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The Fast Track ResettlementProgramme in Zimbabwe: Disparitybetween Policy Design andImplementationMedicine Masiiwaa Institute of Development Studies , University of Zimbabwe ,ZimbabwePublished online: 24 Jan 2007.

To cite this article: Medicine Masiiwa (2005) The Fast Track Resettlement Programme in Zimbabwe:Disparity between Policy Design and Implementation, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journalof International Affairs, 94:379, 217-224, DOI: 10.1080/00358530500082916

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The Fast Track Resettlement Programmein Zimbabwe: Disparity between PolicyDesign and Implementation

MEDICINE MASIIWAInstitute of Development Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT A quarter of a century after independence the distribution of land has become thedominant issue in Zimbabwe, the focal point of political upheaval and the reason behindZimbabwe’s departure from the Commonwealth. Attempts to resolve the issue in the 1980s werethwarted by scarce resources, escalating land values and a failure to turn donor pledges into cash.The issue resurfaced in the late 1990s, symbolized by occupations by ‘war veterans’ against abackground of violence and intimidation. The controversial fast track programme that emergedtransformed land ownership structure in Zimbabwe, with white commercial farmers losing about78% of their land to black farmers, but at a huge price to the Zimbabwean people.

KEY WORDS: Land reform, occupations, Mugabe, war veterans

Background

Land is a natural resource that has been hotly contested among groups of peopleliving in Zimbabwe. Before the arrival of the first European settlers over a centuryago, bloody tribal battles were fought for land and other natural resources. The fighttook on a racial dimension after colonization by the British in the late 1880s, whenrepressive legislation such as the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 pushed the blackmajority to areas with inherently poor soils and erratic rainfall. In response, blacksfought a lengthy war, which culminated in the attainment of political independencein 1980. By then land ownership was skewed in favour of whites. About 4500 whitecommercial farmers owned roughly 15.5 million hectares (39% of total land in thecountry). More than a million black farming households, on the other hand, ownedonly about 16 million hectares.

When the new Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF)government led by Robert Mugabe came into power in 1980, it made landredistribution a high priority. It set itself a target to acquire 8.3 million hectares fromwhite commercial farmers to resettle 162 000 black families during the period 1982 –

Correspondence Address: Medicine Masiiwa, Institute of Development Studies, University of Zimbabwe,

Harare, Zimbabwe. Email: mmasiiwa@science.uz.ac.zw

The Round TableVol. 94, No. 379, 217 – 224, April 2005

ISSN 0035-8533 Print/1474-029X Online/05/020217-08 # 2005 The Round Table Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/00358530500082916

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1985. This target was not achieved, as the government was only able to acquire about2.1 million hectares, where about 60 000 families were resettled. Major reasons givenby the government for the non-achievement of set targets were constitutionalconstraints and lack of financial resources amid a dramatic rise in land prices(Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989).1 Whatever the reasons, a good opportunity to raiseliving standards for the rural poor was missed. This view is confirmed by a study byKinsey (1999) who observed that the well-being of resettled households improveddramatically over the years.

Judging by the high initial interest shown by international donors, it seemed thatthe Zimbabwean government could have raised enough funds for its landprogramme. The British government, for instance, promised £75 million. However,10 years after independence, Zimbabwe had received only bout 40% of the promisedfunds.2 In contrast, a similar programme in Kenya, the Land Restoration andResettlement Process, received about £500 million (de Villiers, 2003). Other keydonors who pledged funds include the US government, which promised $500 million,the World Bank, the European Union (EU) and the UK Overseas DevelopmentInstitute (ODI). Unfortunately none of the pledges made was in the form of writtenguarantees, explaining why the Zimbabwean government had difficulties in gettingthe promised funds. There was particular donor reluctance when it came to theactual acquisition of the land (de Villiers, 2003).

Donor unwillingness to fund land reform in Zimbabwe was underscored at theHarare donors’ conference of September 1998. Here, government unveiled a $1.9billion (about ZW$42 billion) fund for its Phase II of the land reform programme.To the disappointment of the Zimbabwean government, the donors were only able topledge about ZW$7.339 million, just a drop in the ocean. According to the rulingparty, donor refusal to pledge requested funds was confirmation that the latter werenot interested in a successful land redistribution plan in Zimbabwe. A radical viewamong some of its senior members—that the country needed to implement its landreform plan without seeking external assistance—was thus strengthened. However,donors’ reluctance is primarily attributable to the fact that they had grownsuspicious of government’s passing of the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, whichallowed government to acquire land compulsorily (Tshuma, 1997).

Rising Political Pressure

The issue of land redistribution almost vanished from the national agenda during themid-1980s, prompting some observers to claim that land was not the real issue inZimbabwe as previously thought. Paradoxically, it is during this period that warningsigns of the imminent land occupation problem became clear. Although isolated,squatting on vacant state and private land became common. Squatting was also aform of protest by villagers against government’s clandestine selection criterion forland beneficiaries, which favoured well placed politicians and business people. Theland grab scandal of 1994, nicely called the Tenant Farmer Scheme, clearlydemonstrated that the government was no longer wholly committed to theresettlement programme (Moyo, 1995). The scandal not only unearthed the poorand clandestine criterion used in the selection of people for resettlement, but it alsoindicated that the ruling elite was becoming part of the problem in the complex web

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of the land reform programme. Government reaction to the squatting problem wasswiftly to evict the squatters to make it clear that invasions or squatting would not betolerated as a way of speeding up land redistribution.

Nonetheless, land evictions could not hide strong disapproval by the rural peopleof the slow pace of land reform and rising disillusionment among urban dwellersover hardships caused by an Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP).Within a short period political discontent rose to a level which government could nolonger ignore. The Zimbabwe Congress of Labour Unions (ZCTU) managed tomobilize the urban population and resist a controversial ‘war veterans’ levy’ in 1997.In September the same year a vibrant and widely supported opposition party,Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was launched. In February 2000 thenewly formed National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) managed to mobilize peopleto vote against a government draft constitution, which sought to acquirecompulsorily land. Compensation would be paid for farm improvements but notfor the value of the land itself. Apparently the perceived political benefit accruing toZANU–PF in enacting, as law, a provision which had been part of a rejectedproposal was that it would be seen as a revolutionary party that had rescued thepeople from the conspiracy against land reform by those opposed to land reform.

From Plan to Land Invasions

An important message conveyed to ZANU–PF by the majority of Zimbabweansthrough their rejection of the draft constitution was that the party’s support base wasspeedily dwindling. In response to this development, ZANU–PF chose to radicalizethe issue of land as a way to regain people’s support. Land redistribution wasreintroduced, now in a revolutionary manner—the ‘Third Chimurenga’.3 The firststep of the land radicalization process was the amendment of the constitution toauthorize land acquisition without paying compensation (Amendment (No. 16) Act,2000).4 The amendment was taken verbatim from clause 57 of the rejected DraftConstitution:

1. In regard to the compulsory acquisition of agricultural land for the resettlementof people in accordance with a programme of land reform, the following must beregarded as of ultimate and overriding importance;(a) under colonial domination the people of Zimbabwe were unjustifiably

dispossessed of their land and other resources without compensation;(b) the people consequently took arms in order to regain their land and

political sovereignty, and this ultimately resulted in the Independence ofZimbabwe in 1980;

(c) the people of Zimbabwe must be enabled to reassert their rights and regainownership of their land and accordingly.

2. the former colonial power has an obligation to pay compensation foragricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement, through a fundestablished for this purpose.

3. if the former colonial power fails to pay compensation through such a fund, theGovernment of Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay compensation foragricultural land acquired for resettlement.

The Fast Track Resettlement Programme in Zimbabwe 219

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ZANU–PF was portrayed as the only political party that had a genuine commitmentto land reform. The opposition MDC had to be portrayed as puppets of the British,opposed to land reform in order to preserve the privileges of white people inZimbabwe.

Pursuant to this political strategy, war veterans started the first forceful landoccupations on 16 February 2000. This marked a complete departure from a plannedand systematic land reform programme of the early 1980s. Law and order, whichhad been strictly upheld in the previous two decades, were significantly compromisedin favour of land demonstrations and the politics of land invasions. Concurrently,the role of bureaucrats was significantly reduced. War veterans, youths and landlessvillagers became key players in land demonstrations and invasions. For these groupsof people, law could not stand in their way.

At national government level the ruling party identified a two-pronged strategy,which would ensure its political survival. On the one hand, it tolerated andsometimes tacitly encouraged violent farm invasion by ignoring its own laws. On 17March 2000, exactly a month after the first farm invasions, the high court (Garwe J.,presiding judge) in the case of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) versus theCommissioner of Police5 issued an order, to which the state consented, in thefollowing terms:

1. Every occupation of any property listed in the schedule hereto or any othercommercial farm or ranch in Zimbabwe that has been occupied since Februaryin pursuit of any claim to a right to occupy that property as part of thedemonstrations instigated, prompted or encouraged by any person, is heretodeclared unlawful.

2. All persons who have taken up occupation of any commercial farm or range inZimbabwe since February in pursuit of any claim to a right to occupy thatproperty as part of the recent demonstrations instigated, promoted orencouraged by any person shall vacate such land within hours of the makingof this order.

According to this court order, farm occupations were declared unlawful and thegovernment agreed to this. However, the Commissioner of Police did not enforce theorder and decided to go back to the courts seeking to be excused from enforcing thecourt order. After 23 days of not enforcing the order the application by the PoliceCommissioner was heard by High Court Judge J. Chinhengo on 10 April 2000.6 ThePolice Commissioner argued that the police had no resources to enforce the order.More fundamentally, he raised a purely political argument that enforcing the orderwould lead to public disorder, as the people concerned were prepared to disobey thepolice in furtherance of their quest for land. Publicly the ruling party and warveterans employed the strategy of whipping up emotions around the land issue andundermining the judiciary. Chenjerai Hunzvi, leader of the war veterans’ associationunderscored this point when he said:

We are not afraid of the high court. . .This country belongs to us and we willtake it whether they want it or not. The judges must resign. Their days are

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numbered as I am talking to you. I am telling you what the comrades want notwhat the law says. (Sithole and Ruswa, 2003)

Having won in the high court but continuing to lose on the ground, the CFUapproached the Supreme Court with an application based on the breach of theconstitution by the government. The CFU sought to prevent the government fromcontinuing with land resettlement until it had complied with previous court orders.The Supreme Court, presided over by Chief Justice Gubbay, ruled that: ‘‘The rule oflaw in the commercial farming areas had been overthrown’’.

It also criticized the ‘Fast Track Resettlement Programme’ saying it did not meetthe constitutional requirements of a ‘‘programme of land reform’’. However, in anapparent testimony that it was succumbing to political pressure, the Supreme Courtallowed the government to continue with land acquisitions for a period of sixmonths. This was a milestone victory for ZANU–PF.

On the other hand, ZANU–PF enacted new laws that sought to legalize theoccupations. For instance, it enacted the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection fromEviction) Act, 2001.7 The purpose of this Act was to ‘restore’ the rule of law bylegalizing all occupations that took place during the period of 16 February 2000 to 1March 2001. Equipped with this Act, the government went back to the SupremeCourt, which it had by now reconstituted, seeking an order that the rule of law hadnow been restored. The matter was heard in September 2001 and was presided overby the new Chief Justice Chidyausiku. In that case, the Minister of Lands,Agriculture and Rural Resettlement & Others versus the Commercial FarmersUnion,8 the Supreme Court ruled, by a majority of four judges against one, that theland acquisition programme was now lawful as government had restored the rule oflaw. It upheld the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act, 2001 asconstitutional. It also ruled that the government now had a land reform programmein compliance with the constitution.

The Fast Track Resettlement Programme came to an end in July 2003.9 On 4November 2004 the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe upheld the Land Acquisition Act.In a case in which a Mr George Quinnel, a former commercial farmer, challenged theacquisition of his farm two years earlier, the Supreme Court ruled that theacquisition was constitutional and rejected the challenge.

Notwithstanding the controversy that shrouds it, the fast track programme hasmonumentally transformed land ownership structure in Zimbabwe (see Table 1). ByNovember 2003 more than nine million hectares of land had been transferred fromwhite commercial farmers to the black majority. In other words, white commercialfarmers lost about 78 % of their land to black farmers. The ‘Third Chimurenga’ had‘ended’ a century-long land imbalance problem.

The Fast Track Resettlement Programme has, however, been implemented at ahuge price, which the people of Zimbabwe still have to pay. This includes:

. a significant rise in food shortages resulting from a drop in agriculturalproduction;

. a sudden drop in export revenue;

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. a severe shortage of foreign currency because of diminished agricultural exportsand the use of scarce foreign currency to important maize and other commoditiesin which the country is normally self-sufficient;

. massive unemployment, as many farms discontinue the employment of labour;

. substantial depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar and a sharp increase in inflation;

. liquidation of many enterprises whose operations are dependent upon the supplyof inputs normally required by the agricultural sector;

. diminished revenue flow to the treasury by way of reduced taxes payable onagricultural profits;

. a worsening balance of payments position.

The Zimbabwean economy has also suffered as a result of discontinuance of foreigninvestment in the country and alienation of goodwill and the support of theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the European InvestmentBank as well as of the global private sector banking institutions.

Is the Land Problem Over?

The serious problems that beset the fast track programme strongly suggest that theproduct of such a questionable process is still problematic. In other words, the landproblem in Zimbabwe may not yet be over. It is important to note that the fast trackprogramme was hurriedly done ahead of a well organized and enunciated plan(Phase II of the land reform programme). Such a plan had never anticipated thereach, depth and speed of the fast track programme. The Land Report of 2003 by thePresidential Land Review Committee, chaired by Dr Charles Utete, highlightedmajor shortcomings arising from inadequate institutional capacity to implement the

Table 1. Land ownership pattern before and after the fast track programme

November 1997 November 2003

Area(millions ha) Percentage

Area(millions ha) Percentage

A1 N/a – 4.2 10.6A2 n/a – 2.2 5.6Old (1980 – 97)resettlement

3.6 9.1 3.7 9.3

Communal 16.4 41.4 16.4 41.4Large-scalecommercial

12.1 30.5 2.6 6.6

Small-scalecommercial

1.4 3.5 1.4 3.5

National parksand urban

6.0 15.2 6.0 15.2

State land 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.8Other – – 2.8 7.1Total 39.6 100.0 39.6 100.0

Source: Masiiwa, 2004; The Herald, 26 October 2003.

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fast track programme (Utete, 2003). These were in the areas of land identification,land use planning and demarcation, development of basic infrastructure, settlerselection and placement and provision of inputs and other forms of assistance toenable settlers to make a start on production on their new plots. The range ofactivities outlined above challenged the system as regards the marshalling of therequisite financial resources, the deployment of personnel with the skills andorientation the situation called for, the coordination of operations and the creationof effective administrative and governance mechanisms in the newly resettled areas.Availability of the resources for these activities fell far short of requirements.

Some of the problems arising from fast track resettlement and which need furtherattention are:

. ownership of more than one farm by some beneficiaries, particularly influentialpoliticians and business people;

. land ownership wrangles after offer letters for different people were generatedfrom different sources for the same peace of land;

. settlement of undeserving and unqualified people ahead of deserving ones as aresult of corrupt tendencies;

. settlements in undesignated farms, ranges and national parks;

. displacement of commercial farm workers;

. compensation for displaced commercial farmers.

Conclusion

The land question in Zimbabwe has exposed the disparity that can exist betweenpolicy design and its implementation. Well designed policies may not necessarily beimplemented in the way they were intended. Good policies can be sidelined ortwisted in pursuit of political expediency. Zimbabwe once had a well planned andrational land reform plan, which was once cited as a model for Africa. Unfortunatelythe plan was never fully implemented, for a number of reasons, until it was overtakenby events. For the ruling elite it became politically expedient to undertake the FastTrack Resettlement Programme. Law, as a vehicle of conflict resolution, playedsecond fiddle to political interests. At the same time, the role of institutions as policyimplementers was greatly compromised. Like its predecessors (successive colonialgovernments), the ZANU–PF government managed to craft policies and institutionsthat served to fulfil its narrow political agendas at the expense of broaderconsiderations. It is highly debatable, taking into consideration the history ofZimbabwe, whether these policies are fair and/or just. What is clear is that, aftermore than two decades of political independence, the Fast Track ResettlementProgramme has put an end to a specific problem, i.e. the land imbalance that wasgrossly skewed in favour of whites. It is also clear that the programme has beenimplemented at huge cost, which the people of Zimbabwe must pay. Whether theland problem in this country has really been redressed, only time will tell.

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Notes

1. Land prices shot up drastically from ZW$15.67/ha in 1980 – 81 to about ZW$92.24 in 1987 – 88

(Palmer, 1990).

2. The British government took a stance that it would only support a transparent land reform programme,

which benefited the poor.

3. Liberation struggle.

4. Act No. 5 of 2000.

5. Case No. HC 3544-2000.

6. See Commissioner of Police v. Commercial Farmers Union 2000 (1) ZLR 503 (H).

7. Act No. 13 of 2001.

8. Supreme Court Judgement No. SC111/2001.

9. Land acquisition is still going on under the normal land reform programme.

References

Kinsey, B. H. (1999) Land reform, growth and equity: emerging evidence from Zimbabwe’s resettlement

programme, Journal of Southern African Studies, 2, pp. 173 – 196.

Masiiwa, M. (Ed.) (2004) Post Independence Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Controversies and Impact on the

Economy (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institute of Development Studies, University of

Zimbabwe).

Moyo, S. (1995) The Land Question in Zimbabwe (Harare: SAPES Books).

Palmer, R. (1990) Land reform in Zimbabwe, 1980 – 1990, African Affairs, 89, p. 163.

Sithole, S. and Ruswa, G. (2003) Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Programme: An Audit of the Public Perception

(Harare: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung).

Stoneman, C. and Cliffe, L. (1989) Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society, p. 3 (London: Pinter).

Tshuma, L. (1997) A Matter of (In)justice: Law, State and the Agrarian Question in Zimbabwe (Harare:

SAPES Books).

Utete, C. (2003) Land Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee (Harare: Government of

Zimbabwe).

de Villiers, B. (2003) Land Reform: Issues and Challenges: A Comparative Overview of Experiences in

Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Australia (Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung).

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