the ethno-environmental fix and its limits: inidgenious land titlung and the production of...

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The ethno-environmental fix and its limits: Indigenous land titlingand the production of not-quite-neoliberal natures in Bolivia

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⇑ Corresponding author.E-mail addresses: [email protected] (P. Anthias), [email protected]

(S.A. Radcliffe).

Please cite this article in press as: Anthias, P., Radcliffe, S.A. The ethno-environmental fix and its limits: Indigenous land titling and the productionquite-neoliberal natures in Bolivia. Geoforum (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.06.007

Penelope Anthias ⇑, Sarah A. RadcliffeDepartment of Geography, University of Cambridge, Downing Place, Cambridge CB2 3EN, UK

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history:Available online xxxx

Keywords:BoliviaTCOsIndigenous peoplesDevelopmentExtractive industryLand titling

During the 1980s and 1990s, an era of neoliberal reform, global development institutions like the WorldBank began promoting and financing the collective titling of indigenous territories. Extending and linkingexisting discussions of neoliberal multiculturalism and neoliberal natures, this paper interrogates indig-enous land rights as a type of ‘‘ethno-environmental fix’’, designed to synergise protection of vulnerablepopulations and highly-valued natures from the destructive effects of markets, in an era of multiplecountermovements. Using the example of the titling of TCOs (Original Communal Lands) in Bolivia, thepaper explores how governmental aspirations for indigenous territories unravelled in practice, producinghybrid, double-edged and ‘‘not-quite-neoliberal’’ spaces – spaces which have, paradoxically, emerged askey sites for the construction of more radical indigenous projects.

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1. Introduction ongoing capacity of the postcolonial capitalization of natural re-

Recent literature in geography on ‘‘neoliberal natures’’ hashelped to move us beyond oversimplified understandings of neo-liberalism, drawing attention to the variegated practices for gov-erning socio-nature that have emerged in recent decades (forexample, Brenner et al., 2010; Peck et al., 2010; Ferguson, 2010;Mansfield, 2007; Bakker, 2005, 2009; Brand and Sekler, 2009). AsBakker notes, however, this literature has been better at identify-ing variegation than accounting for it. Geographers have been col-lectively ‘‘unable to generate convincing explanations of theneoliberalization of nature as a historically and geographically dif-ferentiated, yet global (or at least translocal) phenomenon’’ (2010,p. 721). It is this challenge of accounting forvariegation that this pa-per takes up. It does so by focusing on a rather different examplethan those previously considered. It starts from a considerationof why, during the ‘‘neoliberal’’ 1980s and 1990s, global develop-ment institutions like the World Bank, in collaboration with states,began promoting and financing the collective titling of indigenousterritories in a range of countries. In contrast to the emphasis onthe neoliberalization of nature, we focus on legal and political pro-cesses that gave rise to the designation of spaces and subjects as‘‘outside’’ the market. The creation of legally-designated territoriescalled Original Communal Lands (TCOs) in Bolivia permits anexploration of a scheme to deliberately produce forms of socio-nat-ure that were not-quite-neoliberal, while also highlighting the

sources to undermine these socio-natures.Bringing together recent work on ‘‘environmental fixes’’ (Bak-

ker, 2009, 2010; Castree, 2008, 2009) and ‘‘schemes to divide citi-zenship’’ (Hall et al., 2011, see also Li, 2007a; Moore, 2005), weargue that global support for indigenous land rights can be seenas an example of what we call the ‘‘ethno-environmental fix’’.We do not use the term ‘‘fix’’ here in a narrowly Marxian sense(Harvey, 2003), nor do we wish to imply a rigid set of policy inter-ventions for creating or governing ethnic territories. Rather, we usethe term to point to the emergence, alongside neoliberal economicreform, of a spectrum of governance approaches that sought tosynergise protection of vulnerable populations and highly-valuednatures from the destructive effects of markets. To put it anotherway, in a world in which environmental risks, ethnic identitiesand spatial technologies of governance have all come to the fore,we think it is important to reflect on how processes of ethnic clas-sification and differentiated citizenship are linked – discursivelyand in practice – to territorialised approaches to nature conserva-tion. We further suggest that examining these links sheds impor-tant light on variegation in neoliberal governance approachesand outcomes. As such, while this paper focuses on indigenousland rights, the concept of ‘‘ethno-environmental fix’’ could beused to interrogate a broader set of governance interventionsregarding not-quite-neoliberal natures. Existing discussions ofindigenous land rights and neoliberalism, on which we draw, couldalso be enriched by a focus on the environmental agendas and out-comes of the ‘‘territorial turn’’ (Bryan, 2012; Wainwright and Bryan2009, Offen, 2003; Hale, 2006, 2011).

In exploring these dynamics in the Bolivian and Latin Americancontext, it is important to emphasise at the outset that the agency

of not-

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1 In fact, distinguishing between capitalist and governmental purposes seemsproblematic. As many authors note, ungovernable socio-natures themselves presentbarriers to processes of capitalist accumulation. Furthermore, interventions are oftendefended on both economic and governmental grounds; as Bakker notes (citingBernstein), ‘‘liberal environmentalism’’ is founded on the belief in the ‘‘compatibilityof environmental concern, economic growth, the basic tenets of a market economy,and a liberal international order’’ (2010, p. 726).

2 A revised version of this paper was published in 2010 (Li, 2010).

2 P. Anthias, S.A. Radcliffe / Geoforum xxx (2013) xxx–xxx

of indigenous peoples in claiming territorial rights and envisioningalternative forms of development were foundational in shaping theemergence and outcomes of this ethno-environmental fix. As weseek to highlight, indigenous mobilisation and advocacy played akey role in shaping these shifting global policy agendas. Nor dowe wish to suggest, by using the term ‘‘fix’’, that indigenous landtitling resolved problems of indigenous dispossession and environ-mental destruction under neoliberalism; still less that it has satis-fied indigenous demands for territory. Our discussion of TCO titlingin Bolivia highlights the governmental limits of the ‘‘ethno-envi-ronmental fix’’ in terms of all of the above. Nevertheless, indige-nous collective territories do mediate market-nature-societyrelations in important ways, giving rise to diverse ‘‘not-quite-neo-liberal’’ spaces, in which processes of marketisation often existalongside other governmental or indigenous projects for territorialdevelopment.

The paper is structured as follows. Section one considers howthe ‘‘neoliberal natures’’ literature has sought to explain variega-tion in neoliberal governance formations, suggesting that insightsfrom this literature, combined with Tania Li’s focus on ‘‘schemesto divide citizenship’’, provide a theoretical framework for under-standing global support for indigenous land rights. Section twoprovides an analysis of global development policy and discourseduring the 1980s and 1990s to elaborate the notion of indigenouslands rights as an ‘‘ethno-environmental fix’’. Section three exam-ines TCOs in Bolivia as one example of how the limitations of the‘‘ethno-environmental fix’’ play out in practice and the hybrid‘‘not-quite-neoliberal’’ natures this gives rise to. We conclude thepaper by reflecting on how indigenous peoples in Bolivia havedrawn on the limitations and contradictions of TCO titling to ad-vance more progressive, post-neoliberal political and territorialprojects.

2. Theorising variegation in ‘‘neoliberal’’ governance

2.1. Neoliberal natures and ‘‘environmental fixes’’

The ‘‘neoliberal natures’’ literature has demonstrated that ‘‘neo-liberalization’’ is a far from monolithic or totalizing process, butrather gives rise to a diverse array of arrangements for governingsocio-nature. What accounts for this variegation? One explanationprovided in many accounts is that variegation occurs as the resultof an encounter between neoliberalizing logics and messy or unco-operative socio-natures. This messiness relates to both the socio-political context in which interventions are implemented, andthe kind of natures that are being targeted:

[Variegation occurs] not only because neoliberalism takes placewithin existing political economic formations with which it hasan antagonistic relationship, but also because of the articulationof labour and accumulation strategies with ecological processesin specific biophysical settings, which create barriers and con-straints to capital accumulation (Bakker, 2010, p. 720).

This explanation is useful in revealing the ways in which gover-nance arrangements are transformed ‘‘on the ground’’ – somethingwe take up in our discussion of TCOs. Nevertheless, it only goes sofar. Crucially, it does not shed light on broader shifts in policy agen-das that may emerge over time from encounters with these naturaland social limits. In fact, there is a danger that governance ap-proaches that don’t appear ‘‘neoliberalizing’’ from the outset willsimply be excluded from analysis – indigenous land rights beinga case in point.

In this regard, a complementary perspective, inflected by Marx-ian interpretations, is the concept of ‘‘environmental fixes’’, whichdescribes economistic strategies of externalization and internaliza-

Please cite this article in press as: Anthias, P., Radcliffe, S.A. The ethno-environmquite-neoliberal natures in Bolivia. Geoforum (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016

tion of socio-environmental conditions that are used to sustainaccumulation in the face of countervailing forces internal andexternal to the capitalist system, which can include economic, eco-logical or legitimation crises (Castree, 2008; Bakker, 2009, 2010).Recent experiments in ‘‘market environmentalism’’ provide oneexample; as Bakker (2010, p. 13) notes, these emerged in responseto the global environmental movement of the 1970s, when ‘‘wide-spread awareness emerged of the fact that an instrumentalist ap-proach to nature as a ‘source’ for resources and ‘sink’ for wasteswas reaching (human-perceived) limits.’’ As she notes, ‘‘a centralirony of these processes is that they purport to present a [mar-ket-based] solution to environmental crises which capitalism hasplayed a role in creating’’. Castree’s definition of ‘‘environmentalfixes’’ is broader than Bakker’s, encompassing cases where it is lessa profit-driven quest for market expansion than ‘‘the danger ofpublic unrest, leading to either regime change or system transfor-mation’’, which propels the state to adopt ‘‘a more interventionistrole, economically, socially, and environmentally’’, culminating inthe application of various ‘‘environmental fixes’’ (2008, p. 149).Crucially, his account reveals that variegated processes of neoliber-alizing nature are driven by objectives that relate not only to theneed to overcome barriers to processes of capital accumulation,but also to the need to govern society and nature in their wake.1

It is in this broader conception of ‘‘environmental fixes’’ that wesee an opening for considering indigenous land rights in relation toneoliberalism – as a global policy agenda that gained tractionamidst attempts to limit the destructive effects of marketisationon designated populations and natures. The key difference, ofcourse, is that, unlike other examples discussed in the ‘‘neoliberalnatures’’ literature, indigenous land rights do not employ marketstowards this end. Nevertheless, as an approach for governing socio-nature arising during the recent period of market expansion, theydemand our critical attention. As such, we argue for moving be-yond a consideration of ‘‘processes of marketisation’’ and theirmisadventures to consider a broader range of governance ap-proaches that have emerged alongside, and in relation to, theseprocesses, and the ways they contribute to the production of des-ignated areas of not-quite-neoliberal nature. In order to furtherinterrogate how indigenous land rights can be considered in rela-tion to marketisation, we turn to the work of anthropologist TaniaMurray Li.

2.2. Countermovements and ‘‘schemes to divide citizenship’’

In a recent paper (2007a), Li summarises the strategies that rul-ing regimes have employed to regulate relations between peopleand land from the colonial period to the present in postcolonialcontexts.2 Her approach draws on that of Polanyi, who famously ob-served that ‘‘to allow the market mechanism to be the sole directorof the fate of human beings and their natural environment would re-sult in the demolition of society’’ (1957 (1944), p. 76). Before thisdestruction happened, Polanyi argued that society would recognizethe risk of destruction, and devise protective measures to re-embedthe reproduction of human life in social relations. These measures,and the social forces that bring them into being, comprise what hecalled a double movement or countermovement. While the conceptof countermovement has often been used to refer to social move-ments facing neoliberal processes of ‘‘accumulation by disposses-

ental fix and its limits: Indigenous land titling and the production of not-/j.geoforum.2013.06.007


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sion’’ (Harvey, 2003; Perreault, 2009), as Li notes (2007a), Polanyi’sconception of the term includes elements of the ruling class, or thosein government, who recognize the need to take protective measuresto curb the destructive effects of the market on populations (see alsoHart, 2010).

In this vein, Li interrogates the strategies through which colo-nial administrations, states and development planners have soughtto mitigate the potentially destructive effects of markets on certaingroups of people. These relate both to the dispossession resultingfrom enclosures enacted by extraterritorial actors and to thatwhich occurs through ‘‘the ‘‘relentless micro-capitalism’’ thatemerges among peasants as some accumulate land and capital,while others slide into debt and are forced to sell up (Li, 2007a,p.5). She highlights three key elite and governmental strategiesfor dealing with these tendencies:

[Rulers either] 1) extend and deepen a market in land, backedby a ‘‘transparent’’ system for registering private property, inthe name of productivity, efficiency and market discipline; 2)seek to restrict the market by a combination of regulation andeducational campaigns designed to convince the feckless andfoolish that they should work harder, avoid debt, and hold ontotheir land; or 3) designate certain people, and certain places, asunfit to become market subjects (Li 2007a, pp. 5-6.).

This triad of approaches places the use of market-based instru-ments in the context of countermovements – ‘‘environmentalfixes’’ – alongside attempts to restrict the market through non-market forms of regulation. In other words, rather than taking asa starting point ‘‘processes of marketization’’ and then enquiringinto their different forms and functions, as scholars of ‘‘neoliberalnatures’’ have tended to do, Li starts with governmental counter-movements and then examines the different governance instru-ments these give rise to – some of which involve markets andsome of which do not. It is within the third category ‘‘designatingcertain people, and certain places, as unfit to become market sub-jects,’’ that Li locates global development discourse on ‘‘indigenouspeoples’’ and the granting of collective indigenous land rights.

Extending these points, the next section explores the character-istics of policy and political convergence around the designation ofcertain socio-natures ‘‘indigenous territories’’ as unfit to becomesubject to the market. The three core strands in this global conver-gence around the legitimacy of indigenous land rights comprisethree inter-related countermovements, namely the indigenousrights movement, social responses to neoliberalism, and the envi-ronmental countermovement.

3. Not-quite-neoliberal schemes to divide citizenship andnature

The global indigenous rights movement emerged during the1970s to challenge the until then dominant ‘‘assimilationist’’ ap-proach to indigenous development. Exposing the violence enactedon indigenous peoples throughout the world in the name of‘‘development’’, it opened ‘‘a crack in the so-far solid confidencethat progress justified almost everything’’ (Blaser, Feit and McRae,cited in Engle: p. 191). Indigenous rights advocates called for alter-native models of development that would allow indigenous peo-ples to develop in culturally-appropriate ways, according to theirown priorities. These brought about a paradigmatic shift towardswhat became known as ‘‘ethnodevelopment’’ or ‘‘development-with-identity’’ (Andolina et al., 2009).

This shift was reflected, and greatly advanced, by the Interna-tional Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169, passed in 1989.Explicitly rejecting the assimilationist philosophy of its predeces-sor, it called for respect for the cultural integrity of indigenous peo-


ples, their co-participation in national society and developmentdecision-making, and the recognition of their territorial rights.During the 1990s, these calls were echoed by leading global devel-opment institutions (Andolina et al., 2009). This occurred against abackdrop of indigenous activism throughout the Americas, whichgained momentum and international attention around the 1992Quintencennial of Colombus’s landing. In voicing their demands– first and foremost for territorial rights – indigenous peoplesmade reference to Convention 169 and drew support from emer-gent transnational networks of development actors (Andolinaet al., 2009). As such, they took advantage of new openings underneoliberalism to voice demands oriented at addressing longer his-tories of exclusionary and assimilationist forms of development.

Yet, global support for indigenous land rights also had a moreambivalent context, occurring against a backdrop of growing trans-national capitalist incursions into indigenous territories. Some ofthe earliest and most influential global policy statements on indig-enous land rights appeared in the context of attempts to mitigatethe effects of large-scale capitalist projects on indigenous popula-tions. In 1982, the World Bank issued its operational policy state-ment, OMS 2.34, outlining procedures for protecting the rights ofso-called ‘‘tribal people’’ in Bank-financed development projects.The directive stated that:

Unless special measures are adopted, tribal people are morelikely to be harmed than helped by development projects thatare intended for beneficiaries other than themselves. Therefore,whenever tribal peoples may be affected, the design of projectsshould include measures or components necessary to safeguardtheir interests, and, whenever feasible, to enhance their well-being. (cited in Davis et al., 1998, p. 4)

Among these safeguards, it recommended that the design of tri-bal components of Bank-funded projects or parallel programmesshould contain ‘‘the recognition, demarcation and protection of tri-bal areas containing those resources required to sustain the tribalpeople’s traditional means of livelihood’’ (Davis et al., 1998, p. 5–6). Operational Directive 4.20 of 1991 strengthened this commit-ment to indigenous land rights, recommending that:

Where Bank-financed projects potentially affect the lands andnatural resources of indigenous peoples, measures should betaken to ensure that the land and territorial security of affectedpopulations and their customary rights of use and access to nat-ural resources are not adversely affected (cited in Davis et al.,1998, pp. 7–8)

Recommended measures include ‘‘regularization of customaryrights and/or compensation arrangements. . . to avoid, minimizeor mitigate such impacts’’. OD4.20 also stipulates that all Bank-funded projects that affect indigenous peoples must contain a spe-cial Indigenous Peoples’ Development Plan, which must include aland tenure component that establishes indigenous titles to ances-tral lands and resources. Finally, the directive indicates the Bank’sintention to provide funding and technical assistance to BorrowerCountries in the process of indigenous land regularisation.

These safeguards appeared at a time when the World Bank waspromoting the privatization of hydrocarbons and mining industriesin numerous developing countries, as well as providing loans forextractive industry projects (Griffiths, 2000). In the context of suchprojects, indigenous land rights have various functions. First, theclarification of property rights in areas with large numbers ofindigenous people, where the application of property law was un-even, provides essential juridical security for investment capital.Second, clarifying the boundaries of indigenous claims is seen toenhance the governability of territories earmarked for extraction,‘‘[reducing] the risk that tribal people will suffer from the project’s




consequences or disrupt its implementation’’ (OD2.34, cited in Da-vis, 1993, p. 5). It would also enable private companies to ‘‘clarifytheir roles and responsibilities where indigenous communitiesare affected by their activities’’ (Davis, 1993, p. 5, cited in Daviset al., 1998, pp. 9–10).

The fact that indigenous land rights were embraced by multilat-eral agencies at a time when their territories and resources (titledor not) were becoming increasingly integrated into transnationalcapitalist circuits makes them highly ambivalent (Bryan, 2012;Hale, 2002, 2006). Hale describes World Bank funding for indige-nous land titling as ‘‘a Faustian bargain: recognition of multicul-tural rights in return for endorsement, implicit or otherwise, ofthe broader political project of neoliberalism’’ (2006, p. 110).Although we would question whether indigenous peoples en-dorsed neoliberalism, Hale’s comment hints at what was at stakehere; not only the governability of extraction, but the legitimacyof the neoliberal development model. The Bank’s growing commit-ment to indigenous land rights occurred against a backdrop of cri-tique from activists, social movements, indigenous organizationsand academics, who pointed to the damaging impacts of its policyprescriptions, both on indigenous peoples and on society morebroadly. In doing so, they contributed towards bringing about abroader shift towards more socially-oriented, participatory andpre-emptive development agenda (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Andoli-na et al., 2009; Soederberg, 2004; Hart, 2010). As such, global sup-port for indigenous land rights in the 1990s was a product both ofgovernmental efforts to manage social tensions resulting from (andanticipated in) ongoing processes of capital accumulation, and ofindigenous peoples’ ability to exploit the resulting political open-ings to articulate historically-grounded demands. This broadlysupports Li’s account, while making more explicit indigenous peo-ples’ agency, illustrative of the dialectical relationship between so-cial and governmental countermovements.3

However, we would argue that this is still only part of the story.What it misses is the extent to which these new territories werealso bound up in an environmental countermovement. Li (2007a,p. 23) acknowledges this to a degree, noting that in addition toaiming to ‘‘[protect] indigenous peoples from capitalism,’’ secure,collective and inalienable tenure is thought to ‘‘encourage themto engage in sustainable management of natural resources and bio-diversity conservation’’. However, she views this conservationfunction as a kind of convenient, post hoc add-on:

The conservation element, grafted onto the countermovement toprotect indigenous people in the 1990s, has brought new socialforces into the assemblage, and given old arguments for collec-tive, inalienable tenure some new twists. (Li, 2007a, ouremphasis).

In contrast, our analysis of development policy and discourse inthis period leads us to the conclusion that conservation was not anafterthought. Rather, from its inception support for indigenous landrights was linked to indigenous peoples’ perceived role in biodiver-sity conservation (Stevens, 1997; Conklin and Graham, 1995). Bythe 1980s and 1990s, global development ‘‘schemes to divide citi-zenship’’ had became intimately connected to territorially-basedapproaches to biodiversity conservation (Harris and Hazen, 2006)– or ‘‘schemes to divide nature’’.

The third countermovement relevant to this account, then, isthe global environmental movement, which emerged during the1970s. Rather than bringing about a shift away from environmen-tally-destructive forms of development, this produced a prolifera-tion of conservation areas to preserve the most fragile or

3 The agency of social movements in shaping governance is undoubtedly moreevident under neoliberalism than under colonialism, and possibly more so in theAmericas than East Asian countries.


valuable environments from destruction (Harris and Hazen,2006). However, conservation areas – like their colonial predeces-sors predicated on the assumption that saving nature meantexcluding people – soon produced their own countermovement.From the 1980s, academics and activists documented the detri-mental effects of exclusionary conservation on local populations,claiming they denied indigenous peoples’ rights, evicted them fromtheir homelands and provoked long-term social conflict (Colches-ter, 2004; Adams and Hutton, 2007; Negi and Nautiyal, 2003). Fur-thermore, it was argued that this approach backfired from aconservation perspective, reducing peoples’ long-term stewardshipof land (WWF, cited in Colchester, 2004, p. 147).

These critiques produced a paradigmatic shift in conservation,towards an approach that sees development needs of local popula-tions as compatible with, and complementary to, the achievementof conservation goals (Marquette, 1996; Rights and Resources Ini-tiative, 2012). In this context, the 1980s and 1990s saw an explo-sion of policy and academic discourse on the links betweenindigenous peoples and biodiversity. Some of this interest camefrom the environmental movement, reflecting early engagementsbetween conservationists and indigenous movements (Conklinand Graham, 1995; Davis and Wali, 1993; Engle, 2010).4 In 1987,the Brundtland Commission’s report Our Common Future connectedindigenous peoples with the Earth’s sustainability because of theirunique environmental knowledge. This argument was reiterated atthe UN’s 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, which – coinciding with the1992 Quintecennial of Columbus’s landing – recognized indigenouspeoples as a ‘‘Major Group’’ that should participate in sustainabledevelopment (Colchester, 2004, p. 148). The 1992 Global Biodiver-sity Strategy included in its ten principles for biodiversity conserva-tion the notion that:

Cultural diversity is closely linked to biodiversity. Humanity’scollective knowledge of biodiversity and its use and manage-ment rests in cultural diversity; conversely, conserving biodi-versity often helps strengthen cultural integrity and values(World Resources Institute, World Conservation Union, andUnited Nations Environment Programme, 1992, p. 21).

Similarly, a 1993 World Bank report noted:

Increasing awareness on the part of the Bank and other devel-opment agencies that environmentally sustainable develop-ment will not come about unless indigenous and othertraditional peoples are brought into the effort to solve theworld’s urgent environmental problem. (Davis, 1993, p. 14)

Reflecting this, a new Social Policy and Resettlement Divisionwithin the Bank’s Environmental Department was tasked withdeveloping new guidelines for increasing indigenous peoples’ par-ticipation in natural resource management and biodiversity con-servation (Marquette, 1996), illustrating the extent to which aglobal environmental countermovement had influenced main-stream international financial institutions.

This new discourse hinged on the idea that indigenous environ-mental knowledge and traditional resource management practicescould be harnessed towards the achievement of conservation goalsthat would benefit not only indigenous peoples but all of human-ity. The links between culture and conservation were elaboratedin an extensive literature on ‘‘ethnoecology’’, an approach whichaimed ‘‘to recognize the value of the belief-knowledge practicecomplex of indigenous peoples in relation to the conservation ofbiodiversity’’ (Toledo, 2002, p. 7). These links were further exploredthrough a variety of mapping projects, which highlighted the

4 The imaginary of indigenous peoples as ‘‘guardians of nature’’ has a long history,reflecting the continuing resurfacing of anxieties about modernity in Westernsocieties (Wade, 2004).




‘‘striking spatial overlap’’ between indigenous peoples and biodi-versity (Marquette, 1996).5

In the context of this new discourse, land rights were justifiedas a prerequisite for realizing indigenous peoples’ potential as nat-ural resource managers. Secure collective land rights, it was ar-gued, would ‘‘encourage indigenous communities to protect theirlands, especially against outside encroachments’’ (Davis and Wali,1993, p. 11); conversely, without such rights, ‘‘indigenous groups[would] face pressure to degrade the land left to them in order tosurvive’’ (Davis and Wali, 1993, p. 8). Conservation organizationssupported these moves, with the added incentive that land rightswere often a prerequisite in market-based conservation and devel-opment schemes. That is not to suggest that indigenous peoplewere to be left alone to manage their territories. Although this dis-course frames indigenous cultures, structures and practices as al-ready there, requiring protection, they are also viewed as in needof promotion, strengthening, development – something that re-quired ‘‘a new type of partnership among indigenous peoples, thescientific community, national governments and internationaldevelopment agencies’’ (Davis and Wali, 1993, p. 11). The harness-ing of indigenous collective agency towards global conservationobjectives thus entailed new forms of not-quite-neoliberal govern-mentality,6 requiring the presence of conservationists, scientists,anthropologists, cartographers, NGOs and state agencies in theseterritories.

To summarise our argument thus far, we support Li’s assertionthat the ascription of collective, inalienable land rights to particu-lar groups of people (indigenous, tribal, ethnic or forest) is linked togovernmental efforts to manage the dispossessionary effects ofcapitalism, and find this helpful for understanding variegation inneoliberal governance. At the same time, our account extends Li’sin two respects. First, we place more emphasis on the agency ofindigenous and other social movements in bringing about thesegovernmental shifts; the fact that indigenous peoples explicitly de-manded differentiated citizenship, including collective land rights,is crucial here. Second, we argue that indigenous land rights – un-like colonial ‘‘schemes to divide citizenship’’ – gained traction witha broad array of development actors and institutions in the contextof growing anxiety about the destructive effects of capitalist devel-opment on nature. Crudely, it was indigenous natures, as much asindigenous peoples, that global policy makers were interested inprotecting.

We find the term ‘‘ethno-environmental fix’’ useful in encapsu-lating this argument for several reasons. First, it signifies the waysin which ethnodevelopment and environmental agendas were clo-sely associated as mutually beneficial and logically coherent withinan emergent mainstream policy discourse. This in turn relied uponlong-standing stereotypes of indigenous populations as relativelystatic and sedentary, rooted (‘‘fixed’’) in certain territories and toparticular forms of development. Here, our argument resemblesDonald Moore’s concept of an ‘‘ethnic spatial fix’’ (2005, p. 14,Chapter 5), while highlighting how this has now become imbri-cated in forms of environmental governmentality. Second, whilewe do not view ethno-environmental fixes as a capitalist fix in anarrow sense, we note that indigenous land rights were embraced,in part, to smooth the way for extractive industry development inindigenous territories (discussed above in relation to World Bankpolicy, below in relation to Bolivian TCOs; see also Hale, 2002,2006; Wainwright and Bryan, 2009). More broadly, these policy

5 Examples include two maps produced by National Geographic, with CulturalSurvival (2002) and with the Center for the Support of Native Lands (2002), whichshow extensive overlap between indigenous peoples and biodiversity sites in theAmazon and Central America/Mexico respectively.

6 Governmentality can be defined as the ‘‘conduct of conduct’’; government is theattempt to shape human conduct by calculated means (Burchell et al., 1991).


models were embraced in the midst of a crisis of governance underneoliberalism. What policy makers were ultimately attempting to‘‘fix’’ here was the legitimacy of a model that portrayed marketiza-tion as a route to collective wellbeing and inclusive, sustainabledevelopment.

We now turn to Bolivia’s TCO territories as a specific example ofthe ethno-environmental fix, the limitations it encountered inpractice, and the hybrid, not-quite-neoliberal territories it gave riseto.

4. Operationalizing the ethno-environmental fix: the case ofBolivia’s TCOs7

4.1. Bolivia’s TCOs as an ethno-environmental fix

Having highlighted the global dimensions of neoliberal counter-movements and the ethno-environmental fix, it is important tolook to specific national contexts to understand the ways in whichthese ideas fed into legal and institutional frameworks for the cre-ation and titling of indigenous territories as sites of not-quite-neo-liberal nature. The creation of TCOs in Bolivia was not a simpleapplication of global norms; it was shaped by national and regionaldynamics, including particular manifestations of the countermove-ments discussed above. At the same time, this process did involvetransnational development actors, notably the World Bank. Assuch, TCOs – as an ‘‘ethno-environmental fix’’ – emerged fromcomplex articulations between countermovements within societyand an evolving neoliberal governance agenda.

The first impetus for the creation of indigenous territories in Bo-livia came from lowland indigenous peoples themselves. Followinga long history of colonial violence and dispossession, lowlandindigenous peoples had been excluded from Bolivia’s 1952 agrar-ian reform, which classified them as ‘‘savages’’, unfit to becomeproductive peasant farmers of rights-bearing citizens (Kay and Uri-oste, 2007; Postero, 2006), and led to their further dispossessionand the spread of exploitative labour practices in their territories.From the 1980s, ethnic groups across the lowlands mobilised toform indigenous organizations which united under the umbrellaorganization CIDOB (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of East-ern Bolivia) to stage a series of national marches, focused on de-mands for territory (including but exceeding a demand for title).The 1990 March for Territory and Dignity led to the recognitionof four indigenous territories by Supreme Decree and the govern-ment’s ratification, in 1991, of ILO Convention 169. A second Marchfor Land and Territory was held in 1996 to coincide with the elab-oration of a new land law (discussed below).

Although this process of ethnic resurgence emerged from place-based histories of colonisation and uneven geographies of postco-lonial citizenship, it was also framed by the countermovements ofthe neoliberal era. The 1990 March responded in part to the grow-ing territorial incursions from transnational companies with con-cessions to extract hydrocarbons, timber or other raw materialsfrom lowland indigenous territories. These incursions were a directresult of Bolivia’s neoliberal reforms of the mid-1980s, which in-cluded the capitalization of the hydrocarbons sector (Hindery,2004; Bebbington, 2009; Humphreys Bebbington and Bebbington,2010). At the same time, indigenous organizations took advantageof new openings within an evolving neoliberal governance agendato voice their demands, drawing support from local, national andinternational NGOs and framing their land claims with referenceto ILO Convention 169 (see CIDOB’s 1991 Proposed Land Law).They did so against a backdrop of growing popular mobilisationacross Bolivia in response to the social impacts of neoliberal re-

7 This section draws primarily on Anthias’s fieldwork in Tarija (2008-9; 2010-11).




form, which produced unemployment and impoverishment amongthe country’s most vulnerable sectors (Postero, 2006).

While these national dynamics provided the context for indige-nous demands, when indigenous peoples finally succeeded intranslating these demands into agrarian law, they did so in an are-na that was influenced, overseen and financed by the World Bank.In 1992, President Sanchez de Lozada’s government opened a four-year national debate on the future of Bolivia’s agrarian policy, aprocess financed and assisted by the Bank through its National Pro-ject for Land Administration (PNAT). Although the project com-menced in 1995, project documents affirm that ‘‘since 1992, theBank has maintained an intense policy dialogue on land tenureand administration with the [Bolivian] Government’’ (World Bank,2001, p. 3). If indigenous land rights were one issue on the agenda,the Bank’s principle goal for the project was ‘‘to assist Bolivia tocreate a more efficient and transparent land administration sys-tem’’. This agenda, combined with pressure from landowner, peas-ant and indigenous organizations (Urioste and Pacheco, 2000),produced a law (the 1996 INRA Law, National Agrarian ReformLaw) that was ‘‘an unusual combination of neoliberal and socialjustice measures’’ (Deere and León, 2001, p. 37). Alongside mea-sures orientated towards the commodification of land and consol-idation of private property, the INRA Law reaffirmed property’ssocial function and recognized indigenous territorial claimsthrough the new legal category of Original Communal Lands (Tier-ras Comunitarias de Orígen, TCOs). However, provisions weremade for private, largely non-indigenous, landowners’ claims tobe recognized within TCOs, providing these third party claimscould demonstrate productive land use.

Drawing on ILO Convention 169, the INRA Law reproduced animaginary of indigenous territories as bounded spaces of ethnicdifference; TCOs were defined as:

The geographic spaces that constitute the habitat of indigenousand originary peoples and cultures, to which they have tradi-tionally had access and where they maintain and develop theirown forms of economic, social and cultural organization, in away that assure their survival and development.

9 DANIDA justified its financial support for the INRA Law citing the importance of amore transparent and efficient system of property rights for transnational companiesinvesting in oil and gas exploitation in Bolivia (DANIDA, 2005, p. 15). Similarly, theWorld Bank noted that ‘‘pressure continues for [land titling] to be completed in the

Furthermore, like the various schemes listed in Li’s account, thelaw places TCOs outside of the land market, declaring them‘‘inalienable, indivisible and irreversible’’ – restrictions designedto protect their status as ‘‘indigenous collective patrimony’’. The lo-gic underpinning this status – that indigenous peoples otherwiserisked dispossession – appears to have been fully grasped by thoseinvolved in the law’s elaboration; as one former INRA employee toldAnthias, TCOs were required alongside ‘‘the terms of the neoliber-als’’ to ensure that ‘‘the system doesn’t end up buying [indigenouspeoples’ land] from them’’ (Interview conducted in Tarija, 4/4/11).

TCOs were also framed explicitly as an ‘‘environmental fix’’. In asection of a 2001 report entitled ‘‘Environmental Aspects’’, theBank argued that ‘‘the titling of TCOs in eastern Bolivia is puttinglimits on the expansion of un-managed, illegal extraction of forestresources’’ (World Bank, 2001, p. 5). Indeed, additional Bank fund-ing for TCO titling was targeted to strengthen these environmentalbenefits, by giving an ‘‘improved treatment’’ to ‘‘i) protection ofcultural property; and ii) demarcation of protected areas adjacentto or within an area of titling’’ (World Bank, 2001). As such, thegeographical overlap between some TCOs and Protected Areaswas no coincidence (see Fig. 1), reflecting broader efforts to capital-ise on and manage the relationship between indigenous develop-ment and biodiversity conservation, through a clarification ofrights and restrictions pertaining to different zones.8

8 On Protected Area management in Bolivia, see Brandon et al., 1998; Beltrán, 2000;Becker and León, 2000.


Indeed, conservation organizations were among the advocatesand financers of TCO titling, arguing that land titling as framedby the TCO law would effectively prevent land grabs and environ-mental degradation:

TCO status enables indigenous groups to formalise their landrights and thus be able to exclude land colonisation and resourceextraction within their territory (Robertson and Wunder, 2005).

Ignoring the significance of third party claims, these environ-mental advocates for TCO titling assumed a legally-clarified andsmooth transition into a regulated and pro-indigenous territoriali-zation, ignoring power differences between actors already presentin the indigenous areas. For instance, the Danish government’sdevelopment agency DANIDA – the main funder of the TCO titling– argued that:

The autonomous management of territory [by indigenous peo-ples] should facilitate a greater identification and more sustain-able management of their own resources. In terms of theprotection of the environment, the titling of TCOs permits indig-enous peoples and communities to police [vigilar] and denouncesocial, cultural or environmental impacts that the exploitationof resources in their environment could give rise to (DANIDA,2005, pp. 23–24, our translation).

Indigenous observers and indigenous rights activists were moresceptical about the interests behind acceptance of TCO titling, sug-gesting that global environmental concerns trumped indigenousrights to defensible territory. As one indigenous rights activist (la-ter Rural Development Minister under Morales) put it:

The World Bank financed the making of that law with US$22million from 1992 until 1996. Why did they speak of indigenousTCOs? Out of humanitarianism, out of sensitivity? No – out ofinterest. Overlying what were previously protected areas, [theBank thought] now even better with TCOs. It’s a contributionto the world, you see, to the environmental imbalance thatexists in the world. (Interview, Santa Cruz 10/2/12)

These examples support our argument regarding the utility of theethno-environmental fix for understanding Bolivia’s TCOs. In thecontext of global development governmentality, TCOs were envis-aged as bounded spaces of ethnic difference in which culturally-appropriate (traditional, subsistence-based) forms of developmentat a distance from the capitalist market would complement ongoingefforts to protect Bolivia’s biodiversity from further destruction by‘‘outsiders’’ (transnational companies and settler populations). Suchrepresentations inevitably de-politicized and de-historicized therealities of postcolonial territoriality, as we elaborate below.

From the outset, this vision was ridden with contradictions aris-ing from the political economic context and rationale for these veryprojects. The creation of TCOs coincided with a deepening integra-tion of Bolivia’s land-based and subsoil resources into national andtransnational markets – a process other aspects of the INRA Lawexplicitly sought to promote.9 Although collectively-held TCO landcould not legally be integrated into land markets, TCO subsoil re-sources were subject to no such restrictions, remaining patrimonyof the Bolivian state. The exclusion of indigenous rights over subsoilresources from the INRA Law represented a major concession fromthe indigenous movement,10 who complained that TCOs offered

fertile areas of eastern Bolivia as a way of promoting economic growth’’ (2001, p. 3).10 See CIDOB’s 1991 proposed Land Law for an integral vision of territory, which

implies rights to the sky, the land and the subsoil, and autonomous territorialgovernance.



Fig. 1. Map of Bolivia showing geographical overlap between TCOs and Protected Areas Elaborated by Cartographic Unit, University of Cambridge, UK, based on CIDOB andCPTI 2000 and CEDLA 2008.


‘‘land and not territory’’ (CIDOB-CPTI 2000), echoing academic cri-tiques of the difference between property and territory (Blomley,2011; Wainwright and Bryan, 2009; Bryan, 2012; Bhandar, 2011).As such, the legal attributes of TCOs reflect their ambivalent posi-tioning in relation to broader processes of marketization, where theyrepresented a scheme to divide citizenship while not threateningcapitalist accumulation through resource extraction.11 We now turnto explore these contradictions as they played out in practice, dem-

11 In fact, it was also hydrocarbons development in claimed TCOs that enabledindigenous peoples to push through their legal recognition. In 1997, right-wingPresident Banzer refused to recognize TCO claims, so indigenous organizationsfocused efforts on an Ayoreo TCO demand in Santa Cruz, the site of a World Bank-funded gas pipeline project. According to one informant, the Bank forced Banzer tosign the Ayoreos’ TCO title, opening the way for the recognition of other TCOs(Anthias, interview with former INRA employee, Tarija, 4/4/11). This shows howindigenous peoples creatively exploited global framings (discussed above) ofindigenous land rights as smoothing the way for extractive industry development.


onstrating how they resulted in diverse, hybrid and not-quite-neo-liberal spaces, which failed to meet global institutions’, stateactors’ or indigenous peoples’ expectations.

4.2. Governmentality’s limits and the production of not-quite-neoliberal natures

Being irreducibly utopian, governmental interventions cannever achieve all they seek. An important reason promisedimprovements are not delivered is that the diagnosis is incom-plete. . .it cannot be complete if key political-economic pro-cesses are excluded from the bounded, knowable, technicaldomain. Furthermore, governmental interventions produceeffects that are contradictory, even perverse.

[Li, 2007b, p. 18]



13 Not because indigenous territories were free of capitalist economic relations priorto TCO titling (indeed, indigenous populations had long been incorporated intoexploitative, semi-servile labour relations in capitalist estates), but rather because of


In her description of ‘‘governmentality’s limits’’, Li points tothree key factors; politics – ‘‘the possibility that a governmentalintervention will be challenged by critics rejecting its diagnosesand prescriptions’’; population – the fact that human relationsand processes present their own limits to the capacity of expertsto improve them; and knowledge – the limits of available formsof knowledge to comprehend a complex social reality (Li, 2007b,pp. 17–19). These observations are echoed in the ‘‘neoliberal nat-ures’’ literature, which identifies as key reasons for variegation ingovernance formations ‘‘nature’s agency’’ and the fact that ‘‘neolib-eralism takes place within existing political economic formationswith which it has an antagonistic relationship’’ (Bakker, 2010, p.720). Building on these accounts, this section examines ‘‘govern-mentality’s limits’’ in relation to TCOs and how this contributesto the production of ‘‘not quite neoliberal natures’’. We focus thisdiscussion around the messiness of postcolonial territory, extrac-tive industry development, and the unresolved question of indige-nous livelihoods.

4.2.1. The messiness of postcolonial territoryContrary to the global imaginary of indigenous territories as

bounded spaces of cultural difference, most indigenous peoplesin Bolivia share their ancestral territories with other actors – alegacy of waves of colonisation, settlement and agrarian reformover the past century. In this postcolonial context, non-indige-nous settlers and colonists have become major landowners andsignificant political actors in rural contexts where indigenouspopulations demand legal rights to TCO territories. As notedabove, the INRA law foresaw the overlapping demands of non-indigenous settlers and indigenous communities, and awardedthe former priority in titling processes. Where non-indigenouslandowners’ productivity could be demonstrated to state officials(often individuals with family and political ties to the same non-indigenous landowners), indigenous peoples’ claims to titlewould be subordinated to private claimants’.12 Such legal provi-sions reduced the area and viability of indigenous territories,while subordinating alternative visions of political economy tothe normalization of a capitalist agrarian economy. Despite therecognition and prioritization of the property claims of non-indigenous, private landowners, this group persistently resistedTCO titling processes through outright violence, corruption, andpolitical lobbying. As a result many TCOs emerged not as a contin-uous area of collectively-owned land, but as a patchwork of collec-tive, private and undefined property rights – particularly in theChaco region (Fig. 2). Moreover, land titled to indigenous claim-ants often represented the least productive land within TCOs, anoutcome that placed severe limitations on the ‘‘traditional’’ liveli-hoods global policy-makers and the INRA Law had imagined forthem.

Neither did arguments about indigenous peoples’ role in glo-bal conservation hold much traction in the elite-dominated re-gional institutions of the Bolivian lowlands. A legacy of recenthistories of colonisation and settlement, dominant lowland re-gional identities in Bolivia combine entrenched notions of racialprivilege with a machista individualism, which together frameland rights as the reward for individual enterprise and economicproductivity (Anthias interviews with former DepartmentalDirector of INRA Tarija, Tarija, 15/5/2009; government official,Tarija 25/3/09).

In summary, the ethno-environmental fix of TCOs was premisedupon neatly bounded socio-natures yet in practice emerged as con-tested, fragmented and partially consolidated territories. In postco-

12 The potential loss of large tracts of TCO land was to be addressed by titlingindigenous claimants adjacent state land, or through INRA’s purchase of third parties’property – measures that have rarely occurred in practice.


lonial territories where powerful non-indigenous actors wereembedded within, and favoured by, markets, state institutionsand most legislation, secondary importance was inevitablyawarded to conservation and ethnic claims, thereby frustratingindigenous aspirations for ‘‘recovering territory’’. This context alsomakes TCOs fundamentally hybrid and ‘‘not-quite-neoliberalspaces’’,13 in which indigenous cultural and livelihoods practices ex-ist alongside, and often in articulation with, those of non-indigenousTCO residents (small farmers, ranchers, agro-industrialists, timberproducers), who engage in local, regional, national and internationalmarkets to varying degrees.

4.2.2. TCOs and extractive industry developmentThe second example of ‘‘governmentality’s limits’’ relates to the

inability of TCOs to mediate the social and environmental impactsof large-scale processes of capitalist territorial restructuring. Asnoted, as well as containing valuable biodiversity, many TCOs over-lie important hydrocarbons, mineral and timber resources, which –by means of other contemporaneous neoliberal reforms, and be-cause of government interest in revenue – had in effect becomeopened up to exploitation by foreign capital. As state officials,World Bank employees and indigenous leaders laboured over thetext of the INRA Law, transnational companies, other governmentministries – and indeed other Bank staff – were busy drawing othermaps of these territories, zoning them into sites of gas, mineral andtimber extraction. By 2008, 20 of Bolivia’s 84 TCOs were subject tocontracts for hydrocarbons exploration or exploitation (CEADESC,2008, see Fig. 3).14

As a result, TCO titling coincided with new extractives develop-ment in many indigenous territories. Elsewhere, Anthias describeshow these two territorializing processes articulated in the case ofTCO Itika Guasu, which contains the mega-gas field Margarita-Huacaya (Anthias, 2012a). As in many other cases, indigenousclaimants were not initially consulted about planned develop-ments in the TCO. Instead, the Spanish oil company Repsol tookadvantage of the TCO’s unconsolidated legal status and establishedland use agreements within private claimants, which were used toundermine guaraní claims, giving rise to a protracted conflict be-tween the guaraní, the oil company and the Bolivian state. As thiscase study illustrates, making indigenous peoples geographicallyintelligible to transnational companies and development donorsthrough land titling does not resolve conflicts around territorialand resource sovereignty, nor does it protect the socio-natures ofTCOs from the impacts of extraction.15 Whereas neoliberal ideologyviews nature as ‘‘a unique object that can be atomized into bits to beowned’’ (Mansfield, 2007, p. 401) – in this case, gas by transnationalcompanies, and land by indigenous peoples – this imaginary is beliedby the actual processes of natural gas extraction, which require acomplex land-based infrastructure and produce profound environ-mental, socio-cultural and economic impacts (CEADESC and APG Iti-ka Guasu, 2005; Anthias, 2012b). After a decade and a half ofhydrocarbons development, TCO Itika Guasu constitutes a hybrid‘‘not-quite-neoliberal’’ space, in which transnational and nationalhigh-tech, security, infrastructure, transport and catering companiescoexist with indigenous communities, cattle ranchers and smallfarmers.

As well as producing conflict, this ‘‘entangled landscape’’(Moore, 2005) of overlapping jurisdictions and political-economic

the policy impetus to try to limit the ‘most damaging’ forms of capitalist activity.14 This figure includes 44 new hydrocarbons contracts signed by the Bolivian State

in April 2007.15 World Bank OMS 2.34 and OD4.20 and DANIDA 2005 exemplify aspirations to this

effect (Davis et al., 1998).



Fig. 2. Map of the Bolivian Chaco region showing legal results of TCO titling in 2008 Elaborated by Cartographic Unit, University of Cambridge, UK, based on CEDLA 2008.

16 We use ‘‘livelihoods’’ in the broadest possible sense to denote the resources usedand activities undertaken by indigenous peoples in order to live (Scoones, 2009, p.172). For a discussion of the evolution, contributions and limitations of the livelihoodsapproach, see Ibid. In using the term here, we do not commit ourselves to an existinganalytical framework, but rather seek to demonstrate the possibility, and theimportance, of bringing livelihoods into a discussion of knowledge, politics, power


processes generates complex articulations between indigenousand capitalist development dynamics, with implications for regio-nal socio-natures. Roads built for extractive industries intensifytrends towards indigenous sales of agricultural produce, consum-erism, and wage labour (including for transnational corporations);corporate social responsibility programmes create new markets forindigenous traditional products, such as honey or handicrafts;departmental gas rents are channelled into rural development pro-jects oriented in most cases towards market-based livelihoodsstrategies; in the context of hard-won compensation agreements,gas rents may be reframed by indigenous organizations as the basisfor self-defined indigenous development (Anthias, 2012a).


4.2.3. The unresolved question of indigenous livelihoods16

The third and final dimension of governmentality’s limits inrelation to TCOs relates to the disjuncture between idealized vi-sions of ethnodevelopment and the complex (often less than ideal)realities of indigenous livelihoods. As noted above, global develop-ment policy discourse tends to identify ‘‘indigenous peoples’’ as

and social difference (Scoones, 2009, p. 186).



Fig. 3. Map of Bolivia showing geographical overlap between hydrocarbons concessions and TCOs Elaborated by Cartographic Unit, University of Cambridge, UK, based onCEDLA 2010.


traditional, isolated and un-acculturated ethnic groups. Collectiveland rights, it was argued, would protect these groups from thedangers of ‘‘rapid acculturation’’, leaving them free to continuepracticing traditional, sustainable forms of natural resource man-agement. However as above sections hinted, Bolivia’s indigenouspeoples do not live solely from hunting, fishing or subsistencefarming. Even without the presence of extra-territorial actors,indigenous peoples have varying engagements with local, nationaland even international markets – as consumers, labourers, agricul-tural producers and providers of primary commodities. Paye et al.make this point forcefully, noting that:

Given that [indigenous peoples] no longer produce all that theyconsume, they are required to acquire agricultural or manufac-tured products which can only be obtained through money. Forthat reason, a considerable proportion of the indigenous popu-


lation is obliged to sell its labour. In other words, a great major-ity of them are fully articulated with the market, because theyare inserted either permanently or temporarily in capitalistrelations of production. . . In that sense, the idea of the existenceof an ‘‘indigenous economy’’ or particular indigenous mode ofproduction does not hold. (Paye et al., 2011, p. 1, owntranslation)

In one of the ‘‘traditional’’ communities of TCO Itika Guasu, ele-ven of thirteen guaraní households had at least one member en-gaged in wage labour outside the community and contributing tohousehold income (household survey 2012; fieldnotes 2011–2012). These jobs included agricultural labour, cattle-ranching,construction, driving, and domestic work. Jobs were temporary,seasonal or semi-permanent, and took place in a range of locationsfrom neighbouring private properties, to Tarija’s urban centres, to



17 Interestingly, the fact that these were in fact market-based conservation projectswas used by indigenous leaders to reassert their role as responsible environmentalstewards.

18 Under the 2009 Bolivian Constitution, which in principle established the right ofindigenous populations to autonomy, the process for achieving formal autonomy inTCOs is contingent upon completion of TCO titling (Article 293, Paragraph 1; Albó andRomero, 2009).


farms outside of Buenos Aires. In 2012, the first community mem-ber began work in the rapidly expanding nearby Margarita-Hua-caya gas field. Ongoing capitalist engagement by indigenoushouseholds results in men’s absence from the community for longperiods of time, returning to the community mostly during thefishing season – when the market, in the form of fish traders,comes to them. Cash generated from these activities pays for indig-enous households’ essential foodstuffs, household goods and re-pairs, school materials, animal vaccines and bus travel. Yet thisincome is never enough; Guaraní communities in the Chaco re-main among the poorest in Bolivia (Concejo de Captitanes Guaraní-es y Tapietes de Tarija, 2009, p. 19).

It is certainly true that continuing land scarcity is part of whatmakes traditional livelihoods unviable or insufficient to meetneeds. However, even where indigenous peoples have gained con-trol over territory and resources, they are often still compelled toseek some form of market engagement – and often do so on un-equal terms. ‘‘Indigenous forest management plans’’, which covernearly six percent of TCO land in Bolivia, give indigenous peoplesexclusive rights to exploit forest resources. However, the high costsinvolved in equipment required for timber exploitation often forceindigenous forestry organizations to sign contracts with commer-cial or industrial capital. In doing so, the indigenous people oftenbecome mere providers of primary commodities, as in the Guarayogroup’s recent 40-year contract with a Chinese company for thepurchase of 200 annual cubic metres of wood, where local indige-nous peoples’ only involvement is as wage labourers (Paye et al.,2011, p. 14). In other words, TCOs are not non-market spaces butspaces in which traditional livelihoods activities coexist with vari-ous forms of market engagement. NGO efforts at culturally-appro-priate development are often oriented towards articulating the twoby seeking markets for indigenous maize, handicrafts or other tra-ditional products. Payments for Environmental Services (PES)schemes with indigenous groups also exemplify efforts to makeethnic territories viable in the context of a market economy.Although PES schemes have been analysed by geographers as illus-trating an ‘‘environmental fix’’ (Bakker, 2010, discussed above),these PES schemes can also, we argue, be viewed as an ‘‘economicfix’’ for indigenous territories – a means of providing much-neededmonetary income for communities for whom ‘‘traditional’’ liveli-hoods are otherwise unviable, with or without land title. As such,indigenous territories provide important insights as to whyschemes to designate certain populations and places as ‘‘outsideof the market’’ often, somewhat paradoxically, end up ‘‘bringingthe market back in’’.

Yet this is not a simple story of the inevitability of capitalistpenetration and fixing of capital, in the sense that we are situatingthese dynamics firmly within the context of postcolonial hierar-chies between indigenous subalterns (disadvantaged in racializedeconomies and legal systems) and other, diverse but relativelyempowered actors. The framing of territorial rights as the basisfor an idealized notion of ethnodevelopment diverts attention fromthese interwoven structures of coloniality and capitalist inequalityand the ways they limit indigenous peoples’ life chances. This res-onates with a parallel critique of territorially-based conservationstrategies, which ‘‘[render] less visible a plethora of non-territorialor flexible conservation strategies that might be more meaning-fully enrolled to further conservation goals’’ – such as those target-ing agricultural or urban landscapes (Harris and Hazen, 2006, pp.102–105). In the context of the ‘‘ethno-environmental fix’’, thesecritiques converge; framing indigenous collective territories as asolution to both indigenous development and conservation chal-lenges obscures the fact that neither can be addressed withoutmore far-reaching change beyond these territories. To put it an-other way, the problem with the ‘‘ethno-environmental fix’’ is thatit is precisely that: a fix and not a solution.


A second concern relating to the gap between the imaginaries ofthe ethno-environmental fix and the ‘‘not-quite-neoliberal’’ reali-ties of indigenous territories relates to what Engle (2010, p. 168)terms the ‘‘invisible asterix’’ of cultural rights. If indigenous peo-ples are granted land rights on the basis of their expected role as‘‘guardians of nature’’, those who diverge from this imaginary –as many inevitably do – could potentially lose their claim to terri-tory. In Bolivia, this double-bind is starkly illustrated in the ongo-ing conflict over the construction of a road through the indigenousTCO and national park Isidoro Secure (TIPNIS), where indigenouspeoples’ market-based livelihoods – forestry management, eco-tourism, organic cocoa bean cultivation, and caiman and crocodileharvesting – were used by the government to delegitimize effortsto protect indigenous territory from large-scale infrastructuredevelopment (Achtenberg, 2011).17

In summary, we have illustrated how the neoliberal contextwithin which TCOs were devised and implemented, and the ambiv-alent agendas behind ethno-environmental fixes, produced contra-dictory outcomes that are illustrative of governmentality’s limits.As a consequence of these processes, TCOs’ implementation, inthe context of intensifying resource extraction, led to the creationof hybrid, ‘‘not-quite-neoliberal’’ and double-edged spaces. Wehave additionally noted that the granting of rights, and productionof socio-natures within TCOs is profoundly shaped by postcolonialexclusions and colonial stereotypes of indigenous populations atmultiple scales, from regional land institutions, to national govern-ments, to international policy.

Fundamentally, TCOs have fallen short of indigenous peoples’own aspirations for ‘‘territory’’, which, although heterogeneous, in-clude both increased territorial control at a local level and a trans-formation of relations with non-indigenous actors originatingoutside the TCO – the state, non-indigenous society and transna-tional companies. TCO community members continue to complainof land scarcity and inter-ethnic resource conflict, while indige-nous leaders express frustration at the impossibility of implement-ing indigenous autonomy18 or bringing transnational companies toaccount while TCOs remain only partially titled (Anthias, 2012a).These disappointments have not, however, prevented indigenouspeoples from continuing to pursue their own, more substantive vi-sions for ‘‘territory’’. For all the limitations of TCOs, indigenous peo-ples have utilized them as a key platform from which to voicedemands directed at transforming colonial power relations, exercis-ing resource sovereignty, and increasing political participation (Gus-tafson, 2010, p. 995), echoing their creative appropriation of otherdouble-edged spaces of neoliberal multiculturalism for more radicalagendas (Postero, 2006, 2008; Lazar, 2008). Furthermore, the frustra-tions of TCO titling have ultimately given rise to a powerful indige-nous critique of a territorial model based on a narrow vision ofagrarian rights (‘‘land, not territory’’), and a renewed focus on theachievement of ‘‘autonomy’’. Summing up this shift, the nationalGuaraní Officer of Autonomies described:

Even if we thought about culture, our principles, our projectionas a nation, those technical procedures [of TCO titling] made[territory] in some way lose its essence, and made it into some-thing predominantly agrarian. . .So now the substantial changeis that we’re changing from a way of thinking based on theagrarian aspect, to now thinking about Land-Territory in the




plain of political power, and that’s where we talk about auton-omy. (Anthias Interview in Camiri, 8/2/12)

As this quotation suggests, it was in encountering the limits ofTCOs that indigenous peoples in the Chaco and Bolivia recently elab-orated a more radical territorial project based on the demand forindigenous autonomies within the framework of a plurinationalstate (Garcés, 2011; Postero, 2006), As such, TCOs provide an aptillustration of how indigenous peoples in diverse contexts have suc-ceeded in advancing more progressive agendas by exploiting ‘‘thelimits of neoliberalism in terms of its extensivity and capacity to gov-ern. . .or by subverting neoliberal forms’’ (Lewis, 2009, p. 116; papersin Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 2009; Hale, 2011). This echoes recent argu-ments about the diverse and potentially progressive ‘‘uses of neolib-eralism’’ (Ferguson, 2010), reminding us that governance is a power-laden, but always incomplete, contested and open-ended process.

5. Conclusion

Governing capitalism entails processes of deregulation and re-regulation, as efforts to secure the smooth functioning of marketsare accompanied by attempts to limit their destructive effects onnature and society. What is notable about recent global manifesta-tions of this double movement is their spatial character. Ratherthan seeking to regulate market-society relations in general, wehave seen the emergence of governmental and policy approachesthat designate particular territories – those containing highly val-ued biodiversity and/or culturally distinct and ‘‘vulnerable’’ popu-lations – as requiring special protection from markets. Whileschemes to divide population and territory are not new, their prev-alence in an era of such discursive confidence in market rule isnoteworthy. Even more striking is the way in which territorially-based approaches to nature conservation and schemes to dividecitizenship have become so profoundly interlinked. That is, howparticular subjectivities, cultural practices and even collectivepolitical demands have become enlisted in the regulation of inter-actions between markets and natures. In this paper, we have ar-gued that global support for indigenous land rights can beunderstood in this light – as an ‘‘ethno-environmental fix’’ imag-ined as limiting the destructive effects of marketisation on bothethnic populations and fragile biodiverse environments. This wasto be achieved through the creation of collectively titled, inalien-able ethnic territories, where indigenous peoples would satisfytheir own development needs while realizing their potential as‘‘guardians of biodiversity’’.

Using the case of TCOs in Bolivia, we have also examined whathappened when one such ‘‘ethno-environmental fix’’ encountereda reality that exceeded the calculations of its architects. We haveargued that the messiness of postcolonial territories, deterritorial-ized processes of capital accumulation and the reality of indige-nous livelihoods all in different ways undermined TCOs as agovernmental project, as well as disappointing indigenous peoples’aspirations for territory. The result has been the production ofTCOs as hybrid, ‘‘not-quite-neoliberal’’ and potentially double-edged spaces. Finally, we have provided some brief reflections onhow indigenous peoples have utilized these ambivalent spacesfor progressive, non-neoliberal ends. While exposing the limita-tions of the ‘‘ethno-environmental fix’’, these indigenous struggleschallenge us to acknowledge the progressive possibilities of ‘‘terri-tory’’ as a basis for decolonisation and alternative forms of devel-opment. TCOs remain key sites for such experiments.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Bill Adams for his comments on an earlierversion of the paper, and to the editors of this Special Issue and


anonymous reviewers for their helpful interventions. PenelopeAnthias gratefully acknowledges financial support for her doctoralresearch on TCO titling from the Economic and Social ResearchCouncil (ES/I901957/1). She also wishes to thank Centro de Estu-dios Regionales de Tarija and Comunidad de Estudios JAINA forinstitutional support, research contributions and friendship.

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