the etawah pilot project: a case study of albert …
TRANSCRIPT
THE ETAWAH PILOT PROJECT: A CASE STUDY OF ALBERT MAYER’S NORMATIVE REGIONALISM IN POST-INDEPENDENCE INDIA
By
LAUREL A. HARBIN
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
2014
© 2014 Laurel A. Harbin
To Horace and Eveline Holmes for leading the way
4
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to acknowledge the exceptional faculty at the University of Florida for
enriching my educational and professional experience in new and challenging ways. It
is an honor to be affiliated with the accomplished faculty and students in the Department
of Urban and Regional Planning at UF. I am especially grateful for the opportunity to
work on this dissertation under the direction of Dr. Kristin Larsen. Dr. Larsen is an
extraordinary leader, mentor, scholar, and educator. Her contributions to this research
and my professional success are invaluable.
This dissertation also benefited from the guidance and encouragement of
committee members Dr. Christopher Silver, Dr. A. Whitney Sanford, and Dr. Margaret
Portillo. Their contributions to this dissertation have inspired me to pursue an
understanding of the dynamics of post-WII planning from a more complete and
comprehensive point of view. Their insights have strengthened the quality of this
research and broadened my perspective of transnational planning history in many ways.
Financial support for this research was provided by the Clarence S. Stein
Institute for Urban and Landscape Studies at Cornell University and the Robert L.
Platzman Memorial Fellowship at the University of Chicago. The generous
contributions from these institutions immensely contributed to the depth and
thoroughness of the archival research used in this dissertation. I would also like to
thank my committee members Dr. Larsen and Dr. Silver, and Dr. Andres G. Blanco of
the Inter-American Development Bank, for their contributions in helping me to obtain
these prestigious awards.
5
Finally, this dissertation would not have been possible without the support of my
family, who encouraged me throughout the dissertation process. I am truly grateful for
their love and support.
6
TABLE OF CONTENTS page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. 4
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ 9
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ 10
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... 12
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 14
Albert Mayer ........................................................................................................... 15 The Regional Planning Association of America ................................................ 16
Albert Mayer in India ........................................................................................ 18 India at the Time of Independence ................................................................... 20
Pilot Project Case Study ......................................................................................... 23
Interpretive-Historical Narrative ........................................................................ 27 Narrative Analysis ............................................................................................ 28
Structure of the Dissertation ............................................................................. 28 Summary .......................................................................................................... 30
2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE .................................................................................... 32
Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................... 34 Modernization Theory ....................................................................................... 35
Development and social change ................................................................ 35 Stages of development .............................................................................. 38
Spatial patterns of development ................................................................. 40 Critiques of Modernization ................................................................................ 41 Critical Structuralism ........................................................................................ 44
Patterns of underdevelopment ................................................................... 44 Breakdown of traditional societies .............................................................. 45 Development as social reconstruction ....................................................... 46
Poststructuralism .............................................................................................. 47 Knowledge and power ............................................................................... 47
Sources of meaning ................................................................................... 48 Postcolonialism ................................................................................................ 49
Historiography of colonization .................................................................... 50 Recovery of peasant subjects .................................................................... 52
Heterogeneity of subaltern subjects ........................................................... 53 Studies in Postcolonial Indian Development ........................................................... 55
Rethinking Western Models of Development .................................................... 55 Assimilation of the Neighborhood Unit Concept in Postcolonial India .............. 56
7
Ideological Bias of Foreign Planners ................................................................ 59 Translation of Western Planning Principles ...................................................... 61 Framework for Analysis .................................................................................... 63
3 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................... 66
Interpretive-Historical Analysis ................................................................................ 67 Project Setting .................................................................................................. 67 Interpretive Lens ............................................................................................... 71 Postcolonialism ................................................................................................ 74
Analysis of Historical Evidence ............................................................................... 76 Interpretive-Historical Narrative .............................................................................. 81
4 ORIGIN OF ALBERT MAYER’S PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE AND IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK IN THE U.S. .......................................................... 83
The Mayer Family ................................................................................................... 84 The New School for Social Research ............................................................... 86
Manhattan Real Estate and Construction Industries ........................................ 87 Professional Practice .............................................................................................. 90
The J. H. Taylor Corporation ............................................................................ 90 The Mayer and Whittlesey Firm ........................................................................ 93
Professional Networks ............................................................................................ 94
The Regional Planning Association of America ................................................ 97 The Housing Study Guild.................................................................................. 99
New Town Planning Commissions ....................................................................... 101 Greenbrook, New Jersey Master Plan ............................................................ 102
Bellmawr, New Jersey Master Plan ................................................................ 108 Willow Run, Michigan Neighborhood Plan...................................................... 110
5 ALBERT MAYER’S INTRODUCTION TO POST-WWII INDIA AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ETAWAH PILOT PROJECT ................................... 113
Albert Mayer’s Introduction to Jawaharlal Nehru .................................................. 114
Albert Mayer’s Service as Rural Development Advisor to Uttar Pradesh .............. 119 The Pilot Project for Village Planning and Reconstruction .................................... 123
Initiation of the Pilot Project ............................................................................ 131
Villagers’ Participation .................................................................................... 137 Village Planning .............................................................................................. 141 Institutionalization of Pilot Project Principles .................................................. 146
Considerations ...................................................................................................... 148
6 OUTCOMES OF THE ETAWAH PILOT PROJECT .............................................. 150
Institutionalization of Rural Development Planning Principles from Etawah ......... 152 Diffusion of Pilot Project Principles to Outside Individuals and Organizations 155 Expansion of the Pilot Development Project ................................................... 158 U.S. Aid for Indian Development Planning ..................................................... 163
8
A National Program of Community Development and Extension ................... 165 Implementation of the National Planning Policy .................................................... 168
National Extension Service ............................................................................. 171
Mayer’s Role in Community Development and Extension in Uttar Pradesh ... 172 Shift in Development Strategy ........................................................................ 178
Translation of Pilot Project Principles ................................................................... 180
7 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 183
Summary of Findings ............................................................................................ 185
Early Influences .............................................................................................. 185 Travelling History ............................................................................................ 187 Translation Experience ................................................................................... 190
Discussion of Findings .......................................................................................... 192
Mayer’s Immersion in the Post-WWII Indian Context ..................................... 192 Mayer’s Recognition of Villagers as Participant Stakeholders ........................ 193
Limited Applicability of Western Methods and Technologies .......................... 194 Balancing Traditional Heritage with Modern Techniques ............................... 195
Mayer’s Resistance to the Rapid Institutionalization of Indian Development .. 196 Planning Innovation in the Postcolonial Milieu ................................................ 197
Limitations of the Study......................................................................................... 198
Opportunities for Future Research ........................................................................ 200
APPENDIX
A IMAGES OF THE PILOT PROJECT ..................................................................... 203
B PRINCIPLES OF THE PILOT PROJECT ............................................................. 207
C ETAWAH PILOT PROJECT OPERATIONS, 1948–1958 ..................................... 209
D ALBERT MAYER’S INDIAN PLANNING COMMISSIONS, 1946–1960 ................ 210
E INTERNATIONAL FUNDING FOR INDIAN NATIONAL PLANS ........................... 214
LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 216
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .......................................................................................... 227
9
LIST OF TABLES
Table page 3-1 Structure of the narrative and associated research questions. ........................... 79
5-1 Progress of the villager participation program 1948–1953. .............................. 139
5-2 Progress of the VLW medical treatment program 1948–1953 .......................... 145
6-1 Increase in agricultural yields per acre in maunds (mds) during the 1950–1951 rabi (spring) harvest ................................................................................. 153
E-1 Sources of foreign aid allocated to India for implementation of the First Five-Year Plan, 1951–1956. ..................................................................................... 214
E-2 Sources of foreign aid allocated to India for implementation of the Second Five-Year Plan, 1956–1961. ............................................................................. 215
10
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure page 1-1 Diagram of critical stages and time periods used to structure the narrative. ...... 24
1-2 Outline of the dissertation structure. ................................................................... 29
4-1 The Mayer family home located at 41 East 72nd Street, New York, NY. ............. 85
4-2 Photographs of 240 Central Park South ............................................................. 93
5-1 Mayer in conference with U.P. Development Commissioner Bhatia and U.P. administrators K. D. Malaviya, B. N. Jha, and Kher Singh, 1948 ...................... 132
5-2 Proposed organization and administration of the Etawah Pilot Project, 1952. .. 134
5-3 Organization of the U.P. administration in 1952. .............................................. 135
6-1 Map of the Pilot Development Project initiated by the U.P. Development Commission 1948–1951. .................................................................................. 159
6-2 Community Development Projects organization and administration. ................ 169
A-1 Photographs of Mayer with villagers at the Etawah Pilot Project ...................... 203
A-2 U.P. Agricultural Advisor, Horace Holmes, working with a villager in the Etawah Pilot Project ......................................................................................... 203
A-3 Village Level Workers at a training class in Lakhna, Etawah ............................ 204
A-4 Information center at the Etawah Pilot Project headquarters in Mahewa ......... 204
A-5 Adult literacy class at the Etawah Pilot Project ................................................. 205
A-6 Kisan mela agricultural fair in the Ballia Pilot Project, 1954 .............................. 205
A-7 Main highway and bazaar in the Etawah Pilot Project headquarters in Mahewa ............................................................................................................ 206
A-8 Road cleaning work in the Etawah Pilot Project ............................................... 206
C-1 Development operations in the Etawah Pilot Project, 1948–1958. ................... 209
D-1 Map of Albert Mayer’s direct influence Indian planning and development, 1946–1960........................................................................................................ 211
E-1 Sources of foreign aid allocated to India for implementation of the First Five-Year Plan, 1951–1956. ..................................................................................... 214
11
E-2 Sources of foreign aid allocated to India for implementation of the Second Five-Year Plan, 1956–1961. ............................................................................. 215
12
Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
THE ETAWAH PILOT PROJECT: A CASE STUDY OF ALBERT MAYER’S
NORMATIVE REGIONALISM IN POST-INDEPENDENCE INDIA
By
Laurel A. Harbin
December 2014
Chair: Kristin E. Larsen Major: Design, Construction and Planning
International planning following the Second World War (WWII) was shaped by
diffusions of Western planning knowledge to countries in the developing world. These
transnational planning flows were facilitated by the work of individual planners that
introduced Western ideas and practices in new postcolonial contexts. Recent
scholarship on the diffusion of Western planning following WWII has examined the
process of translation in which foreign planning practices were adapted to meet the
needs of decolonized countries. As a result, new narratives of postcolonial planning
history have emerged that strengthen understandings of transnational planning flows
and the social, political, and geographical contexts that shape their implementation.
This study in transnational planning history examines the work of American
architect-planner Albert Mayer in post-WWII India and his pioneering work on the Pilot
Project of rural development in the Etawah District of Uttar Pradesh from 1946-1958.
Specifically, this study focuses on three significant stages of transnational planning
diffusions. These include the origin of Western planning principles in U.S. ideology and
13
praxis, the travelling history or planning diffusions in postcolonial contexts, and the
translation of Western planning principles by local entities.
This study is presented in the form of an interpretive-historical narrative drawing
upon archival materials documenting Albert Mayer’s conceptual framework and
professional practice in the U.S. and India and his involvement in Indian planning policy
immediately following WWII. Qualitative analysis is used to interpret the historical
evidence within a theoretical framework of postcolonial development theory. The
purpose of the interpretive-historical narrative is to examine Mayer’s role in the diffusion
of Western planning principles at an important moment in Indian history when that
nation’s planning policy was developed and U.S. foreign policy utilized development
planning as a means of non-military defense against communist aggression in post-
WWII India.
14
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
International planning following the Second World War (WWII) was shaped by
diffusions of Western planning knowledge to countries in the developing world. These
transnational planning flows were facilitated by the work of individual planners such as
U.S. architect-planner and civil engineer Albert Mayer who introduced Western planning
principles to postcolonial India as an advisor to the Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) government
from 1946-1958.1 During his tenure as advisor to the U.P. government, Mayer
introduced a Pilot Project of rural development that was approved by Indian Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and implemented by the U.P. Development Commission.
The Pilot Project was an experiment in rural development in which Western planning
principles were adapted and translated to suit the postcolonial Indian context. Through
the implementation of the Etawah Pilot Project, Mayer translated the principles of
normative regionalism espoused by the members of the Regional Planning Association
of America (RPAA) to suit post-WWII development needs in India, incorporating local
knowledge and participant feedback, which challenged extant disciplinary planning
modes by Indian and foreign administrators.
In 1951, the principles of the Pilot Project in U.P. were used to guide the policies
of India’s first national development plan. The successful Pilot Project example led to
the institutionalization and expansion of Pilot Project methods into the national
Community Development program in 1952. Implementation of the Community
Development program coincided with the introduction of U.S. bilateral aid and the 1952
1 Uttar Pradesh is a state on the Northern border of India adjacent to Nepal. At the time of Independence, Uttar Pradesh was known as the United Provinces, and was home to the nation’s capital of New Delhi.
15
Technical Cooperation Agreement between India and the U.S. The translation of Pilot
Project methods in the national planning program was influenced by national Indian
leaders, local villager participants, and new foreign stakeholders. The dynamics of
social and political influence on the translation of Pilot Project principles and the process
of diffusion in which Albert Mayer introduced Western planning ideas and practices to
the postcolonial context constitute the basis of this interpretive-historical analysis. This
dissertation uses the Pilot Project as a case study for examining the process of
transnational planning flows in postcolonial India and the significance of individual
foreign actors in facilitating the diffusion of foreign planning knowledge to the developing
world immediately following WWII. Specifically, this dissertation reveals the innovative
planning methods introduced by Albert Mayer as a foreign planner in post-WWII India in
response to local needs and conditions.
Chapter 1 introduces Albert Mayer and his role as a consultant advisor and
commissioned planner to the government of India from 1948–1958. An overview of the
political and social transformation occurring at the time of Mayer’s involvement in post-
WWII Indian planning provides the historical context for this dissertation. The overview
is followed by an introduction to the Etawah Pilot Project case study research design
and methods of qualitative analysis used in the interpretive-historical analysis. Finally,
the structure of the dissertation is presented, outlining the direction and focus of this
research.
Albert Mayer
The Pilot Project of rural development in post-WWII India was informed by
Mayer’s experience as a practicing engineer, architect, and planner in the U.S. and his
affiliation with pioneering planners in the RPAA. Mayer began his career in civil
16
engineering in 1919 after graduating from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Mayer’s engineering work on commercial and residential apartment building projects led
to an interest in architectural design and housing. In 1935, he established the
architectural firm of Mayer and Whittlesey with fellow architect Julian Whittlesey. Mayer
and Whittlesey’s work on multi-family residential projects in New York City gained
notoriety and won numerous design awards. During Mayer’s formative years as a
design professional, he also became involved with the RPAA and developed a growing
interest in regional planning.
The Regional Planning Association of America
The RPAA was founded in 1923 as an extension of the international Garden City
movement and quickly evolved into a regional planning organization that combined
garden city concepts with Patrick Geddes’ regionalism and American social criticism
(Buder, 1990). An association comprised of physical planners and theorists from the
architectural, engineering, economics, law, and housing disciplines, the RPAA focused
on decentralization of overpopulated industrial cities and community building through
new town development within the framework of interconnected regions.
Key members of the RPAA included the association’s leader Clarence Stein and
his colleagues Henry Wright, Benton MacKaye, and Lewis Mumford. Design principles
exhibited in the planning projects of RPAA members included the neighborhood unit
concept, the superblock, separation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and an
orientation to regional cultural and ecological characteristics. These defining traits
helped distinguish the RPAA’s regionalism from previous garden city models by
incorporating design as a sociological tool for enhancing the sense of community
17
(Buder, 1990). Most importantly, RPAA members viewed the garden city as a means of
achieving broader humanitarian goals (Buder, 1990; Sussman, 1976).
Similarly, Fishman writes, “The RPAA had seen decentralization in terms of
preserving and creating small communities in balance with nature, advancing the values
of variety and individuality, and opposing ‘the monolithic corporate industrial state’”
(2000, p. 79). For this reason, contemporary scholarship has characterized the RPAA’s
approach to regionalism as “communitarian” (Fishman, 2000) and “normative” (Larsen,
2005). Not to be confused with normative planning theory, which considers the
procedural aspects of achieving anticipated planning outcomes, normative regionalism
reflects the RPAA members’ consideration of social values in shaping the direction of
development and providing alternatives to metropolitanism.2 Sussman explains, “RPAA
members asked themselves what was, what is, and what should be” (1976, p. 5).
In 1933, Mayer became involved in the RPAA and later co-founded a research-
based housing policy group with Wright and Mumford called the Housing Study Guild.
In 1935, Mayer and members of the RPAA were commissioned by the U.S.
Resettlement Administration to design and plan four Greenbelt Towns near Washington,
D.C., Cincinnati, Milwaukee, and Boundbrook, New Jersey. Mayer was assigned to the
design and planning team for the new town of Greenbrook near Boundbrook, New
Jersey with fellow architect Henry S. Churchill and town planners Henry Wright and
Allan F. Kamstra. Although the town of Greenbrook was never constructed, the
2 Sussman writes, “The [RPAA’s] greatest collective contribution has been almost totally ignored: the members sought to replace the existing centralized and profit-oriented metropolitan society with a decentralized and more socialized one made up of environmentally balanced regions” (Sussman, 1976, p.1).
18
experience Mayer gained on the Greenbrook project led to additional planning
commissions for the Mayer and Whittlesey firm from the New Deal administration and
strengthened Mayer’s commitment to normative regionalism as a means for creating a
balanced region.
For Mayer, regionalism defined, “a way of thinking and of feeling and of looking
at things. . . as a set of discrete related entities; each distinct with its own color and
character but woven into a total interrelated excellence” (Mayer, 1971, p. 2-3). When
Mayer was invited by India’s imminent political leader Jawaharlal Nehru to serve as U.P.
Rural Development Advisor, he translated the principles of normative regionalism to
meet the urgent rural planning needs in post-WWII Indian villages.3 These principles
included the decentralization of development into environmentally and socially balanced
regions and the consideration of social values in shaping the direction of rural planning
through a Pilot Project of community development that lasted ten years.
Albert Mayer in India
Mayer came into contact with Jawaharlal Nehru during his service as an engineer
constructing U.S. airfields in India between 1944 and 1945. During his service in India,
Mayer took a sincere interest in the domestic issues of Indian rural life. Mayer was
intrigued by the problems of Indian villagers, and despite some disapproval on the part
of British authorities, and in contrast to the practice of the American army that remained
fairly isolated from civilian issues, Mayer reached out to build new relationships with
members of Indian society. These new acquaintances encouraged Mayer to meet
3 Jawaharlal Nehru’s invitation to Mayer was extended on behalf of U.P. Chief Minister Govind Ballabh Pant.
19
Jawaharlal Nehru before returning to the U.S. Too busy to entertain a formal meeting
with the American military officer, Nehru instead invited Mayer to his home “Anand
Bhawan” in Allahabad for a number of days, with the intention of meeting with him
intermittently between other engagements (Mayer, 1958 & Singh, 1967). During his
stay, Mayer met with Nehru a number of times, typically late into the evening, during
which time the two men discovered a shared interest in the need for rapid improvement
in conditions for the large populations of rural poor. During these talks, the two
discussed opportunities for aligning development goals with the Indian villagers’ values
and traditions (Mayer, 1958).
After returning to the U.S. in 1945 following three years of service abroad, Mayer
resumed practice at the Mayer and Whittlesey firm in New York City. Six months
following his return, Mayer was contacted by Prime Minister Nehru requesting his
assistance in further developing the strategy for rural development and extending an
invitation to return to India. 4 Upon his return, Mayer paid great attention to
operationalizing a model villages plan, meeting with key leaders of the Indian Congress
party, reviewing previous attempts at rural reconstruction, conducting a tour of existing
conditions in the rural areas of U.P. and soliciting the blessing of Indian spiritual leader
Mahatma Gandhi.5 It was during this time that Mayer concluded that his preconceived
4 Mayer’s interactions with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh Govind Ballabh Pant, including transcripts of personal correspondence, are chronicled in Pilot Project India
(Mayer, 1958).
5 In Mayer’s descriptive account of the development of the Pilot Project, he writes that both he and Nehru met with and discussed the proposed community development project with Gandhi for the duration of roughly an hour, at which point Gandhi communicated his “benevolent encouragement” of the project (Mayer, 1958, p. 22).
Mahatma, is a term of reverence commonly used to address Gandhi, whose given name is Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.
20
plan for a model villages approach would not produce the changes necessary for
combating rural poverty and social instability.
As a result, Mayer’s strategy for community development evolved into an
experimental Pilot Project in which lessons learned during the project implementation
provided tools to guide subsequent planning decisions by the Indian Planning
Commission. The Pilot Project began in 64 villages in the district of Etawah, U.P. in
1948 and later expanded to 366 villages by 1956 (Singh, 1967). In a brief summary of
objectives meant to operationalize the government approved plan for community
development in Etawah, Mayer (1958) stated the primary purpose of the Pilot Project as
an assessment of the “degree of productive and social improvement, as well as of
initiative, self-confidence, and cooperation [that could] be achieved in the villages of a
district not the beneficiary of any set of special circumstances and resources” (p. 37).
The plan reflected a dual natured approach that sought to promote social and
economic development, and a shift in strategy from previous efforts in rural
reconstruction implemented by the State under British rule, which focused primarily on
physical reformation and production outputs. Mayer, and those involved in the
program’s initiation, including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and U.P. Chief Minister
Pant, believed that the lessons learned from the Etawah Pilot Project would assist in
guiding subsequent community development efforts, thereby uplifting the rural villages
across Northern India to align with Nehru’s priorities for an Independent nation free of
poverty, ignorance, disease, and inequality (Mayer, 1958).
India at the Time of Independence
Understanding the overriding political frameworks in post-WWII India and the
social instability faced by the new government provides the historical context for
21
analyzing the regional planning paradigm in action. The leadership of the Indian
National Congress Party formed in U.P. in 1885 leveraged the voice of the educated
Indian elite to speak on behalf of the Indian citizenry. The result was an increase in
pressure for greater involvement of Indian leaders in the British administration of Indian
provinces (Wolpert, 2011). Also influential in the development of Indian rights were the
leadership of spiritual figure Mahatma Gandhi and growth of the non-cooperation and
civil disobedience movements that broadened the reach of Indian Nationalism to a more
expansive audience (All India Congress Committee, 2008).6 As the power of the
Congress grew and its principles became more generally accepted by the Indian
citizenry, demands on the Congress became more fervent, eventually leading to a push
for Svarãj, or the freedom from British rule and the transition to self-government
(Wolpert, 2011).
Reaction from the British Empire to the growing momentum of the Indian National
Congress and an increasing level of support from the general public provided
incremental concessions by the British administrative framework to increase
representation of Indian leaders. One such concession was the Government of India
Act of 1935, which marked an increase in the number of Indian citizens eligible to
participate in the 1937 elections of provincial legislatures. As a result of these elections,
the Congress party assumed office in eight provinces, including the area that would
later be established as the State of U.P.
6 Mahatma Gandhi emerged as a powerful voice of the Indian National Movement after returning to India in 1915, and advocating for Satyagraha, or the civil resistance to imperial rules that were considered unjust, beginning in 1919. Gandhi subsequently introduced the non-cooperation program as a special session of the Congress in Calcutta on September 14th through 19th of 1920 (All India Congress Committee, 2008).
22
The impact of the Congress party in U.P. was limited however, due to the onset
of WWII and the subsequent dissent among party leaders in opposition to the Viceroy of
India’s declaration of war on Germany without consultation of Indian leaders (All India
Congress Committee, 2008). As a result, members of the Congress party were
imprisoned and control of the State was relinquished to the British Empire. It was not
until the Congress party reemerged as the democratic leader of the rising Republic in
1946, that a comprehensive planning program emerged to support the vast majority of
rural Indians in the pursuit of general welfare improvements (Pant, 1958).
One of the planning challenges facing the newly formed republic was the need to
create stability in the rural areas that were home to the impoverished and malnourished
landless laborers.7 The situation in India was also intensified by heightened tensions
between Hindus and Muslims resulting from the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947,
and the related partition riots that resulted in an estimated hundreds of thousands of
deaths during the mass migration of over ten million refugees across the India–Pakistan
border (Pandey, 2002). In the Northern State of U.P., in which this study is focused, the
need for stability was especially critical, for not only was U.P. home to the capital of the
newly formed Republic, it was also the home to India’s largest concentration of the rural
poor.
7 Witness to the dire conditions of landless laborers, a tax collector for the district of Etawa[h], Uttar Pradesh recollected, “The landless laborer’s condition must still be regarded as by no means all that could be desired. The united earnings of a man, his wife, and two children, cannot be put at more than three rupees a month. When prices of food grains are low or moderate, work regular, and the health of the household good, this income will enable the family to have one fairly good meal a day, to keep a thatched roof over their heads, and to buy cheap clothing, and occasionally a thin blanket” (as cited in Dutt, 1906, p. 610).
23
In response to these needs, the Indian government implemented a number of
exploratory community development programs in India and U.P. to promote stability and
improve welfare conditions in the rural villages. The results of these programs and
lessons learned from previous attempts at rural reconstruction were influential in guiding
the policies of the Indian Planning Commission, led by the Commission’s first Chairman,
Pandit Nehru in 1950, and the outlining of India’s First Five-Year Plan in 1951 (Planning
Commission, Government of India, 1951).
Pilot Project Case Study
The history of Mayer’s international planning experience in postcolonial India fits
into a broader discourse of transnational planning flows. Recent studies by Banerjee
(2009), Friedman (2012), Vidyarthi (2010), and Ward (2010) have presented analyses
of planning diffusions to India following WWII that invite new understandings about the
role of foreign actors and the translation of Western theory and practice to suit local
needs and expectations. Specifically, these studies identify Mayer as a significant actor
in the diffusion of Western planning principles to postcolonial India. They also
investigate the influence of Western ideology on Mayer’s application of foreign planning
concepts to the Indian context and address the process of translation in which these
foreign planning concepts were adapted to meet immediate planning needs.
This dissertation contributes to translational planning discourse by introducing a
case study of Albert Mayer’s pioneering rural development work in the Etawah Pilot
Project. The case study is presented in the form of an interpretive-historical narrative.
The narrative is presented in three parts to reflect the significant stages of transnational
planning diffusions as introduced by Healey’s (2013) discussion of transnational
planning theory and method. These three stages provide the foci for the interpretive-
24
historical narrative that is presented chronologically to reflect the stages in which
diffusion occurred (Figure 1-1). The three stages structuring the narrative include the
origin of Mayer’s planning theory and method, the travelling history of how these
theories and methods arrived in India and reacted with local planning knowledge, and
the translation experience of how the Pilot Project case study was replicated and
institutionalized by local stakeholders to inform India’s first national planning policy.
The origin of Mayer’s planning theory and method in the U.S. plays an important
role in defining the ideological influences that shaped his approach to regional planning
in post-WWII India. The first part of the narrative focuses on the origins of Mayer’s
personal and professional experiences in the U.S. from the time he was born in 1897, in
New York City to his final year as a practicing architect-planner in the U.S. before
joining the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers during WWII in 1942.
Figure 1-1. Diagram of critical stages and time periods used to structure the narrative.
This section also includes a discussion of the Mayer family as prominent property
developers in Manhattan and their affiliation with the emerging New School for
Research. The narrative presents Mayer’s professional experience as a civil engineer
and architect and his affiliation with members of the RPAA to reveal how these
experiences and networks served as a foundation for Mayer’s work abroad. This
professional experience includes Mayer’s introduction to planning and community
25
design through his work with the U.S. Greenbelt Town program and other planning
commissions for new towns at Bellmawr, New Jersey and Willow Run, Michigan.
The second part to the interpretive-historical narrative introduces a traveling
history to reveal how Western planning knowledge was introduced to post-WWII India
and how it was implemented in response to local needs and expectations. The time
period addressed in the second part of the narrative ranges from 1942 to 1950. During
this time Mayer was introduced to planning challenges in less developed countries
through his work as a U.S. Army engineer and invited by Jawaharlal Nehru to
implement the Pilot Project of rural development in U.P., India in 1946. This section of
the narrative emphasizes the important role that Mayer played as an individual actor in
the diffusion of the American planning ethos to the postcolonial context and
demonstrates the importance of social networks between Mayer and leaders in the
Indian national government, indigenous and foreign individuals involved in rural
planning in India, and his colleagues in the U.S.
In addition to discussing the travelling history of Mayer’s application of normative
regionalism principles to post-WWII India, this section addresses the implementation of
the Pilot Project from 1948-1950. During this time, Mayer advised the U.P.
Development Commission on the administration and operations of the Etawah Pilot
Project and introduced new methods of integrated physical planning and social
education in response to local needs, expectations, and resistance from participants at
the village level.
The third section of the interpretive-historical narrative addresses the translation
experience of Pilot Project planning principles to suit the national planning agenda. This
26
section covers the time period from 1951, as the Pilot Project was expanded and
replicated at the state and national scale to 1958, as the Pilot Project was discontinued
and converted to a National Extension Service development block funded in part by
U.S. bilateral aid. This section discusses the outcomes of the Pilot Project and the
translation of Mayer’s planning principles by local administrators and national leaders. It
also addresses the institutionalization of the Pilot Project into the national Community
Development program and describes the influences of the institutionalization process
through the introduction of new stakeholders from the U.S. following the U.S.-India
Technical Cooperation Agreement of 1952.
The following research questions pertaining to the three stages of transnational
planning diffusions are used to guide the interpretive-historical narrative:
What was Mayer’s theoretical foundation for regional planning, and how was it connected to the ideology of the RPAA?
How was the rural development plan operationalized in the Pilot Project, and what social, political, and cultural factors influenced the plan’s implementation?
How was the knowledge acquired from the Pilot Project used to guide subsequent Indian development planning, and how were the planning principles introduced by Mayer translated by local and foreign stakeholders?
By focusing on these questions, this dissertation supports existing accounts of
Mayer’s role in transnational planning following WWII as a significant actor in the
diffusion of Western planning in postcolonial contexts and presents Mayer’s theoretical
foundation in U.S. planning ideology as a factor influencing his interpretation of planning
principles to suit Indian planning challenges following WWII. This dissertation also
strengthens the understanding of how Western planning diffusions were introduced
through networks involving planning professionals such as Albert Mayer and Indian
27
political leaders including Prime Minister Nehru. Finally, this dissertation investigates
the process of translation in which Mayer’s Western planning principles were adapted
and institutionalized to suit local needs and expectations, thereby strengthening the
understanding of transnational planning diffusions during a critical time in history.
Interpretive-Historical Narrative
The Interpretive-historical narrative used to support this research is characterized
by the exploration of contextually dynamic social and physical phenomenon with the
explanations for the phenomenon presented in a comprehensive narrative (Wang,
2002). The explanatory power of the interpretive-historical design provides an
appropriate medium for retrospectively analyzing the complex ideological, socio-cultural
and political exchanges between Pilot Project administrators, staff, and the villagers
they intended to serve. In line with qualitative methods more generally, the interpretive-
historical approach emphasizes the “natural setting” in which the phenomenon takes
place, as well as the integration of various information strands to form a singular
presentation of events (Groat, 2002).
The narrative draws from historical evidence in the archives of Albert Mayer, the
Housing Study Guild, and members of the RPAA, including Clarence S. Stein, that
constituted Mayer’s professional network during the U.S. New Deal era and in post-
WWII India. Relevant historical evidence in this study includes the newsletters that
Mayer sent to his colleagues in the U.S. to chronicle his experiences in India,
development reports prepared by Pilot Project Development Officers, correspondence
with Indian political leaders and administrators, planning reports prepared by Mayer for
the U.P. Development Commission, correspondence with U.S. colleagues and
individuals involved in Indian planning including members of the Ford Foundation and
28
Rockefeller Foundation, and articles from Indian and U.S. journals and newspapers. A
qualitative analysis of this historical evidence is used to construct the three-part
interpretive-historical narrative.
Narrative Analysis
Analysis of the historical evidence begins during the process of data collection.
During the initial review of sources, significant themes are deduced to code the
evidence into categories that correlate to the study’s research questions. These
categories are used to draw connections between Mayer’s theoretical foundation, the
traveling history and implementation process, and the translation of Pilot Project
principles by Indian actors. Once the data is organized by theme and analyzed for
apparent correlations, it is used to construct a chronological narrative in a process of
emplotment.8 During the emplotment phase, the data is synthesized to form an
interpretation of historical events, combining facts with theory to present a structured
narrative in the form of a story.
Structure of the Dissertation
The Pilot Project case study is comprised of two chapters that introduce the
study and relevant theoretical framework, followed by three chapters reflecting the
three-stages of transnational planning diffusions in the form of the interpretive-historical
8 Referring to the process of interpretation in historiography, White relates the process of emplotting a narrative to the organization of historic evidence into a plot-structure to communicate “a story of a particular kind” (1973, p. 291). The emplotment of the narrative relies on bringing together the available evidence in a coherent account of events, and the historian’s interpretation of the data which is presented in the form of a story. The story that unfolds in the narrative is not directly a reflection of the historical evidence, but may be presented in different manners. For example, the same historical phenomenon may take different narrative forms, depending on the manner of emplotment employed by various historians (White, 1973).
29
narrative. The dissertation concludes with an analysis that situates the finding of this
study within the broader body of knowledge on Albert Mayer’s role in post-WWII
transnational planning discourse (Figure 1-2). Chapter 1 introduces the study and
outlines the research strategy for the dissertation. Chapter 1 also includes a brief
introduction to Albert Mayer’s role in Western planning diffusions to post-WWII India that
is further discussed in the interpretive-historical narrative.
Chapter 1 is followed by a review of literature that discusses the progression of
development planning theory and the existing studies of Mayer’s role in post-WWII India
as outlined by Banerjee (2009), Friedman (2012), Vidyarthi (2010), and Ward (2010).
Chapter 2 focuses on the rejection of modernization theory in contemporary
transnational planning studies and alternative theories of development that are used to
frame this research.
Figure 1-2. Outline of the dissertation structure.
30
Chapter 3 of the dissertation describes the research methodology. Chapter 3
reviews the application of case study research design and the use of interpretive lenses
in guiding interpretive-historical research. It also identifies the influence of postcolonial
theory in guiding the narrative analysis used in this research.
Chapter 3 is followed by the historic-interpretive narrative that is organized in
three sections, reflecting the three stages of transnational planning diffusions.
Chapter 4 of the dissertation covers Mayer’s personal and professional experience in
the U.S. from 1897-1940. Chapter 5 addresses Mayer’s work outside the U.S from
1941-1950, including Mayer’s introduction to post-WWII Indian planning and the
implementation of the Pilot Project in Etawah, U.P. Chapter 6 addresses the translation
of Pilot Project planning principles from 1951-1958, involving the expansion and
reproduction of the Pilot Project. Chapter 6 also addresses the institutionalization of
Pilot Project principles into India’s first national plan and the influence of local and
foreign stakeholders including the U.S. government on implementation of the national
plan. The dissertation concludes with an analysis in Chapter 7 that examines Mayer’s
role in the diffusion of Western planning principles within postcolonial contexts that are
characteristic of transnational planning flows following WWII.
Summary
This dissertation focuses on the transnational flow of Western planning principles
to postcolonial contexts at a critical time in history. The turning point in which India
became a free nation and the associated involvement of U.S. foreign aid as a means of
protecting the global balance of power during the Cold War era provide the context for
this interpretive-historical research. The focus of the dissertation is Albert Mayer’s role
in the diffusion of regional planning in post-WWII India through a Pilot Project of rural
31
development as a means of achieving greater civic outcomes, namely the increase in
welfare of villagers in rural India. It also provides significant insight into the process of
transnational planning flows from the U.S. to the developing world and the translation of
U.S. planning principles to the postcolonial context.
By looking at this specific case in U.S. and Indian planning history, this study
provides intrinsic value to the understanding of one of the first Indian-American
collaborative development efforts realized in the newly formed Republic of India during
a time of profound political and social transformation. Although the Pilot Project
concluded after ten years, the impacts of the program in improving living standards,
economic opportunities, and educational prospects for large populations of rural Indian
villagers have had an enduring influence on the foundations of planning policy in India
and U.S. international aid to South Asia.
32
CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE
A rise in U.S. town planning and development operations in foreign countries
occurred during the postwar era as a result of the increased rate of decolonization in
non-European territories.1 This postwar expansion of planning and development
created new planning challenges and opportunities in the developing world. The effects
of decolonization on the newly independent nations resulted in the need for new
administrative capitals, housing for refugees, development of industrial towns, and
environmental improvements in urban and rural areas. In order to meet these needs,
leaders in some of the developing nations invited participation from Western planners to
assist in new town planning and rural reconstruction efforts. What followed was a
period of accelerated planning and policy development that was marked by the
exchange of U.S. planning technologies with non-Western societies.
British India was the largest European territory decolonized after the Second
World War (WWII), which had been partitioned into the independent nations of India and
Pakistan in 1947. Postwar planning needs in India were an important component of
domestic policy, and were strongly supported by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru. In order to meet planning needs, Nehru and members of the Indian
administration invited the participation of select planning professionals from the U.S.
and Western Europe. These Western planners were instrumental in bringing modern
planning practices to postwar India. The results of these planning diffusions were
evidenced in the new town plans for Indian capitals and industrial towns such as
1 Shepard (2006) describes decolonization as the dissolution of direct European rule over non-European territories.
33
Chandigarh, Bhubaneswar, Jamshedpur, and Delhi; as well as community development
programs in the rural villages of Uttar Pradesh.
More recently, planning diffusions in the postwar period have inspired a growing
body of scholarship concerned with the procedural aspects of planning praxis. Postwar
planning scholars have broadened the understanding of how knowledge is shared in the
process of transnational planning and have used that information to strengthen
postcolonial planning theory. What these studies have shown is that diffusions of
Western planning principles occurred simultaneously with diffusions of Western values
and ideology, and that the outcomes of Western planning diffusions were influenced by
the interaction of Western values with the values of the society in the host country.
These scholars have employed poststructural and postcolonial theoretical
frameworks to explain how Western technologies were altered in response to
interchanged values and knowledge. These frameworks provide the foundation for
postwar planning scholars to explore how Western planning principles were translated
in response to local contexts and how they were received by local subjects. They also
examine the extent to which these principles were adapted to meet local needs and
expectations, and if new innovations in planning were created. These studies add to
postwar development discourse by challenging the binary representation of modern and
pre-modern societies as they were viewed in the wake of WWII.2 What follows is a
2 The dominant theory of international development following WWII was the theory of modernization that was concerned with the process of transitioning the developing world from traditional societies to modern industrial societies through economic and social development. Modernization theory assumed that the modern industrial economy was the singular solution to so-called ‘backwards’ countries, and that the linear path to development should be modeled on the historical progression of institutions and mechanisms of the developed world. The relationship between modern and traditional societies was presumed bilateral, and the decolonized countries were viewed in the simplest of forms, as essentially pre-modern.
34
review of the planning literature on development theory and studies on Western
planning diffusions to post-WWII India.
Chapter 2 begins with an introduction to the development philosophy that guided
postwar planning in decolonized nations and the subsequent critiques of modernization
that spurred poststructural and postcolonial theory. This introduction is followed by a
discussion of social and political factors that influenced planning implementation during
a period of accelerated development and nation-building in post-WWII India. A review
of recent findings by planning scholars on Western planning diffusions to post-WWII
India is provided, and a framework for conceptualizing the problem of postwar planning
in India through dynamic social and political frameworks by Albert Mayer is introduced.
Theoretical Framework
Critical studies in postwar planning diffusions emerged in response to broader
shifts in development theory in the 1970s. As a result, new theoretical approaches for
interpreting transnational planning flows created the foundation for new transnational
planning histories. Poststructural and postcolonial frameworks influenced these
histories, challenging the prominent assumptions about development that were
propagated by overriding theories of modernization. Similarly, this dissertation draws
from poststructural and postcolonial theoretical frameworks to guide the analysis of
Western planning diffusions in the Etawah Pilot Project case study. The following
discussion of development theory explores the development of these theories and their
relation to precursory assumptions about modernization.
35
Modernization Theory
Modernization theory evolved in the mid-20th century from preexisting notions
about human social progress inherited from the Enlightenment period.3 Scholars in the
social sciences developed this theory as a counter argument to neoclassical
explanations of economic growth by utility maximizing economic actors. The principle
concerns of modernization theorists were the social and cultural dimensions of change
that facilitated development in societies across various political and geographical
contexts. Significant theoretical propositions derived from modernization included the
role of culture and social variables in shaping society’s capacity for development, linear
stages of development progress, a singular representation of the ideal society, and the
requisite diffusions of innovation from the industrial centers of the world.
Development and social change
The roots of modernization theory are grounded in sociology. American
sociologist Talcott Parsons played a key role in organizing theories from sociology into a
concept of structural functionalism that became the dominant paradigm of postwar
sociology, greatly influencing modernization (Peet & Hartwick, 2009). Parsons (1948)
drew from existing theories of sociology to produce the concept of “meaningful social
action” to explain how social structures in a society interacted with individual rational
behavior. Parsons (1948) argues that individual actors are influenced by structures of
3 The Enlightenment period describes an intellectual movement of the 18th century in which European scholars advanced concepts about human rationalism that became influential in subsequent social movements and social science theories. Key theories that were influential in modernization theory include naturalism and rationalism. Naturalism describes the belief that the geographic location of a society shapes its potential for development. Rationalism describes man’s ability to assert control over the environment through logic, reason, and planned action.
36
society that shape their norms, values, and beliefs. Parsons’ theory suggests that
patterns of individual actions reflect broader cultural patterns in a society.
Parsons (1966) also asserts that changing patterns in a society, or development,
represent a process of social transformation in which societies evolve in order to adapt
to their environment. These changes may be achieved through internal innovation of
new structures or through cultural diffusions from external societies. Through the
process of social evolution, members of society differentiate and intensify economic
specialization, and the capacity of the society to adapt to its environment increases as a
result. The significance of the structural functionalism concept is the new, more
complex representation it provided of rational actors in the study of economic
development. It also spurred interest in the comparison of social and cultural variables
between industrialized societies and those with low economic growth.
In the field of economics, the social and cultural differences between societies
have become the focus of economic modernization. Economist Bert Hoselitz draws
from the concepts of structural functional sociology to assert that cultural change is a
necessary precondition for economic development. Hoselitz (1960) argues that in
societies with low economic development, performance is limited by cultural barriers
such as closed social structures that emphasize status rather than achievement.
Individual behavior is guided by custom and rigid social hierarchies that do not support
individual economic gain. Consequently, these societies exhibit insufficient divisions of
labor and specialization, with little to no innovation that is necessary to spur
development. To overcome the cultural barriers to development, Hoselitz (1960)
proposes the introduction of small private developments within cities in less developed
37
countries in order to divert power away from traditional social leaders. Hoselitz believes
that the promotion of entrepreneurial behavior in cities promotes new types of social
and political leaders that potentially ignite industrialization.
Hoselitz’s contemporary, Everett Hagen, was also concerned with cultural and
social differences that impacted economic growth. Hagen’s (1962) theory of social
change suggests that traditional societies shape individual personalities in ways that
restrain economic self-interest and limit development. According to Hagen, these
traditional personalities are authoritarian and uncreative, and are linked to technological
stagnation. In order to transform traditional personalities, Hagen (1962) argues that the
society as a group needs to experience a reduction in respect, such as subjugation to
an external takeover or domestic overthrow. This subjugation would result in
“retreatism” of the individuals, followed by the emergence of technological creativity as
traditional people seek new identities and attempt to reassert their power and meet their
needs. Individual personalities would be transformed and would have the potential to
guide innovations and reforms towards the goal of economic development.
Another theory of social change was introduced by psychologist David
McClelland. McClelland (1961) claims that human motivation plays an important role in
social evolution and that the drive for economic development is derived from the
motivation for achievement. McClelland believes that societies with greater
achievement motivations, such as the United States, produce greater amounts of
entrepreneurs and exhibit faster rates of economic development. To address the
apparent lack of achievement motivation in less developed countries, McClelland and
38
Winter (1971) recommend motivational training to individuals as a cost effective means
of accelerating economic development.
Structural functional sociology and economic modernization trends that have
influenced postwar development include the views that social and cultural differences
play a meaningful role in the development of society and may be used to explain
differences in economic growth. Studies in economic modernization point to traditional
societies as constraints to economic growth and present new theories about how to
change society. Underlying the theories of modernization is the assumption that
traditional societies should change to reflect the cultures, personalities, and motivations
of industrialized societies. This assumption appears throughout modernization
discourse and repeats itself throughout subsequent studies about how development
may be achieved by replicating social patterns of the West through linear stages of
development.
Stages of development
A model for tracing the stages of economic development was introduced by
historian W. W. Rostow. In The Stages of Economic Growth, Rostow (1960) outlines
five stages of development that mark a linear path from traditional to technologically
advanced societies. Rostow’s historical stages model is intended to be universal,
meaning that it is applicable to all societies in all areas of the world throughout history.
Rostow describes his first and most primitive stage as “traditional society.” The cultures
of traditional societies exhibit hierarchical social structures, primitive understandings of
science and technology, and views about the physical world that are based on spiritual
beliefs. The economies of traditional societies are limited to agriculture and production
that rely heavily on human labor. Political power is controlled by landowners. This
39
description of traditional society has been used to characterize historical stages of
developed societies such as Britain, and the contemporary stages of economic growth
in the less developed areas of the world. Rostow (1960) suggests that in order to
surpass the primitive stages of traditional society, social and economic characteristics
should be improved to create conditions for economic growth.
The second stage in Rostow’s (1960) model is labeled “preconditions for take-
off.” This stage, characterized by a predominantly traditional social culture, is enhanced
by improvements in education, financing, and commerce. These improvements include
the introduction of machinery to accelerate production and the emergence of lending
institutions. As innovation expands and the economy transitions from agriculture to
commercial activities, the society enters the third stage of development. In the “take-off”
stage, the social obstacles to development are minimized, and a political structure
favorable to industrialization strengthens economic opportunity. Over a period of
roughly 60 years, society reaches the fourth stage of development called, “the drive
toward maturity.” During this stage, a larger proportion of national income is reinvested
in the economy, and economic growth begins to outpace population growth. An
increase in the number of entrepreneurs and technology skilled workers creates
conditions in which all of society’s economic needs can be met. As society matures to
the final “high mass consumption” stage, the economy focuses predominantly on
consumer goods and services. High income levels result in high levels of consumption,
and in some cases, an investment in social welfare and social security.
The implications of Rostow’s (1960) economic growth model on modernization
include reinforcement of the Western example of development as the ideal society, and
40
the perception that the only way to achieve this level of progress is to follow in the
footsteps of Western Europe and the United States. The message to developing
countries is that in order to accelerate the path to development, they must integrate with
Western economies by welcoming foreign investment, diffusion of technologies, and
open markets (Peet & Hartwick, 2009).
Spatial patterns of development
Concurrent with advancements in economic modernization, scholars from the
field of geography have developed theories to explain uneven patterns of economic
growth. Diffusion theory is used to explain the levels of development of periphery
countries in less developed areas of the world, relative to their proximity to industrial
centers of the U. S. and Western Europe. Geographer Peter Gould (1964) argues that
innovations are diffused over space through communications between people in the
center and periphery countries. The degree of communications between countries
depends on the distance between them. The closer proximity that developing nations
have to the industrialized centers, the greater their degree of development. Diffusions
of technology from center to periphery countries can also be facilitated through
transportation systems that connect Western industrial nodes to other parts of the world.
The greater the connectivity that developing societies have to the U.S. and Western
Europe, the greater potential these societies have for development.
Diffusion theory suggests that differentiations in development can be interpreted
in spatial terms and proximity to the centers of modernization. Diffusion theory also
provides a strategy for increasing the spread of Western influence across the globe.
Together with Parsons’ structural functional approach to sociological modernization and
economic modernization, diffusion theory helps formulate policy that guides
41
transnational development operations in the postwar era. These theories have
dominated Western thinking about social and economic development and are used to
justify and legitimize Western intervention in decolonizing and less developed countries.
However, as the influence of modernization on international development policy has
grown, so have the criticisms of the Eurocentric themes embedded in these theories
and their policy implications.
Critiques of Modernization
Critiques of modernization target the theoretical foundation of structural
functional sociology. Sociologist Alvin Gouldner (1970) suggests that structural
functional theories operate primarily as tools for maintaining social order by the
societies already in power. Emphasis is placed on the transmission of knowledge and
values to host countries under the assumption that the values of the West should guide
the social and economic behavior of non-Western societies. Gouldner (1970) contends
that Parsons’ theories about social transformation are too narrowly focused on non-
violent evolutionary change in order to minimize the level of confrontation and
resistance from the societies undergoing transformation. This bias towards equilibrium
renders structural functionalism incapable of addressing the social interactions of
development involving issues of resistance, disproportionate power relationships, and
exploitation (Gouldner, 1970).
Similarly, sociologist Anthony Giddens’ (1977) primary contention is that the
structural functional view of human actions assumes that behavior is determined
exogenously by the needs of the social system, mirroring changes in the behavior of
organisms in the biological sciences. Giddens’ objection to this interpretation of human
behavior is two-fold. First, Giddens (1977) asserts that structural functional sociology
42
conflates concepts of structure and system. The structure of society merely creates the
context and conditions for human actions, whereas a system can be understood as
guiding the functioning of how the structure worked. Second, Giddens (1977) alleges
that human behavior is not determined by the needs of an external system. In contrast
to the animal world, in which readjustments and feedbacks determine behavior,
Giddens (1977) maintains that human consciousness guides behavior to respond to
internal forces, as well as external social influences. Giddens’ (1977) alternative
conception of sociology, called “structuration,” explains that social systems are
generated and regenerated by social interaction in which knowledgeable actors produce
behaviors that take into consideration extant social frameworks. In short, human
actions cannot be assessed solely by their connection to the needs of society, and
those actions are not solely determined by external development forces.
A comparable critique of the determinative nature of modernization is provided by
dependency theorist Andre Gunder Frank.4 Frank (1969) challenges Rostow’s historical
stages of growth model and the narrow view it offers of the final stage of development.
Frank (1969) criticizes this single-outcome portrayal of ideal society for its imposition of
Western values for commercial growth onto traditional societies. This criticism is similar
to critiques of structural functionalism that characterize modernization as teleological
and inappropriately committed to an implied end state of development that mirrors the
patterns of development in the West.
4 Dependency theory is a neo-Marxist critique of modernization that argues U.S and Western European development in other countries forces the less developed countries into a condition of underdevelopment that makes them dependent upon and subordinate to Western countries.
43
Frank (1969) also critiques Rostow’s representation of non-developed societies
as a singular entity. Rostow’s model supports a binary interpretation of developed
society and “backwards” societies that ignores the variations in traditional cultures and
the economic stability many of the colonized societies have achieved prior to European
conquest (Frank, 1969).
The critiques by Gouldner, Giddens, and Frank address the apparent bias in
Western scholarship regarding development. According to these critiques,
modernization theories inadequately account for the role of local actors in the
development process. Specifically, Western scholarship overlooks the response of
local actors to social transformation, discounts societal values that contradict with
Western ideas of progress, and ignores the diversity of traditional societies and the
complex social systems that guide local actor decision making.
These critiques reflect a broader crisis in development theory that gained
prominence in the 1960s. As a result, new critical theories have emerged that
challenge the Eurocentric themes of modernization. These theories surface from one of
two dominant fields of study. The first includes critical structural theories that emerged
from the field of neo-Marxism. These theories criticize the uneven patterns of growth
and look to Marxist theories of production and capital accumulation to explain class
inequalities. The second field of study includes poststructural theories that scrutinize
the conceptual origins of development outlined in Western scholarship. Both fields of
study challenge the theoretical justifications for postwar development, but do so in very
different ways.
44
Critical Structuralism
Critical structuralism is founded in the ideas of 19th century philosophers Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels. Marx and Engels provide a critical view of economic growth
in which land owning and elite classes reap the benefits of development at the expense
of the laboring classes. Marx (1970) explains that uneven development is caused by
exploitive modes of production in which surplus labor value is extracted from workers
without compensation. The process of exploitation is reinforced by political and
ideological forces. According to Marx, both the state and dominant ideologies such as
religion are born out of the need to rationalize and justify labor exploitation and capital
accumulation.
Patterns of underdevelopment
One of the arguments of critical structural theorists is that the control of
production and availability of resources by a small number of powerful elites results in
conditions of “underdevelopment” of laboring classes. This argument provides the basis
for the prominent critical structural theory of dependency. By the late 1950s, developing
countries engaged in capitalism with the West by selling raw goods to industrialized
countries. The industrialized countries produced ‘value-added’ finished goods and sold
these to the periphery countries at prices that exceeded the revenues they had earned
for the raw goods. Therefore economically disadvantaged countries were unable to
afford the finished goods offered in the global market (Prebisch, 1972). Profits received
through the sale of raw materials benefited a small group of elite, further widening the
economic divide between rich and poor classes in the developing world (Peet &
Hartwick, 2009). As a result, developing countries, particularly those in Latin America,
experienced a decline in economic growth.
45
In some cases, import substitution programs allowed domestic industries to
create consumer items comparable with those on the global market, and to prevent
manufacturing revenues from leaving the country. These programs did not succeed in
meeting the needs of domestic consumers due to high prices resulting from not being
able to achieve the benefits of economies of scale. Another weakness of the programs
was the assumption that developing countries benefited from engaging in industrial
manufacturing, although it limited these countries’ ability to control their own raw
material resources (Ferraro, 2008).
Breakdown of traditional societies
Other critical structural theorists challenged the modernization concept that social
transformation is a necessary precondition for development. This concept is based on
Enlightenment era ideas about the advance of modern reason by Western intellectuals.
These ideas created the foundation for modernization theory and provided the
justification for Western intervention in societies in less developed areas of the world.
Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano specifically disputes the Western European
theory that developed societies experience accelerated economic growth as a result of
exceptional intellect and innovation. Galeano (1973) states that the concentration of
development in Western societies was achieved as a result of imperial conquests of
peasant societies outside the home country. Galeano’s theory suggests that the origins
of development are not internal to advanced societies and that development creates
benefits primarily for those societies already in power.
Andre Gunder Frank shares Galeano’s belief that development is a medium for
states at the center of the world capitalist economy to profit from the exploitation of
periphery countries. Frank (1969) particularly focuses on the views of traditional
46
societies in modernization and argues that traditional societies do not constrain the
potential for development. In contrast, Frank asserts that societies in less developed
countries are transformed or damaged as a result of capitalist intervention. Frank
(1966) argues that the conditions of underdevelopment that have emerged in the wake
of postwar international development expansion were created by the structure of
capitalism. This critical view of development suggests that Western intervention in
developing economies negatively impacts periphery nations. As a result, Frank and
other dependency theorists have called for social revolution in underdeveloped
countries in order to free them from the exploitation of capitalism controlled by Western
society. Although these theorists strongly oppose Western intervention in foreign
markets, they still hold a similar view of development as modernization theorists.
Development as social reconstruction
The analyses by critical structural theorists portray development as an uneven
and contradictory process. In contrast to modernization theories that argue
transformation of traditional societies leads to improved development outcomes, critical
structuralists view development as a tool for transforming societies in order to meet the
needs of a capitalist market dominated by Western interests. Despite these differences,
both modernization theorists and critical structuralists have adopted a similar framework
for understanding development. From the structural viewpoint of development, theories
about society and culture are interpreted as components of a broader structural
phenomenon. In the case of postwar development, social variables are interpreted by
their relationship to structures of modern reason and intellect that produce the
industrialized societies and capitalist markets.
47
Poststructuralism
By the 1970s, a new form of modernization critique emerged that challenged the
validity of the structure itself. In poststructuralism, modern reason is viewed as a mode
of social control by which institutions, norms, and ideas about rational self-discipline are
used to dominate and justify Western ideological diffusions. The theoretical foundation
for poststructural theory includes critiques by post-Enlightenment philosophers and
phenomenologists who challenged the principles of modern reason and scientific
knowledge. These critiques provided the basis for subsequent poststructural theories of
knowledge and power in the literature and histories of non-Western societies.
Knowledge and power
A principal concern of poststructural philosophy is the connection between
modern Enlightenment thinking and the spread of European dominance and power
(Young, 1990). One of the critiques stemming from early French poststructural
philosophers such as Michel Foucault is that Enlightenment thinking is accepted as a
form of universal knowledge. Foucault disputes that the so-called “universal”
knowledge is created and controlled by a minority of European intellectual elites.
Foucault’s (1973) hierarchical view of knowledge explains that knowledge deemed true
and objective is regulated by a set of conditions and collectively appointed experts that
comprise the “episteme.” Foucault (1972) calls the types of statements validated by the
episteme as true and significant, “discourses.” Statements of discourse are
differentiated from other assertions of knowledge in that they were deemed credible
because of their formalized and regulated character. Foucault (1972) suggests that
discourses are not inherently true, but claim truth in order to perpetuate power and
influence.
48
Foucault (1980) explains that individual societies develop their own politicized
systems of truth. As early modern societies have advanced in the post-Enlightenment
era, an increased focus on the development of populations have led to the
advancement of human sciences in the episteme of societies. Foucault’s (1980) view is
that the purpose of the human sciences is not to liberate societies, but to dominate them
under the systems of formalized knowledge. For these reasons, Foucault rejects macro
theories based on presumed universal knowledge such as modernization, and
advocates for alternative, decentralized theories that exist outside the episteme of
powerful European experts and institutions (Peet & Hartwick, 2009).
Sources of meaning
Another central concept of poststructural theory that questions the validity of
empirical knowledge is the identification of meaning in language and texts. According to
Jacques Derrida’s (1978) theory of différance, the meaning in language and text is
derived from the relationship between the subject and the author, or the “signified” and
the “signifier.”5 Derrida (1974) explains that truth can never be accurately and
objectively represented because the human mind plays a mediating role in interpreting
existence. Therefore, the focus of Derrida’s analysis is on the process of generating
representations of truth.
Relationships between the signified and the signifier produce meanings that are
temporary and relevant only to their specific contexts (Derrida, 1978). Derrida’s
5 Derrida’s (1978) theory of différance emerged in response to structural linguistic theories such as Ferdinand de Saussure’s that emphasized the symbolic elements of speech. Derrida’s (1978) theory added to these theories, the notion that intermediate dimensions between symbols played a part in establishing meaning. Derrida’s theory resulted in an increased awareness of context specific factors affecting signifiers and the signified.
49
theories of subjective and contextual meanings contribute to the skepticism about
universal truth and empirical knowledge. As a result, poststructural development
studies differ from macro structural theories that look to approved forms of knowledge in
order to uncover the truth (Given, 2008). In contrast, poststructural studies emphasize
the identification of context specific meanings by authors outside the episteme in a
broad range of scenarios. One contentious scenario that has gained prominence in
postwar development studies is colonialism involving the subjugation of a periphery
society under the rule of a dominant Western society.
Postcolonialism
As early as the 1950s, a new theoretical framework emerged that was used to
examine the impacts of colonialism on the social, political, and economic dimensions of
societies (Given, 2008). Studies in postcolonialism address the effects of colonialism
on the formation of identities of both the colonizer and the colonized, during and after
the period of colonization. These studies emphasize the role imposed identities play in
marginalizing colonized peoples and in excluding non-Western peasant narratives from
Western discourse.
Postcolonial criticism surfaced from new sources outside the conventional
episteme, including scholars originating from former colonies. One of these scholars is
West Indian and Algerian theorist Frantz Fanon. In his work, Fanon unites critical
studies in anti-colonialism with structural studies in subject formation (Gates, 1991).
Fanon (1968) applies psychoanalytic theory to explore the effects of Western
domination on the psyche of colonized people as inferior and dependent. Fanon (1968)
also argues that the effects of colonialism help shape the Western identity as the
superior alternative to the non-Western world.
50
In 1979, Palestinian critic Edward Said introduced the seminal work on
postcolonial theory, Orientalism. One of Said’s (1979) central arguments is that “the
Orient” is a representation of Asian cultures that is produced in European discourse.
Said’s argument is founded on Foucault’s theory of discourse and the use of institutions
and regulated knowledge as sources of power. In Said’s (1979) theory of Orientalism,
European discourse shapes binary relations between the West and non-Western world.
It also facilitates the West’s perception of itself as an entity that contrasts with the
traditional societies of Asia and the Middle East.
According to Said (1979), Western discourse on “the Orient” propagates
prejudices against non-Western societies. Images of non-European people are
constructed in Western discourse portraying individuals as childlike, irrational, and
helpless (Given, 2008). These characterizations of “the Orient” legitimize the European
interference in non-Western societies and justifies European conquest through
colonization (Said, 1979). In addition, Western discourse creates limitations on what
could be considered valid knowledge about “the Orient” and its relationship to the West.
Historiography of colonization
Western discourse on “the Orient” also shapes the histories that are authored
and validated by the European episteme. In studies of postcolonial India, the history of
Indian nationalism and the anti-colonial movement are debated.6 One dominant
interpretation of Indian nationalism was introduced by members of the Cambridge
School. These historians assert that Indian nationalism is a byproduct of colonial
6 Nationalism describes a political and ideological movement that reflects the actions and attitudes of nation members (Miscevic, 2010). In postcolonial studies, nationalism is closely associated with independence movements and is often used to describe the political force of colonized people that fought imperialism and achieved self-rule.
51
intervention and the creation of conditions for the dissemination of Western knowledge
and political structures. Historian Anil Seal (1968) explains that Indian nationalism is
caused by Indian elites that were educated in Europe, who sought power and prestige
by coordinating with British leadership in India, and then competed against it.
Cambridge School historians suggest that the perceived struggle for freedom and
autonomy by the Indian nationalist movement is in fact an opportunistic grasp at
authority by Indian elites through vertical hierarchies of power instituted by the British
(Chakrabarty, 2000). In summary, Cambridge school historians argue that the agency
exhibited by Indian nationalists was instigated by the intellectual and political structures
of colonialism.
Nationalist historians present an alternative history of Indian independence.
These historians perceive the struggle for autonomous self-rule as a conflict between
British colonialism and Indian nationalism. Nationalist historians draw from neo-Marxist
theories of class struggles and dependency theory to argue that the political economy of
colonialism created destructive forces that influenced development. These historians
contend that nationalism had the opposite effect on development, and that the central
essence of political struggle in 20th century British India was the conflict in ideology
between the colonizers and the Indian people. Indian historian Bipan Chandra (1979)
defends nationalism as the unifying and regenerating force that resulted in the
mobilization of Indian people to defeat colonialism. As a result, nationalist studies of
Indian decolonization focus on the binary oppositions between the colonizer and the
leading nationalist force. As a result, domestic conflicts of caste and class occurring at
52
the community scale are considered secondary to the broader structural conflict
between colonialism and nationalism.
In response to these interpretations of history, a formalized group of postcolonial
scholars initiated a collection of edited volumes in Subaltern Studies. 7 The term
“subaltern” is derived from Antonio Gramsci’s writings on the subordination by caste,
class, gender, race, language, and culture that are used to perpetuate relationships
between the dominant and the dominated in history (Prakash, 1994). In the collection of
essays that comprise the volumes of Subaltern Studies, new approaches to
historiography are advocated in order to reinstate the history of the subaltern.
Contributors to the journal scrutinize the inherent elitism that blocked peasants
from being recognized as subjects in colonial history. Both the Cambridge School and
the nationalist historiographies are centered on the universal application of European
Enlightenment principles as the driving forces of development (Chakrabarty, 2000).
Although the nationalist interpretation allocates agency to the colonized societies, it
does so by attributing the assimilation of colonized elites to Western forms of knowledge
and power as the driving forces of nationalism.
Recovery of peasant subjects
A leader of the postcolonial critique is Indian historian and Subaltern Studies
original editor, Ranajit Guha. In a critique of Eurocentric historiographies of South Asia,
Guha (1983) argues that the actions of peasants in resistance rebellions have been
7 Subaltern Studies describes both a theoretical approach to postcolonialism that focuses on the issues of the subordinate subjects in history, as well as the name of the collection of essays produced by subaltern theorists that was published from 1982–2008. Subaltern Studies scholar Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) explains, that “it would not be unfair to say that the expression ‘subaltern studies,’ once the name of a series of publications in Indian history, now stands as a general designation for a field of studies often seen as a close relative of postcolonialism” (p. 9).
53
inappropriately relegated to actions of reflex to political and economic domination.
Guha’s (1983) contention with the representation of peasant rebellions is that it omits
the roles of peasant consciousness and agency. For the purposes of Western
historiography, peasants were acting in a programmed response to an external cause
imposed by elite forces (Guha, 1983). In his analysis of colonial discourses, Guha
(1983) uncovers a “counter-insurgent code” to identify the cause of a rebellion in order
to control it and deny agency to the insurgent group. In his discussion of peasant
consciousness and agency in rebellions, Guha acts to recover the peasant subjects in
colonial historiography.
The representation of subaltern as subjects following Guha’s analysis continues
to occupy postcolonial scholarship. Feminist postcolonial theorist Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak (1987) views attempts by scholars to recover peasant subjectivity as a flawed
undertaking that is founded on the fundamental Western concept of consciousness that
it attempts to overcome. In addition, Spivak (1988) argues that efforts by Western
scholars to give a voice to the subaltern introduced the problem of speaking on behalf of
the people they study. In an analysis of subaltern women, Spivak (1988) comes to the
conclusion that “the subaltern cannot speak,” because they lack a coherent subject
position to speak from. Spivak (1988) also argues that the representation of subaltern
voices in scholarship too easily exaggerates the homogeneity of consciousness of
diverse subaltern individuals.
Heterogeneity of subaltern subjects
Like Spivak, postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha also challenges the
homogeneous representation of subaltern subjects in colonial historiography. Bhabha
(1994) suggests that the binary representations of Western and non-Western societies
54
introduced to postcolonialism by Fanon in the 1950s, portray a singular identity to the
subaltern that needs to be expanded to account for the diversity of subordinate
subjects. Bhabha (1994) suggests that cultures and identities of the subaltern are
negotiated and established on a continual process to confront the extant social, political,
and economic constraints. The diversity of subaltern identities also results in a variety
of responses to colonialism that includes uncertainty, ambiguity, ambivalence, and
contradiction (Bhabha, 1994).
In particular, Bhabha (1984) studies the subaltern response to colonialism by
mimicry. This adoption of Western traits by colonized people reflects the ambivalence
of subalterns to colonization (Given, 2008). By adopting these traits, the colonized
people confirm that they recognize the colonizer and are reflections of the colonization
process (Bhabha, 1984). Mimicry also presents a subtle challenge to the colonizer’s
authority because it alters and displaces its meaning (Bhabha, 1984). Bhabha’s
interrogation of hybrid responses and identities in colonial history contributes to the
postcolonial emphasis on the mutual engagement of the dominant and the dominated
during colonialism.
The theories introduced by the Subaltern Studies scholars such as the emphasis
on decentered and subaltern subjects, the heterogeneity of the non-Western entities,
and the complex and hybrid responses of the subordinate subjects adds to the critiques
of colonial and postcolonial historiography. As a result, postcolonial theory provides a
new theoretical framework from which to address the transnational development
programs introduced by Western planners in the postwar era of decolonization.
55
Studies in Postcolonial Indian Development
In light of the progression of development theory in the late 20th century, new
studies in postwar transnational development have appeared in planning scholarship.
These studies introduce critical analyses of the political, social, and ideological
dynamics of Western intervention in developing countries. In particular, these studies
address the engagement of U.S. planning consultants and institutions in the diffusion of
Western planning principles within post-WWII India. The emphasis of these studies is
derived from themes introduced by poststructural and postcolonial theory, resulting in
new insights into the nature of transnational development.
Rethinking Western Models of Development
One of the themes that permeates postcolonial development studies is a
reconsideration of the applicability and appropriateness of Western development
models in foreign contexts. International planning and economic policy was founded on
European ideals of progress and modernity prior to the manifestation of poststructural
and postcolonial theories. Modernization theory legitimizes and validates Western
intervention in social and cultural systems for the purposes of development. Even
critical structural theories targeting unfair economic policies and class exploitation
assume that following in the footsteps of Western progress is the best opportunity for
developing countries to achieve the ideal society (Peet & Hartwick, 2009). In contrast,
poststructural and postcolonial theorists question whether the universal application of
European Enlightenment principles provide the appropriate model for achieving the
ideal society in non-Western contexts. Similarly, postcolonial development scholars
question whether Western development models and policies are appropriate within the
contexts of decolonized countries. New studies have emerged that investigate the
56
diffusion and translation of Western planning principles to meet the demands of the
Indian administration and the needs of the Indian citizenry.
In postcolonial India, Western planning principles were introduced by foreign
consultants from the U.S. and Europe, and by Indian planners returning from Western
universities to fill positions in the Indian Administration. The Neighborhood Unit concept
is one of the foreign planning principles that was implemented by these foreign
consultants and Indian administrators. The Neighborhood Unit concept originated in
U.S. new town planning through the writings of sociologist and planner, Clarence A.
Perry in the 1920s. Mayer and other members of the Greenbelt Town Program applied
principles of the Neighborhood Unit concept in new town plans for the U.S.
Resettlement Administration in 1935 and 1936. In the 1940s, the concept was
introduced to post-WWII Indian town planning by Mayer in the recommendations for the
Bombay plan and by German planner Otto Koenigsberger in the extension plan for an
industrial city in Mysore.8
Assimilation of the Neighborhood Unit Concept in Postcolonial India
In a recent study on postcolonial planning in India, Vidyarthi (2010) investigates
the assimilation of the Neighborhood Unit concept by Indian planners. One of
Vidyarthi’s (2010) major findings is that the Neighborhood Unit was assimilated by
Indian planners in a process that diminished the perceived foreignness of the concept,
and resulted in the institutionalization of the Neighborhood Unit concept over time.
Vidyarthi (2010) asserts that the process of assimilation occurred in three stages:
translation, internalization, and institutionalization.
8 See also Liscombe (2006) and Vidyarthi (2010).
57
Upon the application of the Neighborhood Unit concept by foreign planning
consultants, Indian planners were not convinced of the appropriateness of the Western
neighborhood planning model to indigenous communities of Indian cities such as Delhi
(Vidyarthi, 2010). To reconcile this conflict, Indian planners “translated” the
Neighborhood Unit concept to the Indian context by changing the name of the foreign
planning technique and drawing parallels between the Neighborhood Unit and existing
Indian community spatial organizations (Vidyarthi, 2010). The perceived foreignness of
the concept was diminished by incorporating the Neighborhood Unit concept within the
Delhi plan by calling for “residential unit” planning techniques, and “Mohalla unit” plans.9
This technique allowed for the subsequent internalization of the Neighborhood Unit
concept to Indian planning methods. As a result of internalization, Indian planners were
capable of adopting Western planning technologies to meet nationalist goals of
modernization, while maintaining a critical view of Western modernity that was
characteristic of the postcolonial attitudes (Vidyarthi, 2010).
The final stage of assimilation was the institutionalization of Neighborhood Unit
principles into Indian planning policies. Vidyarthi (2010) writes that evidence of the
institutionalization of Neighborhood Unit principles was apparent in the planning rules
produced in the 1960s and 1970s for subdivision design. Vidyarthi (2010) explains that
the process of institutionalization was facilitated by the dispersal of Indian planners
participating in the Delhi Master Plan across the country to fill the dire need for planning
officials in the age of reconstruction. The emphasis of Vidyarthi’s (2010) study is on the
9 The final Delhi Master Plan replaced the use of “neighborhood unit” with “Mohalla unit” because it was the Hindi and Urdu translation for urban neighborhood (Hull, 2011).
58
gradual assimilation of the Neighborhood Unit concept to fit the Indian context over
time.
Another critical aspect of Vidyarthi’s (2010) study is the analysis of the
Neighborhood Unit concept as a tool for implementing a Western vision of the ideal
society. Vidyarthi (2010) suggests that Neighborhood Unit planning principles were
used in the Delhi Master Plan to displace the indigenous living patterns associated with
existing urban environments. The purpose of the Neighborhood Unit concept in this
context was to create the environmental conditions necessary for producing an ideal
civic life of a modern Indian society.
A similar finding was introduced by Hull (2011) in an anthropological study of the
Neighborhood Unit concept in Postcolonial Delhi. Hull (2011) cited that the foreign
technologies of neighborhood planning and urban community development introduced
by the Ford Foundation consultants were designed to break-down traditional social
groupings.10 The purpose of the Neighborhood Unit plans was to construct a new social
organization based on spatial ties, rather than hierarchies of caste, class, and religion in
order to reduce social conflicts and build community (Hull, 2011). Hull (2011) claims
10 The need for comprehensive regional planning in the Indian capital of Delhi was prompted by the declining environmental conditions of urban neighborhoods following independence in 1947. Increases in population resulting from rural to urban migrations, and the advent of refugees, increased the demands on urban housing and services. The housing shortage resulted in an increased number of squatter settlements and homelessness in Delhi. The Indian Minister of Health, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, observed the declining conditions and appealed to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru regarding the need to adopt a long-range urban improvement plan. In 1954, Amrit Kaur approached Ford Foundation representative Douglas Ensminger to request a program of technical cooperation. In 1956, a proposal was submitted to the Ford Foundation for $340,000 to fund a team of eight foreign consultants to work in cooperation with the newly formed Delhi Town Planning Organization in a program of regional planning that would be approved and implemented by the Delhi Development Authority. The team was assembled by the Mayer and Whittlesey firm in New York and subsequently arrived in India in 1957. The program resulted in the construction of a Delhi Master Plan in 1962, and the establishment of administrative and legal frameworks for comprehensive planning in India.
59
that the objectives of the Ford Foundation team to build community were founded on
American sociological beliefs involving the connections between community life and the
building of democracy.
Ideological Bias of Foreign Planners
Hull’s consideration of the ideological orientation of Western planners in the
construction of the Delhi Master Plan presents an important reflection of poststructural
development theory. In contrast to modernization theories that were prevalent during
the postwar era, poststructural theories reject the assumption that Western science and
knowledge are universally applicable in all contexts. They also suggest that modern
Enlightenment ideals and histories are not value-free, but products of the European
orientations to existence. In postcolonial development studies, the transmission of
Western knowledge is coupled with the transmission of values. This approach also
influences the trend in development studies to focus on context-specific case studies of
transnational planning projects.
In a study of U.S. planning diffusions in Postcolonial India, Banerjee (2009)
suggests that U.S. planning interventions in India were influenced by the dominant
planning ideologies in the West. Banerjee’s (2009) study consists of three case studies
of U.S. planning diffusions in the postcolonial context. The first is the planning of
Chandigarh by U.S. architects Albert Mayer and Matthew Nowicki. The other cases
consist of plans for Delhi and Calcutta conducted by Western consultants of the Ford
Foundation, including Albert Mayer.
In this cross-case analysis of technical assistance programs, Banerjee (2009)
utilizes Hall’s (1989) historiography of 20th century planning ideologies and Boyer’s
(1983) discussion of “the city rational” planning movement to identify correlations
60
between U.S. planning ideologies and applied technologies in postcolonial India.
Banerjee (2009) finds that multiple planning movements influenced planning
implementation in each of these cases, and the influences aligned with the progression
of planning trends in the U.S. For example, Banerjee (2009) asserts that the planning
of Chandigarh benefited from “the city functional” and “the city visionary” planning
movements introduced to the Chandigarh plan through the ideas of Albert Mayer.
Banerjee (2009) explains that Mayer’s exposure to the Radburn idea and the Regional
Planning Association of America influenced his application of “the city visionary”
principles. Banerjee (2009) also asserts that Mayer’s plan for Chandigarh exhibited
organizational qualities such as the segregation of districts based on function and the
nodal hierarchy of circulation and reflected ideological commitments to “the city
functional” movement as well.
The Delhi plan was influenced by a combination of “the city functional,” “the city
renewable,” and “the city rational” planning movements (Banerjee, 2009). These
movements influenced the Ford Foundation planners, affecting their approach to foreign
planning problems. Banerjee (2009) argues that these ideological influences conflicted
with the expectations of local actors who were ideologically tied to principles of “the city
visionary” and possibly “the city beautiful.”11
Finally, the Calcutta basic development plan consisted of a similar group of
foreign consultants, but differed in ideological orientation. At the start, the Calcutta
planning team lacked any coherent planning regime, and the first three years of
11 Banerjee (2009) suggested that the Delhi Master Plan was also initially influenced by “the city grassrooted” movement due to Mayer’s advocacy of a participation program, but it was later dropped from the plan.
61
planning exhibited characteristics of the approach of “muddling through” (Banerjee,
2009). The lack of coherent vision for the Calcutta plan may reflect the ideological
tensions taking place in the U.S. between physical planners and social scientists,
furthering Banerjee’s argument that U.S. planning diffusions in India were subject to
“certain ideological baggage” of foreign consultants (Banerjee, 2009, p. 194).
The second finding of Banerjee’s (2009) cross-case analysis is that the
introduction of Western planning technologies and ideologies resulted in innovations in
the Indian context. Banerjee (2009) finds that Western ideologies resulted in innovative
planning outcomes when they incorporated local knowledge and responded to local
expectations. Banerjee’s study (2009) also identifies that planning practice was
transformed from its original ideological roots to adapt to local circumstances. This
process was characterized by partnership and collaboration, and Banerjee (2009) states
that successful diffusion of Western technologies was achieved when a suitable
institutional structure and sufficient local capabilities in the host country were present.
Translation of Western Planning Principles
The process of translation in Banerjee’s (2009) study is immediate and resulted
from the interaction of foreign and local planners at the time of project implementation.
Western planners and their Indian counterparts were involved in an exchange of
conflicting ideologies and negotiations that resulted in mixed outcomes. In the case of
the Delhi Master Plan, a conflict in ideology resulted in unmet local expectations and
dissatisfaction in the completed plan. In the case of the Calcutta basic development
plan, some of the collaborations between U.S. and Indian planners resulted in
innovations such as the slum improvement program and the integration of social
development with physical development planning (Banerjee, 2009).
62
This finding contrasts somewhat with Vidyarthi’s (2010) assertion that the
transformation of Western planning principles occurred gradually over time. Taken
together, these studies suggested that Western planning principles transformed in
multiple ways over different periods of time. Adding to the debate is Ward’s (2010)
study of transnational planners including Koenigsberger and Mayer in post-WWII India.
Ward (2010) finds that the translation of foreign planning principles to India depended
upon the degree of control exhibited by local entities. For example, Ward (2010)
contends that postcolonial planning diffusions were characterized by stronger
indigenous influence over the translation process than those introduced during the
colonial period as a result of shifting power dynamics between local stakeholders and
foreign planners. Ward (2010) also suggests that individual foreign planners affected
planning outcomes in postcolonial contexts, arguing that planners immersed in the
Indian context including Albert Mayer were more responsive to local needs and
knowledge, resulting in planning methods that were more appropriately translated to suit
local contexts.
An additional perspective on the transformation of Western ideologies is provided
in Liscombe’s (2006) study of German architect Otto Koenigsberger. Liscombe (2006)
states that Koenigsberger’s work in India was influenced by his modernist architectural
training and exposure to Western planning technologies such as the garden city and the
neighborhood unit concept. Over time, however, Koenigsberger’s conceptualization of
modernism was transformed as a result of his experience as an architect and planner
for the Indian administration between 1939 and 1951 (Liscombe, 2006). By the end of
his career, Koenigsberger was a strong supporter of local public activism. Liscombe
63
(2006) suggests that the change in Koenigsberger’s ideological approach to planning in
developing countries was adopted in response to his encounter with the process of
decolonization in India and his perceptions of the challenges Indian citizens faced
during this critical period of transition and redefinition. Liscombe’s (2006) study of
Koenigsberger’s adaptation of personal ideology strengthens the findings of postcolonial
development studies that suggested Western technologies were translated to meet
context-specific planning challenges.
More recently, studies in postcolonial development planning have focused on the
production of new planning innovations resulting from the collaboration between foreign
and local planners and the responsiveness of foreign planners to context-specific needs
(Banerjee 2009; Friedman, 2012). In his study of Albert Mayer in postcolonial India,
Friedman (2012) finds that new planning principles were developed by the Mayer firm
while working on new town plans in India. These planning principles then traveled back
to the U.S. where they were implemented by members of Mayer’s architectural and
planning firm in the master plan for Reston, Virginia in 1961 (Friedman, 2012). These
findings suggest that individual planners in postcolonial India played an important role in
diffusing Western planning principles, as well as facilitating the reverse flows of
knowledge from the postcolonial context back to the Western world.
Framework for Analysis
The prominence of case study historiographies is one of the commonalities
shared by postcolonial development studies in planning scholarship. These studies
provide “thick descriptions” that introduce context-specific meanings that add to the
historical record. Recent planning studies in post-WWII Indian development contribute
to a growing body of knowledge that unites postcolonial development theories with
64
contextual examples of planning in practice. Findings of these historical analyses
provide valuable insight into the international exchanges between the West and the
developing world in both historical and contemporary contexts (Banerjee, 2009).
Case study historiographies also exhibit a critical, poststructural framework to
investigate the meanings of transnational planning exchanges and seek to identify both
the sources of planning methods and ideologies that influenced the approach of
Western planners in foreign contexts. These studies deepen understandings of
Western planning diffusions and the process of translation in which foreign principles
are adapted and institutionalized to meet Indian planning needs.
Similarly, this study of postcolonial development in Northern U.P. following WWII
employs poststructural and postcolonial theoretical frameworks to derive meanings from
the application of Albert Mayer’s village planning program in its specific context of
Etawah and introduces a unique perspective on the postcolonial planning challenges
facing India at the time of Independence. Albert Mayer’s role as a foreign consultant
and development advisor of the Indian administration places his work at the center of
postcolonial development studies.
As this study demonstrates, Albert Mayer brought planning concepts to India that
were derived from his professional experiences and affiliations with the Regional
Planning Association of America and his experience as a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers in India during WWII. This experience shaped Mayer’s
ideological orientation to postwar planning in India and his sensitivity to regional
considerations in postcolonial development. During his tenure in India, Mayer was
greatly affected by the people, cultures, and immediate needs of villagers in rural U.P.
65
His experience on the ground as an architect, planner, and development advisor to the
Indian government transformed Mayer’s planning approach. The results of these
transformations included new planning innovations that were further adapted and
institutionalized by Indian planning commissions at the state and national levels.
Chapter 3 details the research methods that are used to analyze Mayer’s
involvement in the diffusion of Western planning principles of post-WWII India. The
overview of interpretive-historical analysis demonstrates the relevance of postcolonial
theory as a framework for interpreting historical evidence. This overview is followed by
an outline of the interpretive-historical narrative and the relevant research questions
used to guide the analysis.
66
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY
This dissertation explores the dimensions of transnational planning flows from
the U.S. to India through the work of American architect-planner Albert Mayer following
the Second World War (WWII). An interpretive-historic case study research design is
used to examine the process of integrated economic and social development planning
in rural Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), India that was introduced by Mayer beginning in 1946.
The case study design is used to frame the project of coordinated development in the
pertinent social, cultural, and political contexts of postcolonial India to reveal meanings
about the project and its participants. Specifically, this research asks: What ideological
framework influenced Albert Mayer’s conception and implementation of the Pilot
Project? How was the Pilot Project translated to meet Indian planning challenges and
the needs and expectations of a variety of stakeholders from the Indian government to
agricultural laboring classes? What influence did Western planning principles have on
India’s nascent national planning policy, and how were these institutionalized over time
by local and foreign stakeholders?
These research questions frame the analysis used to compose an interpretive-
historical narrative. The narrative draws upon archival materials that document Albert
Mayer’s conceptual framework and professional practice in the U.S. and India, and his
involvement in Indian planning policy immediately following WWII. Qualitative methods
are used to interpret the historical evidence within a theoretical framework, or lens, of
postcolonial development theory. The purpose of the interpretive-historical narrative is
to examine Mayer’s role in the diffusion of Western planning principles at an important
historical moment when India’s national planning policy was being developed. The
67
analysis also deepens the understanding of transnational planning diffusions in post-
WWII India and the important role Mayer played in introducing and adapting foreign
planning methods to the postcolonial context.
Interpretive-Historical Analysis
Interpretive-historical research is characterized by the exploration of contextually
dynamic social and physical phenomenon in which the explanations for the
phenomenon are presented in a comprehensive narrative (Wang, 2002). In line with
qualitative methods more generally, the interpretive-historical analysis emphasizes the
“natural setting” in which the phenomenon takes place, as well as the integration of
various information strands to form a singular presentation of events (Groat, 2002).
The qualitative method is the most appropriate form of research for this case study
because the Etawah Pilot Project and its participants cannot be isolated from their
social and physical settings. In addition, this study applies the historical project setting
as a tool for interpreting the dynamic associations between planning actors, ideas, and
institutions that shaped post-WWII planning policy in India.
Project Setting
In this case study, the natural setting in which the Etawah Pilot Project occurred
constitutes a framework for analysis. The period of postcolonial development planning
in India is typified by complex social, cultural, and political dynamics and the national
and global scales.
At the national scale, Indian leaders including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
recognized the need to achieve stability and reduce poverty in rural areas of India by
introducing Western planning ideas, methods and technologies to support development.
However, Indian leaders were distrustful of the political motivations behind foreign aid.
68
Following independence, the Indian administration adopted a foreign policy of non-
alignment that allowed foreign assistance but prohibited allegiance to foreign political
doctrines. Charting the general strategy for improving economic and welfare conditions
using Western planning principles, Prime Minister Nehru wrote,
We want to raise living standards and to train people to utilize them in full. We want in other words, to build up community life on a higher scale without breaking up the old foundations. We want to utilize modern technique and fit it into Indian resources and Indian conditions. (Nehru, 1946, p. 1)
In summary, Prime Minister Nehru wanted to introduce Western technologies to the
extent that they would improve the welfare of the Indian people.
At the village scale, the introduction of modern technology was confronted with
profound obstacles associated with deep social and cultural traditions that permeated
village life. These traditions were evident in the agricultural methods and daily routines
of Indian villagers. They were influenced by the social hierarchies in the villages
between caste, class, and gender classifications, as well as the relationship between
cultivators and the land.
At the global scale, a significant change took place in the wake of WWII.
Following WWII, U. S. planning initiatives overseas were largely influenced by foreign
policy objectives designed to maintain a balance of power between Western allies led
by the U.S. on one side and the Soviet Union and allied communist nations on the
other. As the U.S. and the Soviet Union emerged as the world’s two strongest political
powers, conflicting ideologies and an ongoing struggle for political power resulted in a
Cold War that lasted over 40 years.
69
At the end of WWII, more than half the world’s population lived in poverty and
leaders of poverty stricken countries sought to strengthen their own economies and
improve the welfare of their citizenry. The majority of these countries were located in
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Near East. As part of a political strategy, the Soviet
Union attempted to increase its global power by forming alliances with other countries
and converting them to communism. By 1950, the Soviet Union converted many areas
of Eastern Europe and supported Mao Tse-tung’s communist revolution by forming
alliances with the People’s Republic of China and North Korea.
The U.S. perceived the spread of communism as a threat to the security of
Western allies, particularly the United States. In response, the U.S. turned to planning
as a foreign policy tool to defend against the spread of communism across the
developing world.1 The U.S. strategy was to reduce the vulnerability of underdeveloped
nations to Soviet take-over through social and environmental improvements, thereby
decreasing the people’s suffering and strengthening their resistance to communist
aggression and invasion (Matthias, 1952).
In his 1949 inaugural address, U.S. president Harry Truman introduced the use
of planning as a foreign policy tool. Truman outlined four points of international foreign
policy as part of a political strategy to maintain a global balance of power in favor of
American democratic interests. The first three points were a continuation of prior
policies including a pledge to continue support for the United Nations, a pledge to
1 Interestingly, Krishna Menon, a member of the Indian administration met with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in Paris in 1946 to inquire about assistance in alleviating India’s food shortage, but was turned down (Zachariah, 2004). Molotov agreed to provide military and technical assistance, but no aid to relieve food shortages.
70
continue participation in European economic recovery, and a pledge to facilitate
Europe’s rearmament for increased security in the U.S. and allied nations. The fourth
point, from which the Point IV program acquired its name, was the technical assistance
program for the development of nations most vulnerable to communist influence. The
objective of the program was to introduce American technologies and expertise to
underdeveloped countries in order to reduce poverty and create higher standards of
living to create a non-militaristic program of defense against the spread of communism
into the developing world (Matthias, 1952).
Albert Mayer’s work on the Etawah Pilot Project preceded the introduction of U.S.
aid and served as an incubator of cooperative development operations between the
U.S. and India. Improvements in villager welfare and agricultural production through the
Pilot Project demonstrated to U.S. decision makers that opportunities for spreading U.S.
influence to the developing world could be achieved through rural development
planning. Personnel in the subsequent U.S.-funded development and extension
programs incorporated principles of the Pilot Project that affected the training of workers
and integration of social programs with agricultural training in Indian villages.
Mayer’s involvement in postcolonial Indian planning at the peak of India’s
emergence as a nation independent from colonial rule that preceded formal U.S. aid is
what makes his role as a central figure in the diffusion of Western planning principles
unique and highly innovative. Mayer was one of two foreign architects invited as
individual consultants to serve as planning administrators for the Indian government
immediately following WWII. Albert Mayer served as the U.P. Rural Development
Advisor from 1946-1958 and German architect Otto Koenigsberger served as Chief
71
Architect and Planner for the State of Mysore from 1939 to 1948 and Director of
Housing for India from 1948 to 1951.
The contexts surrounding these individual planners introducing Western planning
principles to post-WWII India were shaped by the national need to create rural stability
and reduce poverty in India and the struggle for global influence between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union that was characteristic of the Cold War era. The relationship between
these contextual factors and the operations of the project and its participants are
explored in the interpretive analysis of this historical narrative.
Interpretive Lens
Analysis of the historical evidence is guided by the use of theoretical
interpretation. In an outline of interpretive-historical research, Wang (2002) suggests
that variations in interpretation of historic phenomenon are products of the “interpretive
lens” employed by the researcher for analysis. Wang (2002) proposes four distinct
lenses, or theoretical frameworks, that may be used to guide the interpretation of
historical research.
The first lens seeks causal explanations. This interpretation borrows heavily
from the natural sciences and positivist theories in which an objective truth is pursued.
This causal interpretation of history is founded on the belief that no differences exist
between phenomenon in the natural sciences and the social sciences. Carl Gustav
Hempel (1942) supports the view of general laws applying both to nature and society,
and is credited with leading the general laws approach in historical research. Critics of
this approach suggest that causal explanations of social phenomenon are difficult to
identify and do not have universal applicability thereby rendering generalizations invalid.
72
The second lens frames historical interpretation as studies in evolution or
communal consciousness to explain similarities in material culture in society. This lens
is founded on the philosophies of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel who believed that
individual experiences are reflections of an evolving consciousness collectively held by
a society at a given time in history. Significance is derived from the collective, rather
than the individual consciousness of members in a society. Further, the evolution of
knowledge and the advent of the machine age were guiding principles of a collective
movement for modernists (Wang, 2002).
The weakness of the interpretation of history through the lens of communal
consciousness is that it does not account for similarities in material culture across
societies. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963) argues that in ancient cultures for example,
physical contact was not probable and that concurrent developments in material culture
could not be explained by shared consciousness because the individuals of the society
were not in communication. Alternatively, Lévi-Strauss (1963) theorizes that similarities
in material culture may be more accurately explained through structural analysis, or the
study of structures that exist within a society, such as language.
The structuralist interpretation of history constitutes Wang’s (2002) third lens of
analysis. In this interpretive lens, meaning is derived from the relationship between the
component parts of the system. These components operate by self-regulating rules
agreed upon by members of the society with no reference to external systems. Analysis
of the system as a self-contained, self-regulating structure is used to interpret the
significance of individuals and phenomenon.
73
The fourth lens is grounded in the theories of poststructuralism. From this
interpretive lens, the legitimacy of the structural systems is questioned and new
interpretations of knowledge and authority are posited. One of the defining
characteristics of poststructuralism is the rejection of universal truth. Jacques Derrida
(1978) argues that the connection between reality and knowledge is altered through the
process of language creation, thereby obfuscating the realization of objectivity. Michel
Foucault is also influential in leading poststructural criticism by scrutinizing the hierarchy
of power associated with institutionalization of knowledge. Foucault (1972, 1973)
asserts that the structures of formalized knowledge, or episteme, were used to validate
experts and their statements of “discourse” that were presumed to embody universal
truths. In summary, poststructuralism rejects universal truth on the grounds that it is not
achievable and that it is used as a means of domination by the episteme elite.
The focus on subjective knowledge and decentered subjects constitutes another
defining characteristic of poststructuralism (Given, 2008). In contrast to positivist and
structural forms of knowledge, the poststructural approach prefers local knowledge and
fluctuations in subjective experience. The poststructural analysis of history interprets
meaning from contextually relevant phenomenon that presents alternatives to
generalized knowledge and the dominant theories of historical continuity. Foucault’s
(1977) elaboration of Nietzche’s theory of genealogy rejects existing methods of inquiry
and focuses on identifying gaps in the continuity of history that challenge, rather than
support, existing interpretations. Although Foucault rejects the label of
poststructuralism to define his own philosophy, his ideas helped establish a
poststructural critique and created the foundation for postcolonial criticism.
74
Postcolonialism
Postcolonial theory is concerned with the effects of colonialism in the past and
present and the relations of power between and within nations, cultures, and races
(Given, 2008). Postcolonial criticism was introduced by Frantz Fanon in the 1950s.
Fanon (1986) examines the impacts of colonialism on the psyche and on identities and
contends that colonial racism had damaging effects on the psyches of both settlers and
colonized people. The significance of Fanon’s contributions to postcolonial theory
includes the critique of subject identity as settlers and colonized people in colonial and
postcolonial contexts.
Postcolonial theory was further advanced by the writings of Edward Said,
beginning with the publication of Orientalism in 1979. Said (1979) theorizes that the
idea of the “Orient” was invented through European discourse in order to define non-
Western society. Orientalism was influential in shaping perceptions about Europe and
the non-European areas of the world. Oriental discourse imposed an identity on the
Orient that proliferated notions of deficiency and dependency. It also shaped Europe’s
image in contrast to the Orient as the superior “other” (Said, 1979). Embedded in these
perceptions was the understanding that Europe acted on behalf of the Orient and was
more knowledgeable in the interests of colonized people. These perceptions and
understandings of power were used to legitimize colonization and build prejudice
against non-Western people (Given, 2008).
Said’s contributions to postcolonial theory changed views about non-European
countries by members of the episteme. In the 1980s, a collaboration of scholars known
as the Subaltern Studies group emerged that further advanced postcolonial theory
through studies of decentered subjects. The focus of the group was on the study of
75
subordinate classes, castes, races, cultures, and gender in colonial history (Guha &
Spivak, 1988). Ranajit Guha is one of the founding members of the Subaltern Studies
group. Guha is specifically concerned with the lack of representation of peasants as
subjects in the colonial discourse. In response, Guha (1983) focuses on the
introduction of peasant subjects in colonial historiography by addressing the roles of
peasants in acts of rebellion. The organized social and political actions of peasant
rebellions exist independently from dominant political and cultural ideologies. Through
representation of peasants as autonomous actors, Guha (1983) argues for the transfer
of literary subject positions to the subaltern.
Subaltern Studies group member Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak also addresses the
subject positions of peasants and argues that the subaltern have no literary voice
because they were being spoken for through the writings of third party authors. In
Spivak’s (1988) article, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” she makes the argument that
subaltern women in particular have no authentic voice in Western scholarship. Texts
reflecting the subaltern as subjects are problematic because they have the potential to
misrepresent or exaggerate the subjects (Spivak, 1988). Spivak is also concerned with
the homogenous representation of subaltern groups and believes that the binary
colonizer and colonized relationship present in Fanon’s and Said’s positions needs to
expand, reflecting the heterogeneity of actors and societies in colonial history.
Postcolonial scholar Homi Bhabha is also critical of the binary representation of
colonizers and the colonized. One of Bhabha’s (1994) critical arguments is that
colonization resulted in a hybridity of cultures and identities. Bhabha explains that the
relationship of power influenced the development of identities in the colonial context,
76
and that these identities were complex and continually evolving. Bhabha’s position can
be seen as a development of Fanon’s initial proposition that the colonial process
influences the identities of both settlers and the colonized.
The basis of postcolonial scholarship is founded on the theories of
poststructuralism that challenge formalized institutions of knowledge and create the
impetus for decentered subject knowledge. Postcolonial theorists apply these concepts
to the analysis and interpretation of colonial history and add to the debate issues of
subject representation, identity, heterogeneity of non-Western societies, and the
hybridity of settler-peasant cultures. Postcolonial theory emphasizes the effects of
colonialism on both the colonizer and the colonized, and proposes that the effects of
colonization extend beyond the period of colonization. In this study, the concepts of
poststructuralism and postcolonialism are applied as a theoretical framework, or lens,
used to interpret the historical evidence and construct an analytical narrative.
Analysis of Historical Evidence
Interpretation of history begins in the initial phases of data collection. The
process of interpretation is ongoing and cyclical as data is collected, organized, and
analyzed. Sarah Jo Peterson’s discussion on methods of historical analysis in planning
pedagogy states,
Doing history is essentially a creative undertaking that requires certain actions: gathering evidence, analyzing and interpreting evidence, developing an understanding of context, and drafting narratives and arguments. These are not steps. Any attempted diagram would display arrows spinning everywhere and circles inside circles that suddenly invert themselves. Instead, these actions are done all at once and as needed. (Peterson, 2006, p. 294)
77
Archival data is used to substantiate the interpretive narrative and
provides evidence of the historical events and subject knowledge of individual
participants. The source of archival data takes multiple forms to create a
cohesive account of the events under study. Foundational evidence, also known
as determinative evidence, situates the historical events and actors in the
authentic time and space context (Peterson, 2006; Wang, 2002). In The Idea of
History, R. G. Collingwood (1946) suggests that the placement of historical
narrative in the accurate geographical and temporal contexts separates fiction
from historiography. Collingwood (1946) states that the historical validity of the
narrative must be measured by the extent that it corresponds to the existing
world history, which he refers to as “One Historical World.”
In this study, the accuracy of historical context is established through the
use of foundational evidence such as development reports, correspondence, and
dated maps and photographs from the Etawah Pilot Project. Letterhead and post
stamps on international reports and correspondence are used to situate Pilot
Project events and communications within their authentic time-frames and
geographies.
Additional sources of evidence come from contextual and inferential
evidence used to interpret knowledge about the objects of study through
comparisons and reasoned inferences (Wang, 2002). Contextual and inferential
evidence is used to interpret relationships between Mayer and his professional
networks in the U.S. and India, the translation of Western planning principles to
suit contextual needs and expectations, and the influence of local and foreign
78
stakeholders in the Indian and U.S. governments on the institutionalization of the
Pilot Project in India’s first national Community Development program.
Archival sources provide data used to support the narrative analysis.
Primary source documents from the archives of Albert Mayer and members of his
professional network of planners, such as Clarence S. Stein and Henry S.
Churchill, include personal correspondence, project proposals and analyses,
research reports, and memoranda. Additional archival materials that relate
specifically to Albert Mayer’s work in India include correspondence between
Mayer and members of the Indian administration, Etawah Pilot Project bi-weekly
staff reports, research and correspondence from the Planning Research and
Action Institute, and maps and photographs. These sources help construct a
narrative of history that can be verified by multiple sources of evidence.
The data is organized by chronology and theme. The historical sequence
of data shapes a narrative that reflects the accurate development of events and
their interrelationships along the order of time. This data is then grouped by the
corresponding themes that are drawn from Healey’s (2013) stages of
transnational planning diffusions. The three stages are the origin of planning
ideas and practices, the travelling history of how the ideas and practices were
introduced in new foreign contexts, and the translation experience that explores
the adaptations and institutionalization of planning ideas and practices in new
contexts over time. The corresponding themes and time periods divide the
narrative into three coherent parts (Table 3-1).
79
Table 3-1. Structure of the narrative and associated research questions.
Interpretive-historical narrative part 1
Interpretive-historical narrative part 2
Interpretive-historical narrative part 3
Stage Origins Traveling history and project implementation
Translation experience
Time period
1897-1941 1942-1950 1951-1958
Research questions
What ideological framework influenced Albert Mayer’s conception and implementation of the Pilot Project?
How did the project respond to the needs of Indian administrators and villagers, and what influence did local expectations and knowledge have on the project over time?
How was the project translated and institutionalized by Indian entities?
The three narrative sections are used to focus the analysis around the central
research questions and the critical time periods of inquiry. The first section focuses on
Albert Mayer’s personal and professional development prior to his work as advisor to
the Indian government. The related time period of analysis ranges from 1897 to 1941
and covers Mayer’s family life and early career in New York City and his professional
development as a civil engineer, architect, and planner through his involvement in the
Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA), the Housing Study Guild (HSG) and
the U.S. Greenbelt Town Program. This section examines the ideological framework
and professional experience that shaped Mayer’s approach to planning and the built
environment. Questions used to frame the interpretation of this section include: What
was Mayer’s personal and academic background? What influence did Albert Mayer’s
connection to the Regional Planning Association of America and its members have on
his approach to planning and design? What were Albert Mayer’s motivations for
engaging in housing policy and new town planning projects? This dissertation interprets
80
the influence of contextual factors and local knowledge on the implementation of the
Pilot Project in the subsequent section of the narrative by identifying Mayer’s intellectual
networks and professional practice prior to his planning work in India.
The second section focuses on Mayer’s role as Development Advisor to the
Government of U.P. and the implementation of the Etawah Pilot Project in the social
and physical context of post-independence India. This portion of the narrative targets
historical evidence that begins with Mayer’s introduction to Indian planning challenges
during his service as an engineer in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1942, up to
the time the project was fully established in 1950. This section provides the travelling
history of Mayer’s introduction to Indian rural development planning and his connection
to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that led to his appointment as U.P. Rural
Development Advisor from 1946-1958. This section also examines the implementation
of the Pilot Project during its formative years as an experiment in physical, social, and
economic development. The supporting research questions used to guide the
interpretive analysis of this section include: How did Mayer’s approach to planning
respond to Indian needs? How did the Pilot Project change over time in response to
social and physical contexts? What influence did expectations and knowledge of local
participants have on the Pilot Project implementation? This line of inquiry is greatly
influenced by the poststructural and postcolonial lens of interpretation and suggests that
both Albert Mayer and local participants were instrumental in defining the
implementation process for the Pilot Project.
The third section of the narrative focuses on the outcomes of the Pilot Project
and its role in informing India’s first national planning policy. The time frame for analysis
81
ranges from the time the Etawah Pilot Project was replicated in new districts of U.P. in
1951, to the time Mayer exited Indian government service in 1958. The narrative is
guided by the following research questions: How did the Pilot Project inform
subsequent Indian planning policy? What influence did the introduction of U.S. bilateral
aid have on the Pilot Project and Indian planning implementation? What role did Mayer
have in the transition of Pilot Project planning to Community Development and National
Extension Service Planning? These research questions, and those guiding the analysis
of the previous two sections, come together to form the comprehensive interpretive-
historical narrative.
Interpretive-Historical Narrative
During the process of narrative construction, the historical evidence is merged
with the theoretical framework of the researcher. For this reason, some scholars point
to the similarities between historical narration and literature. In Philosophy and the
Historical Understanding, W. B. Gallie (1964) argues that histories share certain
characteristics with literature, such as the development of a storyline that includes a
beginning, middle and end. Gallie (1964) also points to the contrasts between
historiography and research in the natural sciences, arguing that the latter only presents
simplifications and idealizations, whereas the historical narrative presents a progression
of ideas and events as they naturally occur in time.
Hayden White is also influential in drawing parallels between historiography and
literature. White (1973) introduces the concept of emplotment to describe the process
in which a researcher organizes and structures data to form a plot. The emplotment of
the narrative combines historical evidence into a coherent account of events in the form
of a story. The resulting narrative reflects not only the historical events as they occurred
82
in the past, but the interpretive lens of the researcher. This combination of facts and
interpretation has led some scholars to theorize that the interpretive aspect of historical
analysis constitutes a limitation on research, given that the phenomenon under study
can never be empirically observed (Wang, 2002).
For the purposes of this research however, the theoretical framework used to
analyze the historical evidence is essential to interpreting relationships between Pilot
Project participants and the exchange of planning ideas with local knowledge. In
addition, the ideas and participants that constitute the substance of the analysis cannot
be separated from their historical and geopolitical contexts. In addition, this study
follows in the framework of poststructural thinking, which rejects the pursuit of empirical
knowledge and favors subject perceptions of events in their relevant contexts.
The following three chapters of the dissertation constitute the three-part
interpretive historical narrative (Table 3-1). Chapter 4 addresses the conceptual
orientations, or origins, of Mayer’s professional planning work in the U.S. Chapter 5
describes Mayer’s introduction to post-WWII India and his implementation of the Pilot
Development Project in Etawah, U.P. Chapter 6 presents the outcomes of the Etawah
Pilot Project and the institutionalization of Pilot Project principles in the Indian Planning
Commission. Chapter 7 provides a concluding analysis to identify significant meanings
that strengthen the interpretation of transnational planning flows from the U.S. to India
following WWII. Findings regarding the dynamics of Mayer’s role as a foreign planning
consultant in post-WWII India are introduced and compared to contemporary findings by
postcolonial planning scholars.
83
CHAPTER 4 ORIGIN OF ALBERT MAYER’S PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE AND IDEOLOGICAL
FRAMEWORK IN THE U.S.
Recent studies on postcolonial development in India highlight the role of Western
ideologies in transnational planning praxis. These studies indicate that the values and
beliefs of Western planning consultants and practitioners influenced diffusions of foreign
planning knowledge. In the Etawah Pilot Project case study, Mayer’s conceptual
framework played an influential role in the diffusion of Western planning knowledge to
India following the Second World War (WWII). Mayer’s early life and career in the U.S.
as a member of a prominent real estate development family in Manhattan and as a
practicing civil engineer, architect and planner engaged in professional networks with
progressive planners and theorists addressing New Deal era housing and planning
reforms shaped this conceptual framework.
The professional experience and networks Mayer garnered while practicing in the
U.S. in the 1920s and 1930s, provided the foundation for the Pilot Project that Mayer
introduced to post-WWII India in the 1940s. Mayer’s experience included 14 years as a
practicing civil engineer for the family construction and real estate company J.H. Taylor,
professional experience as a licensed principal architect at the Mayer and Whittlesey
firm that he co-founded in 1933, and experience in new town planning for federally
owned communities for the U.S. Resettlement Administration and the U.S. Housing
Authority in the late-1930s. Mayer drew from these experiences during his tenure as
Rural Development Advisor to U.P. while adapting Western planning principles to suit
the post-WWII Indian context.
Chapter 4 examines Mayer’s early life and career in the U.S. and the influences
of the Mayer family, professional networks, and planning experiences on Mayer’s
84
approach to post-WWII Indian planning. From a young age his family instilled in him the
importance of education and building professional networks, contributing to his interest
in other cultures and shaping his planning management style. Mayer’s professional
practice in the U.S. as a civil engineer, architect, and planner from 1919 to 1941 is also
explored, including Mayer’s involvement in U.S. planning associations and professional
networks that influenced his conceptual framework for post-WWII Indian planning.
The Mayer Family
Albert Mayer was born the youngest of seven children to the prominent German-
Jewish family of Bernhard Mayer and Sophia Buttenwieser in 1897. Bernhard Mayer
emigrated from Altdorf, Germany in 1872 and married Sophia Buttenwieser of
Cincinnati, Ohio in 1882. Bernhard Mayer succeeded as a prosperous real estate
investor and property manager who established the family fortune through partnership
with his brother-in-law Jonas Weil at the real estate firm of Weil and Mayer.1 As a result
of Bernhard Mayer’s successful real estate investments, he moved his family to the
Upper East Side of Manhattan to a townhouse at 41 East 72nd Street shortly after
Mayer’s birth (Figure 4-1). The Mayer family also enjoyed regular visits to a second
residence in the town of Sharon Springs, New York.2
Sophia Buttenwieser provided the primary schooling of the children in the Mayer
home and imparted an educational foundation that provided the opportunity for their six
surviving daughters and sons to pursue advanced degrees at distinguished
1 Jonas Weil was married to Bernhard’s sister Theresa Mayer. He was known for his generous philanthropy throughout New York City (“Jonas Weil dies; Donor of $1,000,000”, 1917).
2 In a letter to Clarence Stein dated September 5, 1967, Albert Mayer stated that his family owned four or five houses in Sharon Springs, NY and had taken residence there for generations (Mayer, 1967).
85
universities.3 Each of Bernhard and Sophia Mayer’s daughters attended Barnard
College in New York City. The eldest daughter, Fannie Mayer (b. 1882), graduated
from Barnard with an Arts degree in 1906. She later married a New York City real
estate executive who worked on projects with the Mayer family construction and
property management firm, J.H. Taylor Corporation.4 The Mayer’s second daughter,
Theresa (b. 1893), graduated with honors in Philosophy with a bachelor’s degree in
1911, and a master’s degree in 1913. The Mayer’s youngest daughter, Clara (b. 1895),
graduated from Barnard College in 1915 and served in academia at the New School for
Social Research for over 30 years.
A B Figure 4-1. The Mayer family home located at 41 East 72nd Street, New York, NY. A)
View of the home from East 72nd Street looking northeast. B) Entrance to the home (Images courtesy of author).
3 At the time of his birth, Albert Mayer’s sister Stella was deceased, having died in 1893 at the age of ten from an incurable disease.
4 Fannie Mayer’s husband William Korn was a prominent real estate developer and later served as President of the J.H. Taylor Corporation.
86
The New School for Social Research
The New School for Social Research (New School) played an important role in
the lives of the Mayer family, particularly for siblings Clara and Albert Mayer. In 1919, a
group of U.S. intellectuals incorporated the New School to provide advanced adult
education in a setting that encouraged critical scholarship and intellectual freedom in
1919. The founders of the school included professors formerly of Columbia University,
such as Charles Beard and James Harvey Robinson, as well as scholars John Dewey,
Thorstein Veblen, and former economics professor and New Republic economics editor,
Alvin Saunders Johnson.
The family’s connection to the New School began in 1919 when Clara Mayer
enrolled as a student. She committed herself to making the school a success and
played an instrumental role in acquiring the funds necessary to save the school when it
was on the verge of shutting its doors in 1922. Incoming Director, Alvin Saunders
Johnson recognized the contributions of Clara Mayer to the school and appointed her to
the New School of Social Research Board of Directors in 1924. Over time, Clara Mayer
played an increasingly influential role in the school’s administration including
appointment as the New School Secretary and Assistant Director in the fall of 1931, and
Dean of the School of Philosophy and Liberal Arts in 1943. She also served as Vice
President and Dean of the university from 1960-1961, after which she retired.
The Mayer family also made significant financial contributions to the New School
for Social Research. In 1929, Bernhard Mayer died and left an estate valued at over
$2,000,000. Bernhard Mayer bequeathed $25,000 to charitable organizations and the
87
remainder of the estate to the Mayer family heirs.5 In 1930, the Mayer family donated a
sum of $100,000 from the estate to fund the first permanent building at the New School.
Manhattan Real Estate and Construction Industries
The other Mayer children, Joseph Leo Bernhard, Charles and Albert followed in
the family line of business and served in different capacities in Manhattan real estate.
The eldest son, Joseph L. B. Mayer (b. 1885), succeeded as a real estate executive
holding many different administrative positions for real estate corporations on Park
Avenue. He also co-founded and served as the Secretary, Treasurer, and Director of
the real estate corporation Gruenstein and Mayer. The Mayer’s second son, Charles (b.
1889), graduated from Columbia University with a master’s degree in civil engineering.
Charles Mayer founded the J.H. Taylor Construction Corporation in 1913, and the J.H.
Taylor Management Corporation in 1931, specializing in multi-family apartment
buildings and offices in Manhattan.
Albert Mayer also studied civil engineering at Columbia University from 1914 to
1918. On June 18, 1918, he enlisted in the U.S. military to serve in the First World War
(WWI).6 For a period of five months, Mayer trained in the U.S. Coastal Artillery. After
5 A portion of Bernhard Mayer’s estate was donated to the Lebanon Hospital Association in memory of the Mayers’ deceased daughter Stella, who died in early childhood and for which Albert Mayer’s only daughter was named, and the Mount Sinai Hospital in memory of Bernhard Mayer’s parents. The Lebanon Hospital was founded by Bernhard Mayer’s brother-in-law and business partner Jonas Weil, who also served as the hospital’s president up to his death in 1917. A summary of Bernhard Mayer’s estate was published in the New York Times (“Bernhard Mayer left estate of $2,150,640”, 1932). Bernhard Mayer’s widow, Sophia, also contributed $5,000 to the Palestine Emergency Fund to provide relief to Jewish persons facing persecution during the Arab uprising in September of 1929. Sophia Mayer’s donation was the largest individual donation to the Palestine Emergency fund up until that date.
6 During the time that Mayer studied at Columbia, the tensions surrounding the ensuing European War were intensifying, but the U.S. maintained a policy of neutrality under the leadership of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. Over time, the fighting intensified and the U.S. became increasingly pressured by the allied nations of Great Britain, France, and Russia to join the war effort. On April 6, 1917, the U.S. officially engaged in WWI. By 1918, the U.S. Selective Service System was executing mandatory draft registrations that affected over 24 million American men. The Columbia University Board of Trustees had also passed a resolution requiring the loyalty of all university faculty, staff, and students to support the
88
the war ended in November of 1918, Mayer received an honorable discharge from
service without a foreign deployment. Later that year, Mayer resumed his studies in
civil engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and graduated with
a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering in 1919.
In the years leading up to his military enlistment, Albert Mayer played an active
role in the theatre community at Columbia University. He worked as the Play
Committee Manager at Columbia from 1914–1915, and as a Play Committee member
until 1917. Although Mayer did not pursue theatre professionally, the theatre played a
meaningful role in his life in the 1920s and 1930s. During that time, Albert Mayer was
married to British theatre actress Phyllis Joyce.
Albert Mayer married Phyllis Joyce in 1926, when both were 28 years old.
Phyllis originated from Derbyshire, England, where she previously married a Lieutenant
in the British army who had been killed in military action in British India.7 She relocated
to New York City in 1924, and debuted her U.S. acting career in a performance of the
Irish play “Exiles” at the Neighborhood Playhouse in lower Manhattan in 1925. She also
performed with a small group of actors calling themselves “The Fortune Players,” and
participated in productions held at The New School for Social Research auditorium.
Over a period of ten years, Phyllis’ acting roles became more prominent and she
U.S. government and the ensuing conscription program. At the time of Mayer’s enlistment in the summer of 1918, the U.S. Selective Service System had initiated its second mandatory registration of men between the ages of 21 and 31. Albert Mayer was 20 years old at the time, suggesting that his enlistment at Fort Monroe, Virginia was voluntary. If Albert Mayer had not enlisted in the military at that time, he would have been required to register for the draft during the third registration period that began on September 12, 1918. The third registration period required men between the ages of 18 and 45 to register for the draft. It was during this third registration period that Mayer’s brother, Joseph completed mandatory registration at the age of 33.
7 Phyllis Joyce was also the daughter of an officer in the British military. She married for the first time at the age of 17 to a first lieutenant from the same regiment as her father.
89
performed in a number of stage plays that eventually landed her notable roles in
Broadway theatres.8
Albert Mayer and Phyllis Joyce had two children: a daughter, Stella (b. 1935) and
a son, Cary (b. 1936). Phyllis’ two children from her previous marriage, Wendy and
Michael, also lived at the Mayer home. Between 1926 and 1941, the Mayer family
rented homes in the Upper East Side, and later in Lower Manhattan near the New
School. By 1942, both Albert Mayer and Phyllis Joyce volunteered for military service
associated with WWII, and the Mayer’s children Stella and Cary moved to Albert’s
family home at 41 East 72nd Street under the care of their paternal grandmother, Sophia
Buttenwieser Mayer.9
Albert Mayer was raised in a closely-knit and mutually supportive family that
encouraged him to pursue higher education and engage in communities of professional
practice. As with the family real estate business, building professional networks
became an essential component of his career. These influences enabled him to
appreciate and learn from different cultures while serving abroad in the U.S. Army and
as a planner in India.
8 Phyllis Joyce Mayer’s theatrical credits included roles in the Broadway performances of “The Bishop Misbehaves” in 1935 at the Golden Theatre, the George Bernhard Shaw play “Heartbreak House” performed in 1938 at the Mercury Theatre, and “Dear Octopus” performed in 1939 at the Broadhurst Theatre.
9 Phyllis Joyce registered with the British Consulate in New York City when Great Britain entered WWII. In September of 1942, she was called upon to serve in the Women’s Auxiliary Territorial Service (WATS) in England. At the time she was called upon to serve, Albert Mayer was already on active duty in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Sidelights of the week”, 1942).
90
Professional Practice
Mayer’s professional practice in the fields of engineering, architecture, and
planning originated with his experience in multi-family housing construction and real
estate development in Manhattan during the 1920s and 1930s. Immediately following
graduation from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1919, Albert Mayer began
working for his brother Charles at the J.H. Taylor Corporation. This work yielded
numerous opportunities to develop his practical experience as an engineering and
construction contractor and to establish professional connections in the building
industry. During the 15 years that Mayer worked for the J.H. Taylor Corporation, he
managed the construction of a number of large multi-family residential buildings in
Manhattan.10
The J. H. Taylor Corporation
The majority of the buildings developed by Charles and Albert Mayer were also
owned and managed by the J.H. Taylor Corporation. As a result, Charles and Albert
Mayer controlled many aspects of the projects including site selection, type and
configuration of residential units, amenities, and the selection of architects. The
apartment buildings owned and managed by the J.H. Taylor Corporation featured
community amenities selected to bring the comforts of suburban homes to the urban
apartment for middle-income families. Apartments ranged in scale from one-bedroom
to seven-bedroom units. Most units featured wood-burning fireplaces, kitchens with
dining alcoves, and large storage spaces. Private gardens located on site or on
10 J.H. Taylor construction projects between 1919 and 1934 also included the Jewish Hospital addition in 1922, the Mount Sinai Hospital in 1930, and the New School Auditorium in 1930.
91
adjacent lots provided another distinctive feature of the apartment buildings owned and
managed by the J.H. Taylor Corporation. Six of the J.H. Taylor Corporation apartment
buildings also featured rooftop gardens. These “Sky Gardens,” as they were described
in a 1932 classified ad in The New York Times, were designed to promote health and
create opportunities for recreation among tenants and their children.
Charles and Albert Mayer also worked as general contractors on projects for the
New School for Social Research. In 1930, the New School established the first
permanent building located at 66 West 12th Street. Noted architect and theater designer
Joseph Urban designed the New School building, and the J.H. Taylor Corporation
constructed it under the direction of Charles and Albert Mayer. The seven-story
building, designed in the modernist style, was considered one of the earliest examples
of modernism in New York City. The building also contained the Tishman Auditorium,
the first oval auditorium in existence, which is now registered as an historical landmark
by the New York City Preservation Commission.11
Mayer’s experience at the J.H. Taylor Corporation created opportunities for
collaboration with architects and developed Mayer’s interests in architectural design and
the role of architects in relation to society. Henry S. Churchill, an associate architect
who worked with Mayer on a multi-family housing structure at 210 East 68th Street in
1929, was among the architects that Mayer came to know through the J.H. Taylor
11 The total cost of the new building was estimated to be $1,000,000, and was funded solely by the donation from the Mayer family and the sale of 6 percent bonds among school supporters. A mortgage of $350,000 was also obtained by the school to finance the building (“New social school viewed by public”, 1931).
92
Corporation. Mayer and Churchill shared an interest in urban housing issues and
collaborated on housing research studies in the 1930s.12
The J.H. Taylor Corporation provided Albert Mayer with the opportunity to work
with prominent architects including the presiding American Institute of Architects (AIA)
president, Robert D. Kohn.13 Kohn was an influential figure in the community of
American architects in the 1930s, and the first Jewish President of the AIA serving two
terms from 1930–1932. As a leader in an association of allied architects, Kohn
emphasized the significant roles that architects play in translating the values of society
into physical forms, suggesting that the architect’s work is meaningfully linked to his or
her personal philosophy.14
Kohn’s ideas reflected a broader awareness of social and ideological influences
on the shape and organization of the built environment and directed Mayer’s interests
towards design and planning. In 1934, Mayer acquired his architecture license and then
partnered with Yale graduate Julian Whittlesey to establish the architectural firm of
Mayer and Whittlesey in 1935.15
12 The project at 210 East 68th Street included a 16-story apartment building ranging from one-bedroom to six-bedroom units and featured a distinctive orange brick façade and a rooftop garden.
13 In 1930, the J.H. Taylor Corporation constructed an addition to the Mount Sinai Hospital that was designed by architects Robert D. Kohn and Charles Butler. The addition consisted of a nine-story free-standing building located on the Upper East Side of Manhattan at an estimated cost of $750,000. At the time of the construction of the Mount Sinai Hospital addition, Kohn and Butler had established a reputable portfolio as the architects of many Jewish temples for Reform Judaism in New York City. Kohn also designed the hall for the New York Society for Ethical Culture in 1911, where Kohn was a member and society president from 1921 to 1944.
14 These statements were given at a speech by Robert D. Kohn at a dinner of the American Institute of Architects, the Architectural League of New York, the Society of Beaux Arts Architects, and the New York Building Congress on April 26, 1929 (“Praises architect for Americanism”, 1929).
15 Whittlesey held degrees in both civil engineering and architecture and had previously worked as a draftsman at the firms of Squire and Isbell and Howe and Lescaze.
93
The Mayer and Whittlesey Firm
Mayer and Whittlesey based their firm in New York City, partnering as principal
architects for 27 years.16 The firm initially specialized in single and multi-family
residential buildings and later expanded to include new town planning projects,
integrating structural design and engineering with physical planning.
Many of the Mayer and Whittlesey projects were developed by the J.H. Taylor
Corporation. In 1939 and 1940, Mayer and Whittlesey worked on the luxury apartment
buildings owned by the J.H. Taylor Corporation at 240 Central Park South (Figure 4-
2).17 They also designed a similar structure in coordination with the J. H. Taylor
Corporation in 1941 at 40 Central Park South.
A B Figure 4-2. Photographs of 240 Central Park South. A) View from Central Park South
looking southwest. B) Entrance to 240 Central Park South (Images courtesy of author).
16 Mayer retired from the firm in 1961 at the age of 64.
17 The building at 240 Central Park South is designated a National Register Historic Landmark.
94
Mayer developed his experience in the building industry and strengthened his expertise
in the technical aspects of construction, financing, management, and design through his
work at the J.H. Taylor Corporation and the Mayer and Whittlesey firm. He also
developed a conceptual framework for interpreting the role of architects as socially
responsible agents in the context of a value-driven society. This framework influenced
Mayer’s work as a practicing architect and planner in the U.S. and also influenced his
orientation to international planning issues following WWII.
During the time that Mayer developed his professional experience in
construction, real estate, and architectural design, he also became increasingly involved
in the New School for Social Research as an instructor and board member. During his
time at the New School, Mayer cultivated an expanded network of professional
architects, planners, and theorists and a growing interest in low-cost housing policies
and regional development. By 1933, Mayer’s professional network included members
of leading planning associations including the Regional Planning Association of America
and the Housing Study Guild, which he co-founded in 1933. The influence of these
affiliated networks expanded Mayer’s conceptual framework to include the principles of
normative regionalism, coinciding with the development of Mayer’s professional
experience as a planner for new towns during the New Deal era.
Professional Networks
In the 1930s Albert Mayer became personally involved in the New School for
Social Research. He served on the Board of Directors from 1931 to 1934, and the
95
Board of Trustees from 1935 to 1961.18 Mayer taught classes at the New School from
1931 to 1941, and made presentations as a guest lecturer and principal speaker at New
School functions. Mayer teamed with architects Robert Kohn and Henry Wright to
deliver a presentation on low-cost housing at a New School dinner in 1932.19 He also
taught a lecture series with Lewis Mumford in 1940 on the history and evolution of
architecture in “The Modern City.”
This architectural series belonged to a new program in Housing Education
offered at the New School in cooperation with the U.S. Housing Authority.20 At the time
of its introduction in 1939, it was the first comprehensive program in housing education.
The program consisted of curriculum on the economics and management of housing
18 Albert Mayer’s place on the New School for Social Research Board of Trustees was briefly interrupted between 1943 and 1946, during which time Mayer was on active duty service in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
19 Mayer taught three courses at the New School on the topics of architectural design, construction, and planning in the 1930s. In 1931, Mayer taught a course at the New School titled the “Architectural Workshop” led by Mayer and 20 other instructors. The workshop focused on architecture as a response to extant social, political, and economic problems. The course functioned as a studio in which the class participants studied an existing structure on the Lower East Side of Manhattan and proposed a scheme of reconstruction as a group. Planning issues included the appropriate scale of buildings and open spaces, connectivity to transit, number and types of schools, types of housing units, distribution of income classes, and costs. This course connected Mayer’s professional experience in the field of engineering and real estate development to the broader socio-economic contexts of urban planning.
Mayer also taught a lecture series titled “Present-Day Problems of Architecture and Construction.” Mayer chaired the course, organizing the sequence of lectures and leading discussions after each meeting. The course addressed the technical aspects of building design and construction, and featured representatives of the development and construction industry of prominent New York City buildings such as the Empire State Building and the Chrysler Building.
In the spring of 1933, Mayer directed a course at the New School titled “Landscape Architecture: Gardens, Country and City, Terrace and Roof; Parks and Parkways.” The course consisted of eleven lectures by scholars of Landscape Architecture from Harvard and Columbia University, members of the American Society of Landscape Architects, and editors from two garden magazines. The series concluded with a lecture by Albert Mayer on modern gardens, a topic of interest that was reflected in his approach to modern apartment buildings in New York City.
20 The U.S. Housing Authority (USHA) was established by the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 and administered by the U.S. Department of the Interior to assist local housing authorities in clearing slums and constructing federally subsidized low-cost housing.
96
and addressed both the private and public sectors. The program also offered a
certificate in housing education to students who completed five or more of the Housing
Education program courses.
Charles Abrams and Albert Mayer were the originating instructors of the Housing
Education program. An attorney and advocate for housing and historic preservation in
New York City, Abrams served as a consultant to the U.S. Housing Authority. Abrams
taught the fundamental housing courses, “Introduction to Public Housing” and the
lecture series, “Housing Management.” He also chaired a lecture series titled “Public
Housing in 1940.” The series included other notable speakers including Clarence Stein,
who presented a lecture on “Housing and Planning” and Catherine Bauer, who lectured
on “European Housing, 1940.”21
Mayer’s involvement in the New School and the Housing Education program
deepened the commitment to social considerations in the physical planning of the built
environment and nurtured stronger affiliations with pioneering planners and theorists
including Kohn, Wright, Mumford, Stein, and Bauer who advocated for social and
environmental reforms in American city planning. Mayer’s New School connections to
Kohn, Wright, Mumford, Stein, and Bauer contributed to his involvement in professional
planning associations outside the school including the Regional Planning Association of
America (RPAA).
21 Mayer also taught a course titled, “From the Small House to the Regional Plan” as part of the initial Housing Education curriculum. The course focused on the problems of individual home ownership in the context of shared neighborhoods and cities. It also addressed the role of planning policies to protect against the negative impacts of increased traffic congestion and new construction on the livability and value of the home.
97
The Regional Planning Association of America
The RPAA was founded in 1923 as an association of allied planners and
theorists representing a broad range of disciplines that aligned social and environmental
reforms with the American planning paradigm. This relatively small association of
professionals advocated new town planning as a means of decentralizing densely
populated metropolitan areas into socially and economically balanced regions (Lubove,
1963). Members of the RPAA broadened the framework of planning at geographical
and conceptual scales, and emphasized the values of community and social prosperity
as driving factors of environmental reform (Sussman, 1976).22 RPAA members
communicated the values of community and social prosperity through new town
planning and design, participation in government advisory committees, advocacy of
housing reforms, and literary publications.
Mayer became acquainted with a number of the RPAA members through his
work at the J.H. Taylor Corporation and the New School for Social Research. In the
spring of 1933, RPAA members invited Mayer to a meeting of the RPAA at Clarence
Stein’s home to discuss an outline for U.S. housing policy (Bauer, 1933). The members
outlined a proposal that included minimum design standards for housing, regional
distributions of populations in connection to industry and nature, housing for the lowest
income groups, and urban rehabilitation. The RPAA advocated these housing reforms
22 The RPAA’s contributions to city and regional planning are best considered as developments in planning theory. Lubove (1963) writes that the concept of regionalism proposed by the RPAA members was more of a philosophy than a fixed plan for development. Sussman (1976) also states that the development of regionalism as an alternative to the expanding urban metropolis driven by policies supporting profit-seeking private developers was the greatest collective contribution of the RPAA members.
98
as central to a new series of housing policies as part of President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s first term in office.
The RPAA dissolved during the period of New Deal Era reforms introduced by
the Roosevelt administration and some members assumed positions in the New Deal
housing, new towns, and related programs.23 Albert Mayer, along with RPAA members
Henry Wright and Lewis Mumford, founded a new association focused specifically on
housing policy in the summer of 1933 called the Housing Study Guild.24 The
association was most active between 1933 and 1935, producing research studies,
publishing technical bulletins, holding lecture meetings, and establishing a reading
room. 25 The Guild also offered a “Plan Clinic” where architects could submit plans for
low-cost housing projects to obtain critical feedback from Housing Study Guild members
(Housing Study Guild, 1934).
23 Significant housing legislation passed during the New Deal Era included the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 that established the Public Works Administration (PWA) to develop a program of construction, reconstruction, and repair of low-cost housing and slum clearance. The Housing Division of the PWA was initially headed by Robert D. Kohn, but a lack of participation in Kohn’s limited-dividend program for low-interest loans to developers of low-income housing resulted in Kohn’s resignation in 1934. The National Housing Act of 1934 established the Federal Housing Administration designed to stimulate construction and provide employment relief, but Mayer maintained that these efforts did not ultimately result in meeting low-cost housing demand. Additional housing legislation passed during the New Deal Era included the 1935 establishment of the Resettlement Administration and the Housing Act of 1937 that resulted in the establishment of a permanent public housing program and the creation of the U.S. Housing Authority.
24 Additional sponsors of the Housing Study Guild were Clarence Stein, Frederick Ackerman, Henry S. Churchill, William Lescaze, Catherine Bauer, Herbert Lippmann, Talbot Hamlin, and Dr. Carol Aronovici.
25 The Guild reading room was comprised of loaned materials from Guild members and affiliated professionals. It was transferred to the Resettlement Administration’s Division of Suburban Resettlement between 1936 and 1937, and ultimately donated to the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians (FAECT) headquarters in honor of Henry Wright, who died in 1936 (Federation Technical School, 1937).
99
The Housing Study Guild
The Guild was formed to study and research housing and regional planning, to
create and sustain a reading room, to provide a discussion forum, and to produce
recommended solutions to housing and regional planning problems (Housing Study
Guild, 1934). The Guild was sponsored by individual donations from Mayer and his
colleagues Henry Wright, Lewis Mumford, Clarence Stein, Frederick Ackerman, Carol
Aronovici, Henry Churchill, William Lescaze, Catherine Bauer, Herbert Lippmann, and
Talbot F. Hamlin.26 A mailing list of approximately 150 individuals received information
on Guild discussion forums and the reading room. In addition, Guild members trained
30 assistants involved in the production of technical reports in housing and regional
planning research methods (Housing Study Guild, 1934).
One of the major research projects produced by the Guild included a series of
technical reports on foreign housing agencies and projects in Spain, France, Sweden,
Norway, Soviet Russia, England, and Hungary. The Guild also published studies on
public housing construction and maintenance costs including analyses of building
materials, building heights, and heating systems impacts on operating costs.
In 1933, the Public Works Administration Housing Division suggested that
members of the Guild produce a feasibility study for a large-scale public housing
development on a 488 acre site in Astoria-Queens. The resulting study produced by
Guild members Aronovici, Churchill, Lescaze, Mayer, and Wright proposed a housing
development that combined principles of garden city planning with the economic
26 Donations from the Lavanburg Foundation and the Housing Association of New York City also supported the Guild (Housing Study Guild, 1934).
100
advantages of low-cost land acquisition in the city to support rental housing for low-
income households in close proximity to industry and transit (Housing Study Guild,
1933).
The Astoria-Queens study introduced an alternative to the model housing
strategies that were being used for slum clearance. In contrast to the conventional tear-
down and rebuild approach, the Astoria-Queens study emphasized site location
decisions, site planning for public space and amenities, economic analysis to address
both development and operating costs, and sound financial strategies to secure long-
term economic feasibility for the project. The resulting proposal for a new urban
community within the city utilized low-cost vacant land with space for public parks and
community facilities. Consequently, the Housing Division viewed the study contents
and methods as a model report to guide subsequent public housing research (Housing
Study Guild, 1934).
Mayer advocated for alternatives to conventional slum clearance methods
through community planning in the Astoria-Queens study and through his positions on
the Slum Clearance Committee of New York City and the Technical Advisory
Committee of the New York State Housing Board. Mayer argued that slum clearance
resulted in new construction that was too expensive to meet the immediate need of
displaced slum residents, and he insisted that slum clearance should focus on re-
housing the displaced poor (Mayer, 1934).
Mayer’s primary criticism of conventional slum clearance was that it fell prey to
urban land speculation. He contended that housing redevelopment benefited land
owners at the expense of the poor who could not afford the increased rents resulting
101
from inflated land prices. For this reason, Mayer supported the purchase of low-cost
vacant lands for re-housing the residents of cleared slums. He also favored
restructuring federal subsidies so that money directed to housing would not go to
landowners but benefit those who were most in need.27
Mayer believed that regional planning provided the best alternative to urban
deterioration and land speculation. In his work as a practicing architect, housing
advocate, and published critic of conventional slum clearance methods in the 1930s,
Mayer argued for the re-planning of existing cities to include new housing communities
on vacant lands, such as the proposed Astoria-Queens development and the
introduction of planned new towns on the outskirts of metropolitan areas to curb
haphazard growth and speculative land development. Between 1935 and 1941, Mayer
engaged in three significant new town planning projects in the U.S.: Greenbrook, New
Jersey, Bellmawr, New Jersey, and Willow Run, Michigan. These projects broadened
Mayer’s professional experience and developed his interests in community planning and
design. They also exemplified Mayer’s commitment to normative regionalism and
context-specific planning methods.
New Town Planning Commissions
In 1935, the U.S. government introduced an experiment in federally owned and
managed new towns governed by the U.S. Resettlement Administration (RA) known as
the Greenbelt Town program. Rexford Tugwell, Columbia University economist and
presidential advisor, pioneered the Greenbelt Town program, which represented a new
27 Mayer also recognized the opportunity to apply a differential rental scheme to housing in New York, modeled after the differential city housing policy in Leeds, England. Mayer suggested that a rent structure based on household needs and income level would allow rents for the same property to vary in price depending upon what the family was able to pay (Mayer, 1935).
102
anti-poverty strategy for the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Administration. The Greenbelt
Town program provided immediate employment relief to millions of unemployed
American workers, delivered low-rent housing in communities designed for optimal
social and physical health, and demonstrated best practices in community planning and
operation using Garden City principles (Stein, 1966).
Greenbrook, New Jersey Master Plan
Between 1935 and 1937, four teams of planners, architects, and engineers
worked together to produce Greenbelt Town master plans for Greenbelt, Maryland;
Greenhills, Ohio; Greendale, Wisconsin; and Greenbrook, New Jersey. Chief of
Planning Staff, Frederick Bigger and John Nolen assigned a project coordinator, town
planners, architects, and an engineer to each Greenbelt Town planning team to produce
individual master plans for each new town. Mayer served as one of two principal
architects along with Henry S. Churchill on the Greenbrook, New Jersey planning team.
Additional members on the Greenbrook team included Henry Wright and Allan F.
Kamstra as town planners and Ralph Eberlin as engineering designer. The plan for
Greenbrook also benefited from the expertise of Clarence Stein, who served as a
program advisor.
Because they were developed independently, the four Greenbelt Town master
plans were uniquely responsive to local conditions. The program’s shared principles of
design provided the common thread between the plans. Each of the Greenbelt Town
planning teams drew from the Garden City movement and the American planning
innovations known as the Radburn Idea and the Neighborhood Unit concept (Stein,
1966).
103
The Garden City movement was inspired by the writings of Sir Ebenezer Howard
and the designs of Raymond Unwin and Barry Parker in Great Britain. Howard’s
proposal for the progressive restructuring of capitalist society into communities of
cooperative commonwealths inspired new town planning with Letchworth and Welwyn
Gardens in Great Britain as early examples. The Garden Cities presented a new model
of self-sustained communities that balanced residential, industrial, and agricultural uses
with a surrounding greenbelt to protect undeveloped lands and prohibit unfettered
growth and included central greens and civic buildings to promote community ties and
social wellness. For members of the Greenbelt Town program, the Garden City
movement offered a model for decentralized municipalities designed to attract U.S.
workers and their families out of congested cities and into communities with
opportunities for work and social prosperity.
At the time the Greenbelt Town program began in 1935, few examples of Garden
City planning existed in the U.S. Three such Garden City-inspired communities at the
time were designed by architect-planners Clarence Stein and Henry Wright of the
RPAA. In the 1920s, Stein and Wright planned three new communities at Sunnyside, in
the Queens borough of New York City; at Radburn, New Jersey; and at Chatham
Village outside Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Each plan was an experiment in putting
Garden City principles into practice in the U.S. However none of the plans resulted in
the socialist commonwealth new towns envisioned in Howard’s Garden Cities of
Tomorrow. Alternatively, Stein and Wright’s Garden City-inspired developments
creatively adapted the Howard and Unwin vision for the American socio-cultural
landscape. As a result, they produced new innovations in community planning. The
104
most notable development in U.S. Garden City planning was arguably Stein and
Wright’s Radburn Plan.
The Radburn development was the second experiment in Garden City planning
by Stein and Wright. It was financed by the City Housing Corporation (CHC), a limited
dividend corporation established by fellow RPAA member Alexander Bing. In 1928, the
CHC purchased two square miles of land for Radburn that was located sixteen miles
west of Manhattan in the rural borough of Fairlawn, New Jersey. At the time of
purchase, the site showed potential for industrial growth, but none emerged, and
Radburn was relegated to a commuter suburb for the middle class. Furthermore, the
land purchased was not large enough to establish a surrounding greenbelt. For these
reasons Radburn did not transform into the Garden City that Stein, Wright, and Bing
had originally envisioned (Stein, 1966).
In fact, Stein and Wright’s critical focus rested on key principles that were later
identified as the Radburn Idea. Careful integration of parks and roadways minimized
the negative effects of automobile traffic on pedestrian safety and quality of life, as did
the organization of neighborhoods into superblocks. Radburn’s superblocks were 30 to
50 acres in size and composed of central parkways providing views to nature and
access to recreational areas. Radburn’s parkways provided the primary means of
pedestrian movement and were completely isolated from automobile traffic. The
surrounding homes faced the central park instead of the streets, and small local roads,
the majority of which were cul-de-sacs, provided access to the back entrances of
homes. Underpasses or overpasses accommodated pedestrian pathways at their
intersection with roadways, and the streets themselves were differentiated and scaled
105
according to their types and use. Radburn’s smaller roads resulted in reduced
infrastructure expenditures, which allowed Stein and Wright to promote the
undeveloped parkway lands as economically feasible.
The plan also accommodated social life in the Radburn community. In the
development’s early stages the majority of residents engaged in community recreational
activities such as the Radburn Singers, the Radburn Players, and the Garden Club
(Stein, 1966). In addition, community governing and resident associations facilitated the
management of community facilities and activities. The enthusiasm for community life
witnessed at Radburn reflected a growing interest in the sociology of community deign
in American neighborhoods. Sociologist and planner, Clarence A. Perry, served as a
leader in this field of planning.
At a meeting of the American Sociological Association and the National
Community Center Association in 1923, Perry introduced the Neighborhood Unit
concept that subsequently influenced the plans for Greenbelt Towns. The concept
evolved over time into a published treatise called “The Neighborhood Unit, a Scheme
for Arrangement for the Family-Life Community,” in the Regional Survey of New York
and its Environs in 1929. In the study, Perry (1929) outlines a framework for planning a
model community to meet the “universal needs” of family life. His Neighborhood Unit
concept focused on the neighborhood elementary school. He believed that the local
school was the sociological center of family life and should be located in the center of
the model community. The scale and population of the Neighborhood Unit depended
upon the capacity of the school and the physical distance of residences from the school,
which he believed should not extend more than a quarter mile radius from the building.
106
Physical planning principles included the positioning of the school and other civic
buildings at the center of the neighborhood and the inclusion of public parks and shared
open spaces. The study also addressed automobile traffic flows in order to limit through
traffic using an internal street system with arterial roads bounding the Neighborhood
Units to enhance pedestrian safety. Local shops at the outer perimeter of the model
community served adjoining Neighborhood Units. Most importantly, these planning
principles reinforced Perry’s concept of the model community as a social unit with
physical boundaries and universal functions.
Planning to address the sociological aspects of community life in addition to the
physical housing needs of low income families formed an important component of the
Greenbelt Town program. Between 1935 and 1939, three of the Greenbelt Towns were
constructed at Greenbelt, Maryland; Greenhills, Ohio; and Greendale, Wisconsin. The
fourth greenbelt town of Greenbrook, New Jersey, was never constructed due to
resistance among land owners and government officials in Franklin County, who
challenged the program’s constitutionality in court, and won in the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals.28
Members of the Resettlement Administration decided not to challenge the court
ruling in order to avoid a legal battle that would threaten the implementation of the other
planned greenbelt towns, and they dropped Greenbelt from the program in 1936
(Parsons, 1990). Although the Greenbrook project was never constructed, the
experience Mayer gained collaborating with Stein and Wright, among others, influenced
28 Franklin TP. In Somerset County, N.J., et al. v. Tugwell, Administrator Resettlement Administration, et al. 85 F.2d 208 (1936).
107
his approach to new town planning in subsequent projects and strengthened his social
and professional connections to progressive regional planners that continued to play an
important role in Mayer’s social and professional life throughout his career.
In a summary of his experience in the Greenbrook planning team Mayer wrote,
The underlying basis motivating all the design was that we were building a community, a town, with its own characteristic life and civic sprit. What actuated our thinking was how the houses built up into groups, and how the groups of houses and the public structures built up into a town. We thought in terms of streets, vistas, unity. (Mayer, 1937, p. 135).
In an article published in the New York Times, Mayer (1937, March 14) directly credited
the English Garden City Movement and U.S. planning examples including Sunnyside
Gardens, Radburn, and Chatham Village with influencing the plan for Greenbrook, New
Jersey. Mayer (1943) also indicated that these unified neighborhoods were used to
achieve sociological functions of facilitating individual and group interactions as a
counterpart to the industrialized cities in which over-developed and commercialized
areas weakened social ties in urban communities.
Mayer’s writings on the subject of new town planning and housing in the 1940s,
suggest that Perry’s Neighborhood Unit concept influenced his planning work. In 1943,
Mayer authored a treatise on planning reform that suggested Neighborhood Units were
broadly accepted tools in community design and planning. Mayer explained,
One of the simple principles of planning for better cities on which almost everybody agrees is that urban communities must be crystallized as unified neighborhoods equipped with comprehensive shopping and recreational facilities. Self-contained neighborhood units have important and obvious advantages for the renter, the property owner, the city as a whole. (Mayer, 1943, p. 4).
Mayer (1943) suggested that the advantages of Neighborhood Units included social and
economic stability for residents. He argued, “City dwellers may have lost the habit of
108
living in neighborhoods but they haven’t lost the need for the easily available facilities
that a well-integrated community, like a small town, can provide” (Mayer, 1943, p. 4).
Mayer’s consideration of self-contained neighborhood planning is also evident in his
planning work in the 1940s and his approach to community-building in the new town of
Bellmawr, New Jersey.
Bellmawr, New Jersey Master Plan
In 1941, Albert Mayer seized upon a second opportunity to apply the principles of
community planning to a war housing project administered by the U.S. Housing
Authority. Mayer and Whittlesey, along with New Jersey architect Joseph N. Hettel,
designed a new community at Bellmawr, New Jersey for employees of the New York
Shipbuilding Company at Camden Yards (“Tenants buy housing”, 1936). The
community of 500 low-cost residences consisted of two-family, semi-detached duplexes
and four-family row houses organized around a common green and community center.
Public buildings in the community center included a new grade school, community
building, and commercial center with five stores.
The Bellmawr project was the first community planned by Mayer & Whittlesey
giving the architects a chance to employ six principles of community design informed by
years of previous studies in community design and living (Mayer, Whittlesey, & Hettel,
1943). The architects explained,
We had become convinced of certain principles of community design, based upon the way people live. Civilized, spirited living demands not only good floor plans and good plumbing, the right number and location of playgrounds, and safety from traffic, it requires a lot more which has only very rarely been achieved in the large Government projects. It requires the creation of community unity, form and flavor, but not monotony. (Mayer, Whittlesey, & Hettel, 1943, p. 1)
109
The first principle employed at Bellmawr established a unified identity and sense
of place through careful organization of homes, streets and landscaping. The second
principle offered a variety of housing options to accommodate a wide range of families
and living preferences with homes and lots of varying sizes along linear streets and cul-
de-sacs. The third principle mandated a variety of building heights and materials to
enhance the character of the community without straying too far from the central
identity. The fourth principle incorporated planned views and vistas throughout the
community in both grand and subtle ways. The fifth principle specified that the design
had be somewhat unexpected, which was largely accomplished by the use of varying
structures, street organizations and views. The sixth and final principle called for the
grouping of homes and community structures to create a feeling of community. Due to
cost constraints, the federal government limited the use of ornamentation and amenities
in the individual homes (Mayer, Whittlesey, & Hettel, 1943). For this reason, the
grouping of homes and shared community facilities played an important role in the
design’s success.
In a review of the Bellmawr project published in The Architectural Forum in 1943,
Mayer stated that the sense of community represented the project’s greatest success
(Mayer, Whittlesey, & Hettel, 1943). Further, Bellmawr remained intact following the
WWII dissolution of federally owned communities. In 1953, its tenants under the
collective ownership of the Bellmawr Park Mutual Housing Corporation purchased the
Bellmawr community for $1,000,000 (“Tenants buy housing”, 1936).
The Bellmawr community was one of many war housing projects that were
funded by the U.S. Housing Authority during WWII. These war housing projects
110
provided low-cost housing in close proximity to U.S. factories producing war materials.
During WWII, the Ford bomber plant at Willow Run was the largest and most high-
profile war production facility.
Willow Run, Michigan Neighborhood Plan
Located near Detroit on a large tract of land owned by Henry Ford of the Ford
Motor Company, Willow Run required an estimated 110,000 factory workers at full
capacity to produce bomber planes (“Willow Run poses problems”, 1942). However,
insufficient capacity existed in the private market to meet the demand for housing.29 For
this reason, the U.S. Housing Authority and the Detroit Housing Commission approved
a $35,000,000 grant to construct a large scale housing development located within five
to ten miles of the Willow Run facility (“Willow Run poses problems”, 1942).
Mayer and Whittlesey were one of six architectural firms commissioned to design
one of five neighborhoods and one community center that comprised the large-scale
housing development at Willow Run. They based their proposal on the Radburn plan,
including superblocks, a surrounding greenbelt, cul-de-sac street layouts, and the
complete separation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic (“The town of Willow Run”,
1943).
Mayer and Whittlesey’s plan for the Willow Run neighborhood was the second
community development plan by the firm. However, Henry Ford strongly opposed the
construction of federal housing on the Willow Run property as a waste of financial and
material resources (“Ford stand stirs war housing issue”, 1942). His staunch resistance
29 The closest housing to the Willow Run facility was located 17 miles away in the adjacent city of Detroit. Simply not enough houses existed to meet the needs of the factory workers. This demand resulted in high worker turnover, much to the concern of the U.S. government and U.S. military (“Ford stand stirs war housing issue”, 1942).
111
to the planned community generated a compromise involving the construction of 2,500
temporary housing units to meet the housing need of a small portion of the Willow Run
workforce (“The town of Willow Run”, 1943).30
Although never constructed, Mayer and Whittlesey’s plan for the Willow Run
neighborhood reflected an important period in the evolution of Mayer’s professional
work. Through his involvement in the New School and professional planning
associations in the 1930s and his design and development work in the 1940s, Mayer’s
interests in construction and property development expanded to include architectural
design and regional planning. These interests evolved from Mayer’s expertise in
building construction, design and management and were rooted in ideological principles
of social and environmental reform directed towards improving the quality and
affordability of low-cost housing options and the eradication of speculative urban
development in New York City. Mayer’s professional planning work and advocacy
reflected his commitment to an ideology of normative regionalism that he shared with
planning theorists and practitioners in the RPAA and the U.S. Greenbelt Town Program.
In the 1940s, Mayer conveyed the principles of normative regionalism within
international contexts, beginning with the Pilot Project of regional development in post-
WWII India. During this period, Mayer joined the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
gained an appreciation for Indian culture during his service constructing airfields in the
China-Burma-India Theatre. Through this experience in South Asia, Mayer established
new social networks with Indian families and encouraged others in the U.S. Army Corps
30 Ford’s strong opposition to the war housing proposal also resulted in a public controversy over the federal ownership of residential communities.
112
to do the same. Before the war ended he was introduced to India’s imminent political
leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the two collaborated to introduce an experimental rural
reconstruction program that evolved into the Etawah Pilot Project, which Mayer
administered as an advisor to the Indian government for over ten years. The
circumstances surrounding Mayer’s introduction to Jawaharlal Nehru following WWII
and his work as U.P. Rural Development Advisor are discussed in Chapter 5.
113
CHAPTER 5 ALBERT MAYER’S INTRODUCTION TO POST-WWII INDIA AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ETAWAH PILOT PROJECT
Mayer served as the Rural Development Advisor to Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) for more
than ten years. During that time, he traveled between the U.S. and India, balancing his
pioneering work in planning and rural development in India with his professional and
family life in the U.S. Although his primary purpose as Rural Development Advisor was
to implement a pilot program of development in the rural villages of U.P., Mayer
engaged in urban planning work in India’s growing industrial cities and administrative
capitals when given the opportunity. In association with his role as a U.P. government
advisor, Mayer reviewed plans for cities such as Cawnpore (Kanpur) and Bombay
(Mumbai). In addition, the Indian government commissioned Mayer’s U.S. based
architectural firm Mayer and Whittlesey to produce the first master plan for the new
capital of East Punjab at Chandigarh, to design and plan a portion of the Allahabad
Agricultural Institute, and to establish a technical cooperation program for the Delhi
Development Authority with funding from the Ford Foundation.1
Mayer’s approach to Indian planning scenarios drew from his experience in
construction and engineering in the U.S., his involvement in the Greenbelt Town
Planning Program of the New Deal era, and his exposure to foreign planning challenges
while serving in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Mayer’s broad professional
qualifications as an engineer, architect, and planner were instrumental in successfully
1 For an overview of Mayer’s Indian planning commissions and advising work outside the Etawah Pilot Project, see Table D-1.
114
tackling the complex and interrelated challenges of Indian reconstruction and
development following the Second World War (WWII).
Mayer’s extensive experience did not include foreign rural development planning,
nor was he especially familiar with the unique political, social, and cultural frameworks
that characterized post-WWII India. Many of these new circumstances presented
obstacles to Mayer’s pre-existing methods of planning. Despite Mayer’s limited
familiarity with rural planning techniques and Indian administrative frameworks, he was
able to diplomatically navigate political and functional hurdles. As a result, Mayer’s
story in India was one of adaptation in which he creatively applied Western strategies
and methods to advance rural community development in line with the expectations of
the Indian National Congress Party (INC) and the needs of Indian villagers.
Mayer’s social and professional affiliation with India’s first Prime Minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru provided the authority for Mayer’s experimental Pilot Project methods
and empowered his role as a Western planning expert. Mayer’s engagement with
Nehru began in the year preceding India’s independence when Nehru personally invited
him to participate in the important planning work during the period of transition from
colonialism to independence. Although Mayer worked predominantly within the U.P.
administrative framework under the direction of U.P. Chief Minister Pant and the U.P.
Development Commissioner K. B. Bhatia, it was Nehru’s initial approval and enthusiasm
for Mayer’s ideas that legitimized his role as an expert and valued contributor.
Albert Mayer’s Introduction to Jawaharlal Nehru
During the Second World War, Albert Mayer joined the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. Between 1942 and 1945, Mayer worked as a civil engineer on the
construction of airfields for the Allied Forces in East Africa and Southern Asia in the
115
China-Burma-India Theatre. While in India, Mayer took a special interest in the local
culture and developed friendships with Indian citizens outside the U.S. military. One of
the locals with whom Mayer developed a friendship was a non-separatist Muslim Indian
named Humayun Kabir (Mayer, 1949). In the summer of Mayer’s final year of service,
Kabir suggested that Mayer meet with the INC leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, who was
recently released from prison.2 Mayer was enthusiastic about the opportunity to meet
with Nehru and encouraged Kabir to write to Nehru to arrange a meeting on his behalf.
At the time, Nehru was preoccupied with achieving national independence from
Great Britain and alleviating the social and economic hardships that persisted
throughout India. In the interest of time, Nehru agreed to meet informally and invited
Mayer to stay at his home in Allahabad, U.P., suggesting that the two could meet late in
the evenings or between other important engagements. As a result, Mayer and Nehru
held their first meetings at Nehru’s Allahabad home, Anand Bhavan, in October of
1945.3 The meetings provided Mayer with the opportunity to learn about the immediate
planning needs in the country and to suggest what lessons from the U.S. experience
2 Jawaharlal Nehru was imprisoned by British forces for his participation in the Quit India movement in August of 1942, along with other members of the Indian National Congress Party including Mahatma Gandhi. He was released on June 15, 1945.
3 Anand Bhavan was also the location where many important meetings of the Indian National Congress Party were held before WWII. Today the home is a state owned historical property and museum. It was donated to the state by Nehru’s daughter, the future Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi. She was born at Anand Bhavan in 1917 to Jawaharlal Nehru and Kamala Kaul. When Mayer was first introduced to Nehru and his daughter in October of 1945, Nehru suggested that Mayer visit the Kamala Nehru Hospital, named in memory of his late wife. Mayer was accompanied on his tour of the hospital by Indira Gandhi (Mayer, 1949).
116
might be beneficial in helping Nehru achieve his long term goals for Indian self-
sufficiency.4
During the discussions with Nehru, Mayer expressed his concern that the
anticipation of national independence was coupled with an attitude of delayed action.
Mayer perceived a general sense of waiting for change, instead of making change
happen. He explained that waiting for independence before making advancements in
national planning would result in delayed results and avoidable mistakes. Instead,
Mayer suggested an immediate program of experimental pilot projects that could be
carried out in advance of the political transition to independence. The purpose of the
pilot projects was to steadily increase Indian planning capacities and produce examples
that could be used as models to guide future national planning and redevelopment work
of the INC when it assumed political control of India.
The plan was influenced in part by Mayer’s experience with the U.S. Greenbelt
Town program in 1935 and 1936. In an article published in The Survey in 1949, Mayer
explained the relevance of the experimental planned communities concept to India.
Mayer wrote,
The war years had marked the eleventh hour before Indian independence. The general attitude was one of waiting: ‘Wait until we’re free, when our spirits and energies are unchained,’ they said, ‘THEN we will accomplish great things. Now we can do nothing at all.’ My contention had been that know-how, technical competence, good and bad experience with actual undertakings–that these would not come automatically with freedom. They must be gained, could be gained, only by trying things out at once, on whatever scale could be achieved, to be ready when the time came. So I was all for pilot projects. I remembered the mistakes Americans had made in the early days of the New Deal in breaking new ground, and how
4 Mayer based these suggestions on his experience as a new town planner in the U.S. during the New Deal era, and the importance of gathering as much information as possible from previous projects to guide large scale government planning programs (Mayer, 1949).
117
happy we were if we had existing projects to turn to, when otherwise we would have had to start from scratch. This idea of pilot projects was one of the things Nehru now explored with me avidly. (Mayer, 1949, p. 658)
At the time of their meeting, Nehru expressed interest in Mayer’s proposal for a
pilot project program of work, but no further action was taken at that time. Shortly
thereafter, Mayer returned to the U.S. at the conclusion of his U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers tour of service and resumed his architectural practice at the offices of Mayer
and Whittlesey in New York City. Mayer remained preoccupied with the unique
planning challenges facing India, and he wrote to Nehru in December of 1945. In the
letter, Mayer recounted their meeting and the pilot project development work he had
suggested. In addition, he described two principal concerns regarding the Indian
planning situation. First, he pointed to the poor quality of housing throughout India and
recommended a program of research to identify regionally available materials with
sustained structural integrity. He suggested that this research of available materials
include a study of existing practices in home construction in India and the U.S. Second,
he expressed concern regarding the lack of qualified technicians necessary to
implement significant planning and development initiatives in India. For this, Mayer
suggested the introduction of limited foreign assistance to help implement planning and
infrastructure improvement programs and train large numbers of Indian workers to gain
experience and qualifications in the fields of planning, design, and engineering. A
central theme of Mayer’s recommendations involved Indians achieving self-sufficiency
118
and reducing the amount of foreign interference in their affairs by building technical
capacity and educating specialized technicians in their home country.5
In response, Nehru wrote that he appreciated Mayer’s suggestions and
welcomed further help and advice, but also warned that the INC was currently
consumed with provincial elections. Four months went by before Mayer received
another letter from Jawaharlal Nehru. In the letter, Nehru explained that the INC now
controlled a number of provincial governments, and that he and the other members of
the party were anxious to begin work in the areas of rural planning and village
reconstruction. In particular, he was writing at the request of his friend Govind Ballabh
Pant, who was serving as the Chief Minister of the Indian state of U.P., to see if Mayer
would be interested in coming to India for a period of six months to a year, in order to
develop a program of rural planning in that region. Mayer’s response to Nehru’s
proposal was enthusiastic but hesitant. He expressed a deep interest in the challenges
of Indian planning and excitement about the work he considered both challenging and
“pioneering.” However, he was hesitant to leave his home and family for an extended
period of time after having spent the past three years abroad in military service (Mayer,
1946, May 20). A final agreement was reached whereby Mayer would visit India for an
initial period of three months beginning in October of 1946.
During the five months leading up to his visit, Mayer corresponded with Nehru
about his election as President of the INC, and the Party’s increasing influence
throughout India. He also established correspondence with U.P. Chief Minister Pant
5 In the letter, Mayer justified his recommendations, concluding that building one’s own technical institutions in the manner of the Russians, would minimize or eliminate India’s dependence on foreign institutions (Mayer, 1945).
119
and made arrangements for the transfer of select Indian memorandums and planning
studies to be sent to his office in New York for preliminary study. During this
intermediate period, Mayer began initial preparation for the work in India by reviewing
existing studies on Indian planning, making contact with individuals acquainted with
Indian conditions, and studying Hindustani to prepare for his upcoming arrival (Mayer,
1946, Oct 4). Mayer also outlined his planning strategies for U.P. including a proposal
to unite physical planning work with training and social education programs. In a letter
to Chief Minister Pant, Mayer explained,
Basically the objective is to formulate a practicable program for Functional Planning and Physical Rebuilding of rural community life in such a way as to improve its quality and performance, negatively to remove as far as possible the handicaps to proper development of the individual and the community, positively to foster such development. (Mayer, 1946, Aug 2, p.1)
At the time of this proposal, Mayer had limited experience with the types of challenges
faced in rural U.P. villages, and he drew considerably from his knowledge of U.S.
planning and development programs. Once he arrived in India, he was exposed to local
conditions and villager needs, which broadened his understanding of post-WWII
planning needs. Mayer subsequently adapted his initial proposal to incorporate
knowledge gleaned in the Indian context and the Pilot Project of rural development
emerged.
Albert Mayer’s Service as Rural Development Advisor to Uttar Pradesh
Mayer’s first visit to India as Rural Development Advisor to the Government of
U.P. came one year after his initial meeting with Jawaharlal Nehru. Mayer arrived in
Delhi in October of 1946, to solidify his plans for the rural development Pilot Project by
working directly with Government officials in the U.P. capital of Lucknow. When he
120
arrived in Delhi however, he found that Nehru had different plans. Nehru requested that
Mayer join him for dinner his first night in India. During dinner, Nehru suggested Mayer
stay in Delhi another day to meet various people regarding his new work in India.
Nehru scheduled an appointment for Mayer to meet his new U.P. contact, Chief Minister
Pant, who happened to be in Delhi on business the same weekend that Mayer arrived.
Nehru also encouraged Mayer to meet Mahatma Gandhi before he left, and Nehru’s
secretary scheduled this meeting and other appointments for the following day (Mayer,
1946, Oct 27).
Mayer was eager to meet with these influential Indian leaders and appointments
with Nehru and Gandhi’s trusted friend and INC General Secretary and Working
Committee member Mridula Sarabhai, and the former Indian Civil Service worker who
supported the Indian independence movement, Edward Penderel Moon, soon followed.
Mayer was impressed with the enthusiasm of these Indian leaders and their
determination to generate positive change for a new era of independence. However,
Mayer was also struck by the enormity of the challenges he was assuming. At this early
stage in his Indian experience, Mayer expressed concern that there was a distinct and
significant difference between his professional capabilities and the expectations of him
by Indian leaders Nehru and Pant.6 Despite Mayer’s doubts, he committed fully to
battling India’s postwar planning challenges and was guided by Nehru, Pant, Gandhi,
and others during the initial meetings in Delhi.
6 In a letter from Mayer to his American friends he wrote, “Those who have expected me and know what I’m here for, seem just to assume with confidence that I can accomplish a great deal… I say the disparity between what they expect and what I believe I can do is so terrific that I have realistically considered telling them my deep doubts, apologizing and going back home” (Mayer, 1946, Oct 27, p. 2).
121
In addition to providing direction to Mayer’s planning efforts, the Indian leaders
Mayer encountered as a direct result of his affiliation with Pandit Nehru exposed Mayer
to the heightened significance and sense of immediacy felt by members of the INC
during the initial stages of decolonization. Mayer described the atmosphere,
The number and kinds of people I’ve seen: their ability, outlook, energy and devotion; the tingling atmosphere of plans and expectation and uncertainty; and yet the calm and self-possession–what it adds up to is being present at the birth of a nation. (Mayer, 1946, Oct 27, p. 1-2)
Though this rural development work was an important element of the political transition
to independence, it was only one part of the broader struggle for freedom, stability, and
self-sufficiency that occupied the primary attention of the leaders whom Mayer
encountered.7
Mayer’s first job in U.P. was to consult on the Master Plan for the city of
Cawnpore to address the urgent needs affecting physical planning in India in 1946.
This consulting role occurred as a result of his introduction and meeting with Chief
Minister Pant. Mayer (1946, Oct 27) was surprised to learn that Pant wanted to delay
his work in Lucknow to address overcrowding in the growing industrial city of Cawnpore.
Pant explained that the population of U.P.’s largest city had nearly tripled in the past
four years, and local authorities were working diligently to address the physical planning
concerns for political stability, security, and human services associated with the chaos
in the city. Pant delayed action on the Cawnpore plans in anticipation of Mayer’s visit in
order to get his review and critical feedback on the plans. In response, Mayer
7 Mayer was aware of Nehru’s ongoing negotiations with members of the Muslim League over the possibility of its members joining the cabinet. Mayer was also privy to the outburst of social unrest that often demanded the attention and physical presence of INC leaders, such as Pant and Sarabhai and sometimes interfered with scheduled meetings.
122
postponed his trip to Lucknow and traveled to Cawnpore directly from Delhi the Monday
morning after his weekend appointments.
Mayer stayed one week in Cawnpore consulting on immediate housing solutions
and outlining opportunities for future long-term solutions before making his way to
Lucknow, with a stop in Benares. Mayer’s recommendations on the Cawnpore plan
included opening up lines of communication from top level administrators to lower level
workers and civilians through open hearings, a civic survey, and a public relations
strategy (Mayer, 1947, Feb 28). Mayer also strongly encouraged the U.P. State
Government, particularly Chief Minister Pant, to become directly involved with the plans
and to invite participation from influential locals and Board members in order to increase
participation and support.
After completing his week of consultations in Cawnpore, Mayer redirected his
focus to the rural planning strategies for U.P. The primary challenge involved
determining a method of advancing development within the confines of the Indian
administrative and social system. In the process Mayer discovered significant
weaknesses in the implementation of development programs and distribution of
resources. Although a number of committees existed to address village problems, and
they produced many reports, little actual work was done (Mayer, 1947, Feb 28).
Villagers often worked to help themselves independently by building their own irrigation
systems for example, but lacked the technical knowledge to execute sustainable
systems. After two months of touring rural villages and working with U.P.
administrators, Mayer concluded that his initial plans for physical reconstruction in the
rural villages of U.P. would require a more comprehensive plan for socioeconomic
123
development. The final plan, which Mayer discussed with Pandit Nehru, Chief Minister
Pant and Mahatma Gandhi was designed to combine physical planning with economic
and social development to improve local capacity and self-sufficiency at the village
scale.8
The Pilot Project for Village Planning and Reconstruction
The “Preliminary Outline for Village Planning and Reconstruction” that Mayer
ultimately proposed was far more complex and larger in scope than what he had initially
presented to Nehru (Mayer, 1946, Dec 11). The plan consisted of three sequential
steps. The first step targeted the local economy, making improvements in agriculture
and local industry depending on the needs and resources of the village. Mayer believed
this process of working with villagers and adding tangible economic value would lead to
the second step of the project, which built trust between staff and villagers and created
acceptance and demand for overall village improvements. The third step introduced
general improvements to village life through health and sanitation initiatives, physical
planning, and improvement to housing and community facilities. The three-step plan
sought to increase villager participation and initiative so that villagers themselves would
sustain building and infrastructure improvements and the involvement of project staff
would no longer be needed.
The proposed three-step plan far exceeded Mayer’s previous work experience in
physical planning, architecture, and engineering. As a result, Mayer often felt
8 Mayer (1958) described how the proposal for the Pilot Project gained the approval of Nehru, Pant, and Gandhi. He wrote, “This proposal was discussed with Gandhiji for about an hour, at a meeting arranged by Nehru for this particular purpose. He listened carefully and gave the project his benevolent encouragement” (Mayer, 1958, p. 22).
124
beleaguered by the phenomenal challenges of rural development work.9 In a letter sent
from India, Mayer explained to his friends and colleagues in the U.S. that he felt
inadequate to these challenges, and that the complexity of the plan created obstacles
for securing appropriate personnel and integrating other departments. However, Mayer
balanced these challenges with a firmly held commitment to immediate action that he
believed was necessary at this important transformational stage in India’s history to
create a foundation of planning policy from which future planning initiatives could
emerge (Mayer, 1946, Dec 11).
Once Mayer’s preliminary plan was approved, his next steps included identifying
key personnel to complete the work, devising a budget proposal, and tailoring the
project to meet the needs of the specific area that would become the Pilot Project site.
Mayer submitted a budget for the proposed work to Chief Minister Pant on January 1,
1947 that was approved by the U.P. legislature in February. Mayer spent the remainder
of his first visit to India as U.P.’s Rural Development Advisor conducting field studies
throughout U.P. and conducting interviews with existing rural development workers
ranging from foreign Christian missionaries to Gandhian constructive workers. 10
Important stops during Mayer’s tour included a visit to American Presbyterian
Missionary workers Bill and Charlotte Wiser. Although Mayer was suspicious of
Christian missionary work, he was wholly impressed by the Wisers who had recently
9 In a letter sent from India, Mayer addressed his mixed feelings about the Pilot Project explaining, “I am still blowing hot and cold on my prospects of accomplishment--sometimes actually glowing with excitement (not often); more often, and more realistically, depressed at the prospects” (Mayer, 1946, Dec 11, p. 5).
10 Constructive work was a program of rural village improvement initiated by Gandhi and his followers in the 1930s. The constructive workers traveled to rural areas and trained villagers in basic education and cottage industries.
125
initiated a program of village improvement they called the India Village Service (Mayer,
1946, Dec 11). The Wisers demonstrated great familiarity with the social and cultural
dimensions of Indian village life and expressed a deep respect for the villagers.
Generally, though, Mayer was dissatisfied with two particular aspects of Christian
missionary work in India (Mayer, 1958). Because Mayer believed the villagers did not
adequately identify with the missionaries, he maintained that their work was less
effective. Further, missionary work was slow and did not reflect the sense of urgency
felt by the INC at the time.
Mayer also visited Dhiren Mazumdar of the Renewa Ashram to study the
operations of Gandhian constructive work outside Faizabad, U.P. (Mayer, 1947, Jan
20). In contrast to the work of Christian missionaries, the constructive workers closely
identified with the villagers with whom they lived and worked. The weakness in this
scheme, in Mayer’s view, was that little productive improvement occurred as a result of
this strong connection. Mayer suggested that the constructive workers identified with the
villagers too much, resulting in the acceptance of low productivity and economic
improvement among workers and villagers. Mayer recognized that the objectives of the
constructive workers were not to improve production of local industries, but rather to
instill certain moral and spiritual beliefs to guide a way of life congruent to Gandhi’s
teachings. However, Mayer’s focus on rural development called for greater economic
productivity and he concluded that the high degree of isolation in Gandhian constructive
villages placed unnecessary limits on the level of economic growth that could be
achieved through development (Mayer, 1958). However, Mayer gained a greater
respect for the work of Gandhian constructive workers and better ideas about how to
126
motivate and organize workers, including preferred roles within the villages, based on
his visit to the Renewa Ashram.
In March of 1947, Mayer returned to the U.S. after five months in India and
continued his intense study of rural development work. Mayer devoted a great deal of
time to reviewing publications regarding foreign village improvement programs in the
developing world and conducted interviews with individuals experienced in foreign
development including Carl C. Taylor and Douglas Ensminger.11 This research helped
Mayer to identify the personnel requirements for the Pilot Project, which he submitted to
Pant for acceptance in 1947. The proposal for the “American team” included three
additional project specialists that would live and work in India for the duration of the
project. 12
In the summer of 1947, Mayer returned to India for a short six-week visit to
discuss his progress in procuring a team of American specialists, and to consult on
urban planning projects in Cawnpore and Bombay. Mayer spent the first half of his visit
working on the Master Plan for the Greater Bombay Area with American traffic engineer
William J. Cox. On the night of August 14th, Mayer and Cox were working from a hotel
room at the Taj Mahal Hotel, overlooking the Gateway to India.13 In a letter to his
11 Carl C. Taylor was a rural sociologist who had served as Assistant Director of the New Deal’s Resettlement Administration in the 1930s. In the early 1940s, Taylor conducted rural sociological research with the U.S. State Department in Argentina and had published a number of studies on these topics. Douglas Ensminger was a rural sociologist with the Department of Agriculture’s land grant colleges program in the 1940s. In 1951 he became the Ford Foundation representative in India.
12 The three project specialist positions were the town and village planner, the agricultural extension worker, and the agricultural engineer. The American team proposal originally called for an additional foreign specialist, but no suitable candidate for a rural industries specialist could be found (Mayer, 1958).
13 The Gateway to India is an architectural monument located on the waterfront in South Bombay, now Mumbai. The structure was built in 1924 by the British Raj as a ceremonial entrance to India.
127
American friends, Mayer recalled the atmosphere of anticipation on the eve of
independence. Despite being overloaded with work, as the hour of independence drew
near, he was continually drawn to the window to witness the crowds gathering in the
public space below. Mayer wrote,
I was in no particular mood for all this–nor against it either–but I was in the midst of a pile of work; and the crescendo of shouting and automobile honking wasn’t conducive to it. It was the night of August 14, and 12 midnight was the zero hour of Independence, of the transfer of power. Gradually I went more and more to the window. The illuminations were a noble sight. Ships in the harbor were outlined in the glitter of electric lights. The melee of people and cars and colored flags kept growing unbelievably thicker and thicker. We wandered down among the demonstrators and found we could actually walk, in fact met some friends who had their kids and babies with them. Whole families were still indifferently sitting Indian style in the middle of the sidewalk. An unusually large proportion of women–a taste of the new India. With not a single policeman in sight, the hordes of shouting people milled around, cars were immoveable islands in a sea of people. We went up again to the window as it neared the zero hour. Just then the flag on the Gateway was illuminated and the flood-lights went on. Innumerable ships’ sirens blew, and the people were silent… you can’t describe the feelings of that minute. (Mayer, 1947, Aug 29, p. 1-2)
Mayer also noted that the tensions surrounding the partition of India and Pakistan
tempered the atmosphere of celebration in the hours leading up to independence. He
recounted the persistent violence between Hindus and Muslims in parts of India,
particularly Bengal and Punjab. On a train ride to Delhi, he joined a discussion with
other members of his second class compartment about the agitation they felt as a result
of the partition. Three of the individuals on board were Hindus in a predominantly Hindu
portion of Bengal that would later be awarded to Pakistan. At the time, the individuals
were on their way to express their concerns to Prime Minister Nehru and Deputy Prime
Minister Sardar Patel. The passengers persistently inquired about Mayer’s opinion
regarding the situation, but Mayer was in no position to contradict the decisions made in
128
accordance with India’s independence, so he provided some neutral responses in
support of the agreed resolutions (Mayer, 1947, Aug 29).
After leaving India on August 29, 1947, Mayer spent the next nine months in the
U.S. assembling the team of American specialists to join him on his return trip to India
the following summer. Mayer made a concerted effort to expand his professional
network of development and agricultural extension professionals to inform his decision
making.14 In order to account for villagers’ receptivity to the development activities,
Mayer included an additional key specialist in the project. In a letter to Nehru, Mayer
introduced the concept of a Rural Life Analyst, an Indian specialist in rural sociology and
anthropology to facilitate communications between foreign specialists and village
workers (Mayer, 1948, March 24). Specifically, the Rural Life Analyst identified the
villagers’ immediate needs and gauged their responses to Pilot Project personnel and
initiatives (Mayer, 1949, June 29). The added specialist position was approved, and
Rudra Dutt Singh filled the role of Rural Life Analyst in summer 1948 (Mayer, 1948, July
8).
When Mayer returned to India in July 1948, U.S. personnel joined him, including
agricultural extension agent and economist Horace Holmes and agricultural engineer
Eldon Collins. The team of American specialists joined Mayer to assess the rural
14 These included a town and village planner, an agricultural extension worker, and an agricultural engineer. To acquire the right personnel for the job Mayer relied on personal contacts and recommendations. In January of 1948, Mayer gave a presentation on his work in India at the urging of regional planner and conservationist Benton MacKaye and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) consultant Judson King, which increased his contacts with U.S. professionals in the fields of development. He also reached out to British agronomist Leonard Elmhurst and Dr. M. L. Wilson, Head of the Extension Department at the U.S. Department of Agriculture for additional recommendations for selecting the right personnel.
129
villages in order to select the site best suited for the Pilot Project work.15 They traveled
by car, plane, foot, and elephant to seven districts in rural U.P. during the summer rainy
season. The team decided on the predominantly rural District of Etawah with work to
begin in September 1948 in time for the October sowing season.16
Mayer described the atmosphere as one of “eagerness and high expectation”
(1948, Oct 12, p. 4). However, Mayer wanted to keep these expectations in check so
as not to lose the interest and trust of villagers and government officials as the project
progressed, so in June of 1948 he produced a report titled “What the Pilot Project is and
What It is Not” (Mayer, 1948, Oct 12). In the report Mayer described the Pilot Project as
exploratory, and what he would refer to in America as “action research.” He warned
that results would not be immediate, but that information gleaned during the process
would add long-term value. In short, the project was not a miracle; it would take time,
commitment, and patience.
In the report, Mayer also outlined the positive aspects of the program. He lauded
the introduction of the Rural Life Analyst to the project team. He commended the
atmosphere of enthusiasm and spirited energy by members of the project team that he
described as “The New Deal atmosphere.”17 Mayer also emphasized the importance of
interdepartmental exchanges of information at the administrative level and partnerships
15 The criteria for site selection included that the needs be urgent, but not insurmountable, and that the problems be typical of average villages so that the potential solutions would have broad applicability in future planning initiatives. The Etawah district met these criteria, in addition to a severe land erosion problem that could be addressed through improved agricultural methods and tools (Mayer, 1958).
16 Mayer recommended that a Provincial Town and Village Planning Office be established in U.P. This office was run by the American town planner, R. D. Trudgett.
17 Mayer explained, “Just as in the New Deal days in our country people of the greatest ability, energy and capacity trooped in to our projects to participate in what they believed in and had been waiting for. We hope and expect to build up that kind of excitement and reputation” (Mayer, 1948, Oct 12, p. 7).
130
between public and private organizations, as well as individuals, so that the knowledge
gained from the project would extend beyond the Pilot Project area. Finally, Mayer
supported the dual efforts of physical planning and social development opportunities
through training and education in the three-step approach to village improvement.
Then on September 15, 1948, he outlined the Pilot Project scope and objectives
in a report that specified the project area. This area initially consisted of a development
block of about 70 villages and would expand to a second development block the
following year. Research and field experience in these areas would inform subsequent
expansion of the program on a regional scale to connect villages through improved
transportation infrastructure and markets in subsequent development work.
Organization of the work would take place in the first development center located in the
village of Mahewa in the Etawah District of U.P.
The sequence of Pilot Project initiatives began with immediate efforts to achieve
better distribution of resources, such as food crop seeds and health services.
Specifically, these immediate efforts included increases in the availability of improved
seeds, introduction of sanai seed for green manure, interplanting of compatible crops,
and the introduction of agricultural implements for demonstration and use in the villages.
Additional resources and services targeted health and sanitation concerns and included
expanding sanitary water supply, drainage and treatment of stagnant water to prevent
the spread of malaria by insects, introduction of smallpox vaccinations, and general
clean-up campaigns to control household vermin.18 Following these initiatives,
18 The cleanup campaigns included the introduction of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), an insecticide that was later identified as having harmful effects on ecological systems including people and animals exposed to the chemical.
131
operational work to expand and improve agricultural methods and health and sanitation
practices through training and villager cooperation occurred. The nature of the projects
depended on the needs of the villages, and included soil conservation, construction of
irrigation ditches and wells, and construction of subsurface drainage systems to improve
sanitation. Subsequent stages of the plan, including social development and physical
planning, would come later.19
Initiation of the Pilot Project
In September of 1948, the Pilot Project commenced in 64 villages in the District
of Etawah. From 1948-1950, the program was led by U.S. Agricultural Advisor, Horace
Holmes, under the authority of U.P. Development Commissioner K. B. Bhatia.20
Following the project’s initiation, Mayer played an advisory role. He returned to the U.S.
in October of 1948, and over the next eight years visited India for three to four months
each year.21 During the visits, Mayer toured the Pilot Project area, conducted meetings
with the U.P. Development Commissioner Bhatia, and prepared annual progress reports
and recommendations to the Pilot Project staff, and Indian leaders including Prime
19 The social development and physical planning stages included literacy classes, social activities, well construction, and road drainage.
20 Holmes served as the Agricultural Advisor to the Government of Uttar Pradesh for two years, during which time he administered the Pilot Project in Etawah. Holmes had a background in agricultural extension and a Master’s degree in economics from Cornell University. Prior to joining the Pilot Project team, Holmes had worked for two years in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in China (Singh, 1967). Holmes decided not to renew the contract offered to him by the U.P. government in 1950 (Holmes, 1950). He left the Pilot Project and his position as U.P. Agricultural Advisor later that year. He returned to India as the Chief Agricultural Advisor under the U.S. Point IV program of technical assistance in 1951 and continued to visit the Etawah Pilot Project area on an informal basis.
21 Some years, Mayer made two visits to India. In January of 1950, when Mayer sensed a declining interest in the Pilot Project by government administrators, he stopped briefly in India to reinvigorate enthusiasm for the work by making a weekend village tour to Etawah and Gorakhpur with important U.P. administrators including Chief Secretary Bhagwan Sahay, Finance Commissioner Gopal Krishnan, and Agricultural Secretary Adit Jha (Mayer, 1950, Jan 31).
132
Minister Nehru, U.P. Chief Minister Pant and the U.P. Development Commission (Figure
5-1).
Figure 5-1. Mayer in conference with U.P. Development Commissioner Bhatia and U.P.
administrators K. D. Malaviya, B. N. Jha, and Kher Singh, 1948 (Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
Mayer stayed connected to Pilot Project progress through biweekly development
reports sent to his office in New York and correspondence with Pilot Project staff.
During the first two years of the project, Mayer received many letters from Agricultural
Advisor Holmes. In the letters, Holmes explained that the project successfully engaged
the villagers but failed in the area of inter-governmental cooperation.22 Holmes (1950)
expressed particular frustration with the lack of Indian administrative leadership for the
project. He was also deeply troubled and embarrassed by the work of the other
American specialist, Eldon Collins, who behaved in the old manner of a paternalistic
Western expert rather than getting his hands dirty and leading by example. Holmes
(1950) argued that Eldon’s behavior compromised the validity of the Pilot Project and
22 Holmes was frustrated by the lack of commitment to the Pilot Project at the upper administrative levels of Indian government, as evident in the diversion of resources, both financial and physical, away from the Pilot Project and its staff. Holmes felt that the Pilot Project needed greater allocation of resources to progress. Both Holmes and his wife Eveline wrote to Mayer to encourage his immediate return to India for help.
133
reflected poorly on the American specialists who were sincerely dedicated to the
villagers and the objectives outlined in Mayer’s Pilot Project outline.
Mayer delivered a mixed response to these allegations. He was very encouraged
by the reported success of the project in obtaining villager interest. Mayer secured this
engagement by targeting the villagers’ most immediate needs, which involved
increasing food production to feed their families. Holmes’ work with the Pilot Project
and the pioneering efforts of Rural Life Analyst Rudra Dutt Singh ensured the success
of this engagement.23
Mayer took two corrective actions to address the problems of Pilot Project
administration. Upon his return to India in the summer of 1949, Mayer removed
American specialist Eldon Collins from the Pilot Project. Disliked by many of the project
staff, Collins had been confronted by both Mayer and Development Commissioner
Bhatia about his poor performance, and Mayer recommended that he change his ways
or leave the program (Mayer, 1949, Aug 23). When Collins did not respond to Mayer’s
request, Mayer removed the position of Agricultural Engineer from the Pilot Project
administration in September 1949.
Mayer also considered these challenges when devising a detailed organizational
structure for the Pilot Project in July 1952 as a long-term resolution to internal
administration problems (Figure 5-2). This organizational hierarchy, based on the
Etawah Pilot Project included modifications to guide future Pilot Project areas as the
work expanded to new districts in U.P. (Mayer, 1952, July 29).
23 Mayer credited Holmes as having a unique spirit and enthusiasm to carry out the Pilot Project development work. Holmes credited Rudra Dutt Singh as having a significant influence on the facilitation of cooperation between staff and villagers (Holmes, 1950).
134
Figure 5-2. Proposed organization and administration of the Etawah Pilot Project, 1952.
Mayer’s new organizational framework contained two principle characteristics: an
increased participation and valuation of the lowest level workers on the project and an
increased sense of accountability by officers at the highest level of the project
administration. This novel administrative structure united the combined strategies of
social and physical improvement in Mayer’s three-stage development plan in an
135
approach Mayer called, “Inner Administrative Democracy,” or “Inner Democratization”
(Mayer, 1952, July 29).
Inner Democratization challenged the existing administrative practices adopted
from the British Raj (Figure 5-3). Based on an impression formed during his first visit to
India as Rural Development Advisor, Mayer believed that the existing administration
was ineffective at resolving planning problems in the field (Mayer, 1949, April 14). The
lack of vertical communication between Indian government officials and project workers
frustrated him. He also found that government officials lacked specialized knowledge in
planning-related issues and were more skilled at writing reports and forming committees
than producing results. For this reason, Mayer’s plan for Inner Administrative
Democracy called for a decentralized organizational structure with stronger flows of
vertical communication between the Pilot Project staff on the ground and development
administrators in the government offices in Lucknow.
Figure 5-3. Organization of the U.P. administration in 1952.
136
To accomplish a more democratic administration of the Pilot Project, Mayer
introduced a three-tiered system of responsibility and command that included the village
level, group level, and district level administrations (Figure 5-2). At the village level,
Mayer introduced the position of Village Level Worker (VLW). Trained by Development
Officers in agricultural methods at the project headquarters in the Mahewa village, the
local residents serving as VLWs of the Etawah district worked closely with the villagers
as multipurpose workers and friends. They also accumulated field experience and
knowledge of local villager’s perceptions of Pilot Project strategies, which they shared in
biweekly meetings with group level and district level staff.
The group level workers consisted of Deputy Development Officers with
specialized knowledge in agriculture, engineering, education, and village participation.
These Officers developed policies and provided technical expertise to a block of villages
and Village Level Workers.24 VLWs also reported development progress to the District
Level Planning Officer, Dhyan Pal Singh. Singh secured resources, coordinated district
level work, generated interest in the project, and handled administrative matters. He
also served as the direct link to the Development offices in Lucknow and U.P.
Development Commissioner K. B. Bhatia, who served as head of command for the Pilot
Project until 1953 when he was replaced by U.P. Agricultural Secretary Adit Jha.
The overall atmosphere that Mayer attempted to achieve through the
decentralized administration was one of government as servant. This approach
required that project administrators respond to local needs, but also that the villagers
24 At the start of the Pilot Project in 1948, the number of villages in the block totaled 64, but as the project area increased, the average block size grew to 100 villages (Mayer, 1958).
137
become active participants in the Pilot Project operations. Mayer considered the Inner
Administrative Democracy concept his greatest contribution to Indian development
planning throughout his tenure as Rural Development Advisor of Uttar Pradesh (Mayer,
1958).
Villagers’ Participation
Villager participation was an important aspect of the Pilot Project and set it apart
from previous rural reconstruction projects in India.25 Many villagers were interested in
the agricultural development components of the Pilot Project, but this applied mainly to
land-owning castes. Other members of the community, such as the lower caste
Harijans, felt a greater need for social services through the Social Education program
(Singh, 1967). Therefore, the Pilot Project played an important role in broadening
villager participation and Mayer considered it an important tool for communicating
project goals and methods to the villagers.
The Deputy Development Officer of Villagers’ Participation, Baij Nath Singh,
administered the Social Education Program including adult literacy classes, a
development related newspaper, local discussion meetings, sightseeing tours to view
Pilot Project work in other areas, agricultural fairs, and local social activities that
included drama and performance clubs (Table 5-1) (Singh, 1967). Popular with the
locals, these initiatives of the Pilot Project were typically offered for a small fee. The
benefits of increased cultivation resulting from improved farming methods and
implements was successfully promoted by newspaper, sightseeing tours, and
25 In 1954, the second U.P. Development Commissioner, Adit Jha, considered cutting the Social Education program from the Pilot Project budget. In a letter to Jha, Mayer fiercely defended the program, explaining that a fundamental principle of the Pilot Project methodology involved enhancing villager’s education and capacities on the social level (Mayer, 1954, Nov 1).
138
agricultural fairs. Dramas, plays, and songs reinforced project goals and often engaged
religious themes congruent with these values (Mayer, 1958).
The data presented in Table 5-1 indicates that the greatest increases in
participation occurred between the first and second year in each of the four participation
categories. The causes behind these trends may be explained by fluctuations in villager
enthusiasm, saturation of development benefits, or changes in administration. It is
possible that villagers were most eager to participate in the Pilot Project between 1948
and 1950, when the methods and resources were new. Another possible explanation
for the patterns of participation is that development benefits reached most of the
participants by the second year and that new numbers of participants gradually declined
as the percentage of villagers reached by development steadily increased. Finally, the
Pilot Project may have been negatively affected by changes in development
administration. Between 1950 and 1951, significant loss of Pilot Project personnel
occurred, including the loss of American agricultural advisor and Pilot Project administer
in India, Horace Holmes and the loss of seasoned development personnel that were
transferred to other projects, such as Gorakhpur.
Other strategies for garnering strong local support and participation targeted the
need to counter traditional beliefs and cultural norms that sometimes conflicted with
Pilot Project interests. The project staff approached such conflicts in two ways. They
first adapted Pilot Project tools and methods to meet the needs of the villagers.26 The
26 One example of a Pilot Project method adapted to meet villager’s needs and expectations as outlined in a letter from Holmes to Mayer during the first year of the project introduced advanced plowing equipment. The villagers found the tool too heavy and did not want to use it, despite its superior results. To respond to the villagers’ needs, Holmes created a simpler, lighter version of the American tool. Holmes and another Pilot Project staff member modified 100 such plows to sell to Etawah district cultivators (Mayer, 1949, Aug 13).
139
other approach gained the villagers’ acceptance of the proposed changes through face
to face communications between the Villagers’ Participation Officer or Rural Life
Analyst, and influential members of the village.
Table 5-1. Progress of the villager participation program 1948–1953.
1948-1949 1949-1950 1950-1951 1951-1952 1952-1953
Adult literacy
Number of villagers trained as adult teachers
26 47 34 33 15
Number of adult classes run
26 47 34 33 77
Number of adults made literate
396 495 240 271 366
Development-related newspaper
Number of copies in circulation
- 510 1,200 987 1,033
Agricultural sightseeing
Number of sightseeing tour participants
- 611 2,975 2,309 152
Social activities
Number of dramas performed
- 8 14 23 29
Number of cinema shows given
- 78 102 90 69
Note: The population of the Etawah Pilot Project increased over time as new villages were added to the project area (Singh, 1967). In 1948 the number of villagers included in Pilot Project operations was approximately 49,000. This number increased to approximately 79,000 in 1949 and grew to approximately 104,700 by 1951. This indicated that some of the increases in participation were due in part to the expansion of the Pilot Project operations. The data presented in the table was obtained from Pilot Project Senior Economic Intelligence Inspector P. L. Sharma (1953).
One of the immediate obstacles the VLWs faced was villagers’ resistance to the
use of sanai for green manure (Mayer, 1958; Singh, 1967). This method required the
plowing of the sanai, commonly known as sunn hemp, deep into the soil to increase its
nutrient quality, increasing crop yields. However in the village of Ikari, one of the VLWs
140
reported that cultivators were not adopting the green manure practices. Mayer called
upon Village Participation Officer Singh to help gain acceptance for the new method.
When the VLW and Singh went to the village, they met with the local panchayat leader
Kanhaiya Lal to determine why villagers rejected the method. Upon meeting with Lal,
they discovered that he was not the true leader of the village, and that his uncle Ram
Sanehi, an orthodox Hindu, was the more respected and influential elder in the village.
Sanehi explained that he did not support the efforts to increase agricultural
production because it did not agree with his religious beliefs. Sanehi’s objection to the
green manure was two-fold. First, he asserted that the increased agricultural production
was considered a form of greed. Second, he declared that the act of plowing the sanai
represented an act of violence that conflicted with the values of Hinduism. In response,
the VLW and Singh considered the apparent violence against the sanai similar to the
violence against worms and insects that occurred during farming. They viewed farming
as a sacred act with the sins of violence against plants and small animals outweighed
by the noble acts of providing for one’s family and cattle. Sanehi eventually agreed to
have two mounds of sanai for green manure and the other villagers followed his
example.
Pilot Project staff faced additional challenges including villagers’ apprehension
about the animal husbandry program. Many Hindu villagers opposed castration of the
scrub bull population as sinful because it interfered with the sacred animal’s freedom.
Others opposed the artificial insemination of pedigree cattle because it interfered with
the cow’s natural breeding process.
141
For these reasons, participation in the animal husbandry program was slow at
the start. However, in 1948 some villagers began to support the inoculations program
that protected against the two predominant cattle diseases in the villages, haemorhagic
septicemia and rinderpest. In addition, village sightseeing tours included visits to the
veterinary center in Mathura, which made a positive impression on sightseeing
participants from other villages surrounding the Pilot Project area (Mayer, 1950, June
27). As a result, the livestock population became healthier, and the animal husbandry
program gained acceptance as villagers began to take pride in the health and stock of
their cattle compared to other villages (Singh, 1967).
In addition to increasing villagers’ acceptance of new methods and tools, the
villagers’ participation program developed local leadership for the planned transfer of
responsibility for development activities and maintenance from Development Officers to
local organizations including cooperative societies and village Panchayats, the local
councils comprised of elected village leaders. Planning for the transfer of responsibility
was a critical step in Mayer’s outline for the Pilot Project. Planning addressed the key
problem identified by Mayer in previous government initiated development work.
Essentially, the villagers did not retain new tools and methods, which perpetuated their
dependency on assistance from outside the village. By developing local villagers’
initiative and leadership to support the transfer of responsibility, Mayer’s Pilot Project
concept helped establish the conditions that Nehru expected for a free and self-
sufficient nation.
Village Planning
By 1954, the agricultural and villagers’ participation programs had generated
visible impacts in the villages. Coordinating the villagers’ participation into cooperative
142
improvement programs was the next step. Initially, Mayer envisioned a dramatic
“village replanning” program for housing and road reconstruction that commenced in
four villages in 1954.27 In reality, no dramatic planning results occurred as a result of
the village replanning initiative of 1954. Instead, village planning evolved organically
over time as villagers’ felt needs expanded beyond agricultural productivity. Although
not in compliance with Mayer’s three-step development plan for agricultural
development, social education and villager initiative, this evolving demand for village
planning reflected Mayer’s fundamental goal for expanding villagers’ demand for village
improvement as a result of increased interest and participation in the economic and
social developments of the Pilot Project.
New Pilot Project village plans consisted of three programs in public works
improvement, environmental sanitation, and public health. These programs were
administered by the Villagers’ Participation Officer, Baij Nath Singh and coordinated
with local organizations including village panchayats and multi-village cooperative
unions.28
Public works improvements
The public works improvement program for building construction was one of the
first programs established. This program used mud bricks made with the cooperative
brick kilns introduced in 1948. During the first year of the project, the cooperative brick
27 By 1954, the Pilot Project had expanded to four districts encompassing 300 villages, with new development center headquarters at Bhagyanagar and Ajitmal. These development centers were surrounded by a geographical area called the development block. The village re-planning program began in the Bharaipur and Bhawanipur villages of the Mahewa block, the Harikapura village of the Bhagyanagar block, and the Udotkapura village of the Ajitmal block.
28 In time, two positions were created to assist the Villagers’ Participation Officer: the Assistant Development Officer of Sanitation and the Assistant Development Officer of Public Works (Mayer, 1958).
143
kiln industry expanded as a result of the immediate need for improved housing
construction after severe floods washed away hundreds of mud homes in the Pilot
Project area (Trudgett, 1948). The village brick kilns also created economic
opportunities for locals during the periods between agricultural sowing and cultivation
seasons. Over five hundred brick kilns were introduced during the first five years of the
project, and these were used to build homes, school buildings, and community centers
through cooperative efforts. In addition to providing structural improvements to village
buildings, the brick kiln initiative also strengthened opportunities for community
involvement. School buildings and community centers provided meeting places for
many villagers’ participation programs. A number of the community centers, which
served as panchayat council houses, also housed circulating library materials (Mayer,
1958).
Additional public works improvements included the construction and
improvement of village roads. During the early years of the project, many roads were
widened by removing encroaching fields and residences from roadways. Over time,
new roads were constructed and some existing roads were paved. The construction of
road drainage systems that included culverts and off-site soakage pits or dry wells to
collect runoff represented an important type of road improvement. In addition to
improving the quality of the roads, the drainage systems enhanced village sanitation.
Environmental sanitation
Once the villagers witnessed the success of the road drainage systems, the
program was in high demand. As a result, project staff added new prerequisites for
road drainage assistance including the drainage of interior courtyards throughout the
144
village to reduce standing water. Strong support for the environmental sanitation
initiative through comprehensive village drainage systems meant that improvements in
one area, such as roads, would not be offset by neglect in other areas such as standing
water in village courtyards.
Additional progress in the environmental sanitation program included the
introduction of sanitary wells with hand pumps in place of open wells. Further, a
government subsidy provided to the Harijans caste funded paved bathing places and
kitchen cleaning areas, with paved drainage leading to remote soakage pits and dry
wells.29
Public health
A public health program was initiated during the second year of the Pilot Project
for the treatment of human patients and the provision of medical supply kits to VLWs
(Sharma, 1953). The VLWs received 60 medical supply kits and training to provide
treatment and administer vaccines under the authority of the Public Health
Department.30 During the first year of the program 2,306 villagers received medical
treatment. This number increased to 11,565 treated patients during the third year of the
program and decreased in the following years (Table 5-2).
Some of the most successful public health initiatives included eye clinics and
smallpox vaccinations (Mayer, 1958). Initially, villagers did not view preventative
medicine as an immediate need, presenting a difficult hurdle for the VLWs implementing
29 One initiative of the environmental sanitation program, the introduction of latrines, was not successful. Despite the introduction, little change occurred in conventional defecation practices by members of the villages (Mayer, 1958).
30 The number of medical supply kits provided by the Pilot Project decreased over time as medical supplies were gradually relocated to the village panchayats.
145
the vaccination programs. During the first year of the program, disinterest in newly
introduced vaccines for malaria and cholera reflected a lack of urgency because these
diseases did not present a major problem in the 64 Pilot Project villages. During the
second year of the program however, interest in smallpox vaccines dramatically
increased. Mayer attributed this acceptance in part to the visible success of the cattle
inoculations that increased villager confidence in vaccination (Mayer, 1958).
Table 5-2. Progress of the VLW medical treatment program 1948–1953
1948-1949 1949-1950 1950-1951 1951-1952 1952-1953
Number of villagers receiving medical treatment from VLWs
- 2,306 11,565 4,624 1,864
Medical supply kits in use in the Pilot Project
- 60 60 43 54
Note: The data presented in the table was obtained from Pilot Project Senior Economic Intelligence Inspector P. L. Sharma (1953).
Village planning programs demonstrated slow and steady progress. To gain the
notice and accolades of government administrators, Mayer recommended focusing on
the means of change, such as developing participation and leadership, rather than
forcing dramatic results in the Pilot Project. However the challenge of transferring the
responsibility for village planning from project staff to the villagers themselves
represented a significant hurdle that was not fully resolved by the time the project
ended.
An important component of Mayer’s plan for sustained village improvement
involved preparing for the transfer of responsibility for development and maintenance to
villagers through the identification of local leaders. Over time, Mayer realized that his
initial plan to rely on individuals with local leadership positions in the village panchayats
146
did not work.31 Involving local panchayats and cooperative unions in the coordination of
Pilot Project work yielded some progress but the presence of the strong leaders
necessary for the transfer of responsibility to the villages was scarce (Mayer, 1951,
June 27). Although the transfer of responsibility from Pilot Project staff to Indian
villagers proved difficult and unresolved, visible improvements in agricultural production
and village reconstruction in the Pilot Project areas led to an expansion of the project to
other districts in rural U.P.
Institutionalization of Pilot Project Principles
By 1951, the Pilot Development Project had been replicated in four additional
districts in rural UP. This expansion coincided with the introduction of India’s First Five-
Year Plan. This plan produced by the Indian Planning Commission in 1951, outlined a
strategy for community development and rural extension based on existing development
programs in India, including the Pilot Project in Etawah (Planning Commission,
Government of India, 1951). The new program of community development and rural
extension was designed to promote self-help and address villagers’ immediate needs in
agricultural development. The organizational structure of the community development
and rural extension program was also remarkably similar to Mayer’s, and included
Village Level Workers and central development training centers in association with
groups of villages in larger development blocks.
To implement the First Five-Year Plan, the Indian Planning Commission
launched a new national planning program of Community Development on October 2,
31 Mayer found that the panchayat leaders were not always the most respected members of the village and often lacked enthusiasm and enterprising spirit (Mayer, 1950, June 27).
147
1952. 32 In addition, the National Extension Service (NES) was established to introduce
agricultural training to a larger percent of the rural population on October 2, 1953.33 The
NES program introduced agricultural education to encourage cultivators to apply
improved farming methods on a voluntary basis. The NES program operated at a lower
budget than Community Development and for that reason was implemented on a
broader scale for longer periods of time. However, NES blocks that demonstrated
substantial improvements in agricultural production were also considered for the
Community Development program.
The Indian Planning Commission’s Community Development and National
Extension Service programs eventually replaced the Etawah Pilot Project. In 1958, the
first of the Pilot Project development blocks was transferred to an NES development
block, and Mayer’s role as U.P. Rural Development Advisor came to an end.34 Although
Mayer viewed the Pilot Project’s influence on national planning policy a success, the
pace of the new programs dissatisfied him. Mayer learned from his Pilot Project
experience that one of the biggest challenges was finding people with technical
expertise coupled with an enthusiasm and respect for villagers to implement a
community development program (Mayer, 1958).
32 The National Extension Service launch on October 2nd was historically significant because it coincided with the birthday of Mahatma Gandhi.
33 The First Five-Year Plan set a target goal of 100% saturation of rural villages through the NES within
ten years (Planning Commission, Government of India, 1951).
34 Figure C-1 provides an outline of Etawah Pilot Project development operations from 1948 to 1958.
148
Considerations
Many factors shaped the adoption of the community development Pilot Project
for Indian rural planning. Mayer initially learned of Indian planning needs and
opportunities through personal connections and networks with the Indian administration,
particularly India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Without Nehru’s sincere
endorsement of Mayer’s expertise and outlook, Mayer would not have been invited to
join the Uttar Pradesh administration as the Rural Development Advisor.
Secondly, Mayer’s Pilot Project for community development evolved over time in
response to local needs and expectations. In 1945, Mayer first introduced Nehru to a
model villages program for rural reconstruction inspired by national planning initiatives
of the U.S. New Deal era. During the two-year period from 1946 to 1948, Mayer revised
the plan to integrate combined economic, social, and physical improvements.
Influenced by Mayer’s interactions with Western rural sociologists, these changes also
emerged from his findings during the initial tour of existing conditions in rural U.P. during
his first visit as Rural Development Advisor. In the outline of the Pilot Project report of
September 1948, Mayer changed the original plan to include a three-step development
plan, the introduction of a Rural Life Analyst, and a reduced scope from state level
planning to a single district, in order to conduct action research to inform future Indian
planning policy.
The resulting plan for the Etawah Pilot Project reflected the values and
immediate planning needs of the Indian administration in the period directly following
WWII. Mayer also introduced an innovative and detailed organizational structure for the
project administration in 1952 that promoted bottom-up planning, and challenged
conventional administrative hierarchies that had been inherited from the British Raj as a
149
result of decolonization. The organizational structure also created a framework for
national development planning, including the role of Village Level Workers, and served
as a prototype for Indian Community Development and National Extension Service
planning.
The Pilot Project also reflected extant modernization theories that emphasized
social transformation as a precursor to economic development. Mayer’s plan did not
attempt to replicate Western cultural norms beyond those necessary to create
fundamental improvements to the health and welfare of the villagers. Mayer’s plan was
influenced by indigenous community development work and was responsive to local
knowledge and traditions. As a result, a combination of Western technologies and local
influences shaped this rural community development initiative. Over time, these
changes would be further adapted as Pilot Project principles were translated by
members of the Indian Planning Commission. Chapter 6 discusses this translation
process and the dynamics of institutionalization during the post-WWII period as new
foreign stakeholders played influential roles in shaping Indian development policy in the
1950s and 1960s.
150
CHAPTER 6 OUTCOMES OF THE ETAWAH PILOT PROJECT
The Etawah Pilot Project commenced in 1948 and lasted ten years. During its
ten years of operation, the Pilot Project expanded from one to five locations in Uttar
Pradesh (U.P.) and contributed to the first national planning policy introduced by the
Indian Planning Commission in 1951. Over a four-year period between 1948 and 1952,
members of the U.P. Development Commission and the Indian Planning Commission
institutionalized the Etawah Pilot Project principles in a process marked by the diffusion
of planning knowledge, the expansion of the project to new locations, and the
integration of Pilot Project principles in the Indian Planning Commission’s First Five-
Year Plan.
Implementation of the First Five-Year Plan included the introduction of 55 new
Community Development Projects in more than 16,000 villages in 1952. These projects
incorporated best practices and lessons learned from the Etawah Pilot Project and were
financed in part by U.S. Point IV Program and Ford Foundation grants.1 The
introduction of U.S. aid led to a shift in planning strategy from improving villager welfare
to achieving rapid increases in agricultural production. By helping the Indian Planning
Commission achieve increased production rates, the U.S. government and the Ford
Foundation intended to spread the influence of democracy to South Asia as a form of
1 Additional sources of international aid were given to India for the implementation of the First Five-Year Plan, but the United States was the single largest contributing nation in the 1950s (Table E-1). The Point IV program, introduced in the U.S.-India Technical Cooperation Agreement of 1951 and 1952, and the Ford Foundation coordinated development efforts to help the Indian Planning Commission implement the Community Development Projects and National Extension Service development blocks with some assistance from non-governmental agencies. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) provided a specialist in public health education for the Singur Health Heath Center in West Bengal in 1953 that was established as a regional training center for Community Development Projects personnel with Ford Foundation grants (Ford Foundation, 1955).
151
non-militaristic defense against communism. Through this strategy, the Pilot Project
principles developed at Etawah were translated by Indian planners and foreign
stakeholders to suit national planning needs and U.S. foreign policy objectives.
The change in development strategy by the Indian Planning Commission
coincided with the changing priorities of the Indian Central Government. When Prime
Minister Nehru invited Mayer to devise and implement the Pilot Development Project in
1946, the priority was to improve the welfare of rural Indian villagers through the
introduction of select Western methods while preserving the identity of India’s traditional
village societies. Ten years later, the priority of the Indian government had gradually
shifted to stopping the threat of an impending food shortage and the modernization of
traditional village societies through significant infusions of Western technological
assistance and aid for agricultural development.
These changes in priority were reflected in the policies of the Indian Planning
Commission and the Five-Year Plans. The shift in focus by Indian planners from
community development to agricultural extension reflected the increasing influence of
U.S. stakeholders and the growing number of Western experts and technologies at work
in India during the post-WWII era. As new foreign experts tied to U.S. aid were
introduced to assist the Indian Planning Commission in implementing the Five-Year
Plans, Mayer’s influence in U.P. rural development declined. In 1958, The Etawah Pilot
Project transitioned to a National Extension Service development block, and Mayer’s
service as U.P. Rural Development Advisor came to an end. However, the principles of
the Pilot Project introduced by Mayer in the late 1940s laid the foundation for India’s first
152
community development planning policy and reflected the values of the Indian
leadership at the peak of India’s emergence as an independent nation.
Institutionalization of Rural Development Planning Principles from Etawah
The purpose of the Pilot Development Project at Etawah was to determine what
accomplishments in rural development could be made to improve villager welfare and in
turn used to inform a national development policy (Mayer, 1958). During the first three
years of the Pilot Project, Mayer prepared five Interim Reports outlining the progress
being made at Etawah for U.P. Chief Minister Pant and U.P. Development
Commissioner Bhatia. These reports communicated the accomplishments made in
agricultural production, social education, and innovative implementation strategies
incorporating lessons in rural development from indigenous sources.
Between 1948 and 1951, the Etawah Pilot Project generated measurable
improvements in standards of living and agricultural production that exceeded
anticipated targets (Table 6-1). By 1951, agricultural yield per acre of improved seed
increased by 25%-44% (Mayer, 1951, June 27). The acreage of land brought under
cultivation also increased as a result of the Pilot Project. Over a three-year period the
area of cultivated lands in the Pilot Project area increased from 16% to 91% (Mayer,
1951, June 27). In addition to improved seeds and larger cultivation areas, Mayer
attributed this increase in yields to the agricultural demonstrations by Pilot Project staff,
the introduction of green manuring practices, and the use of new implements such as
the Olpad Thresher (Mayer, 1951, June 27).2 Mayer attempted to publicize these
2 The Olpad Thresher is a farming implement used in India to separate grain from crop yields in the field. During the threshing process, the machine is pulled behind a pair of cattle and operated by cultivator. The introduction of the Olpad Thresher was used to supplement traditional methods of threshing by cattle hooves and resulted in more rapid harvesting.
153
accomplishments within the U.P. administrative framework in order to sustain interest
and funding for the Pilot Project.
Table 6-1. Increase in agricultural yields per acre in maunds (mds)3 during the 1950–1951 rabi (spring) harvest
Yield per acre of traditional seeds
Yield per acre of improved seeds
Increase in yield per acre
Percent increase in yield per acre
Pea crop 16 mds 20 mds 4 mds 25%
Potato crop 181 mds 257 mds 76 mds 41%
Wheat crop 18 mds 23 mds 5 mds 28%
Wheat crop with ammonium sulfate fertilizer
18 mds 25 mds 7 mds 39%
Wheat crop with sanai green manure
18 mds 26 mds 8 mds 44%
Note: Data obtained from Mayer (1951, June 27).
Mayer worked to sustain interest and support for the Pilot Projects throughout his
tenure as Rural Development Advisor. In January 1950, Mayer sensed that interest in
the Project by U.P. government officers was on the decline so he made a special trip to
India to convince members of the U.P. government including Chief Secretary, Bhagwan
Sahay, Finance Commissioner Gopal Krishnan, and Agricultural Secretary Adit Jha to
visit the Etawah Pilot Project (Mayer, 1950, Jan 31). Mayer and the members of the
U.P. government stayed overnight at the Mahewa Pilot Project headquarters and
attended a dinner and “campfire talk” with Village Participation Officer Baij Nath Singh
and other members of the Pilot Project staff. Mayer felt it was important for the
government officers to witness the new approach to development that was being tried
with success at Etawah.
3 Maunds are a unit of measurement used in India. One maund is equivalent to 82.29 pounds.
154
The response from the U.P. government officials to the project was positive. On
the drive back to Lucknow from Mahewa, Chief Secretary Sahay reported to Mayer that
he was impressed with the Village Participation Officer and the concept of the Village
Level Workers. Finance Commissioner Krishnan stated that the Etawah Project was
the most effective example of rural construction he had seen, and Agricultural Secretary
Jha, who would later be appointed to the position of U.P. Development Commissioner,
requested that members of Mayer’s Pilot Project team train 200 other agricultural
workers for service in other areas of U.P. (Mayer, 1950, Jan 31).
The responses from the U.P. government officials reinforced Mayer’s view that
the novel administrative framework that decentralized project administration among
workers trained to respond to the needs and expectations of local villagers and the
strategy for inner administrative democracy that incorporated bottom-up leadership from
within the villages were the two most salient characteristics of the Pilot Project
experiment. In the summer following the visit from U.P. government officials, Mayer
wrote,
I think I am justified in feeling we’ve produced, within our project, something of a quiet revolution in governmental attitude, both in inter-relations up and down within it, and in relations with the people; that in this later respect we’ve restored accurate meaning to the term Government Servant. (Mayer, 1950, July 2, p. 5)
During this time, Mayer’s American colleagues asked him how members of the Etawah
Pilot Project team changed villagers’ attitudes towards development. In response,
Mayer explained that the villagers were actually eager to engage in development, and
that the significant change occurred in the administration of the project, not the attitudes
of the villagers. In a letter from India to U.S. and Indian colleagues Mayer stated,
155
Some anthropologists and other friends in the U.S.A. have asked about the methods used in awakening the villager, expecting some light of a scientific nature, which unfortunately I cannot give, because we really have not anything striking to offer. The fact is that, as I’ve said, the villager seems to have always been pretty ready, under a surface of suspicion and disbelief, based on centuries of bad relations with government, bad experiences with their advice and good faith. Our achievement really lies along the line [of] having produced a new attitude among the governmental team which we formed to work with the village. (Mayer, 1950, July 2, p. 5) Clearly, Mayer rejected the idea that villagers were resistant to progress
and embedded in traditionally ‘backwards’ habits. He understood that the
purpose of the Pilot Project was not to modernize Indian citizens but to introduce
selected modern techniques and reform development administration to respond
to local needs and work directly with the villagers to achieve improved welfare.
The ability of Pilot Project staff to engage villagers in new agricultural methods on
a voluntary basis caught the interest of U.P. government officials and visitors and
led to the diffusion of Pilot Project principles to other projects.
Diffusion of Pilot Project Principles to Outside Individuals and Organizations
In addition to promoting the project within the U.P. administration, Mayer
facilitated the diffusion of Pilot Project principles to individuals and organizations outside
the U.P. government in an effort to strengthen and grow the program beyond the
development areas. Mayer referred to this diffusion of Pilot Project methods and
experiences as “radiation.” In the Fourth Interim Report prepared for the U.P.
Development Commission on the progress of the Etawah Pilot Project Mayer explained,
It is too expensive of finance and personnel, to have all the necessary skills and experience in any one project. Close consultant inter-change and advice is essential, whether from government departments or outside; conversely, radiation of our own results as soon as we are sure of them, is essential for maximum utility of the project. (Mayer, 1950, June 27, p. 2)
156
Mayer considered the principle of “radiation” essential to the Pilot Project
because it provided a critical link between the experimental planning work taking place
in Etawah and the broader goal of improving villager welfare at the national scale in
coordination with India’s independence in the post-WWII context. Although the scope of
the Etawah Pilot Project was limited to roughly 100 villages in 1950, Mayer believed the
lessons learned at Etawah could be applied in other U.P. development programs and
inform subsequent national planning policies. His beliefs were supported by the
institutionalization of the program and expansion to 16,000 villages by 1952.
The radiation of Pilot Project methods and experience to individuals and
organizations outside the U.P. government was accomplished through the distribution of
a development-oriented news bulletin and site visits from outside personnel. The bi-
weekly news bulletin titled, Mandir Se, contained local news, announcements, and
explanations of work at the Pilot Project, and reports of development productivity
achievements.4 Publication of Mandir Se began in 1949 at the suggestion of American
agricultural economist, Dr. Arthur Mosher.5 The purpose of the news bulletin was to
generate interest in the operations at Etawah among rural villagers, to promote the
improved seeds and methods used in the project, and to offer reading material to
4 Distribution of the news bulletin began with about 1,000 free copies in 1949, and transitioned to a paid subscription publication in 1950. The number of paid subscribers grew from 100 within the project area to over 1,000 by 1951, with over 600 of those subscribers located outside the Pilot Project area (Mayer, 1951, June 27). Publication of the news bulletin lasted about 13 years (Singh, 1967).
5 At the time, Mosher was serving as Principal of the Allahabad Agricultural Institute, located just over 200 miles west of the Pilot Project headquarters. Mosher visited the Etawah Pilot Project a number of times and made recommendations to Mayer and the Pilot Project team at Mayer’s request (Mayer, 1949, Aug 13).
157
support the adult education program that had been initiated as part of the Social
Education Program (Mayer, 1949, Aug 13).
Arthur Mosher was one of many external experts that Mayer invited to visit the
Pilot Project in order to get critical feedback and guidance.6 Mayer used these visitors
from outside the project to serve as unofficial consultant advisors providing critical
feedback on the project operations. These unofficial consultant advisors helped to
share experiences at Etawah and spread the influence of Pilot Project principles to
outside organizations with interests in Indian development. In the Interim Report
prepared in the summer of 1950, Mayer specified three examples of Pilot Project
“radiation” to individuals and organizations outside Etawah (Mayer, 1950, June 27).
Mayer specified that the agricultural practices in the Pilot Project had been adopted by
two well-known Gandhian constructive workers who had visited the project at Etawah.
The Gandhian constructive workers utilized the agricultural practices to supplement
existing rural village work focused on cottage industries. Mayer also observed that the
Etawah Pilot Project training camps at Mahewa had been used to train workers from
other rural development projects with much success. Finally, Mayer described the U.P.
Development Commission practice of reassigning experienced Pilot Project personnel
to other rural development projects in U.P. in order to spread the influence of the
Etawah Pilot Project training methods. As a result, the experienced personnel at the
6 Other visitors included members of the Indian National Planning Commission such as R. K. Patil, and the Indian spiritual-political leader from the Deoria District, Baba Raghava Das (Mayer, 1950, June 27). Additional visitors included United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) members, R. L. Sethi of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), Dr. D. Spencer Hatch of the Martandam Rural Work in South India, research geneticist E. K. Jannaki-Ammal, and Cornell anthropologist Dr. Morris Opler.
158
Pilot Project were replaced by new recruits trained at the Mahewa headquarters in
Etawah thus increasing the number of workers trained in Pilot Project methods.
Expansion of the Pilot Development Project
The positive responses to the Etawah Pilot Project led to the expansion of the
program to four additional locations within three years of the project’s initiation (Figure
6-1). In 1950, the U.P. Development Commission initiated a second Pilot Project
location in the Gorakhpur district of U.P., approximately 300 miles east of Etawah. Like
Etawah, Mayer helped to select the district of Gorakhpur as the second project site
because it contained typical conditions with the potential to produce results that could
be used to guide subsequent development work in India.7
The U.P. Development Commission established the new Pilot Project at
Gorakhpur with Mayer’s assistance to replicate the principles tested at Etawah in order
to achieve similar improvements in agricultural production, environmental sanitation,
and villager participation. Similarities in socio-economic composition between Etawah
and Gorakhpur allowed for the Development Commission to replicate Etawah Pilot
Project methods with little variations in implementation or administration necessary to
carry out the work. However the Gorakhpur project differed from Etawah in one
significant respect. At Etawah, the even distribution of staff and resources was planned
to reach all the villages in the development area. Village Level Workers (VLWs) were
7 One of the selection criteria for the Pilot Projects was that the districts not exhibit high levels of social unrest between Hindu and Muslim villagers because this was believed to place constraints on development that would limit cooperation and voluntary participation. While Mayer offers no explicit explanation for the selection of Gorakhpur as the second location for the Pilot Project, certain criteria were likely important deciding factors in both Etawah and Gorakhpur, such as the opportunity to choose project personnel carefully due to lack of existing staff, neither especially advanced or difficult conditions, and a lack of social unrest.
159
assigned to every village in a development block to achieve saturation of development
assistance in 100% of villages.8 In the Gorakhpur project, the U.P. Development
Commission reduced expenditures for Pilot Project staff by assigning each VLW to
multiple dispersed villages throughout the development area. This modified approach
limited the distribution of development assistance to some villages in the district and
excluded others. The objective was to reduce costs by capitalizing on the effects of
“radiation” to spread Pilot Project principles to adjoining villages through the “interstitial
diffusion” of shared knowledge and resources (Mayer, 1951, June 27).
Figure 6-1. Map of the Pilot Development Project initiated by the U.P. Development
Commission 1948–1951.
8 Village Level Workers (VLWs) were members of the Pilot Project staff who were trained by Development Officers in agricultural methods at the project headquarters. These local residents of villages in the development districts then worked closely with the villagers as multipurpose workers and friends.
160
The Gaom-Ki-Aur news bulletin, similar to Mandir Se, facilitated the
dissemination of development knowledge and resources in Gorakhpur. The news
bulletin introduced new agricultural methods to villagers not receiving direct assistance
by VLWs in the development blocks. In addition, villagers from outside the development
area participated in sightseeing tours to agricultural lands to view examples of new
seeds and methods in progress. The distribution of the news bulletin and participation
in agricultural sightseeing tours led to an increase in the sale of improved seeds to
villagers outside the development blocks (Mayer, 1951, June 27).9
Mayer and the members of the U.P. Development Commission viewed the
Gorakhpur Pilot Project as a success. They recognized the dramatic increase in
agricultural production in Gorakhpur as a positive indicator of village improvement. In
fact, production increases in Gorakhpur exceeded the rate of production increases in
Etawah during the first year (Mayer, 1951, June 27). Mayer credited this rapid
production increase in Gorakhpur to the training of VLWs under the leadership of
seasoned Pilot Project personnel in the Etawah headquarters and the benefit of three
years’ experience in rural development tried first at Etawah.
Training for the Development Officers and Village Level Workers employed by
the Gorakhpur Pilot Project took place at the Etawah headquarters in Mahewa.
Therefore, the Gorakhpur Project benefited from the knowledge and experience
accumulated in the first year and a half of the Pilot Project resulting in greater
9 Agricultural development was an important component of Pilot Project methods. According to Mayer’s three-stage development plan, achievements in agricultural productivity developed villagers’ trust and participation by meeting the villagers’ most immediate needs to feed their families.
161
agricultural productivity as compared to the first year at Etawah (Mayer, 1951, June 27).
Accelerated agricultural productivity reinforced Pilot Project principles as potential
solutions to national development challenges.
Mayer considered adequately trained personnel the most important aspect of the
Pilot Project approach. He explained, “This is most important, and vastly more
efficacious than merely a plan based on the proved principles and methods” (Mayer,
1951, June 27, p. 2). Mayer believed that only those individuals with the appropriate
outlook and training could implement the Pilot Project methods, reinforcing his view that
the development process was the more important outcome as compared to the tangible
production outputs.
For Mayer, recruitment of capable personnel reflected a significant obstacle to
expanding the Pilot Project to other development districts in U.P. but transforming
development administration at the district and state levels to accommodate the Pilot
Project’s “inner democratization” approach represented the most challenging problem
(Mayer, 1950, July 2). Mayer found that success at Etawah occurred due to the unique
administrative framework he established that operated in isolation from the
organizational constraints of the U.P. Development Commission, representing a special
case implemented under Mayer’s guidance for the sake of exploring new methods.
With the expansion of the Pilot Project to new development blocks in 1950, Mayer
explained,
The big effort now is to try to convince enough important people of the necessity for some general and corollary specific changes in the whole administration system, so that such projects can flourish. …The fact is that I did not foresee this terrific implication when I first formulated and tackled our project. But now, I see our project like a small plant that somehow has found nurture in a small cleft in a rock. But it can’t exist
162
long that way. Either it grows to the point where its strength can split the face of the rock, or it will eventually wither. (Mayer, 1950, July 2, p. 6) As the Pilot Project expanded into new districts, Mayer struggled to influence the
development personnel selection process and to encourage on-site training at the
Etawah district. However, Mayer’s influence over the selection and training of
development personnel declined as the U.P. Development Commission obtained
greater control and responsibility for administration of the Pilot Project. When the U.P.
Development Commission initiated three new development blocks in 1951, Mayer’s
involvement in the selection of personnel was minimal (1951, July 23). In addition, the
new Pilot Project locations in the Azamgarh, Ballia, and Ghazipur districts exhibited
considerable environmental and social challenges that had been avoided in the
previous projects.10
In a newsletter from India Mayer reported that selection criteria for the Pilot
Project locations at Etawah and Gorakhpur differed from the criteria for the selection of
the three locations at Azamgarh, Ballia, and Ghazipur. Mayer explained,
Three more of these [Pilot Projects] have been started this summer, under some essential conditions that sharply differentiate them from the two main ones in Etawah and Gorakhpur. The original Pilot Project thesis was to take ‘average’ areas neither especially advanced or especially retarded or difficult. The three new areas were chosen for entirely different reasons. They are particularly backward and hitherto neglected. They do not have any but home-made shallow well or pond irrigation. There is a great deal of political unrest and lately, violence. A second difference is that in the first two projects we chose all our personnel as carefully as we could, from top to bottom. In these new cases, a good deal of the personnel is in place, and only part of it is our selection and creation. Lastly, the budgets are less but yet appreciably more than in non-Pilot
10 In contrast to the Etawah and Gorakhpur districts, which were chosen for their typical conditions, these three new districts were selected because they were particularly “backward” and neglected (Mayer, 1951, July 23). During his initial site visits during May and June of 1951, Mayer (1951, July 23) found that the areas selected for Pilot Project development in 1951 had no existing form of irrigation and exhibited a considerable amount of political tension and social unrest, including violence.
163
areas. I won’t go into the ins and outs, the major disadvantages and difficulties of such projects, the reasons why they seem worth doing, the new problems they raise, the set-back they may cause to our tradition of reasonable measure of success, what we are doing and propose to do, to overcome the difficulties and create positive conditions, etc., etc. That would get us into an excessively extensive shop discussion. (Mayer, 1951, July 23, p. 3)
As a result, Mayer was less certain about the outcomes of the Pilot Project in the
new locations stating,
The fact is that two connected dangers are inherent in these projects: that their reputation and accomplishments become recognized but not deeply understood, and that they spread too fast, by formula, without the trained personnel and systematic sustained concentrated approach and follow-through that are necessary; and that the feeling that they have already proved their case and can be easily and painlessly multiplied may take emphasis off them. (Mayer, 1951, July 23, p. 2)
Mayer feared that outsiders with a limited understanding of the unique characteristics of
the Pilot Project would attempt to replicate the Etawah model in new locations by
placing too much emphasis on production outputs and not enough emphasis on villager
initiative and cooperation. As the news of Pilot Project success traveled to the U.S.,
rural development soon became viewed as an opportunity for achieving U.S. foreign
policy interests involving the spread of democratic processes. As a result, Mayer’s
fears caused by an over-emphasis on outputs and an under-emphasis on villager
behavior came to fruition.
U.S. Aid for Indian Development Planning
In 1951, the U.S. media including Time magazine, Life magazine, and The New
York Times began to report on the accomplishments in rural development at the Etawah
164
Pilot Project.11 In addition, the Pilot Project caught the notice of important U.S decision
makers including Ford Foundation President Paul Hoffman. Hoffman strongly
supported a program of U.S. technical assistance and aid to India in order to strengthen
the spread of democracy to the developing world. At a presentation to the 20th annual
meeting of the New York Herald Tribune in October 1951, Hoffman advocated for U.S.
aid to India totaling $2,000,000 per year to promote rural development replicating the
successes of the Etawah Pilot Project including increases in agricultural production and
living standards (“Foreign-aid fund urged by Hoffman”, 1951).
Under Hoffman’s leadership, the Ford Foundation established an agreement with
the Indian Ministry of Agriculture to award $1,200,000 in grants for the implementation
15 Pilot Extension Projects throughout India beginning in April 1952 (Ford Foundation,
1955). Lasting three years, these Pilot Extension Projects reflected the influence of the
successes at Etawah but differed in substance. The Pilot Extension Projects focused
explicitly on agricultural education and development, with some contributions by Indian
State agencies to supply additional health, education, and public works resources. By
focusing specifically on agricultural development, the Pilot Extension Projects identified
how quickly increases in crop yields could be obtained through the introduction of
improved methods, seeds, and fertilizers. The Pilot Extension Projects were motivated
by the need to demonstrate immediate increases in food crops with U.S. technologies
and assistance.
11 Mayer (1952, June 16) believed the U.S. media misrepresented the Pilot Project in order to boost American opinion of U.S. aid in India and this misrepresentation negatively influenced Indian’s perceptions of American interventions.
165
While the Ford Foundation coordinated the 15 Pilot Extension Projects with the
Ministry of Agriculture and Indian State agricultural departments, the Indian Planning
Commission devised a rural development program of its own.
A National Program of Community Development and Extension
In 1951, the Indian Planning Commission, eager to administer a national
development program to help the country become self-sufficient in food production,
initiated the First Five-Year Plan (Plan). The Plan included rural agricultural
development designed to eliminate food imports, increase nutrition levels, and improve
the quality of village life (Planning Commission, Government of India, 1951). Lessons
learned from previous rural planning projects influenced members of the Indian
Planning Commission to combine agricultural development with coordinated educational
and social programming. Accordingly, the First Five-Year Plan introduced new
development initiatives based on principles from comprehensive rural planning projects
including the Etawah Pilot Project.12
Mayer was not directly involved in the Indian Planning Commission, but his work
at the state level with the U.P. Development Commission lent credibility to his voice as
an experienced planner in Indian rural development. During the initial review stages of
the Plan, Mayer wrote to Deputy Secretary of the Indian Planning Commission, Tarlok
12 In a summary of the Etawah Pilot Project’s influence on the Community Development Program, Indian Planning Commission member R. K. Patel explained, “The Community Projects program was conceived on the experience gained on the Etawah Project. The only difference was that the American aid enabled finances to be more plentiful than what they had been for the Etawah Project” (1955, p. 5).
166
Singh,13 with his recommendations for the national development plan.14 In the letter,
Mayer reinforced the message he gave to Prime Minister Nehru in 1945 when he first
suggested the Pilot Project. He warned Singh not to overburden existing
administrations and organizations with new responsibilities but encouraged him to find
out what could be achieved by looking at existing rural development programs in India.
This strategy reflected Mayer’s experience in the U.S. Greenbelt Town program in
which existing projects informed broader national plans and model communities.15
When the time came to develop India’s first national planning policy, members of the
Indian Planning Commission looked to existing projects as Mayer suggested.
Introduced by the Indian Planning Commission in 1951, the First Five-Year Plan
established a “Community Development and Rural Extension” program incorporating
findings from preexisting rural development projects, including those Mayer reviewed at
Etawah and Gorakhpur.16 The Plan’s principles were drawn from eight “broad
conclusions” the Planning Commissioners identified in the existing projects (Planning
13 Mayer considered Tarlok Singh his first friend in India (Mayer, 1956, Oct 22). Jawaharlal Nehru introduced them in October 1946, during Mayer’s initial visit to India. The two became friends when Singh gave Mayer a tour at Nehru’s request. Mayer and Singh continued to correspond and meet regularly during Mayer’s annual visits to India.
14 The Indian Planning Commission produced a “Draft Outline of the Plan” in July 1951 to encourage public discussion and comment.
15 Mayer indicated that his experience in the U.S. New Deal Program influenced his proposal to Jawaharlal Nehru in an article published in The Survey in 1949.
16 Chapter 15 of the First Five-Year Plan outlined the “Community Development and Rural Extension” program. The first section of the chapter, titled “Basic Principles,” listed the names of existing Indian development projects that influenced the Planning Commission. The Plan states, “If one goes back to the study of the efforts made before World War II in individual Provinces and States and considers, the experience gained in later years in Sevagram in Madhua Pradesh, in the Firka Development scheme in Madras, in Sarvodaya centers in Bombay, in Etawah and Gorakhpur in Uttar Pradesh and other centers which are perhaps less well known, certain broad conclusions emerge” (1951, chapter 15, para. 3). The broad conclusions drawn from these existing programs provided the substance of the “Community Development and Rural Extension” program’s Basic Principles in the First Five-Year Plan.
167
Commission, Government of India, 1951). These conclusions incorporated the
following findings:
Coordinate government activities so that information relayed to the villagers comes from a single government representative called the Village Level Worker.
Encourage the people’s voluntary cooperation rather than forcing new methods upon them.
Allow villagers to take ownership of the programs and assume responsibility for their own accomplishments. To achieve this, development staff must assist and guide the villagers rather than undertake the work themselves.
Reduce chronic unemployment through the development of scientific agriculture and cottage industries.
Establish reliable distribution of seeds, fertilizers, and other resources through state and district administrators.
Support intensive programs that involve the cooperation of every agriculturalist in the village.
Engage the villager in work that is framed in his own experiences and solutions presented in a simple, unaffected manner. Delay the introduction of elaborate techniques and equipment until the villager is ready for them.
Arouse and sustain villager participants’ enthusiasm around a central purpose to create a desire within the people for a higher standard of living. These findings provided the foundation for the Community Development Projects
introduced in the Plan. The primary focus of the Community Development Projects
included the expansion of irrigation systems, construction and expansion of roads,
increased educational and training opportunities, health initiatives to improve water
supplies, sanitation and disease control, supplementary employment opportunities
through the expansion of cottage industries such as brick kilns and saw mills,
demonstrations and training in improved housing construction techniques, training of
Village Level Workers and Development Officers, and recreational programming to
168
improve villagers’ social welfare (Planning Commission, Government of India, 1951).
Implementation of the Community Development Project activities was supported by U.S.
Point IV technical assistance and Ford Foundation grants.
Implementation of the National Planning Policy
The proposed Community Development Projects launched on October 2, 1952,
the birthday of the late Indian spiritual and freedom movement leader, Mahatma
Gandhi. In the first year, the Indian Planning Commission introduced 55 new
Community Development Projects, each covering approximately 300 villages and
150,000 acres. Implementation of the projects coincided with the expansion of the
Technical Cooperation Agreement between India and the U.S., which introduced the
Indo-American Technical Cooperation fund allocating $50 million U.S. dollars to support
mutually agreed upon programs, including the Community Development Projects.
The Ford Foundation shared the U.S. State Department’s interest in
strengthening rural development projects as a means of spreading the influence of
democracy to India and supported training for Community Development Projects
personnel (Ford Foundation, 1955). The agency financed the construction of 34 training
centers that conducted six-month sessions for VLWs. Further, it provided additional
grants to five agricultural colleges in India, including the Allahabad Agricultural Institute
run by Arthur Mosher, which developed extension departments initially opened in 1952.
The Indian Central Government established the Community Projects
Administration in 1952 to administer the Community Development Projects under the
direction of the Indian Planning Commission. The Community Projects Administration
and its leading Administrator planned, directed and coordinated the projects with the
State Development Commission, comprised of the State Chief Minister and State
169
Development Commissioner (Figure 6-2). These individuals oversaw the functions of
the District Development Boards consisting of the District Magistrate/Collector, District
Development Officer, and other officers from related development departments.
Directed by the Project Executive Officer, the Community Development Projects
were further organized into development blocks. Each project contained three
development blocks each under the direction of a Block Development Officer. Each
development block contained about 100 villages divided into ten groups of ten villages.
One VLW managed each group of ten villages (Figure 6-2).
Figure 6-2. Community Development Projects organization and administration.
170
The decentralization of development administration to Development Bock
Officers and Village Level Workers reflects the influence of Mayer’s Inner Pilot Project
administration framework. The District Development Officers played key roles in
facilitating the allocation of resources and technical assistance through the assignment
of Agricultural Extension Agents to the development blocks. These Agents served as
district-level advisors, providing technical assistance geared towards increasing the
area of cultivatable lands, preventing soil erosion, expanding irrigation systems,
improving the quality of livestock, and introducing improved seeds, fertilizers, and
implements (Planning Commission, Government of India, 1951). Combined with a
social education component, these efforts mirrored the Pilot Projects at Etawah and
Gorakhpur by expanding primary and secondary education, as well as vocational
training.17 The social education component included education, recreation, and social
activities such as sports and fairs.
The coordination of agricultural and social education activities in the Community
Development Projects reflected the principles of development outlined in the Plan.
However, the social education activities required significantly more funding than
agricultural extension education alone. In an effort to broaden development assistance
by reducing costs, the Indian Planning Commission introduced a new development
17 The Community Development Projects also included an initiative administered by the Health Organization in each development area to improve environmental sanitation and protect water supplies, to promote sanitary waste practices, and to prevent the spread of epidemic diseases through medical aid, education, and improved nutrition. The Health Organization consisted of three primary health units located in each of the development blocks, with a central health unit including a hospital and mobile dispensary located at the project headquarters. The projects also included cottage and small-scale industries such as brick kilns, in addition to training and demonstration programs on rural housing construction techniques.
171
program focused specifically on agricultural extension in 1953, without the social
education activities.
National Extension Service
The Indian Planning Commission launched a second component of the national
development plan on October 2, 1953, with the introduction of the National Extension
Service. The program sought to dramatically broaden the scope of rural development to
reach every village in India within a ten-year period (Planning Commission, Government
of India, 1951). These development projects supplemented existing Community
Development Projects and provided a less intensive form of intervention based on
agricultural extension at a reduced cost. According to the Ford Foundation (1955), the
National Extension Service development blocks were directly influenced by the Pilot
Extension Projects introduced by a joint effort of the Indian Ministry of Agriculture and
the Ford Foundation. The Ford Foundation financed the Pilot Extension Projects from
April 1952–March 31, 1954, when they were incorporated into the National Extension
Service.
The Indian Planning Commission initiated the National Extension Service with
251 development blocks in the first year (Planning Commission, Government of India,
1956). After a period of one to two years, some National Extension Service
development blocks that had demonstrated substantial progress temporarily
transitioned to the more comprehensive Community Development Projects for a three-
year period. This transition sequence became the norm, and by 1956, all development
projects were initiated as National Extension Service blocks with the possibility of
transitioning to Community Development Projects.
172
Between 1952 and 1956, the Indian Planning Commission introduced 300 new
Community Development Projects and 900 National Extension Service blocks (Planning
Commission, Government of India, 1956). In U.P., the number of new Community
Development Projects annually ranged from six projects in 1952 to 30 projects in 1956,
and the number of National Extension Service blocks ranged from 40 blocks in 1953 to
158 in 1956 (Mayer, 1958). In addition, the U.P. continued to fund and administer the
five Pilot Project locations at Etawah, Gorakhpur, Azamgarh, Ballia, and Ghazipur.
Mayer’s Role in Community Development and Extension in Uttar Pradesh
Between 1951 and 1958, Mayer advised the U.P. government on the expansion
and implementation of Pilot Projects, Community Development Projects, and National
Extension Service development blocks. In his annual progress reports for the U.P.
Development Commission Mayer warned that inadequate numbers of personnel,
insufficient training procedures, and weaknesses in government administration were
limiting the effectiveness of the Community Development and National Extension
Service Projects.
Mayer submitted three progress reports to the U.P. Development Commission
between 1953 and 1955. In the first progress report, Mayer argued that the Community
Development Projects were too broad in scope and suffered from inadequately trained
project staff (Mayer, 1953, April 26). He recommended that the projects be simplified to
focus on the most immediate needs of villagers and that some components of the
program, such as establishing schools and hiring teachers, should be postponed until
the second year. He also criticized the social education programs, citing that too much
emphasis had been placed on activities and not enough emphasis had been placed on
the “service element” of rural development (Mayer, 1953, April 26). Mayer’s
173
assessments found that new information and opportunities introduced through
development and extension education did not effectively engage villager cooperation
and acceptance of new methods.
After the introduction of the National Extension Service in October 1953, Mayer’s
criticisms of the rapid expansion of rural development work in U.P. intensified. During
the first year of the program Mayer sent two impromptu reports on the problems of
National Extension in U.P. to Development Commissioner Adit Jha (Mayer, 1954, Feb
19). Mayer noted that only ten of the 40 National Extension Service blocks had Block
Development Officers, and even those in place lacked the necessary administrative
support from the District level for effective implementation in the field. Mayer also
strongly opposed the reduction in training for development personnel to only three
months, and he urged Jha to increase training by at least one month to include a field
study and apprenticeship in an existing development project. Mayer believed that rapid
implementation compromised the quality of development programs by reducing the time
and expenditure devoted to hiring and training personnel.
In his second progress report submitted in 1954, Mayer outlined three immediate
measures for improving rural development (Mayer, 1954, May 31). The first
recommendation addressed the persistent personnel training problem by pressing for
more selective recruitment of staff and better incentives to attract and retain quality
workers. Mayer also observed that the VLWs were stretched too thin and
recommended a 50% increase in the number of workers in each development block.
The second recommendation concerned deficiencies in supply lines, which Mayer
believed were weakening villagers’ confidence in the projects. He advised that an
174
Assistant Development Officer be appointed for each project with the specific
responsibility of coordinating resource supply and distribution from various departments
to the villages. Finally, Mayer warned that the Community Development and National
Extension Service projects focused too narrowly on agricultural production, which
limited the benefits of development to land-owning classes. Mayer believed that a
broader share of the rural population would benefit from development if the Indian
Planning Commission placed renewed emphasis on cottage industries. In 1954, Mayer
argued that this lack of support for cottage industries resulted in uneven distribution of
development benefits and neglected the needs of India’s landless laborers. This
concern for landless laborers became India’s primary focus (Mayer, 1954, May 26).
By the following year, Mayer reported some progress in the areas of project
administration and cottage industries (Mayer, 1955, April 21).18 However, Mayer’s
dominant concern that the less-intensive National Extension Service blocks were doing
little more than introducing new technologies persisted. In his third progress report,
Mayer reiterated that development work moved forward too rapidly and that an
insufficient number of experienced development staff existed to implement the important
task of working directly with the villagers while cooperating with various levels of
government. Mayer explained, “We cannot achieve the regenerating effects that we
hope will result from Development as embodied in [the National Extension Service]
18 A new policy of promotions had been adopted in which Project Executive Officers considered Village Level Workers for promotion to Assistant Development Officers, and Assistant Development Officers for promotion to Development Officers. In addition, the number of teaching personnel in the training camps had increased, and new brick kilns introduced in some of the development blocks improved rural labor work opportunities.
175
unless we have an adequate number of workers and set a really high standard of
personnel and performance” (Mayer, 1955, April 21, p. 5).
In the summer of 1954, Mayer decided that something more had to be done. In
addition to his progress report to the U.P. Development Commission, Mayer bypassed
the U.P. State government and wrote a “red-hot letter, a really tough mincing-no-words
letter,” and sent it to the Indian central administration in New Delhi (Mayer, 1954,
March–April, p. 3). Mayer felt a sense of relief after having sent the letter, but held little
hope for its impact on National Extension Service program reforms. However, Mayer
noted that the letter did cause a stir, relaying in his newsletter to colleagues,
The letter was circulated in all high quarters concerned, with a request for close consideration. But in effect, the decision to do in 5 years what cannot genuinely be done in 5 years is not being changed. Some good has come of it, in some detailed ways, and some people think it will still detonate into the main objective. I don’t, at least not for now, and probably not until too late. (Mayer, 1954, March–April, p. 3-4) This disappointing realization combined with Mayer’s sense of loss over the
changes in personnel at the state level. By the summer of 1955, Mayer was working
with a new Chief Minister, a new Minister of Planning, an additional Development
Commissioner, and all but one new Deputy Development Commissioner.19 Mayer also
became increasingly disillusioned with government service and in 1955 he entertained
thoughts of leaving government work to focus exclusively on non-governmental projects
in India, such as those administered by the United Nations Expanded Program of
Technical Cooperation.20
19 Mayer learned that changes in administration were commonplace in India and that officers were often promoted to new positions, including former Chief Minister Pant who moved to the central administration to serve as the Minister of Home Affairs in 1955.
20 Established by the United Nations in July 1950, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance coordinated the financing of international development projects by participating agencies including the
176
At the time, Mayer already had experience working with the United Nations,
preparing two pamphlets on self-help housing and construction in India and the
selection criteria for planners and specialists working in developing countries in the
1950s.21 In 1952, Mayer coordinated with the United Nations Expanded Program of
Technical Assistance to help the Indian government secure aid for the Damodar Valley
Corporation.22 Mayer also worked with U.S. philanthropic organizations including the
Ford Foundation, which provided the grant to the Allahabad Agricultural Institute used to
commission the Mayer and Whittlesey firm to produce the new campus master plan in
1950. In addition, Mayer advanced the idea of a state planning research center in U.P.
and helped to acquire funding from the Rockefeller Foundation for the introduction of
the Planning Research and Action Institute in 1954.23
Mayer considered his work establishing the Planning Research and Action
Institute (PRAI) his most important contribution to Indian planning since Etawah (Mayer,
United Nations itself, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were also associated with the activities of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance but were not official participants (Von Goeckingk, 1955). Under the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, developing countries appealed to the Technical Assistance Board or participating agencies for technical assistance on programs directly related to economic development. Funding for these programs came from the central fund comprised of voluntary donations by U.N. member nations. The largest contributor to the U.N. Expanded Program of Technical Assistance in the 1950s was the United States.
21 Mayer prepared the first pamphlet, “Self-help Housing and Construction: Some Experiences in India,” for the U.N. in 1951. The second pamphlet titled, “Application of Planning Techniques in Less Developed Areas; Effect of Specific Personnel Qualities on their Potential Impact,” was prepared for the Housing and Town and Country Section of the Department of Social Affairs at the United Nations in 1953.
22 The Indian Central Government established the Damodar Valley Corporation in 1948 to develop the first hydro-electric plan on the Damodar River in Bihar and West Bengal.
23 The Rockefeller Foundation first introduced a grant for the School of Tropical Medicine in Calcutta in 1916 and continued to provide support for medical, agricultural, and humanities institutions and programs throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Gordon, 1997).
177
1953, April 29). He initially introduced the idea of a planning research center in U.P. to
Chief Minister Pant in 1946, but no funding was available to support the project. In
1953, Mayer attempted to revive the concept again and appealed to Warren Weaver,
Director of the Division of Natural Sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation, who provided
a grant to the U.P. government to establish the institute (Mayer, 1954, May 26).
The PRAI was founded in Lucknow on May 1, 1954. It was administered by the
U.P. Planning Commission under the direction of former Etawah Pilot Project District
Planning Officer, Dhyan Pal Singh. The purpose of the Institute was to conduct
research on planning policies, to administer controlled experiments in the field in order
to evaluate the feasibility of innovative development methods, to assess the strengths
and weaknesses of ongoing development work, to conduct seminars, conferences, and
training courses for specialized workers, and to publish and disseminate research
findings with a reference library for use by government officers and field workers
(Mayer, 1958).
In an explanation of the Institute’s importance to Indian development Mayer
wrote,
I personally feel that this new Center or Institute is much the biggest and most significant and in a way revolutionary step in this part of the world since the Etawah Project was accepted and activated. Research is certainly not new here. But it is generally remote. There is little or no inter-play between the researchers and the field men–there is indifference, or maybe hostility, or at least there are no free and unclogged channels between them. (Mayer, 1954, March 25, p. 2) The functions of the PRAI were remarkably similar to the activities of the housing
research and education organization that he co-founded in the U.S. called the Housing
Study Guild. Mayer’s work with the Guild between 1933 and 1935 included housing
178
studies, a central library, and collaborations with planners and housing advocates to
discuss housing issues, innovations, and opportunities to improve U.S. housing policy,
similar to the way the PRAI contributed to development research and policy in India.
The primary field laboratory for the Institute was the Etawah Pilot Project, which
operated under the control of the PRAI beginning in 1954. As a result, the Pilot Project
continued to function as an experiment in rural development, fulfilling its primary
objective of producing new methods and experiments to inform development planning in
India on a broader scale. By the late 1950s however, the Indian Planning Commission
was moving in a new direction towards development that de-emphasized the
importance of Pilot Project principles and focused more exclusively on agricultural
production.
Shift in Development Strategy
The Pilot Project lasted until 1958, at which time the U.P. Development
Commission discontinued the comprehensive planning approach Mayer introduced as
an experiment in producing best practices in community development, and the Etawah
Pilot Project transitioned to a National Extension Service development block. This
discontinuation of the Pilot Project resulted in a decline in funding and services for
participating villagers. The same year, the U.P. government informed Mayer that his
services as consultant advisor could no longer be afforded, and he was relieved of his
responsibilities to the U.P. Development Commission.24 In a letter from India Mayer
explained,
24 Mayer continued to advise the U.P. Development Commission and worked with the PRAI from 1958-1960. The Ford Foundation also commissioned him to participate in a program of technical cooperation that resulted in the Delhi Master Plan of 1962.
179
In the first place, I had word from the U.P. Government before going over that they felt they could no longer afford the foreign exchange for my consulting services. After twelve years of service, I must say I quite agreed with them. (Mayer, 1958, April 16, p. 10)
This change in U.P. administration reflected broader shifts in development
priority in the Indian Central Government. By 1957, a special report of the Foodgrains
Enquiry Committee within the Indian Ministry of Food and Agriculture indicated that
cultivation yields were falling short of projected targets outlined in the Second Five-Year
Plan (Ford Foundation, 1959). Coupled with anticipated population increases, the lower
than expected yields pointed to an impending food shortage crisis that the Indian
Central Government intended to avoid by prioritizing agricultural development in all the
Community Development and National Extension Service Projects. In anticipation of
preparing the Third Five-Year Plan, the Indian Central Government also engaged the
Agricultural Production Team of American specialists financed by the Ford Foundation
to recommend strategies to increase food crop production.
The Agricultural Production Team prepared a report outlining recommendations
to intensify agricultural production as an emergency measure for preventing famine in
1959. The recommendations, incorporated into the Third Five-Year Plan as the
Intensive Agricultural District Program, emphasized advances in agricultural science
from the West, including the use of chemical fertilizers and stabilization of farm prices
that were later described as the “Green Revolution.” The new intensive strategy was
designed to re-orient existing Community Development and Extension Projects to focus
on production through the adoption of modern farming methods from the U.S.
180
Translation of Pilot Project Principles
Institutionalization of rural development in the First Five-Year Plan resulted in the
rapid duplication of Pilot Project principles to hundreds of Community Development and
National Extension Service blocks in U.P. The process of institutionalization was
characterized by an urgent need to improve economic and social conditions in rural
villages and by an influx of U.S. technical assistance and bilateral aid. Implementation
of the national plan required new administrative frameworks and responsibilities for
Development Officers and Village Level Workers. These inter-related factors influenced
the translation of Pilot Project Principles in the postcolonial Indian context.
The introduction of U.S. technical assistance and bilateral aid in the 1950s
resulted in the introduction of new foreign stakeholders in Indian development.
American agricultural technicians introduced to India through the Ford Foundation and
the Point IV program were motivated by the mandate to produce immediate tangible
results in order to support the U.S. foreign policy objectives of propagating democracy
in the developing world.
The demands to dramatically increase agricultural production and demonstrate
immediate tangible results coming from Indian leaders and stakeholders in the U.S.
resulted in the prioritization of quantitative outputs that devalued the innovative social,
administrative, and organizational frameworks that Mayer had introduced in the early
stages of the Etawah Pilot Project. On a return visit to the Etawah Pilot Project in the
summer of 1959, Mayer found that much of the original “administrative-spiritual” impact
established during his involvement in the operations and administration of rural
181
development was on the decline.25 In Mayer’s last newsletter from India in 1959, he
reported with regret that the administration of rural development by Indian
administrators and foreign technicians reflected the “old” system of governance from the
colonial period. Mayer explained,
It does not appear to me that there has been any serious radical overturn of the administrative mechanism and relationships and, maybe more critical of mutual attitudes. The new social-economic push, if it is to be successful, must be damn near revolutionary in the sense of a forward-pressing dynamic and at the pace of growingly aware people. The attempt is being made to carry it out, within the framework of an administrative system that is essentially static and circumscribed by checks and balances and seniorities, by up-down relationships that do not encourage the initiative of the down-side, and of clogged communications upward, hence of clogged incentive. The system itself is still, roughly, the same system, with some changes resulting from hattering [sic] away at it by a few persistent determined individuals. Changes do occur, but are relatively minor, narrow and slow. (Mayer, 1959, May 21, p. 3) In addition, the influx of U.S. experts and foreign agricultural extension advisors
in the 1950s undermined the change in administrative attitude that led to the successful
results at Etawah in which Pilot Project staff operated as government service workers.
Mayer criticized representatives from the United Nations and the Ford Foundation in
India that operated under the conventional hierarchies in which foreign advisors
disengaged themselves from the villagers. Mayer wrote,
I have come more and more to feel that the condition I am referring to, which could in fact prove a fatal one, will not be altered from within sufficiently under present circumstances. The system is too entrenched, and those top people responsible for it are too unaware of the serious inadequacy of it, with a sort of built-in unawareness. (Mayer, 1959, May 21, p. 4)
25 Mayer wrote, “Some of that experience and vision of inner democratization locally still remains. But I must recognize regretfully–though this last time I have not been in close personal contact–that much of it has begun to disappear, has receded” (Mayer, 1959, May 21, p. 4).
182
In fact, Mayer hoped to see changes in administration and implementation of
development operations at the national development planning level. Mayer had grown
increasingly appreciative of traditional village culture during his visits in India. His
experience transformed him, and increasingly he attempted to integrate the knowledge
and expectations of villagers and staff members into his principles for Indian
development planning. Mayer became increasingly committed to India’s traditional
societies and advocated for modernization of government administration at the same
time that same Indian government sought to modernize society while concurrently
preserving imbedded patterns of hierarchy and authority inherited from administrations
of colonial government.
The outcomes of the Etawah Pilot Project point to the conflicted priorities of the
Indian government following decolonization. The Indian development programs of the
1950s reflect the tensions between the preservation of indigenous Indian identity as a
non-Western society and the concurrent objectives for achieving modernization to
obtain economic self-sufficiency. Planners in the Indian Central Government translated
Pilot Project principles introduced by Mayer to achieve national economic goals,
resulting in new dependencies on foreign technology and aid from the West. In Chapter
7 the outcomes of the Pilot Project are evaluated in relation to postcolonial planning
theory to identify findings that strengthen interpretations of transnational planning
histories in post-WWII India. Findings of the study point to Mayer’s transformative role
in the diffusion of Western planning in post-WWII India.
183
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
The Etawah Pilot Project case study examines transnational planning flows
immediately following the Second World War (WWII). The diffusion of Western ideas
and practices from individual planners within new and disparate contexts characterizes
planning during this period. Albert Mayer played an instrumental role in bringing
Western planning principles to post-WWII India through the Etawah Pilot Project. Mayer
drew from his formative years in the U.S. as a practicing engineer, architect, and
planner to shape his initial approach. Mayer’s strategies for postwar Indian planning
were shaped by an ethos of normative regionalism that he shared with a network of like-
minded planners and theorists affiliated with the Regional Planning Association of
America (RPAA).1 For Mayer, normative regionalism provided the theoretical
framework for introducing a program of rural development in post-WWII India that
broadened the humanitarian goals of the RPAA and leaders in the Indian government to
achieve improved standards of welfare for India’s economically disadvantaged rural
villagers.
Following WWII, India’s imminent Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru offered Mayer
the unique opportunity to implement a program of rural development in Uttar Pradesh
(U.P.) that tested the applicability of Western planning principles in the postcolonial
context. Implementation of the Pilot Project in Etawah, U.P. from 1948–1958 introduced
modern techniques to improve villager welfare in accordance with traditional Indian
values and resulted in development principles that were incorporated into India’s first
1 See also Banerjee (2009).
184
national planning policy in 1951. In 1952, the First Five-Year Plan produced by the
Indian Planning Commission introduced Community Development and National
Extension Service programs modeled in part on the Pilot Project. The implementation
of Mayer’s Pilot Project principles through the Community Development and National
Extension Service programs was supported by U.S. bilateral aid and technical
assistance.
During the ten years of Pilot Project operation, Mayer succeeded in translating
Western planning principles to respond to Indian villagers’ local needs and
expectations. Following the institutionalization of Plot Project principles within the
Indian Planning Commission’s First Five-Year Plan, the Indian Planning Commission
further translated these principles to meet the objectives of the Indian Central
Government and the U.S. State Department. The process of institutionalization and
adaptation of these development strategies to meet expedited agricultural production
targets compromised the focus on steady and long-term villager welfare improvements
that had been a key component of the Pilot Project.
The travelling history of how Mayer introduced and translated the fundamental
planning principles conceived in the U.S. to suit the post-WWII Indian context provide
the basis for this analysis. A summary of findings in the interpretive-historical narrative
presents a holistic and illuminative evaluation of the Etawah Pilot Project as a significant
example of post-WWII transnational planning.2 These findings are discussed and
2 Kumar (2005) writes that the primary objective of holistic and illuminative evaluations is to describe and interpret a program in all its aspects. Instead of evaluating a program for the purposes of measuring results or predicting future outcomes, the holistic and illuminative analysis focuses on how a program is implemented, how it responds to contextual factors, how individuals involved in the program view its success, and the experiences of individuals participating in the program.
185
compared to other recent studies on Mayer’s planning experience to identify
correlations and contradictions with existing knowledge in order to strengthen the
transnational planning discourse. Finally, recommendations for additional research
suggest continued discussion of Mayer’s contributions to transnational planning history.
Summary of Findings
The Etawah Pilot Project of community development introduced a dynamic
program of integrated social, economic, and physical planning founded on the principles
of Western planning ideology and practice. Over a period of 12 years, Albert Mayer and
Indian planning administrators translated and adapted the program to address the
immediate planning needs of post-WWII India. The translation process reflects Mayer’s
sensitivity to India’s traditional village culture and his role as an advisor to U.P. Chief
Minister Pant and the U.P. Development Commission.
Mayer’s capacity for understanding the unique circumstances of post-WWII
Indian planning, recognizing the value of indigenous sources of knowledge and working
collaboratively within networks of politicians, planners, and institutions contributed to the
early success of the Pilot Project and provided the foundation for the Indian Planning
Commission’s Community Development Projects. Mayer’s unique approach to planning
in the postcolonial context demonstrated his enduring commitment to preserve the
values and identity of India’s traditional village culture in spite of mounting pressures
from the Indian Central Government and U.S. stakeholders to modernize agrarian
societies to achieve more immediate outputs in agricultural development.
Early Influences
Mayer acquired his commitment to life-long learning and sense of civic
responsibility during his formative years in the Mayer household. Mayer’s parents,
186
Bernhard and Sophia Mayer, imparted the importance of education to each of their
children and set an example of philanthropy through their active participation and
financial support of their community. Members of the Mayer family actively engaged in
communities of professional practice with members from the construction and real
estate industries, creating the foundation for Mayer’s subsequent involvement in
professional organizations and advocacy groups including the RPAA and the Housing
Study Guild.
As a member of the professional planning community in the 1930s, Mayer
participated in critical discourse on the issues of community planning and design,
housing policy, and urban renewal. He also served as a principal architect for the U.S.
Greenbelt Town of Greenbrook, New Jersey. These opportunities provided Mayer with
the professional experience necessary to institute a program of community development
in post-WWII India and an orientation to planning issues from a framework of normative
regionalism.
Throughout his service as U.P. Rural Development Advisor, Mayer maintained
close affiliations with his professional networks in the U.S. Between 1948 and 1952,
Mayer was active in the reconvened RPAA, renamed the Regional Development
Council of America (RDCA), and in 1949 presented a lecture on planning in India that
was attended by RDCA members Clarence Stein, Lewis Mumford, Catherine Bauer,
Benton MacKaye, and others (Regional Development Council of America, 1949).
Mayer also established new professional networks in the Indian context to ensure
the effective administration of the Etawah Pilot Project. Perhaps most significantly,
Mayer established friendships and professional connections with Indian citizens during
187
his service in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that led to his introduction to Jawaharlal
Nehru in 1945. When Mayer arrived in India to serve as the Rural Development Advisor
of U.P. in 1946, Nehru helped him to expand his network of Indian leaders by arranging
personal meetings with members of his trusted cabinet and allies including an
introduction to Indian spiritual leader Mahatma Gandhi.
Throughout his term as U.P. Rural Development Advisor, Mayer expanded and
fortified his professional networks in the U.S. and India with planners, political leaders,
and other contacts in international development agencies. Between 1946 and 1958,
Mayer expertly navigated these professional networks to acquire support and solicit
feedback for the Pilot Project, share the progress of the Pilot Project, and advocate for
certain planning initiatives with members of the U.P. Development Commission and the
Indian Planning Commission.
Mayer also drew from his background as an innovative and collaborative planner
to guide his international planning endeavors as a Western planner working in the post-
WWII context. Through the Etawah Pilot Project, Mayer sought to unite Western
planning techniques to improve villager welfare with the villagers’ traditional values and
beliefs. In order to do so, Mayer reformed his initial proposal to Jawaharlal Nehru for a
model villages program and created a new program of development that drew from both
Western and indigenous planning experiences.
Travelling History
Mayer’s professional experience as an architect and planner in the U.S.
Greenbelt Town program influenced his proposal to Jawaharlal Nehru for a model
villages program during their first meeting in October of 1945. Mayer’s
recommendations to Nehru were designed to assist the Indian National Congress Party
188
demonstrate best practices in the physical planning of villages while preserving the
identity of traditional village culture. Mayer envisioned that these recommendations
could be used to inform a national program of community development following India’s
independence from colonial rule (Mayer, 1949).
Once he arrived in India to formalize the program, Mayer recognized the urgent
need to adapt his preconceived strategies to suit the distinct social and cultural contexts
of rural U.P. In 1946, Mayer integrated new sources of knowledge and experience in
Indian planning to inform the Pilot Project development strategies. At the suggestion of
Indian spiritual leader Mahatma Gandhi, Mayer toured the rural villages of U.P. to get
acquainted with village conditions and the traditional cultures rooted in a subsistence
agriculture economy. He also surveyed existing rural development programs conducted
by U.S. Christian missionaries Bill and Charlotte Wiser, and the work of Gandhian
constructive worker Dhiren Mazumdar at the Renewa Ashram.
These interactions with Western and indigenous sources of knowledge
influenced Mayer’s rural planning strategy and led him to recognize the importance of
villager-staff interaction at the local level and the importance of cottage industries in
improving the welfare of landless laborers. In response to growing awareness of
villager-staff interactions and the importance of cottage industries, Mayer introduced a
new administrative framework for rural development that decentralized leadership to
include village leaders and district-level training centers. He also introduced the
position of the Rural Life Analyst, a sociologist who interacted with villager participants
to gauge their acceptance of Pilot Project methods and staff members. This new
189
administrative framework enriched the Pilot Project with knowledge from villager
participants and guided development operations in more responsive ways.
After a period of two years, the U.P. Development Commission viewed the Pilot
Project as a success based on the tremendous increase in agricultural production rates,
exceeding initial targets. More importantly to Mayer and other members of the original
Pilot Project team including U.P. Agricultural Advisor Horace Holmes and Rural Life
Analyst Rudra Dutt Singh, the Pilot Project successfully engaged the villagers through
voluntary participation in Pilot Project operations and through self-help programs in
agricultural development, social education, and cooperative village improvements.
By 1951, visible improvements in the Etawah Pilot Project led to the replication of
the program to new districts in U.P and the institutionalization of Pilot Project principles
into the national Community Development Projects introduced in India’s First Five-Year
Plan. These Etawah Pilot Project principles established the foundation for Community
Development operations, personnel training methods, and a new administrative
framework for development. Mayer recognized the importance of preserving the
development process that had been critical to the success at Etawah, and he introduced
a recommended organizational framework for administration of development projects in
1952 that decentralized project administration from the State and District levels to the
Group and Village levels (Figure 5-2).
This organizational framework also signified the recognition of villagers as
participant stakeholders. Mayer viewed the Pilot Project as an experiment in progress
where the feedback and expectations of villagers shaped future development
operations. In broader terms, Mayer’s diffusion of Western planning principles to post-
190
WWII India did not impose the singular ideal of modern society envisioned by Western
nations, but rather sought to define a new ideal society in collaboration with villager
participants that combined traditional Indian heritage with tools for improving standards
of wellbeing.
Translation Experience
The institutionalization of Pilot Project principles within India’s first national
planning policy and the introduction of new foreign stakeholders characterized the
translation process. The U.S.-Indian Technical Cooperation Agreement signed in 1952
led to the introduction of U.S. bilateral aid to fund the national Community Development
Projects in 1952, and the National Extension Service program in 1953. This influx of
U.S. aid spurred the rapid expansion of rural development in India and shifted focus
from villager welfare improvements to agricultural production outputs. While serving as
the Rural Development Advisor of U.P., Mayer witnessed first-hand the dramatic
changes taking place in the administration of Community Development and National
Extension Service programs.
Mayer responded to the changes with disapproval and urgency. He felt that the
mass mobilization of development aid into new rural development programs in U.P.
compromised the quality of development administration. He implored leaders in the
U.P. Development Commission and the Indian Planning Commission to recognize and
address the problems of inadequate staffing and loss of villager trust in Development
Officers. Mayer argued that Development Officers in the Community Development and
National Extension Service programs operated under the old colonial system of
governance by exhibiting paternalistic attitudes and distancing themselves from the
villagers. In an effort to protect the most significant elements of the Pilot Project, Mayer
191
recommended more rigorous selection criteria and prolonged training periods for
personnel to include field experience in one or more of the Pilot Projects.
A difference in ideology was the principal conflict between Mayer’s Pilot Project
principles and the operation of Indian development programs with U.S. bilateral aid and
technical assistance. Mayer’s implementation of community development was guided
by a regionalism planning ethos aimed at establishing villager welfare improvements
that preserved the values of local villager participants. The operation of these U.S.
funded development programs focused on immediate results and imposed technological
advancements, reflecting the Western ideology of modernization. Administration of
Community Development Projects and National Extension Service development blocks
failed to prioritize the decentralization of project administration and collaboration with
villagers because it replicated Western models of the ideal society. The weaknesses
Mayer identified in the administration of Indian development programs following U.S.
intervention were caused by failures to recognize villagers’ responses to development
and the complex social systems of traditional societies that guided decisions of villager
participants.
Despite the conflicts in ideology resulting from the administration of Indian
development with the resources and expertise of new foreign stakeholders from the
U.S., the Pilot Project succeeded in achieving its original purpose of integrating modern
techniques that could be sustainability maintained and operated by local participants
while preserving the heritage and identity of traditional Indian villages. The Etawah Pilot
Project case study also exemplifies Mayer’s pivotal role in the diffusion of Western
192
planning knowledge within post-WWII India and contributes to a deeper understanding
of transnational planning history and theory in the postcolonial context.
Discussion of Findings
This case study of transnational planning in the Etawah Pilot Project identifies
and documents the planning innovations resulting from the infusion of Western planning
principles with Indian knowledge and experience. Although Mayer originally introduced
the Pilot Project using a preconceived approach based on U.S. experience, he adapted
the program to incorporate planning knowledge originating in the grassroots rural
development projects in northern U.P. and feedback from villager participants. For this
reason, the Pilot Project cannot be viewed as a Western planning archetype, but an
innovation in the postcolonial milieu that incorporated ideas and methods from both
Western and Indian sources.
Mayer’s Immersion in the Post-WWII Indian Context
This synchronization of Western and Indian planning principles was facilitated
through the leadership of American planner, Albert Mayer. Mayer’s conceptual
viewpoint on planning for non-Western societies and his immersion in the post-WWII
Indian setting enhanced his sensitivity to the planning needs of India’s rural poor and his
high valuation of local expertise. Mayer’s immersion in Indian society exposed him to
indigenous knowledge sources, which he used to adapt Pilot Project operations to meet
the context-specific needs of Indian villagers. Mayer also developed a sincere
appreciation for the traditional village culture, and over time he grew to appreciate the
success of the Pilot Project through its ability to respond to villagers’ needs,
expectations and long-term welfare. Following increased U.S. intervention in Indian
development in 1952, Mayer remained committed to serving the interests of Indian
193
villagers and strived to achieve new standards in villager welfare, which he believed
would lead to the sustainable long-term increases in food crop production sought by
leaders in the Indian government.
Mayer’s Recognition of Villagers as Participant Stakeholders
This case study of the Etawah Pilot Project demonstrates that Mayer came to
recognize the villager participants in the Pilot Project as important stakeholders in
India’s rural development planning. This growing awareness influenced Mayer’s
implementation of the Etawah Pilot Project and his critiques of Community Development
Projects and the National Extension Service.
This finding regarding Mayer’s consideration of traditional Indian knowledge and
feedback reflects a significant deviation from Vidyarthi’s (2010) analysis of Western
planners Albert Mayer and Otto Koenigsberger in post-WWII India. According to
Vidyarthi (2010), these planners were solely influenced by their inherent Western
ideological views and the motivation to meet the expectations of Indian elites and the
modernist agenda. Consequently, Vidyarthi (2010) asserts that Mayer and
Koenigsberger justified the introduction of Western planning typologies because they
believed them to have universal validity, in alignment with the goals of Indian elites to
establish a modern society free from social inequalities between castes and classes and
other traditionally “backwards” characteristics.3
3 Vidyarthi (2010) addresses the application of Neighborhood Unit planning principles by Koenigsberger and Mayer in postcolonial Indian planning. Mayer did not introduce Neighborhood Unit principles to the Etawah Pilot Project, but he did employ the Neighborhood Unit concept in his plans for the new capital of East Punjab at Chandigarh in 1949. In the neighborhood plans for Chandigarh, Mayer proposed neighborhood blocks grouped by general income level. These blocks were then organized into superblocks with community amenities shared between classes. He believed the Neighborhood Unit was applicable in India because it preserved traditional village lifestyles. In a letter to Chandigarh architect, Maxwell Fry, Mayer wrote, “Even more than in the West, the neighborhood unit has validity in India. Most people are village-based, and even though they work in the city, their roots and relatives are in the village,
194
Limited Applicability of Western Methods and Technologies
This Etawah Pilot Project case study finds that Mayer did not presume Western
methods and technologies to have universal validity. In the time between Mayer’s initial
proposal for a model villages program to Jawaharlal Nehru in 1945 and his arrival in
India as U.P. Rural Development Advisor in 1946, he began to question the applicability
of the model villages concept to the post-WWII Indian setting. These doubts were
subsequently magnified in 1946 when he toured existing conditions in Indian rural
villages. It was not until two months after his arrival in India and his tour of rural villages
that Mayer submitted his “Preliminary Outline for Village Planning and Reconstruction”
to the U.P. Development Commission. The resulting plan incorporated social,
educational, and cooperative activities that were influenced by his visits to the Gandhian
constructive work site at the Renewa Ashram and the rural work conducted by
American missionaries Bill and Charlotte Wiser. The plan also introduced new cottage
industries, such as cooperative brick kilns, to provide development assistance to non-
land owning villagers and reflected planning principles borrowed from Gandhian
constructive work.
Another indication that Mayer did not presume the universal validity of Western
planning methods can be interpreted from an article he authored for the U.S. journal on
to which they frequently return. So a pretty self-contained neighborhood in the city accords with the people’s social habits and roots, as we in the West have only begun to re-discover. It is the heart of the whole [Chandigarh] plan” (Mayer, 1951, Jan 31, p. 3). Mayer believed the Neighborhood Unit concept was appropriate to the Indian context because it preserved elements of traditional society. His organization of neighborhood blocks by income level also indicates that he did use the Neighborhood Unit concept to modernize society through forced integration of classes and castes. His approach to neighborhood planning in India was moderate. He introduced Western planning methods but hoped to preserve aspects of traditional village culture.
195
social work and social reform, The Survey, in September 1947. In the article Mayer
explained the validity of U.S. influence in India. Mayer wrote,
First, India must try to amalgamate into her own ancient matrix the Western world’s long time respect for the individual, for the validity of his own self-respect and especially his self-reliance; also the newer Western concept of minimum well-being for all, however lowly–regardless of the fact that we ourselves have yet to achieve it. …Second, India should not, will not, and fortunately cannot, join the mad rush of materialism. If she did, India would be failing herself and failing to make the needed contribution to the world of which she, and she alone, seems capable. (Mayer, 1947, p. 483) In this quote, Mayer demonstrates a firm and determined view on what he
considers the best interests of postcolonial India, and he does not indicate that India
should follow blindly in the footsteps of the developed Western world. Instead, Mayer
recognizes human welfare and self-reliance to be universal ideals that can only be
accomplished through means compatible with the values of the society in which the
planning takes place. These ideals were also shared by Prime Minister Nehru and
created the impetus for the Pilot Project as an experiment in community development.
Balancing Traditional Heritage with Modern Techniques
In addition, the Pilot Project that Mayer implemented in Etawah, U.P. from 1948–
1958 did not function with the primary purpose of fulfilling the modernist agenda of the
Indian elites. Prime Minister Nehru invited Mayer to introduce the Pilot Project of rural
development in order to “build up community life on a higher scale without breaking up
the old foundations” and to “utilize modern technique and fit it into Indian resources and
Indian conditions” (Nehru, 1946, p. 1). In the case of the Etawah Pilot Project, it
appears that Nehru wanted to preserve the traditional values of rural Indian society as
196
evidenced by Nehru’s successful attempt to acquire Gandhi’s encouragement of
Mayer’s work on the Pilot Development Project plan.4
By the end of Mayer’s tenure as U.P. Rural Development Advisor in 1958, it
became apparent that Mayer’s strong opposition to the rapid institutionalization of
Community Development Projects and National Extension Service reflected a conflict
with the modernist agenda. Mayer’s introduction of select modern techniques to
achieve improvements in village life and crop yields that were compatible with traditional
values required greater investments in personnel training and time than what the Indian
Central Government was willing to accept.
Following the U.S.-India Technical Cooperation Agreement of 1952, Indian
political leaders worked to mobilize U.S. aid and technology at a massive scale and
pace in order to dramatically increase food production and civic amenities in villages
across the nation. The shift in emphasis from community development to intensive
agricultural production reflected changing priorities in the Indian Central Government to
advance economic stability at a national scale through the modernization of traditional
society.
Mayer’s Resistance to the Rapid Institutionalization of Indian Development
Mayer however, began to strongly oppose the mass institutionalization of these
programs and recommended that certain administrative practices be put in place to
improve the quality of the programs at the expense of delaying tangible results. For
these reasons, clearly Mayer advocated against the methods of the Community
4 The assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in January 1948 had a tremendous and sorrowful impact on many Indian people, including Prime Minister Nehru. The loss of India’s great spiritual leader and advocate for rural development may have played a role in the loss of commitment to the Community Development Project principles inspired by the Pilot Project.
197
Development Projects and the National Extension Service not to appease Indian elites,
but to help advance the standards of welfare for the citizens in rural villages of U.P. that
he came to view as important stakeholders in Indian rural development planning.
For these reasons, Mayer’s work falls more appropriately under the critical
theories of dependency and poststructuralism than modernization. Theorists from these
schools of thought challenge the historical stages of the growth model that imposed
narrow views of ideal society onto the traditional societies of India. Like Frank (1969),
Mayer rejected binary representations of development and “backwards” societies that
ignored variations in traditional culture and the values of non-Western societies that
conflicted with economic growth and modernization.
Mayer’s views of the ideal society in India differed from the single-outcome
portrayal offered by Western development models. Mayer’s critiques of U.S.
intervention in Indian development in the 1950s indicate his resistance to Western
technologies for rapid agricultural development that discounted the values and
responses of local actors to social and economic transformation, resulting in divisions
between Mayer’s approach and the expectation of the Indian Central Government.
Although this finding conflicts with Vidyarthi’s (2010) analysis of Mayer’s role in
post-WWII planning diffusion in India, this case study does produce results that confirm
the findings of recent transnational planning histories by Banerjee (2009) and Ward
(2010).
Planning Innovation in the Postcolonial Milieu
Principle outcomes of the Etawah Pilot Project case study include the planning
innovations produced in the postcolonial context by a combination of Mayer’s Western
influences and indigenous experience. Similar to Ward (2010), this study finds that
198
Mayer’s responsiveness to local knowledge sources and context-specific planning
needs is positively correlated with Mayer’s degree of immersion in the Indian setting.
Immediately following Mayer’s arrival in India in 1946, his views towards planning in the
Indian domain broadened to incorporate new sources of knowledge and a greater
awareness of villagers’ planning needs. Over time, Mayer’s motivations for rural
planning evolved as he began to demonstrate stronger commitments to improving
villager welfare than he did to meeting the expectations of Indian political leaders and
members of the U.P. Development Commission to achieve quantifiable development
targets at a pace that compromised the quality of project administration at the village
and district levels.
In accordance with Banerjee’s (2009) study of American planning diffusions to
postcolonial India, this case study also finds that innovations in planning were
accomplished when the ideas and practices of an individual planner, such as Mayer,
were confronted with the needs and expectations of local clients and local experts. In
the case study of the Etawah Pilot Project, innovations including the introduction of
Village Level Workers and the Rural Life Analyst, development of cottage industries,
and integration of social and educational activities to supplement agricultural and
physical planning tasks would not have been realized without the influence of local
experts and feedback from villager participants.
Limitations of the Study
Findings in this dissertation reflect interpretive-historical research conducted in
the archives of Albert Mayer, members of his professional network including Clarence
Stein and Henry Churchill, and organizations in which he participated including the
Housing Study Guild. The contents of these archives allow for rich descriptions of
199
historical events as they occurred in the relevant historical, geographical, and socio-
economic contexts of postwar planning in the U.S. and India. Consequently, this
dissertation focuses on the interpretation of data from the perspective of U.S. engineer
and architect-planner Albert Mayer and his colleagues in the U.S. and India that
comprised the transnational planning community immediately following WWII. As a
result, this study does not benefit from the narratives of Etawah Pilot Project villager
participants that were integral stakeholders in post-WWII Indian development. This
study also limits detailed accounts of development implementation to the Etawah Pilot
Project in which Mayer was most directly involved. This focus on Mayer’s role in the
Etawah Pilot Project limits the study and points to opportunities for future research that
are more inclusive of local indigenous experiences of transnational Indian planning. It
also creates opportunities for future research in cross-case analyses of concurrent
development programs in post-WWII India to assess the influence of villagers as
intervening variables on development outcomes.
In addition, the portrayal of villager participants in this study reflects Mayer’s view
that the village population could be understood as a cohesive unit. Mayer recognized
variations in social hierarchies from class and caste distinctions in the Etawah Pilot
Project villages yet he chose to address these villagers as a homogenous group in most
of his letters and development reports. Possible explanations for this representation of
the villagers as a single entity include Mayer’s limited knowledge of complex social
systems in the villages and his tendency to avoid interfering in traditional social norms.
Another explanation is that the social conditions in the Etawah Pilot Project area were
200
moderate and divisions between castes and classes were not extremely severe.5 For
this reason, future studies of rural planning in post-WWII India may benefit from more
detailed and differentiated discussions of participant groups in development.
Opportunities for Future Research
In the Etawah Pilot Project case study, Albert Mayer’s conceptual orientation to
post-WWII Indian planning included the recognition of villager participants as Pilot
Project stakeholders. This recognition influenced Mayer’s approach to Pilot Project
development and his valuation of Indian development planning in the postcolonial era.
Between 1946 and 1958, when Mayer served as Rural Development Advisor to U.P. he
also served as a consultant advisor and planner on multiple urban master plans in other
locations in India including Cawnpore, Greater Bombay and Chandigarh (Figure D-1).
For this reason, Mayer’s recognition of villager as participant stakeholders warrants
further analysis of his concurrent planning work in India.
Opportunities for future research include the analysis of Mayer’s idealization of
traditional Indian societies as a potential influencing variable on his plans for new towns
and urban redevelopment in post-WWII India. The focus of this research may
investigate the negotiation between traditional values of India’s rural and migrant
societies and the Indian Central Government’s commitment to modernization and
industrialization in the design and planning of urban neighborhoods for the cities of
Cawnpore, Bombay, and Chandigarh.
5 Singh writes that the lowest caste villagers in the Etawah Pilot Project were “socially not so depressed” and some even owned land (1967, p. 139).
201
This study also finds that the innovations produced in the Etawah Pilot Project
informed India’s first national planning policy of 1951. As a result, the Indian Planning
Commission institutionalized and translated Pilot Project principles to meet immediate
planning needs and meet the objectives of the Indian government. This outcome
indicates that new innovations in planning produced in the postcolonial context
influenced subsequent community development planning at a national scale and incites
new questions about the transnational flow of postcolonial planning innovations.
The impact of new knowledge produced in the postcolonial context on
subsequent planning praxis in the West due to reverse knowledge flows remains
unclear. Future opportunities for research will examine how this knowledge gleaned in
the postcolonial context was translated in the U.S. A recent study by Friedman (2012)
identifies the influence of Mayer’s urban planning work in India on subsequent urban
village planning strategies by members of Mayer’s architectural firm in the designs for
Reston, Virginia in the 1960s. This case study points to additional opportunities to
examine the influence of Mayer’s post-WWII Indian planning commissions on his work
in new town planning outside the postcolonial context. This research may examine the
potential correlations between Mayer’s planning work in India and his involvement in
postwar planning projects in North America including the new town of Kitimat, British
Columbia in 1951.6 Combined with the planning histories of Western diffusions in the
postcolonial context, proposed studies of reverse knowledge flows may strengthen the
understanding of transnational planning at the global scale.
6 Albert Mayer and his business partner Julian Whittlesey produced architectural designs for the new town plan for Kitimat, British Columbia in collaboration with Clarence Stein who served as coordinator and director of planning (Larsen, 2005).
202
This Etawah Pilot Project case study of transnational planning in the post-WWII
Indian context identifies Albert Mayer as a central figure in the diffusion of Western
planning ideas and practices to the developing world. Through a narrative analysis of
historically significant archives, this study examines Western planning in post-WWII
India and contributes to a deeper understanding of how foreign planners translated
exogenic planning concepts to meet local needs and expectations during this critical
post-war period. This case study confirms recent findings that indicate Western
planners immersed in the postcolonial setting were receptive to context-specific
knowledge from local experts and participants, and this knowledge resulted in planning
innovations characterized by a synthesis of Western knowledge and Indian experience.
The Etawah Pilot Project case study contributes to development theory by
challenging assumptions about underdeveloped populations and linear development
trajectories espoused by modernization theorists. Findings from this study shed light on
the complex interchanges of knowledge, values, and power across societies in an
increasingly globalized world. The challenges and solutions discovered through
Mayer’s work from 1946–1958 on the Etawah Pilot Project remain insightful and
pertinent to contemporary planning praxes that strive to transfer knowledge within
disparate contexts involving variations in ideology, geography and history, thereby
affecting the translation of exogenic knowledge. Greater understanding of transnational
planning diffusions contribute to ongoing endeavors to expand human welfare and to
achieve universal prosperity for all persons, congruent with individual values and
beliefs.
203
APPENDIX A IMAGES OF THE PILOT PROJECT
A B Figure A-1. Photographs of Mayer with villagers at the Etawah Pilot Project. A) Mayer
drawing water from a sanitary well. B) Mayer using water from the well. (Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library)
Figure A-2. U.P. Agricultural Advisor, Horace Holmes, working with a villager in the
Etawah Pilot Project (Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
204
Figure A-3. Village Level Workers at a training class in Lakhna, Etawah (Special
Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
Figure A-4. Information center at the Etawah Pilot Project headquarters in Mahewa
(Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
205
Figure A-5. Adult literacy class at the Etawah Pilot Project (Special Collections
Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
Figure A-6. Kisan mela agricultural fair in the Ballia Pilot Project, 1954 (Special
Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
206
Figure A-7. Main highway and bazaar in the Etawah Pilot Project headquarters in
Mahewa (Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
Figure A-8. Road cleaning work in the Etawah Pilot Project (Special Collections
Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
207
APPENDIX B PRINCIPLES OF THE PILOT PROJECT
In an Interim Report and Appraisal of the Etawah Pilot Project, Mayer outlines the
objectives used to guide development principles. Mayer writes that the purpose of the
Pilot Project is,
To see what degree of productive and social improvement, as well as initiative, self-confidence and cooperation can be achieved in the villages of an ‘average district’ not the beneficiary of any set of special circumstances and resources. The problem is also to ascertain how quickly these results may be attainable, consistent with their remaining permanently part of the people’s mental, spiritual and technical equipment and outlook, after the special pressure is lifted and special personnel leaves. In the context of India’s urgent need, we must not take too long. But we cannot afford to be superficial, nor, if results are to be permanent and self-renewing, must we use ‘high-pressure’ methods. (Mayer, 1950, June 27, p. 1) The objectives outlined in Mayer’s Interim Report and Appraisal reflect the
Pilot Project as an experiment in development aimed at identifying methods for
improving villager welfare. Further, sustainability of Pilot Project methods
through villager initiative represented a central focus of development that could
not be superficially implemented without adequate training and acceptance by
villager participants. This outline of Pilot Project objectives was followed by an
overview of development principles.
Principles of the Pilot Project
Reproducibility: Methods may be reproduced in other locations at minimal expense.
Concentration: There are many development needs in the villages, but Pilot Project operations must initially focus on a small number of initiatives at first due to limitations in time and personnel. Selection of initiatives must be based on villagers’ most immediate needs. Therefore, the first initiatives should typically address agricultural development to meet the villagers’ immediate needs for food and water.
208
Inter-departmental Cooperation: Cooperation between local, district and state departments is necessary to achieve a reliable supply of resources necessary to achieve progress and maintain the trust of villagers.
Local Self-Sufficiency: Attempts must be made to acquire supplies from local sources as much as possible to facilitate timely distribution of resources and invest in the community.
Simultaneous Improvement: Development is targeted at improving the social, economic, and environmental conditions in the villages.
Attitudes: The attitudes of Pilot Project personnel must be that of ‘government as servant’ and personnel must work with the people and lead by example through project demonstrations. The Pilot Project personnel must also adopt the “inner democratization” framework in which high-level administrators acknowledge and respond to the feedback and concerns of lower-level personnel.
Targets: Targets in agricultural production, health improvement, and literacy should be used as time-tables for development and indicators of project success.
Personnel: Adequate training of personnel is a requirement for effective development. No project should be undertaken without careful selection and training of personnel, except in emergency situations.
Radiation: Advice from outside personnel should be used to strengthen development operations. Conversely, outcomes in the Pilot Project should be shared in order to spread the benefits of successful development methods. Mayer outlined the principles of the Pilot Project in development reports and
appraisals to the U.P. Development Commission and Pilot Project personnel. These
principles guided Pilot Project operations between 1948 and 1958.
209
APPENDIX C ETAWAH PILOT PROJECT OPERATIONS, 1948–1958
Figure C-1. Development operations in the Etawah Pilot Project, 1948–1958.
210
APPENDIX D ALBERT MAYER’S INDIAN PLANNING COMMISSIONS, 1946–1960
Albert Mayer’s work in India extended beyond his service as U.P. Rural
Development Advisor. In addition to his work on the Etawah Pilot Project, Mayer
engaged in urban planning projects in India as a consultant and commissioned planner
and architect through the Mayer and Whittlesey firm between 1946 and 1960 (Figure D-
1). Upon his arrival to India in 1946, U.P. Chief Minister Govind Ballabh Pant asked
Mayer to review two housing and re-planning projects for the Cawnpore (Kanpur)
Development Board before beginning his work on the Pilot Project. Mayer spent one
week reviewing the plans and recommended to Cawnpore Development Board
President, Eva Raj, and Cawnpore Town Planner, V. C. Mehta, to incorporate feedback
from local interest groups and to redesign the two existing plans to remove through
traffic and relocate schools in closer proximity to housing (Mayer, 1946, Nov 14).
Mayer was also commissioned by the Municipality of Bombay (Mumbai) to
provide recommendations to the Municipal Engineer N. V. Modak for the Greater
Bombay Master Plan in 1947. Mayer and U.S. traffic engineer W. J. Cox produced the
Outline for the Greater Bombay Master Plan that guided municipal planners in
developing the Master Plan in its final form. In the outline, Mayer recommended the
introduction of satellite towns and low-rent subsidized housing with public parks and
limited through-traffic. Mayer’s recommendations were influenced by Western planning
principles that were adapted to suit the context-specific needs of Bombay, India. In
1949, Mayer and Modak published a progress report on the Master Plan, calling it, “a
fusion of Indian knowledge and feeling with Western experience” (Modak & Mayer,
1949, p. 2).
211
Figure D-1. Map of Albert Mayer’s direct influence Indian planning and development, 1946–1960.
212
In 1949, the Mayer and Whittlesey firm secured an important commission from
the Indian government to create the Master Plan for the new capital of East Punjab at
Chandigarh. Mayer and Whittlesey in collaboration with architect Matthew Nowicki and
U.S. consultants Clarence Stein, Ralph Eberlin, Clara Coffey, and Dr. E. H. Landsberg
produced the initial Master Plan for the new capital. The Master Plan incorporated
Western planning principles including the Neighborhood Unit concept and the
superblock. The Master Plan also incorporated climactically responsive design, public
parks and greenways, and major civic buildings as focal points in the city. The resulting
plan was used as the foundation for Corbusier’s designs for Chandigarh, although
Corbusier is widely recognized as the author of the Chandigarh plan. In a review of
Corbusier’s plan in 1958, Mayer wrote, “Actually, the town plan and unit super-blocks
bear a very considerable resemblance to ours, if one reasonably allows for normal
changes that would occur in any plan between the first sketches and the worked-out
drawings” (Mayer, 1958, June 11, p. 1-2).
Mayer also served as a consultant advisor to the Indian government in the
planning of Ahmedabad University in Gujarat in 1949, the expansion of the Pilot Project
to Gorakhpur, U.P. in 1950, and the initiation of technical assistance from the United
Nations for the Damodar Valley Corporation in 1952. The Mayer and Whittlesey firm
was also hired by the U.S. Ford Foundation to plan and design buildings for the
Allahabad Agricultural Institute in 1950 and to assist the Delhi Town Planning
Organization to develop the Delhi Master Plan in 1957. The Ford Foundation
commissioned the Mayer and Whittlesey firm to assemble a team of Western specialists
who traveled India to work with local planners. In this project, Mayer attempted, “to
213
apply to urban conditions the principles and experience of the Rural projects” (1957,
July 22, p. 4). Mayer’s statement strengthens this study’s findings, which suggest that
Mayer was greatly influenced by his rural planning experience. It also points to the
need for future research to identify the long-term influence of postcolonial planning
innovations of Mayer’s subsequent planning projects in India and in other parts of the
world.
214
APPENDIX E INTERNATIONAL FUNDING FOR INDIAN NATIONAL PLANS
Table E-1. Sources of foreign aid allocated to India for implementation of the First Five-Year Plan, 1951–1956.
Source of grant or loan Value in
rupees Value in
U.S. dollars
U.S. Food Loan 9,000,000 1,878,914
U.S.–India Technical Cooperation Agreement (Point IV)
4,300,000 897,704
Colombo Plan–Commonwealth Assistance
1,200,000 250,522
Proceeds of loans from International Bank
900,000 187,891
Other aid 200,000 41,753
Total 15,600,000 3,256,784
Total directly from U.S. sources (85%) 13,300,000 2,776,618
Note: Data obtained from First Five-Year Plan (Planning Commission, Government of India, 1951).
Figure E-1. Sources of foreign aid allocated to India for implementation of the First
Five-Year Plan, 1951–1956.
215
Table E-2. Sources of foreign aid allocated to India for implementation of the Second Five-Year Plan, 1956–1961.
Source of grant or loan Value in
rupees Value in
U.S. dollars
U.S. Food Loan (wheat) 9,030,000 1,885,177
U.S.–India Technical Cooperation Agreement (Point IV)
10,250,000 2,139,874
U.S. Program J (international study travel) loan 3,930,000 820,459
Ford Foundation 540,000 112,734
World Bank loan 1,200,000 250,522
Colombo Plan–Australia 1,050,000 219,206
Colombo Plan–Canada 3,560,000 743,215
Colombo Plan–New Zealand 120,000 25,052
Colombo Plan–United Kingdom 50,000 10,438
Norway 30,000 6,263
Total 29,760,000 6,212,940
Total directly from U.S. sources (80%) 23,750,000 4,958,244
Note: Data obtained from Second Five-Year Plan (Planning Commission, Government of India, 1956).
Figure E-2. Sources of foreign aid allocated to India for implementation of the Second
Five-Year Plan, 1956–1961.
216
LIST OF REFERENCES
All India Congress Committee. (2008). History. Retrieved from http://www.aicc.org.in/new/history.php
Banerjee, T. (2009). U.S. planning expeditions to postcolonial India: From ideology to innovation in technical assistance. Journal of the American Planning Association 75(2), 193-208.
Bauer, C. (1933, May 17). [Regional Planning Association of America Meeting Minutes.]
Clarence S. Stein Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell
University.
Bernhard Mayer left estate of $2,150,640. (1932, May 26). The New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved October 21, 2013 from http://search.proquest.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/publication/45545
Bhabha, H. K. (1984). Of mimicry and man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse. October, 28, 125-133.
Bhabha, H. K. (1994). The location of culture. London: Routledge.
Boyer, M. C. (1983). Dreaming the rational city: The myth of American city planning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Buder, S. (1990). Visionaries and planners: The garden city movement and the modern community. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chakrabarty, D. (2000). Subaltern studies and postcolonial historiography. Nepantla: Views from the South, 1 (1), 9-32.
Chandra, B. (1979). Nationalism and colonialism in modern India. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
Collingwood, R. G. (1946). The idea of history. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Derrida, J. (1974). Of grammatology. (G. Spivak, Trans.) Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Derrida, J. (1978). Writing and difference. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dutt, R. C. (1906). Economic history of India in the Victorian age. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.
Fanon, F. (1968). The wretched of the earth. New York: Grove Press.
Fanon, F. (1986). Black skin, white masks. London: Pluto Press.
217
Federation Technical School. (1937, September 1). [Agreement of the Henry Wright
Library at the Federation Technical School.] Housing Study Guild Papers,
Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University.
Ferraro, V. (2008). Dependency theory: An introduction In G. Secondi (Ed.). The development economics reader (58-64). London: Routledge.
Fishman, R. (2000). The metropolitan tradition in American planning. In Fishman (Ed.), The American planning tradition: Culture and policy (65-85). Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press.
Ford Foundation. (1955). The Ford Foundation and foundation supported activities in India. New Delhi: Caxton Press.
Ford Foundation. (1959). Report on India's food crisis & steps to meet it. New Delhi: Times of India Press.
Ford stand stirs war housing issue. (1942, Jun 28). The New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved October 21, 2013 from http://search.proquest.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/publication/45545
Foucault, M. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge. New York: Harper & Row.
Foucault, M. (1973). The order of things. New York: Vintage Press.
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. London: Allen Lane.
Foucault, M. (1980). Power/knowledge: Selected interview and other writings. New York: Pantheon Books.
Foreign-aid fund urged by Hoffman. (1951, October 25). The New York Times (1857-1922). Retrieved October 14, 2014 from http://search.proquest.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/publication/55428
Frank, A. G. (1966). The development of underdevelopment. Monthly Review, 18, 17-31.
Frank, A. G. (1969). Latin America: Underdevelopment or revolution? New York: Monthly Review Press.
Friedman, A. (2012). The global postcolonial moment and the American new town: India, Reston, Dodoma. Journal of Urban History 38(3), 553-576
Galeano, E. (1973). Open veins of Latin America: Five centuries of the pillage of a continent. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Gallie, W. B. (1964). Philosophy and the historical understanding. New York: Schocken Books.
218
Gates, H. L. (1991). Critical fanonism. Critical inquiry, 17, 457-470.
Giddens, A. (1977). Studies in social and political theory. New York: Basic Books.
Given, L. M. (2008). Postcolonialism. The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 651-656. doi:10.4135/9781412963909
Gordon, L. A. (1997). Wealth equals Wisdom? The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations in India. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 554 (1), 104-116.
Gould, P. (1964). A note on research into the diffusion of development. Journal of modern African studies, 2, 123-125.
Gouldner, A. (1970). Coming crisis of western sociology. New York: Basic Books.
Groat, L. N. (2002). Qualitative Research. In Groat, L. N., & Wang, D. (Eds.), Architectural research methods (pp. 173-202). New York: J. Wiley
Guha, R. (1983). Elementary aspects of peasant insurgency in colonial India. Delhi, India: Oxford University Press.
Guha, R., & Spivak, G. C. (1988). Selected Subaltern studies. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hagen, E. (1962). On the theory of social change. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.
Hall, P. (1989). The turbulent eighth decade: Challenges to U.S. city planning. Journal of the American Planning Association, 55 (3), 275-282.
Healey, P. (2013). Circuits of knowledge and techniques: The transnational flow of planning ideas and practices. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 37(5), 1510-26.
Hempel, C. G. (1942). The function of general laws in history. Journal of Philosophy 39, 35-48.
Holmes, H. (1950, February 28). [Letter from Horace Holmes to Albert Mayer.] Albert
Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Hoselitz, B. (1960). Sociological aspects of economic growth. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Housing Study Guild. (1933, October 16). [Summary Report of Housing Development
for Queensbridge Dwellings.] Henry S. Churchill Papers, Division of Rare and
Manuscript Collections, Cornell University.
Housing Study Guild. (1934). [The Housing Study Guild.] Housing Study Guild Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University.
219
Hull, M. S. (2011). Communities of place, not kind: American technologies of neighborhood in postcolonial Delhi. In Comparative Studies in Society and History, 53 (4), 757-790.
Jonas Weil dies; Donor of $1,000,000. (1917, April 12). The New York Times (1857-1922). Retrieved October 21, 2013 from http://search.proquest.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/publication/55428
Larsen, K. E. (2005). Cities to come: Clarence Stein’s postwar regionalism. Journal of Planning History, 4 (1), 33-51.
Levi-Strauss, C. (1963). Structural anthropology. New York: Basic Books.
Liscombe, R. W. (2006). In-dependence: Otto Koenigsberger and modernist urban resettlement in India. Planning Perspectives, 21, 157-178.
Lubove, R. (1963). Community planning in the 1920s: The contributions of the Regional Planning Association of America. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Marx, K. (1970). Preface. In A contribution to the critique of political economy (pp. 19-23). Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Matthias, C. D. (1952). The point four program. (Published Thesis). Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL.
Mayer, A. (1934, February 14). [New Homes for a New Deal: Slum Clearance–But
How?] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of
Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1935, November 24). A pattern for a city housing policy. The New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved October 21, 2013 from http://search.proquest.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/publication/45545
Mayer, A. (1936, January 8). The architect and the world. The Nation, 142 (3679), 43-45.
Mayer, A. (1937). A technique for planning complete communities: Part two. The Architectural Forum 66, 126-146.
Mayer, A. (1937, March 14). The nation again weighs a vast housing program. The New York Times. Retrieved October 21, 2013 from http://search.proquest.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/publication/45545
Mayer, A. (1943). [Horse sense planning I.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections
Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1945, December 19). [Letter from Albert Mayer to Jawaharlal Nehru.] Albert
Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
220
Mayer, A. (1946, May 20). [Letter from Albert Mayer to Jawaharlal Nehru.] Albert Mayer
Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1946, August 2). [Letter from Albert Mayer to Govind Ballabh Pant.] Albert
Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1946, October 4). [Letter from Albert Mayer to Jawaharlal Nehru.] Albert
Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1946, October 27). [A Letter from Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1946, November 14). [A Letter from Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1946, December 11). [A Letter from Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1947). Footholds for a new India. The Survey, 36(9), 482-485, 503-504.
Mayer, A. (1947, January 20). [A Letter from Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1947, February 28). [A Letter from Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1947, August 29). [Letter from Albert Mayer: Indian Visit: July 11–August 29,
1947.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of
Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1947, April 14). [Letter from Albert Mayer to Jawaharlal Nehru.] Albert Mayer
Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1948, March 24). [A Letter from Albert Mayer to Jawaharlal Nehru.] Albert
Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1948, October 12). [A Letter from Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1948, July 8). [Letter from Albert Mayer to Jawaharlal Nehru.] Albert Mayer
Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1949). Nehru, the man–and India’s travail. The Survey, 85(12), 658-661.
Mayer, A. (1949, June 29). [Etawah Pilot Development Project–Interim Report.] Albert
Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
221
Mayer, A. (1949, August 13). [Etawah Pilot Development Project–2nd Interim Progress
Report.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of
Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1949, August 23). [A Letter from Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1950, January 31). [Letter Re Recent Trip to India.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1950, June 27). [Etawah Pilot Development Project Interim Report and
Appraisal by the Advisor.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research
Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1950, July 2). [News Letter from Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special
Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1951, January 31). [Letter from Albert Mayer to Maxwell Fry.] Albert Mayer
Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1951, July 23). [News Letter from Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1951, June 27). [Interim Report on Pilot Development Projects Etawah and
Gorakhpur.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center,
University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1951, Sept 24). [Letter from Albert Mayer to Tarlok Singh.] Albert Mayer
Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1951, December 31). [Self-Help in Housing and Construction: Some
Experiences in India.] Albert Mayer Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division,
New York Public Library.
Mayer, A. (1952, June 16). [News Letter from Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1952, July 29). [Note on Organization of Etawah Pilot Project.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1953, January 20). [Letter from Albert Mayer to Jawaharlal Nehru.] Albert
Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago. Mayer, A. (1953, April 26). [Community Projects in U.P.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
222
Mayer, A. (1953, April 29). [News Letter from Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1954, February 19). [Letter from Albert Mayer to Adit Jha: Note No. 1 on
Immediate Problems of N.E.S.] Albert Mayer Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
Mayer, A. (1954, March–April). [News Letter from India.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special
Collections Research Center, University of Chicago. Mayer, A. (1954, March 25). [News Letter from Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago. Mayer, A. (1954, May 26). [Letter from Albert Mayer to Warren Weaver.] Albert Mayer
Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library. Mayer, A. (1954, May 31). [Community Projects and National Extension Service
Projects in U.P.] Albert Mayer Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
Mayer, A. (1954, November 1). [Letter from Albert Mayer to Adit Jha.] Albert Mayer
Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago. Mayer, A. (1955, April 21). [Community Projects and National Extension Service
Projects in the U.P.] Albert Mayer Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
Mayer, A. (1956, October 22). [News Letter from Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1957, July 22). [India Newsletter.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1958). Pilot project, India: The story of rural development at Etawah, Uttar Pradesh. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Mayer, A. (1958, April 16). [Newsletter: India, Israel, & Morocco.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1958, June 11). [Second 1958 News Letter.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special
Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1959, May 21). [Newsletter No. 2] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections
Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A. (1967, September 5) [Letter from Albert Mayer to Clarence Stein.] Clarence
S. Stein Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University.
223
Mayer, A. (1971). [What is Regionalism?] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mayer, A., Whittlesey, J., & Hettel, J. N. (1943). [Housing project, Bellmawr, N.J.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
McClelland, D. C. (1961). The achieving society. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand.
McClelland, D. C. & Winter, D. G. (1971). Motivating economic achievement. New York: Free Press.
Miscevic, N. (2010). Nationalism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. N. Zalta (ED.). Retrieved July 23, 2013 from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nationalism/
Modak, N. V. & Mayer, A. (1949). [Greater Bombay Master Plan: First Progress Report.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Nehru, J. (1946, June 17). [Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Albert Mayer.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
New social school viewed by public. (1931, Jan 2). The New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved October 21, 2013 from http://search.proquest.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/publication/45545
Pant, G. B. (1958). Foreword. In Mayer, A. Pilot project, India: The story of rural development at Etawah, Uttar Pradesh (pp. vii-ix). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Parsons, T. (1948). The structure of social action. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Parsons, T. (1966). Societies: Evolutionary and comparative perspectives. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Parsons, K. C. (1990) Clarence Stein and the greenbelt towns: Settling for less. Journal of the American Planning Association 56(2), 161-123.
Patil, R. K. (1955, October 6). [Note: Background of the Etawah Pilot Project.] Albert Mayer Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
Peet, R. & Hartwick, E. (2009). Theories of development: Contentions, arguments, alterations (2nd ed.). New York: Guilford Press.
Perry, C. A. (1929). Perry, Clarence A. “The neighborhood unit, a scheme for arrangement for the family-life community.” Regional Survey of New York and its Environs. New York: Regional Plan of New York and is Environs.
224
Peterson, S. J. (2006). Priming the historian in all planners. Journal of Planning History 5(4), 289-300.
Planning Commission, Government of India (1951). 1st Five Year Plan. Retrieved August 12, 2014 from http://www.planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/welcome.html
Planning Commission, Government of India (1956). 2nd Five Year Plan. Retrieved August 12, 2014 from http://www.planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/welcome.html
Praises architect for Americanism. (1929, Apr 27). The New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved October 21, 2013 from http://search.proquest.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/publication/45545
Prakash, G. (1994). Subaltern studies as postcolonial criticism. The American historical review, 99 (5), 1475-1490.
Prebisch, R. (1972). International economics and development. New York: Academic Press.
Regional Development Council of America. (1949, December 26). [Planning in India.]
Clarence S. Stein Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell
University.
Resettlement Administration. (1936) [Greenbelt Towns.] Housing Study Guild Papers,
Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University.
Rostow, W. W. (1960). The stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifesto. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Said, E. W. (1979). Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books.
Seal, A. (1968). The emergence of Indian nationalism: competition and collaboration in the later nineteenth century. London: Cambridge University Press.
Sharma, P. L. (1953). [Vertical Statistics for the Period 15.9.48 to 30.6.53.] Albert Mayer Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Shepard, T. (2006). Decolonization. In J. Merriman & J. Winter (Eds.), Europe since 1914: Encyclopedia of the age of war and reconstruction (Vol. 2, pp. 790-803). Detroit: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Sidelights of the week. (1929, Sep 27). The New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved October 21, 2013 from http://search.proquest.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/publication/45545
225
Singh, B. N. (1967). The Etawah pilot project. In S. Dasgupta (Ed.), History of rural development in modern India (Vol. 1) (pp. 91-426). New Delhi: Impex India.
Spivak, G. C. (1987). In other worlds: Essays in cultural politics. New York: Routledge.
Spivak, G. C. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? In C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism and the interpretation of culture (pp. 271-313). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Stein, C. S. (1966). Toward new towns for America. Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool.
Sussman, C. (1976). Planning the fourth migration: The neglected vision of the Regional Planning Association of America. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Tenants buy housing (1936, Jan 1). The New York Times (1923-Current File)
Retrieved October 21, 2013 from
http://search.proquest.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/publication/45545
The Town of Willow Run (1943). [The Town of Willow Run.] Albert Mayer Papers,
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Trudgett, D. (1948, December 2). [A Letter from Dudley Trudgett.] Albert Mayer
Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.
Vidyarthi, S. (2010). Inappropriately appropriated or innovatively indigenized?: Neighborhood unit concept in post-independence India. Journal of Planning History, 9(4), 260-276.
Wang, D. (2002). Interpretive-Historical Research. In Groat, L. N., & Wang, D. (Eds.), Architectural research methods (pp. 135-171). New York: J. Wiley
Ward, S. V. (2010). Transnational planners in a postcolonial world. In P. Healey & R. Upton (Eds.), Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices (47-72). New York: Routledge.
White, H. (1973). Interpretation in history. New Literary History 4 (2), 281-314.
Willow Run poses problems. (1942, April 19). The New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved October 21, 2013 from http://search.proquest.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/publication/45545
Wolpert, S. (2011). A mixed legacy: From the Raj to modern India. Harvard International Review 32.4, 36-39.
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
226
Young, R. (1990). White mythologies: Writing history and the West. London: Routledge.
Zachariah, B. (2004). Nehru. London: Routledge.
227
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Laurel Harbin was first introduced to the history of post-WWII Indian development
as a child. Her great-grandparents Horace and Eveline Holmes worked in India on the
Etawah Pilot Project from 1946-1950. They encouraged all of their family, including
Laurel, to utilize education and a global point-of-view to find meaningful ways to
contribute to society.
Laurel began her studies at the Florida State University and graduated with
Bachelor of Science and Master of Fine Arts degrees in 2003 and 2005, respectively.
Laurel worked as an adjunct faculty member in the Department of Interior Design at the
Florida State University from 2005–2012, teaching design studios and courses in design
technology, 3D modeling, and sustainability. From 2012–2014, Laurel taught an e-
Learning course for the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of
Florida titled Cities of the World. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Florida
in December of 2014.
In 2009 Laurel became accredited by the Green Building Certification Institute
and continues to hold a Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design accreditation
with specialization in Building Design in Construction. Laurel also holds a certificate in
International Sustainable Construction from the M. E. Rinker, Sr. School of Construction
Management at the University of Florida earned in 2010. She is member of a number of
professional design and planning organizations and has presented her peer-reviewed
research at regional, national, and international conferences of the International
Planning History Society, the Society of American City and Regional Planning History,
the Environmental Design Research Association, and the Interior Design Educator’s
Council.