Republicans during the government shutdown; and Republicans who openly criticized

their party’s decision to permit a government shutdown (Bendery 2013, Fuller 2014d, 2014e). 35 Walter Jones (R-NC) signed a second petition (Petition No. 3), introduced by Democrats, to move a resolution

urging budget discussions with the Senate to avoid a government shutdown. If the analysis below includes Jones as

a petition signer, the “maverick” variable has a partial correlation of 0.17, significance level of 0.01. 36 Using NOMINATE data as a substitute for caucus membership to measure ideology has little discernable effect

on the results in Table 6a.

23

Another opportunity to circumvent the governing party’s agenda-setting authority

emerged in August 2013. Some House members had been arguing that appropriations for the

next fiscal year should be contingent on successfully defunding the Affordable Care Act, but

Speaker Boehner opposed that strategy. Nonetheless, Mark Meadows (R-NC) penned a letter

urging the Speaker to change his mind and, with the help of lobbying and publicity by

FreedomWorks and Tea Party-favored senators like Ted Cruz (R-TX), gathered 79 additional

signatures from other House members (Lizza 2013). It was a striking example of a minority of

the G.O.P. publicly—and, it would turn out, successfully—rebuking the legislative strategy of its

top leader (Caldwell 2013).

Probit regression analysis illuminates the factors that distinguish the signers of the

Meadow letter (whom journalist Ryan Lizza called the “Suicide Caucus,” given how imprudent

their strategy turned out to be) from the rest of their party (Lizza 2013). It shows (Table 6b, first

three columns) that electoral and policy goals, along with governing attitudes (and, to a smaller

extent, expectations), are statistically significant in explaining the likelihood that a Republican

would sign the letter. The Tea Party was a particularly important player, not only electorally (by

endorsing lawmakers in past elections) and attitudinally (those openly critical of the Tea Party

uniformly avoided the letter), but also in terms of Tea Party caucus membership (which could

represent either a set of policy goals or a more rebellious governing philosophy among its

members). District conservatism also proved statistically significant, as did ideology—although,

when looking at caucus membership as an indicator of ideology (Model 1), being a moderate was

significantly related to avoiding the letter, while being a conservative (in terms of RSC

membership) proved not to be statistically significant.37

Also, legislators with legislative

37 With all explanatory variables at their mean values (or zero, if dichotomous), being a moderate caucus member

reduces the probability of signing the letter from 30% to just 8%.

24

authority and expectations for loyalty—being on appropriations, or serving as a chair—were less

likely to sign the letter, as were those with a background in legislative leadership, suggesting that

attitudes towards party loyalty and, possibly, expectations for behavior were also important

factors.

<Table 6b About Here>

Finally, in early July 2013 Rep. Tom Graves (GA) introduced H.R. 2682, a bill to defund

the Affordable Care Act. Cosponsoring a bill is a commonly accepted practice in Congress, and

opposition to the ACA was a position long supported by party leaders. However, as the end of

the 2013 fiscal year approached, and with the Meadows letter in the spotlight, Graves’ bill and

attention to it complicated leaders’ ability to stick to a strategy that would avoid a government

shutdown. By the end of August 2013, 138 Republicans had cosponsored the bill.38

Regression

analysis (see Table 6b, last three columns) reveals a slightly different mix of factors from those

that explain support for the Meadows letter. District partisanship, legislator ideology, and Tea

Party caucus membership did prove statistically significant, though committee service did not.

Unlike with the Meadows letter, seniority proved significant (with more senior members less

likely to cosponsor the bill), as did ambitions for higher office (having a positive effect on the

chances of cosponsorship). As before, however, those with experience in legislative leadership

at the state level proved less willing to buck G.O.P. leaders on the matter. Goals, attitudes, and

perhaps also roles each contributed to the decision to cosponsor the Graves bill.

Rebellion against the Majority’s Policy-Making Authority. In the U.S. Congress, one

lawmaker’s vote against his party on a single bill or amendment does not necessarily constitute a

challenge to his party’s authority. Congressional parties rarely demand perfect allegiance from

all of their members on policy votes, and they may even permit or tolerate some dissention (to

38 That number had grown to 153 by February 2014; the additional 15 cosponsors are not included in this analysis.

25

protect certain members’ reelection, for instance, or because of their deeply held beliefs). It is

another matter, however, if enough representatives openly rebuke their party so as to put the

party’s greater objectives in jeopardy—by defeating a desired bill, say, or creating the

impression of a no-confidence vote in the leadership.

The most direct way to challenge the ability of one’s party to enact policy is to be part of

a majority of the majority party that votes against the party’s proposals. Even if it serves the

party’s goal of protecting its members from difficult but necessary votes, it nonetheless also

suggests a failure on the part of party leaders to get their members behind them when it matters

(Koger 2013). Between January 2013 and January 2014 the House cast five votes which

constituted majority “rolls,” meaning a majority of Republicans voted against the bill at hand,

but the bill still passed. The topics of the bills varied, as did the degree of G.O.P. loyalty. On

the final vote, to raise the debt limit in February 2014, nearly 90% of the party opposed the bill,

suggesting “the final nail in the strategic coffin” for the Hastert Rule (Hawkings 2014).

Conventional wisdom is that the Republicans who contributed to these rolls were more

conservative, Tea Party-affiliated lawmakers who faced pressure from conservative activists at

home and in Washington, and perhaps feared a strong primary challenge if they voted with their

leaders.39

Bailey et al. (2012), for instance, find that on major votes in the 112th

Congress, larger

numbers of Tea Party activists in a district, as well as ideological conservatism and, in some

cases, endorsement by the right-leaning group Freedom Works increased the odds of voting in a

conservative direction (pp. 785-793). To test these claims, I conducted probit regression

analyses of each vote in which the majority Republicans were rolled. The results are in Tables

7a through 7c.

39 A number of the votes had been highlighted as a “key vote” by the conservative group Heritage Action—

including the seemingly-uncontroversial set of amendments to American Battlefield Protection Program Act, which

may explain the mass defections on that vote (Binder 2013b).

26

<Tables 7a through 7c About Here>

Though the substantive and statistical significance of most of the variables vary by vote,

one can make some broad generalizations based on the results. First, electoral concerns were

often at play. Not only were representatives from more conservative districts often more likely

to vote against the bills, but—just as in the 112th

Congress—the number of Tea Party activists in

a district frequently had a statistically and substantively significant effect on vote choice as

well.40

Legislators retiring in 2014 and thus no longer concerned about reelection emerged as

likely loyalists over time. Interestingly, however, the efforts of national conservative groups to

influence incumbents’ reelection—either by targeting them in 2014 or having spent money for or

against them—had no statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable.41

Also,

measures of salience for bills in districts were seldom statistically significant (with the impact of

Hurricane Sandy being a noteworthy exception), suggesting that, contrary to traditional views of

“rational” congressional behavior, lawmakers paid little attention to whether bills might hurt or

help key local constituencies.

Besides the policy concerns of tea party activists in their districts, lawmakers were also

clearly driven by ideology. But when looking at caucus membership rather than NOMINATE

scores, it appears that while legislators who were more conservative might sometimes be more

likely to roll their leaders, it was moderates who were consistently unwilling to vote against

those leaders. Tea Party Caucus membership was sometimes a statistically significant factor, but

less consistently so than one might expect, given conventional wisdom about the role and

importance of the Caucus.

40 For instance, increasing the number of tea party district activists by one standard deviation (409 members), with

all other variables at zero or their means, reduces the probability of voting for the Hurricane Sandy bill by 8.7%. 41 Endorsement by local or national tea party groups occasionally had a statistically significant effort, although for

the February 2014 debt limit bill that effect is in an unexpectedly positive direction.

27

Variables measuring other legislator goals or expectations for loyalty were often

statistically insignificant. The seniority variable proved significant for the most number of votes

(3), but the sign was not in a consistent direction. The committee chair variable proved

insignificant, and even those in leadership were not always significantly more likely to support

rolled bills. The desire for higher office did not often explain vote choice either, and being first

elected in 2010 never did. Attitudinal factors did prove statistically significant for a number of

votes, however. Mavericks were more likely to vote against the Violence against Women

reauthorization, for instance, and friendship with Speaker Boehner increased the likelihood of

supporting the controversial debt limit bill that ended the October 2013 government shutdown.

Those who openly opposed the Tea Party were uniformly in favor of the Hurricane Sandy bill,

and the variable measuring a reputation for bipartisanship also proved statistically significant at

times—albeit not always in the expected direction (such as for the Battlefield Protection and

February debt limit bills).

Rebellion against the Majority’s Electoral Authority. Perhaps the closest that any House

Republicans have come to openly revolting against their party’s electoral authority in the 113th

Congress is the decision of seven lawmakers (as of October 2013) to withhold contributions to

the NRCC, the House G.O.P.’s campaign arm (Isenstadt 2013).42

Since all lawmakers are

expected to donate to the party’s campaign coffers, the chariness of these seven constitutes an

unusual rebellion against an important party norm.

Seven is too few to warrant regression analysis, and it is entirely possible that some of

these lawmakers will eventually pony up to the NRCC. But it is worth noting that five of the

eight also voted against Boehner for speaker (and a sixth, Bachmann, refrained from voting for

42 They included Reps. Amash, Bachmann, Bridenstine, Gohmert, Graves (GA), Huelskamp, and Labrador. Still to

be examined are contributions or endorsements, if any, by incumbent House Republicans to insurgent primary

challengers.

28

Boehner on the first round of balloting). It thus seems reasonable to assume that the same

attitudinal, electoral, and policy-related factors that explain rebellion against organizational

authority—affiliation with the Tea Party caucus, seeking higher office, prior punishment by the

party, and having won a contested primary against an incumbent—explain the reluctance to

support, at least financially, the electoral authority of the G.O.P.

Discussion

The findings presented here illustrate the flaws of any mono-causal explanation for

rebellion and dissent within the House G.O.P. since 2012. Neither ideology, nor electoral fears,

nor Tea Party affiliation, nor a maverick streak alone explain why Republicans have dissented

from their leaders and their colleagues since the 2012 elections. Rather, a combination of

factors—member goals and attitudes and, to a lesser extent, roles—have been at play.

Furthermore, that combination has differed depending on whether the Republican Party’s

organizational, procedural, policy-making, or electoral authority is at stake, as well as the

specific issue at hand.

Ideology and district partisanship stand out as particularly important variables when

explaining disloyalty to the party’s procedural and policy-making authority. They suggest that

conservative policy goals by individual House members, and the desire to either reflect

conservative constituents’ preferences or head off the possibility of a primary challenge, drove

rebellion against these two spheres of party power. In addition, Tea Party affiliation and

influence correlate with certain challenges to agenda-setting authority—though not with policy-

making authority—which supports the claim that the Tea Party movement is as much about

defying the power of the established Republican Party as it is about voting against party-

29

endorsed bills on the floor. Those willing to go further—to challenge their party’s organizational

and electoral authority—are both fewer in number and driven by other factors. Tea Party caucus

membership explains rebellion to some extent, but more so a desire for higher elected office,

having defeated an incumbent Republican in a primary, and having been punished by party

leaders for previous disloyalty. Also worth noting is that, in most of the cases studied here, large

independent conservative groups seem to have had far less influence on individual lawmakers’

decisions to rebel than media reports would suggest. Possibly those groups with strong grass-

roots support successfully activated those constituents to lobby their representatives, or

nonetheless created an atmosphere in the House in which party loyalty was less rewarding to

Republicans. Yet in terms of endorsements, electoral challenges, and campaign spending, their

influence appears to have been far more constrained.

Generally speaking, the findings complicate the simple, conservative vs. moderate

portrayal of Republican Party congressional politics frequently portrayed in the popular media.

G.O.P. leaders cannot simply appeal to their colleagues’ policy preferences in order to ensure

their loyalty. In many cases, rebellious Republicans are simply rebellious by nature or because

their immediate electoral future depends on it (because they represent conservative

constituencies or feel pressure from local Tea Party groups and activists), factors which

Republican leaders in Congress have less control over.

Looking at patterns of loyalty among the ten cases examined in this paper, we can

identify at least three distinct groups of Republicans within the U.S. House in 2013 and early

2014. The first consists of five lawmakers who have been the most willing to rebel against their

party’s authority in all four spheres.43

If we consider their apostasy sufficient in scope and

43 All five voted against Boehner for Speaker, had given no funds to the NRCC, signed the Meadows letter,

cosponsored the Graves bill, and voted against the party (or else failed to vote) on the five votes in which the Hastert

30

consistency to constitute a sort of “mini faction” or “No” caucus, it means that, as a practical

matter, the House G.O.P. in the 113th

Congress has only a working 229-member majority, just 11

more than a bare majority in the chamber.44

The second group consists of those who showed the

greatest disloyalty to the party’s policy-making and procedural authority, but not to its

organizational authority. Some of these 37 Republicans may be “gettable” votes on occasion

but, whether because of their personal preferences, constituency pressures, or views towards

party discipline, pose potential difficulty for House G.O.P. leaders. Alas for those leaders, their

support is essential for them to have a working majority without the help of Democrats.45

The

third group consists of those who have shown the greatest loyalty to the party, voting with their

leaders on all five majority rolls, supporting Boehner for speaker, and refusing to endorse either

the Meadows letter or the Graves bill. They include some party leaders, and many of them

cluster towards the left end of the ideological spectrum within the Conference. Unfortunately,

their small size (a mere 10 members) is nowhere near large enough to be a strong foundation for

majority party authority.46

Rule was violated. They are Amash (MI), Bridenstine (OK), Gohmert (TX), Hueslkamp (KS), and Labrador (ID).

Four of the five met with Ted Cruz to plot strategy during the government shutdown (Fuller 2014d, 2014e). A sixth,

Massie (KY), gave only a pittance to the NRCC but otherwise fits the profile of the group. Bachmann (WI) is

another near-member of this group; she voted with the party on one instance of Hastert Rule violation (the

Battlefield Act) and initially withheld her vote for speaker before casting it for Boehner 44 In the 112th Congress, the G.O.P. had a majority of 242 seats, meaning that 10% of the Party (25 Republicans)

could, by opposing their colleagues, deny their party an absolute majority. In 113th Congress, the G.O.P.’s majority

shrank to 234 seats, so that a mere 17 Republicans (7%) of the Party could do the same. 45 Specifically, they voted against the party on all five violations of the Hastert Rule, cosponsored the Graves bill on

Obamacare, and signed the Meadows letter, but voted for Boehner for speaker. They include Kerry Bentivolio, Rob

Bishop, Mo Brooks, Bill Cassidy, Steve Chabot, Doug Collins, Mike Conaway, Ron DeSantis, Jeff Duncan, Chuck

Fleischmann, John Fleming, Bill Flores, Trent Franks, Tom Graves, Ralph Hall, George Holding, Richard Hudson,

Bill Huizenga, Randy Hultgren, Jim Jordan, Steve King, Doug Lamborn, Ken Marchant, Tom McClintock, Mark

Meadows, Jeff Miller, Randy Neugebauer, Scott Perry, Mike Pompeo, Keith Rothfus, Matt Salmon, Steve Scalise,

David Schweikert, Marlin Stutzman, Randy Weber, Brad Wenstrup, and Joe Wilson. Five Republicans would be in

this group as well but for the fact that they voted against Boehner in January 2013 (Walter Jones, Tom Massie, Mike

Mulvaney, Steve Stockman, and Ted Yoho). These five are arguably closer to the first group; if they were counted,

the “No” caucus would have eleven members, giving the G.O.P. a meager 224-seat working majority. 46 They include Charlie Dent, Mike Fitzpatrick, Peter King, Kevin McCarthy, Buck McKeon, Pat Meehan, Dave

Reichert, Jon Runyan, John Shimkus, and David Valadao. Boehner rarely votes but would otherwise be considered

an obvious member of this group.

31

Both the findings presented earlier and the groups identified here underscore the extent to

which traditional norms and expectations have decayed within the G.O.P. Conference. What is

especially striking in identifying members of the third group of Republicans is the absence of

many committee chairs and, in particular, Minority Leader Eric Cantor (who voted against the

party on one instance of Hastert Rule violation, the American Battlefields Act). Whether for

self-interested or other reasons, their absence is further testament to the ways in which norms of

party loyalty for those in positions of authority have eroded, at least in the first year or so of the

113th

Congress (Hawkins 2014).

Looking to the Future

There are good reasons to think that the divisions that plagued the House Republican

conference in 2013 may be more muted and that at least some of the party’s authority has been

restored. For one thing, the disastrous government shutdown in the fall of 2013 crushed the

party’s reputation and led record numbers of Americans to oppose reelecting incumbents (Pew

Research Center 2013). Those Republicans and conservative activists who had advocated a

government shutdown and who might have once exercised some significant influence within the

G.O.P. appeared to have egg on their face. As Rep. Aaron Schock (R-IL) put it, “when your

strategy doesn’t work…you lose credibility in your conference” (Associated Press 2013).

Speaker Boehner also began reasserting himself more forcefully against outside groups

that had pressed lawmakers to vote against him. At a press conference in December, he

lambasted their advocacy for the shutdown and, implicitly, their electoral threats against

Republican incumbents. “Frankly, I think they’re misleading their followers,” he said;

recounting how one of the group’s leaders later admitted that he never expected the shutdown to

32

work, Boehner angrily retorted, “Are you kidding me?” (Terbush 2013)47

Party leaders also

began demonstrating procedural creativity to overcome internal divisions, such as passing a

Medicare “doc-fix” bill in March 2014 by voice vote before opponents within the G.O.P. could

mobilize (Newhauser 2014). And when Heritage Action criticized a major water bill and made it

a “key vote” in May 2014, all but four Republicans voted in favor of the measure anyway.48

In addition, outside groups aligned with party leaders and its more mainstream

members—most notably, the Chamber of Commerce—began to flex electoral muscle. Early

signs suggest that their efforts have been working. In an Alabama special election run-off on

November 5th

, 2013, the Chamber-backed candidate Bradley Byrne beat Dean Young, a

conservative affiliated with the Tea Party, while highly touted Tea Party primary challenges

against Rep. Pete Sessions (TX) and John Boehner fell flat. Meanwhile, once-feared groups like

Club for Growth and FreedomWorks either supported far fewer primary challengers than

expected or had failed to find strong candidates to run against incumbents, and their support for

challengers often failed to translate into victory, with targeted incumbents like Mike Simpson

(ID) winning their primaries with relative ease (Ball 2014, Kraushaar 2014). By March, most

state deadlines for filing ballots in primaries had passed, and any fear of Republican incumbents

that they would face a serious primary challenger evaporated.49

Finally, the pull of office and the desire for reelection tempered the rebellious tendencies

of at least a handful of once-difficult Republicans. One such lawmaker first elected in 2012, Ted

Yoho of Florida, told a reporter that while he “ran on limited government, fiscal responsibility,

and free enterprise…when you’ve got programs that have been in place and it’s the accepted

47 Boehner did it again in April 2014, telling a group of Rotary Club members in his district, “I’ll stand with the tea

party but I’m not standing with these three or four groups in Washington who are using the tea party for their own

personal benefit” (Fuller 2014b). 48 The four rebels were Reps. Amash, Gohmert, Huelskamp, and Salmon (Dumain 2014). 49 See http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2014/2014pdates.pdf.

33

norm, to just go in there and stop it would be detrimental to our sugar growers” (Wallsten and

Hamburger 2013).50

As former West Virginia Senator and famous bacon-bringer Robert Byrd

once put it, “potholes know no party.”51

One should not assume, however, that the House G.O.P. is singing “Kumbaya” in unison

at its conference meetings. There remain a core group of disgruntled Republicans who appear

increasingly willing to work together, perhaps even organize as a bloc. As noted above, a

number of them have formed an ad-hoc “Liberty Caucus,” and in late April 2014 Sen. Ted Cruz

of Texas reportedly met with about ten House Republicans (including Reps. Brooks of Alabama,

Jordan of Ohio, and perhaps Huelskamp of Kansas) to discuss policy matters and—more

ominously for Boehner—the selection of party leaders for the next congress (Fuller 2014c).

Since many of the most resistant members of House Republicans Conference appear to be driven

by their own temperament or attitude towards party loyalty, they are unlikely to be persuaded by

short-term shifts in the political environment.

Speaker Boehner also remains in a far weaker position than he could be in. The fact that

most House Republicans voted against the debt ceiling increase in February 2014 (see Table 7)

suggested there was a shrinking number of partisans willing to take tough votes on behalf of the

party (Cillizza 2014). The speaker also did little to build confidence among die-hard opponents

after the unexpected passage of the Medicare “doc-fix” bill, which led to outspoken criticism by

Reps. Gohmert, King, Massie, Mulvaney, and Salmon (Newhauser 2014b).

Nor has the influence of the Tea Party movement—at either the grass-roots or the

national level—dissipated entirely. The Senate Conservatives Fund, one of the groups that like

50 One way some such lawmakers work around this is by voting against legislation opposed by their conservative

constituents, but then taking credit for individual provisions that their (other) constituents would like. For an

example of this, see Fuller 2014a. 51 Quote from Eigen and Sigel 1993, 478.

34

to interfere in Republican primaries, announced in March 2014 that it would begin endorsing

primary candidates in the House as well as the Senate (Sullivan 2014). And Tea Party-affiliated

organizations can still point to important election victories or near-victories at the state and local

level. For instance, badly-outspent conservative primary challengers to Reps. Bill Shuster (PA)

and Lee Terry (NE) nonetheless managed to keep those incumbents to winning less than 55% of

the vote. One “tea party favorite,” Alex Mooney, became the G.O.P.’s nominee in a

congressional race in West Virginia, and when Curt Clawson, another conservative candidate for

the House, won the G.O.P. primary in Florida in April 2014, one reporter noted that “the tea

party will likely claim credit for the win” (Cahn 2014, Fund 2014, Levinson 2014b, Livingston

2013, Livingston 2014, Tysver 2014). Tea Party activists in Virginia chalked up a victory in a

local party election, beating the preferred candidate of Eric Cantor (Portnoy 2014).

In short, it is still too soon to tell whether these recent developments portend newfound

party unity and authority or are merely chimerical. It will probably become clearer in the coming

months, as the rest of the 113th

Congress unfolds.

35

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42

Table 1. Areas of Authority of the Majority Party in the U.S. House of Representatives

Scope of Authority Usual Degree of Control Recent Examples of

(Attempted) Intraparty

Rebuke of Authority of House

G.O.P.

Organizational High * Speakership election (January

2013)

Procedural High * Discharge Petition No. 2

(2011-12)

* Discharge Petition Nos. 3, 4

(2013-14)

* Rep. Southerland Letter (2013)

* Votes against previous question

(February 4, 5, and 11, 2014)

Policy-making Moderate * Violations of the “Hastert rule”

(2011-2014)

Electoral Low to moderate * Reluctance to donate to NRCC

(2013-14)52

52 A stronger example of this occurred in the Senate when then-Sen. Jim DeMint (R-SC) endorsed and funded his

favored (and more conservative) nominees in various Republican Senate primaries.

43

Table 2. Variables Used to Test Various Theories of Party (Dis)loyalty

Variable Theory for Party

(Dis)Loyalty

Origin

District Partisanship (% Romney in 2012) Goal (Electoral) Outside Congress

Primary %, 2012 Goal (Electoral) Outside Congress

General %, 2012 Goal (Electoral) Outside Congress

Campaign Funds (Logged) Spent (For –

Against) by Outside Ideological Groups, 2012

Goal (Electoral) Outside Congress

Targeted by Outside Ideological Group (Club

for Growth) in Primary in 2014?

Goal (Electoral) Outside Congress

Endorsed/Opposed by Tea Party Group(s) in

2010 or 2012?

Goal (Electoral),

Roles/Expectations

Outside Congress

District Considered “Marginal” in 2014 (by Stu

Rothenberg)?

Goal (Electoral) Outside Congress

Retiring or Resigning? Goal (Electoral) Outside Congress

Tea Party Members (1000s) in District Goal (Electoral,

Policy)

Outside Congress

Particular Bill/Issue Salient to District? Goal (Electoral,

Policy)

Outside Congress

Ideology (Caucus Membership or NOMINATE

score)

Goal (Policy) Individual Member

Member of Relevant Policy (i.e. Tea Party)

Caucus?

Goal (Policy),

Legislative

Style/Attitude

Within Congress

On Bill’s Committee of Jurisdiction? Goal (Policy) Within Congress

Seniority (Terms in Office) Goal (Power),

Roles/Expectations

Individual Member

In Party Leadership Position? Goal (Power),

Roles/Expectations

Within Congress

Committee Chair? Goal (Power),

Roles/Expectations

Within Congress

44

Running for Higher Office? Goal (Higher Office) Outside Congress

Electoral Mandate (Class of 2010)? Roles/Expectations Outside Congress

Understanding of Legislative Norms (Former

State Legislative Leader)?

Legislative

Style/Attitude

Individual Member

Reputation as Maverick/Independent-Minded? Legislative

Style/Attitude

Individual Member

Open to Bipartisan Cooperation? Legislative

Style/Attitude

Individual Member

Personal Tie to Leaders (Friend of Boehner)? Legislative

Style/Attitude

Individual Member

Tea Party Critic? Legislative

Style/Attitude

Individual Member

45

Table 3. Top Congressional Campaign Spenders Among Ideological

(Non-Party) Groups, 2011-12 Election Cycle

Name of Entity Type Independent

Expenditures on

House Races, 2011-

1253

Direct Contributions

to House Candidates,

2011-1254

FreedomWorks for America Super PAC $5,764,559 --

Now or Never PAC Super PAC $3,007,289 --

American Future Fund 501c $2,247,133 --

Campaign for Primary

Accountability

Super PAC $1,816,476 --

Club for Growth Action Super PAC $1,114,604 --

Club for Growth PAC $197,693 $2,071,214 55

Club for Growth 501c $49,152 --

Koch Industries Corporation $738 $1,771,840

FreedomWorks PAC $0 $2,500

American Future Fund PAC -- $10,000

Source: FEC, compiled by OpenSecrets.org, Center for Responsive Politics.56

53 Home>Politicians & Elections>Outside Spending >Federal Election Spending. 54 Home>Influence & Lobbying>Organizations>[name of group]>All Recipients. 55 Individual contributions from CFG members directed by the CFG. 56 Note that Super PACs are prohibited by law from contributing directly to congressional candidates.

46

Table 4. Republicans Not Voting for Boehner for Speaker, January 2013

Member of Congress Ballot Choice

Massie Rep. Justin Amash

Bridenstine, Pearce, Yoho Rep. Eric Cantor (Majority Leader)

Huelskamp Rep. Jim Jordan (former head of RSC)

Amash Rep. Raul Labrador

Jones Former Comptroller General David

Walker

Broun, Gohmert Former Rep. Allan West (R-FL)

Stockman Present

Labrador, Mulvaney Refused to Vote

47

Table 5. Challenging the G.O.P.’s Organizational Authority: Vote for Speaker,

January 2013 (Partial Correlation Coefficients)

Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Romney vote 2012 -.05

(.51)

-.01

(.88)

.04

(.59)

Primary % 2012 .04

(.59)

.03

(.68)

.00

(.97)

General % 2012 -.04

(.59)

-.05

(.44)

-.06

(.43)

Outside $ Spent For – Against,

2012 (log)

-.00

(.96)

.01

(.92)

-.03

(.70)

Targeted by CFG (2014) .03

(.70)

.01

(.90)

-.03

(.68)

TP Endorse/Oppose in Past -.11

(.10)

-.11

(.11)

-.14

(.07)

Rated Marginal by Rothenberg .01

(.86)

-.02

(.83)

.03

(.67)

(Planning on) retiring .01

(.93)

.00

(.95)

-.01

(.89)

1000s of Tea Party Members

in District

.01

(.90)

.02

(.75)

-.03

(.73)

Ideology (RSC Member) .07

(.32)

-- --

Ideology (Mod. Caucus

Member)

.02

(.79)

-- --

Ideology (W-NOMINATE,

113th partial)

-- -.07

(.30)

--

Ideology (W-NOMINATE,

112th)

-- -- -.11

(.13)

In TP caucus -.13^

(.06)

-.10

(.14)

-11

(.13)

Seniority (Terms) .07

(.33)

.04

(.56)

.05

(.53)

In Leadership .07

(.35)

.07

(.34)

.08

(.30)

Committee Chair -.02

(.81)

-.01

(.88)

.02

(.83)

Seeking Higher Office - .17*

(.01)

-.17*

(.02)

-.10

(.19)

Class of 2010 -.03

(.63)

-.02

(.76)

.02

(.78)

Legislative Experience (state

legislative leadership)

.02

(.80)

.01

(.91)

.03

(.70)

Maverick Reputation -.09

(.21)

-.11

(.13)

-.03

(.69)

Friend of Boehner -.01 -.01 -.02

48

(.92) (.87) (.79)

Openly Opposes Tea Party -.00

(.98)

-.00

(.98)

.01

(.91)

Punished by GOP in

December 2012

-.43***

(.00)

-.43***

(.00)

-.47***

(.00)

Frosh Who Beat Incumbent

GOP

- .31***

(.00)

-.31***

(.00)

N/A

N 232 231 198

Note that numbers in parentheses are significance values, not standard errors. ^p<0.1, *p<.05,

**p<.01, ***p<.001.

49

Table 6a. Challenging the G.O.P.’s Procedural Authority: Signing Discharge Petition #4(a)

(Partial Correlation Coefficients)

Variable Signed

Discharge

Petition

Romney vote 2012 .05

(.46)

Primary % 2012 -.16*

(.02)

General % 2012 .10

(.13)

Outside $ Spent For – Against, 2012

(log)

.14*

(.04)

Targeted by CFG (2014) -.02

(.73)

TP Endorse/Oppose in Past -.02

(.77)

Rated Marginal by Rothenberg .02

(.72)

(Planning on) retiring -.04

(.52)

1000s of Tea Party Members in District -.06

(.35)

Ideology (RSC Member) .01

(.88)

Ideology (Mod. Caucus Member) -.02

(.76)

In TP caucus .04

(.60)

Seniority (Terms) .05

(.48)

In Leadership -.04

(.59)

Committee Chair -.01

(.91)

Seeking Higher Office .21**

(.00)

Class of 2010 .03

(.68)

Legislative Experience (state legislative

leadership)

-.01

(.85)

Maverick Reputation .07

(.29)

Friend of Boehner -.00

(.99)

Openly Opposes Tea Party .02

(.81) Note that numbers in parentheses are significance values, not standard errors. ^p<0.1,

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

50

51

Table 6b. Challenging the G.O.P.’s Procedural Authority: Other Actions

Signed Meadows Letter Cosponsored Graves Bill

Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Romney vote 2012 .03^

(.02)

.03

(.02)

.04*

(.02)

.06**

(.02)

.07**

(.02)

.08***

(.02)

Primary % 2012 -.52

(.53)

-.05

(.58)

-.04

(.73)

-.39

(.54)

-.08

(.60)

.25

(.75)

General % 2012 -1.09

(1.08)

-1.21

(1.10)

-.92

(1.17)

-1.13

(1.19)

-1.21

(1.30)

-1.66

(1.36)

Outside $ Spent For –

Against, 2012 (log)

-.02

(.02)

-.02

(.02)

-.01

(.03)

.00

(.02)

.01

(.02)

.01

(.03)

Targeted by CFG (2014) .58

(.61)

.80

(.53)

.90

(.54)

-.51

(.58)

-.42

(.47)

-.40

(.48)

TP Endorse/Oppose in

Past

.81*

(.31)

.82**

(.31)

.94*

(.43)

.68

(.44)

.56

(.47)

.51

(.57)

Rated Marginal by

Rothenberg

.20

(.48)

.36

(.47)

-.33

(.47)

-.26

(.41)

-.21

(.39)

-.44

(.45)

(Planning on) retiring -.14

(.54)

.15

(.57)

.36

(.59)

-.53

(.54)

-.25

(.56)

-.36

(.51)

1000s of Tea Party

Members in District

.02

(.24)

.08

(.25)

.13

(.30)

.02

(.29)

.11

(.28)

.10

(.32)

Ideology (RSC Member) .35

(.35)

-- -- .84**

(.28)

-- --

Ideology (Mod. Caucus

Member)

-.99**

(.35)

-- -- -.68*

(.29)

-- --

Ideology (W-

NOMINATE, 113th

partial)

-- 7.34***

(1.91)

-- -- 6.46**

(2.09)

--

Ideology (W-

NOMINATE, 112th)

-- -- 2.57***

(.87)

-- -- 1.65^

(.87)

In TP caucus .69**

(.25)

.62*

(.25)

.93***

(.27)

.59^

(.33)

.54

(.33)

.83*

(.33)

On Appropriations -.78*

(.38)

-.70^

(.37)

-.49

(.39)

-.51

(.34)

-.28

(.32)

-.30

(.34)

Seniority (Terms) -.03

(.04)

-.02

(.03)

.00

(.03)

-.09**

(.03)

.54

(.33)

-.11**

(.04)

In Leadership -.29

(.28)

-.30

(.29)

-.22

(.33)

.01

(.30)

-.04

(.28)

-.01

(.29)

Committee Chair -.89^

(.50)

-.82^

(.47)

-.76

(.52)

.33

(.38)

.40

(.38)

.39

(.36)

Seeking Higher Office .49

(.48)

.39

(.45)

.66

(.54)

1.26*

(.60)

.78^

(.46)

1.00

(.73)

Class of 2010 -.15

(.27)

-.24

(.27)

.19

(.32)

.33

(.29)

.28

(.28)

.32

(.31)

Legislative Experience

(state legislative

leadership)

-.86^

(.44)

-.90*

(.45)

-1.40**

(.50)

-.64^

(.38)

-.67^

(.38)

-.84*

(.42)

Maverick Reputation -.58 .76 .58 -.71 -.64 -.80

52

(.46) (.59) (.55) (.75) (.82) (.71)

Friend of Boehner -.60

(.45)

-.58

(.38)

-.34

(.40)

-.07

(.45)

-.09

(.41)

-.11

(.40)

Openly Opposes Tea

Party

N/A1 N/A1 N/A1 -.40

(.73)

-.93

(.70)

-.99

(.67)

Constant -1.22

(1.03)

-6.75***

(1.70)

-4.70***

(1.28)

-2.49*

(1.16)

-7.27***

(1.75)

-4.58**

(1.37)

N/R-sq 233/0.29 232/0.34 196/0.34 237/0.42 234/0.44 198/0.36 Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ^p<0.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

1 Dropped from analysis; predicts a “no” vote perfectly.

53

Table 7a. Challenging the Policy-Making Authority of the House G.O.P.: Majority Rolls

Hurricane Sandy (Jan. 2013) (a)

Violence vs. Women (Feb. 2013) (a)

Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Romney vote 2012 .00

(.02)

.06*

(.02)

-.00

(.02)

-.07**

(.03)

-.07**

(.03)

-.11***

(.02)

Primary % 2012 .45

(.56)

-.02

(.70)

-.33

(.81)

.80

(.50)

-.33

(.71)

-.27

(.71)

General % 2012 1.25

(1.36)

.09

(1.64)

1.59

(1.26)

-1.68

(1.32)

-2.72^

(1.58)

-.30

(1.26)

Outside $ Spent For

– Against, 2012 (log)

-.01

(.03)

.00

(.03)

.01

(.04)

.00

(.02)

-.02

(.03)

.01

(.03)

Targeted by CFG

(2014)

.40

(.57)

.19

(.61)

-.24

(.54)

-.23

(.39)

-.09

(.49)

-.05

(.49)

TP Endorse/Oppose

in Past

-.23

(.35)

-.31

(.38)

-.45

(.46)

-.45

(.28)

-.56^

(.31)

-.33

(.37)

Rated Marginal by

Rothenberg

.56

(.41)

.23

(.52)

.07

(.51)

-.23

(.51)

-.21

(.49)

.27

(.53)

(Planning on)

retiring†

.37

(.49)

.15

(.56)

.33

(.53)

.14

(.72)

-.50

(.65)

-.45

(.67)

1000s of Tea Party

Members in District

-1.22**

(.35)

-1.28**

(.39)

-1.00**

(.36)

-.07

(.25)

.04

(.25)

-.30

(.30)

State Impacted by

Hurricane Sandy

1.09**

(.34)

1.40*

(.54)

1.55***

(.44)

-- -- --

Ideology (RSC

Member)

- .29

(.31)

-- -- -1.00**

(.31)

-- --

Ideology (Mod.

Caucus Member)

.69*

(..29)

-- -- 1.24***

(.30)

-- --

Ideology (W-

NOMINATE, 113th

partial)

-- -17.00***

(3.22)

-- -- -15.70***

(2.62)

--

Ideology (W-

NOMINATE, 112th)

-- -- -5.54***

(1.27)

-- -- -2.92**

(.74)

In TP caucus -.54

(.36)

.32

(.45)

-.26

(.38)

.04

(.31)

.48

(.34)

-.17

(.31)

On Appropriations .03

(.36)

-.29

(.34)

-.10

(.40)

-- -- --

Seniority (Terms) .06^

(.03)

.06*

(.03)

.09**

(.03)

-.09*

(.04)

-.11**

(.04)

-.06

(.04)

In Leadership -.47

(.37)

-.55

(.39)

-.31

(.36)

.19

(.28)

.15

(.31)

.31

(.30)

Committee Chair -.22

(.44)

-.22

(.38)

-.21

(.42)

.44

(.41)

.59

(.40)

.30

(.38)

Seeking Higher

Office

.00

(.45)

.09

(.59)

.58

(.47)

.29

(.43)

.55

(.45)

.13

(.55)

Class of 2010 .11

(.29)

.38

(.34)

.43

(.34)

-.15

(.26)

-.04

(.30)

-.13

(.29)

Legislative

Experience (state leg.

-.08

(.48)

-.13

(.51)

.18

(.45)

.34

(.40)

.30

(.42)

.42

(.40)

54

leadership)

Maverick Reputation -.23

(.46)

-1.46

(.94)

-.94

(.73)

-1.11^

(.58)

-1.92**

(.71)

-.84

(.55)

Reputation of

working with Dems

-.11

(.37)

.26

(.34)

.09

(.36)

.34

(.37)

.91*

(.36)

.68*

(.34)

Friend of Boehner .01

(.46)

-.21

(.40)

-.31

(.43)

.54

(.47)

.32

(.46)

.50

(.42)

Openly Opposes Tea

Party

N/A1 N/A1 N/A1 -.39

(.55)

.11

(.62)

.22

(.67)

Constant -1.49

(1.07)

8.82***

(2.18)

2.35

(1.44)

4.73**

(1.48)

17.96***

(2.73)

8.67***

(1.55)

N/R-sq 228/0.33 228/0.57 194/0.43 225/0.39 225/0.50 191/0.34

% of GOP Voting No 79% 61% Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ^p<0.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. In all models in Tables

7a-c, the dependent variable is coded “1” if the lawmaker voted for the particular bill.

1 Dropped from analysis; predicts a “yes” vote perfectly.

† This variable is coded “1” if the lawmaker had announced her retirement or would do so later in the Congress. If

only those lawmakers who have announced their retirement are included, the variable is no longer significant. (a) This vote was placed on the score tally sheet of Heritage Action.

55

Table 7b. Challenging the Policy-Making Authority of the House G.O.P.: Majority Rolls

Battlefield Protection (Apr. 2013)

(a)

Debt Limit Agreement (Oct. 2013)

(b)

Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Romney vote 2012 -.01

(.02)

.01

(.02)

-.02

(.02)

-.04^

(.02)

-.02

(.02)

-.06**

(.02)

Primary % 2012 1.29^

(.51)

.87^

(.52)

.38

(.69)

1.03^

(.53)

.25

(.63)

.96

(.84)

General % 2012 -.35

(1.20)

-.81

(1.28)

-.62

(1.28)

-.21

(1.24)

-1.18

(1.56)

-.23

(1.28)

Outside $ Spent For –

Against, 2012 (log)

-.03

(.02)

-.03

(.02)

-.02

(.03)

.01

(.03)

-.01

(.03)

-.01

(.03)

Targeted by CFG

(2014)

.22

(.50)

.07

(.40)

-.19

(.43)

-.59

(.81)

-.63

(.60)

-.80

(.57)

TP Endorse/Oppose in

Past

-.54*

(.22)

-.49*

(.22)

-.56^

(.29)

-.77**

(.29)

-.79*

(.34)

-.89^

(.47)

Rated Marginal by

Rothenberg

-.10

(.44)

-.35

(.50)

.14

(.50)

.73

(.56)

.59

(.57)

1.15^

(.63)

(Planning on)

retiring†

1.65**

(.62)

1.63**

(.62)

1.32

(.66)

1.32*

(.64)

1.03*

(.52)

1.38*

(.62)

1000s of Tea Party

Members in District

-.47^

(.26)

-.47^

(.26)

-.79*

(.31)

-.33

(.31)

-.37

(.29)

-.31

(.33)

Number of Protected

Battlefields in District

-.05

(.13)

-.13

(.17)

-.06

(.14)

-- -- --

% Fed Employees in

District

-- -- -- .22

(4.53)

-5.78

(4.76)

-2.61

(5.67)

% Financial

Employees in District

-- -- -- 11.70

(9.92)

24.70*

(10.04)

20.18*

(10.27)

Ideology (RSC

Member)

-.22

(.27)

-- -- -1.06***

(.30)

-- --

Ideology (Mod.

Caucus Member)

.74**

(.27)

-- -- .79**

(.30)

-- --

Ideology (W-

NOMINATE, 113th

partial)

-- -8.34***

(1.72)

-- -- -11.57***

(2.90)

--

Ideology (W-

NOMINATE, 112th)

-- -- -3.43***

(.83)

-- -- -4.36***

(1.18)

In TP caucus -.53*

(.26)

-.32

(.27)

-.52*

(.26)

-.67^

(.34)

-.56

(.35)

-.78*

(.34)

On Appropriations -- -- -- .42

(.33)

.11

(.34)

.16

(.34)

Seniority (Terms) .02

(.03)

-.00

(.03)

-.00

(.04)

-.04

(.04)

-.04

(.03)

.01

(.04)

In Leadership -.00

(.28)

.04

(.27)

.09

(.29)

.72*

(.31)

.73*

(.30)

.88**

(.33)

Committee Chair .06

(.40)

.01

(.39)

.02

(.42)

-.16

(.42)

.07

(.39)

-.10

(.41)

Seeking Higher Office .19

(.50)

.24

(.55)

.03

(.68)

.75

(.49)

1.16^

(.60)

-.11

(.54)

56

Class of 2010 -.39

(.25)

-.32

(.25)

-.46

(.28)

-.36

(.28)

-.34

(.29)

-.24

(.31)

Legislative

Experience (state leg.

leadership)

-.42

(.40)

-.45

(.36)

-.22

(.35)

.07

(.46)

.35

(.44)

.40

(.45)

Maverick reputation -.28

(.38)

-.57

(.55)

-.50

(.51)

.82^

(.47)

.86

(.82)

.82

(.71)

Reputation of working

with Dems

-.74*

(.35)

-.56

(.35)

-.64^

(.38)

-.05

(.33)

.05

(.35)

.05

(.36)

Friend of Boehner .12

(.38)

.05

(.38)

-.12

(.36)

1.38***

(.35)

1.20**

(.35)

1.17**

(.37)

Openly Opposes Tea

Party

.27

(.73)

.57

(.64)

.54

(1.25)

.54

(.74)

1.29^

(.74)

1.00

(.76)

Constant .56

(1.01)

6.45***

(1.56)

4.64***

(1.25)

1.80

(1.14)

9.78***

(2.13)

4.69**

(1.48)

N/R-sq 223/0.23 223/0.32 189/0.30 231/0.43 230/0.53 194/0.47

% of GOP Voting No 55% 62% † This variable is coded “1” if the lawmaker had announced her retirement or would do so later in the Congress. If

only those lawmakers who have announced their retirement are included, the variable is no longer significant. (a) This vote was placed on the score tally sheet of Heritage Action. (b) The Speaker also voted (for) this measure.

57

Table 7c. Challenging the Policy-Making Authority of the House G.O.P.: Majority Rolls

Debt Limit Increase (Feb. 2014) (a) (b)

Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Romney vote 2012 -.42*

(.02)

-.03

(.83)

-.11**

(.03)

Primary % 2012 -.06

(.75)

-.28

(.83)

-.98

(.92)

General % 2012 1.21

(1.77)

-2.79

(3.10)

2.71

(1.83)

Outside $ Spent For

– Against, 2012 (log)

.05

(.04)

.02

(.04)

.05

(.05)

Targeted by CFG

(2014)

N/A1 N/A1 N/A1

TP Endorse/Oppose

in Past

.86**

(.27)

1.35***

(.37)

1.28**

(.40)

Rated Marginal by

Rothenberg

-.27

(.48)

-.88

(.63)

-.84

(.63)

(Planning on)

retiring†

1.65***

(.46)

1.86**

(.56)

1.84**

(.54)

1000s of Tea Party

Members in District

-1.00**

(.37)

-1.02*

(.45)

-.72

(.46)

% Financial

Employees in District

-1.79

(12.59)

-.23

(14.03)

8.38

(13.51)

Ideology (RSC

Member)

-.33

(.37)

-- --

Ideology (Mod.

Caucus Member)

.83*

(.35)

-- --

Ideology (W-

NOMINATE, 113th

partial)

-- -8.98***

(2.39)

--

Ideology (W-

NOMINATE, 112th)

-- -- -2.48*

(1.05)

In TP caucus -.36

(.38)

-.19

(.48)

-.57

(.39)

Seniority (Terms) .10**

(.04)

.07^

(.04)

.12**

(.05)

In Leadership .78*

(.37)

.81*

(.39)

.88*

(.40)

Committee Chair .66

(.51)

.83^

(.49)

.79

(.51)

Seeking Higher

Office

N/A1 N/A1 N/A1

Class of 2010 .08

(.43)

-.42

(.48)

.24

(.48)

Legislative

Experience (state leg.

leadership)

.32

(.55)

.48

(.53)

.33

(.54)

Maverick reputation .30

(.40)

-.08

(.64)

.12

(.53)

58

Reputation of

working with Dems

-.57^

(.35)

-.75^

(.40)

-.68^

(.40)

Friend of Boehner .39

(.45)

.46

(.44)

.36

(.49)

Openly opposes Tea

Party

N/A1 N/A1 N/A1

Constant .40

(1.22)

8.77**

(2.65)

4.84**

(1.83)

N/R-sq 227/0.41 225/0.49 189/0.44

% of GOP Voting No 88% † This variable is coded “1” if the lawmaker had announced her retirement or would do so later in

the Congress. If only those lawmakers who have announced their retirement are included, the

variable is no longer significant. 1

Dropped from analysis; predicts a “no” vote perfectly. (a) This vote was placed on the score tally sheet of Heritage Action. (b) The Speaker also voted (for) this measure.

59

Figure 1. Majority Rolls and Voting Victories of House Minority Party, 1971-2012

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

12.0%

14.0%

16.0%

18.0%

20.0%

Congress (Years)

Percent of Final Passage Votes in which Majority Party was Rolled

Percent of Final Passage and Amendment Votes in which Majority Party was Rolled

Percent of Final Passage and Amendment Votes in which Minority Prevailed over Majority