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2012 SISP Annual Conference (Rome 13-15 September) Panel: The International Role of the European Parliament: An innovation in/for world politics?

The European Parliament in the International Election Observation Regime

– An Innovation for International Democracy Promotion?

Author:

PD Dr. Andrea Gawrich: Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel,

Olshausenstraße 40, 24098-Kiel, Germany; e-mail: andrea.gawrich@politik.uni-kiel.de

Please don’t quote without permission

Table of Content 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

2. On inter-organizational cooperation ............................................................................................... 3

3. Chances and Risks of Election Observation as a Democracy Promotion Tool ................................ 4

4. Not Innovative, but more Professional - Election Observation as the EP’s Foreign Policy Pool ..... 7

4.1 Institutional Setting and Empirical Development of EP Election Observation Activities .............. 9

4.2 In the Shade of the EU-Commission and the EEAS - Non-European EOMs as part of EU EOMs 15

4.2.1 The EU’s Retreat from European Observations and the EP’s Cooperation with the OSCE as a European Observer ..................................................................................................................... 15

4.2.2 Mutual benefits – The EP in EU EOMs .................................................................................. 17

4.3 Under the Aegis of the OSCE/ODIHR – EP as part of IEOM ......................................................... 19

4.4 Flying the Flag for Parliamentary Observations – the EP and Elections in Kosovo ..................... 25

5. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 26

6. References ..................................................................................................................................... 28

1. Introduction1

Election observation is regarded as an instrument of increased importance in international democ-

racy promotion. According to Thomas Carothers, it might be qualified as some kind of “democra-

cy promotion industry”. Despite the fact that election observation is a core democracy promotion

tool, it nevertheless bears a lot of challenges with respect to the proper use of instruments, neutral-

ity, knowledge and various further skills.

1 I would like to thank Christian Patz, M.A. for helping me with data collection.

2

The European Parliament (EP) has been an election observing institution in third countries since

1994. In fact, the EP shared its election observation activities, on the one hand, with the EU’s

Election Observation Missions (EU EOM) in non-European territories. On the other hand, Euro-

pean parliamentary election observation became an instrument of inter-organizational cooperation

between the EP, the parliamentary assemblies of the OSCE and the Council of Europe as well as

the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in the OSCE area. This

cooperation arrangement is officially referred to as the International Election Observation Mission

(IEOM).

The following paper is organized as follows: After discussing present scientific research on inter-

organizational cooperation, it introduces current academic debates on election observation. This is

followed in the next section by an analysis of the EPs election observation activities. After analyz-

ing the EPs institutional setting and development with regard to election observation, I analyze the

EP’s cooperation within the EU in the EU EOM. This is followed by an analysis of the EP’s co-

operation with the OSCE-lead IEOMs, before coming to a conclusion.

When referring to the core term of the panel topic, innovation, one might at first state that innova-

tion is not evidently connected with political science concepts. For example, political science dic-

tionaries often do not mention “innovation”. In comparison Oxford Dictionaries

(http://oxforddictionaries.com/) define this expression as “the action or process of innovating:

innovation is crucial to the continuing success of any organization”. Innovations occur in the

form of “a new method, idea, product, etc.” Based on this, we can understand innovation as pro-

gress in a certain field of activity which should generate success for the activities of the EP.

This raises the question how progress leading to success should be defined and which benchmark

this should have. Success with respect to the effects of election observation is generally difficult

to measure, as many external and internal influences are relevant. Furthermore, the EP is always

only one among a number of other actors. In contrast, it is an interesting point of analysis to de-

termine how the contribution of the EP generally improved European election observation strate-

gies of the various actors. Thus, it is worth searching for new ideas and methods in the sense of

progress in the field of EP election observations.

For the purpose of this paper, I will therefore refer to the term innovation in various directions,

which ultimately leads to two levels of analysis:

At first, inside the EP and the EU, it is worth asking, whether election observation as a part of EP

foreign policy has been an innovation for EP activities. Which relevance does election observation

have within the tableau of EP foreign policy instruments? How have observations evolved and

have there been institutional innovations in order to establish, maintain, and develop EP activi-

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ties? How are EP election observations situated within the general institutional setting of the EU

and how important are they for this part of EU foreign policy?

Secondly, on an international level this paper questions, whether the EP acted in an innovative

fashion in comparison with the international scene of election observers. How did the EP contrib-

ute to international cooperation and the division of labor in election observation procedures? Has

it remained in the shadow of other international election observation institutions or has the EP

substantially contributed to standards of inter-organizational cooperation and improved interna-

tional norms, techniques, and procedures of election observation? In sum, which role does the EP

play in the international scene of election observers?

Related to these research questions, a hypothesis can be posed as follows:

Ad (1): As the EU is not, like the OSCE and the Council of Europe, a traditional democratic norm

promoter it is assumed that the EP, as the EU itself, lagged behind other international organiza-

tions with respect to election observation. Yet, in the context of its weak role in EU foreign poli-

cy, following e.g. Crum in his broader analysis on the EP’s attempts “to exploit the loopholes that

are left” (Crum 2006, 384) in the field of the EU’s CFSP, it is assumed that the EP tried to con-

stantly improve and increase election observation activities in order to compensate its weak for-

eign policy role.

Ad (2): Based on the first hypothesis of being comparably slow in establishing election observa-

tion procedures and due to the fact that only short term election observations can be realized by an

international parliament, it is assumed that the EP did not improve European election observation

in an innovative fashion.

2. On inter-organizational cooperation

The EP’s activities in the field of election observation have two different institutional settings. On

the one hand, the EP acts inside the EU in cooperation with the Commission’s Election Observa-

tion Missions, on the other hand, it acts in cooperation with the OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE Parlia-

mentary Assembly (OSCE-PA) and the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE).

In order to analyse inter-organizational variation of EP election observations, it is worth looking

at concepts of analyzing and theorizing inter-organizational cooperation, currently of an increased

interest in international relations research (see e.g. Biermann 2008). “Most concepts applied to

organisational interplay…are rational in orientation. IOs are assumed to make individual deci-

sions based on cost benefit calculations or perceptions of these” (Brosig 2011, 154). By following

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e.g. a basic categorization by Oliver, who understands cooperation according to necessity, asym-

metry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability and legitimacy (Oliver 1990), election observation coopera-

tion might be analyzed through checking the relevance of reciprocity, as all partners pursue com-

mon objectives, as well as with respect to the enhancement of the legitimacy of the activities of

IOs. Furthermore, efficiency could also be examined, which Oliver understands as Intra-IO effi-

ciency, referring to cost-effective goal attainment through resource-pooling in election observa-

tion. This in fact bridges the two levels of analysis in this paper. In contrast, election observation

can neither fruitfully be explained through necessity, which is related to legal requirements under-

lying the interactions of international organizations, nor can it be explained through asymmetry, as

the EP (in contrast to the EU as a whole) itself is not an asymmetric actor with respect to other

participants of IEOMs. The same is valid for stability, as election observation is a very soft too,

which might not have enough potential to really stabilize inter-organizational relations.

3. Chances and Risks of Election Observation as a Democ-

racy Promotion Tool “The essential democratic institution

is the ballot box and all that goes with it.”

(Riker 1965, 25 cited in Hyde 2007, 39)

Election observation can be regarded as the most visible strategy of democracy promotion. Until

the 1980s, election observation had been mainly carried out by UN-operations and US-

interventions. It traces back to US activities in the 1920s and 1930s in Central America and the

Caribbean. Up until the 1980s, election observation became a rather systematic approach and after

the end of the Cold War it became a globally used instrument implemented by a huge variety of

local, regional, and international actors. One core function is the avoidance and exposure of elec-

toral fraud (Carothers 1997).

Election observation can be understood as the “purposeful gathering of information about an

electoral process and public assessment of that process against universal standards for democrat-

ic elections by responsible foreign or international organizations committed to neutrality and to

the democratic process”, aiming at “building an international confidence about the election’s

integrity or documenting and exposing the ways in which the process falls short” (Bjornlund

2004, 40).

During the 1990s, the majority of elections in transition countries were monitored (Bjornlund

2004). This is not only because democratic elections are a core precondition for democratic de-

velopments. For various reasons, election observation is a rather attractive strategy for interna-

tional actors. First, it is an internationally visible strategy, as polling days are globally known

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events. Secondly, election observation requires low levels of infrastructure when compared with

other tools for democracy promotion, which are costly and need a commitment over years. Addi-

tionally, an election observation tool box, once developed, can be transferred to other target coun-

tries as well. On this account, election observation is especially appropriate for an international

parliament like the EP, which only has a low level of resources at its disposal.

Regarding basic forms of election observation missions, the EP’s election observation missions

can be categorized as short-term missions of politicians, in contrast to short-term and long-term

missions by experts. Short-term missions face many constraints concerning the potentials of

monitoring, for example they can only observe electoral fraud on the polling days, which doesn’t

include other forms of electoral fraud, such as media restrictions and the like (Bjornlund 2004,

129). In contrast, observations by politicians are advantageous due to higher visibility in contrast

to observations of experts.

Table 1 Forms of election observation missions and EP activities

Time frame EP

Short Term EOM x

Long Term EOM -

Actors

Politicians x

Experts -

Level

National x

Referenda x

Local x (seldom )

Regional x (seldom)

Source: Own compilation

Basically, international observers have no special immunity and of course they have to comply

with national laws and especially with the legal provisions which allow them to participate in such

observations. This helps them to gain credibility with the local authorities regarding the election

observation statement and upcoming election observations. Most international observer organiza-

tions formalized their mission rules at the end of the 1990s or the beginning of the second millen-

nium (Bjornlund 2004, 131ff.). The EU did so after having experienced misbehavior and disap-

pointments in 1998 and 2000. The EP, instead, only formalized their rules in 2007 after having

endorsed an international election observation agreement from 2005 (see below). So with regard

to election observation norm development, the EP has been lagging behind.

There is a basic challenge accompanying post-election-statements of international organizations.

They want to both continue good cooperation and be frank in their criticism, which has in fact

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often led to moderate statements (Carothers 2004, 91). The OSCE overcame this tendency compa-

rably better than other international organizations. This is important because the core mechanism

of election observation is naming and shaming by explicitly admonishing electoral fraud and oth-

er forms of manipulation. Based on rational choice assumptions, observed actors are expected to

react to prospects of gaining or losing international legitimacy.

Kelley argues that intergovernmental organizations in contrast to international non-governmental

organizations are more likely to endorse elections due to geostrategic interests (Kelley 2009a,b,

2010). This additionally depends on the democratic quality of an international organization’s

member states, which is far less a problem in the EU (except the current cases of Romania and

Hungary) than in the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Furthermore, international parliaments do

not have to consider the international diplomatic implications of their statements to such a great

extent. In contrast, there is also a danger in a reverse direction in that countries receiving foreign

aid attempt to use election observation, hoping that international support will be maintained

(Bjornlund 2004; Crawford 2001; Dunning 2004; Knack 2004; Laakso 2002). This bears the risk

of strategic manipulation, especially with respect to short term missions. Autocratic regimes

could build up democratic facades and manipulate elections during the campaigning process in

spite of observations (Abbink/Hesseling 1999; Carothers 1997; Geisler 1993; Pastor 1998). Ma-

nipulations which the EP short-term observers cannot reveal include, for example, manipulation

of candidate registration, media censorship, and repression against oppositional candidates during

election campaigns (e.g. Myagkov et al. 2005; Schedler 2002). It is well-known that techniques of

strategic manipulation of election observation and hidden election manipulation have been greatly

revised by autocratic regimes after experiences with election observation in the 1990s. This has

been pessimistically viewed by Beaulieu und Hyde: „With the Western international community

emphasizing internationally certified elections, the best strategy for any benefit-seeking incum-

bent without a firm normative commitment to democracy is to hold elections, invite international

monitors, and rig the outcome in a way that is unlikely to provoke a negative report.”

(Beaulieu/Hyde 2009, 401). Several actors like the EU therefore turned to long term missions.

However, the EP as a parliamentarian observer is not able to turn to long-term missions and limits

its observation missions to cooperation with long-term observers (the EU or the OSCE).

The increase of election observation activities bears several risks. In the case of a lack of coopera-

tion of international actors, there is the danger of a „zoo-like atmosphere“ (Carothers 2006, 143),

if too many international observers want to organize briefings with local representatives. Conse-

quently, it is an innovation per se, if international actors coordinate their observations, as the EP

does through IEOMs, which at maximum would represent five international organizations. In

addition to the EP, the OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE-Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Europe

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Parliamentary Assembly and occasionally the NATO Parliamentary assembly carry out coordinat-

ed observations. At the international level, the UN, the EU, the Commonwealth, the OSCE and

the COE are regarded as the most professional election observers (Bjornlund 2004, 63, 130).

Despite this cooperation experience, it remains a basic challenge to combine insights from long-

term and short-term election observation missions (Bjornlund 2004, 144ff.), as there is a basic risk

that „Sunny day-after-election reports contrast with detailed reports issued months later that re-

veal many glaring inconsistencies in the voting process” (Mendelson 2001, 101). This in fact

endangers the credibility of the naming-and-shaming-effects. The EP tried to evade this problem

by also coordinating post-election statements with the EU or the OSCE as long-term observers, as

will be shown below.

Table 2 Observable problems and manipulations

Structural complaints

Legal framework not up to standards, limits on the scope and jurisdiction of elective

offices, unreasonable limits on who can run for office, etc.

Explicit pre-election cheating

Improper use of public funds, lack of freedom to campaign, media restrictions, intimi-dation, etc.

Pre-election administrative problems

Voter-registration and information problems, complaints about electoral-commission

conduct, technical or procedural problems, etc.

Explicit election-day cheating

Vote-padding, ballot-box tampering, voter impersonation, double-voting, vote-buying,

intimidation, etc.

Election-day administrative problems

Insufficient information about rules and polling locations, lax polling-booth officials, long waits, faulty procedures or equipment, problems with voters lists, complaints

about electoral-commission conduct, etc.

Source: Kelley (Kelley 2010, 163).

4. Not Innovative, but more Professional - Election Obser-

vation as the EP’s Foreign Policy Pool

It is commonly known that the EP traditionally played a rather marginal role in the EU’s Common

Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as the EU’s foreign policy remained a rather inter-

governmental field of policy regulations and the EP only had rather “’soft’ rights of consultation,

of information, questioning, recommendation and debate” (Diedrichs 2004, 33). This has im-

proved since the Maastricht Treaty basically through the Inter-institutional Agreements of 1997,

2002 and 2006, which set up information duties by the Presidency and the Commission. Infor-

mation and consultation rights in the field of CSFP are of certain importance for EP decisions

whether to establish an election observation mission or not. Since 2006, the EP has been informed

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on the basic foreign policy choices of the CSFP by each presidency (Barbè/Surralès 2010). Even

after the Lisbon Treaty, the EP remained “by and large, confined to a deliberating role. Member

states have taken care to restrict the EP’s budgetary influence on CFSP expenditure and even its

consultative powers have remained below the level desired by MEPs” (Peters et al. 2010). Yet,

Sjursen argues that through the establishment of the EEAS, the EP strengthened its position

through parliamentary questioning towards the High Representative and the involvement in budg-

et decisions (Sjursen 2011). Thym, in contrast, is more skeptical that “a general parliamentariza-

tion of the CFSP” is contrary to its strategic nature, which requires confidentiality and flexibility

in decision-making (Thym 2006, 124f).

In light of the background of the EP’s weak position in EU foreign policy, election observation is

one among several attempts to partly get over the evident lack of influence. A basic classification

can be generated from Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackelton, who regard EP election observations as

part of its various types of international delegations. Most of these delegations refer to contacts

with other national or international parliamentary bodies. More than two dozen of them cooperate

with national parliaments and about half a dozen with international parliamentary assemblies.

Election observation missions in this framework are regarded as ad hoc delegations, even though

they do not cooperate with parliaments in target countries. The most important similarity between

election observations and other types of delegations can be seen in the fact that many permanent

delegations have a certain monitoring role as well (Corbett et al. 2011). One further similarity to a

second tool of EP “parliamentary diplomacy” can be viewed in policy reports of the Foreign Af-

fairs Committee, e.g. on the EU and Russia, Iraq or the South Caucasus. These are own-initiative

reports and therefore not part of the consultation procedure within CFSP. Thym regards this as

“virtual parliamentary reality” or “parallel worlds”, as these reports are in no formal way linked to

decision-making processes in the Council (Thym 2006, 120). This is the same for election obser-

vation reports, which all election observation delegations submit to the Foreign Affairs Commit-

tee. If these reports prove to be convincing, they could have an impact on EU foreign policy deci-

sions through the EP’s consultations with the Commission, the Council, the High Representative

and recently the EEAS. Additionally, the aim of these reports is to influence the situation in the

target country, based on the rational choice assumption of naming and shaming effects.

From an institutional point of view, we can follow Corbett et al., who qualify EP election observa-

tion activities as one type of international delegation, beside joint parliamentary committees, pri-

marily with candidate countries or delegations to inter-parliamentary assemblies like EUROMED

or the NATO parliamentary assembly. Election observation missions are qualified here as ad hoc

delegations in contrast to fixed delegation structures. Until the 1980s, when EP international dele-

gations increased, they were essentially linked to European Community agreements with third

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countries. Only after 1990 did international delegations increase and thus increasingly provided

parliamentary backing for EU external policies and were political counterparts to Commission’s

and Council’s strategies (Corbett et al. 2011, Chapter 8).

4.1 Institutional Setting and Empirical Development of EP Election Ob-

servation Activities

As election observation primarily has to be regarded as a post-1989 instrument, the international

starting point of election observation can be pinpointed to the early 1990s. In comparison to the

OSCE (1992) and the Council of Europe (1990), election observation by the European Parliament

started comparably late, first in 1994 when the EP observed presidential elections in Belarus.

Thus, in European comparison, the EP has not been an innovative beginner with election observa-

tion activities but instead lagged slightly behind.

The EP election observations follow typical aims of parliamentary observations, as for example

stated in an EP decision in 2009 “European Parliament election observation delegations shall

aim to strengthen the legitimacy of the national election or referendum process, to increase public

confidence in the electoral process, in particular by ascertaining whether all the election proce-

dures are conducted in the most proper and most transparent manner possible, and, through its

presence, to provide more effective human rights protection and, where appropriate, to contribute

to conflict resolution or post-conflict stabilization of the State structure.” (EP 2009). As election

observation is a third country instrument, in contrast to the OSCE and the Council of Europe the

EP cannot refer to common rules, thus its starting point of criticism could refer to compliance

with national regulations and other multilateral agreements.

The empirical development within the time frame of this analysis in the 4th, 5th and 6th EP shows a

constant increase of election observation activities (see the graph below, the number of observa-

tions in the first half of the 7th EP, until July 2012, is just shown for additional information).

This can first and foremost be explained through restructurings inside the EP, which will be ex-

plained in detail below. On the one hand, the EP (following the EU) established a more structured

approach in election observation after 1999. On the other hand, the EP’s administration created an

Election Observation Unit in 2004, which partly could explain the second increase. The institu-

tional responsibilities concerning election observation inside the EP varied during almost the past

two decades. There is a rather general responsibility assigned to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

as well as to the Committee on Development (EP 2012) without any further specification, even

though it is obvious that the Committee on Development first and foremost works on target coun-

tries of the EU’s developmental policy.

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Figure 1 The EPs Election Observations Per Legislative Period

Source: Own compilation based on http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/

election_observation/default_en.htm

The 1990s as a nonsystematic take off

Even though there were about 32 election observations during the 4th EP from 1994 to 1990, these

times can be characterized by a nonsystematic approach. The expression ad hoc delegation would

fit here very well. As election observation reports are obviously not accessible any longer (EP-

Interview 2012)2, it cannot currently be evaluated how these observations were carried out.

Triggering momenta by Council and Commission decisions 1999 and 2000

One step for the EP to see an increased relevance in election observations was initiated by the

EU’s external strategies of consolidating democracy, strengthening rule of law, human rights, and

fundamental freedoms in third countries in 1999 through respective council regulations (EU-

Council 1999a,b), which then provided the legal basis for Community activities.

2 Research in EP archives remains to be done in my further work on this topic.

0

20

40

60

80

1994-1999 (4. EP) 1999-2004 (5. EP) 2004-2009 (6. EP) 2009-2014 (7. EP)

Nu

mb

er

of

EOM

s

Legislative Period

EP: Number of EOMs per legislative Period (1994-7/2012)

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An even more important incident has been the Commission’s initiative to organize its election

observation more coherently, announced in the Commission Communication on EU Election As-

sistance and Observation in 2000. This communication was motivated by a respective parliamen-

tary initiative encourage the Commission to deploy a more coherent approach in election observa-

tion. The European Commission indicated that election observation provided the legal basis to

switch from the second intergovernmental pillar of the CFSP - which had been under low influ-

ence of the Commission and at that time out of reach for EP - to the first pillar, which than would

increase influence of both EU institutions in various ways. Possibilities for first-pillar-funding

can, for example, be found in co-operation instruments, such as the Lomé-conventions and the

European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (EC-COM 2000). Based on this,

varying case-by-case funding stopped and election observations by the EU became more system-

atic with coherent supranational funding. Even though in this Communication the European

Commission regretted a lack of co-ordination between EU institutions and the EP until 2000 and

stressed a “special role” of the EP, there have been no recommendations for concrete steps of bet-

ter cooperation.

The EP’s Reaction on this “turning point in the EU’s approach to election observation”3 –

the 2001 Fava-Report and the 2001 Resolution

The Communication of the Commission in 2000 had a huge influence on steps toward a more

systematic approach of the EP’s election observation. At this point it is obvious that the EP could

not act as a frontrunner in the EU’s election observation, but was dependent on the Commission’s

initiative in order to improve its election observation activities. The EP reacted through a respec-

tive report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (Rapporteur Giovanni Claudio Fava) and a re-

spective resolution. The Fava-Report aimed at establishing a common approach in election obser-

vation through a trialogue between the Council, the Commission and the EP (EP 2001c), which

has not yet been realized. Yet, the close communication between the parliamentary Chief Observ-

ers and the High Representative (wearing the Council-Commission double-head) is today some

type of a trialogue (EP-Interview 2012).

The subsequent resolution of 2001, based on the Fava-Report, stressed that the EP “ought to as-

sume a prominent role in the EU’s scrutiny of elections, given its democratic legitimacy and spe-

cific expertise”. The EP tried to push the Council and the Commission to more coherence in elec-

tion observation, e.g. through a common 6-month planning period of election observation mis-

sions and suggested that a member of the European Parliament should regularly become Chief

3 So the EP’s ex-post Evaluation of the Commission Communication on Election Observation in 2000 EP 2008.

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Observer of the EU Election Observation Missions without requesting a formal regulation (EP

2001b). Later on, this became a regular solution.

The Election Coordination Group

The EP internally reorganized its structure on the basis of the resolution from 2001, subsequent to

the EC’s Commission communication for improving election observation. One important step was

to create an Election Coordination Group (ECG) in order “to examine all questions related to the

planning, organisation, evaluation and follow-up of the European Parliament’s observation mis-

sions, ensuring adequate cooperation with the Council and Commission, and coordination with

the relevant international organisations” (EP 2001b). Its composition should be designed accord-

ing to members of the foreign policy and development committees as well as members of the EP’s

inter-parliamentary delegations and especially from the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly.

The fact that only this Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPC) has been mentioned does not indicate

a geographical imbalance, but stems from the fact that at that time the ACP-EU JPC, founded in

1963, had been the only formation of that kind. Nevertheless, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamen-

tary Forum set up under the 1995 Barcelona Declaration could have been mentioned as well.

These regulations have been updated in the revision of the EP’s rules on election observation by a

decision of the Conference of Presidents in 2009. Since then, representatives of the EUROLAT,

EUROMED, and EURONEST JPC’s, which were founded later, have to be represented in the

ECG as well. Additionally, its political composition, which in the 2001 resolution rather generally

had been regulated as “balanced between the political groups”, was later determined in the 2009

regulation according to each political group (EU-EP 2009).4

The proposition to establish the ECG has in fact to be traced back to the Fava-Report, which again

was a reaction to the Commission’s communication on election observation in 2000. Furthermore,

the increase of election observation missions in 2001 (from 3 in 2000 to 7 in 2001) required an

improved coordination, so that the EP could demand a special budget post with good reason in

order to provide a secretariat for the ECG (EP 2001a). The establishment of the ECG formally

strengthened the role of the Conference of Presidents, as it is an additional institution inside the

EP which is not subordinated under any of the two relevant committees, but directly subordinated

under the Conference of Presidents. The Conference of Presidents authorizes election observation

missions based on the ECG’s preparatory work (ibid.). The ECG delivers its opinion to planned

election observation missions twice a year and examines general questions related to planning,

organization, and evaluation of these missions (EP-ECG 2009, 2010, 2011).

Delayed Acceptance of International Norms in Election Observation

4 For the 7th EP: EPP 4 seats, S&D 3, ALDE 2, Verts/ALE 1, ECR 1, GUE/NGK 1, EFD 1.

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On a global scale, a new level of multilateral election observation cooperation has been entered

through approving the „Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation“ as well

as the „Code of Conduct for International Election Observers“, which were established in 2005 as

a result of several years of cooperation involving more than 20 intergovernmental and internation-

al nongovernmental organizations. The process has been fostered by the National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division

(UNEAD) and can best be understood by referring to the rational choice based logic of inter-

organizational cooperation with reference to the reciprocity of common goals, the legitimacy of

the IO’s election observations as well as their efficiency according to an adequate performance of

all the actor’s election observations (see explanations on Oliver 1990 above). Despite the fact that

several international organizations signed the declaration of several institutions separately, the EP,

in contrast to the EU Commission, did not sign it. Regarding, for example, the Council of Europe,

the declaration was signed by its Venice Commission as well as its Parliamentary Assembly. This

was not the only case of parliamentary endorsement, as the Southern African Development Com-

munity Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) also belonged to the first signatories. In contrast, the

OSCE’s parliamentary assembly also did not sign the declaration. The European Parliament en-

dorsed this declaration with two years delay in 2007. Obviously, we must admit that the EP in this

context did not belong to the innovative actors and lagged behind, for example in comparison to

the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, with whom it cooperates in IEOMs. Neverthe-

less, the declaration has been an important point of reference in the EP’s subsequent argumenta-

tion on improvements of the EU’s election observation activities (Declaration 2005; EP 2008).

“The Learning Curve”5 – the EP Demands Broader Approaches in 2008

About one and a half decades after the EP started election observation activities, it summed up

previous experiences in its 2008 resolution on election observation. A primary intention of this

resolution was to stress the political will for a broader approach, including follow-up activities of

election observation with respect to parliamentary capacity building as well as lessons learned

evaluations at the Commission’s side. Moreover, Council and Member States have been requested

to better incorporate the recommendations of the EU EOMs in their political dialogues with re-

spective third countries while avoiding a “business as usual attitude” (EP 2008). These demands

fit into general election observation evaluations in practitioner’s as well as academic debates at

that time, when deficits of the “first generation” of election observation missions from the 1990s

were broadly discussed (see e.g. Burnell 2008). According to its weak role in international activi-

ties and the limitations of “parliamentarian foreign policy” due to a lack of time and resources of

5 This is a quotation from the title of Thomas Carothers’s book on democracy promotion, first published in 1999, later in

2006 (Carothers 1999, 2006). Carothers tries to explain mistakes in the “first” generation of democracy promotion strategies,

of which election observation is one of the most important strategies.

14

parliamentarians, the EP itself had no capacities to start follow-up activities itself and can only

demand the Commission to do so. Yet, the broader approach recently became visible as in May

2012, the Conference of Presidents decided to enlarge the mandate of the Election Coordination

Group and rename it as the Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group (DSECG), in

order to regard election observation as implemented into broader democracy promotion tools.

How this will work remains to be seen.

Additionally, the EP presented an innovative election observation idea in its 2008 resolution with-

out realizing it until today. The EP aimed at developing joint short-term election observations

together with several Joint Parliamentary Assemblies (ACP-EU, EUROMED, and EUROLAT) in

order to establish election observation cooperation with parliamentarians from Africa, the Carib-

bean, the Pacific as well as Mediterranean and Latin American areas (EP 2008). This idea aimed

at transferring its experiences in European IEOMs to non-European areas. Following Oliver’s

categorization of inter-organizational cooperation as mentioned above, this idea could be less ex-

plained through raising efficiency via resource-pooling, like in IEOMs, as the EP would cooperate

with parliamentarians with less or no election observation experience. Instead, the main motiva-

tion would be to enhance the legitimacy of the EP’s Joint Parliamentary Assemblies.

The EP Increases Formal Commitments in 2009

Despite the fact that the EP endorsed the international Code of Conduct for election observation in

2007, the EP’s implementing provisions in governing election observation delegations from De-

cember 2009 especially focuses on appropriate behaviors of delegation members. It sets as a rule

that MEPs have to sign the “Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament participat-

ing in election observation delegations” which is complementary to the international Code of

Conduct. Despite the fact that the EP set up an administrative Election Observation Unit in 2004,

which also works on coaching parliamentarians (EP-Interview 2012), even in 2008 the EP’s reso-

lution on election observation negatively evaluated the behavior of delegation members according

to visibility and credibility on a number of occasions. Furthermore, from time to time the number

of participating parliamentarians has been too small (EP 2008). Obviously, the behavior of MEPs

in the meantime has not been as appropriate as it has been expected. The 2009 Provisions addi-

tionally formalized best practice experiences to limit the EP’s election observations to long-term

missions either by the EU or by the OSCE/IDIHR (EP 2005, 2009).

The EP Gains Consultation Rights through the Lisbon Treaty

Through the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the role of the EP in EU

EOMs has been formalized for the first time. The respective “Council Decision establishing the

organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service” from August 2010 deter-

15

mined that the "European Parliament will be consulted on the identification and planning of Elec-

tion Observation Missions and their follow-up - in keeping with Parliament's budgetary scrutiny

rights over the relevant funding instrument, i.e. the EIDHR. The appointment of EU Chief Ob-

servers will be done in consultation with the Election Coordination Group, in due time before the

start of the Election Observation Mission" (EU-Council 2010). The EP’s influence on EU’s deci-

sions on EU EOMS could explain the increase of the EP’s participation in EU EOMS in 2011.

Consultation rights towards EAAS therefore decreased the EP’s commitment in the OSCE area in

the short term.

Regarding the institutional setting of election observation activities in the EP, it can be stated that

it is valid what Malamud and De Sousa called the “Monnet-method” while analyzing parliaments

as international actors. They argue that “incrementalism is preferred to early institutionalization”

(Malamud/de Sousa 2007, 98). Also in this case, institutional development followed the constant

and increased activities of MEPs in the field of election observation. Yet, neither cooperation in

election observation with the EU nor cooperation with IEOMs led to institutional innovations of

the performance of the EP’s election observation activities.

4.2 In the Shade of the EU-Commission and the EEAS - Non-European

EOMs as part of EU EOMs

4.2.1 The EU’s Retreat from European Observations and the EP’s Coopera-

tion with the OSCE as a European Observer

The EP’s current role in international election observation has partly to be regarded as a reaction

to the EU’s retreat from European observations due to a division of labour between the EU and

the OSCE/Council of Europe. This can be regarded as an informal “gentlemen’s agreement” be-

tween the EU and the OSCE, even though the strategic relevance of Eastern European countries is

very high for the EU (Meyer-Resende 2006, 2008). Through its cooperation with the OSCE, the

EP somehow compensated the EU’s strategy to refrain from election observations in the European

area.

The EU basically started with election observations in 1993 for Russian parliamentary elections

(where MEPs took part as well). But even during the subsequent elections in 1995, the EU acted

under the formal coordination of the OSCE (EC-COM 2000). The role of the OSCE increased on

a case-basis, which arose from its leading role in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1996-1998, where the

OSCE had been charged by the Dayton Peace agreement to organize elections and therefore to

coordinate international observations as well. Following the neo-institutionalist logic of path-

16

dependency, this fostered the OSCE’s role as a front runner in election observation during the

following years.

Therefore, an evident lack of visibility - despite funding of other actor’s election observations -

contributed to the European Commission Communication in 2000 already mentioned above. The

Commission frankly stated that ”co-ordination should mean partnership, not delegation of re-

sponsibilities. Due to lack of the management capacity to implement large field operations, the

EU has often delegated responsibility to other international actors such as the OSCE and the UN.

In the OSCE geographical area, the EU has systematically worked under the umbrella of the

OSCE/ODIHR. This has in all cases diminished the EU’s identity and rendered the control of

Community funds problematic, as the Court of Auditors has pointed out. A real risk exists that the

EU, instead of being a policy actor, becomes a bank to finance the policies of others, particularly

as long as problems of EU procedures and expertise are not addressed” (EC-COM 2000, 9). The

EU’s retreat from election observation can therefore be explained by some rational-choice argu-

ments, as “Organisational interplay is rational in character because any activity requires re-

sources and interplay provides for access to them, on the basis of reciprocal exchange”, which

“forces IOs to measure and calculate and finally decide which resources are the most valuable

for exchange” (Brosig 2011, 157). It is doubtless that reciprocal exchange could not be expected

in cooperation with the OSCE, especially because EU states participating in the OSCE contribute

to about 70 % of its annual budget (Chambers 2010).

Additionally, the European Commission criticized that since 1993 the EU only took the lead in

election observations in Palestine (1996) and partly in Cambodia (1998). Yet, the European

Commission did not draw conclusions to demand for more co-ordination with other international

organizations, but rather demanded an improvement of the EU’s own strategies and standards. As

stated above, this Communication was a milestone in pushing the election observations of the EU

to adhere to a more coherent approach and, additionally, led to the EU’s retreat from the OSCE

area in its election observation activities.

In its resolution from 2001, the EP stressed “the importance of avoiding overlapping and duplica-

tion of effort between different organisations involved in monitoring elections in a country” and

the EP “observes that the EU’s involvement should not be an end in itself where other election

monitoring organisations are represented” (EP 2001b). It called on the Commission to establish

partnership agreements with relevant international organisations, such as the OSCE, the Council

of Europe, and the United Nations for election observation and assistance missions in order to

ensure better cooperation, the coordination of working methods, and EU/EP visibility. Thus, close

cooperation between the EP and the OSCE in European election observation is ascribed to the

17

EU’s change of strategy, but not to innovations of the EP. Until today, the de-facto avoidance of

duplication with the OSCE and the EP’s role in it has not been formalized (EP-Interview 2012).

Yet, a second crucial point has to be regarded: the EU refrained from European election observa-

tion in OSCE areas in order not to interfere in post-Soviet regions, as Russia increased its criti-

cism during Putin’s first presidency after 2000. Russia constantly attempted to water down elec-

tion observation through demanding OSCE observations in western countries as well. This reduc-

es capacities for observations in the east (Fawn 2006; Gawrich 2012). If this continues and Russia

is successful in diminishing the outstanding role of the OSCE/ODIHR, the EU could return to

European election observations again (Meyer-Resende 2006).

4.2.2 Mutual benefits – The EP in EU EOMs

As the following graph shows, election observations in cooperation with the EU Commission

have been the primary strategy of the EP since 1999 (data on cooperation before 1999 are not

available). A first increase can be noticed after the Commission Communication on election ob-

servations (2000), when the EU improved its methodology. The second increase took place in

2005 after the EP had established its administrative Election Observation Unit in 2004 and it is

therefore due to internal reasons. A third increase has been visible since 2011 after the EP’s for-

mal consultation rights were established following the Lisbon Treaty and subsequent regulations

in 2010.

Figure 2 EP Cooperation with EU EOM and IEOM 1999 to 7/2012

Source: Own compilation, based on European Parliament data.

Mutual benefits in inter-institutional relations: In EU EOM cooperation, the EP follows the lead-

ing role of the Commission, since in addition to the Commission’s staff, the diplomatic missions

of EU member states are also involved in host countries, so that there is an inter-governmental

18

dimension included in EU activities (EP 2008a). Apart from this, there is no hierarchical structure

between the Commission and the EP with regard to the field of election observation, as both pur-

sue distinct approaches in that the EP is assigned to parliamentary short-term observations with

small delegations. In contrast, the Commission conducts long-term observations with large expert

delegations. Accordingly, problems of inter-institutional cooperation and knowledge sharing

could mainly be avoided (Tsai 2002 basically refers to this as "coopetition").

Due to the increased structuring of EU election observation after the Commission’s communica-

tion in 2000 (see above), the Commissioner for External Relations at that time, Chris Patten, of-

fered (in the aftermath of this Communication and the parliamentary Fava-report on election ob-

servation the EP) to “integrate any Parliamentary delegation, if they so wish, into the EU Elec-

tion Observation Mission, including the training, briefing, debriefing and deployment of observ-

ers” (COM-Ex-Rel 2001). Yet, he did not promise the systematic approach of appointing MEPs

as chief observers of EU EOMs. As stated above, after the establishment of the EEAS, the EP at

least has to be consulted on the appointment of a head of mission, which in fact is a MEP as a rule

today and which the EP regards as its most important achievement as being its “key role” in EU

EOMs (EP 2008). Appointing an MEP as head of mission gives each EU EOM a parliamentarian

face, which could be regarded as an added value with respect to its legitimacy for both institu-

tions.

In contrast to IEOMs, the EP constantly tried to influence EU EOMs through reports and resolu-

tions. The 2001 Fava report and the subsequent resolution corresponded to the EU’s improve-

ments of methodology in election observation. Before 2000, several EU EOMs had been regarded

as superficial by the EP (Meyer-Resende 2008) and the EP could not compensate this. The EP

resolution in 2008 attempted to motivate the EU to implement a broader approach of election ob-

servation with further post-election support, without having resources to realize this on its own.

Nevertheless, the EP just recently offered to help with follow-up measures through its standing

delegations and joint parliamentary assemblies (EP 2011), yet effects remain to be seen. Several

times, the EP demanded that the EU should improve follow-ups, prioritize founding elections in

emerging democracies and better incorporate EOM’s findings in third-country strategies, without

sustainable success, which could be explained through the fact that the EU has no agreed strategy

on democracy promotion (EP 2008, 2011; Meyer-Resende 2008). Therefore, election observation

remained only one fragment.

On geographical preferences: The EP stated in 2008 that it appreciates the regional focus of the

EU EOMs in Africa, Asia and Latin America, but it complains about a lack of EOMs in the

Southern Mediterranean and in Middle Eastern countries in the previous decade (EP 2004, 2008).

This regional imbalance is striking, because since 2004 the instrument of Neighbourhood Policy

19

could have included election observation in the respective action plans. Yet, in contrast to eastern

neighbors, action plans on southern neighbors (except for Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority)

do not refer to electoral standards (Meyer-Resende 2008). The EP explicitly demanded to include

feasibility of election observation in association agreement negotiations with these countries. The

fact that the EU obviously dropped behind the Mediterranean countries in election observation

activities is a huge shortcoming of the background of the arab spring democratizations, beginning

at the end of 2010. As the EP does not conduct election observations without the EU’s long term

missions, there was no opportunity to observe this region on its own.

The following graph shows, that EP EOMs especially focused on observations in African coun-

tries. This interregional comparison additionally shows that the EP pursues its intermediate role in

European election observation with respect to OSCE areas, because here the EP did observe many

elections.

Figure 3 EP EOMs per Area 1994-7/2012

Source: Own compilation, based on European Parliament data.

4.3 Under the Aegis of the OSCE/ODIHR – EP as part of IEOM

IEOMs have comparably good reputations within the international election observation scene

(Kelley 2009), so the participation of the EP basically increased its international relevance. Never-

20

theless, one should take a deeper look into several critical aspects. Generally, EP cooperation in

IEOMs is of totally different character than cooperation inside EU. Here, the ODIHR is an elec-

tion observation agency and obtained a managing role for all other partners for cooperation, both

inside and outside the OSCE. Obviously, the EP accepts a hierarchy of competences between the

EU and the OSCE and regards the OSCE as a frontrunner in the methodology of election observa-

tion, e.g. in its 2008 resolution, the EP paid “tribute to the ODIHR, whose pioneering work has

strongly inspired the EU methodology on election observation” and “the important role of

ODIHR EOMs in the OSCE area, where the EU does not as a rule deploy election observation

missions; commends the ODIHR for the quality of its work and its adherence to high standards of

transparency and independence”. Furthermore, it drew attention to the “added value of participa-

tion in international election observation missions in the OSCE area, along with the

OSCE/ODHIR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of

Europe and, where appropriate, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; is of the opinion that its

involvement in these missions should be continued and even increased; underlines the crucial

importance of thorough political coordination between the bodies involved, in particular as re-

gards the diligence of its assessment, adherence to independence standards, the conclusions of

long-term observers and the coherence of public statements“ (EP 2008),

ODIHR’s multilateral election observation leadership had already been initiated by the OSCE

Budapest summit in 1994. Until the end of 1993, the ODIHR had already observed more than 10

elections, whereas the EP only started with two observations in 1994. Interestingly, the OSCE's

first international cooperation took place with the United Nations in 1995 and not with European

actors, such as the EP. But since 1995, multilateral election observation cooperation mostly with

the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the EP and even-

tually the NATO Parliamentary Assembly became a typical constellation of IEOMs (Gawrich

2012; Löwenhardt 2005; OSCE-ODIHR 1995).

Coordination: Regarding the more than 40 common observations of IEOMs since 1999, it is

astonishing that this cooperation is not based on a formalized agreement of cooperation between

the OSCE and the EP or the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. This only exists inside

the OSCE through an inter-institutional agreement between the ODIHR and the OSCE Parliamen-

tary Assembly from 1997, which provides regulations for cooperation. There has been a long-

standing dispute between the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the ODIHR concerning the

leading role and visibility in election observations, which generally had negative effects on gener-

ating a common international voice in IEOMs (Chambers 2010). The OSCE Parliamentary As-

sembly insists on having a leading role in short-term observations and constantly fears that

ODIHRs managing role will undermine its competences (Gawrich 2012). Yet without a doubt,

21

among the four to five election observation institutions, only the ODIHR has capacities to proper-

ly organize pre-election briefings (i.e. meetings with state representatives, party members and so

on), observation logistics for polling days as well as post-election statements and final press con-

ferences according to the joint preliminary post-election statements, which are the most important

democracy promotion tool of election observations. But, it’s not only a question of resource-

pooling, which is a basic argument in current analysis of inter-organizationalism. Instead, inter-

organizational coordination at this point is of utmost importance, because e.g. separate post-

election statements would bear risks of “forum shopping” by national actors. This would cause

de-legitimization of international election observation actors (Kelley 2009).

Visibility: Because the leadership of the OSCE/ODIHR in election observation in post-Soviet

space is largely undisputed, which the EP has also acknowledged several times, there remains the

evident risk of a lack of visibility in IEOMs for all non-OSCE actors. The participation of the EP

in IEOMs plays no role in academic literature, despite the fact that the EP, for example, co-

observed one third of OSCE’s observations between 2004 and 2009 (Chambers 2010; Fawn

2006). The 1997 agreement between the ODIHR and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly should

have positive effects on the Council of Europe and the EP as well, as it not only provides for a

leading role of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in short-term missions, but also for co-chairs

of IEOMs by other partners like the Council of Europe and the EP (OSCE 1997). This has not

been realized and IEOMs are widely regarded as OSCE-led, which of course poses is a constant

problem of visibility for the EP and the Council of Europe.

The EP carries out most election observations with the European Commission; the visibility prob-

lem is comparably harder for the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, which cooperates

fully with the OSCE. It has been disappointed according to “the difficulty…. presenting their

opinions on equal terms… Equality in co-operation is extremely difficult to achieve. The problems

are due in particular to the considerable human and material resources at the ODIHR’s dispos-

al” (CoE-AS 2001-9267).

The dominant organizational and evaluative role of ODIHR and the constant struggles in achiev-

ing visibility allows only for a limited understanding of IEOMs as a field of inter-parliamentary

networks, which Crum and Fossum regard as an inter-parliamentary type of cooperation, if “pre-

viously independent bodies have become linked in a horizontal structure with functional relations

between them” (Crum/Fossum 2009, 258). Instead, from an organizational point of view, the hor-

izontal is rather hierarchic, as participating parliamentary institutions lack capacities to organize

these missions on their own.

22

EP non-observation in candidate countries: The EP’s opportunities to closely cooperate with the

OSCE/ODIHR in IEOMs do not fully build on a common history of election observation, as the

OSCE/ODIHR observed EU’s eastern applicant countries since the 1990s and during the EU ac-

cession process, whereas the EU and the EP did not participate as a rule (EP-Interview 2012).6

Superficially considered, this seems to be a huge paradox, since the EU and the EP appear to have

the largest geopolitical interests in election observation in this area. Regarding the EU, this has

already been explained through its general retreat from election observation in Europe With re-

spect to the EP, this seems astonishing, as it joins in on IEOM observations in all other parts of

the OSCE area. An explanation can be found in the fact that the countries observed regard posi-

tive post-election statements as one important step of being ready for EU membership (Fawn

2006; Gawrich 2012). The EU itself fostered these hopes through occasionally referring to posi-

tive observations in their progress reports with candidate countries. As accession process has been

complex, the EP did not want to raise accession hopes among the accession countries too early.

This could explain the restraint of EP participation in observation activities. Nevertheless, there

have occasionally been exceptions, for example the parliamentary elections in Slovakia in 1998,

which led to the end of the government of autocratic Vladimír Mečiar.

The same pattern can be observed for the Balkan countries, which applied for membership com-

parably late. During the 1990s, the EP participated in election observations in this post-conflict

region, which the OSCE especially emphasized due to its state building activities. The EP stopped

observing these countries after they were identified as a potential candidate for EU membership

during the Thessaloniki European Council summit in June 2003. These countries included Alba-

nia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, with the exception of the

latter and in addition to Montenegro, have applied for membership in the past few years. EP ob-

servations in Albania in 2005 were the only exception in a potential Balkan applicant country

after the Thessaloniki Council of 2003, because many deficits were expected (EP-EO-Albania

2005). Additionally, the EP observed Montenegro during its referendum on independence (EP-

Montenegro 2006). Most importantly, there were also several election observations in Kosovo

before and after independence, which will be explained below.

Serving as a bridge – EP observations in the Eastern European Neighbourhood: The EP put spe-

cial emphasis on observing elections in those countries, which are actively included in the EU’s

Eastern European Neighborhood countries, e.g. the Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia and

Azerbaijan. This was a geographic priority in the first half of the 1990s and became important

again after the idea of a European Neighbourhood Policy had been announced in 2003, when ca-

pacity absorption due to EU enlargement policies decreased. Especially the countries of colored

6 There have been exceptions according to Slovakia and Bulgaria.

23

revolutions, specifically Georgia and Ukraine, invited the EP to carry out observations several

times, but observations were also carried out in the less democratic countries of Armenia and

Azerbaijan (e.g. EP-EOD-Armenia 2012; EP-EOD-Azerbaijan 2005; EP-EOD-Georgia 2004,

2008; EP-EOD-Moldova 2009, 2010; EP-EOD-Ukraine 2007).

During the very special observations during the event of the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine in

2004, which arose from demonstrations against presidential election results, there have been cases

of a lack of impartiality by members of the EP, which has given cause for a subsequent improve-

ment code for the conduct of mission members (Meyer-Resende 2008).

As the EU relies quite a bit on the findings of IEOMs, especially with respect to the European

Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) agreements with the Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, the EP serves

as an additional channel for information on the political atmosphere in the ENP countries for the

European Commission as well as for showing the EU’s interest in the political developments in

these countries. As mentioned above, the EP puts a similar regional emphasis on neighbourhood

countries in its EU EOM cooperation as well when dealing with the Southern Neighbourhood

countries. In contrast to Georgia and Ukraine, where the EP had been an election observer already

before revolutionary movements arose, the Mediterranean neighborhood observations had not

been an EU priority before the Arab spring started in 2010. Consequently, the EP’s main focus on

Eastern Europe in IEOMs is somewhat complementary to its criticism directed towards the EU

about its lack of observations in the Mediterranean area.

Restraint regarding Russia – following EU’s strategy: Russia has been one case of non-

observation, in which the EP de facto followed the EU strategy of careful observations in Europe.

The EP observed parliamentary elections in Russia in 1995, at that time even in cooperation with

EU institutions. Since then, the EP only observed the 1996 presidential and the 1999 parliamen-

tary elections (EP-EOD-Russia 1999). The latter were a case of cooperation with the OSCE and

the Council of Europe. Within the OSCE, Russia is a special case, because it played a rather ob-

structing role with regard to funding and formal competences of the OSCE/ODIHR. Since the

beginning of the Putin area there is a constant struggle of most western participating countries to

keep up scope and methodology of election observation against Russian strategy (Gawrich 2012).

Despite the fact that the EP itself did not participate in the 6 OSCE observations after 1999, it

followed the activities with a critical eye. In 2008 the EP criticized this development, without

mentioning Russia, as it expressed ”its concern about statements and actions of some OSCE par-

ticipating States that call into question the ODIHR’s mandate and undermine the effectiveness,

funding and independence of its missions; calls on OSCE participating States and on the Europe-

an Council to uphold the ODIHR’s position as the principal election-monitoring body in the

OSCE area; in particular, condemns the recent imposition by certain OSCE participating States

24

of restrictions on the duration of EOMs and their refusal to issue, or delay in issuing, visas for

observers, which has made it impossible for the ODIHR to fulfill its mandate” (EP 2008).

Visibility and legal basis of recommendations: It is a basic problem that the EP cannot refer to

own EU’s commitments in its observation missions in the OSCE area in contrast to the OSCE and

the Council of Europe. Both organizations act on membership territory and can refer to treaties

and commitments. The OSCE and the Council of Europe refer either to ODIHRs previous rec-

ommendations or to the OSCE commitments, such as the Copenhagen Document or to Council of

Europe resolutions and advice from the Venice Commission. The EP instead can refer to ENP

commitments in Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova and regularly does so since

the ENP started in 2003/4. The EP already referred to the ENP from its early beginning, which

became obvious in the observation of presidential elections in the Ukraine during the Orange

Revolution (EP-EO-Ukraine 2004) and since then it has been a constant point of reference (e.g.

EP-EOD-Armenia 2012; EP-EOD-Georgia 2008; EP-EOD-Moldova 2010).

Regarding the EP’s evaluations in Central Asia, it is obvious that the EP statements reflect its

comparably low influence and comparably low legitimacy in that area: these statements remain

rather vague without referring to any legal framework. Instead, the EP uses, for example, past-

present-comparisons for their evaluation, whether election processes have been improved (EP-

EOD-Kyrgyztan 2005). Occasionally, in Central Asian IEOMs with the OSCE, the EP even

waives any explicit recommendation or comment (EP-EOD-Tajikistan 2010), in contrast to post-

election statements in other regions.

In Eastern European observations, despite the ODIHR’s leading role, during post-election press

conferences in which IEOM presents its preliminary post-election statements, the heads of all

delegations (OSCE short-term and long-term observation missions, the EP, the Council of Europe

Parliamentary Assembly, occasionally accompanied by NATO parliamentary assembly) give

statements, which appear as short quotations in the joint preliminary post-election statements. The

EP statements do not contain added evaluation information (EP-EOD-Azerbaijan 2005; EP-EOD-

Georgia 2004; EP-EOD-Kyrgyzstan 2011).

Due to the fact that joint post-election statements rely on findings of long-term missions as well

and are furthermore a result of a compromise between all mission members, there is no visible

typical EP style of election evaluation. As the ODIHR among all IEOM participating organiza-

tions reflected most on methodology, improvements from the “free and fair” dichotomy of the

1990s (see e.g. the categorization of Elklit/Svensson 1997) to more tailor-made arguments in post-

election statements (Bjornlund 2004,119ff.) belong primarily to ODIHR’s reflections.

25

4.4 Flying the Flag for Parliamentary Observations – the EP and Elec-

tions in Kosovo

Kosovo has been an area of international concern since the beginning of the 1990s, when Serbian

president Milosevic increased his attempts to strengthen his ethnicity-based autocratic power. His

strategies of ethnic cleansing lead to the internationally disputed NATO air strikes in Kosovo in

1999 and in the aftermath to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UN-

MIK), based on Security Council resolution 1244. Under the auspices of the UN, the OSCE

played an active role in state building in Kosovo and its Kosovo Mission had to organize elections

as well. The first EP Kosovo election observation in 2001 showed two peculiarities: The huge

OSCE Mission on the ground helped to organize elections on behalf of the UN, but the ODIHR

was not charged with observing elections. Instead, the United Nations asked the intergovernmen-

tal level of the Council of Europe to organize a long-term election observation mission in order to

subsequently evaluate these elections as valid or non-valid. The Council of Europe therefore sup-

ported a mission between 2001 and 2007 (Gawrich 2012). Besides this, both parliamentary as-

semblies (OSCE and Council of Europe) as well as the EP participated as a “parliamentary troika”

in the observations under the auspices of (the intergovernmental organized) Council of Europe

long-term mission (EP-EOD-Kosovo 2002).

The EP’s observation of the subsequent Kosovo parliamentary elections in 2004 were an excep-

tion to the rule observable in IEOMs, as the EP carried out this observation on its own without the

participation of the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Neverthe-

less, it was briefed by the UNMIK, the OSCE Kosovo mission, the Council of Europe intergov-

ernmental long-term election observation mission as well as the European Union Rule of Law

Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) (EP-EOD-Kosovo 2004). So, in contrast to the elections of 2001,

only the EP guaranteed the presence of parliamentary election observers in 2004. There has been a

similar development in the parliamentary elections of 2007, when the EP again acted under the

auspices of the Council of Europe long-term mission, without the ODIHR and both parliamentary

assemblies being present. In contrast, the EP cooperated with two international bodies, the EU

Committee of the Region and the Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities,

focusing on regional and local elections which were conducted simultaneously (EP-EOD-Kosovo

2007). Obviously, Kosovo elections induced new and unique constellations of election observa-

tion cooperation, which have not been deployed in other contexts again.

26

The observations of the EP became of increased importance after Kosovo’s declaration of inde-

pendence in 2008. Since then, all European regional organizations face the problem of partial non-

recognition. Election observation is indeed a type of soft foreign policy, which requires ac-

ceptance of the target country’s sovereignty. It is of no surprise that the OSCE and the Council of

Europe, having Serbia as a participating or member state, have a restricted approach towards Ko-

sovo in the field of election observation, even though its parliamentary assemblies would be inde-

pendent enough to make suitable decisions. The EP observed the general elections after independ-

ence in 2010/2011 as the only parliamentary body. Even though the EU would not usually send an

observation mission to a Balkan country due to its European retreat strategy, the European Com-

mission did send a European Union Election Expert Mission to Kosovo because of the absence of

a long-term international election observation mission in order to support the EP’s short-term ob-

servation (EP-EOD-Kosovo 2010-11). The EP’s continuation of election observations in Kosovo

after independence could partly be explained through path dependent behavior, since the EP ob-

served four elections before Kosovo became independent. Furthermore, a good reason to be the

only parliamentary body participating in an election observation can be found in the abovemen-

tioned visibility factor, which is a core problem in IEOMs.

5. Conclusion

The EP’s election observation activities can be summarized in various directions. At first we have

to come to conclusions according to the analytical framework on inter-organizational cooperation,

which has been deployed above and which has been, for the field of the EP’s election observa-

tions, transferred to intra-organizational cooperation as well. According to the three categories

reciprocity, efficiency and legitimacy, it has been seen that reciprocity of common objectives of

all international organizations involved – to be understood as an enhancement of democracy

through election observation – is an underlying moment for the activities of the EU, the EP, the

OSCE and the Council of Europe in a similar way. In contrast, resource-pooling, as an underlying

factor of efficiency – being a main-stream argument in inter-organizational cooperation analysis

today (e.g. Brosig 2011) – is not of high importance in this case, which can be explained through

the fact that EP itself has only small resources to undertake election observation missions and is

limited to short-term observations conducted by small delegations. EP’s strategy limiting to elec-

tion observations in cooperation with EU’s or OSCE’s long term missions relies instead on other

actor’s more efficient capacities and higher resources. Therefore, the EP’s election observations

are basically a foreign policy tool as a kind of “small-resources tool”. This brings us to the utmost

relevance of legitimacy in EP election observation cooperation. The EP indeed can improve the

legitimacy of all other actor’s election observations substantially, as its delegation members are

27

elected parliamentarians themselves. This is especially the case in its cooperation with the EU,

giving EU EOMs a parliamentarian face, as MEPs are usually head of missions. But due to the

lack of resources and its inability to conduct long-term observations, the EP does not only deliver

legitimacy to its partners, but in the same way needs to gain their legitimacy. Therefore, EP coop-

eration in election observations can be best understood as reciprocal legitimacy.

Second, in view of general findings of experts and practitioners on meaningful election observa-

tions, EP cooperation with long-term observation missions furthermore compensates core criti-

cism on small, short-term observations, which do not address strategic manipulation as well as

pre-election and tabulation cheating, described above.

Finally, I would like to turn to consider innovation, from the background of this analysis. In my

first hypothesis, presented above, I assume that EP and EU are both lagging behind election ob-

servations of other international organizations. Therefore, the EP is not expected to be innovative

in an international comparison. Instead, it was expected that the EP would have tried to constantly

improve and increase election observation activities in order to compensate its weak foreign poli-

cy role. I regard this hypothesis as being verified due to the fact that the EP only reached a more

coherent approach after the European Commission Communication on election observation in

2000, which basically improved EU election observation. Nevertheless, internally, the EP con-

stantly improved its election observation management in the past two decades.

My pessimistic assumption on potential innovations by the EP at the international scene of elec-

tion observers, which became obvious in my second hypothesis, also has to be regarded as being

verified. It is evident that especially the OSCE/ODIHR has been innovative in improving election

observation methodologies and has been a frontrunner towards the EU and the EP as well. Fur-

thermore, in contrast to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the EP did not participate

in the process of establishing the Declaration of Principles of International Election Observation

and only endorsed it with a two year delay. Its small resources led to the fact that the EP has at no

time been a frontrunner in the methodology of election observation in contrast to the

OSCE/ODIHR and even the comparably weak Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly.

In spite of these rather negative evaluations concerning the EP’s lack of innovations in interna-

tional election observation, the EP nevertheless makes a remarkable contribution to international

election observation. The core innovation which can be ascribed to EP activities refers, on the one

hand, to its multi-partner-cooperation both inside and outside the EU and, on the other hand, to

the global scope of its election observation activities. The global dimension of its election obser-

vation is to be explained through the fact that it didn’t follow the EU’s retreat from European

election observation, according to its flexibility in “parliamentary diplomacy”. The EP’s double-

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track election observations in EU EOMs and IEOMs made it a unique parliamentary body, being

engaged globally inside the European election observation regime (see Figure below).

Figure 4 The EP’s double-track Election Observation in the European Election Observation

Regime

The added value of the EP’s double-track election observations leads in two directions: On the

one hand, the EP somewhat compensates the EU’s geopolitical fears about the post-soviet regions

and, on the other hand, it shares its legitimacy, based on its mission members being democratical-

ly elected themselves, with as many international partners as possible. Despite the fact that the

EP’s double-track election observations have been rather a response (to the EU’s strategy) than an

innovative strategy, it can be concluded that not the activity of election observation itself has been

innovative, but that its double track form through intra- and inter-organizational cooperation has,

without a doubt, innovative features and raises the legitimacy of the European election observa-

tion regime.

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