Mario Rossi

The End of the World

Bordeaux France, June 1940

Introduction: The Spawn of Defeat

For the third time in less than a century in the spring of 1940 France

fought Germany and lost. Defeat was total, crushing, without hope of a

reversal. Breaking through French defenses, the German army began

pouring into France. Still alive in the collective memory burned images of

German cruelties in Belgium during World War I. Seized by dread, the

French people fled the rapid German advance. First thousands, then

hundreds of thousands, then millions crowded the roads of France. Soon

soldiers mixed with those in flight in a migration that would lead all the way

to the Atlantic Ocean. By now the decimated French forces had lost all

cohesion, resembling roving armed bands more than a disciplined fighting

force, remnants of what only a short while ago had been considered one of

the best armies in the world.

The French government, too, was on the run. Abandoning Paris on

June 10, then detouring to Tours, it reached Bordeaux on June 14, exactly a

month after the commencement of the German offensive. Government

officials followed roads encumbered by millions of fleeing civilians,

exhausted, hungry, without shelter in the night. Conditions for that drifting

humanity were frightful beyond description, enough to convince ministers

and deputies in large numbers that further resistance would only increase the

misery. The time had come to surrender. Stouthearts argued that the fight

must go on, that not until England and the United States succumbed also

would the battle be lost, but their voices were rapidly diminishing in

strength.

The French government had once considered moving north to Rennes,

to be closer to England, and perhaps with British assistance organizing a

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redoubt in Britanny to hold out long enough to move men and matériels to

North Africa. From there French forces could go on fighting though the

Germans invaded the whole of France and subjected it to Nazi rule. But

Bordeaux became the chosen destination, for unlike Rennes Bordeaux,

facing the Atlantic Ocean, offered the option of going abroad or staying in

France.

On that mid-June of 1940 Bordeaux proved quite unprepared for the

human deluge. Surrounded by its fertile vineyards, famous for producing

fine wines the toast of the world and the symbol of refinement, for centuries

a city open toward the sea and proud of its wealth and its renown, Bordeaux

sunk under the sheer weight of the chaotic masses fleeing the advancing

Nazis. Nothing could stop that terrorized humanity. Nothing Ready or not,

Bordeaux became the last stand for thousands of desperate men and women

and children pouring in from every corner of embattled France. Beyond lay

the Atlantic Ocean, and beyond the ocean the last hope-- the United States of

America.

French government ministers hastily scrambled to set up offices in

municipal buildings. With poorly connected facilities and few archives to

give continuity to their work, the secretariats soon dispersed. Foreign

diplomats housed in surrounding properties had difficulty contacting the

proper ministers in the resulting confusion. Meanwhile refugees continued

pouring in, a frantic mass, knocking repeatedly at consulate doors,

mercilessly anxious to find refuge somewhere, anywhere, as far as possible

from the advancing enemy.

Most officials arrived without their families, often ignoring what had

become of them. A few prominent politicians managed to take along their

mistresses, though the few remained the exception. As well, several

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members of the French Parliament also made their way to Bordeaux and

were quickly accosted by various factions, some urging armistice with the

Germans, others, a shrinking minority, advocating a move to North Africa.

Édouard Herriot, head of the Chamber of Deputies, and Jules Jeanneney,

leader of the Senate, strongly supported the North Africa initiative, but their

influence diminished by the hour.

How did this calamity happen? How could one of the most stunning

collapses in history ever occur? Whatever had become of glorious France?

Matrix of the Rights of Man, of a revolution that announced to a suffering

humanity an era of liberté, égalité, fraternité, why was she now forfeiting

the sources of her greatness?

Here commence the events of the two weeks that brought French

might to an end and stunned the world.

I

After the excitement following the declaration of war on September 3,

1939, nothing happened. Then suddenly, on May 10, 1940, the German army

unleashed its might on the Low Countries, and furious combat on French

soil ensued. Four days later France faced defeat. Resistance continued here

and there, but for France the contest was over. Early in the morning of May

15, French premier Paul Reynaud rang British prime minister Winston

Churchill to convey the disturbing news: “We have been defeated.” “We are

beaten,” repeated Reynaud. “ We have lost the battle.” Churchill doubted:

“Surely it can’t have happened so soon.” Reynaud insisted: “The front is

broken near Sedan; tanks and armored cars are pouring in great numbers.”

Churchill attempted to dispel the gloom, but Reynaud remained obstinate:

“We are defeated,” he said. “We have lost the battle.”1 At 7 P.M. came a new

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message from Reynaud to Churchill: “The route to Paris is open. Send us all

the planes and all the troops you can.” Two days later Reynaud warned U.S.

president Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the “imminence of the danger.” “On

the western front,” he wrote, “the situation is serious due to Allied inferiority

in men and matériel. It is to be feared that Germany might win the war.”

U.S. ambassador to France William Bullitt was with Minister of

Defense Édouard Daladier on the evening of May 15. They were talking in

Daladier’s office at the War Ministry when the commander-in-chief of the

French forces, General Maurice Gamelin, phoned. Suddenly Daladier

shouted: “No! What you are telling me is impossible. You must be wrong.

It’s not possible.” Daladier turned ashen pale: “We must attack

immediately!” he shouted. “Attack with what?” retorted Gamelin. “My

reserves are gone.” Between Laon and Paris not a single army corps

remained intact. “Then it is the destruction of the French Army?” responded

a stunned Daladier, close to collapse. “Yes,” confirmed Gamelin, “ it is the

destruction of the French Army.” Bullitt left the ministry shortly after 9 P.M.

and immediately sent a dispatch to Washington: “It seems obvious that

failing a miracle like the one of the Marne, the French Army will be totally

crushed.” That same day Premier Paul Reynaud mentioned the name of

Marshal Philippe Pétain for the first time. “If only the marshal were here,”

he told an assistant, “he could influence Gamelin. His wisdom and calm

would be of considerable help.” Thereupon summoning his aide General

Bertrand Pujo, Reynaud instructed him to take that very evening the Sud-

Express to Madrid, where Pétain served as ambassador, and bring the

marshal back to Paris.

Chaos reigned. The chief of the French fleet, François Darlan, wrote

in his journal that evening:

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The Dutch army surrenders. Our high command gives the impression of being disoriented and crushed. All that Gamelin finds to tell me is: “We didn’t deserve all this.” Which needs to be proven. Our troops give up and flee in disorder, because [they are] badly trained, badly equipped, badly armed. There is no aviation. The High Command [is] encrusted in routine and dogmatism, living as far from the troops as an inhabitant of Jupiter from an inhabitant of the earth. No sacred fire, no esprit de corps among the officers, who have become mere functionaries. The men are corrupted by pacifist theories. Paris is in turmoil. The government considers quitting the capital. The Quai d’Orsay [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] burns its papers. Grotesque and disheartening. 2

Churchill arrived in Paris on the sixth day of the German offensive.

Accompanying the prime minister was General K. G. Ismay, who later said

he had “never forgotten the complete dejection on the faces of Reynaud,

Daladier and Gamelin as we entered the room at the Quai d’Orsay. I

remember saying to myself ‘the French High Command are beaten already.’

”3 The Britons met with the French Supreme War Council, which drew a

dark picture of the situation. According to Daladier, “If the Germans got into

Paris, the war would be lost.” Gamelin explained: “North and south of

Sedan, on a front of fifty or sixty miles, the German have broken through the

French Army...[now] destroyed or scattered.” A long silence followed.

Churchill then asked, “Where is the strategic reserve?” repeating his

question in French, “Ou est la masse de manoeuvre?”Gamelin turned to him

with a shake of the head and a shrug: “Nowhere.” When and where did he

propose to attack the flanks of the breakthrough bulge, Churchill asked

Gamelin. The reply: “Inferiority of numbers, inferiority of equipment,

inferiority of method.” Gamelin stopped, shrugging his shoulders

hopelessly.4 Another long pause followed. Churchill later wrote, “Outside in

the garden of the Quai d’Orsay clouds of smoke arose from large bonfires,

and I saw from the window venerable officials pushing wheel-barrows of

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archives onto them. Already therefore the evacuation of Paris was being

prepared.”5 Lack of a strategic reserve with which to turn the tide, Churchill

later admitted, proved to be “one of the greatest surprises I have had in my

life.” Soon the Germans would split the Allied armies, encircle them along

the Channel, and drive toward Paris.

With the British unable or unwilling, in Reynaud’s view, to intervene

in force to save France, Reynaud turned to the United States. “Now began a

series of extraordinary, almost hysterical appeals to the President from

Premier Reynaud,” U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull wrote.6 “The French

Premier was understandably alarmed and excited over the terrific German

victories. But he asked the impossible.” On May 18 Reynaud informed the

U.S. ambassador that he planned to ask President Roosevelt to obtain from

Congress a declaration of war. Such an appeal would do more harm than

good, he was admonished. Only Congress could declare war, and the mood

of the country definitely opposed war. The ambassador was asked to convey

to Roosevelt Reynaud’s conviction: Were France defeated, Britain would be

strangled in short order by German submarines based in French ports and by

German planes based in France and the Low Countries. Also, Hitler would

have little trouble installing Nazi regimes in many South American countries

and thus in the near future would threaten the United States itself as directly

and completely as he was then threatening France. Four days later Reynaud

suggested that were the Germans to gain a spectacular victory in northern

France, Hitler might offer France a separate and generous peace--and the

French people might be inclined to accept it. Were such an offer made to

France, the premier made clear, he hoped Roosevelt would go to Congress

that same day to ask for a declaration of war. No other course would save the

Americans from the Germans.7 Thus began a series of appeals that continued

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until Premier Reynaud left office.

With inevitable defeat imminent, at Bullitt’s suggestion Reynaud

decided on public prayers to protect Paris from the Germans. The Sainte

Geneviève reliquary was taken in procession to the Saint-Etienne-du-Mont

Church, and in the afternoon, following the cabinet’s meeting, a solemn

ceremony reverberated within Notre Dame Cathedral. Reynaud, Pétain, and

a number of ministers listened to the lithany. “Some spoke of a mascherade,”

wrote Jean Daridan, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official. “The sudden piety

of men many of whom rarely set foot in a church could appear suspect.”8

Reynaud suspected the Germans would choose their most victorious

moment to bring the war against France to an end. He proved correct. In

Berlin Nazi leaders deemed France’s position so desperate that the time was

right to induce her to quit. Meanwhile Raoul Nordling, consul general of

Sweden in Paris, had left Stockholm to reach his post by way of Berlin and

Switzerland. Having learned on May 15 of the consul’s presence in the

German capital, Marshal Hermann Goering invited him to meet at Luftwaffe

headquarters. The consul confirmed his intention of returning to Paris, his

trip delayed only because of a railway traffic jam. “I shall place the

necessary means at your disposal,” Goering told him, “because I wish you to

see the French premier as quickly as possible. Tell Paul Reynaud that

nothing will change the course of events. He should make immediate

proposals for an armistice. We are ready to grant France reasonable

conditions. But he must hurry if he wishes to avoid total occupation and the

crushing of his country. The offer that I am authorized to make today will

not be renewed. The more France delays to recognize the evidence, the more

severe our conditions will become.” Consul General Nordling reached Paris

on May 17 and immediately requested an interview with Premier Reynaud,

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who would see him only on the 20th. The premier’s mood grew somber

when he heard the news. Goering, it appeared, was promising France a

separate peace. After thanking the consul, Reynaud asked him to make no

mention of Goering’s message. 9Although the consul promised silence, he

failed to keep his word. In 1942 he mentioned the offer to Admiral Darlan,

then head of government.

In making their offer the Germans undoubtedly knew of a party in the

British cabinet, led by the foreign secretary, Lord Halifax, amenable to

discussing acceptable terms. “Should we [British] be offered such terms,

Lord Halifax considered it doubtful whether we should be wise to refuse

them.” But Churchill, who according to Halifax “talked the most frightful

rot,” remained dead set against compromise.10

Politicians and historians have endlessly debated why France

collapsed. Opinions diverge to this day. A country with France’s military

traditions and industrial capacity going under in less than a month--the

possibility defied imagination. When hostilities broke out, the French High

Command showed not the least worry. To the contrary, the brass felt certain

the Germans would soon be on the run. Gamelin appeared cheerful and

relaxed, expecting the attack to founder before France’s impregnable wall of

defenses. French strategy consisted of a continuous front, a figurative wall

of steel, protecting the country against invasion. Alas, the continuous front

lasted exactly two days! The High Command ignored the blitzkrieg, refusing

to believe that the strategy that had brought Poland to its knees in two weeks

would also defeat France. Although Polish General Wladyslaw Sikorski had

briefed the French High Command about his country’s war experience, his

recommendations went unheeded.

“The collapse of the French army was the most important event of the

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20th century,” wrote military analyst General André Beaufre. “Our fall

destroyed in Europe an equilibrium that the ages had laboriously achieved

and maintained. Europe, mother of our modern civilization, found itself

amputated of its western counterweight.”11 Why the debacle? “The French

army represented a vast inefficient instrument, incapable of swift

reactions..., totally inadapted for the offensive, and consequently for the

manoeuvre. The machine was old, rusty and dusty. A new battle of the

Marne [whicht saved France during World War I] would have been

impossible irrespective of the valor of the supreme commander.”12

Had France adopted General Charles de Gaulle’s proposal for a

professional army equipped with tanks, would the country have known a

different fate? Correct in theory, the assumption fails to consider the

country’s condition at the time. France felt bitter, ideologically split down

the middle and lacking all sense of adventure; aged, it was hostile to all risk

taking and wanting in spirit of enterprise, aspiring only to security. Such an

attitude fostered the myth of total protection behind fortifications and

engendered a defensive strategy. The French military doctrine of 1940

reflected the mood of the country, a mood incompatible with an aggressive

strategy of movement.13

The French High Command would never admit to wrongdoing.

Military doctrine reflected the country’s mood, that’s all. Politicians would

have it no other way. Politicians, not the generals, bear responsibility for

France’s defeat. They are to blame, not the army. Such would become the

official doctrine under the Vichy government. Also responsible were the

British. Had they agreed to thrown their entire airforce into battle, the

French might have turned the tide. Churchill was blamed for refusing. “In

spite of every kind of pressure,” Churchill later recalled, “we never would

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allow the entire Metropolitan strength of the Air Force, in fighters, to be

consumed. This decision was painful, but it was also right, because the

fortunes of the battle in France could not have been decisively affected, even

if we had thrown in our entire fighter force. The battle was lost.”14 To

sacrifice British planes would no longer serve a useful purpose. French

Commander-in-Chief Gamelin remained unconvinced. Fighter planes were

needed to give the French army confidence, he maintained, as well as to stop

the tanks. No, Churchill replied: It is the business of the artillery to stop the

tanks.

This view proved troubling to the British. They did not want history to

record that they had failed to do their share. Churchill felt he had to meet the

French part way. On the evening of May 16 the British cabinet informed him

it had accepted his proposal to bring fighter strength in France up to ten

squadrons. Accompanied by General Sir Hastings Ismay, the British prime

minister proceeded to Reynaud’s flat. “We found it more or less in

darkness,” Ismay notes, “the only sign of life in the sitting room being a

lady’s fur coat. M. Reynaud emerged from his bedroom in his dressing gown

and you [Churchill] told him the glad news. You then persuaded him to send

for M. Daladier, who was duly woken up and brought to the flat to hear the

decision of the British Cabinet.”15 The lady’s fur coat belonged to the

Countess de Portes, Reynaud’s mistress, whom we shall meet again in our

account of the terrible weeks that witnessed the collapse of France.

How could this have occurred? France had never fully recovered from

the consequences of World War I. Most of the war had been fought on

French soil. The French had lost 140 million peoples, the cream of their

youth, and suffered over .5 million severely injured. Material losses had

been staggering, for the Kaiser’s troops had destroyed everything along their

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path of withdrawal. Thus France had suffered enormously materially as well

as morally. Most French believed their country’s postwar role unequal to her

sacrifices, and a deep sense of bitterness and betrayal seeped into French

politics. France adapted neither smoothly nor well to the realities of the

postwar world.

Suffering from this sense of alienation, the political life of the country

split into contending factions. Right and left did not coexist; they were at

war. Especially significant and troubling was the emergence of a communist

party that had abandoned Socialist ranks to undermine traditional French

social values. French communism became the French branch of the

Moscow-centered Communist International. Simultaneously, various right-

wing movements and parties took shape as a reaction to the new

communism and out of bitterness over France’s diminished role in the world.

They claimed justification in French history and were often anti-Semitic.

One, the Croix-de-Feu movement, counted a million members. Another, the

Camelots du Roi, a monarchist organization dedicated to the violent

overthrow of the Republic, was particularly active. Numerous organizations

with similar general aims sprung up throughout France. Understanding only

the language of violence, in 1934 the right provoked disorders that nearly

brought the Republic to its knees.

Reacting to the right’s provocations, 12 million workers participated

in a general strike. After a long-lasting trial of strength, Léon Blum formed a

government, the Popular Front, which included communists. This

government introduced reforms to which the French are attached to this day,

but the wealthy classes viewed the presence of communists as a direct threat

to their own existence. A certain Eugène Deloncle formed the Secret

Committee of Revolutionary Action, better known as Cagoule, a

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paramilitary organization for which the best instrument of policy was

murder. Many of its leaders were thrown into jail only to be freed later by

the Vichy government, which made good use of their services. A few joined

de Gaulle and the Free French.

In this politically tense atmosphere with deep ideological undertones,

a weak center had difficulties surviving. yet the center, underrepresented and

easily destabilized, provided the only alternative government. Worldwide

economic depression following the Wall Street crash of 1929--a debacle

from which France did not escape and that tightened her already weak

financial resources--provided another source of tension. Efforts to prepare

France for war must be considered against this background.

Communists preached unilateral disarmament, war being by definition

imperialist. The right believed France’s problems could be solved only by

coming to terms with Adolph Hitler and Benito Mussolini. The center, in

contrast, favored preparedness through rearmament--especially with Marshal

Pétain and General Maxime Weygand occupying official positions in the

military establishment. Unfortunately, the official doctrine on an exclusively

defensive army constrained the center: The country must be ready to

withstand any attack, but not to carry war beyond its borders. Despite

economic crises and financial strictures, Parliament had always dealt

generously with the military, allocating huge sums to various programs.

Indeed, a major effort toward modernizing the armed forces was undertaken

by the Popular Front government in the years before the outbreak of

hostilities, but the prevailing mood of the country, pacifist and favoring

disarmament, evident in the enthusiastic response to the Munich accords,

prevented a total overhaul. France thus declared war without being prepared

for it.

13

Political and ideological divisions pulled governments in opposite

directions. On the left, a majority of Socialists supported the war effort,

though a substantial minority stuck to a tradition of pacifism and

antimilitarism. The right, after working for years to sabotage the institutions

of the Third Republic and the hated parliamentary system, found that the

moment had come for translating its programs into action. Past supporters of

the Munich agreement with Nazi Germany; representatives of great

industrial and financial institutions who detested the Popular Front leftist

experience and felt that “Hitler is better than Léon Blum”; monarchists

dreaming of a royal comeback; pro-fascist individuals, many of whom, news

reporters in particular, had benefited from large emoluments from the

German and Italian embassies; the dreaded Cagoule, unrepentant

homegrown fascists--all advocated an agreement with Nazi Germany to end

the conflict “honorably.” The war, they proclaimed, was a national tragedy.

The Fifth Column found the climate ideal to sap confidence in the

cause for which the war was fought. German propaganda told the French

they were fighting England’s war. A particularly vicious, but effective,

Anglophobe campaign was conducted by Radio Stuttgart, where a French

renegade called Ferdonnet (he will be executed after the war) constantly

preached that “England intends to fight to the last Frenchman,” or that

“England provides the machines, the French their breasts.” Letters mailed to

France from neutral countries carried German propaganda. Loudspeakers

placed near the front lines pleaded with French soldiers to heed Hitler’s offer

and seek peace: “French soldier, you are being fooled. Do you know the

results of the Polish campaign? Why has Germany not yet attacked you?

Simply because a new butchery would serve no purpose” (March 8, 1940),

“Do you really wish for total war to begin: the shock will be terrible. It is for

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you to decide” (April 23, 1940). Jews became scapegoats as anti-Semitism

flourished. It was said: “This war is a crime against France, defeat is

inevitable. The Jews have won.” 16

For eight months, from September 3 1939, to May 10, 1940, all

remained quiet along the front. Then attention focused directed almost

exclusively on hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union following

the Red Army invasion on November 30, 1940. The main issues were

whether to declare war on Moscow, how to help the Finns in their resistance,

and whether to organize an expeditionary corps. France provided Finland

with 175 planes, 436 cannons, 5,000 machineguns, 400 sea mines, and

200,000 grenades. The Soviet Union, it seemed, not Nazi Germany, was the

enemy. To declare war on the Soviet Union, it was argued, could, at the

opportune moment, facilitate an understanding with Germany. Finland

became an issue around which the French, from the extreme right to the left,

could unite. Communists represented the only exception. “All workers greet

with joy the assistance provided by the Red Army to the Finnish proletariat,”

proclaimed a clandestine issue of L’Humanité, the communist party organ.

The Balkans drew the usual attention, with various Byzantine policies

tried and discarded. What would the Turkish position be? Diplomatic

activity also centered on Mussolini’s Italy with the intent of convincing il

Duce to stay out of the conflict. This effort produced an almost incessant

flow of dispatches between Paris and Rome. British policies during the same

period were largely followed suite, with the fate of Finland at the center of

foreign policy concerns. To confuse matters further, in the spring Roosevelt

sent Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles to Europe to investigate the

possibility of peace. Welles met European leaders, Hitler included, and was

duly impressed by Mussolini. On his return to Paris from London, however,

15

Welles found a vast number of letters insulting him for having met with

former premier Léon Blum, a Jew. “Peace” reigned as a leitmotif in the

United States, too, and Roosevelt was up for reelection.

Hitler exploited the “phony war” most ably. With the submission of

Poland, he kept repeating, his territorial ambitions had been satisfied. The

Allies had no reason to fight. France and England had initiated the war:

They could now stop it. Peace in Europe, the Führer declared, was his

overriding ambition. French citizens of various political shades considered

Hitler reasonable and urged that his offers be accepted. They chose to ignore

that while talking peace, Hitler was pushing the war machine at a furious

pace, making up for losses suffered during the Polish campaign and creating

a number of new divisions.

As Germany readied for war and drove its army to a pitch of

unprecedented fanaticism, the French continued debating by what margin

the German army was better equipped than their own. Later, to justify their

defeat the French alleged a crushing German superiority not in fact

mentioned at the time. General Heinz Guderian, who led the bulk of German

armor into action, disposed of 3,500 tanks, far less than the 7,000-7,500

alleged by the French military. The French boasted an equal number of

tanks, slower than the German equivalent, but often more solidly built.

“Crushing German armor superiority” was the French generals’ invention to

justify their own incompetence. The Riom show trial, organized by the

Vichy government against presumed organizers of the defeat, revealed that

hundreds of tanks, the equivalent of several armored divisions, were left in

arsenals. “It is appalling,” former premier and minister of war Édouard

Daladier stated at the trial, “that the Germans, in the course of their advance

through France, should discover huge quantities of modern war matériel. It’s

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incredible. It is without precedent in French history.” In a deposit at Gien the

Germans found 500 new tanks good enough for them to use on the Russian

front.

As concerns the airforce, figures prove more controversial and

contradictory, with French inferiority quite evident. The full story has never

been told, probably to shield French mistakes. Appearing after the war

before the Commission of Inquiry of the Assemblée Nationale, General

Gamelin testified under oath that on May 10 France disposed of “about

2,000 fighter planes of recent model. But of these 2,000 planes there were,

equipped and with the armies, but 900, out of which, according to the figure

given by General d’Harcourt, Superior Commander of Fighters, only 418

were engaged in the battle.” 17 Gamelin summed up his testimony with these

words: “What is the mystery which exists in this domain of aviation? I must

humbly admit that I know nothing. [Je n’en sais rien.]”18 According to

former air minister Guy La Chambre, 2,500 planes were found intact and

unused in the free zone after the armistice, together with tons of military

equipment of every type dispersed throughout the territory.

Widespread conviction that the country had been left utterly alone to

fight in defense of democracy against Nazi tyranny contributed to poor

French morale. Allies, it was alleged, had abandoned France, one after the

other. The Poles had been expected to resist for several months, but caught

in a German and Soviet pincer, they were compelled to give up the struggle

quickly. Overwhelmed, the Belgians and the Dutch surrendered in a matter

of days. The British had provided only 10 divisions (down from 50 during

World War I) and quite understandably refused to commit their airforce

fully, withholding the bulk for protection of the British Isles. Whereas in

World War I the United States had sent 2 million men to France--making the

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difference between victory and defeat--the Americans were now absent and

just beginning to arm. Left alone, the French felt free to blame the rest of the

world for their misfortunes. And they did.

II

Their defensive policy led the French to engage in a war they could

not win. At the start of World War II, the Anglo-French had 110 divisions,

the Germans more than twice that number. In 1940 only the Soviet army

might have made the difference between French defeat and victory. Poland

and Romania, however, refused to allow the Soviets to cross their territory to

reach the German border. Negotiations so lacked in enthusiasm that Moscow

concluded the Allies were not serious and turned, instead, to Berlin.

The only alternative to battle was to starve Germany into submission.

The Norway campaign designed to deprive Germany of iron ore from

Sweden might seriously have hurt German industry had it succeeded, but the

campaign was badly organized and badly conducted. The Germans moved

quickly to neutralize it by occupying Norway. Another plan under

consideration aimed to deprive Germany of oil needed for its war machine.

Targeted were not only Romania’s oil production facilities but also oil fields

in the Soviet Union. On January 19 Premier Daladier ordered the military to

“prepare a project concerning an eventual intervention for the destruction of

Russian oil.” A General Jean-Marie Bergeret went so far as to propose a

pincer strategy from Petsamo to the north and Baku to the south to enable

the French to join up in Moscow! Also considered was a project that

involved General Weygand, then military commander in the Levant. It

consisted in air raids against oil production facilities at Baku on the Caspian

Sea. Weygand suggested that attacking the Soviet Union would be “as easy

as cutting through butter.” U.S. ambassador William Bullitt summed up the

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situation in a dispatch to the State Department: “The French position is that

France will not break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or declare

war on the Soviet Union but will if possible destroy the Soviet Union--using

cannon if necessary.”19

Considering the plan too risky, the British refused to go along. To

push Russia even closer to Germany was not in the Allies’ interest, they felt.

Further, consequence would be far-ranging: Soviet submarines action against

Allied shipping, the Murmansk base placed at Hitler’s disposal, and Soviet

attacks against the oil fields of the Anglo-Iranian Company, as well as the

danger of seeing Turkey distancing herself from the

Allies.20

Abandoning all hope of strangling Germany economically, France had

but one alternative: the field of battle. The French confidently believed they

could compensate for their inferiority in numbers and quality of matériel by

relying on the defensive strategy that had prevailed, as noted earlier, since

the end of World War I: a straight line of defense along the length of the

French border acting as a wall of steel to sustain and repel any attacks, no

matter how powerful. For a country with a population half that of Germany,

this plan seemed not without merit. But by taking some of their best French

and British divisions north of the defensive line, deeply into Belgium, where

they were threatened with encirclement and destruction, the military ignored

its own doctrine. The British managed to get the bulk of their forces out at

Dunkerque; meanwhile, the Belgian king surrendered his army and the

French forces were either captured or destroyed. Havingh penetrated deeply

into France through the Ardennes forest, considered by the French

impenetrable, the Germans now moved unhampered toward Paris. Why the

Germans had abstained from attacking the Allied force from the air now

19

became clear: It was a way of inviting them to move ever deeper into

Belgium! With the encirclement completed, 1.2 million French, Belgian, and

British soldiers became prisoners of war. France’s northern strategy had

proven fatal.

With officers often lacking competence and a sense of purpose,

discipline disintegrated and army units soon ceased being organized bodies.

“I shall putrefy their war,” Hitler had once declared. The common soldier

could not fail to be painfully influenced by what he saw around him. Some 6

million of his compatriots and 2 million Belgians fled before the advancing

Wehrmacht, crowding the routes with makeshift transports, impeding

military movements, facing strafing from the air to add fresh terror to their

exodus. Numbed by panic, the fleeing millions were unsure where to go or

what the next day would bring.

Pursuing their advance, the Germans reached Rennes and the Loire

River above Tours. The Tenth Army took position in Brittany but lost contact

with the rest of the forces. The third group presented a semblance of

cohesion but was reduced to 10 to 12 divisions whose flanks had already

been overtaken by German units moving down the coast on the left and on

the right east of Nevers. The fourth group of armies had practically

disappeared, leaving a hole in the front extending from Nevers to the valley

of the Saône. The second group of armies (nine divisions) was surrounded in

the Vosges and lacked food and munitions. The Army of the Alps remained

intact but had only four divisions with which to contain the Italian attack.

The equivalent of 20 to 23 French divisions were now opposing 120 German

divisions.

III

20

As the French drama unfolded, comparison with World War I became

inevitable. At the time of the Great War the French government had been

led by a man of inflexible will, Georges Clemenceau, who well deserved the

title of Le Tigre, the tiger. Leading with an iron, often brutal hand, he

allowed nothing to stand in the way of victory. All members of his cabinet

dedicated themselves to the same task and pulled in the same direction. Of

the premier who led the country in 1940, one can say only that he was no

Clemenceau.

Paul Reynaud had become premier the previous March, replacing

Édouard Daladier, a traditional Third Republic politician in power too long

through a variety of arrangements then typical, though many believed him

too weak to lead France in wartime. He was a man of considerable

intelligence, of medium height and build, his slanting eyes resembling those

of a Latin American Indian. Apparently conscious of his unattractive

features, he compensated with elegant clothes and personal style. He

enjoyed and sought the society of the “beau monde,” the fashionable and the

renowned. Politically, though, he was a loner, which exacted a price. During

the years preceding the war he courageously went against the current of

pacifists and skeptics who peopled the society from which he issued. His

opposition to fascism in all its forms had been total, and he condemned all

compromises with the dictators, including the Munich Pact. Colonel de

Gaulle, whose views he adopted, convinced him of the urgency of

overhauling the country’s military structures. Belonging to the center-right

in the political spectrum, in his governmental career he had almost

exclusively dealt with economic and financial issues. He had been minister

of the colonies, of finances, and of justice, but never of national defense.

21

During the two months former premier Daladier, a political and personal

antagonist, served as minister of defense, Reynaud was deliberately kept

misinformed about the military situation.

Reynaud owned his premiership largely to his opposition to deal with

Hitler and Mussolini. His close ties to Great Britain, especially after Winston

Churchill became prime minister, helped him also. But at the same time he

suffered a serious handicap for a man leading a country at war: He had never

headed a political party on whose support he could count. His cabinet had

been confirmed by a one-vote majority, and some critics at the time doubted

the counting had been correct. Reynaud sought to compensate for this lack

of solid political backing by relying on different, at times contrasting,

currents in the name of national unity. He chose collaborators and associates

largely on personal connections and alliances without apparently measuring

the political implications. Some of his entourage exerted a harmful influence

and shared in the responsibility for the venomous atmosphere that led to

disaster. Particularly unhappy had been his choice of deputy at the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, Paul Baudouin, a former banker and a rightist once

overheard to say that France had perhaps chosen the wrong allies. Also

unfortunate was his appointment of Yves Bouthillier, a routine reactionary

and in 1935 an important member of Pierre Laval’s brain trust, as minister of

finances. In a dispatch of June 6 to Roosevelt, Ambassador Bullitt wrote of

the first that “he is the official of the Banque de l’Indo-Chine who

conducted, with invariable success and without a single loss, speculations

against the franc on information received from various Ministers of Finances

whose duty it was to support the franc with the money of the French

taxpayer,” and of the second that he was “a stupid functionary who will do

anything he is told to do.”

22

Baudouin had championed a close understanding with Germany. In a

January 1938 article for La Revue de Paris, he maintained that “no problem

separates France from Germany” and advocated “the possibility and

necessity of an understanding with Germany.” Fervent Christian and fervent

pan-Latin, he advocated a Mediterranean Catholic union joining France,

Italy, Spain, and Portugal. He looked forward to a postwar France capable of

reducing the “perturbing influence of the French Revolution.” Wishing to

concentrate his time and energies on the war effort, Reynaud had

empowered Baudouin to take any decisions required in his capacity as

minister of foreign affairs. Thus, foreign relations became, in fact,

Baudouin’s exclusive domain. As for Bouthillier, he was known for his pro-

Munich position and his Anglophobia. (They, as well as other ministers such

as Vice-President Camille Chautemps, Minister of Transportation Anatole de

Monzie, and Minister of Labor Charles Pomaret, will become mainstays of

the Vichy regime.) Reynaud’s secretariat comprised people interested only in

preserving their own influence and given to conspiring with the premier’s

mistress, Madame de Portes, a defeatist and an intriguer.

Born Hélène Rebuffel, daughter of the head of a large public works

enterprise in Marseilles, Madame de Portes thought of herself as the power

behind the throne. According to two acute observers of the French political

scene, Pertinax and Jean Chauvel, she had another kind of influence on

Reynaud: She wanted to flaunt him in fashionable society. “Too many

parties,” wrote Pertinax, “too many endless lunches and dinners where the

minister, on display, felt obliged to dazzle fools and idiots. He had no time

for solitary meditation and reflection. Reynaud developed his ideas in

conversations with casual acquaintances. Poincaré, Clemenceau, Millerand

and Briand almost never went out. Reynaud was never at home. His way of

23

life condemned him to perpetually fritter away his time.” More severe,

Chauvel expresses the same idea: “She turned him into a dandy in a

unwholesome world.”21

Reynaud and Daladier detested each other, each doing his best to

undermine the other’s authority. This hostility hurt the country and may have

contributed to the disasters that followed. To make matters worse, the two

men’s mistresses got into the act, poking up the fire of distrust.

Novelist and biographer André Maurois, who knew both men

intimately, wrote:

Daladier, after the death of his wife, had for his Egeria the Marquise of C. [Jeanne de Crussol]. This gracious and beautiful woman, blonde and youthful in appearance, had a taste for power and an unfortunate passion for economic and political doctrines. But she knew how to keep herself in the background, she never tried to show off her great man to the world and her discreet influence was not, on the whole, very harmful. On the other hand, Paul Reynaud’s friend, the Countess de P. [Portes], was slightly mad, excitable, meddlesome and, as the course of events was to show, dangerous.

One day when I had criticized in Reynaud’s presence a particularly unsuitable political appointment made by Daladier:

“It was not his choice, Reynaud said, “it was hers.”“That is no excuse,” I said.“Ah,” said he, “you do not know what a man who has been hard at

work all day will put up with to make sure of an evening’s peace.”...From the very start of the war the dominant characteristic of

Madame de P. seemed to be ambition. She filled the salons of Paris with accounts of Daladier’s lack of energy, and gave everyone to understand that it was urgent that Reynaud should succeed him. Naturally, these remarks were repeated the same evening to Daladier and the latter’s detestation of Paul Reynaud grew constantly stronger.22

That a mistress enjoyed a semiofficial position in the life of a

statesman caused not the slightest scandal in France. To the contrary,

mistresses tended to be treated with even greater respect than legitimate

wives. After all, if they managed to seduce a man of importance, they must

24

have shown character and determination. And hadn’t the kings of France had

mistresses too, some of whom marked the country’s history?

Faced with a disastrous military situation, and in the hope of

energizing the country’s will to fight and of consolidating his personal

position, on May 18 Reynaud took Marshal Pétain, 84, into his cabinet and

named General Maxime Weygand, 72, commander-in-chief. It is difficult to

realize today, when we know the extent of Vichy’s collaboration with Nazi

Germany, to what immense prestige Pétain enjoyed at the time.

Born of peasant stock in 1859, a date closer to the 1815 Battle of

Waterloo that defeated NapoLéon than to the Great War of 1914-1918,

Pétain was essentially a l9th-century man. He had little understanding or

liking for 20th-century ways. In his time most French had been farmers who

passionately loved their soil, “which does not lie,” and who provided the

bulk of the army he led in World War I. The “isms” that characterized

postwar politics lay beyond his understanding. Despite his background he

had never been a rightist in the traditional sense. He rose to prominence late

in life: He was 61 years old when he won the epochal battle of Verdun and

64 when he got married to a divorced woman. His reputation of caring for

the welfare of the common soldier ingratiated him with the left. Parliament,

both the right and the left, greeted his nomination as the number two in the

government with enthusiasm. Socialist leader Léon Blum spoke of the

marshal’s “modesty, gravity, his pondered and sensitive consciousness” and

was scandalized when this “most noble and human of our military chiefs”

was named ambassador to Francisco Franco’s Spain. Conspiracy theories

brought up at Pétain’s postwar trial were never really proven. When the

marshal took power in August 1940, his ambition was not to align France

with fascism but simply to take the country back to what she had been the

25

previous century.

Once appointed to his new post, Pétain named as his chef de cabinet

Raphaël Alibert, a jurist with an ambition to rewrite the constitution of the

Republic, an anti-Semite, and an important member of the fascist Cagoule.23

Doctor Bernard Menetrel, Pétain’s personal physician and confidant,

described Alibert as “affected by megalomania, with a certain tendency

toward mental unbalance, characterized by periods of agitation alternating

with periods of mental depression.” Later Alibert became his minister of

justice and closest adviser. His influence proved perverse.

During the interwar years Pétain occupied a number of important

posts in the military establishment. Contrary to the impression postwar

polemics conveyed, Pétain showed a clear understanding of the country’s

defense needs but was handicapped, as we saw, by two political

considerations: that France should have a defensive army capable of

repelling any attack but not extending war outside her borders; that the

serious economic crisis that limited the availability of financial resources

come to an end. Parliament, which held the power of the purse, mirrored the

country’s political alignments, among which pacifism and the campaign for

disarmament played prominent parts.

Pétain had been among the first to stress the importance of the

warplane in any future conflict and had urged repeatedly for an increase of

tanks and armored cars, but he opposed creation of professional army units

as suggested by the then colonel Charles de Gaulle. (Incidentally, de Gaulle

failed to implement his project when he became president.) Also, French

industry lagged far behind Germany’s and took much longer to produce

modern arms. Another negative factor was government instability: Between

1931 and 1935, with General Weygand as commander-in-chief, the country

26

saw a succession of twelve governments and nine war ministers. Which

government was responsible for what proves difficult to determine as a

result.

Maxime Weygand’s appointment as commander-in-chief

corresponded to Reynaud’s desire to consolidate power. The general, too,

had gained a reputation in World War I but had always been considered a

brilliant second rather than a leader of men. His extreme right-wing views

and intransigent Catholicism came into play when, as France faced military

collapse, his main concern became how to prevent the communists from

taking advantage of the situation. “As an ardently religious Catholic,”

Churchill wrote, “he saw in the ruin which had overwhelmed his country the

chastisement of God for its abandonment of the Christian faith.”24

Weygand’s appointment had horrified Daladier. “What is the matter with

Reynaud? He is crazy. You do not change horses in the middle of a river.

And with whom does he replace Gamelin? That Weygand, he is a fool.” His

aide Jean Daridan, to whom these remarks had been addressed, asked, If

Weygand is a fool why not look for a brigadier general to get us out of the

mess in which we have sunk? “Of all brigadier generals only two are

worthwhile, de Gaulle and de Lattre,” Daladier replied.25

Reynaud had hoped to find in the two military men a strong backing

for his policies and the determination to fight to the bitter end, but he in fact

became their prisoner. They pursued policies exactly contrary to his own and

in the end were his undoing. Their appointment proved a fatal mistake. Both

men bore responsibility for France’s lack of preparedness; but far more

serious, both hated all that Republican France stood for. They were among

the first to urge France to seek an armistice and thus an end to war.

Expressing determination never to abandon the soil of France, they branded

27

as cowards and self-seekers those favorable to continuing the struggle from

overseas. Their prestige made them untouchable, and Reynaud soon became

captive. To keep them would strengthen the party of surrender; to drop them

would provoke an upheaval from which neither Reynaud nor his government

could recover. Meanwhile other generals, still supportive of war, were

assigned vital tasks in recognition of reputations gained during World War I.

Shortly following his appointment, on June 4, a mere two weeks after

the launching of the German offensive, Marshal Pétain told Ambassador

Bullitt, in the course of a luncheon, that “the British after a very brief

resistance, or even without resistance would make a peace of compromise

with Hitler, which might even involve a British Government under a British

Fascist leader.” He added that unless the British sent to France “to engage in

the battle which was imminent both its air force and reserve divisions the

French Government would do its utmost to come to terms immediately with

Germany whatever might happen to England.” “It was not fair,” he felt, “for

any French Government to permit the British to behave in a totally callous

and selfish manner while demanding the sacrifice of every able-bodied

Frenchman.”26 To think that Pétain had been appointed vice-premier to

strengthen the country’s will to fight!

Pétain revealed his true colors in a July 1 conversation, once more

with Bullitt. In a dispatch to President Roosevelt, the ambassador quoted

Pétain as saying that “he expected Germany to crush England rapidly and

make her chief demand at the expense of England. Germany probably

would annex certain portions of France and would probably control the

whole of France through economic arrangements but...England would be

destroyed by Germany and that while Germany would take French Morocco

and other French possessions on the Atlantic coast of Africa she would also

28

take South Africa and Canada if the United States should be defeated...

[T]he Italians would take Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria and perhaps some

portions of continental France...Algeria would be permitted to remain in

French hands.”

Admiral Darlan had similar sentiments: “He said that he felt certain

that Hitler would attack the United States shortly after disposing of England

and equally certain that the defenses of the United States would prove to be

as vulnerable as those of England.” The admiral also felt convinced that “if

Great Britain should win the war the treatment that would be accorded to

France would be no more generous than the treatment accorded by

Germany.” 27

Such at the time was the mood of the country, as Ambassador

Anthony Biddle, who accompanied the French government to Bordeaux

while Bullitt stayed on in Paris, was to report: “A latent state of mind,

prepared to accept defeatism, ran like an undercurrent through the minds of

France - not in government circles alone, but probably throughout the

country at large. It was like a rising tide that quietly permeated. Hence, few

were surprised to learn that France was defeated, and not sufficiently

enangered to react.”28

Confronted with unprecedented military disaster, what was France to

do? The Belgian king had surrendered to the Nazis, and on May 24 the

British had began evacuating their forces at Dunkirk. President of the

Republic Albert Lebrun, Paul Reynaud, and the highest military leaders held

a War Committee conference on May 25. According to Admiral Darlan,

Premier Reynaud had been the first to mention armistice. To Lebrun’s

question “What are we going to do if there no longer is an army?” Reynaud

is said to have replied: “We shall freely examine the enemy’s proposals.” “It

29

is not gay this deliberation,” Lebrun commented, his eyes filled with tears. 29

For the first time General Weygand alluded to an end to the struggle.

“France has committed an immense mistake of going to war without

possessing the material required nor the military doctrine adapted to the

situation,” Weygand declared. “It is possible that France will have to pay for

this imprudence.” Paul Reynaud thought, “The enemy might not be ready to

concede an immediate armistice.” Lebrun gave the impression of hoping for

German “peace offers.” He made clear that though France had committed

itself not to seek a separate peace, “We must nevertheless, if Germany were

to offer us relatively advantageous conditions, to examine them closely and

decide with a cool head.” Pétain merely compared Britain’s modest war

effort to France’s: 10 divisions against 80. Weygand, for his part, worried

about the troubles the army’s total collapse might produce. That afternoon

Reynaud met the president of the Senate, Jules Jeanneney, to ask whether to

submit eventual German peace conditions to the Chamber of Deputies and

the Senate.30

The premier had obvious doubts about which course to follow. The

government was considering a number of initiatives, among them a charm

offensive, useless and pitiful, meant to convince Mussolini he did not need

to enter the war because his territorial claims would be satisfied at the peace

table. All advances were rebuffed. Meanwhile, one of Reynaud’s ministers,

Jean Ybarnegaray, undertook a strange mission in Madrid. Ybarnegaray

suggested Latin countries unite to free the Mediterranean of the servitude

represented by British control over Suez and Gibraltar.31

A climate of incertitude prevailed. Five days prior to the cabinet

meeting, Reynaud had received a peace offer from Filed Marshal Goering.

On approximately the same date the Germans had sounded out the British

30

through Sweden with offers to come to terms, namely, to partition the world

between Nazi Germany and the British Empire. The main condition was

British renunciation of intervention in European affairs. The British

establishment was not united in its hostility to exploring German terms.

Things might have followed a different course had Britain not recently

acquired a new prime minister in the person of Winston Churchill.

Reynaud’s cabinet split more or less openly between followers of

Pétain and Weygand desiring to come to terms with the advancing enemy

and a shrinking group determined to keep fighting. Intending to isolate the

defeatists, on June 5 Reynaud reshuffled his cabinet by including people he

thought would support him but who in the end let him down. A notable

exceptions. was Georges Mandel, the iron-willed former collaborator of

Clemenceau, who was named minister of the interior. Another choice with

immense consequences for the future was Charles de Gaulle.

On May 24 de Gaulle wrote to his wife: “I am a general as of

yesterday. I learned it from a letter that Paul Reynaud, minister of war, had

delivered to me at the front and in which he announced he had signed my

promotion on General Weygand’s proposal.”32 He had been given the

temporary title of brigadier general.

A passionate advocate of the warfare the Germans had adopted, de

Gaulle wrote brilliant books with considerable repercussions in France and

abroad. Yet the military establishment had refused to listen. Reynaud had

become an advocate of de Gaulle’s theories and tried to push them, but

without success, through Parliament. Reynaud also shared de Gaulle’s

conviction that neither undisputed German dominance over Europe nor

Britain’s defeat would resolve the issue of the war.

Convincing evidence shows that as the Germans overran the

31

Netherlands and Belgium, de Gaulle approved Commander-in-Chief

Gamelin’s decision to send a French army into Belgium. Unconvinced by

Gamelin’s reasoning, Reynaud worried; that de Gaulle, an officer in whom

he had confidence, should agree completely with someone he so distrusted,

like General Gamelin, much surprised the premier.33

After commanding a division brilliantly, though unsuccessfully, on

June 5 de Gaulle became undersecretary of state for national defense. Like

Pétain aghast at the news of de Gaulle’s appointment, Weygand saw the new

undersecretary as “a child.” De Gaulle was 49 years old. The press, in

contrast, greeted the news with enthusiasm, a feeling shared by several

politicians, Léon Blum among others.

De Gaulle suggested to Reynaud that he be put in charge of measures

to enable France to continue the struggle. Agreeing, Reynaud ordered him to

proceed to London to reassure the British of France’s determination to fight

on and to ask them for increased participation on land and in the air. Worried

lest the prevailing pessimism, evident to the British, convince London that

France had no more fight in her, the premier especially wanted the British to

know he played no role in the widespread discussions concerning an

armistice.34 Reynaud’s instructed de Gaulle to cooperate with Robert

Schuman, in charge of refugees, in organizing the rear and in securing

London’s cooperation in efforts to pursue the war.

Before leaving for London, de Gaulle called on General Weygand,

giving of their exchange a version the generalissimo later denied. De Gaulle

said he had insisted on the worldwide character of the war, whereas

Weygand had expressed the conviction that once France was beaten,

England would negotiate within a week. Weygand is supposed to have

added, “Ah! if only I were sure the Germans would leave me the forces

32

necessary for maintaining order!”35

On Sunday, June 9, de Gaulle left for London to confer with Sir John

Dill, imperial chief of staff, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Foreign

Minister Anthony Eden. “Churchill received me at Downing Street,” de

Gaulle wrote. “It was my first contact with him. The impression he gave me

confirmed me in my conviction that Great Britain, led by such a fighter,

would certainly not flinch. Mr. Churchill seemed to me to be equal to the

rudest task, provided it had also grandeur.”36 The next day de Gaulle met

with Churchill, on whom he “had made a very favorable impression,”37 to

convey a personal message from Paul Reynaud. “Mr. Reynaud wanted Mr.

Churchill to know that in the present, very difficult circumstances we are

actually confronting, England can be fully confident of the determination of

France and its government to fight and to resist. The battle is engaged; we

are fighting relentlessly on practically all the front. No matter how important

our losses may be, the battle will continue and the perseverance of the

government and the High Command will not be in any way affected.”

Churchill expressed his satisfaction.

The following day French ambassador Charles Corbin informed Paris,

“According to information from people close to the Prime Minister, the

conversations Mr. Churchill had yesterday with General de Gaulle left him

favorably impressed. It would be good if these conversations could take

place regularly so that the Prime Minister might be kept informed of the

French government’s views of the military situation. These conversations

would give the Under Secretary of State the possibility of presenting and

justifying the needs of our ground and airforces.”38

How would the British, who refused to live in a world dominated by

Hitler, react to the collapse of a nation once friendly and allied? Earlier, on

33

March 28, France and Great Britain had agreed never to seek a separate

armistice or peace. The terms of the agreement left France honor bound to

stay in the war so long as the British did. The war on the continent lost,

France’s alternative to breaking her commitment to the British was to let the

Germans occupy the country while she keep fighting from her overseas

possessions. There were precedents. With Norway and Holland occupied

by the Germans, the two countries’ monarchs and their governments had fled

to London and there represented their countries’ legitimacy and prepared for

the future. Other governments at war against Hitler followed their example:

Belgium, Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Luxembourg.

Aware that in a question of weeks, perhaps days, France would be

compelled to give up the struggle, the government considered two solutions

to surrender: creating a redoubt in Britanny to resist long enough to enable

the country to take further steps; or moving directly to North Africa. Initially

taking the first alternative, Reynaud requested constructions to fortify a line

of 180 kilometers between Saint-Malo and Saint-Nazaire in Britanny. The

job had to be completed in a month. The engineer could not believe his ears.

Such an undertaking would be enormous, requiring 200,000 men and

considerable material. Unimpressed by these objections, Reynaud specified

that de Gaulle would provide the necessary workforce and that General René

Altmayer, the region commander, would organize the position. De Gaulle

met the engineer on June 10 to show him the positions’ layout. But upon

returning the next day as requested, the engineer found no one at the War

Ministry: The government had departed the previous evening. The engineer

reached Rennes on the 12th to get the work underway and there met a weary

de Gaulle, who had arrived the previous evening. Work had not yet

commenced when Germans occupied the town on the 18th.39 The redoubt, a

34

pet project de Gaulle had pushed insistently for several weeks, never got off

the ground.

Moving to North Africa would have been a more viable project than

the redoubt had it been undertaken in time, when a substantial number of

troops might still have been moved to Mediterranean ports for embarkation.

Based in North Africa, the French fleet, Europe’s second most powerful,

could have contributed significantly to the common struggle, it was argued,

but was that a realistic possibility? The issue has long been debated.

According to pessimists, mainly those around Pétain, the North African ports

lacked the facilities and the anti-aircraft protection to host a fleet of such

dimensions. The territory had no productive industrial capacity--someone

claimed it could produce not even a nail. Spare parts would soon have been

wanting, and because of discrepancies in caliber of arms, Great Britain could

not have replenished stores once exhausted. The same consideration applied

to the airforce: An airplane deprived of its base rapidly becomes useless.

Also problematic, the best divisions stationed in North Africa had

transferred to France to join the struggle, and most troops now languished as

German prisoners. Although General de Gaulle solicited London to secure

the tonnage required to transport troops to North Africa, the British had little

to spare. Indeed, had it been possible to transfer soldiers to North Africa--at

most 15,000 to 20,000 men, the equivalent of a division--the only equipment

available would have been that brought by the troops. Following the U.S.

landing in North Africa, the new French army had to be entirely equipped

with U.S. arms and matériel. The French fleet might have had to move to

French Central American possessions or to Canada and depend entirely upon

supplies from the United States. Difficulties would have abounded. The

impossibility of continuing the war from North Africa became the central

35

argument Pétain and his followers used to justify an armistice. Documents

brought to light after the war, however, tend to prove that North Africa could

have defended itself for several months with available resources had it been

able to count on the navy’s support. For reasons debated to this day, the fleet

refused to lend assistance.40

Advocates of the North Africa move hoped to await developments

there -- mainly U.S. entry into the war-- under the protection of the fleet.

The Germans could not have attacked without Spanish cooperation, which

was most unlikely. Within such limits France might have refused to bow to

Hitler’s dictate. Yet still debated is how the population of France would have

reacted to the government’s transfer to North Africa in an attempt to keep

France at war. The French were tired and frightened, and if Marshal Pétain,

the hero of Verdun, urged an end to combat, by what right had the politicians

who had failed to prepare the country for war, to take a contrary view? The

French needed most to feel protected, and they considered the marshal

sufficiently respected, even by the enemy, to shield them from further

disasters.

36

Chapter One: The Flight

With the victorious German army poised to enter Paris, the French

government fled to Tours, a lovely ancient town, the provisional capital of

France during the 1870 war. Embassies soon followed in a trip that became a

nightmare. Canadian minister Colonel G. P. Vanier remembered the

experience on the night of June 10-11 as one of “the most dramatic trips” he

had ever taken:

The distance from Paris to Pernay [a locality close to Tours where his Mission would be located] would normally take less than 3 hours... It took us 17 hours. For much of the time we were only able to do 15 miles in 5 hours. We became one in a line of cars and carts that was between 30 and 40 miles long. Bumper to bumper, we crawled and crept, yard by yard and stop by stop, over the 60 miles of that nerve-wrecking journey That was not all. Added to the ordeal was the fact that we were all instructed to extinguish car lights. We drove in pitch black darkness. And overhead, continually, we could hear enemy planes; well within earshot we heard the dull thud of falling bombs and repeatedly the night air was pierced by the shriek of the new whistling bombs with which the enemy tried to terrorize the civil population. We could readily perceive the wisdom of the no-light order. Enemy planes flying all around us, and dropping bombs a few miles from us, could not see that 30-mile long black snake of cars winding along the dark lanes and roads. If he had seen us and set about bombing that road there would have been one of the most ghastly massacres of all times. 41

The ministries were housed in chateaux along the Loire Valley, several

kilometers apart, rendering communication extremely difficult. Along the

roads leading to the various residences, lines of cars bumper to bumper were

causing delays and bad tempers. Thus fractured, the government lost all

contact with the French people and simply could not function properly and

efficiently. Along the roads leading to the various residences, lines of cars

bumper to bumper were causing delays and bad tempers. British ambassador

37

Campbell vividly described the reigning confusion:

On reaching our destination in the Touraine, we found that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established at Langeais, about 18 kilometers from the Chateau de Champchevrier [where the British were staying], the Ministry of Finance was at Chinon, about 50 kilometers distant, the Ministry of the Interior was at Tours, about 28 kilometers, the Air Ministry was at Amboise and the Ministry of War was still further, while the Ministry of Supply was established in the Massif Central, some 200 kilometers away. No attempt had been made beforehand to improve telephonic communication, which was purely rural. It was almost impossible to get into telephonic communication with any ministry and the only way to get into touch with anyone was to get into a motorcar and go to what was supposed to be his headquarters, but frequently was not, over roads thronged with refugee traffic of every description.42

Same experience for the Canadians: They were located

18 kilometers from Langeais, new home to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

and 70 kilometers from Faverolles and the Ministry of War. Furthermore, the

skeleton ministries were understaffed and short on documents required to

conduct normal business. Often the few available telephones failed to work

properly. This was not the most propitious atmosphere for conducting

government business and making momentous decisions. It is fair to say that

on June 11 and the greater part of June 12, the government ceased to

function.

As government debated, the weary people of France were too stunned

and too scared to care much about the decisions made on their behalf. They

lived a tragedy such as France had never known, and their every thought

concentrated on finding shelter for the night and food for the next meal. But

despite their present ordeal, passionate in their love of France and convinced

that despite defeat and occupation France symbolized a civilization that had

brought light to Europe and the world, most French men and women chose

38

not to look beyond their borders. The outside world did not exist; only

France mattered. The argument about a struggle bound to become global, a

war not over until France’s actual and potential allies, Great Britain and the

United States, also fell, was too abstract to impress the masses. Their

concern turned to their present situation and the immediate future.

On June 10, as France lay prostrate and bleeding and Benito

Mussolini moved to stab her in the back, Premier Paul Reynaud cabled the

U.S. president: “Today the enemy is almost at the gates of Paris. We shall

fight in front of Paris, we shall fight behind Paris; and if we should be driven

out we shall establish ourselves in North Africa to continue the fight. May I

ask you, Mr. President, to explain all this yourself to your people [and to]

declare publicly that the United States will give the Allies aid and material

support by all means short of an expeditionary force. I beseech you to do

this before it is too late. I know the gravity of such a gesture. Its very gravity

demands that it should not be made too late.”

A few hours later, at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville,

Franklin Delano Roosevelt spoke angrily of “those [Americans] who still

hold to the now somewhat obvious delusion that we...can permit the United

States to become a lone island in a world dominated by the philosophy of

force.” He added: “In our [new] American unity, we will pursue two obvious

and simultaneous courses: we will extend to the opponents of force the

material resources of this nation; and at the same time, we will harness and

speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves...may have

equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and any defense.

All roads leading to the accomplishment of these objectives must be kept

clear of obstructions. We will not slow down nor detour. Signs and signals

call for speed--full speed ahead.”

39

A message from Roosevelt in response to the June 10 appeal, which

“moved [Roosevelt] very deeply,” reached Reynaud after he had left Tours

for Bordeaux.43 Roosevelt implied that so long as France possessed a

powerful fleet, she would continue to play a significant role. “It is most

important to remember,” he wrote, “that the French and the British fleets

continue mastery of the Atlantic and other oceans; also to remember that

vital material from the outside world are necessary to maintain all armies.

Naval power in world affairs still carries the lessons of history, as Admiral

[François] Darlan well knows.” The communiqué set the tone for all further

U.S. declarations: All is not lost so long as France possesses a fleet and an

empire. This was not the message the French were hoping for. They had

hoped against hope, and even against logic, that the United States would

intervene directly to save France. Yet Roosevelt had repeatedly made clear

that the power to declare war was not his.

“We were fortified by the grand scope of your declaration,” Winston

Churchill wrote to Roosevelt the next day, referring to the Charlottesville

speech; but for the French it was, alas, already too late. Churchill advised the

president that “everything must be done to keep France in the fight,” and on

June 12 the British prime minister warned Roosevelt that whereas Reynaud

wished to fight on, other French leaders would soon urge an armistice.

“This, therefore, is the moment for you to strengthen Reynaud the utmost

you can and try to tip the balance in the favor of the best and longest

possible resistance. If there is anything that you can say publicly or privately

to the French now is the time.”

This pressure annoyed the president. He had, after all, a general

election coming up and a country willing to help the Allies only on condition

of not becoming directly involved. He considered requests on immediate

40

U.S. declaration of war unconscionable. Understandably, therefore, he made

quite clear to Reynaud that he could undertake no fresh commitments; to

strengthen the point, Roosevelt specified that his reply was not for

publication. Reynaud appeared to ignore a significant detail--that in June

1940 the United States was militarily unprepared. The U.S. Army stood

eighteenth in the world, trailing not only Germany, France, Britain, the

Soviet Union, Italy, Japan, and China but also Belgium, the Netherlands,

Portugual, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. At the time the Germans

attacked the Western front with 136 well-armed divisions, the United States

could muster no more than 4 fully equipped divisions!

I

If the French thought of themselves first, so did the British. They

were simply not prepared to allow the French to make decisions likely to

compromise Britain’s security. If their attitude often seemed to betray a lack

of sympathy for France’s ordeal, it was simply because they did not want to

find themselves in France’s position. The future of the two countries thus

intermingled. The French who stood by England comprised not only

individuals who, like General Charles de Gaulle, refused to admit to the

finality of France’s defeat but also those who believed in Western

democratic values and traditions, the very values and traditions Pétain

supporters determined to liquidate.

Through military liaisons General Weygand took the initiative to

invite Churchill to come urgently to Briare, the government’s refuge after

abandoning Paris. De Gaulle reacted to the initiative with indignation.

“What?” he told Reynaud. “Are you allowing the Generalissimo to invite the

41

British Prime Minister like this, on his own authority? Don’t you see that

General Weygand is pursuing, not a plan of operations at all but a policy, and

that it is not yours? Is the government going to leave him still in command?”

Reynaud apparently agreed, suggesting they contact General Charles

Huntziger to replace Maxime Weygand. A car soon arrived, but the premier,

wishing to prepare for the meeting with the British, asked de Gaulle to see

Huntziger alone.

Meeting the general at Arcis-sur-Aube, his headquarters, de Gaulle

revealed: “The government sees plainly that the Battle of France is virtually

lost, but it means to continue the war by transporting itself to Africa with all

the resources that can be got across. That implies a complete change in

strategy and in organization. The present Generalissimo is not the man to be

able to carry it out. Would you be the man?”

“Yes!” answered Huntziger simply.

This account has appeared in de Gaulle’s War Memoirs.44 Huntziger’s

version of the meeting, however, was quite at odds with de Gaulle’s. He

reportedly told Henri Massis:

You remember that June 10th I was expecting the visit of Paul Reynaud and General de Gaulle. I had been told about it two days earlier. At the last moment the Premier couldn’t leave Paris....De Gaulle came alone but he spoke in the name of the Premier. What did Reynaud propose? To take command of what was left of the French army, while de Gaulle, in accord with the British government, installed himself in London, and to establish a stronghold, a bridgehead, guess where? In the Contentin peninsula. When I explained to him how absurd this project was de Gaulle said it could be in Brittany. That was just as ridiculous. How could we get our troops, who were dispersed all over France, to Brittany? Then how would we supply them? By sea? But German planes would have easily prevented the landing of provisions, munitions and reinforcements! It was impossible. De Gaulle, however, didn’t want to give in. He clung to his idea even though our forces were totally disorganized. 45

42

According to this source, General Huntziger, who like General

Weygand thought the idea of a stronghold in Brittany a delusion, refused the

offer de Gaulle made in Reynaud’s name. Upon returning to Briare,

however, de Gaulle discovered that the premier had changed his mind and

remained unprepared to name a new commander-in-chief. De Gaulle’s

mission had been pointless.

On June 11 Churchill, accompanied by ministers and generals, arrived

at Briare. On route to meet the British, Marshal Philippe Pétain invited

French fleet chief Admiral François Darlan to join him in his car. The

marshal mentioned how the government’s inability to make decisions

disheartened him. “We would need some sort of consulate,” he told the

admiral, “and if I were asked to give my opinion on the choice of the first

consul, it is you I would designate, my friend.” “It’s indeed a lovely present

you offer me, monsieur le Maréchal, but I really do not care for it.” “Yes,

yes,” replied the marshal, “I have thought it over. You are the only one to

have shown some success, it is therefore you who must lead.”46 Pétain knew

that power lay within his reach, but not without the fleet’s support. By

flattering Darlan, he hoped to gain an ally whose attitudes he nonetheless

viewed with some suspicion. At the time, Darlan continued to proclaim his

attachment to the British alliance.

The morning following the British arrival, a scene occurred long

remembered in British lore. Appearing before startled French officers was

Churchill in a long silk kimono, girded with a white belt. With every sign of

irritation he muttered, “Uh ay ma bain?” Remembering the episode in later

years, he would comment with a chuckle, “I suppose I ought to have said

‘Uh ay MONG bain.” This scene came as the only light touch in two days of

43

deep tension and, on the French side, of utter despair. Churchill had come to

meet Reynaud in a last frantic effort to infuse France with the will to resist.

A final meeting was to be held after dinner.

Before seating at table, General Sir Édouard Spears approached

Churchill and proposed introducing General de Gaulle. Churchill having

consented, Spears went looking for the general to introduce him to the prime

minister: “General de Gaulle about whom I spoke to you.” They thereupon

engaged in lively conversation, and as they were leaving for the dining

room, Churchill declared in his heavily accented French: “I have had a most

interesting conversation with General de Gaulle. He shall seat him next to

me.” The carefully elaborated seating plan was completely upset!47

After dinner Weygand drew a most somber picture of the military

situation. The battle of the north had cost the French 35 divisions: The battle

of the Somme had cost another 20-25 divisions. France was left with some

40 divisions in all. Churchill tried to conjure the nefarious signs of the

strategic picture by recalling a dramatic situation from World War I. Turning

to Marshal Pétain, he bantered in a friendly tone: “Come, come, Monsieur le

Maréchal! Remember the Battle of Amiens in March, 1918, when things

were going so badly. I visited you at your Headquarters. You outlined your

plan to me. A few days later the front was reestablished.” The marshal was

not amused. The analogy between 1918 and today cannot be pushed too far,

he responded. When General Gough’s army was broken into, the

commander-in-chief of the French Army immediately placed 20 French

divisions at his disposal, and a few days later he sent 20 more for a total of

40. “Yes, the front was reestablished. You the English were done for. But I

sent forty divisions to rescue you. Today it’s we who are smashed to pieces.

Where are your forty divisions?”

44

Over and over again the French premier and General Weygand argued

that unless the British threw into battle the full weight of their airforce, all

was lost. “Here,” General Weygand stated, “is the decisive point. Now is the

decisive moment. It is therefore wrong to keep any squadrons back in

England.” Churchill replied: “This is not the decisive point and this is not

the decisive moment. That moment will come when Hitler hurls his

Luftwaffe against Great Britain. If we can keep command of the air, and if

we can keep the seas open, as we certainly shall keep them open, we will

win it all back for you.” According to General Sir Hastings Ismay, chief

military aide to the prime minister, “Before we left for the meeting at Briare,

Air Marshal Dowding, Commander-in-Chief, Fighter Command, had given

the cabinet the most solemn warning that if any more fighting squadrons

were sent to France, he could not guarantee the security of the British Isles.”

Churchill urged the French representatives to understand that this decision

reflected not British selfishness but merely London’s deep conviction that if

they broke up their fighter defense, they would be unable to carry on the

war. “The British fighter force was the only weapon with which they could

hope--and he was confident that they would succeed to break the might of

Germany, when the time came, that is, when the onslaught against the

British Isles began.”48

With the military situation indeed disastrous, the British were as

convinced as the French that terribly difficult choices might soon have to be

considered. Despite the army’s defeatism, Reynaud made clear what

abandoning the struggle would imply:

Political independence is impossible for France with its forty million inhabitants without close cooperation with the Anglo-Saxon world. A divorce between France and the Anglo-Saxon world would be a catastrophe not only for the future peace treaty, but also for the reconstruction of France

45

after the war, no matter how it ends. Anyway, whether we sign an armistice or not, the blockade of France by England and the conquest of France by Germany are certain. The French will be captives. If we don’t sever our relations with England, there will at least be the hope that our captive people will benefit from a victory if the United States enters the war, which is probable. To ask for an armistice without taking that into consideration is to lose both honor and hope.

Weygand would not be swayed by Reynaud’s arguments. At one point

the general mentioned that the French might have to ask for an armistice. In

response Churchill clarified Britain’s position: “If it is thought best for

France in her agony that her Army should capitulate, let there be no

hesitation on our account, because whatever you may do we shall fight on

forever and ever and ever.” “Marshal Pétain was mockingly incredulous,”

Minister of War Anthony Eden recalled. “Though he said nothing, his

attitude was obviously C’est de la blague,” it’s a joke.49 With the exchange

leading nowhere, Churchill requested the French to make no final decision

without consulting the British cabinet. Reynaud agreed.

French skepticism concerning British determination to go on fighting

to the end outraged the prime minister. If the French accepted this premise,

he felt, their long-term attitude would change. But with few exceptions the

French believed the British stood no chance and that their own interest

dictated coming to terms with the Germans. A conversation between General

Spears and Marshal Pétain proved revealing in this respect.

Prime Minister Churchill had flown home when General Spears,

trying to locate his ambassador, ran into the marshal. Pétain declared bluntly,

the British general recalled, that to keep the army fighting on in present

conditions was tantamount to murder. “An armistice is inevitable,” he said,

“and it is sheer pusillanimity to shirk the issue. Whilst Ministers hesitate and

46

think of their reputations, soldiers are being killed and the land of France is

being ruined. We must pay now, and pay dearly, for the anarchy we have

indulged in for so long. Where are the Deputies now who sought popularity

by voting against any measure of rearmament? And the Front Populaire,

where are its leaders now that the poor deluded chaps who went about with

clenched fists have nothing but clenched fists to shake at the German

tanks?”

“But,” objected Spears vehemently, “France cannot be allowed to

become absorbed into the German stomach and there quietly digested. You

know we shall fight on. You must fight on in Africa or elsewhere until we

have developed our strength and we can make a retour offensif together.”

Pétain countered: There was no use sending recruits to Africa, where there

were no rifles with which to arm them. Besides, the disorganization of the

Ministry of War was such that troops could never get to the harbors, still less

to sea, and if they could, Italian submarines would undoubtedly drown them.

Spears countered: The French could not leave the British to fight alone in

what remained their common struggle. “You have left us to fight alone,”

Pétain replied, adding that he was thinking of “between the wars.” Spears

admitted that they had both been very blind and must now pay the price.

Pausing slightly, Pétain responded that with France unable to continue the

struggle, wisdom dictated that England should also seek peace, for she

certainly could not carry on alone. “You have no army,” he went on. “What

could you achieve where the French Army has failed?” “But you heard the

Prime Minister?” Spears said. “Words are very fine,” replied Pétain, “but

you cannot beat Hitler with words.”

Spears later recalled that Pétain “repeated that it was just a cruel self-

deception to think we could stand up to the Germans alone for more than a

47

month, the time it would take them to organize the invasion and the bombing

of England. Then, in the tone of putting someone in his place for being

insufferably presumptuous, he returned to the theme of the French Army. It

was sheer folly to think we could succeed where it had failed.” For Spears

this conviction of the inevitable destruction of England represented a

“deadly danger.” He wrote: “If the French could be made to believe we

could fight on successfully, then many of them would stand by us...[T]hey

would not be able to bear the thought that we had carried the war to a

successful conclusion after they had withdrawn from it. They would wish us

to win, or some of them would, but their pride would be torn to ribbons, and

a feeling of injury would prevail. I realized much better than before the

Prime Minister’s insight when, from the first, he had told me to insist on our

determination and our faith.”

The French cabinet divided, some ministers sharing Pétain’s views,

others Reynaud’s. It was decided to invite Prime Minister Churchill back to

enable the ministers to better understand the situation before making a final

decision. The atmosphere seemed anything but propitious. Britain was

becoming increasingly unpopular with the French, who needed a scapegoat

for their defeat. The British were accused of letting France down, of

contributing little to the war, of abandoning the French at Dunkirk, and of

refusing to engage their airforce fully. Many French men and women would,

like Pétain, have found a consolation for their defeat had Britain been

defeated also.

II

With Germans still advancing at a furious pace, the government had to

48

move again or risk being overtaken by the enemy. Alternative destinations,

with huge implications for the future, were Quimper in Britanny and

Bordeaux along the Atlantic Ocean. Moving to Quimper meant proximity to

Britain and thus the chance of more men and planes from the ally. There

France could hope to resist long enough to move substantial numbers of men

and large amounts of matériel to Britain in transit to North Africa. Of the

two locations, de Gaulle favored Quimper. and on the afternoon of June 11

spent several hours trying to convince Reynaud that Quimper was the best

destination. De Gaulle believed he had succeeded, for Reynaud asked him to

inform the High Command that the government would leave for Quimper

the next day. Then the scene changed. Philippe Barrès recounts de Gaulle’s

confidences to him on the subject:

At about 5 P. M. Madame de Portes arrived. The general got up and moved close to a window. Madame de Portes was a rather short woman, with chestnut hairs interspersed with gray. She was about 43 but looked like 50. Her face, covered by red spots and rather ordinary, was enlivened by her eyes clear and penetrating. Dressed in a tailored suit without distinction and a rather provincial velvet hat, she was impressive for the decided, nearly aggressive tone of her voice and the vigor of her nervous hands. Madame de Portes led Reynaud far from the window close to his desk. Reynaud had the expression by now familiar both annoyed but also unable to ask her to leave or even to resist her. After nearly an hour of feverish mutterings they were about to leave the room. Reynaud had spoken not a word to de Gaulle. When they had reached to door, Madame de Portes asked Reynaud: “Have you told the general?” Turning to de Gaulle Reynaud told him: “Please take note that the government will remain at Tours.” The general did as requested. Shortly afterwards when phoning headquarters to annul his previous instructions, he was informed that the counter-order had already been given.50

To discuss the situation once again, on June 12 the cabinet met at the

Chateau de Cangé, residence of Albert Lebrun, the president of the Republic.

There, for the first time, Weygand pronounced the fatal word “armistice.”

49

Given the hopeless military situation, Weygand felt, his main task must be to

act upon the government to force it, as he put it, to face up to its

responsibilities. Marshal Pétain and only one minister, Jean Prouvost

(information) sided with him. A majority of ministers favored fighting from

North Africa if no other solution proved possible. Reynaud warned his

ministers that Adolph Hitler was no “old gentleman” like William II but a

“new Genghis Khan.” Finally the cabinet opted to invite Churchill to attend

the next day’s deliberations.

When Churchill and his party arrived in France, no one came to meet

them. They borrowed a car to drive to the prefecture of Tours, where the

government was supposedly installed, but there they found no one. By now

it was 2 P.M. and Churchill felt hungry. Driving through jammed streets, the

party found a restaurant that served them a meal of cold chicken, cheese, and

Vouvray wine. During this lunch Churchill was visited by Baudouin, who

“began at once in his soft, silky manner to speak about the hopelessness of

the French resistance.” Churchill paid no attention to this “Niagara of doom;

[the prime minister] might have been hearing an actor declaiming the decline

of hope in some stage tragedy.”51 Churchill’s visit could not have proven

more portentous (it will be his last visit to France for four years), bearing

directly on future events and establishing the nature of Franco-British

relations for years to come.

Accompanying the British prime minister were Foreign Secretary

Lord Halifax, War Production Minister Lord Beaverbrook, Permanent

Undersecretary of State at the Foreign Office Sir Alexander Cadogan,

General Ismay, and Captain Berkeley, an interpreter. Churchill’s eyes and

ears in France, Sir Edward Spears, joined the party. Spears found the group

the very image of dejection. Churchill “looked extremely stern and

50

concentrated. His likeness to the elder Napoleon when in deep thought

struck me. He was evidently deeply preoccupied.” Halifax “seemed in things

happening above our heads; he was closer to heaven.” Evidently concerned,

Beaverbrook “looked tough, as indeed he is, the lips of his wide mouth were

clamped together.” Ismay looked “very stern,” Cadogan “dapper and cool.”

The Britons were directed to the prefect’s office, the prefecture having

become the temporary seat of government; there they found Minister of the

Interior Georges Mandel sitting behind a desk, gripping a telephone in each

hand, and snapping orders in every direction, his lunch uneaten on a tray

before him. Churchill, who liked Mandel best of all the French leaders (he

was never to see him again), went over to greet him and to exchange a few

words. As the man in charge of police, Mandel had shown himself to be

fearless. He favored continued resistance in France, but as a Jew he had a

limited audience, especially in a country increasingly anti-Semitic.

Paul Renaud arrived shortly afterward accompanied by Paul

Baudouin, who had progressively moved to the defeatists’ side. Baudouin’s

influence over the premier was indeed deleterious. Succeeding Reynaud as

foreign minister under Pétain, he explained: “France is not a Poland, she is

not a slab of flesh, but a delicate nervous tissue. She is not a race but a

tenderly human civilization, a structure of spiritual, moral, intellectual

values. France could not support a total occupation, a deep rupture of her

delicate equilibrium, while her military armature and civil administration

collapse. A Nazi domination without counterweight would deeply wound her

soul. A French government must tend France during her illness.” Sentiments

of this kind were widely shared and thus worth recalling, for they help us

understand the events soon to unfold. The French viewed themselves as a

people apart, not to be compared to the Belgians or the Dutch, much less to

51

the Poles, as Baudouin made clear. A French government could not take

refuge in London, as other Allied governments had done, without losing the

respect of the French people--and a government which no longer represents

its people loses its legitimacy. Even General de Gaulle’s self-proclaimed

legitimacy remained unrecognized by the Anglo-Saxons; they merely

recognized him as the head of those French men and women who accepted

his leadership, nothing more.

Churchill was not insensitive to the despair he felt around him, for he

loved France deeply and had been a student of her history and civilization.

He had known and admired her World War I leaders and remembered how

Clemenceau’s inflexibility had pulled France through to victory in 1918.

Alas, not only was Reynaud no Clemenceau, but France in 1940 in no way

resembled the France of 1914-1918. During World War I the country had

known moments when all seemed lost, only to recover and overcome all

obstacles. France had been led by brilliant military officers, Marshal Pétain

among the most able. Even during World War I, though, Churchill had never

been a Pétain admirer. Field Marshal Douglas Haig, the British military

commander, opposed him, although Pétain could count on the support of

General John Pershing, commander of the U.S. Expeditionary Force--which

helps explain why Pétain was always popular in the United States but never

in Great Britain. The notion of Pétain as a defeatist--according to Churchill

he had been a defeatist during World War I, too--rather than his political

views would color future British attitudes toward him; in the United States,

by contrast, even during the Vichy period most people considered Pétain a

man who did his best under terribly adverse conditions.

Arriving in France, the British understood perfectly that France could

no longer reverse the military situation; they nevertheless hoped France

52

would fight long enough to give Britain a chance to organize a defense. To

preserve her role as a world power, the British urged, France needed to view

the conflict globally, not through a provincial lens. It was like talking to the

deaf.

Meeting the French in the afternoon, the British learned of the

position taken the previous evening by General Weygand. The army was

withdrawing in disorder, he had warned, and France had no alternative but to

seek an armistice from the Germans immediately. Reynaud had a less

pessimistic outlook: Nothing was lost, he said, provided the United States

intervened. He had told Roosevelt that the Allied cause rested with him. The

cabinet’s attitude toward the armistice depended upon what the U.S.

president decided. If the United States committed itself to the limit, the idea

of an armistice would be rejected. Hearing this, the British had no choice but

to play along with the French; they promised their backing in messages to

Roosevelt, although they knew Roosevelt could hardly declare war. Yet

anything that contributed to delaying a decision was to be encouraged.

“The meeting was probably the gravest so far held between the

Governments,” Spears wrote. Churchill made clear that “at all events

England would fight on. She had not and would not alter her resolve: no

terms, no surrender. The alternative for her were death or victory.”

According to the official British record:

M. Reynaud replied that he had never doubted England’s determination. He was, however, anxious to know how the British Government would react in a certain contingency. The French Government--the present one or another--might say: “We know you will carry on. We would also, if we saw any hope of a victory. But we see no sufficient hopes of an early victory. We cannot count on American help. There is no light at the end of the tunnel. We cannot abandon our people to indefinite German domination. We mpust come to terms. We have no choice.” It was already too late to organize a redoubt in

53

Brittany. Nowhere would a genuine French Government have a hope of escaping capture on French soil.

The question to Britain, Reynaud went on, would therefore take the

form: “Will you acknowledge that France has given her best, her youth and

life-blood; that she can do no more; and that she is entitled, having nothing

further to contribute to the common cause, to enter into a separate peace

while maintaining the solidarity implicit in the solemn agreement entered

into three months previously?”52

Reynaud no longer spoke as someone ready to fight to the bitter end.

Thus the British faced a painful surprise when asked to recognize, in view of

the present situation, that France could no longer fight. Must more of France

be abandoned to Nazi terror? True, the two governments had solemnly

agreed never to seek a separate armistice or peace; but given the present

circumstances, how could the British insist on holding France to this

commitment?

Answering this plea, Churchill spoke as the leader of an England that

would never surrender. Spears thought he “appeared to be at his fiercest” as

he declared:

The British people have not yet felt the German lash, but they do not underestimate its force. This in no way deters them; far from being cowed, they are looking forward to thrashing Hitler. They have but one thought, to win the war and destroy Hitlerism. Everything is subordinated to the British determination to destroy Hitler and his gang. No risk, however formidable, will hinder us. I know the British people, their endless capacity for enduring and persisting and for striking back. And they will strike until the foe is beaten. We must fight, we will fight, and that is why we must ask our friends to fight on.

Churchill waited for the translation to catch up with his flow of words

and then set out to make clear Britain’s position toward France:

54

You must give us time. We ask you to fight on as long as possible, if not in Paris, at least behind Paris, in the provinces, down to the sea, then, if need be, in North Africa. At all costs time must be gained. All [Hitler’s] victories cannot destroy the natural forces of resistance of the nations, great or small, that may temporarily find themselves under his heel. If Germany fails in her attacks against England, the destruction of which is indispensable to Hitler, if within two or three months his assault on our island has not succeeded, if the power of her Air Force is curbed or destroyed, then after months of suffering the whole hateful edifice of Nazidom will topple over. Should the United States give immediate help to the Allies, and perhaps even declare war, then victory may not be so far off as it seems today.

Reynaud did not quite know how to respond to this outpouring.

Churchill spoke for a country never conquered and devastated as France had

been. Clearly England, even if conquered and devastated, would never

surrender, but that was neither here nor now. Reynaud wanted the British to

understand that France had suffered beyond endurance, whereas Great

Britain had so far been spared--a remark that did not go down well with the

British. Reynaud repeated the question: Since clearly France could no

longer contribute to the common cause, would the British agree to release

her to conclude a separate peace?

Churchill proved insensitive to the argument. How could a country

with so rich a tradition of glorious undertakings, with enormous resources

overseas, and with a powerful fleet ever consider surrender? Churchill could

not understand how Reynaud, of all people, the same Reynaud who had so

often proclaimed his determination to fight, would take a defeatist position.

Generous as always, Churchill assured Reynaud that “under no

circumstances will Great Britain waste time in reproaches and

recriminations”; but, he added, “this is a very different matter from

becoming a consenting party to a peace in contravention of an agreement so

55

recently concluded.” The prime minister urged the premier to inform

President Roosevelt of the situation and to await his reply before making

further decisions. Britain would strongly support the initiative. Then

Churchill added: “I have already said we would refrain from reproaches and

recriminations. The cause of France will always be dear to us, and if we win

the war we will one day restore her to all her power and dignity.” But

Churchill also warned that in fighting the Nazis, he would inevitably be

compelled to take measures affecting France. Friendship between the two

countries might suffer. Had the French considered the consequences for

Britain of a German occupation of France? French harbors would become

German bases for attacks on England, and German planes taking off from

bases in France would wreak havoc upon British cities. Surely Reynaud

could not believe that the British would in the name of friendship hesitate to

retaliate with all their power against the Germans on the soil of France?

Britain would also be compelled to blockade the coasts of Europe to hurt the

Reich economically and in so doing would starve the inhabitants. Painful as

these decisions might be, they would be made.

As the atmosphere became heated, Spears suggested a break. The

British moved into the garden to be alone; Reynaud and Baudouin,

meanwhile, went into a nearby room to join Jeanneney and Herriot, the

presidents of the two Assemblies, and Mandel. After briefly outlining the

talks that had taken place, Reynaud was subjected, Baudouin wrote, “to the

violent reproaches of Jeanneney and Herriot, who will not accept that the

Premier should have allowed it to be understood that one day France would

sue for a separate armistice. They are all three violently opposed to the

armistice and they reproached Reynaud for his weakness. President Herriot

is very moved. His face is ravaged and tears are on his cheeks. Mandel

56

declares he must see Churchill.”

Probably shaken by the experience, Reynaud gave the impression of

tredding on shaking ground. “Reynaud told me as early as the night of the

18th at Tours,” Ambassador Biddle wrote, “that he sensed, before the closing

of the meeting, that he was destined to pave the way for another government

for which he would have to step aside to make peace on the best possible

terms, and one which might at the same time be able to prevent revolution

throughout the country.”53

While with Churchill, Reynaud put on a brave face. He enquired

whether the members of the British cabinet shared their prime minister’s

views and was assured that such was the case. Churchill emphasized,

however, that anything he and his two companions might say must be

construed not as a decision of their government but as a decision of three

individuals. Reaffirming Britain’s position, Churchill reiterated that they

could not agree to a separate peace however it might come. Britain’s war

aim remained the total defeat of Hitler; the British therefore refused to

release France from her obligation. General de Gaulle had now joined the

party without being invited. Churchill reaffirmed the urgency of appealing

to Roosevelt and renewed assurances of support. Meanwhile, with nothing

further to discuss, the British party planned to return to England. Before

leaving, Churchill mentioned the presence in France of 400 German pilots

held prisoner, most of them downed by the Royal Air Force. He would be

grateful if Reynaud gave instructions for their transfer to Great Britain and

out of harm’s way. Reynaud agreed, but he did nothing; the airmen

eventually returned to Germany to resume the struggle against England. On

his way out, Churchill saw de Gaulle “standing solid and expressionless at

the doorway.” Greeting him in French, Churchill prophetically declared,

57

“L’homme du destin.” Then in the courtyard he saw more than 100 French

leaders “in frightful misery.”

As he was preparing to leave, Spears was approached by de Gaulle,

who had taken no part in the discussions. Baudouin, de Gaulle said, was

proclaiming to whoever would listen that Churchill fully understood the

French position and would understand if France concluded an armistice. De

Gaulle was very upset. Had the prime minister actually used those words?

If he had, defeatists would conclude that to go on fighting was useless, since

even the British did not expect the French to do so.

The misunderstanding arose because of two words Churchill had

pronounced, Je comprends, when answering Reynaud. He obviously meant

“I understand what you say,” and certainly not “I agree with what you are

saying,” but the peace-at-any-price crowd chose the second interpretation

and labeled Churchill a double-crosser for first having accepted France’s

need to sign an armistice and then going back on his agreement. De Gaulle

considered the misunderstanding most “unfortunate,” but Spears managed to

reach Churchill as he was about to board his plane. “When I say ‘Je

comprends,’ that means I understand,” Churchill assured him. “Comprendre

means understand in the French, doesn’t it? Well, when for once I use

exactly the right word in their language, it is going rather far to assume that I

intended it to mean something different. Tell them my French is not as bad

as that.” Churchill would have been wiser to stick to English, for despite his

disclaimers “comprendre” could have the meaning the French attached to it.

Alas, Churchill’s French was not as good as he thought it to be.

That evening the French cabinet met at Cangé. Mandel drove with

Reynaud to the chateau, where to their surprise they found members of the

government in a state of high excitement. Churchill was supposed to meet

58

with the entire cabinet. Why did Reynaud see him alone? As President

Albert Lebrun was to write, “A great disappointment found expression in the

Council. M. [Camille] Chautemps used bitter words; other ministers echoed

his expressions. They would have been glad to obtain contact with the

British statesman at a critical moment when France was in mortal peril.

Perhaps, in fact, their presence would have reaffirmed a resistance to which

they attach so high a price.” “Something perhaps irreparable had happened,”

Spears lamented. “An opportunity that might not recur had been missed.”

The misunderstanding--and misunderstanding it was, for had

Churchill been informed of the cabinet’s desire to meet with him, he would

not have hesitated to comply 54--probably caused a change of hearts, or so

Spears feared. He wrote:

The bad impression and the ill-temper caused by the disappointment of not seeing Churchill had been the background of the discussion and undoubtedly played its part in swaying the majority of the Cabinet toward surrender. To those bewildered men the picture of a Churchill flying off to his own country without seeing them gave them a feeling of being abandoned. Churchill would not confer with them, left them to their own devices? What could they do, when there was nothing left to fight with in France, and their most eminent soldiers advised surrender? It took a stout heart to opt for continued resistance now that the impression had been gained that Britain was cutting [them] adrift. To be responsible, yet to be in flight, the forerunner of a flying army, with nothing solid on which to build either a plan or a hope, was dreadful indeed.

Why Reynaud chose to follow the course he did, keeping Churchill to

himself and ignoring the wishes of his own cabinet, remains a mystery. His

decision had a devastating effect, for obviously no one was left to incite

resistance and every statement Reynaud made afterward became suspect.

“Perhaps,” Churchill later wrote, “the harassed premier did not think I

59

should be stern enough. In this fierce French quarrel I might well have done

more harm than good. There was too much in my memory for me to be a

harsh claimant.”55

The atmosphere of uncertainty and resentment was made to order for

General Weygand. With a bad temper occasionally bordering on hysteria, he

berated the cabinet and came up with the startling announcement that the

communist leader Maurice Thorez had taken over the Elysée Palace, seat of

the presidency, that Paris was in the hands of the communists, and that all

telephone lines to the capital had been cut. From an adjoining room Mandel

managed to reach the prefect of police in Paris and was assured all remained

calm. The alarming news was obviously a canard. Not in the least

discouraged, Weygand reproached the government for having fled Paris.

The government should have remained in the capital--that is how the Roman

Senate behaved when the barbarians entered Rome. Had the ministers acted

like the ancient Romans, Weygand would have been rid of them! In his

capacity as commander-in-chief, Weygand should have limited himself to

instructing the cabinet on the military situation; political statements were

outside his province. It was typical of the prevailing atmosphere that no one

dared call him to order.

A member of the cabinet, Marshal Pétain could freely express his

political convictions, because no such restraint applied to him. As Weygand

had done, he pledged that under no circumstances would he leave the

country and urged the ministers to do likewise.

It is impossible for the government, without emigrating, without deserting, to abandon the French soil, [he declared]. The duty of the government is, whatever the circumstances, to remain in France, failing which it may no longer be recognized as representing the country. To deprive France of her natural defenders during a period of general disarray,

60

means to deliver her to the enemy, means killing the soul of France: it means as a consequence to render her renaissance impossible. We must await the renewal from the soul of our country, which we shall preserve by staying in place, rather than from a reconquest of our territory by allied guns, under conditions of delay impossible to foresee. We must not abandon the soil of France and accept instead the suffering imposed upon her and her children.

He concluded his intervention by declaring: “I shall refuse to abandon

metropolitan France. I shall remain among the French people to share their

pains and their miseries. The armistice is in my view the necessary condition

for the survival of eternal France.” These words, summing up Pétain’s

position for the four years to come, foreshadow Vichy. Reynaud considered

Pétain’s position contrary to France’s honor, but even so it prevailed. Pétain

enjoyed immense prestige unimpaired until the liberation. To this day, most

of his fellow French believe he had been right.

Later in the night of June 12, Reynaud told U.S. ambassador Anthony

Biddle that “he sensed in the face of growing opposition, especially among

the leading generals, that he was destined to make way for another

government which might make peace and prevent revolution within the

country.”56

Once the cabinet meeting adjourned, Reynaud returned to Tours for a

radio address to the French and the American peoples. The French army had

been at the forefront of the democracies, Reynaud told the Americans;

France had a right to turn to other democracies and say, “You have a debt

toward us.” In one of his appeals to the United States, he asked for “clouds

of planes” to be flown to France. At the time, the U.S. Air Corps had only

160 pursuit planes for 260 pilots, and 52 heavy bombers instead of the 136 it

required!

On June 14 Reynaud took to the air again for a last appeal to President

61

Roosevelt:

At this most tragic hour of its history France must choose. Will she continue to sacrifice her youth in a hopeless struggle? Will her government leave the national territory so as not to give itself up to the enemy and in order to be able to continue the struggle on the sea and in North Africa? Will the whole country then live abandoned abating itself under the shadow of Nazi domination with all that that means for its body and its soul? Or will France ask Hitler for conditions of an armistice? France can continue the struggle only if American intervention reverses the situation by making an Allied victory certain.

Since Roosevelt lacked the power to “reverse the situation,” asking

Germany for conditions became the only alternative. The message

concluded with these passionate words: “I must tell you...that if you cannot

give to France in the hours to come the certainty that the United States will

come into the war within a very short time, the fate of the world will change.

Then you will see France go under like a drowning man and disappear,

having cast a last long look toward the land of liberty from which she

awaited salvation.”

Replying the next day, Roosevelt reiterated in “the most emphatic

terms” that the United States “has made it possible for the Allied armies to

obtain airplanes, artillery and munitions of many kind,” and that “this

government so long as the Allied governments continue to resist will

redouble its efforts in this direction.” He added, “Every week that goes by

will see additional matériel on its way to the Allied nations.” The message

fell on deaf ears. If U.S. help was contingent on a will to resist, it came too

late. That will had all but gone.

With Reynaud having officially contemplated an armistice at the

Tours conference with the British, de Gaulle felt he could no longer serve in

the cabinet. He was about to dispatch his letter of resignation when Minister

62

of the Interior Georges Mandel sent for him. Their conversation, de Gaulle

later wrote, had proved critical. According to de Gaulle, as the first German

troops were entering Paris, the minister pointed to the future, saying: “We

are only at the beginning of world war. You will have great duties to fulfill,

General! But with the advantage of being, in the midst of all of us, an

untarnished man. Think only of what has to be done for France, and consider

that, in certain circumstances, your present position may make things easier

for you.” De Gaulle was persuaded to wait before resigning. “On this,

perhaps,” he wrote, “depended, physically speaking, what I was able to do

later on.”57

De Gaulle was sent back to London for further negotiations, but

Weygand resented what he felt were initiatives taken behind his back.

Meeting Louis Marin on June 15 prior to a cabinet meeting, Weygand told

him “with violent language that without forewarning him the government

had charged de Gaulle with a mission, that he was the commander-in-chief

and that it was inadmissible.”58

Back in London on June 16, de Gaulle held negotiations with the

minister of war. All armaments from France were to be deposited on British

territory without prejudice to prior agreements. German prisoners of war,

most urgently all officers, were to be delivered to the British military

authorities. Agreement was reached on the above two points. As concerned

the cooperation of British tonnage for transportation of men and matériel, de

Gaulle request 500,000 tons for a three-week period starting June 19. The

turn of events, however, caused the British government to reserve its reply.59

In a June 16 cable Biddle summed up the alternatives left to the French:

Those that advocate surrender stress the very likelihood of an uprising of an

63

enraged people against their masters, both political and industrial, who have so criminally betrayed and deceived them: the innocent will suffer with the guilty and much blood will flow. They also point to German vengeance which will be wreaked on France for continuance of the struggle from Africa and loss of an uncaptured fleet. They question the morale of a French evacuated army in Africa whose families are left to Nazi rule. Those who urge removal of the government to North Africa foresee that only thus can a free and independent France survive; that only thus can the symbol of a living France be maintained; that only thus can the French fleet be kept afloat for the democracies.

Ambassador Biddle had the opportunity to confer with Reynaud

before the premier set out for Bordeaux. He found Reynaud depressed. The

hope of France, Reynaud declared, now depends on the U.S. response:

“Immediate declaration of war by the United States is the only hope for

England and for France if she is to continue to fight in North Africa,” Biddle

cabled. “The French army is cut to pieces and at meeting of Council of

Ministers on June 13 Reynaud obtained only with great difficulty the

Government’s consent to continue the struggle. It was clear to me that in the

absence of some positive action by us within the next 48 hours the French

Government will feel that there is no course left but surrender.”

The meeting had been preceded in the morning by a visit for which

Biddle was certainly not prepared. Colonel Paul de Villelume, Reynaud’s

military aide, showed up accompanied by Madame de Portes; pretending to

speak in the premier’s behalf, he urged that with the situation worsening, “It

has become indispensable for France to obtain an immediate armistice.” As a

consequence, he said, the telegram the premier had that very morning asked

the ambassador to forward to Roosevelt urging the U.S. to join the war was

irrelevant. It corresponded to a situation that no longer obtained. Madame de

Portes broke into tears, and Biddle, touched, offered his handkerchief. The

64

maneuver did not quite succeed because Biddle duly sent the French

message on to Washington. The colonel and Madame de Portes were

compensated for their efforts by traveling with the Biddles to Bordeaux,

where they arrived at two in the morning.

Government ministers and other officials had reached Bordeaux on

the evening of June 14, and for two weeks Bordeaux became the capital of

France. The country by then could no longer count on her own resources.

That this premier, undoubtedly well meaning but overcome by events he

could no longer control, should seek hope of salvation abroad was a sorry

spectacle. Although the British could reassure Reynaud, they could not

decide for him. His appeals to Washington appeared pathetic because

Roosevelt could help France only if France first helped herself. The result,

certainly unintended by Reynaud when he appealed to Britain and the

United States to save France, was to lend credit to a certain defeatist

propaganda by prominent people in France anxious not only to come to

terms with Hitler but to switch sides, a propaganda declaring, in effect, that

abandoned in her hour of need, France owed nothing to the Anglo-Saxons.

65

Chapter Two: Collapse

The German invasion came as an explosive, overwhelming flood

bursting through the Belgian frontier, tossing wave after wave of troops over

the northern plains, each wave swelling the next, pouring down on to Paris,

past Paris, with undiminished fury pounding across France all the way

toward the restless Atlantic. In an exodus with few precedents in history,

millions of Belgians and French fled before the relentless drive of the

German Wehrmacht. The French army no longer offered the enemy a

continuous front but instead disintegrated piecemeal, often mixing with

refugees crowding the same escape routes and both easy prey to Luftwaffe

strafing. Chaos was loosed upon the soil of France, over which, all knew, the

unappeasable Nazi conqueror spread at will.

As of June 6 the Wehrmacht launched a final assault against an army

reduced to some 60 divisions and 1,500 tanks. South of Paris the Germans

encountered strong resistance and suffered heavy losses; but two days later,

moving from positions along the Somme River, they infiltrated deep into

French defenses overcoming all centers of resistance. Marshal Erwin

Rommel’s tanks reached the lower Seine near Rouen, encircled a British

division--the last still fighting on the continent--and a number of French

units, and took over 50,000 prisoners. After taking Paris the Wermacht

advanced in three directions. The first, under Hermann Hoth’s orders, moved

toward the ports with the obvious intention of separating France from

England. Rommel’s Seventh Panzer division covered 260 kilometers in a

single day, and by June 19 the enemy occupied the ports of Cherbourg and

Brest.Two days later la Rochelle and Rochefort had their turn. The French

navy destroyed as many installations as possible, but even so an immense

66

number were left behind, including 100,000 tons of shipping under

construction. A second group of armies under Ewald von Kleist’s command

moved southward, reaching the Swiss border. Having delayed an order to

withdraw, the French Army of the East surrendered, and 300,000 men were

made prisoners. The enemy, now close to Lyon, was moving along the

valleys of the Massif Central. By then the French army had ceased all

resistance. The Germans had lost 40,000 men, 300 tanks, and 1,200 planes;

the French 100,000 dead and a total of 1.8 million made prisoners who

would be taken to Germany for the remainder of the war.

To escape capture by the inexorably advancing enemy, the

government, thoroughly rattled, decided to abandon Tours, too close to the

front lines, and flee to Bordeaux. There, facing the sea, it could decide what

to do next. The issue reduced to two simple propositions: to go on fighting,

if not in France then from a French overseas territory, or to ask the Germans

for an armistice and seek as honorable a place in Hitler’s Europe as could be

managed. Those favoring the second solution assumed the Allies incapable

of beating the Axis powers and thus believed national self-interest demanded

adjustement to the actual state of affairs. Those like Paul Reynaud and

Georges Mandel, who proclaimed their determination to stand by England

and fight to the last, offered undoubtedly sincere sentiments but nebulous

projects, and as events would shortly show, nothing remotely effective was

done to implement them.

Churchill had suggested that a determined resistance within Paris,

fighting block by block, house by house, would wear out the enemy--a tactic

succesful in the struggle for Madrid during the Spanish civil war-- but the

French generals objected that such a defense would destroy one of the

world’s most beautiful cities for no purpose, since the Germans could not be

67

beaten. Another project considered for a time but soon dropped aimed to

concentrate the remaining military forces within a redoubt in Brittany, on the

coastal region along the Channel, where continuous contact with England

might have proven possible. The British could land forces there to delay a

German advance long enough to enable thousands of French troops to reach

North Africa by ship. Expressing interest in the project, General de Gaulle

had urged the government to move farther north to Quimper, for as he put it,

“There would sooner or later be no alternative except to put to sea” and to

make for Africa after a halt in England. The project encountered several

difficulties, however, not the least the negative mood of the local population.

Women practically disarmed arriving soldiers to ensure no more fighting.

The war had been lost, so why sacrifice more human lives?

Another difficulty was of a technical order. If we are to believe

General Maxime Weygand, the Africa project was envisaged on May 29,

that is, 15 days before--hardly enough time, in any event, to prepare its

execution. In a letter sent June 13, Reynaud told Weygand first, “To hold out

as long as possible in the Massif Central and in Brittany,” and, next, “If we

should fail, to install ourselves and organize the struggle in the Empire,

making use of the freedom of the seas.” But when the decision to move to

Africa was reiterated on the 29th, nothing was done to implement the move

save to send de Gaulle to London to request a large tonnage of transport

ships. Having concluded that the Brittany redoubt project was stillborn, the

government decided to stick to its original decision to move to Bordeaux.

The move could not have occurred at a worse moment. June 14 was

the day the enemy entered Paris, and the bitterness of the news combined

with the symbolic significance of the government’s flight. For centuries

writers and poets have identified Paris with France: Paris is France. With

68

Paris gone, what else was worth saving? The few reporters still in Tours

heard the communiqué read by a somber-faced editor at the emergency

headquarters of the French news agency Havas. Women clerks sobbed, and

an elderly news reporter appeared red-eyed as he delivered the latest reports.

The news from the front was bad, very bad, with the Germans making

sweeping gains on all fronts. Short on news because information and

censorship services had left Tours and because Havas provided only official

bulletins, the press left as well, with several foreign correspondents glad to

have taken along camping gear, for accommodations of any kind were

practically nonexistent.

Several ministers and government officials were heading for

Bordeaux as well, selecting whatever routes lay open, the gendarmes doing

their best to assist them. What they witnessed during their endless hours of

driving was heartrending: a mass of people moving along, without knowing

very well where to, driving cars, tractors, horse-drawn carts, bicycles, but

mostly on foot carrying on their backs their meager possessions, sleeping out

in the fields, promiscuous, unwashed, exhausted, lacking hygienic

conditions of any kind.

To gauge what was on the minds of those weary travelers is nearly

impossible at this distance from the events. They had abandoned their

homes--did they worry whether they would ever see them again? The farms

where families had lived for generations? Simple apartments where every

piece of furniture recalled events in the lives of rich and poor alike? “I

couldn’t make up my mind to leave this house where I had lived so many

years,” Léon Blum later recalled, “where I had known happiness and

suffering, where everything had been chosen and put in place for me by

someone whom I had loved and lost, that I had never left except for

69

necessary trips, to which I always returned with a feeling of satisfaction and

well-being. The idea of leaving that house really broke my heart. Leave my

house, leave Paris, when would I see my house and my city again?”60 How

many hearts were broken in that tragic French spring? Questions were

certainly asked: Why? Why us? A great number of those desperate people

fleeing their homes, and the memories they enshrined, must have asked

themselves for the reasons that had led to their present plight. They probably

thought, If government officials recognized the superior strength and

leadership of the German army, why did they then declare war? Where did

politicians stand with the masses?

Quite possibly the politicians themselves had but vague insight into

the popular psyche; their decisions were taken in the abstract at a time when

obtaining popular approval proved impossible. Could Reynaud be sure that

if he moved with his cabinet to Africa or to London or to the United States,

the French people would still consider him the nation’s leader? Would not

Philippe Pétain’s con siderable popularity provoke opposition to him? These

questions played a prominent role during the two weeks the government sat

in Bordeaux; but in the immediacy of the moment those officials driving

toward the new provisional capital could consider no more than the human

drama unfolding before them.

Not many newspaper representatives remained in France, but those

who stayed could not fail to be overwhelmed, too, by what they saw. “Now

that Paris has fallen,” The New York Times reported,

the bewilderment of the French people...is beyond description. Their minds...are so stunned by the disaster that they can hardly grasp the tragic fact. Tours is now in pandemonium, with refugees in every vehicle they can find, or even afoot, pouring in from Paris and others pouring out in the hope of getting out of the path of the advancing Germans. Many have no clear

70

idea of where they are going. They are just going anywhere farther east or south, nervously looking up whenever planes fly overhead. Most stores and other places of business are closed. There is little food left in the city. It is a terrible thing to see a great people in disintegration. It is like watching the end of the world. 61

Celebrated writer and novelist Antoine de Saint-Exupéry served as an

army flier at the time. What he saw from the air was startling:

I fly over the routes black of the interminable syrup that flows without stop. The populations, it is being said, are being evacuated. It is no longer true. They evacuate themselves. There is a demential contagion in this exodus. People move southward, as if, down there, there were lodgings and food to be found, as if there were, down there, some tenderness to welcome them. But down south there are only cities full to explode where people sleep in hangars while food is getting scarce....And if a caravan abords a village that gives the impression of being still alive, it will be emptied the very first day of all its substance. The newcomers will clean it as worms clean a bone....Up north a kick had been administered to an anthill and the ants took to the roads. Laboriously. Without panic. Without hope. Without despair. As if by duty.

Foreign representatives shared the general emotions even if other,

more personal considerations flooded their minds. As they traveled to

Bordeaux, the British ambassador in his superb Rolls Royce and General Sir

Edward Spears, for example, were unpleasantly aware that the public’s

attitude at the sight of British uniforms had changed; people appeared

morose if not hostile, their faces blank.62 Nearly all the villages the envoys

passed spilled over with gaping, idle soldiers. Overtaking French airforce

convoys, the diplomats wondered why French pilots were on the ground

instead of in the air joining the Royal Air Force against the Luftwaffe.

Before leaving for Bordeaux, Pétain in conversation with Paul

Baudouin lashed out against the government’s attitude, “ignoble and

cowardly,” and again insisted on the urgency of requesting an armistice. ”If

71

only Reynaud had not signed that agreement with the British, ”he lamented.

Still, all in all, he thought Reynaud rather “sympatique,” - likable. 63

Arriving in Bordeaux, one felt bewilderment everywhere, the

categorical affirmation, stated and repeated, There is nothing left, no army,

resistance is no longer possible. “One had the impression,” Léon Blum

recalled, “that within a few days a kind of decomposition, of volatilization

had taken place. We kept asking: ‘But really, this not possible, there are men

here, there are men there, there is such and such an army.’ No, Weygand kept

repeating, ‘there is nothing left, we could not put together three full

divisions, we can no longer resist, it’s impossible.’ We were confronted with

the extraordinary evidence that the men commanding the army were saying:

‘The army no longer exists, there is nothing left, don’t count on anything.’”64

But if the country’s leaders, those who had in the past played

important roles in France’s political life, could not quite accept that all was

finished, that the country had suffered the worst defeat in her history, neither

could the common people. The millions who had swelled the roads of France

in a frantic search for security had reached the end of the road and were

gripped by despair.

Bordeaux we must remember, had been unprepared for what was

coming. The government, the deputies, the members of the press, found

themselves headquartered in various public buildings throughout the city,

but nothing was provided for the refugees in the hundreds of thousands

(some spoke of 2 million). With hotel rooms exhausted, people were forced

to make do with whatever they could find, often sleeping in their cars. Fanny

Craig Ventadour, for example, in France at the time, worked her way to

Bordeaux to help a refugee center in one of the stations. “It was

disheartening to see the poor devils arrive by train, bicycle, or on foot. They

72

are utterly beaten,” she wrote in Atlantic Monthly.65 “the evacuation of the

northern and northwestern regions of France has left the villages and small

towns completely desolate. When these last straggling refugees went

through there was not a loaf of bread, not a single occupied house. Unless

they happened to meet retreating soldiers with a soup kitchen, they simply

starved. The oldest and the feeblest starved to death. It is pathetic to see

them, flopped down on the floor and steps of the station, among their own

and other people’s filth, refuse, greasy papers, and mangy baggage--some

sleeping, others just stupidly sitting, waiting for I don’t know what.”

The most fearful refugees besieged the consulates in a frantic effort to

leave the country, possibly to the United States. The U.S. consulate was of

no help, however. In the late 1930s and early 1940s America struggled in the

grips of a wave of xenophobia and anti-Semitism that militated against the

admission of Jewish refugees. Fear that Fifth Columnists disguised as Jews

would enter the country to spread terror, as they effectively did in Europe,

compounded the problem. “Though it was absurd to believe that Jewish

refugees, Hitler’s principal victims, would somehow become his principal

weapons against the United States,” Doris Kearns Goodwin wrote, “the

widespread paranoia about foreigners combined with anti-Semitism to cast a

net so wide that everyone except the British children was caught in it.” 66

Unalterably opposed to the admission of refugees under any circumstances,

the head of the State Department’s visa section, Breckinridges Long, had

instructed consulates abroad to ignore most requests. Eleanor Roosevelt

considered him a “fascist.”

Nothing, however, would convince refugees that the United States,

that land of asylum, would refuse them welcome. And the road to the

Atlantic, where they dreamed of waiting ships, crossed Spain and Portugual.

73

The incredible scramble at the Portuguese consulate could not be

contained. Five soldiers with rifles barricaded the door. To enable a group of

Americans to get in, two soldiers struggled to open the way through the

clamoring crowd.67 Once inside the consulate, the most desperate for help,

the Jews, found a Portuguese Raol Wallenberg. The Portuguese dictator,

Antonio de Olivera Salazar, had sternly instructed his diplomatic corps to

“issue no visa to persons of impure blood, or opponents of the Nazi regime,”

in other words, to Jews and anti-fascists. Defying the order, Aristides Sousa

Mendes “threw himself into a frantic seventy-two hour visa-writing blitz at

the Portuguese consulate, with hordes of beseeching refugees camped

outside his door. Scribbling around the clock with the help of two sons, by

June 18 the Portuguese consul had issued permits to 30,000 fleeing Jews,

Poles, French resistance fighters, and other refugees. Trying to save as many

as he could from the Nazis, he passed 500 of the impromptu visas from the

bathroom window of the train about to carry him home in the custody of

Portuguese secret police.”68 Portugal’s ambassador to Spain was in Bordeaux

at the time, and after bursting in on the unwashed, bearded Sousa Mendes in

the midst of his visa campaign, he wired Lisbon to say the consul had lost

his mind. Sousa Mendes is reported to have quoted Don Quixote: “Must you

be crazy to see what’s right?” He was dismissed and died in disgrace.

A Portuguese visa became a vital means of escape. Spain readily gave

refugees and others with a Portuguese visa passage through its territory but

only issued visas to Jews who could prove that their ancestors had once

lived in Spain. The novelist Julian Green, an American who had spent most

of his life in France, recalled his experience at the Spanish border in his

quest to reach Lisbon and a ship bound for the United States. A horde of

people besieged the Spanish consulate in Bordeaux throughout the day and

74

waited patiently before its doors late into the night. But the Spaniards proved

far from generous with their visas, especially for French refugees trying to

flee the country. Probably, as Green thought, the Spanish authorities

remembered the concentration camps into which Republicans had been

herded during the Spanish civil war. Even though Republicans were

Francisco Franco’s enemies, they were first of all Spaniards.69 To get a visa

one had to prove one would enter Spain in transit to the final destination,

namely, the United States, Canada, Haiti, or any other country on the other

side of the Atlantic. Few were so lucky. Some crowned heads managed to

escape in time: Empress Zita, Otto von Habsburg-Parme, the Grandduchess

of Luxembourg with her children, and the children of King Leopold of

Belgium. On June 21 it was announced that the Duke of Winsdor had arrived

in Barcelona. Hastily convened from Vienna, London, and Paris, the

Rothchilds had been observed confabulating in front of the Hotel Splendide.

Confusion and stress also prevailed outside the British consulate,

where a crowd of anguished and frightened people kept growing. “I had to

elbow and push through them,” Spears recalled, “as they struggled to force

their way in past a couple of military policemen. Another crowd, that of the

more privileged, almost as large as the one outside, packed the stairs and

living rooms. My sleeve was continually plucked by people I knew, as I

forced my way through. Everything was done to try to ensure the escape of

those most justified in their fear of falling into Nazi hands, but the shipping

space was far short of the demand.”70

The French administration’s reluctance to issue exit permits

compounded the refugees’difficulties. Functionaries proved hostile toward

the wealthy and others with the means to flee when they themselves were

condemned to confront the invasion and were probably willing to adjust to

75

it.71 Green found an amazing malevolence and jealousy in the government’s

offices, as if those obliged to stay would exert every effort to force others to

stay as well.72 Tragedies were enacted when refugees found they could not

cross the Spanish border. German anti-Nazis, in particular, knew what

awaited them if ever they fell into the hands of the Gestapo. In France were

some 10,000 German and Austrian anti-fascist exiles, of whom some 4,500

were communists. They included many prominent German and Austrian

writers, among them Heinrich Mann, Lion Feuchtwanger, Franz Werfel,

Anna Seghers, Alfred Doblin, Alfred Koestler, and Manes Sperber; painters

such as Max Ernst and Hans Hartug; musicians like Bruno Walter, Oskar

Strauss, and Lotte Schoene; German communist leaders such as Walter

Ulbricht, Franz Dahlem, and Wilhelm Piek. Also included were Czechs,

Poles, Italians, and Spanish Republican exiles.

There were a number of suicides. After being repeatedly turned back

by Spanish guards, noted German philosopher and literary critic Walter

Benjamin took an overdose of morphine and died. With a stone tied round

his neck, Carl Einstein, Albert Einstein’s nephew, threw himself into the

Gave d’Oloron, the river running through Navarrenx. Ernst Weiss, the

novelist, committed suicide by taking veronal in Paris. Walter Hasenclever,

the playwriter, committed suicide by opening his veins in a concentration

camp near Avignon. Kayser, an editorial writer, swallowed strychnine in

another camp. Willi Muenzenberg, one-time head of the Comintern West-

European propaganda section, was found dead with a rope round his neck in

a forest near Grenoble,. Numerous similar examples abounded.

Well-known novelist Arthur Koestler sought refuge in France during

the war. Even though of Hungarian nationality, hence technically neutral, he

was dragged from one camp to another, facing appalling conditions,

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repulsive food, and vicious guards. Camps were filled with refugees of

various nationalities, including Germans, Italians, and Spaniards, whose

only crime was simply to exist and, in a number of cases, to have been anti-

fascist fighters before their time. Koestler, for example, had fought in Spain

during the civil war and had been sentenced to death by General Franco for

having sided with the Republicans.

German exiles faced the most precarious situation simply because

they were wanted by the Gestapo. Most of them populated the camps.

Herded into a camp at Gurs were 7,000 Germans. All were deported to

Birkenau concentration camp in Germany for extermination. “Another

section of the German exiles had previously joined the French Army for the

duration,” Koestler wrote. “They were not demobilized and were kept in

Moroccan forced-labor battalions to work in mines and quarries, reduced to

a state of slavery.” Refugees called up for auxiliary service during the last

days of war managed to reach Nantes 24 hours before Germans occupied the

town, but the French shut them in the local jail and handed them over to the

invading Germans. Another group of refugees reached a French village,

where villagers mistook them for parachutists and shot or lynched several;

survivors were sent to a concentration camp near Paris. In a letter that

reached First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, a German doctor wrote that

conditions in the refugee camps in France were far worse than anything

imagined. Thirteen thousand refugees lived “like criminals behind barbed

wire in dark, cold, wet, unhealthy barracks without beds, table or chair.” In

the first seven weeks, he reported, more than 500 refugees had died.73

“A minority of those who were left of the German exiles had in

various adventurous ways reached the south of unoccupied France,”

Koestler wrote. “They were hiding in little villages in the Pyrenees around

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the Gurs camp, where their women were kept, and on the Mediterranean

coast. Their fate depended on the local gendarmes, mayors and prefets. Any

of these had the power to put them back into jail or in a concentration camp

without legal proceedings.” Even the lucky few granted visas to the United

States--a few hundred out of 10,000--those on the list of “outstanding

intellectuals” established by committees in New York, had to go through

endless red tape before reaching their goal.

“If there were any spontaneous popular feeling left in the apathetic

masses of France, it was the feeling of hatred for foreigners,” was Koestler’s

sad commentary on his experience.74

Apparent French indifference to similar tragedies, the widespread

feeling that foreigners had caused much of France’s misfortunes, made

matters worse. The French felt too much affected by their own immediate

troubles and the uncertainty of their own future to feel concerned about other

people’s misfortunes. Besides, under the impact of the country’s disasters,

attitudes rapidly began changing. Frightened people simply ignored any hint

ofwhat was in store for them. Tensions within families pitted against each

other advocates of contrasting solutions for the country’s problems. The

atmosphere soon reeked with hatred and distrust--hardly conducive to calm

assessment of the alternatives confronting France. Some French even felt

that if the Germans were victorious, it was because they deserved to be.

Foreign observers in Bordeaux at the time painfully observed the

speed with which the country seemed to shift toward accepting the invaders

or at least accommodating to their views. The later about-face of the

government and of most public opinion thus came as no surprise to them.

Green recalled the painful experience of a conversation with the wife of a

high government official: “In any case, my dear sir, remember we would

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rather be Germans than Americans.” Green’s experience paralleled that of

Britons looked upon as if they, not the Germans, were the enemy.

Equally unwelcome to many French in Bordeaux were the remnants

of foreign governments who had accompanied the French in their retreat, the

Poles and the Belgians in particular. After Poland’s crushing defeat in

September 1939, prominent Poles who had managed to escape through the

Balkans reached France expecting to find refuge, welcome, and fighting

spirit. Because the French and the Poles had traditionally been close

politically, culturally, and emotionally fleeing Poles quite understandably

thought France would open its arms to them as brothers. The French and the

Poles have traditionally been close politically, culturally, and emotionally.

Quite understandably, then, fleeing Poles thought France would welcome

them as brothers. December 1939 the expatriate Poles established a National

Polish Council in Angers. Nearly 85,000 Polish soldiers joined the fight in

France, but instead of organizing into a Polish legion, they dispersed among

French units. When the French abandoned combat, however, the scattered

Poles refused to surrender. In June some 20,000 Polish soldiers and officers

succeeded in reaching England; others either fell into enemy hands or

escaped to parts unknown. On June 16 Reynaud suggested that the Polish

government, then in Bordeaux, transfer to London. During its last session in

France, on June 18, the Polish government vowed to “continue the struggle

with England and all those fighting for the freedom and independence of

nations and for the defense of civilization and culture.” That same day

Churchill sent a plane to take Polish premier and commander-in-chief

General Wladyslaw Sikorski, to London. President Raczkiewicz and Foreign

Minister Zaleski also succeeded in reaching the British capital. For Poles the

stay in France had been, to say the least, a disappointing experience.

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The Belgian government, too, was in Bordeaux at the time and found

living conditions a nightmare. Premier Huberty Pierlot revealed:

“[The government] had found a home on the second floor of a horrible

shack. That miserable hole was our meeting room. The air was full of the

sour smell of cheap cigars, smoked the day before by God knows who. The

ceiling was dirty, a door turned into a kitchen table and several rickety chairs

the only furniture in a thief’s den. In Bordeaux, the end of our voyage, fate

led us to this garret from which only evil could emerge. All I could see out

of the window was a patch of gray sky. One could almost smell the lassitude

and hopelessness in the air.” The Belgians were losing heart, when Mr.

Pierlot read a memorandum he had written the night before: “I have given a

lot of thought to our situation. We won’t leave for England. France has

abandon the fight, and so shall we.” The struggle was over. The abdication

was absolute and irreparable. The men were shattered.75

King Leopold’s surrender to the Germans the previous month had

prompted French government accusations of treason and made Belgian

refugees unwelcome targets of abuse by the population. Sentiments calmed

somewhat, though, when the Pierlot government vowed to continue the

struggle. Now that the Pétain government had decided to ask the enemy for

an armistice, the Belgians stood with the French. Thus Pierlot asked the

French government “to inform the German government that the Belgian

government would like to enter into contact with it to discuss the problems

related to the presence of Belgian officers, soldiers and civilians in France.”

Added Pierlot, “The Belgian Government is also ready to discuss the

conditions of an armistice between Germany and Belgium.” His letter

remained unanswered because the Germans had vetoed contacts between the

exiles and Brussels. Meanwhile, the Belgian minister of public health,

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Marcel-Henri Jaspar, decided to ignore his own government and to leave for

London, where he planned to set up a national committee on de Gaulle’s

model. He was vehemently condemned. During this period the Belgian

government, still unpopular in France and criticized at home, fell into total

disarray. Deeply concerned with the future of the Belgian Congo and its

immense wealth, London continued pressing the Belgian government to take

refuge in England. Indeed, South Africa had already envisaged taking over

administration of the colony in case of Belgian default. The issue was

resolved when four ministers, including Premier Pierlot and Foreign

Minister Henri Spaak, reached London by way of Spain. They alone

represented Belgian legitimacy and government continuity throughout the

war. After Belgium’s liberation the government-in-exile returned home, its

legitimacy uncontested.76

Czechs and Slovaks in large numbers had reached France after the

Munich accords and the German invasion that had destroyed their country.

They reached Boulogne-sur-Mer aboard Polish vessels and, for lack of better

solutions, joined the Foreign Legion. In September 1939, following

negotiations between Paris and the Czech government-in-exile, Legion

members sent to Africa returned to France to become part of a Czechoslovak

division. During the Polish campaign several hundred Czech airmen had

volunteered to fight the Germans. Thus Poland’s defeat was followed by a

Czech exodus, marked by temporary detention in Soviet prison camps and

Hungarian prisons. Those who survived these traumatic experiences

managed to reach Syria and Lebanon, and a few weeks later Marseilles and

the camp of Agde, where the first Czech units assembled. The Czechs

succeeded in forming one division 11,400-men strong. Meanwhile some 600

airmen had joined the French airforce and taken an active part in the war.

81

After the armistice the Czech division dissolved. Some 4,500 men and

nearly all airmen chose to leave for England rather than surrender. In

response to an arrangement between President Éduard Benes and General de

Gaulle, the Czech units were incorporated into the Free French and sfought

in the war to the very end.77

Serious debate in France about pressing decisions twas hardly

possible in the prevailing atmosphere of confusion and mutual detestation.

Besides, those with whom the decisions rested were exhausted and in a rare

state of excitability. All who dealt with Reynaud at the time agree that he

appeared a shadow of his previous self. Gone were the self-assurance, the

decisiveness, and the clear vision of what to do. Although Reynaud

proclaimed his determination to stand firm, not to abandon the fight, but his

behavior implied the contrary; inevitably sooner or later he would be set

aside by people who knew exactly what they wanted, particularly those for

whom defeat would provide the occasion for a radical change in the familiar

Republican political structure of France. For the British, who followed the

situation in Bordeaux with increasing anxiety, the question centered on

Reynaud: What was becoming of him? Would he be able to arouse the

determination required to counter the defeatists? The impression he gave

disheartened them. “If ever a confident courageous little man lost his nerve,

it was Reynaud,” Biddle cabled Washington. “He turned literally ashen gray

in panic and you would never have known him to be the same man of two

weeks earlier.” Spears found him “beaten by events.” Perhaps it was too

much to ask any individual, let alone Reynaud, to withstand the conflicting,

unrelenting pressures applied by rapid changing events, clamoring

associates, and unforgiving enemies. When Reynaud became premier in

March 1940, he failed to appoint a war cabinet of decisive men who agreed

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with him on the war aims and the means to reach them. In fact, some of

Reynaud’s ministers, as well as other politicians he named to important

posts, became Pétain supporters and members of Pétain’s cabinet.

Another problem was Madame de Portes’s influence, at times

overstated, but nevertheless real. Divorced from a French count and mother

of children sent to safety in the United States, she was awaiting Reynaud’s

divorce so that she might marry him. According to Baudouin, she

passionately loved her country and ardently believed that Paul Reynaud, for

whom she felt a true adoration, was the only man who could save France.78

In a “personal and confidential” message to Roosevelt, Ambassador Bullitt

warned that Paul Reynaud “is completely dominated by his mistress, the

Comtesse de Portes. Reynaud forbade her to come in the room when he went

to talk to you on the phone; but she came right in and when he ordered her

out, refused to go. I think you should avoid such conversations in the future

since the lady in questions will repeat them all over town in exaggerated

form.”79 She would undo at night what Mandel would construct during the

day. She would meddle at all times. She also expected to be informed about

everything and even tried to intervene in decisions. On the morning of June

13, at the Chateau de Chissey, she shouted at Mandel: “We are fed up with

your politics and your politicians. We need an armistice and an armistice at

any price.” Pointing to de Gaulle, she added: “There is another one who

wishes to play the politician! Let him go back to his tanks and give proof of

himself on the battlefields.” Once, at the prefecture of Tours, she tried to

enter the drawing room where Reynaud was in conference with Churchill.

There she was overheard to say to Baudouin: “Tell Paul we must give up, it’s

time to end it all.” On the evening of the 13th, at the Chateau de Chissey, at

the very moment Pétain was declaring to the cabinet that he would never

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leave France, she turned to a young diplomat, Jean Daridan, to exclaim,

“Must we appeal to Pétain ?”80 On June 16 a telephone intercept in Bordeaux

registered her admonition: “Well, Paul, is it the armistice?” By the

afternoon, having heard about the Franco-British union proposal, she is

reported to have inveighed: “Paul, do you want to replay Isabelle of

Bavaria? [In 1420, Isabelle of Bavaria delivered France to Henry of

England, heir and regent of the throne.] It’s atrocious.” Nervously pacing the

antechamber of the prefecture during the cabinet’s afternoon meeting she

turned to a high official to ask: “What are we waiting to ask for an

armistice?”81 By then France needed another Clemenceau to impose a

decision and bend all obstacles to his will; instead there was a tired man

overwhelmed by events he could no longer control and surrounded by

people within his intimate circle, within his very cabinet, pursuing policies

at odds with his own.

The fate of their country in the balance, the British were exerting

more pressure on Reynaud than he could withstand. Clearly they had no

intention of condoning a separate peace by France. Their intent was to

provide him with a powerful argument in the cabinet. A message from

Churchill received during the day of the 14th renewed Britain’s pledge to

France, a pledge implicitly expecting reciprocity: “We renew to the French

republic our pledge and resolve to continue the struggle at all costs in

France, in this Island, upon the oceans and in the air, wherever it may lead

us, using all our resources up to the utmost limit, and sharing together the

burden of repairing the ravages of war. We shall never turn from the conflict

until France stands safe and erect in her grandeur.” Other messages had been

sent to Reynaud by the Dominions. On behalf of Canada, Mackenzie King

telegraphed:

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We have followed, with the pride of blood, the heroic action of your soldiers. Canada swears to France, as she has to Great Britain, the complete support to the extreme limit of her force and resources. I have read your appeal to the United States. You may rest assured that the people of North America are fully conscious of the needs of the hour. I am certain that the support which, with the full weight of its economic and material power, this continent is affording the French republic for the defense of the sacred cause for which she is fighting, will be accelerated to a rhythm as yet unknown. The sacrifices and the devotion of France are an example to the free men the world over.

Beyond the rhetoric the meaning of the message was clear: keep

fighting and North America will assist you to the limit.

One overwhelming concern dictated Britain’s attitude toward the

French during those dramatic hours: If France abandoned the struggle and

dealt with Nazi Germany, the French might be compelled to turn their fleet

over to the enemy. Were that to happen, Britain’s fate would be sealed.

Indeed, the fate of the United States would also be sealed. Churchill stressed

the point forcibly in a June 15 message to Roosevelt. If ever the Germans

were able to beat and starve the British into submission, the British fleet

might well fall into enemy hands.

The fate of the British fleet would be decisive on the fate of the United States because if it were joined to the fleets of Japan, France, and Italy and the great resources of German industry, overwhelming sea power would be in Hitler’s hands. The revolution in sea power might happen very quickly and certainly long before the United States would be able to prepare against it. If we go down you may have a United States of Europe under Nazi command far more numerous, far stronger, far better armed than the new [world]. I feel I have a right to place on record the vital manner in which American interests are at stake in our battle and that of France. We are now faced with the imminent collapse of French resistance and if this occurs the successful defense of this Island will be the only hope of averting the collapse of civilization as we define it.

In that fateful month of June few people, even in the U.S. military,

85

thought Great Britain had much chance of surviving. Despite France’s

proclaimed intention of never surrendering the fleet, Hitler could, if he

wanted, exert such pressure and launch such threats that the French would be

compelled to bow. The Führer had shown in Poland what he could do to

people who dared to oppose his will.

Churchill’s warning about the fate that might await Britain was not

meant simply to scare the Americans into action. A small but significant

number of members of Parliament favored a negotiated peace with Hitler to

an all-out war that might leave the United States and the Soviet Union the

dominant world powers. The tone of Roosevelt’s response to Reynaud’s

desperate appeals left some in the British cabinet with the impression that

the United States would undertake actions short of war. “If France decided to

endure the further trauma of the war, the United States would be deeply

committed to enter it,” Churchill had told Reynaud. Roosevelt’s clarification

of the U.S. position dashed those hopes but at the same time ensured France

would surrender.

Roosevelt had made his position clear on the afternoon of the June 14

when he jointly received the ambassadors of France and Great Britain. He

showed them Reynaud’s telegram sent from Cangé and received that

morning in Washington. The president insisted he could not declare war on

Germany had he wished to; Congress and the country would simply not

support him. Speaking as a friend, he suggested that France could preserve

her independence and integrity only by pursuing the war in overseas

territories; if this proved impossible, she could take the fleet over to the

British side. Roosevelt recognized the grave difficulty of advising France.

Yet the French would, in his opinion, be better off allowing Germany all of

France as the French government, army, and fleet moved across the seas,

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rather than asking for an armistice and coming to terms. He urged the French

neither to deliver the fleet to Hitler nor to scuttle it; were they to do either,

the U.S. fleet would find itself inferior to the Axis fleets. Such an upset in

the balance of naval forces could prove fatal, he stressed. In a message to

Churchill that same day Roosevelt wrote: “As naval people you and I fully

appreciate the vital strength of the fleet in being, and command of the seas

means in the long run the saving of democracy and the recovery of those

suffering temporary reverses.”82

The British ambassador met with Reynaud late that evening to stress

once more that Britain would not allow France to abandon the struggle. In a

defensive tone Reynaud assured the British that at in his meeting with

Churchill at Cangé he had spoken for the French cabinet and not in his own

behalf. As determined as ever to stay in the war, had he not sent de Gaulle to

London to seek British help in transporting troops and matériel to North

African ports? These assurances failed to convince the British, who felt

Reynaud “had that evening been too tired and bewildered to be rational, and

that what we had extracted from a turgid and disconnected flow of words

could not be taken to express a policy or even a point of view.”83 The

impression was shared by British ambassador Campbell: “Reynaud was in

an unreceptive mood and did not respond to my remarks to the effect that I

did not think that H[is] M[ajesty’s] government would willingly accept the

idea of France abandoning the struggle. It was impossible to get M. Reynaud

to talk rationally. The majority of his colleagues were working on him all the

time in a defeating sense, while he himself swayed backward and forward.”84

Those who should have done their utmost to strengthen Reynaud’s

will to go on fighting were themselves hampered by mental confusion and

feeble determination. President Albert Lebrun meant well but was not the

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man for the situation; he could do no better than to strengthen what

Ambassador Campbell called Reynaud’s “mood of indecision.” Lebrun

believed that having retained their own forces for their own defense, the

British no longer possessed the “necessary moral authority for saying: we

cannot free you from your engagement.”85He also felt, apparently, that

considering the enormity of the events, any conditions offered to end

hostilities should be examined.86

Édouard Herriot, too, had endeavored to succor the premier but was

unconvincing. One of the great personalities of the Third Republic, several

times premier and minister, he greatly loved his good town of Lyon, which

had elected him mayor at every election. A man of immense culture and the

author of more than thirty books, he made emotional speeches that were

invariably successful; he also loved good food and pretty women. As a

leader of the radicals, a center party, he had played an important role in the

political life of the country, supporting decisions aimed at strengthening

democracy and international understanding, but also opposing fascism in all

its forms. In that tragic month of June he never wavered in his hostility to

the armistice and in his belief that France should remain committed to war.

But if his heart was in the right place, he lacked the determination, perhaps

even the energy, to steer Reynaud in the right direction. As president of the

Chamber of Deputies, he always insisted on applying formal procedures and

lengthy parliamentary debates--certainly not what France needed at the

time-- and as a result Herriot’s influence on Reynaud and the grave decisions

confronting him was practically nil.

Amidst these efforts to rekindle the fighting spirit of France, the

frightened refugees, sorry symbol of defeat, continued pouring into

Bordeaux. A high official had been compelled to sleep in a ditch along the

88

road after failing to secure a room, the local daily, La Petite Gironde,

reported. A famous physician had to bunk on a wrought iron bench in a local

park. The director of the Beaux Arts conducted interviews in the street

because refugees occupied all available rooms in the museum. With no more

beds available, people had to sleep on the floor, on mattresses, or, more

likely, on straw. Contending with refugees of its own, the surrounding

countryside could no longer continue to provide the city with sufficient fresh

vegetables, milk, chicken, and other foodstuffs. Although not yet critical, the

situation could not continue much longer without becoming so.

General de Gaulle had managed to reach Bordeaux in the afternoon.

Upon his arrival he joined Reynaud at his temporary residence. He then

called Admiral Darlan to request a cruiser to transport him to England. On

Reynaud’s behalf he instructed Darlan to be in Bordeaux the next morning

for consultation. Darlan protested--he had better things to do--but finally

accepted. By then the admiral had concluded that the war, lost, could not be

transferred to North Africa; at the same time he wanted to ensure that the

fleet could be saved in case German conditions proved unacceptable. On

June 14 he ordered the French Admiralty to transfer to Marseilles, across the

Mediterranean from Africa; he also instructed two admirals to transfer a

certain number of ships, including the battleships Richelieu and Jean Bart,

to British harbors, the British immediately accepting. The French Naval

Mission in London having solicited further instructions that evening, a wire

the next morning from the French Admiralty announced the arrival of

General de Gaulle to discuss, among other things, the transfer to Britain of

ships under construction. Arriving in London on the 16th, however, de

Gaulle informed the French Mission he had in fact received no instructions

concerning these matters.

89

That evening de Gaulle, before leaving on his mission, dined at the

Hotel Splendide in company of his military aide, Geoffroy de Courcel.

Dining at the same hotel at a table not far from de Gaulle’s was Marshal

Pétain. The general went over to pay his respects. They shook hands without

uttering a single word. (They will never meet again!) At another restaurant,

the Chapon Fin, one of the best in Europe, the British ambassador and

General Spears dined by themselves. Several parliamentarians who had

managed to arrive in Bordeaux during the day, Georges Mandel and Pierre

Laval among them, were also seen dining at the same restaurant.

As de Gaulle traveled to Rennes, and from there to England, General

Weygand drove in the opposite direction, toward Bordeaux, summoned by

Marshal Pétain. “The Cabinet has agreed last night not to make a decision

concerning the request for an armistice before receiving a reply from

Roosevelt to a telegram requesting a declaration of war on Germany,” the

marshal wrote. He added that the outside limit for making a decision was the

next day, Saturday, June 15, and that General Weygand’s presence was

necessary. “The Supreme Commander must be in Bordeaux, 58 rue Saint-

Genes, at Monsieur Baudouin domicile, tel. 868-20, before 10:30 A.M.” The

tone was that of a man already in charge. Reynaud apparently accepted

Weygand’s presence at the Council of Ministers on condition that he limit

his remarks to military matters and refrain from all political comment.

By then Bordeaux had become the symbol of a physically and

spiritually beaten country, one swept by anxiousness to leave the war behind

and start anew no matter how. There were, of course, even in the month of

June, the few exceptions, those for whom faith in victory at the end of a long

and painful road remained unshakable. An unforgettable example was

furnished by the inhabitants of the lsland of Sein, nearly all fishermen, who

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decided their men would not be taken alive by the Germans. Practically the

entire adult population, 130 men, took to their fishing boats and sailed for

England.

As cabinet members spread throughout Bordeaux trying to organize

without exactly knowing their mission, the news from the front could not

have been worse. The Wehrmacht was advancing along three axes: to the

west toward the mouth of the Loire; to the east toward Lyon and the Rhône

Valley; to the northeast with an accelerating encirclement of the second

group of French armies. Given the situation, the British concluded the

moment had arrived for them to quit the continent. Early on June 15, a

message from Sir John Dill, imperial chief of staff, informed Weygand that

the British forces would no longer be under his command, thereby putting an

end to Franco-British military cooperation. 87

Meanwhile, that same day Spanish dictator Francisco Franco

transformed his country’s neutrality into nonbelligerency, which set the

French wondering whether a new front would open along the Pyrenées and

in Morocco.

Early that morning, the British called at Reynaud’s office in Quartier

General, rue Vital-Carles, and there were shown the full text of Roosevelt’s

telegram of the 13th. They underlined the positive aspects of the U.S.

position with no results. Roosevelt had promised to do the utmost to aid the

Allies and to support the ideals for which they were fighting. Reynaud

should have considered the passage concerning the fleet as especially

encouraging. Roosevelt’s promise of unlimited aid, the British pointed out,

represented in itself a form of belligerency. Given the president’s position,

how could one not believe that sooner or later the United States would be at

war? Roosevelt had also shown his satisfaction at Reynaud’s declared

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intention to fight on outside France. But these encouraging words failed in

shaking what the British sensed as a depressed lassitude. They could not

deny that Reynaud was weakening. “Everything,” he kept repeating,

“depends on Roosevelt’s answer to my last telegram.” Yet obviously

Roosevelt’s reply, conditioned as it was by the reality of a deeply divided

American political situation, could not meet Reynaud’s expectations. These

illusive hopes served only to postpone decisions.

No sooner had the British left than Reynaud received a

communication from General Alphonse-Joseph Georges, commanding the

northeastern armies, informing him of Britain’s decision to reembark its

remaining British forces. An enquiry in London produced a laconic answer

by Churchill: Given General Weygand’s statement about French resistance

having ceased, the Allies’ cause would be better served by keeping British

forces at home. Weygand objected to Churchill’s interpretation of his words:

He had told General Sir Alan Brooke that “French resistance would not last

long,” not that it had “ceased.” This would not be the last time that Weygand

felt his words had been misinterpreted.

Before leaving for Bordeaux, fleet chief Admiral François Darlan had

left instructions to take all measures to prepare ships for departure. The first

person he met when he arrived the morning of the 15th was Roland de

Margerie, Reynaud’s diplomatic adviser and a supporter of a move to North

Africa. “Here is a document from General de Gaulle, he told me,” Darlan

recalled. “He requests that I assure the transfer to North Africa of 870,000

men. But I do not see how I can manage it. I can dispose of a limited number

of transport ships and I must be given the time to assemble them.

Furthermore, how can we provide victuals, arms and munitions through the

port of Casablanca to all the forces to be concentrated in North Africa?”

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Darlan later repeated the same arguments to Premier Reynaud but lost his

temper when informed that the agreed-upon 45-day assembly period had

been reduced to 10 days and that the premier did not know the whereabouts

of the forces to be evacuated: “In such conditions, how could I possibly

evacuate 900,000 men in ten days.” “The admiral is not happy with your

plan,” Reynaud told de Margerie.88

Apparently Darlan disapproved of how things were moving in

general. Paul Baudouin described him as “violently critical of the manner in

which the armistice will be requested, for he feels that sooner or later such

demand will be made. The admiral wants to remain in complete agreement

with Britain. Under no circumstances will he accept the accession of Laval

to power. He says that Laval is already very active sending emissary upon

emissary to the Marshal.”89

No sooner had Darlan left, furious at having been disturbed for

nothing, than Reynaud received a message from the French ambassador to

Washington, René Doynel de Saint-Quentin. Should President Roosevelt

even suggest U.S. participation in the war, it stated, he would antagonize not

only the Republicans but also most trade unions and certain dissident

Democrats only too happy to find congenial terrain for an attack on him. A

similar position was taken by Cordell Hull in his Memoirs.

Then came the turn of the British ambassador, who called on the

premier at the latter’s request. Determined to ask for an armistice, Pétain had

evidently made up his mind to resign unless an armistice was sought or the

United States declared war. He scheduled a cabinet meeting for 4 P.M. The

ambassador tried to strengthen Reynaud’s resolve, making several

suggestions, apparently without success. What the ambassador did not know

while talking to Reynaud he learned upon returning to the embassy: In a

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telegram to Churchill, President Roosevelt had made clear he would not

agree to make public his earlier message to Reynaud. The communication of

June 13, the president had stated, in no sense intended to commit, nor did it

commit, the government of the United States to military participation.

Because no news would have been more likely to shatter Reynaud’s

position, the ambassador decided not to inform Reynaud, who remained

unaware of it when the cabinet met.

Following on the heels of the British ambassador came Polish foreign

minister Zaleski. What defense, the president of the Polish Republic would

like to know, had the French government adopted? General Sikorski held to

his post, commanding the Polish units defending the Maginot line, Zaleski

reminded the premier. Reynaud admitted that colleagues favoring armistice

had increased in number. The morale of the French army had sunk very low,

he added. “We must look reality in the face,” Zaleski argued. “Why not keep

fighting, why not move to the Mediterranean, even to North Africa? It is

impossible to conclude an acceptable armistice with Hitler,” insisted the

Pole. “Unfortunately,” Reynaud countered, “we have no alternatives.

Churchill understands our position, he knows we can no longer defend

ourselves. He no longer insists that we respect the terms of our alliance.

France, after Poland, has discovered that the Germans are far too well

prepared militarily and too strong. We must now bear the consequences of

such a situation.” “But,” retorted Zaleski, “have you considered the position

of the Polish Government? What will happen to our army which has fought

so bravely and is still covering the withdrawal of French forces from the

East? We are not the kind of nation that capitulates.” “Well,” responded

Reynaud, “I can only say this: If you care to join your cause to ours and

request an armistice at the same time as we do, we shall do our utmost to

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obtain the best possible conditions for your government, your army, and the

numerous Polish refugees residing in France. Which other solution can you

envisage? What can you do? Your army is in contact with the enemy. You do

not have enough boats and planes to evacuate it. And even if you had, where

will you be looking for your soldiers?”

Leaving Reynaud, Zaleski marched at once to Mandel. “Why don’t

you and your friends snatch power from the defeatists?’ he demanded. There

is nothing he would like better, Mandel answered, but these are not the days

of Clemenceau!90 Although Reynaud later denied his words to Zaleski, the

conversation did take place, causing much concern among the Belgians,

who worried just as much as the Poles about their immediate future.

Shortly before lunch Reynaud received the presidents of the Chamber

of Deputies and the Senate to share with them his frustration at the High

Command’s unwillingness to obey government instructions. “Perhaps a

government other than mine will agree to sign an armistice. I shall never

consent to lay down our arms,” the premier assured them. The two

presidents soon had to contend with the arrival of deputies and senators

clamoring to call the chambers session.

Early in the morning, probably to prepare for a showdown, Pétain had

asked General Weygand, Admiral Darlan, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister

Baudouin, and Finance Minister Yves Bouthillier to meet him at the Grand

Hotel, where he was staying. Because a majority of ministers favored an

armistice, Pétain told them, Reynaud could be expected to resign. The

president of the Republic would then charge him, Pétain, with the task of

forming a new government. Throughout this critical period, those who were

to determine France’s future behaved as if the head of state did not exist. In

the debate over armistice, President Lebrun had shown no capacity for

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leadership. Although the constitution limited his powers, he might have used

his considerable authority to steer events in a direction he considered best

for the nation. But Albert Lebrun seldom knew what he wanted and was

usually influenced by the last person with whom he spoke. Had Reynaud

actually imposed a decision despite opposition, in the president he would

have found neither encouragement nor support. Lebrun insisted on following

parliamentary rules to the letter, even though the system had broken down

and decisions could not be endlessly negotiated among people by now only

technically representative of the nation. Had he found before him a strong

personality--Clemenceau or a Churchill--someone who would allow nothing

or no one to stand in the way of a given course, Lebrun would have done his

best to cooperate; but Reynaud was no such personality. In their

indecisiveness, President Lebrun and Premier Reynaud left the way open to

those who knew what they wanted and how to get it.

Why was Admiral Darlan one of the four people Pétain invited? He

had spoken adamantly of taking the fleet to North Africa, to the United

States, to Canada, only to join those who favored an armistice to end the

war. The fleet was his obvious creation; largely thanks to him, it had become

Europe’s second most powerful naval force. He had also gained the

reputation of being a Republican attached to the country’s democratic

values. Under no circumstances would he let the fleet fall into enemy hands,

but then why not just leave with it to play a decisive role in the battles to

come? Interviews with officers who served under Darlan at the time suggest

that given Pétain’s immense popularity with the navy, orders contrary to

Pétain’s instructions would simply not have been obeyed. “A few ships

might have sided with Darlan and left, but the majority would have refused

to disobey Pétain,” a former navy commander commented. Further, as his

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conversation with Ambassador Bullitt proves, Darlan believed as strongly as

Pétain did that the Germans had already won the war, and that in time

England would be obliged to throw in the towel. Darlan might have decided

to stand by Pétain to ensure that no part of his fleet would be disposed of.

What became of him later, when fully committed to collaboration with

Germany, is another story.

At the private meeting with Pétain, Weygand spoke of the army’s

desperate plight; Baudouin stressed Churchill’s words of understanding

voiced at Cangé, forgetting to add, as he would in the future, that the prime

minister had not freed France of her commitment not to seek a separate

peace or armistice.

Subsequently General Weygand called on the premier, who had

summoned him early that afternoon. Weygand painted a somber picture of

the military’s plight and again insisted on an immediate armistice to end the

troops’ terrible suffering. Reynaud assured Weygand that the same concerns

moved him. He too wanted an immediate end to the butchery. Yet armistice

was not the quickest means of achieving their shared purpose. Negotiations

would take time; meanwhile the killing would continue. The fastest way to

stop the killing, he felt, was to follow the Dutch example; that is, the

commander-in-chief must order a ceasefire, and the government must

assume the responsibility for the decision. Dutch general Winkelman had

had no contact with the enemy, no conversation, no capitulation, and hence

no armistice. At the same time, the French government would move to North

Africa to continue the struggle alongside the Allies.

The general reacted with great indignation at the suggestion. Alleging

political considerations clearly outside his competence, he could not

compare the behavior of foreign sovereigns with that of a French premier.

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“What analogy exists between a sovereign and a premier, considering that

there were more than hundred premiers during the seventy years the Third

Republic lasted?” The comparison, of course, had no validity. In a republic

the counterpart of a sovereign is the president, and in the present instance the

president seemed ready, under pressure from the premier and the presidents

of the Chambers, to follow Queen Wilhelmina’s example, abandoning

national territory to continue fighting against the Axis powers. But General

Weygand refused, as he put it, “clearly and indignantly” to follow the

example of the Dutch general. To accept such an order would shame the

flags of the French army. This would not do. Nor would he under any

circumstances leave national territory. When reminded that Algeria

comprised three French departments, Weygand simply replied: “It is not the

same thing.” The conversation ended abruptly as the Council of Ministers

was called to order.

It was by then 4 P.M., exactly the hour Pétain had urged for the

meeting originally scheduled for two hours later. After a brief statement by

Admiral Darlan, General Weygand argued with his usual vehemence: With

the military situation worsening by the hour, an armistice had become a

matter of extreme urgency. Their statements completed, President Lebrun

invited the two officers to withdraw. Reynaud, in his turn, again insisted that

the honor of France required them not be abandon the struggle. “If the High

Command considers there is no other solution, I am ready to give the order

for a ceasefire, as the Dutch command has done, which has not prevented the

government from moving to London and thus staying in the war.” Several

ministers approved this solution. Reynaud believed Marshal Pétain the most

qualified to explain to General Weygand, waiting in an adjoining room, that

the proposed solution in no way offended the army’s honor. Accepting the

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task, the marshal returned 15 minutes later with the news that Weygand had

stuck to his position: It was for the government to conclude an armistice, not

for the army to lay down its arms.

The two sides remained unyielding. Camille Chautemps proposed a

compromise solution: “Resistance by the French people as a whole, its moral

resistance in particular, will be total once our fellow citizens realize there is

nothing to be expected from Hitler. It is necessary to put this assumption to a

test. We must accordingly request the conditions for cessation of hostilities.”

Was this an honest appraisal, or a ruse to make the armistice more palatable?

The issue has long been debated, apologists for Vichy and Gaullists taking,

as expected, opposing sides. But the issue was not as clear-cut then as later

suggested. Reynaud threatened to resign but reconsidered when a majority

of the government favored the Chautemps initiative, probably considering

the proposal a way to circumvent France’s obligation to Britain. Reynaud

finally agreed to remain; he would accept the initiative on condition that the

British concur.

Once the meeting adjourned, at 7:55 P.M., Premier Reynaud

approached General Weygand, still waiting in the adjoining room in case the

government needed to consult him. Turning to the commander-in-chief

Reynaud told him: “General, as previously agreed, you will request the

army’s capitulation.” Taken aback, Weygand practically shouted his riposte:

“Never have I spoken as you say. No human force will ever compel me to

sign the capitulation of an army that has fought as ours has done. To suggest

that I agreed is a lie.” Reynaud attempted to calm him down, arguing that

perhaps he had misunderstood. The suggestion simply rendered Weygand

furious: “Certainly not. I shall not calm down and I shall not shut up either. I

will never accept a similar infamy. Never will I inflict such shame on our

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flags. You made a mistake if, by asking me to come from afar, you thought

you had found a man ready for all compromises. The cessation of hostilities,

like the declaration of war, is the government’s responsibility. Let the

government face its responsibilities.”

To make his position unmistakably clear, Weygand asked to speak to

the president of the Republic, Lebrun, who refused to hear him without the

premier. Reynaud entered the room. Weygand now felt free to unburden

himself: “Do they take me for a child? Was it thus to trap me that I was

recalled from Beirut. I have been aware of the affairs of this country long

enough to know where the responsibilities lie for the present drama.” Lebrun

invited him to control himself: “The tone of your words is inexcusable.”

Because Weygand repeatedly referred to military honor, Reynaud confronted

him with a simple question: “You say that surrender is a dishonorable act;

but if the Germans conditioned the granting of an armistice to the army’s

surrender, would you consider the request contrary to military honor?”

Weygand: “I shall decide when the moment comes.” Lebrun: “It’s right now

that you must decide!” But Weygand refused to be pinned down. He

continued talking about past mistakes made because no one had listened to

him. Finally Lebrun ended the conversation. Implementing his own

suggestion, Premier Reynaud submitted to the British ambassador a “project

of a telegram” in which he summed up the cabinet’s position:

At the meeting it was held that at a moment when the enemy is on the point of occupying the entire country, which will mean inflicting cruel privations and suffering on the French nation, the departure of the Government would be considered as desertion by the people. This might give rise to violent reactions on the part of the public unless it had been established that the peace conditions imposed by Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini were unacceptable as being contrary to the vital and honorable interests of France. The Cabinet does not doubt that these conditions will in any event be

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unacceptable, but have decided it is indispensable that this should be proved beyond doubt. If this course is not adopted the government will break up, as many of its members would, in that case, refuse to leave the soil of France.

The Council of Ministers had consequently decided to ask the British

government to authorize the initiative. Reiterating that under no

circumstances would the fleet be ceded to Germany, Reynaud warned that in

view of the opinions expressed at the cabinet meeting, should the British

government withhold consent to this step, he would have no alternative but

to resign. Reynaud recalled that in response to French appeals President

Roosevelt had signified he could not furnish the military assistance the

Allies requested. He added: “At Tours, it had been agreed, upon your

request, that the question of authorizing a demand for an armistice would be

posed again if President Roosevelt’s reply were negative.” “Such having

been the case,” he concluded, “ the question is once more pertinent.”91

No sooner had Premier Reynaud finished reading the document to the

British, then he was handed Roosevelt’s reply to his last message. Turning

deathly pale, the premier managed to whisper: “Our appeal has failed. The

Americans will not declare war.” In his reply President Roosevelt renewed

the pledge to provide the Allied armies with airplanes, artillery, and

ammunition so long as the Allied governments pursued their resistance: “In

these hours, so heartrending for the French people and for yourself, I assure

you of my deepest sympathy, and I can furthermore assure you that, as long

as the French Nation continues to defend its liberty, and in so doing the

cause of democratic institutions in the world, it can rely upon receiving from

the United States in ever increasing quantities material and supplies of all

kinds.” The words that so much distressed Reynaud came in the last two

sentences of Roosevelt’s message: “I know you will understand that these

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declarations imply no military commitment. Congress alone can undertake

such engagements.”

The British and the Americans viewed with great skepticism the

Chautemps proposal as contained in Reynaud’s letter. By threatening to

resign, Reynaud would in fact make way for his opponents. He spoke to the

American ambassador as if favoring the Chautemps proposal: “Only by such

a move could he show the French people, who have been kept in utter

ignorance of the real gravity of the military situation, the severity of the

German terms and justify a flight of the government to Africa or England. ‘I

only hope the terms won’t be too moderate,’ he added.”92

By agreeing, however conditionally, to the Chautemps proposal,

Reynaud signed his own political death warrant. As Léon Blum noted: “The

terrible, the fatal error made by supposing that one can play with the idea of

an armistice, was not to have understood that, once one is involved, one is

trapped. What was so dangerous about this proposition was that it had

convinced the majority of the cabinet. I know this from certain friends,

members of the Reynaud cabinet, who had, with Reynaud, been firm and

even vehement in their opposition to Pétain and Weygand, but who were

fascinated, seduced by the Chautemps-Frossard suggestion because it made

it possible for them to take sides.”

Reynaud’s mistress, Madame de Portes, had meanwhile come up with

her own solution to the crisis. Eager for an armistice, she saw a new cabinet

presided over by Marshal Pétain as the only alternative. Reynaud, as vice-

premier, would use his experience to advise Pétain behind the scenes. She

had already convinced the marshal that a cabinet change was necessary.

They had even agreed that Pétain should very soon provoke the fall of the

present cabinet by resigning.

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During a dinner attended by friends the lady made no attempt to hide

her maneuvers from Paul Reynaud, who only smiled when she mentioned

them. As the discussion became more and more agitated, she boldly declared

to the premier, “Besides, my poor Paul, you aren’t even French.” His reply

was sharp, his tone furious. In a heated exchange Madame de Portes half

seriously accused him of cowardice, to which Reynaud threw two glasses of

water at her.93 The premier once mentioned he sometimes dreamed of living

in a hotel room in New York, and Madame de Portes was probably referring

to this attitude as a sign of his lack of attachment to French soil. She might

also have credited totally baseless stories that Reynaud’s physical

appearance betrayed Mexican ancestry. Reynaud’s ancestors were in fact all

French.

“H. Freeman Matthews, the first secretary of the United States

Embassy and the most experienced observer on the American side,” William

L. Langer wrote,

saw Reynaud three or four times a day at Bordeaux and had grave doubts whether any human being could have succeeded in generating enough courage and energy in the crumbling morale of the French authorities to keep up the fight. It is his considered opinion that Reynaud simply caved in under the strain and under the constant defeatist pressure of his own immediate circle. Mme de Portes was hanging on his coat-tails, and begging him to surrender. She even went so far as to look up Matthews and spend an hour in his office weeping bitterly in her effort to get him to bring pressure on the Prime Minister. Though she knew full well that the United States government was doing its utmost to strengthen the forces of resistance, she was so panic-stricken that she could leave no stone unturned in her effort to obtain her end. 94

The British showed even more pessimistic than the Americans if that

was possible. “This is certainly one of the worst days I have ever lived,”

Spears wrote. “I do not believe anything could possibly be worse. My

personal conclusion is that Reynaud is terrified of Pétain’s resigning as he

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cannot face the prospect of governing in the face of the Marshal’s and the

Commander-in-chief’s combined and violent opposition.”95 He found

Reynaud “beaten by events.” He wondered whether “the apprehension of

being described as a refugee, a man who had fled to save his skin, would

influence [Reynaud] against going to Africa.” Even if Reynaud, Mandel, and

others succeeded in moving to NorthAfrica, they would exercise but

doubtful authority, for Pétain and Weygand controlled the armed forces. “It

was unlikely that under these circumstances [Weygand] would delegate

authority of the Army in Africa, or that if they did the Germans would not

force them to withdraw it.”

Meanwhile de Gaulle had departed Bordeaux the night before on his

way to London. That morning he reached Rennes, where he conferred with

military and civil authorities to coordinate their resources and their efforts to

defend the Brittany region where he hoped to organized a redoubt. He then

traveled to Brest, overtaking British convoys on their way to recover troops.

With Admirals Traub and Laborde he studied the shipping--what was

available, what required, to embark French troops at Brittany ports. In the

afternoon he boarded the destroyer Milan bound for Plymouth, and from

Playmouth he proceeded to London, arriving at the British capital on the

morning of June 16.96 During the crossing de Gaulle had asked the

commander of the ` Milan, “Would you be prepared to fight under the

British colors?” Receiving a negative reply, de Gaulle is said to have

commented, “Do you think it is amusing, today, to call oneself General de

Gaulle?”

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Chapter Three: Dangerous Waters

“Now that Paris and Verdun have fallen, and the Maginot line pierced

on a large front near Saarbruck, the war is slowly turning to a pacific

occupation of the whole of France. The population is calm, sometimes very

friendly,” General Rommel wrote his wife on June 16.

As the Wehrmacht relently marched forward, thousands of French

men and women and their children took to the road, scrambling to escape the

invasion. The safety they sought was nowhere to be found. At the same time,

thousand of soldiers, now prisoners of war, were being crowded into freight

cars for the humiliating trip to Germany’s electrified barbed wire stalags.

Left behind were thousands of civilians, soon more than a million--the

parents, wives, and children of the defeated troops-- a profound disruption

and one of the cruelest trials of war. Abandoned homes fell prey to pillage,

though pillagers were shot when caught by the Germans. Famine had

already ravaged those in flight. Certain towns more than doubled their

population, and in some cases ten refugees could be counted for each

inhabitant. Some 40,000 refugees overran Lourdes, camping in fields, on

streets, blocking the roads; at Toulouse the railroad station’s sidewalks were

littered with people seeking but seldom finding food and a shelter. Stunned

by the huge disaster, ordinary life collapsed.

Feeling betrayed by the British and abandoned by the Americans, the

French turned against their own government, in their contempt damning

ministers and parliamentarians alike. A host of letters, mostly anonymous,

urged Marshal Philippe Pétain to turn firing squads on former popular front

leader Léon Blum, Premier Paul Reynaud, Interior Minister Georges

Mandel, and the rest. Everywhere was desolation, misery, and death.97

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Meanwhile, in the unreal atmosphere of Bordeaux events ran a course

soon leading to capitulation. Early on June 16 Reynaud asked to see British

ambassador Sir Roland Campbell and General Sir Edward Spears. He was

more than impatient for Britain’s response to his June 15 message. They had

not heard, the Britons said, but he need not doubt the impression his

message had made. France had solemnly undertaken not to conclude a

separate armistice or peace, yet now Britain was asked to release France

from its solemn undertaking despite France’s option to fight on abroad. The

agreement intnded to meet such contingencies as those now before them,

Spears argued. Indeed, the French were better positioned to continue

fighting than had been the Norwegians and the Dutch, whose sovereigns

had, after all, moved to England to keep their countries in the war. Spears

put it that Pétain, who would not leave, should be left as a sort of Stadhalter

to negotiate the army’s surrender while the government left for North Africa.

But public reactions to an eventual Pétain resignation greatly concerned

Reynaud. Given censorship, Reynaud was told, the people would know only

what the government chose to tell them. During this conversation Madame

de Portes opened the door several times, clearly signaling her displeasure at

the presence of British diplomats with her Paul. Understandably angered,

Campbell and Spears stormed into the office of Reynaud’ chef de cabinet,

Roland de Margerie, to complain. “She is ugly, mal soignée, nasty and half-

demented, and a sore trial to me,” de Margerie told them.98

Reynaud had also asked to see the president of the Senate, Jules

Jeanneney, and the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Édouard Herriot,

to consult them about moving the organs of the state away from Bordeaux.

They met at 10 A.M. All agreed the issue was urgent. Reynaud asked

Jeanneney and Herriot to confirm their position before the cabinet. At 11

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A.M. they reached the prefecture, home to the office of President Albert

Lebrun only to find the ministers seated around the room--like young

wallflowers at a dance, Jeanneney recalled--99 on gilded wooden chairs amid

rose satin. Under no circumstances, Jeanneney explained, can the head of

state and his government fall into enemy hands and thus, at the enemy’s

mercy, be unable to represent France. With the Germans closer to Bordeaux,

this was about to happen. “Therefore, we can only favor a move which

implies that resistance goes on.” Herriot had nothing to add to Jeanneney’s

statement, and so the two presidents retired. As he reached the door, Herriot

turned to Reynaud: “I would rather be shot by the Boches,” he said, “than

despised by the French.”

As the cabinet came to order before discussion started, Pétain rose

from his seat to read his letter of resignation. Citing as his reason the delay

in requesting an armistice, he slowly moved toward the door.100 “Ah, you

cannot do that to us,” Lebrun cried out, close to tears. Reynaud then turned

to the marshal: Having addressed the letter to me, said Reynaud, you should

await my reply before acting. Pétain agreed but remained standing. Only at

President Lebrun’s urging did he resume his seat. To quell emotions aroused

by the marshal’s move, Reynaud declared that having asked a question of an

ally, it was only correct to await a reply. He expected to receive news by the

afternoon but warned of the British government’s intransigence toward

France--the response to his message would probably be negative. Indeed,

when he finally read out Roosevelt’s message, its content left the ministers

depressed.

U.S Ambassador Anthony Biddle met Premier Reynaud again late in

the evening. The premier “explained that only by such a move [the

Chautemps proposal] could he show the French people who have been kept

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in utter ignorance of the real gravity of the military situation the severity of

German terms and justify a flight of the government ‘to Africa and England.’

(‘I only hope they won’t be too moderate,’ he said.) Biddle felt, as did the

British, “that the dangers of this move and the shock to the morale of both

the army and the people will far outweigh the political advantages.”

Biddle found Reynaud in a “state of fatigue and despondency.” The

position in which the French people found themselves, Reynaud explained,

was growing more horrible by the hour. “Masses of refugee women,

children, and old men [are] dying on the roads of starvation and illness.

Those who had cars were unable to use them because there [is] no gasoline

on the main refugee routes. The supplies of food [have] long since been

devoured.” This “heartrending situation,” Reynaud claimed, had affected so

many in his cabinet that pressure for an armistice had grown too strong to be

held down.

Reynaud was at the breaking point, so evident to those who saw him.

H. Freeman Matthews, the U.S. embassy’s first secretary and a keen

observer of the French scene who had kept in constant touch with Reynaud,

“had grave doubts whether any human being could have succeeded in

generating enough courage and energy in the crumbling morale of the

French authorities to keep up the fight. It is his considered opinion that

Reynaud simply caved in under the strain and under the constant defeatist

pressure of his own immediate circle.”101Likewise, Campbell and Spears,

who also saw Reynaud after the cabinet meeting, had reached a similar

conclusion: The premier had just about reached the end of his tether. “He

was losing, if he had not already lost, control of his Cabinet,” Spears wrote:

The President of the Republic meant well but was weak. He might have lent support to a strong man, but was incapable of giving fresh inspiration to an

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exhausted one. Mandel was too aloof, too cutting, almost too inhuman to provide that faith which was the quality in shortest supply, after courage at Bordeaux. We were convinced that once the French asked for an armistice they would not fight again, and that the Chautemps proposal to examine the German conditions and reject them if too harsh was just a trick to obtain the agreement of weak ministers to surrender. In any case, they were subjected to every form of pressure by the defeatists, as were the Deputies and Senators present at Bordeaux.

The charged atmosphere of Bordeaux was indeed very, very bad. As

Lebrun was to write: “The uncertainty of the news, the German advance, the

influx of refugees, all these things have created a great malaise, an obvious

troubling of the minds, of which the members of the Fifth Column will take

advantage to activate their deadly propaganda. The Parliamentarians who

have arrived from the different provinces are surrounded, isolated, lectured.

The uselessness of the struggle is demonstrated. An end must be made.”

Shortly before lunch London’s reply to Reynaud’s message arrived at

the British consulate. It read:

Mr. Churchill to M. Reynaud 16 June 1940, 12:35 P.M.Our agreement forbidding private negotiations, whether for armistice

or peace, was made with the French Republic, and not with any particular French administration or statesman. It therefore involves the honor of France. Nevertheless, provided, but only provided that the French Fleet is sailed forthwith for British harbors pending negotiations, His Majesty’s Government give their full consent to an inquiry by the French Government to ascertain the terms of an armistice for France. His Majesty’s Government, being resolved to continue the war, wholly exclude themselves from all part in the above-mentioned inquiry concerning an armistice.

Spears didn’t like the initiative in the least. He felt that once provided

with an excuse, no matter how conditional, to circumvent their pledge, the

French would find no stopping place. Campbell held the same opinion, but

of course he could not ignore his government’s instructions. To test a

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responsible reaction, both men decided to approach Jeanneney to place the

issue before him as a hypothetical possibility. The Germans, they argued,

would be unable to bring overwhelming pressure to bear on the French if the

fleet no longer fell under French control. Noncommittal, Jeanneney failed to

respond as the British had hoped he would. When the project was finally

submitted to Reynaud, he reacted negatively. The French fleet was

protecting Algeria and the western Mediterranean, he argued. The proposal

would mean offering all North African harbors as targets to the Italian fleet.

“What a silly thing to do,” Reynaud said.

Was it really silly? As the armistice was declared, units of the fleet

harbored in Toulon, the rest dispersed at Casablanca, Algeria’s northern

ports, and Dakar. Italy’s only possible target was Tunisia, unprotected by the

fleet. The Italian fleet could attack Algerian and Moroccan ports only if it

crossed the Strait of Gibraltar--guarded by the British to ensure that would

not happen. Therefore, the French had no reason not to seek safety in British

harbors. Almost certainly the German would have refused to negotiate if

solicited for conditions under the Chautemps plan. Without an armistice,

France had no alternative but to stay in the war. According to some

observers, the British initiative might have been more acceptable had

London requested the fleet to move to North Africa rather than

to Britain.

Aware of the atmosphere reigning in Bordeaux, the British envoys

thus confirmed their original view--that London should have categorically

refused to release France from her previous agreement and insist that she

continue fighting. Reynaud told the envoys he had spoken with Churchill,

who suggested they meet the next day somewhere in Britanny. Spears was to

take care of the details. All parties finally agreed to meet off Concarneau, at

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sea.

After lunching at the Chapon Fin, where the British had a table

reserved, Campbell and Spears strolled outside to observe the scene, meet

people, and gauge the mood in town. What they learned only served to

discourage them further. “The tide of defeat had swamped even the gestures

of defiance,” Spears noted. “The lack of virile reaction which had been so

marked throughout all classes in France since the German breakthrough had

now become a cloying helplessness.”

At about 4 P.M. came a telegram from the British Foreign Office. The

ambassador was to inform Reynaud:

We expect to be consulted as soon as any armistice terms are received. This is necessary not merely in virtue of Treaty forbidding separate peace or armistice, but also in view of vital consequences of any armistice to ourselves, having regard especially to the fact that British troops are fighting with French Army. You should impress on French Government that in stipulating for removal of French Fleet to British ports we have in mind French interests as well as our own, and are convinced that it will strengthen the hands of the French Government in any armistice discussion if they can show that the French Navy is out of reach of the German forces. As regards the French Air Force, we assume that every effort will be made to fly it to North Africa, unless indeed the French Government would prefer to send it to this country.

We count on the French Government doing all they can both before and during any armistice discussions to extricate the Polish, Belgian, and Czech troops at present in France, and to send them to North Africa. Arrangements are being made to receive Polish and Belgian Governments to this country.

Within minutes Campbell and Spears rejoined Premier Reynaud.

Campbell read out the telegram, translating as he went along. Reynaud

repeated his earlier arguments, the British theirs. During their somewhat

acrimonious exchange the telephone rang. Reynaud took up the receiver:

“One moment,” he said, “I must take it down.” De Gaulle was transmitting

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from London the text of a Declaration of Union offered by the British

government. “Does he agree with this? Did Churchill give you this

personally?” Reynaud asked, shaking with emotion. The premier then

switched to English. Churchill had picked up the phone: Yes, the document

was a decision of the British cabinet. “Well, see you tomorrow at

Concarneau,” Churchill said, and hung up. “Reynaud,” Spears recalled, “was

transfigured with joy for he was happy with great happiness that France

would now remain in the war.” After dictating the text of the Declaration,102

De Gaulle mentioned that Reynaud might be called to preside the Union’s

War Cabinet.

How did this Declaration of Union come about? On that Sunday, June

16, John Colville, Churchill’s private secretary, was called into the prime

minister’s room only to find his boss still in bed, “looking just like a rather

nice pig, clad in a silk vest,” preparing to announce a “stupendous idea,” one

that would become “epoch making.” 103The project had been discussed and

approved at a British cabinet meeting in the early afternoon, and de Gaulle

had become an ardent supporter. “De Gaulle is a magnificent crook. Just

what we want!” said Sir Desmond Morton, a close Churchill adviser. Jean

Monnet, the future father of the European Common Market, received credit

for the idea. While the project was being debated, de Gaulle, Colville wrote,

was “strutting about in the Cabinet, with [French ambassador] Corbin too.

Everybody has been slapping de Gaulle on the back and telling him he shall

be Commander in Chief (Winston muttering ‘je l’arrangerai’). Is he to be a

new Napoleon? From what I hear, it seems that a lot of people think so. He

treats Reynaud (whom he called ‘ce poisson gelé’) like dirt and discourses

familiarly on what he will do in France.”104

De Gaulle and Corbin feared that the sharp tone of the two earlier

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telegrams could prove counterproductive. “I had seen de Gaulle in the

morning,” Churchill wrote, “and he had impressed on me that some dramatic

move was essential to give M. Reynaud the support which he needed to keep

his Government in the war, and suggested that a proclamation of the

indissoluble union of the French and British peoples would serve the

purpose.” From an office adjoining the Cabinet Room de Gaulle telephoned

Reynaud to inform him of an important iincoming communication. Reynaud

agreed to put off his cabinet meeting till five o’clock, but warned he would

be unable to postpone it longer.

Shortly before these events developed, de Gaulle is said to have

directed the Pasteur, carrying a cargo of 1,000 75s, several thousand

machineguns, and quantities of ammunition, all from the United States, to

divert from Bordeaux, where she was bound, to Great Britain. 105The guns

and machineguns would rearm the British, who had suffered great losses at

Dunkirk. The problem of the fate of the French fleet hounded the British, as

de Gaulle was to learn in the course of his conversations. He felt that

Churchill’s attitude at Tours had been a mistake, having been interpreted in

France as a British release from the alliance. De Gaulle, as well as Corbin

and Monnet, urged an immediate gesture. “As things are now, nothing must

be neglected by you that can support France and maintain our alliance,” de

Gaulle told Churchill. Both intransigent patriots and nationalists, de Gaulle

and Churchill were convinced that their countries represented the epitome of

greatness, but in the circumstances of the moment they would have stopped

at nothing to prevent the French fleet from falling into enemy hands.

Britain’s survival might depend on it.

French ministers, however, failed to react as Reynaud and Churchill

had hoped they would. When the cabinet finally met, the announcement fell

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on deaf ears. No one, not even Mandel, supported the initiative. “I was the

only one to defend Churchill’s offer. It was the greatest disappointment of

my career,” Reynaud wrote. Endless bad news had posoned the prevailing

atmosphere. The latest Roosevelt message, for example, though promising

increased assistance, reiterated a depressing fact: that only Congress had the

power to take the country into war. “The impression produced by the

message was somewhat depressing,” Lebrun wrote. Another blow to morale

followed when shortly afterward, in what had by now become standard

procedure, an officer arrived with an urgent message from General Alphonse

Georges to General Weygand: The military situation was as black as could

be. “Absolute necessity for immediate decision,” Georges warned. To

preserve one’s freedom of thought before the assault after assault of

disastrous news from everywhere required tremendous moral courage,

Lebrun commented. The British project might have been applauded had it

been suggested much earlier, but now it was too late. Pétain fought the

project as an excuse for delaying the request for an armistice and offered

Chautemps an opportunity to resume his proposal of the previous day:

asking the Germans under what conditions they would agree to cease

hostilities. This plea provoked a sharp rebuke from Mandel: “There are those

who wish to fight and those who wish not to.” Losing his temper,

Chautemps shouted: “No! There are only Frenchmen here conscious of the

misery in which military reverses have placed the country and who wish to

find the means more apt to free her.” Flaring tempers grew increasingly hot:

Pétain: “Union with Great Britain is fusion with a corpse.”

Ybarnegaray: “Better be a Nazi province. At least we know what that

means.”

Chautemps: “England wishes to reduce France to the rank of a

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dominion.”

Louis Marin: “I ask the Premier if he considers, in his conscience as a

responsible political person, whether the honor of France is totally engaged.”

Paul Reynaud: “Perfectly so. Totally.”

In a last desperate effort to avoid requesting an armistice, Reynaud

once again suggested authorizing Weygand to surrender their arms to the

enemy, following the Holland’s example. Pétain and Weygand refused

categorically, with a number of ministers agreeing that to do so would be

unworthy of France.

As Reynaud was leaving his office to meet with the cabinet, London

instructed Ambassador Campbell to delay presentation of the two stiff

messages, or anyhow to suspend action upon them. The two earlier messages

should be considered “canceled,” Reynaud was informed as the cabinet

meeting got underway.

In London, meanwhile, Prime Minister Winston Churchill made ready

to meet Reynaud the next day on a ship off the coast of Normandy. Late in

the afternoon he set out on his mission. “I took with me the leaders of the

Labor and Liberal Parties, the three Chiefs of Staff, and various important

officers and officials,” Churchill wrote. “A special train was waiting at

Waterloo [Station]. We could reach Southampton in two hours, and a night

of steaming at thirty knots in the cruiser would bring us to the rendezvous by

noon on the 17th. My wife had come to see me off. There was an odd delay

in starting. Presently my private secretary arrived from Downing Street

breathless with the following message from Campbell at Bordeaux:

‘Ministerial crisis has opened. Hope to have news by midnight. Meanwhile

meeting arranged for tomorrow impossible.’ On this I returned to Downing

Street with a heavy heart.”106

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Pétain and Chautemps’s hostility to keeping France in the war, an

attitude shared by an increasingly important number of ministers, convinced

Reynaud he could no longer govern. At the time the Council of Ministers did

not customarily vote, consequently, there exists no record of where the

ministers actually stood. It has been argued that Reynaud had a majority

with him, but this, of course, cannot be proven. Evidently Reynaud believed

the opposition substantial enough to prevent him from governing. As a

consequence he placed his resignation in President Lebrun’s hands,

convinced that should he refuse to agree to an armistice, the president would

not support him. Lebrun, too, concluded that the government should carry

out the Chautemps plan and approach the enemy. Confronted with the need

to choose a new premier, Lebrun offered to reappoint Reynaud on condition

that he implement the Chautemps proposal. The reply was a flat no: “To get

this policy, address yourself to Marshal Pétain.” Before taking his leave

Reynaud suggested following the usual procedure, namely, consulting the

presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, Jules Jeanneney and

Édouard Herriot, before reaching a decision.

Paul Baudouin rightly suggested that by resigning, Premier Reynaud

knew full well Marshal Pétain would succeed him and approach the enemy

for an armistice. Had he been made in the Clemenceau mold, Reynaud

would have formed a cabinet composed of ministers determined to prosecute

the war, pitilessly breaking down any opposition. He could have counted on

Jeanneney’s and Herriot’s support; and Lebrun, who always bowed before a

strong determination, would have had no choice but to comply.

Immediately following the Reynaud-Lebrun exchange, Campbell and

Spears called on Reynaud, who told them that “forces in favor of

ascertaining terms of armistice had proven too strong for him.” Urging

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Reynaud to “try to get rid of the evil influences among his colleagues,” the

Britons pleaded to no avail. An hour or so later Reynaud informed them that

beaten, he had submitted his resignation. Pétain and Weygand had

strengthened their argument by waving twin specters of revolution and

sedition. In a further desperate effort to keep France engaged in war, the two

British diplomats called on Jeanneney to urge him to influence Lebrun to

reappoint Reynaud. On the way they stopped to see Mandel. “He was in a

cold rage,” Spears recalled. “‘There is nothing you can do with that kind of

people,’ he said. ‘I called Chautemps a coward. When there were

protestations, I distributed the same diploma to his supporters but it was no

use. When you are dealing with panic-ridden troops, only shooting will stop

them. The only thing Reynaud has shot is his bolt.’” The premier, Mandel

said, had spoken without heat or fire, like a lawyer defending a cause in

which he did not believe but for which he had been promised an adequate

fee. “No, Reynaud has lost all authority,” Mandel went on, as Spears

remembered. As for the president, “He is a poor fellow who just can’t make

up his mind to leave France.” Sadly he added: “You should have held France

to her signature. Churchill has been too nice. His kindness, his chivalry and

loyalty, may sometimes be at fault; they have been in this case.”107 Had

Churchill acted as Mandel had wished, would it have done any good? At the

Pétain trial after the war, Lebrun declared: “From the moment when a nation

signatory to a convention like that of March 28, 1940, retains part of its

forces for its own defense instead of risking them in battle as does its

partner, it may chose to produce a paper rescinding the obligations of the

convention, but it no longer has the moral authority to say: ‘I cannot free

you from your obligations.’”

Leaving Mandel, the two diplomats set off to see Jeanneney, who had

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not been informed of the British offer. “A look of pain came over his face”

when he was told. He promised to do all his position allowed, for he

approved of the British proposal. He would keep his word.

At 9 P.M. Jeanneney, Herriot, and Reynaud met with the president of

the Republic. Reynaud presented his case: Great Britain has made an offer of

fusion while refusing to consent to an armistice; but Pétain, who enjoys

great prestige, and Weygand refuse to continue fighting. Hearing this,

President Lebrun renewed his request to Reynaud to implement the

Chautemps proposal accepted by a majority of the party, but Reynaud stood

by his refusal. Turning to the presidents of the assemblies, Lebrun asked

them to designate a successor to the premier. “Reynaud,” came their reply.

But Reynaud insisted on refusing to address the Germans. “Then who?”

Lebrun asked again. “It’s your business,” exclaimed Reynaud. “Marshal

Pétain told me this morning he had his cabinet in his pocket.” There the

conversation ended and the three withdrew. In the anteroom assembled

potential ministers, among them Admiral François Darlan. “Well, admiral,”

Herriot asked him, “are you preparing the government’s departure?” “No,”

replied Darlan, “a government that departs never comes back.” How wrong

he was! Only the governments that departed--those of Holland, Belgium,

Luxembourg, Greece, Norway, and Czechoslovakia--returned home. Those

that stayed later faced the wrath of people at last freed from the nightmare of

Nazi occupation.

Ambassador Biddle saw Reynaud again at 11 P.M. He found him

“calm and entirely himself again--a man relieved of an enormous weight for

the future of France.” “I have remained faithful to my word, and loyal to my

policy of closest collaboration with Great Britain and the United States,”

Reynaud told him. “I shall always remain convinced that such is the only

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policy. The majority felt the sacrifices France is being called to make are too

great to continue.” He regretted that Churchill’s offer had not been accepted.

“It might have marked the beginning of the United States of Europe,”

Reynaud mused.

Reynaud’s exit from the political scene marked the end of an era. With

him the Third Republic had all but in name come to a close. He had

unfortunately assumed power when the situation was probably beyond

redemption. To keep on fighting in France’s desperate circumstances would

have required a leader of brutal resolution, but he had no such resolve. It has

been said of him that he was no Clemenceau, but then Clemenceau the

intransigent leader became so during World War I, when France had a

different character--a land largely peasant, since the French Revolution

composed of a population attached to the soil and ever ready to defend it.

The France over which Reynaud was called to preside was deeply divided,

embittered, resentful, aspiring only to peace and security. Military strategy at

the time reflected this mentality. Of course, France would have been better

served to have adopted de Gaulle’s proposals concerning the creation of

armored divisions, which implied an aggressive strategy based on

movement. For such strategy, the Germans were ready; the French were not.

Reynaud found himself projected into the midst of a situation beyond

anyone’s control. Let history not judge him too harshly. He was not the

leader France needed at the time, but then such a leader was nowhere in

sight. After the war Reynaud worked tirelessly to project the image of a man

of steely resolution, never bending to compromise, and free of the faults he

attached to others he considered responsible for France’s fall.

Persecuted by the Vichy government, Reynaud withstood its

vituperation with dignity. Even in the years following his deportation to

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Germany he refused to compromise his principles. His chief failure, a

serious one, was poor judgment in choice of collaborators, most of whom

betrayed him. Further, he had allowed himself to be easily influenced by a

woman whose single-minded goal had been to steer him in a direction

incompatible with his own policy. Another failure, certainly fatal, was to

allow himself to be cowed into submission by General Weygand. The 73-

year-old general had

been a poor choice. In recalling him from Beirut and obliging him to take a

fresh look at the situation, Reynaud’s government lost precious days.

Weygand represented the traditional officers’ cast, which had failed to

prepare France for modern warfare. The new methods, particularly those

dictated by experience in the Polish campaign, lay beyond his

understanding. When it became evident that his approach was more political

than strategic, aimed at saving the army’s honor to gain military support in

remaking France along ultraconservative lines, Renaud should have chosen a

younger general on whose political support he could count. An indecisive

Reynaud lost control of the situation, and the elderly generals who knew

exactly what they wanted decided for him.

Once the armistice had been requested, perhaps Reynaud thought that

Germany’s terms would prove unacceptable, that the Pétain experiment

would consequently fail, and that the president of the Republic would have

no choice but to call on him again. Reynaud failed to realize that once men

like Pétain, Weygand, and Darlan have tasted power, they never let go. With

misguided confidence in the outcome, Reynaud considered approaching the

Germans a tactic worth trying. But Lebrun’s influence during that dramatic

June 16 was negative. The military managed to scare him--an easy task--and

he surrendered.

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The Americans saw Reynaud at the conclusion of the cabinet meeting:

“If ever a confident, courageous little man lost his nerve, it was Reynaud. He

turned literally gray in panic and you would never have known him to be the

same man of two weeks earlier,” Biddle reported. The ambassador saw

Reynaud again after his resignation and “found that he was calm and entirely

himself again. It seemed fairly plain that the Prime Minister had suffered a

moral collapse and that, unable to carry the burden any longer, he had

preferred to shunt the responsibility to his opponents. The situation was

hopeless and an armistice was probably the easiest way out.”

To justify his resignation Reynaud had shown Lebrun a paper in

which he had recorded the attitude of his ministers: forteen for the

Chautemps proposal, six against.108 This paper had no trouble convincing a

man already convinced. After informing the presidents of the Senate and the

Chamber of his intentions, President Lebrun sent for the marshal to ask him

to form a new government, and to do so as rapidly as possibly to ensure

continuity. The country should not be left ungoverned at such a dramatic

moment in its history. Pétain anticipated Lebrun’s request by pulling from

his wallet a list of ministers. Lebrun could not hide his “happy surprise,”

used as he was to the protracted parliamentary compromises that in the past

had preceded the formation of a government. The list contained the name of

Pierre Laval as foreign minister. Laval’s detestation of Great Britain was

well known, and now was not the moment to defy the British and

compromise all ties with the United States. Lebrun crossed out Laval’s

name, thereby indicating his refusal to confirm him, and pleaded with Pétain

to select another candidate. Paul Baudouin was thereupon promoted from

deputy foreign minister to foreign minister. Named minister of justice, Laval

refused to accept the post. He would be foreign minister or nothing. Pétain

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bowed to his demand.and agreed to accept him.

Demonized during and after the war as the incarnation of evil and the

architect of France’s pro-German policy, Laval deserves a more balanced

judgment. Deputy, senator, three times premier, fourteen times minister, he

was a man of considerable charm and power of persuasion. He had no

illusions about himself or France. The League of Nations, he felt, could not

be taken seriously; he preferred face-to-face negotiations with the world’s

leaders. Democracy was too old fashioned to work any longer, he believed;

indeed, Laval showed no scruple about dealing with dictators. He declared,

“We are paying today for the fetishism which chained us to democracy and

delivered us to the worst excesses of capitalism, while around us Europe was

forging without us a new world inspired by new principles.” The Soviet

Union was the danger, Germany the shield. Yet Laval solicited Soviet

assistance in building a defensive ring to contain Germany. The traditional

enemy, England, opposed his efforts to move close to Benito Mussolini’s

Italy at the time of the Ethiopian war, thus gaining his contempt. Parliament

had voted him out of power in 1936, also drawing his hatred. This

background explains Laval’s behavior and policies after his country’s defeat.

No institution that had rejected him was worthy

of survival!

Laval thought himself too clever, and that proved his undoing. After

the war, he felt that his policy of reconciliation with Germany as

indispensable to peace in Europe was carried out also by de Gaulle, albeit

under deeply different circumstances. Laval ended up as an intriguer,

devoured by personal ambition and beguiled by the delusion that even

Adoph Hitler would be seduced by his cunning. He was the architect of a

pro-German policy, convinced to the last that Germany would prevail and

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that everything should be done to put France on the victor’s side. This turned

out to be a hopeless policy, one that led to his postwar show trial and

execution. Whether Laval deserved to be shot is open to question, but the

communists adamantly claimed his head and de Gaulle had no qualms in

doing what they, and those who agreed with them about Laval, wished done.

To kill Laval in 1945--by then the butt of a facile victorious patriotic hatred--

was popular enough. To kill him as the incarnation of defeat and dishonor,

moreover, made it easier to be lenient to hosts of Vichy officials and police

who had followed him happily and enthusiastically. His death, in fact,

legitimized wide support for such leniency.

When France collapsed, Laval felt his hour had come: He would

structure a policy assuring France an honorable place in Hitler’s Europe. His

capacity as an intriguer became evident the moment he reached Bordeaux.

He allied himself with Adrien Marquet, the city mayor who shared his view

that France must change and who placed city hall at his disposal. There

Laval received deputies and politicians, whom he tried, with great of

success, to convert to his ideas. His reasoning proved simple but appealing

to people disoriented by the drama that enveloped them: France should not

have gone to war for Poland any more than it had for Austria and

Czechoslovakia; it should fight only if attacked. That the war had an

ideological justification lay beyond his understanding. He knew only that

France had fought the wrong war, lost, and now had to pay the price. Only

he, with his experience and cunning, could redeem the country. The foreign

ministry should have come to him by right to enable him to deal with the

Germans and the Anglo-Saxons and to work for the establishment of a Latin

union comprising France, Italy, Spain, and Portugual, a union capable of

countering the weight of German power.

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On hearing that Pétain had bowed to pressure and named Laval to the

foreign ministry, the ministry’s permanent secretary, Ambassador F. Charles-

Roux, a much respected diplomat, made clear he would resign. Laval had

“since reaching Bordeaux become the interpreter of all sorts of

recriminations against England,” wrote Charles-Roux, “and he shouted to all

who would hear that the only way to save France was to push her into the

arms of Germany. His attitude since 1936 was saturated by a hatred of the

British. Having a personal quarrel with them, he would not hesitate to

transform it into a national quarrel. Finally his name was detested in London

to such an extent that his nomination would be interpreted as defiance and

the request for an armistice as the prelude to forthcoming acts of hostility.”

Seated next to Weygand, Charles-Roux asked the general to convey

his objections to Pétain. Weygand complied, approaching Pétain, engaged

in conversation with Laval, who missed not a word of what was being

whispered. Informed that the objection had not been convinced Pétain, the

ambassador reiterated that if Laval were confirmed, he would resign.

“Oh!” exclaimed Weygand, “up to a refusal to serve?”

“Yes,” replied the ambassador, “without the shadow of a doubt.”

Impressed by so much determination, Weygand returned to Pétain,

who held adamantly to his position. After a few moments Pétain appeared at

the door connecting the two rooms. “Laval,” he said, “insists. He keeps

refusing the ministry of justice. He pretends he has a policy: Latin union.”109

Evidently Pétain no longer felt sure of himself or else Laval’s hard-

headedness had shaken him. He returned to Laval in the adjoining room and

conversed with him quite a while. Finally Laval was seen leaving in a fury,

slamming the door. Charles-Roux had won. Marquet, designated for the

ministry of the interior, chose to close ranks with Laval and leave. Turning

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to Charles-Roux he said: “You have rendered a truly bad service to your

country. You made it impossible to break with a foreign policy that has led

us where we are now.” And then, in the best tradition of parliamentary

intrigue: “Even so, let me shake your hand.” Eight days later Laval became

vice-premier and Marquet minister of the interior! Baudouin was asked, in a

spirit of continuity, to take over foreign affairs, to which he agreed on

condition, as he put it, that the armistice did not destroy the Anglo-French

community of interest. Other posts were filled, the decrees signed by the

president of the Republic, and immediately afterward the new cabinet came

to order. Its first decision was to confirm the need for an armistice; the only

discussion concerned the procedure, and in about half an hour the meeting

concluded. The cabinet had decided to seek an armistice with Germany and

Italy through Spain and the Vatican. Emerging from the meeting, Darlan

confirmed that the fleet remained non-negotiable, and Weygand suggested

that the fleet take to sea.

At midnight Foreign Minister Baudouin received Ambassador Biddle

to let him know that terms for an armistice had been requested through the

Spanish government. Baudouin insisted that withthe French army

“completely smashed,” France had no hope of winning. The slaughter of

further thousands must be stopped, he declared, adding that if the terms of

surrender were “unworthy of the honor or dignity of France,” they would be

made public and their unacceptability made manifest to the French people.

Baudouin then renewed the pledge never to surrendering the fleet to

Germany, Darlan’s appointment as minister of marine representing a

guarantee in that respect. Biddle remained unimpressed: “The Admiral’s new

government associates hardly inspire complete [confidence] that the French

fleet will remain a bulwark against Nazi aggression.”110

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Pétain took to the air that same June 16 to address the French people.

He declared that he was making a gift to France of his person to ease her

misfortune, and most memorably that “it is with a heavy heart that today I

tell that we must cease the combat.”111 He then informed his fellow French

that he had addressed himself to the adversary to enquire whether honorably,

as between soldiers, Germany was prepared to seek with France an end to

the hostilities.

These words, heard throughout France, had a devastating effect upon

an army that had days before recovered its will to fight and given splendid

examples of heroism and courage, examples all the more notable before an

end approaching with frightening speed. To compound the confusion,

superiors instructed soldiers that no armistice had yet been reached and

fighting must go on with renewed vigor. Many units simply refused to

believe that all was over; they had recovered the sense of honor that

accompanies love of country. This renewed patriotic impulse, overlooked in

the histories of the defeat, was the germ of later resistance to the invader.

Such was the situation that nothing could reverse it; officers and soldiers had

no choice but to draw the necessary conclusions. Rather than ease the return

to civilian life of as many soldiers as possible, thus saving them from

capture and imprisonment, the government gave orders to punish all

defections. Soldiers meekly allowed themselves to be captured; officers

occasionally broke rank. These men confidently expected to be demobilized

and sent home. Wasn’t the war finished? Wasn’t England to be done with in

a matter of weeks? Couldn’t peace negotiations now start? They never

dreamed, those men, that the war would last another five years, during which

time they would be kept in Germany, far from their wives, their children,

their homes,--homes that would become breeding grounds of resentment

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against the invaders. Had the Nazis been less brutal, less stupid, they would

have realized that returning prisoners to their homes would win them

gratitude and perhaps sympathy. The relationship between occupier and

occupied would have changed, perhaps radically. Indeed, at first German

behavior in occupied France favorably impressed many French citizens.

Vichy police chief René Bousquet visiting former premier Édouard Daladier

in prison in September 1942 told him: “Hordes of disarmed retreating

soldiers in rags looted the villages. The German army arrived, disciplined,

powerful and well-mannered. This aroused the sympathy of the French

people. At that moment France was ready to collaborate with the

Germans.”112 That a large segment of the population would have come to

terms with the German presence and perhaps contributed to maintaining it

was not without possibility. Those left behind had little choice but to heed

the advice of the leader who had once covered France with glory: Follow

me, Pétain said. I shall protect you. Pétain became the nation’s beating heart,

its center of hope. Few French “heroes” have been as massively followed

and respected as Pétain had been in that tragic June 1940.

With request for an armistice certain, what dictated the choice of

intermediaries? A certain logic appeared in selecting the Vatican to approach

Italy, but why Spain to approach Germany? Why not a truly neutral country,

such as Switzerland, or a country geographically distant from the area of

conflict, such as the United States? A double reason explained why Spain

was finally chosen. Until a few weeks before, Pétain had been ambassador to

Francisco Franco’s Spain, where his ideas concerning the future of France

were well known. When Pétain returned to Paris to take up the post of vice-

premier, he had had numerous contacts with the Spanish ambassador, José

Félix de Lequerica, who became his confidant. The ambassador had also

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become friendly with Laval, who had tried to interest him in his plan for a

Latin union. Since three out of the four eventual members--Italy, Spain, and

Portugual--had dictatorial regimes, France would have to favor dictatorships

to become acceptable, an eventuality that presented not the slightest problem

for Laval.

Lequerica had followed the French government to Bordeaux, as had

done other embassies accredited to Paris. On that fateful June 16 he had

lunched with Laval, who thus might well have played a role in the armistice,

a role he afterward consistently denied. From the moment he reached

Bordeaux, Lequerica had taken the necessary step to reach Madrid without

delay. He requested authorization to call Saint-Jean-de-Luz, where awaited

two attachés who on communication from him would travel to Irun and from

there call Madrid on a direct line. Lequerica received a handwritten note for

transmission to Madrid.113

Receiving the British ambassador late that night, Baudouin felt

saddened at Campbell’s coldness and lack of sympathy for a fallen ally.

Obviously concerned, very deeply so, over the repercussions of the armistice

on Britain’s prospects, Ambassador Campbell had no time for the minister’s

emotional state. Then came the turn of the “aimable” U.S. ambassador who

was asked to transmit to his president the French government’s

determination never to allow the fleet to fall into German hands.

That same evening Ambassador Campbell and General Spears visited

Reynaud. “Will you come to England?” Spears asked. No, answered

Reynaud; he still hoped to be recalled to office. The interchange continued

for a while, leading nowhere. Remembering the projected meeting at

Concarneau the next day, Reynaud offered to talk things over with Prime

Minister Churchill. He would ask Pétain to place a plane at his own disposal.

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This flight from reality provoked a sharp rebuke: “Tomorrow there will be

another government and you will no longer speak for anyone. The meeting

has been canceled.” Roland de Margerie, lately Reynaud’s chef de cabinet,

told the Britons a few days later in London that after their interview

Reynaud joined Madame de Portes engaged in conversation with her friend

the Comtesse de Montgomery in an adjacent drawing room. Reynaud told

them about a “really fine telegram” he had prepared for Roosevelt and

insisted on reading it out aloud: “At the moment when I am giving up my

post, I wish to tell you, Mr. President, that I know that the answer you gave

to my last message went to the extreme limit of what was possible in present

circumstances. I wish to express to you my extreme gratitude for this. In the

immense misfortune which overwhelms us, France knows that, because

America exists, the form of the civilization which is hers will not die, and

that one day freedom will live again in ancient Europe.” This telegram was

probably the one that has since been published.

En route to see Reynaud, General Spears ran into de Gaulle. Recalled Spears:

Passing by a large column I was startled to see a tall figure flat against it, shrouded in its shadow. It called my name in a loud whisper. I stopped and looked up at de Gaulle. “I must speak to you,” he said, “it is extremely urgent.” “But I can’t now, the Ambassador and I are just going to see the Premier.” “You must,” he insisted. “I have very good reasons to believe Weygand intends arresting me.” I looked round, Margerie had opened the door of Reynaud’s study; the Ambassador, about to enter, had stopped, waiting for me. “We shan’t be long, I think,” I said to de Gaulle. “If you stay exactly where you are until we come out, it should be all right. In any case I must go now, I really must. It is very, very important. It certainly was.

Upon leaving Reynaud, Spears went searching for de Gaulle but

found him still standing by the same column. “He was very white.” De

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Gaulle asked to spend the night on a British ship, intending to return to

England as soon as possible. He was told to walk to the Hotel Montré, five

minutes away on foot, and wait. Upon arrival he was escorted to the

ambassador’s room. There he explained his plans. Spears managed to get

Prime Minister Churchill on the phone and received permission to bring de

Gaulle with him to England.114

Spears had a tendency to weave a romance around events that

involved him. Nevertheless, quite possibly de Gaulle’s concern for his own

security was genuine. No longer a member of government, he was now but

one general among many. That Weygand could not stand him was common

knowledge. Like any other officer, de Gaulle was bound to obey his

superiors, and it cannot be excluded that Weygand might have sent him,

under good escort, to command troops in a Saharan outpost.

Quite understandably de Gaulle did not acknowledge fear for his own

safety but gave a far more sober version of the events than did Spears:

Late on the evening [of the 16th] I went to the hotel where Sir Ronald Campbell, the British Ambassador, was residing, and informed him of my intention to leave for London. General Spears, who came and joined in the conversation, declared that he would accompany me. I sent word to M. Paul Reynaud. He made over to me the sum of a hundred thousand francs, on the secret funds. I begged M. de Margerie to send at once to my wife and children, who were at Carantec, the necessary passports for reaching England, which they could just do by the last boat leaving Brest. On June 17, at nine in the morning, I flew off, with General Spears and Lieutenant de Courcel, in the British aeroplane which had brought me the evening before. There was nothing romantic or difficult about the departure.115

The last sentence is an obvious stab at Spears!

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Chapter Four: Pétain Crowned

With Philippe Pétain safely in power, hymns of praise to the savior

were sung throughout what was left of shattered France. Pétain would

redeem France from her base instincts and pave the way to a new

renaissance. He had the appearance and personality that in the popular

imagination accompanied blue eyes, soft pink skin, and dignity and charm.

He was succesful with women. Both right and left, as we have seen, treated

him with the utmost respect, and rare were those who suspected his

intentions.

“In the tempest that carries men and things in a fateful atmosphere of

Greek tragedy,” the Bordeaux daily La Petite Gironde wrote on June 21,

“Pétain’s figure appears as a timeless symbol. Who can say what might have

been the life of this grand old man from the day he left Madrid once more to

serve? What thoughts must he have entertained, tumultuous, sad, terrible,

under this forehead of ivory that immortal glory had stamped as its most

proud sign? What drama in the heart of the hero of Verdun at a time when he

must weigh the elements of decisions and take them; then, once taken, to

reveal, explain, sustain, defend, perhaps even impose, them to certain

people!”

The same emotional response flushed other dailies. Le Figaro:

“Invaluable contribution”; L’Ordre: “Pétain’s name is a symbol”; Le Petit

Parisien: “In the present circumstances, the presence at the head of the

government of a man whose concern has always been the army’s morale,

and who was considered by the soldiers of the last war more as a father than

a chief, is particularly significant.”

Shortly afterward the presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of

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Deputies, Jules Jeanneney and Édouard Herriot, addressed Pétain in similar

lyric style. Jeannenay: “I declare to Marshal Pétain our veneration and the

gratitude for a renewed sacrifice of his person. He knows our sentiments

toward him; they date from times past. We know the nobility of his soul; it

has assured us days of glory; may it preserve us in these days of terrible

trials and guard us against all discord.” Herriot: “Around Marshal Pétain, in

the veneration that his name inspires in all, our nation has closed ranks in its

misfortune. Let us not compromise the unity thus established around his

authority.”

François Mauriac, who was to win the Nobel Prize for literature in

1957 and who dubbed himself a Gaullist of the first hour, wrote on June 19

in the Bordeaux edition of the Le Figaro:

After that on 17 June [by assuming the responsibility of power] Marshal Pétain had given his country a renewed supreme proof of love, the French heard on the radio a voice [that of General de Gaulle] assuring them that never has France been more glorious. Well, no! Our only hope of salvation rests in never again lying to ourselves. In truth, what appears in the light of the disaster, is that France looked like those ancient palaces, splendid and apparently intact, but eaten into by invisible termites. Reform must encompass everything: the principles and the methods. The official doctrine of our democracy is dated. The French must first of all reassemble, agree upon the reasons of the immense collapse, and only then will our children have a chance of seeing the dawn of a resurrection; the only hope for us, the fathers, is to be forgiven.

And again, in the same newspaper:

Marshal Pétain’s words, the evening of June 25th, sounded almost intemporal: it was not a man speaking to us, but from the depth of our history, we heard arise the appeal of our humiliated nation. This old man has been delegated to us by the Verdun dead and by the innumerable number of those who, down the centuries, have transmitted the same standard that our weak hands have caused to fall. A voice broken by sorrow and age brought us the reproach of heroes whose sacrifice, because of our defeat, has been

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rendered useless. [3 August]

Patriots who played leading roles in the Resistance doubted not for a

minute that Pétain’s secretly aimed to seek an opportunity to lead France

back into the war against Germany. General Gabriel Cochet, among the first

to invite the French not to abandon hope in the final outcome of the war

against Germany, was to write on October 28: “Let us have confidence in

Pétain’s fervent patriotism. Let us unite behind the Marshal and concern

ourselves, as he does, with the future of France.” Henri Frenay, founder of

Combat, a leading underground resistance movement declared, “May the

Marshal have a life sufficiently long to sustain us with his high authority and

incomparable prestige.” 116 Belief in a secret understanding between Marshal

Pétain and Charles de Gaulle, one acting within the country, the other

outside, but both having the same objective, lasted through the occupation

years and iremains widely held today.

Many months, sometimes years, would elapse before patriots

committed to fighting the Nazis finally realized that after France’s defeat

Pétain was no hero plotting national revenge against the German enemy but

something much less. On July 14, 1941, Pétain’s Vichy government offered

to adhere to the Tripartite Pact, joining Germany, Italy, and Japan in all the

obligations membership implied; on January 11, 1942, Vichy offered to join

in a military alliance with the Reich; and on September 21, 1942, it asked to

participate actively in defending French coasts against the Allies. Four

offers, four engagements on the side of Nazi Germany, to which Berlin never

bothered to reply!

The endemic eulogy of Pétain served the purpose of self-

identification. A France led by a hero who in 1916 saved it during the epic

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Battle of Verdun, the battle that turned the tide against the Germans, could

still consider itself as great as the marshal had once been. The Third

Republic had failed the country and brought it ruin; the British, after

practically forcing the French to enter the war against Germany, had

abandoned them to their fate by refusing to throw the Royal Air Force into

the battle, thus denying the France any chance of victory. Throughout the

country there arose a hysterical outcry against the old politicians--some

newspapers editorials suggesting they should be shot for treason--and

against “perfidious Albion,” the secular enemy of France’s greatness from

Joan of Arc to the latest heroic but useless drama. Only the marshal emerged

great and intact amid so much ruin, and he played with gusto the role

popular opinion assigned to him. He abolished the Third Republic and

established an authoritarian regime. His picture appeared in all public places;

children sang his praise: Marechal, nous voila, “Marshal, here we are.” All

civil servants, functionaries, ambassadors, and the military personnel swore

allegiance to him. Liberté, fraternité, egalité “liberty, fraternity, equality,” no

longer served as the nation’s ideals, replaced with travail, famille, patrie,

“work, family, fatherland,” a rallying cry more in tune with France’s rightist

traditions. It took just a month for all this to occur; but for the moment

Pétain had been installed according to legal procedures, and his legitimacy

could not be contested.

Pétain was the man of the hour because no one else could have

convinced the French people to accept capitulation nor could another have

obtained the total submission of the French generals, including those

passionately advocating resistance. No one else could have been followed

without the shadow of a revolt. Adolph Hitler knew what he was doing when

he agreed to deal with Pétain. He had told Hermann Rauschning: “I shall

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choose old men, too old to look into the future, and realize my aims. They

will not necessarily be rogues and traitors. I shall exploit their foolishness,

their weakness, their senility, but especially their ambition. My success will

depend on whether I shall succeed in finding them.” Much about Pétain has

been written, at the time and later, but accounts generally agree that he was

consumed by ambition. In that respect, Hitler succeeded. Pétain never

suspected he was acting exactly the way Hitler expected him to do.

The military even more than the politicians had failed the country

through ineptitude and failure to understand the methods and terms of

modern warfare. As self-protection, positioning themselves to place blame

on politicians, many of whom would soon be persecuted or imprisoned,

military leaders accepted political appointment. Pétain assigned key

ministries to military men and to the people devoted to them. The sinister

Raphaël Alibert, for example, became undersecretary of state to the

presidency, thus remaining the marshal’s closest adviser. Robert Schuman, a

different kind of figure, was put in charge of refugees.

The men who took power under Pétain’s aegis were Catholic by

tradition, monarchist by choice, and antiparliamentarian by instinct. All of

them had their own vision of what the “new” France should be and advanced

their own pet programs and projects. General Maxime Weygand elaborated a

program of his own, which he showed Pétain and several ministers:

I.- The old order of things, that is, a political regime of Masonic, capitalist and international compromises has led us where we now are. France rejects it.II.- Class warfare has divided the country, prevented all profitable enterprise, allowed all excesses of demagogy. France’s recovery through labor cannot be achieved without the institution of a new social regime, founded upon the trust and collaboration between workers and employees. Such a regime must be instituted.

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III.- The fall of the birth rate, by diminishing France’s potential, has led us: from a military point of view, to defend our territory with an inadmissible proportion of North Africans, colonial and foreign contingents; from a national point of view, to carry out massive and regrettable naturalizations and to deliver a part of our soil and wealth to foreign exploitation. We must honor the family.IV.- The wave of materialism which has submerged France, the spirit of gratification and facility represents the deep cause of our weaknesses and renunciations. The education of our youth must be reformed.V.- Such reforms are too fundamental that they should be carried out by a personnel worn-out, no longer inspiring confidence. France would not understand if she were once again abandoned to their care. She would lose all faith in her renaissance. A new program; new men. Time is pressing. The old cadres, fearing punishment, work in the shadows to reconquer power. The enemy which occupies our soil tries to organize a clientele. Tomorrow will be too late. It is today that a group composed of a small number of men, free of blemish and ties, moved by the only purpose to serve, must, under the guidance of Marshal Pétain, our universally accepted chief, make known its program and get down to work.117

Once, during a cabinet meeting, he exclaimed: “France has been

beaten because God has been chased from our schools. Our first task will be

to get Him back in.”118

The new government’s immediate task, however, was not to give

France a new face in line with a program adopted later, and which reflected

the spirit if not the letter of Weygand’s suggestions, but to end the struggle

and secure an armistice. At 3 A.M. on June 17 the request for an armistice

forwarded through the Spaniards reached Hitler’s headquarters at Sedan.

At 12:30 P.M., shortly after the cabinet’s first meeting, Pétain gave the

now-famous speech in which he offered his person as a gift to France in

order to alleviate her pains. He told the country that all combat must cease

and that he had requested the adversary, if ready, to end hostilities. With the

enemy advancing on all fronts, why should the common soldier keep

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fighting if the marshal himself declared that doing so was useless? General

Alphonse-Joseph Georges informed Weygand that the army was

disintegrating, whole regiments giving up the struggle, whereupon the

commander-in-chief ordered fighting to continue, an order that only

deepened the confusion. All planes still in flying condition were ordered to

North African airports. Admiral François Darlan, for his part, ordered the

navy to keep pursuing all aeronaval operations. In an effort to correct the

situation, the phrase that caused such havoc, “we must cease” the combat,

was redrafted “we must attempt to cease;”--but through various means the

Germans had already distributed to French soldiers tens of thousands of

leaflet copies of the original version. That day, at 9 A.M., de Gaulle reached

London in General Spears’s plane.

At lunchtime Georges Mandel, who had the previous day been urged

in vain to leave for London, was arrested at the Chapon Fin. Charles

Pomaret, Pétain’s minister of the interior, called it a tragique bouffonerie.

This is how Pomaret described the scene:119 At 11.30 A.M. he received a

phone call from Yves Bouthillier, minister of the economy, asking him to

stop in at the presidency. There he met Weygand, who said not a word, and

with him Bouthillier and Alibert. Bouthillier told him: “We have learned

from a good source that Mandel upon reaching his hotel last night, the Royal

Gascogne, had distributed arms and money to shady characters. These armed

men have been assigned the task of murdering some of us because the

government demands an armistice. You as minister of the interior [in charge

of police] must take the necessary steps.” Pomaret assured them he would

investigate.

At about 2:45 P.M., Pomaret returned to the ministry of the interior

where he learned that Georges Mandel and General Jules-Antoine Bührer,

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commander of colonial troops, had been arrested. Mandel had been lunching

at the Chapon Fin with Madame Bretty, his companion, a former actress at

the Comedie Française who had shown a great deal of courage, dignity and

discretion, when an officer of the gendarmerie requested Mandel to follow

him. “You will let me finish my cherries?” Mandel asked in a sarcastic tone.

Lunching at a nearby table was Count Carlo Sforza, past and future

Italian foreign minister. “I admired the stoic indifference with which Mandel

first finished his cognac, then kissed the hand of his friend and followed the

policeman,” he wrote.120 “I was probably the only one to see him. All the

others, generals and comtesses, admirals and bankers, were staring at their

dishes. They had immediately understood the new law: not to compromise

oneself. The long era of fascist cowardice began that day for the France of

Vichy. When I got up to leave I stopped at the table of the British

ambassador, Sir Ronald Campbell. He murmured with a tired voice: ‘Have

you noticed that our two tables are the only ones where people are suffering.’

Sforza was struck at the open joy the request for an armistice had produced

among professional patriots. He had run into the Comtesse de Portes. who

hissed at him, her voice full of hate, “Well, my dear sir, you anti-fascists

didn’t win after all.”121

Allowed to complete his meal, Mandel was escorted to a bureau of the

gendarmerie. As he was inspecting the room he approached the window.

“Beware,” the officer told him, “no signals to the outside.” Mandel took a

seat and waited. Meanwhile General Bührer was arrested while having lunch

with other officers at army headquarters.

Pomaret wrote of his outrage that a former minister, replaced but the

previous day, could be arrested like a common criminal. He tried to alarm

his political friends but found only Ludovic Frossard, who already knew

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what had happened. “I am going to see the Marshal,” Pomaret told him,

“please come with me.”

Equally alarmed, Herriot and Jeanneney called on Lebrun, who in turn

sent for Alibert. Alibert confirmed that Mandel was preparing a putsch

against the government.

“What proofs do you have?”

“A journalist has informed us.”

“His name?”

“Unknown”122

Mandel and Bührer were received by Pétain around 5 P.M. Only

Alibert was present. Pétain: “I am the one who ordered the arrest. I did so

because I was told in the morning that Mandel was organizing a plot against

the government in the hope of preventing the armistice.” Pomaret objected:

He found it inadmissible that a decision of such gravity should be made on

the basis of reports of a suspicious nature and without even consulting him,

who as minister of the interior was responsible for public order. “If you

weren’t our glorious Marshal,” Pomaret told Pétain, “I would say you acted

in a frivolous manner leading to grave consequences. The first act of internal

politics by the government represents a grave mistake. It compromises the

union more than ever necessary among Frenchmen.”

Pétain felt somewhat shaken by Pomaret words: “You are right. I

made a mistake in not consulting you.” “In that case,’`answered Pomaret,

“what are you going to do?” Pétain proposed bringing Mandel and Bührer

before him. Thereupon General Lafont, commander of Bordeaux’s military

region was instructed to implement this decision. Lafont faced a

predicament: Should he join Mandel, a former minister, or General Bührer, a

colleague?

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Fifteen minutes later Mandel and Bührer entered the room. Pomaret,

who was standing near the door, offered to shake hands with Mandel, but the

former minister refused. He obviously thought his successor responsible for

the incidents. Having noticed Mandel’s gesture, Pétain pointed to Pomaret

and Frossard: “These two are your friends.”

“I do believe it, Monsieur le Maréchal,” Mandel replied.

Breaking into tears, General Bührer cried: “Monsieur le Maréchal,

you had me arrested among my officers, despite my five stars and my past as

a soldier. It was shameful.”

Pétain turned to Mandel to say he was awaiting his explanations. “I

shall not stoop so low as to give you explanations,” Mandel replied coldly.

”It is rather up to you to furnish them. Meanwhile let me say simply this: I

pity you for being at the mercy of your entourage and I pity my country for

having chosen you as chief.” Surprised by such language, or perhaps

because being somewhat deaf he had not captured its full meaning, Pétain

asked Mandel to repeat his explanation. Mandel obliged him: “I have said,

Monsieur le Marechal, that I pity you, in other words that I feel

commiseration for you.” Pétain did not react to these words. Perhaps he had

acted imprudently, he explained; perhaps he should have first asked the

former minister of the interior to clarify matters. Mandel’s response: “Will

you please put down in writing what you have just said, recognizing your

mistake?” Pomaret and Frossard felt Mandel asked too much; Pétain’s

explanation should have sufficed. But the marshal accompanied Alibert to a

nearby office and soon returned with a handwritten letter. “Following the

explanations you have furnished me, I recognize that...” Mandel interrupted

him: “I didn’t furnish any explanations.” “It is true,” Pétain agreed and left

to write a second letter. “I have acquired the conviction that this

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denunciation was without a foundation and had the character of a maneuver

of provocation and disorder.”

As they were about to leave, the marshal turned to Mandel: “Are you

satisfied, Monsieur le Ministre?” “No,” responded Mandel, “ I am not

satisfied.” Pretending not to have heard, Pétain said to Mandel: “You may

thank your friends Pomaret and Frossard.” Then to Pomaret: “You have

given me a lesson on prudence today from which I shall profit.”

Ambassador Biddle had talked that morning with Mandel’s

companion, Madame Betty, who said “she fear[ed] for his life,” especially

because the “morning’s Bordeaux press spoke in threatening terms of

‘political men who had been responsible for France’s defeat.’” Mandel

phoned at 7 P.M. to inform the ambassador of his release. When Biddle

called at his hotel later that evening, Mandel ascribed “his arrest to a

hysterical and irresponsible group of men around Pétain who invented the

‘fantastic charge’ that he was plotting an uprising against the government but

who were not clever enough to make their charges stick.”

Alibert could not disguise his rage. That day sealed the destiny of this

“Jew”--Alibert never referred to Mandel any other way. Pétain, too, would

never forget. Mandel became enemy number one of the new regime.

An investigation convinced Pomaret that the virulent Alibert had

masterminded the whole affair. Alibert, for his part, would never forgive

Pomaret for having protected Mandel. A few weeks later found Mandel

imprisoned under circumstances we shall relate in the next chapter; later

still, as the war neared its end, he was brutally murdered by the Milice,

whose task it was to hunt down Resistance fighters. (His assassin will be

executed after the war.) A few weeks following these events Pomaret, no

longer a minister and in disfavor with the regime, was interned at Pellevoisin

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prison at the same time as Mandel!

While Bordeaux concerned itself with imaginary plots and

counterplots and with fantasies of punishing politicians responsible for

leading France to her ruin (the military, of course, was excluded from

blame), Washington and London were intensely concerned that despite all

declarations to the contrary, the French might turn their fleet over to

Germany or else scuttle it. British and U.S. diplomatic activity focused on

this single issue.

On this same June 17 the U.S. Senate passed a stiff resolution refusing

to recognize any transfer of territory in the Western Hemisphere from one

non-American power to another. Berlin and Rome were notified of this

policy. At the same time Roosevelt instructed Secretary of the Treasury

Henry Morgenthau to freeze all French assets in the United States to make

sure that no pro-German French government might use them for Berlin’s

benefit. On that afternoon Secretary Hull sent Ambassador Biddle the

following message:

The President desires that you obtain immediately an interview with Admiral Darlan and subsequently, if possible, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and state that the views of this Government with regard to the disposition of the French Fleet have been made very clear to the French Government on previous occasions. The President desires you to say that in the opinion of this Government, should the French Government, before concluding any armistice with the Germans, fail to see that the fleet is kept out of the hands of her opponents, the French Government will be pursuing a policy which will fatally impair the preservation of the French Empire and the eventual restoration of French independence and autonomy. Furthermore, should the French Government fail to take these steps and permit the French Fleet to be surrendered to Germany, the French Government will permanently lose the friendship and goodwill of the Government of the United States.

This tough U.S. position worried the French, who had hoped

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Washington would use its influence to moderate British anxieties. France

considered it all the more important, therefore, to reassure the Americans.

The French ambassador to Washington consequently left Undersecretary of

State Sumner Welles with a memorandum stating the French government

was “resolved not to yield to any condition contrary to national honor,

dignity or independence. If, in reply to the overtures made to Germany,

unacceptable demands should be returned, it is with fierce resolution that the

whole country, preferring to suffer what it could not accept, would continue

the struggle on bases in the French Empire until the day when the common

effort of all free peoples led to its liberation.”

More immediately concerned than the Americans, the British renewed

pressure on the French to dispatch the fleet from metropolitan French ports

before the Germans asked for it. Campbell was instructed to give Pétain the

message previously directed to Reynaud, which considered the fleet’s sailing

to British ports a “necessary pre-condition” of French application for an

armistice. Campbell was to insist forcefully. Seeing Pétain before a meeting

of the Council of Ministers, he appealed “not to make the situation of an ally

worse than it was,” insisting that the fleet’s departure for British ports was

the least London could expect. “Sir R. Campbell reported that Marshal

Pétain was most dispirited: that he was thinking mainly of the sufferings of

the people, and that conversation with him was fruitless.”123 That afternoon,

Campbell once again saw Pétain to explain that failure to implement British

conditions “would compromise the successful continuance of the struggle

[in Britain] --which we are determined to continue in any case and at any

cost--and on which now depends the salvation and liberation of France.”

Later in the evening Campbell met the secretary general of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, François Charles-Roux, and requested that the two

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telegrams originally delivered to Reynaud be brought to the attention of the

cabinet. He then called on Camille Chautemps, renewing the urgency for the

fleet’s departure for British ports. The British government expected to be

consulted beforethe French replied to the Germans, he added.

Not at all reassured about French intentions, Churchill appealed

directly to Pétain. He repeated his profound conviction that “the illustrious

Marshal Pétain and the famous General Weygand” would not injure their

ally by delivering the French fleet to the enemy. “Such an act would scarify

their names for a thousand years of history.”124 He again urged that the fleet

sail to safety in British or U.S. ports. The appeal was not to the liking of the

illustrious marshal and the famous general. For further reassurance about

French intentions, two days later Churchill dispatched to Bordeaux Britain’s

first lord of the Admiralty, first sea lord, and secretary for colonies, all

reputedly having cordial relations with Admiral Darlan and known as friends

of France.

In a message broadcast later in the evening of June 17, Churchill told

his fellow Britons: “We have become the sole champions now in arms to

defend the world cause. We shall do our best to be worthy of this high honor.

We shall defend our island home, and with the British Empire we shall fight

on unconquerable until the curse of Hitler is lifted from the brows of

mankind. We are sure that in the end all will come right.”

Speaking on the radio that same evening, Foreign Minister Baudouin

stated that the Pétain government had asked the enemy for peace conditions. 125Pétain’s aim to make peace with Germany produced an immense

outpouring of emotion at home and abroad. At 10.30 P.M. Jeanneney and

Herriot handed President Lebrun a note stating that “no consideration allows

us to admit, as compatible with France’s honor, a separate peace which

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would destroy our commitments to Great Britain and Poland, gravely

compromise our relations with the United States, ruin our reputation

throughout the world, especially with those people who have tied their

destiny to ours.” 126

The French had asked the papal nuncio to transmit to the Italian

government, through the Holy See, an intimation of the French

government’s desire to seek the basis of a lasting peace. No mention was

made of a cessation of hostilities. Though little known at the time, in

appealing to Hitler and Mussolini the French government had spoken of

“peace conditions.”127Admiral Maurice Le Luc, who was to represent the

navy in the armistice negotiations with the Germans, received from Admiral

Darlan the following instruction: “You are designated as plenipotentiary

with a view of being informed of peace conditions.” Following the signing

of the armistice with Italy on June 24, General Charles Huntziger declared:

“In the present infinitely dolorous circumstances, the French delegation

finds comfort in the firm hope that the peace which will soon intervene will

enable France to realize its work of reconstruction and renewal, and that it

will provide a solid base to the establishment of durable relations between

our two countries in the interest of Europe and civilization.”

Did those around Pétain ever suspect what kind of “peace” Hitler had

in mind? As Germany’s foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, told the

Italians, when peace came Germany would probably take Alsace, the Briey

ironfields, part of Belgium, the former German colonies, the Congo, and the

principal ports of Norway; Spain would have French Morocco, excepting the

Atlantic ports, which would go to Germany; and Italy would have Nice,

Corsica, Algeria, Tunisia, Djibouti, and British Somaliland, with a strip to

connect Libya with Ethiopia; both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar would be

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neutralized, and Egypt would become an “ally” of Italy.128

The Germans preferred to remind the French that peace was not actual

and would follow only after hostilities ended. This attitude was explained by

Hitler to the Italian foreign minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, during a July 7

conversation in Berlin:

Hitler said that a separate peace with France would undoubtedly present many advantages for our two countries [Germany and Italy], but that there are two arguments against it. First, German inability to occupy the colonies which would, as a result of the peace treaty, pass from France to Germany, for example, the Cameroons--colonies which would probably be occupied in the meantime by the English; second, the necessity of keeping the west coast of France in German hands, on the one hand, because the coast was indispensable for the attack against England, on the other, in order to maintain communications with Spain--a country which was most useful for the Axis game whatever happened, and indispensable should one wish to make an attempt at Gibraltar.129

Hitler had left Charleville during the night of June 18 accompanied by

Ribbentrop and other military and civil personnel. As it was entering the

Black Forest, his train suddenly ground to a halt. A Ribbentrop aide,

Ambassador Hewel, had flown in from Berlin with the Spanish note

concerning France’s request for an armistice. Hitler stepped from the train to

read the note and gave vent to his glee by dancing a jig. (Ambassador Otto

Abetz later wrote that he had considered the scene disheartening. He recalled

how after the Seven Years’ War Frederick II, so much admired by Hitler,

heard a Bach chorale played in the solitude of a Berlin church rather than

attend the victory parade. The contrast pained Abetz.) The train then

proceeded toward Munich.

Hitler’s long term strategy aimed at achieving freedom of movement

so he could destroy the Soviet Union in the east. France played a secondary

role in this plan. Moreover, the Führer probably never thought he could

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dispose of France so rapidly and so thoroughly. He despised the French and

wanted to ensure the country would never rise again. His main concern was

in fact the British, with whom he had hoped to come to terms: He would not

touch England and her empire, which he thought played a useful role by

preserving a certain equilibrium in the world, on condition that London no

longer interfer in European affairs. To this end France must be permanently

separated from England. In a June 19 conversation at Munich with Count

Ciano, Ribbentrop defined German intentions toward France.

Ribbentrop, Ciano wrote, “said it was the Füehrer’s intention to avoid

offering conditions to the French such as would give them a pretext to refuse

to conclude the negotiation and to transfer the Pétain Government to

England or Algeria whence it could ‘proclaim the holy war’ and continue

hostilities for an indefinite time. In particular he was preoccupied with the

question of the French fleet, an elusive factor, which rather than give itself

up to the enemy, would certainly go over to England or America, whence it

would be able to come into play again at the opportune moment.”

Ribbentrop then spoke of possibilities that might arise with regard to

England:

He said that, in the Fuehrer’s opinion, the existence of the British Empire as an element of stability and social order in the world is very useful. In the present state of affairs it would be impossible to replace it by another similar organization. Therefore the Fuehrer--as he has also stated in public -- does not desire the destruction of the British Empire. He asks that England renounce some of her possessions and recognize the fait accompli. On these conditions, Hitler would be prepared to come to an agreement. England has already been informed of the above through the confidential channel of the Swedish legation.130

Ribbentrop’s language took Ciano aback. The German “expressed

himself in terms which are absolutely new in his vocabulary. He spoke of

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humanity’s need for peace, of the need for reconstruction, of the need for

bringing together the nations, whom the war has separated so much, to live

together in harmony.”

While Ciano and Ribbentrop conferred, Hitler tackled Mussolini,

whose ambitions far exceeded his success at war. Central to their

conversation was the issue of the French fleet, for it was essential at all costs

to neutralize it. Hitler thought occupying the whole of France would be

unwise, running the risk of the establishment of a French government-in-

exile. Wiser, in his view, would be to allow the French to preserve a

government of their own in France. As for the fleet, the best solution would

be for the French to sink it; the worst, that it join the British navy. A Franco-

British naval force could organize large convoys capable of bringing arms,

provisions, and troops from North America and the French Empire. The

result would be the creation of secondary theaters of operation and

consequently a war drawn out and impossible to control by massive force.

Under these circumstances, Hitler went on, to ask the French purely and

simply to surrender their fleet would be imprudent. Better to ask them to

reassemble it such that the fleet could be, not scattered, but kept in French

harbors under German and Italian control. More prudent still would be to

allow the French the hope of regaining their fleet at peace treaty

negotiations. Once England is beaten, Hitler said, and we become concerned

with the establishment of peace, we shall see.

At the conclusion of Mussolini’s interview with Hitler, during which

Mussolini advanced various claims, fearing that a peace close at hand would

deny him the realization of his lifelong dream of glory on the battlefield, the

two Axis partners agreed that the Germans would inform the French of their

readiness to set conditions for ending hostilities. The French were to send

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plenipotentiaries; as soon as their names were forwarded the Germans would

stipulate when and where they could be received. The French were also

reminded that no agreement could be reached without consulting the Italians.

Hitler wished to ensure that France would never again play a leading

role in world affairs. On June 17 the Berlin correspondent of the Neue

Zürcher Zeitung wrote that German victory would be as total as war had

been. “France’s military power on the continent must be destroyed once and

for all in order to ensure, in a not distant future, the power of the German

Reich in the center of Europe. The entirely new order envisaged by the

German conqueror can only rest upon the concept of total victory.”131

Back in France Pétain, much concerned that his communication to the

Germans had gone without reply, received the Spanish ambassador José

Félix Lequerica at 10:30 A.M. Lequerica confirmed he was without news. In

this uncertain atmosphere the cabinet was told to meet at 11 A.M.

Ambassador Biddle encountered Admiral Darlan on his way to the meeting

and showed him the text of the message received the previous evening.

Angry that the American doubted his word about the fleet’s safety, the

admiral made his feeling known: “les Americains,” he said, “commencent

a m’enmerder,” a vulgar phrase to express his annoyance.

Baudouin was then called from the meeting to be shown the note. The

minister was not amused. He recalled the engagement taken with the U.S.

government and confirmed with the ambassador during the night of June 16-

17 and reconfirmed to him in the course of the 17th. “I indicated to the

ambassador that the second paragraph surprised me,” the minister wrote.

“No threat was necessary to incite the French government to keep its

promises and it was not necessary for President Roosevelt to threaten France

with breaking off Franco-American friendship to receive a confirmation of a

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French government position dictated by a simple sense of honor.” In a

conversation with Biddle on the 21st, Charles-Roux confirmed the same

position. He stressed the U.S. note’s lack of generosity, that “the United

States, which did not wish to risk war, should not have threatened France

with the withdrawal of their amity because France, having been left alone,

had succumbed under the weight of numbers.” This observation, stressed the

American ambassador, “was made in a spirit of the most sincere cordiality

and was received the same way.”

In a June 18 cable to Washington, Biddle confirmed the essence of the

Baudouin conversation, adding, however, that even though the French

government said it was “deeply pained” by the last sentence of the Roosevelt

message, he believed “the effect thereof was highly salutary at this juncture”

despite this natural feeling. “He [Baudouin] wished to assure me [the

ambassador reported] in the name of the Government in the most solemn

manner that the French Fleet would never be surrendered to the enemy: ‘La

question ne se pose pas....’ Baudouin added that he could not, however, say

that the French Fleet would join the British Fleet; it might be sent overseas

or it might be sunk. That question is now before the Council of Ministers. I

urged with all possible emphasis that the fleet be moved to safety rather than

destroyed.”132The next day Reynaud conversed with Mandel, who “with his

usual cynicism” characterized Darlan as “an Anglophobe like most French

naval officers.”

The cabinet resumed its debates. After being acquainted with the

tough U.S. note, the ministers turned to consider the question of the fleet.

Their “solemn and irrevocable” decision was “under no circumstances to

allow the fleet to fall into enemy’s hands. If its surrender was included in the

conditions for an armistice, such conditions would be purely and simply

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rejected, however grave may prove to be the consequences of such refusal.”

This decision was then brought to the attention of London and the American

ambassador.

The British ambassador, too, had been active throughout the day. He

had received renewed assurances about the fleet from Baudouin, but of

course London would be satisfied only with the French ships far from

German grasp. While the cabinet was in session on June 21, Ambassador

Campbell sent Baudouin a handwritten note: “I am sure the Council of

Ministers is aware of the insidious nature of the conditions concerning the

fleet. I have no confidence in the word of the Germans. They never keep it.

Excuse me for repeating what you surely know already. My excuse is my

anxiety. ”Leaving the cabinet’s meeting, Darlan encountered the ambassador

and confirmed that in an emergency the fleet would sail for ports of a

friendly country.

Whereas cabinet debated the issue of the fleet primarily at U.S. and

British urging, it left unresolved another issue: the status of the two

messages the British had left with Reynaud on June 16 and subsequently

withdrawn. Reynaud confirmed to Baudouin that the messages had

effectively been received but having been withdrawn, were no longer in his

possession; consequently he could no longer show them to the cabinet.

Baudouin turned to the British ambassador for clarifications. The two

telegrams, the foreign minister was told, constituted an element of

negotiations leading to the offer of Franco-British union. With the offer

rejected, there was no reason to consider the telegrams. The next day,

however, “to make absolutely sure that no member of the French

Government should be in any doubt as to [Britain’s] attitude,” Campbell

asked Charles-Roux to bring the two telegrams to the government’s

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attention. At Baudouin’s request Reynaud approached the foreign ministry to

explain the circumstances under which the two telegrams had been later

withdrawn and replaced by the offer of Franco-British union. Later that day,

meeting the British ambassador, Baudouin wished to know how to interpret

the restitution of the two telegrams: Were they to be filed for the record, or

were they to be considered valid? Sir Roland left to consult his instructions

and said he would return an hour later. That Baudouin understood the British

ambassador correctly is doubtful, considering that the British foreign

secretary, Lord Halifax, subsequently confirmed the telegrams’ validity:

Only by sending the fleet to British ports would France be released of her

obligations. In other words, were the project of union accepted, the

engagement not to seek a separate peace or armistice would automatically

cease to exist; were the project rejected, the obligation would remain.

Reynaud now wondered what fate held in store for him. Quite

unexpectedly, it was suggested that he leave for Washington as the new

French ambassador. Apparently Baudouin had envisaged the possibility in a

private conversation with Reynaud on June 17, adding that he would try to

convince the marshal. 133 When the cabinet meeting concluded next day,

Pétain invited Reynaud to see him. Asked to accept the post, Reynaud

hesitated, unsure how to respond. Pétain insisted: “When you appealed to

me, I accepted. Today, I am appealing to you and you refuse me? It is true

that France has changed politics, but things are what they are and France

must be served. I am appealing to you because your role could be useful to

France. At this similar moment, you cannot refuse.”134

Reynaud accepted in principle, asking only that the appointment

become effective after armistice conditions became known. Pétain agreed

but at the same time ordered a decree readied for Lebrun’s signature and a

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request for Roosevelt’s agreement to be cabled to Washington.

The next morning, June 19, Reynaud called on Ambassador Biddle to

inform him of the marshal’s offer and to seek his advice. Reynaud remained

unsure. “He did not know,” the ambassador wrote, “whether it was his duty

to remain [in France], if he could render greater service, or whether if he left

at this time he would not cut a sorry figure in our eyes: he had been the man

whose policy stood for continued resistance and he had gone down on that

issue; he was still convinced that that policy was the only one for France. If

he now accepted an important post as collaborator of the Government which

asked for an armistice, would not his usefulness near us be undermined?”135

At first Reynaud thought he could do good work in Washington by

clarifying the true situation in which France found herself. By week’s end,

on the 23rd, with the terms of the armistice known, he asked to be received

by Pétain to learn what conditions had been made for the fleet. Told the

German assurances, he said: “Do you believe that for the first time in his

career Hitler will honor that commitment? If he does not, what may happen?

A conflict between the French and the British fleets, resulting in a break in

the alliance, and worst still, an end to the friendship between the French and

the British peoples.” Summoned to the interview, Admiral Darlan confirmed

his determination to keep the fleet in no other than French hands. It was

Roosevelt who finally threw cold water upon the whole affair. “The

President desires me to let you know,” Cordell Hull informed Biddle on June

21, “that so long as the French Government continues to resist, Reynaud

would of course be highly acceptable as French Ambassador in Washington.

The President assumes that in the event an armistice is concluded he would

not wish to serve as ambassador in Washington of a government dominated

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by Germany.”136

In his Mémoirs, written after the war, Baudouin implied he had

disapproved of the appointment. “It is difficult to imagine,” he wrote, “that

at the very moment when our plenipotentiaries are at Rethonde face to face

with the German plenipotentiaries that we should decide to send to the

United States an ambassador representing a supreme effort to draw the

United States in the war against Germany.”137 This was not the only time

Baudouin stretched the truth.

To complicate matters further, President Lebrun had refused to sign

the decree concerning the government appointment. He wanted Reynaud

available in case unacceptable German conditions led to collapse of the

Pétain government. Were that to happen, he would ask Reynaud to form a

new cabinet. Also, having discussed the matter with Herriot and several of

his former ministers, Reynaud had concluded that under present

circumstances he could not go to Washington. President Roosevelt’s views

confirmed him in this judgment, he told Biddle. He assured the ambassador

he had no intention of leaving France at present. 138

The one person anxious to leave for the United States was Madame de

Portes. She had already sent her parents and children there. She had also

taken advantage of a diplomatic mission to the United States by two of

Reynaud’s most intimate advisers, Dominique Leca and Gilbert Devaux, to

entrust them with some jewels and a large sum of money for her children.

The two were caught by the Spanish police, who seized their luggage, which

also contained secret documents from Reynaud’s files, and sent it back to

France and government inspection; but the advisers managed to get to

Portugual and from there to England, where they spent the rest of the war

years. De Gaulle, whom they had tried to join, did not want of them because

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they were identified with the Third Republic.

It is time, alas, to bid Madame de Portes goodbye. She would be killed

a short time later in a car accident that would leave Reynaud seriously

injured. 139 Although in her passionate convictions she stirred up problems,

her advocacy of an end to war and its devastations was deeply felt and

sincere. There is no evidence, furthermore, that she influenced Reynaud’s

choice of policies in any serious way. Let it be said in her honor that she

really cared for her man.

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Chapter Five: Traitors or Heroes?

As Bordeaux awaited Adolph Hitler’s response to France’s request for

an armistice, the German army, ignoring pleas for a halt in its advance, kept

rolling forward at a dangerous pace. In a matter of days Bordeaux itself

would be invested and occupied. Of immediate concern was the danger of

the government’s being made prisoner. Whether to stay on in Bordeaux or to

leave thus became an imperative and urgent question to be decided.

Pressured by Édouard Herriot and Jules Jeanneney to act, Albert

Lebrun invited Marshal Pétain to take part in a meeting later known as the

“meeting of the four presidents.” Jeanneney, who had not seen Marshal

Pétain since his departure for Spain, shook hands “cordially.” “I would have

preferred to see you under different circumstances,” he told him. “We are so

far from Clemenceau.” At Herriot’s urging Jeanneney, the president of the

Senate, came to the point of the meeting: Under no circumstances must the

head of the state and the government of France fall into enemy hands.

Pétain: “For my part I shall never abandon the soil of France.”

Jeanneney: “Agreed. But do you agree as well that the Head of the

State cannot be taken prisoner?

Pétain: “I do.”

Jeanneney: “All acts by the President of the republic needing the

countersignature of a minister to be valid, the government could not

negotiate on behalf of France if made prisoner.”

Pétain: “Obviously so.”

Jeanneney: “You are determined not to abandon the soil of France. We

wish to respect the sentiments inspiring your decision. But at the same time

we must preserve our independence of decision. There is a way out: you stay

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on in Bordeaux, but at the same time delegate to a vice-president the

functions of Head of Government. Afterwards, the President of the Republic

and the vice-president, empowered by your delegation, will move with the

required number of ministers to a place to be determined. France goes on.”140

Herriot and Lebrun strongly supported Jeanneney’s argument. To

leave for Algiers, no less French than Paris, the president argued, is neither

betrayal nor flight but, simply, a means to preserve freedom of negotiation.

Furthermore, the government had solemnly undertaken to reject an armistice

containing clauses contrary to France’s honor. Were that to happen, with

most of France occupied by the enemy, it would be too late to act.141

The marshal seemed convinced, and an agreement was reached. On

his own initiative Pétain said that to prevent the ministers leaving for Algeria

from being treated as deserters, he would himself give them the order to

depart.142 After the meeting Pétain asked Vice-President Camille Chautemps

to join him the following evening at his private residence. Finding Pétain

“deeply moved” by the arguments advanced at the meeting, Chautemps

envisaged the possibility that the government, though split in two, would act

for the good of the country.143

The proposed solution seemed simple and logical were it not for the

currents pulling in opposite directions. Over 100 deputies and senators had

made their way to Bordeaux, all witnesses to the misery and the despair

encountered along the road. People were at the end of their tether and

wanted out. They found scapegoats not only in the politicians who had led

France to disaster, or so it was widely felt, but also in the British, who

refused to recognize the probability of their own imminent defeat, while

vociferously insisting that France keep fighting while its government moved

to North Africa. Deputies and other politicians split into two groups, one

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advocating that France stay in the war and honor its obligations to England,

the other, known as the “Bordeaux Commune,” siding with the Pétain

government.

During a meeting of deputies that same June 18, a minority opted for

staying in France. A main concern was the desire not to abandon families to

the mercy of German reprisals, and another was the fear of being treated as

cowards, eschewing the responsibilities the new situation imposed. Such

attitudes so concerned most of the departing deputies that they decided to

consult Pétain. The new head of government reassured and even teased

them: “Believe me, don’t spread it around because I cannot say so publicly

at the moment, with me you run no risks. I am happy to know you come on

the Parliament’s behalf: Parliament is necessary. I became aware of its

usefulness when in government. Parliament was where I found a deep

devotion to the common weal, and I could not operate unless you brought

me its support. I need Parliament’s collaboration, tell your colleagues, you

know how loyal I am. I have always been loyal.”144 A short while later Pétain

furnished proof of his “loyalty” by abolishing Parliament!

As doubts and fears tore Bordeaux asunder, on the other side of the

Channel, in London, two voices rose to challenge fate. Only a few in France

heard General de Gaulle’s call to resistance, but it made history. Speaking

before the British Parliament, Prime Minister Churchill stated, “However

matters may go in France or with the French Government or other French

Governments, we in this island and in the British Empire will never lose our

sense of comradeship with the French people. If final victory rewards our

toils they shall share the gains--aye, and freedom shall be restored to all.” He

explained further: “What General Weygand called the ‘Battle of France’ is

over. I expect that the battle of Britain is about to begin.... Hitler knows that

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he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to

him, all Europe may be free, and the life of the world may move forward

into broad, sunlit uplands; but if we fail then the whole world, including the

United States, and all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the

abyss of a new dark age made more sinister, and perhaps even more

prolonged, by the lights of a perverted science.” The address ended with

words that also made history: “Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties,

and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last

for a thousand years, men will say, ‘This was their finest hour.’”145

On that same day, June 18, First Lord of the Admiralty A.V. Alexander

left for Bordeaux to convince the French fleet to take to sea. He was to

concern himself with the aircraft carrier Béarn, stocked with important air

matériel of U.S. origin. Alexander also intended to deal with the problem of

the French merchant fleet, which the British so anxiously wished to keep out

of German hands. Alexander was to urge Admiral Darlan to destroy all

stocks of oil before German troops arrived. The next day Alexander was

joined by Lord Lloyd, who s minister of colonies had particular interest in

the immediate future of overseas French territories. He was carrying a

message from Churchill offering to provide all the shipping necessary to

evacuate troops and matériel. Apparently the unofficial but true reason for

Lord Lloyd’s mission was to convince Georges Mandel to return to London

with him in his own plane to form a government-in-exile with de Gaulle.

Jean Monnet, future father of the Common Market, who accompanied the

British minister, also tried to convince other armistice opponents, such as

Jules Jeanneney and Léon Blum, to leave for London, but none agreed to do

so.146

In Bordeaux the unbending spirit that animated Churchill, and with

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him the whole British nation, was conspicuously lacking. A mood of

recrimination and self-pity prevailed. It was in this spirit that on the morning

of June 19 Bordeaux learned of the German reply to its request. The news

was transmitted by Spain’s José Félix Lequerica, who awakened Baudouin

at 6:30 A.M. to inform him the Germans were ready to open negotiations for

an armistice. At 8:30 A.M. Baudouin transmitted the news to the marshal

and Lebrun. At 10:30 A.M., following a cabinet meeting, the names of the

nominated plenipotentiaries were communicated to the Spanish ambassador.

General Charles Huntziger was selected to preside a French delegation

which also included a diplomat, Léon Noel, former French ambassador to

Poland, a navy officer, Admiral Maurice Le Luc, an army officer, General

Henri Parisot, and an airforce officer, General Jean-Marie Bergeret.

Informed of the decisions made the previous day by the four

presidents--Jeanneney, Herriot, Pétain, and Lebrun-- the cabinet agreed to

split the government in two, one part immediately leaving for North Africa

to avoid capture and to preserve its freedom of action. Lebrun was to embark

from a southern port that same afternoon on a warship; members of

Parliament would depart at an hour to be determined. At 1:30 P.M., Herriot

and Jeanneney called on Lebrun to express their concern about pressures

exerted on members of Parliament. Rumored was that they would not be

allowed to leave unless they first renounced their mandate. Later that

afternoon Darlan and Chautemps met with Herriot to coordinate the details

for departure. Darlan later confirmed in a letter to Herriot that a ship, the

armed auxiliary cruiser Massilia, would be ready the next day, June 20:

embarkation between 2 P.M. and 4 P.M., departure at 4 P.M. Herriot also

received a “moving” visit from Ambassador Biddle, who felt sure the United

States would feel obliged to enter the war. Although Herriot strongly

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advocated of moving to North Africa to continue operations, he told

Ambassador Biddle “with no uncertain emphasis that he felt that the people

of France had been martyrs, and while he believed in the setting up of a

government in Morocco, and the continuance of the struggle, he would be

the first one to call a halt to this continued resistance if he felt that the

French fleet, Air Force and remaining troops in Morocco were to be left

alone to carry on the fight without early active aid from the United

States.”147

While these preparations were under way, through Lequerica the

French government requested the Germans to suspend their advance on

Bordeaux. The Germans finally consented, making the departure abroad less

urgent. Thus at 8:50 P.M. Chautemps informed Herriot that the marshal

considered the need for departure less pressing; this resulted in adjournment

of measures already taken--a decision Herriot found “strange and suspect.”

Amidst the flurry of orders and countermands, three high-ranking

Britons arrived in Bordeaux to discuss the future of the French fleet, an issue

of unremitting vital concern to the British. First Lord of the Admiralty Albert

Alexander, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, and Secretary of State for

the Colonies Lord Lloyd, had met the previous afternoon with Darlan to

plead with him to send his ships, in particular the large battleships, to

England, where they would be received with open arms. It would be a

disaster, they said, if the Germans seized the French fleet; but Darlan assured

the Britons the fleet would belong to no country but France. The British

emissaries made clear that should the French be averse to sending their fleet

to England, they could chose bases in the French Empire, the United States,

or Canada. That the British should repeat the same question over and over

annoyed Darlan. “I told them at least twenty times they have nothing to

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fear,” he complained. “I am disgusted by the attitude of those people who

don’t have a sense of pity (not even a tiny one) for vanquished France and

who seem having forgotten the immense services the French Navy has

rendered them.”148

Dudley Pound returned to England during the night, but Alexander

and Lord Lloyd stayed on during the 19th for late-evening conversations

with Pétain, Baudouin, and again Darlan. Lord Lloyd had brought the

French government a message: London undertook to help evacuate to North

Africa as many men and as much matériel as possible. London promised to

collaborate in the defense of North Africa and renewed the offer to transform

the Anglo-French alliance into a complete union. The British message,

delivered in the early morning of the 19th to Lebrun, who “was clearly

unable to cope with the situation,” was later discussed with Pétain and

Baudouin. Lord Lloyd, who found Pétain “vain, senile and dangerously

gaga,” received most solemn assurances concerning the fleet. When the

interview concluded, Lord Lloyd suggested to Baudouin that they take a

walk. The night was dark, Baudouin wrote, and they kept bumping into

sentinels. Making plain his concern at the grave situation, Lord Lloyd urged

the French minister to join the group leaving the next day for North Africa.

Baudouin could count on Britain’s friendship, Lord Lloyd confided. Once in

North Africa, the French contingent would meet with important British

government officials, preferably in Morocco, he concluded. These advances

left Baudouin cold. 149

French assurances failed to relieve British fears, especially when

Darlan refused to base the fleet out of Axis reach at Mers-el-Kebir,

apparently undefendable, preferring to keep it at Toulon. The atmosphere

further darkened when Darlan learned of the British Admiralty’s instruction

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to its warships to force French commercial ships into British ports. Tension

between the two Admiralties grew visibly. As Lord Halifax clarified to

Darlan, no one in England doubted his word; simply, it was believed he

would be unable to keep it.

The next day, June 20, Darlan reconfirmed to British Ambassador

Campbell and Lord Lloyd the assurances given.earlier.150 In the course of

discussions with the two British envoys, Herriot and Jeanneney asked that a

small ship be sent to Bayones to convey to England several officers who

wished to place their services at Britain’s disposal and certain politicians

who were marked men. Campbell decided to ask for two ships in case

“considerable numbers” of officers wished to respond to de Gaulle’s appeal

from London.151 Far from “considerable,” their number was insignificant.

While the British conferred with the French, the Germans showed

force through heavy air bombardment of Bordeaux that left 63 dead and 180

injured-- clearly telling the French their only alternative was surrender. The

bombing prompted the government’s move to Perpignan, farther from the

front lines, where ministers could consider armistice terms in relative calm.

On the morning of June 20, Foreign Minister Baudouin told the South

African minister, Colin Bain Marais, that “after the air raids of the previous

evening and the fact that no reply was received to their request for a

cessation of hostilities, and the German terms of peace, it was quite evident

that whatever the peace terms were, they were certain to be unacceptable and

for that reason the government had decided to leave and to meet the

following afternoon at Perpignan.” Baudouin further told the South African

that if he meant to accompany the government, he should leave as soon as

possible.152Later in the afternoon, however, a last minute change of plans

prompted the government to remain in Bordeaux.

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That day Pétain took to the air to explain the defeat: “Too few

children, too few arms, too few allies, there is the reason of our defeat. We

shall draw the lesson of lost battles. I have been with you in the days of

glory. Head of Government I shall remain with you in the days of darkness.

Be with me. The issue is France, its soil, its children.”

During the whole of the 20th, orders and counterorders followed each

other at a frantic pace. At a morning cabinet meeting Lebrun insisted that he

and the ministers leave that very day. They were to embark at Port-Vendres

and meet at nearby Perpignan, where the Grand Hotel had been

requisitioned and all guests expelled, including the Duke and Duchess of

Windsor, who had taken up residence there. Members of Parliament were

instructed to leave Bordeaux. At 11:45 A.M. the parliamentarians heard the

government’s decision. At 12:30 P.M. Herriot advised the deputies that

departure was to take place from Verdon on the Massilia. Upon reaching

Toulouse, Blum and Jeanneney, who had taken the route for Port-Vendres,

were informed of their mistake and requested to return to Bordeaux.

Herriot’s luggage had already been placed on board.

Those preparing to leave the country, whether from fear of being

overtaken by the Wehrmacht or in the hope that North Africa would refuse to

abandon the struggle against the Nazis, had failed to consider Pierre Laval

and his machinations. During the morning some 50 deputies had met at the

Ecole Anatole-France to debate their plight. Bordeaux mayor Adrien

Marquet opened the debate by shouting: “This slaughter must stop. Enough.

Enough. We must negotiate. All resistance is impossible. I saw Weygand. It’s

the end.” Another deputy, André Le Troquer, rejoined: “But England is our

ally. She stays in the war and we are committed not to make a separate

peace.” The argument did not carry. “England will be on her knees within

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two months,” argued a certain Mistler. “How can you say that,” exclaimed

Le Troquer. “Don’t we have a great empire? Don’t we have a fleet?” “You

do not gain a war with a fleet,” said former Navy Minister François Pietri.

Fiery debate between opposing parties continued vehemently until the

session was suspended at 11 A.M.

Early that afternoon Darlan informed Herriot that with the river mined

at Pauillac, the Massilia could not make its way to Bordeaux and was still at

Verdon. Deputies would have to reach Verdon to board. At 5:30 P.M. a bus

carrying only 31 deputies left for Verdon. Some deputies could not be

reached in time; others renounced leaving. Lebrun and the ministers were

expected at Port-Vendres, ready to leave for North Africa at the same time as

the deputies, but last-minute conspiracy forced them to remain in Bordeaux.

Author of the conspiracy was Raphaël Alibert. He achieved his goal,

as he admitted, by lying and cheating. Worrying because the Germans,

despite assurances to the contrary, had crossed the River Loire between

Nantes and Tours and were advancing toward Bordeaux, Lebrun panicked. A

decision, he told Alibert on the phone, must be taken urgently. At 3 P.M.

Pétain and Alibert arrived at Lebrun’s office to find the president of the

Republic talking to Chautemps. Without uttering a single word the marshal

took a seat. Turning to Lebrun, Chautemps wished to reconfirm the

president’s instructions: “As vice-president I shall immediately leave for

Algiers and assume the responsibilities of government. I shall meet with

deputies and senators, at least those who will have managed to leave, and

take all necessary measure for the pursuit of the war in the empire. Marshal

Pétain will remain in France to insure by his prestigious presence and as far

as possible the protection of the people and their properties. You, Mister

President, will leave without delay. Are we agreed?” “Perfectly so,” Lebrun

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replied. “My luggage is packed.” Pétain gave a sign of assent.

Alibert feared that with the seat of government transferred to Algiers,

Pétain would miss any chance of becoming head of state. It was then that

Alibert produced his lie. He told President Lebrun he had received

information that would certainly influence decisions: Contrary to belief, the

Germans had not crossed the Loire; they were instead facing strong military

opposition. “That is indeed very serious,” the marshal exclaimed. Throwing

Lebrun off his guard, Alibert moved to take advantage of the charged

atmosphere. “Don’t you think, Mister President, that the urgency being

lesser we could postpone all decisions to tomorrow morning?” “That would

be more prudent,” admitted the marshal. “It’s a last delay,” Lebrun said

without much conviction. “I am ready to leave. Please keep me regularly

informed of the situation. I am counting on you.”

Then came the forgery. “Back at my office,” Albert confessed, “I am

bombarded with telephone calls by Jeanneney, Herriot, [Minister of

Merchant Marine] Campinchi, all wishing to know if the order for departure

was finally given. An end must be put to it all and I take my decision. Using

the marshal’s personal stationary, I dictate to my secretary the order for each

minister not to leave his domicile until the next morning to await

instructions and the injunction not to leave town before having received

them. I mark each letter with the marshal’s seal and fake his signature.

Without this forgery Pétain would never have become head of state.” 153

The ruse succeeded in discouraging ever-fearful Lebrun from leaving

for Port-Vendres, where a warship awaited to take him, Herriot, Jeanneney,

Chautemps, and a number of ministers to North Africa. It was then that

Pierre Laval entered the stage, maneuvering to undermine whatever

remained of Lebrun’s shaky willpower. His aim, like Alibert’s, was to

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prevent the president from departing, thus enabling Pétain to remain sole

master of the situation. Laval had been active behind the scenes during this

period, brainwashing deputies and politicians with a mixture of persuasion

and scare tactics. People were panic-stricken, concerned about their families,

distraught by the scenes of misery and destruction they had witnessed on

their way to Bordeaux. It was easy to convince them the time had come to

end it all.

At 10 P.M. Pétain received a delegation headed by Laval. Alibert and

Yves Bouthillier were present. Once more Laval protested with his usual

vehemence against the president’s and the government’s departure.

Interrupting him, the marshal made known he had delayed the president’s

departure. At the next day’s cabinet meeting he hoped to furnish useful

information to avoid the departure altogether. As he made this declaration

with a malicious air, he winked.

“Thus the veil fell,” wrote an indignant Édouard Herriot. “The whole

history of the armistice becomes clear by comparing this conversation with

the agreement reached with the president of the Republic, Jeanneney, and

myself. The marshal reneged the word given before the highest authorities of

the state. One hesitates to write the word of ‘deceit’ when applied to a

marshal of France: there is none other, however, to define a similar attitude,

a similar repudiation.”154

Laval and his followers saw the moment had come to put pressure on

Lebrun, Herriot, and Jeanneney. Next day, June 21, a delegation led by

Bordeaux mayor Adrien Marquet called on Herriot at 5 P.M. Its intention

soon became clear. Opposition to departure corresponded not only to

acceptance of the armistice but also to the antiparliamentarian and

Anglophobic attitudes taking hold with the support of certain ministers,

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civilian and military. Following this meeting with Herriot, accompanied by a

dozen deputies Laval broke into Lebrun’s office without being announced

and without appointment, as etiquette required. “I had before me men in a

panic, having lost all self-control, gesticulating, all speaking at the same

time,” Lebrun later wrote. After imposing silence Laval turned to Lebrun,

his body shaking with excitement and a fury malrepressed: “Over one

hundred parliamentarians, deputies, and senators have gathered and named a

delegation that I am charged to lead.” And then: “You will not leave, you

must not leave. We will not accept that by a fraudulent maneuver the

government continues in Africa a combat that is clearly impossible. Will you

resume a policy already condemned, that of Reynaud and Churchill, by

means of departure for Africa?”

Lebrun listened in silence to this tirade. Emerging from his apathy, he

countered: “The situation is not that easy. The government has deliberated. It

will do so again. Some can leave, others can stay.”

Laval: “I don’t recognize your right to leave whatever the pretext. Do

not listen to the advice of those who have led the country to the abyss. Why

have you followed them?”

Lebrun: “For the simple reason that my constitutional duties obliged

me to do so.”

Laval: “And that Jeanneney who is the cause of so much misery: I

hate him, I hate him, I hate him.”

Lebrun: “The more you shout, the less I hear you.”

Laval: “We must save whatever can be saved. You do not serve France

by abandoning it.”

Lebrun: “How can the government of France remain free when its soil

is occupied by the enemy and risks being made prisoner? You have not

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answered my question. Don’t you see that the government must preserve its

freedom?”

At this point a certain René Dommange broke into the exchange:

“Mister president, it is your government that would no longer be free and

sovereign after having abandoned over forty million Frenchmen, in the

midst of a battle fought on the nation‘s soil. The populations you abandon

will constitute by themselves the true government of France. It is we who

will form that government, for we shall never depart from France. What can

you then do there where you are going?”

Laval, resuming with increased vehemence: “If you abandon the soil

of France, you will never come back. When it will become known that you

have chosen to leave at a moment when the country suffers the most, a word

will be on every lips: that of defection; perhaps even that of treason. Your

duty is to follow the example of the marshal. If you wish to depart, that is

your right. But you can do so only as a private person. Resign first! Do not

heed the advice of those who have led France to her ruin. I hate them for all

the wrong they have done the country.”155

As the delegation prepared to leave, Lebrun approached Laval to

shake his hand. By that gesture, Lebrun later wrote, he meant to compensate

for the harshness he had shown toward a man he had once chosen as

premier. The experience, however, later joined other “painful memories.”

“At a moment when the men who had the greatest responsibilities needed all

their strength to govern a country in a most terrible situation,” he wrote,

“there were other men, elected by the people, who instead of supporting

them, menaced them and tried to prevent them from carrying on their

duties.”156

By that time, Marshal Pétain agreed with Laval. Baudouin stirred the

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flames by asking Pétain what attitude he would adopt if the president of the

Republic remained determined to leave: “It’s very simple. I shall have him

arrested,” Pétain’s replied.157

The charged Bordeaux atmosphere was growing more perverted by

the hour, Biddle reported: “As the day wears out and Bordeaux remains in

ignorance of Germany’s armistice terms, the atmosphere of capitulation

grows apace. Such will to resist as still remained is being sapped by buzzing

stories of collapse at the front; by the tales of wholesale disintegration; by

anti-British feeling.... General Weygand, I am told, has stopped further

shipment of matériel to Africa.... I am reluctantly reaching the conclusion

that the passing of time has ill served the supporters of a free government in

Africa in spite of all valiant efforts. The order to unpack may be

expected.”158

To defend their position advocates of armistice exploited the anti-

British feeling now pervading the country. Ambassador Biddle alerted

Washington:

I doubt whether the British themselves realize the strength of this feeling though we have seen clear indications in the last few weeks that they are not been kept au courant of the hourly changing temperature and plans of the French Government and its leaders...: In fact I believe that they are being deliberately kept in the dark. It seems obvious that regardless of the terms of any armistice that might be signed German policy will be to redouble previous efforts to split the two allies and feed the flames of Anglophobia now so rapidly kindling. I need not point out that to a lesser degree we shall share the odium of this “too late and too little” atmosphere in the minds of the mass of Frenchmen who have no knowledge of the help we have been giving and who cannot comprehend our absence from the conflict.

Biddle further reported on government efforts to keep the public

ignorant of news likely to sap support for capitulation. He mentioned several

instances of censorship. The national news agency Havas, for example, on

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June 21 gave the following instructions: “It is forbidden to use the following

dispatches: One. Roosevelt brings into his Government two Republican

advocates of aid to the Allies; Two. The furnishing of American war material

to England; Three. Explosion at the German consulate at New York; Four.

The American rearmament program.” Other instructions denied permission

to comment on reported U.S. delivery of destroyers to Great Britain; all

mention of turnover of French military contracts to Great Britain was

suppressed; suppressed also were reports of Royal Air Force bombing of

Libyan airports.159

On the evening of June 21 the French delegation at Rethondes

informed the government of German conditions for an armistice. When

France finally capitulated, planned departures by the organs of state were

suspended indefinitely. Laval and the cohort that followed him thus

succeeded in preventing a symbol of resistance from transferring to North

Africa; they also succeeded in ensuring that henceforth France’s will to resist

would be incarnated in Charles de Gaulle and in Charles de Gaulle only.

By then the Massilia had left with 26 deputies and one senator on

board. The deputies were to join the government in North Africa, but since

the government refused to leave Bordeaux, the ship should not have been

allowed to leave either. Obviously, the Pétain crowd felt only too happy to

get rid of people opposed to its policies. It was, as Léon Blum stated, “a

truly abominable act.” One of the saddest adventures of that tragic period

thus got underway.

What kind conditions would the passengers find in North Africa? How

had the French Empire reacted to the events that ravaged the motherland?

Untouched by the war nor witness to the disaster, the empire

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overwhelmingly supported continuing the struggle. On June 17 General

Noguès, resident general of Morocco and commander-in-chief of the whole

North African area, had written urgently to Weygand offering to continue

fighting independently, with all the risks that implied. Two conditions

applied: The government would agree to resistance and the navy and the

airforce would assist. Were these conditions fulfilled, Noguès felt confident

he could resist.

On June 19 General Paul Legentlhomme, commander-in-chief of

French Somaliland, and on the 20th General Eugène Mittelhouser,

commander-in-chief of the Levant, expressed the same resolution. The

governors and residentsgeneral throughout the empire were equally

determined. French authorities in Tunisia particularly worried that the

Italians might take advantage of the situation by launching an offensive from

nearby Tripolitania. The states of the Levant, Syria, and Lebanon shared the

anguish of their North African counterparts, perhaps even more so because

of their proximity to British-occupied Palestine and Egypt. The 60,000-

strong French army of the Levant could have greatly assisted the British in

their defense of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

When called to order by Bordeaux, the French high commissioner at

Beyrouth, Gabriel Puaux, replied: “A continuing resistance in our Empire

was in my view the best means of assisting the British army, for only its

victory could free France of the definitive servitude which threatens her”

Puaux later recalled: “Had a center of resistance emerged in North Africa, I

would have joined it with enthusiasm. I cannot hide to you that my

deception as a patriot has been poignant.” Puaux closed his reply with these

words: “At the present hour, it is still England who could save us.” A similar

degree of dissatisfaction and resentment permeated the West African

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colonies, some of which would in later months join de Gaulle. In the Far

East Indochina’s governor general, Georges Catroux, took measures to

preserve the colony within the framework of the British alliance. He felt that

only thus could he preserve Indochina for France. Dismissed, instead of

returning to France he left for London to join the Free French.

Because of Noguès’s personal prestige and North Africa’s strategic

situation, French administrators and military commanders throughout

France’s overseas possessions looked to Morocco to take the lead in keeping

the French Empire at war. In a June 18 message to Pétain, Noguès had

written: “With our fleet intact, with the planes formations actually crossing

the Mediterranean, and some assistance in men and matériel, we could hold

out for a long time, undoubtedly enough to be in a position to contribute to

our enemies’ defeat. It is therefore with a respectful, but burning insistence

that I ask the government to come to pursue, or to allow the struggle to be

pursued in North Africa, if it is no longer possible to do so on the continent.

To leave North Africa free to defend itself means to undertake as of now

France’s recovery.” Noguès held the fate of the empire in his hands, but no

sooner

had the government learned of his intentions than he was ordered to

Bordeaux for consultations. Noguès declined to leave his post at such a

delicate moment, an attitude that greatly irritated General Weygand, who for

a moment even thought of replacing him.

In his new capacity as minister of defense, Maxime Weygand sent

General Louis-Marie Koeltz to acquaint Noguès with conditions in France

and with the reasons for the government’s request for an armistice. North

Africa had sufficient resources to withstand an enemy attack for three

months, Noguès told the envoy; in the interval supplies in increasing

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quantities would arrive from England and the United States.

Studies undertaken after the war tend to prove that Bordeaux’s

pessimistic analysis of the situation was no more than the product of minds

for whom the war had ended. For them, the task of adapting France to the

new reality of Hitler’s Europe had begun. 160 It has been argued that had

North Africa refused to bow to the armistice, the Germans would have lost

no time in invading. Whether Spain would have allowed the Germans to

cross its territory to reach their objective remains debatable, however. The

Spaniards refused permission on October 1940; they might have thought

differently in June. Certainly had Hitler decided to bring the war to North

Africa, several months would have been required to prepare the assault--time

probably sufficient to organize defense. Not only was the fleet intact, but

600 planes were based in North Africa and some 1,000 more flew over after

the armistice. The excuse that France lacked the tonnage required to

transport troops and arms was apparently groundless. Minister of the Marine

Alphonse Rio stated that 600,000 tons of shipping was available along

Mediterranean

ports.161

For Bordeaux the war was over and the armistice terms had to be

observed faithfully. Weygand forbade the transfer of men and matériel to

North Africa and arrested a group of Noguès officers loading tanks into a

boat. The government went so far as to forbid modern warplanes that had

made their way to North Africa from being hidden in a West African colony.

Never saying so explicitly, Noguès let it be understood he might have

ignored Bordeaux’s orders and stayed in the war if only the fleet had taken

the same attitude. Obviously, without the fleet North Africa could not have

been defended, and Admiral Darlan, now a minister in Marshal Pétain’s

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cabinet, had bowed to the marshal’s wishes. As events were to prove, the

French navy was loyal first to Pétain and the legitimate authority he was

thought to represent. Any doubt of what was best for France dissipated after

the British navy attacked French naval units at Mers-el-Kebir, causing over

1,000 deaths among French sailors.162 The action reinforced and confirmed

latent Anglophobia.

Pursuing a “ghostly speculation,” Churchill tried to imagine what

would have happened had the French government moved to North Africa.

Italian forces would have been cleared of the North Africa shore. Malta

would at once have taken its place as the Allies’ most advanced naval base.

Italy could have been attacked with heavy bombing from Africa far more

easily than from Britain. The Germans would have occupied the whole of

France, but the country would not have suffered any more than she did after

accepting the Germans in November 1942. Had Hitler attempted to invade

North Africa, the British could have moved troops and airforces into

Morocco and Algeria more quickly than the Germans could have and in

greater strength. “We should certainly have welcomed in the autumn and

winter of 1940 a vehement campaign in or from a friendly French Northwest

Africa.”

Musing further, Churchill wrote:

Surveying the whole scene in the afterlight, it seems unlikely that Hitler’s main decision and the major events of the war, namely, the Battle of Britain and the German surge to the East, would have been changed by the retirement of the French Government to North Africa.... Once France was prostrate, he must if possible conquer or destroy Great Britain. His only other choice was Russia. A major operation through Spain into Northwest Africa would have prejudiced both these tremendous adventures, or at least have prevented his attack on the Balkans. I have no doubt that it would have been better for all the Allies if the French Government had gone to North Africa. And that this would have remained true whether Hitler followed

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them thither or not.163

Pursuing the argument, Churchill told the Canadian Parliament that

had the French gone to North Africa, “they would have had the recognition

of the United States, and the use of all the gold they had lodged beyond the

seas. If they had done this France would have held her place as a nation in

the councils of the Allies and at the conference table of the victors. But their

generals misled them. When I warned them that Britain would fight on alone

whatever they did, their generals told their Prime Minister and his divided

Cabinet, ‘In three weeks England will have her neck wrung like a chicken.’

Some chicken! Some neck!”164

II

By the time the Massilia arrived at Casablanca on June 24th, the

armistice had been signed and the French Empire had submitted to Pétain.

Departure three days earlier could not have started under more adverse

circumstances. It has been widely reported that the ship’s crew showed open

hostility and contempt for passengers who after leading France to disaster

and indifferent to the fate of the French people left behind were concerned

only with saving their own skins. This version does not tell the whole truth,

considering that many Massilia sailors would later join the Free French

naval forces. Their discontent was prompted primarily by denial of shore

leave and departure shortly after arrival. Most crew came from Bordeaux

and felt anxious for news from home. It took the captain’s considerable

authority to oblige them to do their duty. During the voyage César

Campinchi, until recently minister of the marine, met with the sailors to

explain who the deputies were and why they had chosen to leave for North

Africa. His speech went over very well.

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Among those who embarked, former premier Édouard Daladier, who

had turned down a British offer to embark on a ship heading for London, felt

encouraged by the empire’s attitude. He knew Noguès well, having been

instrumental in his appointment to Morocco. The general’s position with

respect to the armistice convinced Daladier he had a role to play in North

Africa. Other prominent Frenchmen felt the same way, among them Georges

Mandel and Jean Zay (Zay like Mandel will be murdered by the fascists). 165

Also among them was Pierre Mendès France, the future premier (he will

play a key role during the Fourth Republic); imprisoned in France, he

managed to escape, reach London, and join the Free French airforce.166 Also

inx the group were a number of Jews anxious to put as much distance as

possible between themselves and the Nazis, and distinguished personalities

not in the least interested in returning to France.

Having learned while still at sea that the armistice had been signed

and the government now refused to leave Bordeaux, the deputies passed a

unanimous resolution asking that the ship be returned to France; but radio

silence to avoid alerting enemy submarines prevented contact with Bordeaux

and consequently the captain could not alter the instructions received. He

also turned down a further request for the ship to proceed to England. The

deputies’ resolution was telegraphed upon arrival at Casablanca, but all ship

movements were subjected to the agreement of the Armistice Commission,

which had not taken up the matter.

Once in North Africa, the officials met friendly authorities. Still

widespread was the conviction that the empire would not abandon the

struggle. Noguès had not yet given up all hopes of convincing the Bordeaux

Government. The presence of the Massilia’s passengers surprised him,

though, for he had not been informed of their arrival, and he instructed the

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Residence’s secretary general, André Morize, to investigate the matter.

Morize greeted the parliamentarians warmly, providing them with the latest

news about German conditions, the de Gaulle movement, and the Levant’s

hostility to the armistice. Later he shared a meal with them aboard the ship. 167 Daladier’s request for a car to transport him to Rabat was quickly

satisfied. Driven to the Residency in the afternoon, he and Mandel were

received by a Noguès collaborator who had little news to share. Mandel then

requested to be driven to the British consulate, where he conversed briefly

with Consul Hurst. Daladier and Mandel afterward returned to the Residency

for a telephone conversation with Noguès, still in Algiers; later they called

on Morize, who showed them in great secrecy a wire from Baudouin

assuring Noguès that the empire would remain exclusively under French

administration.

Probably encouraged by an apparently favorable atmosphere, Mandel

and Daladier issued a proclamation establishing an administration of

resisters with Mandel as premier. After calling on the British consul, Mandel

set up his headquarters at the Hotel Excelsior and forwarded the text of the

proclamation to the semiofficial Havas press agency for transmission.

Instead of allowing the world to become acquainted with the text, the agency

telegraphed it to Pétain and Darlan. Mandel soon realized conditions in

North Africa were not what he had at first thought them to be: It became

obvious to him that the local authorities had totally submitted to Pétain, and

in their eyes Mandel had become a troublemaker.

Accompanied by Daladier, Mandel drove to Rabat, the Moroccan

capital. Noguès remained in Algiers, probably to avoid seeing his

unwelcome guests, and Morize seemed unable, or unwilling, to provide any

useful information. Whereupon Mandel asked to be driven again to the

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British consulate, where he informed Consul Hurst of his desire to leave for

London. Through an American friend, Daladier submitted the same wish to

the British at Gibraltar. A British submarine awaited him and his son near

Casablanca, but authorities learned of the plot and made sure the

embarkation due to take them to the ship was not at the designated spot.

Late at night on June 25 the British government instructed Minister of

Information Duff Cooper and General John Standish Gort to fly to Morocco

the next morning to meet “the men who were against surrendering in the

hope of persuading them to form a new French Government in North Africa

to carry on the resistance.”168 “They found the town in mourning. Flags

flying at half-mast, church bells tolling, and a solemn service taking place in

the cathedral to bewail the defeat of France.”169

As local authorities attempted to prevent a British plane from landing,

the British party reached its destination on a flyingboat that landed on a

narrow waterway. Ashore they found a British general, Lord Dillon, head of

the British military liaison in North Africa, who told them their reception

would not be good, that he had telegraphed--too late--to stop them from

coming, and that the authorities were determined they should meet none of

the people they had come to see. Since those they wished to see were at

Casablanca, Cooper asked the British consul general to call the consul in

Casablanca to send a message to Mandel. The telephone was obviously

tapped, for a few minutes later Morize rang up to say he had instructions to

prevent the British from getting in touch with French ex-ministers; he hoped

Cooper would comply, as otherwise he would be compelled to take steps he

would much regret. Cooper asked for an interview, and Morize agreed. “I

found him a tall, thin, rather attractive man in a very nervous and emotional

state,” Cooper wrote. ‘He had tears in his eyes most of the time. He said that

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he was only an official and that he must carry out any orders he was given.

‘If General Noguès tells me to shoot myself I will gladly obey.

Unfortunately the orders he has given me are more cruel.’ By which he

meant that he had to treat the former Ministers of France practically as

prisoners.” 170 Duff Cooper explained that the British cabinet, learning that

important French politicians were in Casablanca, had sent him and Lord

Gort to Morocco to discuss with them, and especially Mandel, the possibility

of continuing the war from North Africa. Morize would not hear of it: The

politicians who had arrived on the Massilia had no authorization to

negotiate and no legitimacy in North Africa, where they were only

unexpected visitors, Morize said. He pointed out the insupportable

impropriety of acting behind the back of the French government. A

discussion followed, and Duff Cooper promised to make no further attempts

to see the French deputies, but he sent Mandel a ciphered message through

the consul to say he would do anything he could to get him out and if

necessary would send a ship the next day from Gibraltar.

Later in the evening, after dining at a local hotel, Gort and Dillon

were preparing to leave to join Cooper at the consulate general when a

private soldier told Gort that he was not permitted to leave. “This was a bit

too much. The Commander-in-Chief of the B.E.F. [British Expeditionary

Force], wearing the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, practically put

under arrest by a French private soldier,” Cooper wrote.171 General Dillon

called Morize, who claimed to know nothing of the incident. A few minutes

later the soldier returned to say he had made a mistake. Morize went

personally to the consulate general to offer apologies. “It was not a pleasant

scene,” Cooper commented. After spending the night, “very uncomfortably,”

aboard the flying boat, the British party left Morocco the next morning at

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dawn. A few days later, on July 1, Churchill instructed the Admiralty to try

to cut out the Massilia and rescue those on board, but no plan could be

made.172

These initiatives followed British attempts to support elements in the

French Empire that had shown a fighting spirit. On June 17 British consular

representatives in French colonial territory had approached French

authorities. “The greater part of France is now under enemy occupation,” the

statement read, “but her overseas territories retain their freedom. The British

forces will therefore do all in their power to assist these territories to defend

themselves against the enemy, and the British people are confident that their

co-operation will be forthcoming.” On June 18 the British consuls in Algiers

and Rabat had sent a message to the governor general and the resident

general to inform them of the British government’s overture. On June 23 the

consul general of Great Britain in Tunis had sent the same message to the

resident general there. The French colonial authorities had given an

uncertain response.173

On June 23, once it had become known that France was accepting

German conditions for an armistice, Churchill issued a statement appealing

to “all Frenchmen, wherever they may be, to aid to the utmost of their

strength the forces of liberation which are enormous and which faithfully

and resolutely used will assuredly prevail.” That same day British consular

representatives in French colonial territories were to “call upon the civil and

military authorities of all French overseas territories to stand by our side and

fight hand in hand with us until victory is reached, and thus redeem the

pledge of the French Republic.” These interventions were unappreciated in

Bordeaux, which requested the British to recall their consuls in North Africa.

General Dillon was also asked to leave Algiers.

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Mandel had been informed by British consul Bond of Cooper’s

presence in Morocco, but shortly afterward the harbor’s police chief and

later the national police’s regional director informed Mandel that contact

with Churchill’s envoy would be prevented and that for added security the

Massilia would be docked farther away in the harbor. The next day Consul

Hurst requested Noguès’s permission to allow a British ship arriving from

Gibraltar to fetch Mandel. Noguès reacted swiftly. The Massilia was

returned to a quay and Mandel sent under military escort to Ifrane and there

put under house arrest.

Confronting the chief of police, Mandel charged the officer with

acting illegally, since Mandel had been accused of no crime. As the police

officer babbled excuses, Mandel fumed: “Sir, I see today what you are worth

as a functionary and I take note. I shall fire you. It may take six months or

six years, but I shall fire you.” The same approach confronted Morize. Being

a French citizen, juridically “clean,” Mandel said, he had every right to

return to France. The argument was flawless, but Morize dared not free

Mandel or to let him have the necessary passport: “It is a special situation. I

cannot decide by myself. I must refer to the government.” “Sir,” Mandel

replied, “I have always appreciated functionaries who know how to take

initiatives without constantly hiding behind their chiefs. I see you belong to

a different category.” 174

Already the atmosphere had changed.. Massilia personnel proved

increasingly disagreeable and the population decidedly hostile. Anti-

Semitism was rampant, and the Jews among the passengers insulted. All

passengers were by now ordered not to leave the ship. The deputies had

expressed their resolve to return to France, and although Noguès anxiously

wished to get rid of them, Bordeaux proved equally anxious not to get them

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back. A vicious campaign promoted by the minister of information, Ludovic

Frossard, aimed at presenting the Massilia passengers as cowards and

traitors: They had left for “abroad,” thus deserving not only the severe

disapprobation of public opinion but also exclusion from the French

community.175 The charges totally ignored the true circumstances of the

exodus. Answering a note of protest by Lebrun, technically still president of

the Republic, on June 29 Pétain asked him “to let forgetfulness erase words

that lacked a dramatic reach.”

In Bordeaux Herriot and Parliament functionaries multiplied their

efforts to repatriate the deputies stranded in North Africa. Alibert argued that

the government could assume no responsibility for people who had

voluntarily left their homeland, but he was compelled to change his attitude

when shown Darlan’s letter, which officially placed the Massilia at the

deputies’ disposal. Alibert feigned to learn for the first time what he

obviously knew all along, namely, that the government was implicated in the

whole affair. 176 Only on July 16 were the deputies allowed to return to

France --arriving at Marseilles on July 20, too late to be present when

deputies and senators met at Vichy on July 10 to vote full powers to Pétain.

Charged with sedition before a military tribunal, Mandel was found

not guilty by a Colonel Loireau, the judge. The colonel would later pay for

this act of honesty and courage, but it did not save Mandel, who was sent

back to France and to French and German prisons. His martyrdom had

begun.177

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Chapter Six: A Fleet in the Balance

President Roosevelt was aboard his yacht on the Potomac when he

learned of the French surrender. Military intelligence had informed him on

May 16178 that France was all but beaten. Nonetheless, when government

sources confirmed the news that France had capitulated, having requested

armistice terms, Roosevelt sank into a depression, a true state of shock. The

French army represented a barrier between Nazi Germany and the United

States; that barrier had now collapsed, and the fate of the other barrier, the

British fleet, hung in the balance. The French ambassador, René Doynel de

Saint-Quentin, met with Roosevelt on May 30 and found him “in a poor

frame of mind, defeatist and fanciful, speaking of German hegemony as if it

were a fait accompli and already predicting the fall of Hitler’s empire in

twenty years.” Saint-Quentin’s attempts to obtain a realistic view failed

against a wall of smoke and fatalism. Columnist Dorothy Thompson, who

saw the president the same day, confirmed the ambassador’s impressions.179

France’s crushing defeat stunned the United States as had few other

events in recent history. That England, too, would soon be compelled to bow

to Adolph Hitler’s diktat was widely taken for granted. Chief of Staff George

Marshall objected to Roosevelt’s instructions to ship obsolete guns to

England, arguing they would soon be turned against the United States.

In a conversation with General Charles de Gaulle, Presidential

Adviser Harry Hopkins, spoke of the “stupefying disappointment we

suffered when we saw France collapse and surrender in the disaster of 1940.

Our traditional conception of her value and her energy was overthrown in an

instant. Add to this the fact that those French military and political leaders in

whom we successfully placed our trust because they seemed to symbolize

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that France we had believed in did not show themselves--and this is the least

that can be said--worthy of our hopes.”180

Upon receiving from Ambassador Anthony Biddle a wire informing

him of the French government’s decision to sue for an armistice, Roosevelt

instructed Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles to convey to the French

his opinion that France could preserves her independence and integrity

solely by pursuing the struggle from her overseas possessions or by placing

the fleet at Britain’s disposal.

In relaying this information to Paris, Ambassador Saint-Quentin

added: “We must interpret the American communication as meaning that if

we deliver the fleet, the United States will cease to be interested in our fate. I

must stress that delivering the fleet to the winner would cause an irreparable

harm not only as far as the present government is concerned but also in the

consciousness of the American nation for many years to come.”181

Early in June, President Roosevelt suggested to the French

ambassador that the French fleet find refuge in U.S. harbors. The

ambassador objected, however; Allied fleets could not take refuge in the

United States unless the country joined the war.182

“To the President,” Sumner Welles wrote,

the question of the French fleet was basic. Were French naval vessels to fall into German hands, a greatly weakened England could not only be more readily invaded but even more readily starved. The control of the Atlantic would be endangered at once. The future of these warships, still in French hands, was to be the dominating issue in deciding United States policy toward the French people throughout the succeeding three years. For not only did the stability of the French government to keep the Germans out of Africa and out of their Near Eastern mandates and colonies depend in great measure upon their retention of their fleet, but the ability of the British to defend Egypt and the Suez Canal would have ended instantly had the Germans and the Italians been able to use the French navy for their own

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end.183

Speaking to Saint-Quentin, Secretary of State Cordell Hull said

“earnestly and definitely” that the United States was greatly interested in

preventing Germany from getting control and possession of the French fleet;

otherwise the French “would hand to Germany a cocked gun to shoot at us.”

He recalled the role of the U.S. navy in protecting French possessions in the

Pacific.184 Hull doubted that the Germans would respect their undertakings

concerning the French fleet. To Saint-Quietin’s successor, Gaston Henry-

Haye, he said, “No matter how good may have been the intentions of the

French government, the theory that Germany could never get the French

fleet is wholly fallacious.” He added: “The German power to prevail on

France to sign away her fleet for the period of the armistice will enable

Germany, to an even more clinching extent, to require and, if necessary,

compel France to turn over the fleet, lock, stock, and barrel, to Germany in

the final peace agreement that Germany will write for herself and France.”185

President Roosevelt warned Marshal Pétain that “if the French government

now permits the Germans to use the French fleet in hostile operations

against the British fleet, such action would constitute a flagrant and

deliberate breach of faith with the United States.” The president concluded

with a series of threats: Any such agreements would definitely wreck the

traditional friendship between the French and the American peoples. Any

chance that the United States would aid the French in their distress would

permanently be removed, and in these conditions the United States would

make no effort to exercise its influence in ensuring France retained her

overseas possessions.186

If the United States felt concerned, Great Britain understandably felt

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even more so. Decisions regarding French naval forces could affect, perhaps

decisively, the country’s survival. Britain had hoped to be not only informed

but also consulted--the proper way to proceed between allies--but the French

government saw the problem otherwise. Having repeatedly assured the

British that the fleet would never be turned over to the Germans, the French

wondered what else London wanted. British ambassador Sir Ronald

Campbell, who had lived through the whole drama of French defeat,

witnessed the French government’s apparent lack of concern about Britain--

its assumption that if France could not stand up to the Germans, the British

without an army and arms stood even less of a chance. Here precisely the

two countries’ vision of the future parted. The French scoffed at Winston

Churchill’s boast that the British would never surrender. A break between the

two allies came as the inevitable consequence of these irreconcilable views.

The Germans had no less concern about the French fleet than the

British and the Americans, but for a different reason: They wanted to keep it

from joining the British naval forces. At least in the beginning, the Germans

would have preferred that the fleet scuttle itself and thus cease to be an issue,

the alternative being neutralization.

A document presented at the Führer Conference on Naval Affairs

early in 1941 spelled out Hitler’s policy toward France:

If France were to resume the struggle against Germany on her own initiative it would be impossible to prevent the remaining fleet from escaping from Toulon. This would have a detrimental effect on the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean. Italy would be entirely on the defensive; the employment of French forces to carry out escort duties and anti-submarine measures would render it more difficult to disrupt British and supply lines....Italy’s position in Tripoli would have become untenable; she would be caught between British and French forces, since the enemy would possess naval supremacy. Every bridgehead in Africa would be lost, so that Africa could not be attacked. Deliveries of oils, ores, and rubber from French colonies to

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Germany herself, which are being increased at present, would be stopped. All anti-Axis forces in the world would be given fresh encouragement both politically and propagandistically.187

Ironically, the German document points to all the reasons why the

French fleet should have joined the British fleet.

The fate of the fleet was being played out in Bordeaux, where officials

were awaiting news about the armistice. The French were committed to

reject all conditions that included the fleet’s surrender, but how long would

they withstand Nazi threats? In Poland the Germans had shown what they

were capable of when their will was opposed.

Having already occupied the French coast along the Channel, the

Germans were massing outside Bordeaux, soon to control France’s Atlantic

coast as well. During their drive through France they had amassed

considerable war matériels further strengthening their already formidable

war machine. Northern France considerably increased the Luftwaffe’s

capacity to bomb British targets. If ever the Germans were to seriously

consider an invasion of the British Isles, northern France represented the

shortest route.

The British worried about France’s ability, or willingness, to stand up

to Nazi threats. Particularly anxious was Ambassador Campbell, having

reached the conclusion that France’s collapse had been moral as well as a

military. On June 22 he had been awaked in the middle of the night by the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs with information that German conditions had

been received and would be considered by the cabinet at 1 A.M., after which

Foreign Minister Paul Baudouin would receive him. By then all decisions

would have been taken, too late for the British to exert any influence. At 2

A.M. Colonel G. P. Vanier, the Canadian minister, and his South African

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colleague, Colin Bain-Marais, staying at the Hotel Montré, were awakened

and requested to join the British ambassador at the premier’s office, only to

be told to go on to the presidency. On arrival they were shown into a large

hall. “Gloom and darkness prevailed,” the South African recalled. The hall

was cloaked in semidarkness, feebly lighted by a few electric bulbs that had

been dimmed with blue. “There was an air of death about the place,” Vanier

wrote.188 On entering they found the British ambassador at the end of the

hall, seated on a settee at the foot of the staircase. Campbell informed them

about the German proposals regarding the fleet and gave other details he had

learned from Foreign Ministry Secretary General François Charles-Roux

about half an hour before. “On hearing the conditions about the fleet,”

Campbell wrote, “I hastily wrote a note calling attention to its insidious

character and the folly of placing any reliance on the German word so many

times broken, and demanded that the note should be taken into the Council

[of Ministers], which by that time was sitting at the Presidency of the

Republic nearby, whither I then went, accompanied by the Canadian and

South African Ministers.”189

During the night the cabinet had reached agreement on amendments to

allow French naval forces to be stationed and disarmed in North Africa and

the planes disarmed and stocked instead of turned over to the Germans.

Other suggestions concerned extension of the zone that was to remain free

and the hope that Paris be included in it.

The cabinet meeting ended at about 3 A.M. It was them, the reader

will recall, as the ministers were hurriedly leaving, that Campbell asked

Baudouin about the cabinet’s deliberations. Baudouin at first waved him

away; he had no time to give the British envoy information, as he was

hurrying to draft the cabinet’s reply, due to the Germans before 9 A.M.

189

Whether to accept or reject the armistice remained undecided; what had been

deliberated were the questions to be submitted to the Germans. With

Campbell insisting, Baudouin sketched a hasty outline of the conditions

about the fleet, adding that at Admiral François Darlan’s suggestion a

counterproposal suggested sending the ships to North African ports to be

dismantled. Ambassador Campbell objected: The fleet should be sent even

farther away, he said; if sent to a Mediterranean port, it risked falling into

Italian hands. He then requested to be received somewhere where they could

talk quietly. “With bad grace” Baudouin showed him into the Council Room;

there, in the presence of President Albert Lebrun “who merely made some

irrelevant remarks,” Campbell renewed his protest. Never had the Germans

respected any undertaking, he pointed out. Why would they behave

differently this time? What would prevent the Germans from seizing the

ships? Baudouin, “whose attitude throughout was, to say the least,

discourteous,” finally agreed to receive the ambassador at 8 A.M., before

submitting to the cabinet the draft reply to the Reich.

At that moment several ministers followed by President Lebrun

entered the salon. The group was unimposing, Vanier later remarked; they

did not look like people in charge of a country. The president shook hands

with the three envoys. Baudouin then appealed to the president to confirm

that the proposed French reply remained undrafted. He asked for the

president’s permission to receive Campbell at 8 A.M., prior to the further

meeting of ministers at 8:30 A.M. To this, the president immediately gave

his consent. During Baudouin’s conversation with Campbell, Baudouin

complained that Campbell seemed to think he was not being fully informed.

“Put yourself in my position,” Campbell replied.

The second cabinet meeting centered on the military situation in North

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Africa. Of particular concern was Spain with its occupation of Tangiers, its

shift from neutrality to nonbelligerency, and the strengthening of the Riff.

An offensive leading from Tunisia toward Tripolitania, an Italian territory,

was also considered. As we know, the information received led the

government to conclude that no resistance could be organized in North

Africa.

The sun was still below the horizon when the two ministers, in need of

fresh air, decided to walk the short distance to their hotel. “The distance was

short,” Vanier wrote, “but that walk through the deserted streets at dawn will

remain an ever vivid memory.”190 Back in the Hotel Montré, where

Campbell also had accomodations, the three envoys met a little before 4

A.M., afterward returning to their rooms to draft a record of the events. At

5:15 A.M. Campbell sent word that he would be grateful if the envoys came

to his room to confirm what had occurred that morning. Campbell showed

his colleagues a preliminary report to the Foreign Office. “The report in so

far as facts were concerned was accurate but undoubtedly colored by his

distrust of Baudouin, whom he had during the discussion several times

referred to as a crook and to Pétain as a silly old man,” Bain-Marais recalled.

Obviously, the ambassador never felt disposed to accept Baudouin’s

assurances.

Shortly after 7 A.M. Campbell decided to seek an interview with

Pétain. The Canadian and South African ministers agreed to meet Campbell

at the premier’s residence, but once there found neither the ambassador nor

the marshal. Campbell had first gone to the marshal’s home only to be told

that Pétain was resting and could not be disturbed. The ambassador said he

would wait. “While he was waiting,” colleagues later learned, “he heard

sounds upstairs of someone moving about and putting on boots. A little later,

191

he was informed that the marshal had just left. He heard a car leaving and

immediately rushed out and jumped into his car telling his chauffeur not to

lose sight of the car. After a hectic drive he arrived at the Presidence du

Conseil, rushed up the steps and just caught the marshal in the hall. The

marshal seemed very displeased.”191

Campbell recalled: “I said that at an hour when France had laid down

her arms and her Ally was about to be plunged into a life and death struggle,

I came to the Marshal, whose name throughout the world was synonymous

with honor, to beg him to see to it that France kept the solemn engagement

binding the honor of France not to allow the fleet to fall into German hands

and thus strike a mortal blow at an ally who had always been loyal. To recall

the Fleet to French ports to be disarmed under German control was

equivalent to surrender.” Pétain interrupted the ambassador to renew the

pledge that if ever the fleet found itself in danger of falling into German

hands, it would sink itself. Baudouin, who had meanwhile shown up to

complain that Campbell had not kept the 8 A.M. appointment, also once

more offered reassurances regarding the fleet.

At 10:15 A.M. U.S. Ambassador Biddle called on Vanier at his hotel

to complain that since applying for an armistice, the French government had

forbidden publication of any news that might inspire hope in the people of

France. He branded Marshal Pétain an “arch-defeatist.” Biddle had grown

increasingly pessimistic about the Bordeaux government, considering the

foreign minister’s attitude particularly noxious: “That Baudouin is the evil

genius of the present capitulation government is becoming more and more

clear. Marshal Pétain is feeble and old--you know Laval. Most of the others

are of little ability or importance. The atmosphere of complete and

uncomprehending defeatism--resisted in vain only by the aging Herriot and

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Jeanneney--may best be symbolized by Baudouin’s following remark to me:

“Is their [the Germans’] manner of treatment of us better than we treated

them in 1918? ”192

Ambassador Campbell had reached a similar conclusion concerning

the foreign minister. He firmly believed Baudouin was “really a crook.”

“[Baudouin] had the feverish eye and look of the fanatic, with obviously no

sense of detachment or of humor,” Colonel Vanier remembered.

Ambassador Biddle doubted French determination to keep French

naval forces out of enemy control. “I am frankly anxious,” he reported on

June 22. “Baudoin said the Germans had ‘agreed’ to permit French

maintenance of crews and withdrawal of the fleet to African ports. I pinned

him down, however, to the fact that the fleet is first to return to ports in

Metropolitan France for disarmament under German control. While he

insisted that in case of last minute German treachery, the ships would be

sunk, the value of such a last minute safeguard seems pitifully small.”193

In a conversation with the U.S. naval attaché, Darlan once more

proved reassuring. He believed in the German promise not to use the fleet,

he said. Asked why he thought these promises any more sacred than Hitler’s

past promises, Darlan claimed Germany’s self-interest dictated a

counterbalance against Italy in the Mediterranean, and this counterbalance

could be provided only by France with a fairly strong fleet. The attaché was

left with the impression that Germany had used similar arguments in the

negotiations leading to the armistice.194

Admiral Darlan had instructed all warship commanders how to react if

ever the Germans attempted to seize the fleet: It was to be sunk. A secret

code to be included in Darlan’s signature would avoid unauthorized

interventions in his name. He named three admirals to replace him in case he

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should become incapacitated. These measures, Darlan believed, would allay

British fears. And indeed they might have, had a prevailing mood of

capitulation and submission not swept Bordeaux. A government in such a

mood simply could not be trusted, especially when the issue was Britain’s

survival.

At 5 P.M., as always accompanied by the two Commonwealth

ministers, Campbell called on Charles-Roux, who informed him in broad

terms of the main conditions the Germans had imposed. Learning of the

clause concerning the fleet, the ambassador felt horrified. Demobilized and

disarmed under German and Italian control, the fleet’s units would be at the

enemy’s mercy, all the more so the first ships to reach their regular home

bases. With the exception of Toulon, these bases were located in the

occupied zone. According to the ambassador, Charles-Roux said he was

authorized to make a statement to which he bound his interlocutor to

secrecy: “The dispositions taken by Admiral Darlan are such that no ship

would be utilizable were an attempt to use it be made.” He was sure, he said,

that these words would give Campbell complete satisfaction.

Charles-Roux gave a more dramatic version of the exchange:

“But then you deliver the fleet,” the ambassador exclaimed.

“No, the fleet is not being delivered,” Charles-Roux reassured him

advancing arguments he thought convincing.

“But a disarmed French ship, with a reduced crew, in an occupied

port, will be at the mercy of an enemy aggression.”

“No. Admiral Darlan has already taken measures to ensure that no

ship will fall into enemy hands.”

“But the execution of the measures prescribed by the admiral may be

prevented by the sudden eruption of German troops upon a ship.”

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“No, because the admiral, who knows his business, assures to the

contrary and has already prescribed that certain measures be taken in

advance.”

“Poor France will never rise from this fall.”

“Yes, she will rise and in any case I can assure you the French fleet

will never fight the British fleet.”

André François-Poncet, lately ambassador to Rome, witnessed the

conversation. Overtaken by deep emotion, he could only whisper, “They

shall never forgive us.” 195

Campbell rejected French explanations with “contumely,” arguing that

that “lamentable clause might well just make the difference to us between

victory and defeat, and therefore jeopardize also all hope of a future for

France.” It was obvious that if the Germans wished to take possession of the

fleet, they had only to invoke, in good or bad faith, Article 24 of the

armistice agreement, which included the following clause: “It [the armistice

convention] may be denounced at any time, such denunciation to take effect

immediately, if the French government does not fulfill the obligations

assumed by it in the present convention.”

Campbell further conveyed to Charles-Roux his regret that the Anglo-

French alliance, on which such confident hopes had been founded, should

have dissolved in such circumstances. The ambassador thereupon informed

Charles-Roux that he intended to leave with his staff for England as soon as

the armistice had been signed. He had been appointed to a free and allied

government that within a few hours would be under enemy control. The

British ambassador in Brussels had been captured by the Germans and taken

to Berlin, Campbell recalled. Even were that not to happen to him, no useful

communication would be allowed between himself and the French: “We

195

should both of us be in a ridiculous and impossible position.”

The Canadian and South African ministers took much the same

position. Informed that the two diplomats would soon be leaving, Charles-

Roux shrugged his shoulders, asking: “Pourquoi,” why? “We said,” the

South African recalled, “that as occupation was progressing so rapidly we

might, as belligerents, be captured. He, then, asked us why it would not be

possible to continue our mission in unoccupied territory. I then asked

Charles-Roux what guarantees we would have to communicate freely with

our respective governments. Charles-Roux seemed to have become more

philosophic. He referred to Iena, 1870, 1914-18, and now it was the turn of

Germany, but France would rise again.”196

Preparing to leave, the British ambassador firmly believed “that the

French had completely lost their heads and would thenceforward be

unmanageable.” He considered the German terms “diabolically clever,”

devious enough to destroy the last remnants of French courage. He further

feared that “in their present state of collapse,” the French would bow if the

Germans rejected (as they substantially did) their counterproposals--and

might even reverse the scuttling order.

In a note to Halifax the ambassador complained that he was now

“being kept at arm’s length and was becoming the object of hostile looks

from the rank and file of Ministers.”197 He found “an organized conspiracy to

keep me from ascertaining the facts [and] a growing Anglophobia among the

Ministers and Parliamentarians, the result of clever and successful fifth

column work. The situation has become (I think for good) about as bad as it

could be. There is no fight left in anyone and French soldiers back from the

front are selling their arms in Bordeaux.”

Later that evening, after dining at the Chapon Fin, and always

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accompanied by the ministers of Canada and South Africa, Campbell called

on the president of the Republic, only to be received by a Monsieur Magre,

head of the civilian household, who was in slippers. Magre told them the

president had retired; rather than disturb him he would convey any message.

They had come, the envoys said, to pay their respects, to thank President

Lebrun for his warm receptions, and to assure him of their deep feeling for

France and the conviction that she would soon resurrect herself.

They then proceeded to the presidency to see the premier, Marshal

Pétain, but he was absent. In his place, General Weygand received them

immediately. The general asked why they were leaving, ”Pourquoi?” and

they again stressed the danger of capture by the Germans. When asked

whether this danger existed, Weygand replied, “Certainly.” Nothing in the

armistice agreement would prevent it. The armistice had been signed,

Weygand admitted, but would become operational only when the Italian

armistice was also signed--and possibly no armistice with the Italians would

be signed if their demands proved impossible to accept. The part played by

the Italians was ignoble, declared the ministers. “Ah, yes, infamous,” agreed

Weygand. He added that the Italians had attacked that day and had been

repulsed. Without hesitation Weygand agreed to sign the two identity cards.

Writing in the dates, he added sadly, “Cruel date!” Vanier then mentioned he

had a signed photograph of Marshal Foch. Had Foch been there, things

might have been different, the general commented.

At about 10 P.M. the party called on Foreign Minister Baudouin who

had retired to bed. Making apologies, he came down to receive them in his

slippers and a bright blue dressing-gown. Baudouin, too, affected surprise.

How sorry he was that Campbell remained unreassured that France would

carry out her obligations. In suddenly deciding to return to London without

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awaiting his government’s instructions, the ambassador made clear, he

wished to avoid giving the French public and the outside world the

impression that Britain condoned French action.

The British ambassador and the two Dominion ministers planned to

leave before midnight. “We had been through one of the blackest days in the

history of a once great nation. The reaction of the soldiery and public was

pathetic. I pity France!” the South African wrote.198 Recollecting his

departure from “the France for whom I have undying love,” Colonel Vanier

vividly depicted the experience:

A few minutes before the midnight of Saturday, June 22nd, I left Bordeaux and spent the night in a small house in Arcachon, a little fishing village a few miles to the south. My companions were the British ambassador and the South African minister, Mr. Colin Bain-Marais, a very fine man--we became, during those dark days, like brothers. Early next morning we were awakened, had a hurried cup of tea and were hustled on to a small, smelly sardine boat [called ‘Le Cygne’]. I shall never forget the next few hours. The boat was small and the waves were high. We were slewed to the top of a wave and catapulted into its trough. Speaking for myself alone, I can say that I had never felt so brave in my life. I could almost have prayed for a squadron of enemy aircraft to come over and hail bombs down on us--I was that sick. Of the two evils, I prefer a quick death!

As Vanier proudly remembered, a Canadian destroyer then picked

them up. They were then transferred to a British ship that transported them

safely to England.199 “It was a thrilling finale to the melancholy story of our

retreat from Paris to Tours to Bordeaux and then to the United Kingdom,”

Vanier wrote.200 Canadian prime minister William Mackenzie King, musing

about “this darkest of all hours,” thought he had found in the Bible at

Jeremiah an explanation for the fate of France. “I could not bring myself to

express the thought,” he wrote in his diary, “that the present situation could

be a judgment upon the French nation and peoples for forgetting the ways of

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God and the miracle of the salvation of France after the last war.”201

A mix of sadness and indignation characterized British reaction to the

armistice: “His Majesty’s Government find that the terms of the armistice

reduce the Bordeaux government to a state of complete subjection to the

enemy and deprive it of all liberty and all right to represent free French

citizens. The Government therefore now declare that they can no longer

regard the Bordeaux Government as the government of an independent

country.” Bordeaux reacted with bitterness. Minister of Information Jean

Prouvost read a statement in English: “We regret that certain members of the

British government criticize us unjustly. We wish our English friends to

respect our sadness and examine their own conscience.” At this point

Prouvost listed the usual complaints about England. Finally the French

minister went so far as to lump the ally with the enemy: “We ask [England]

not to make London a nest of agitation by politicians and separatists. Our

foreign policy will not be dictated by England, Germany or Italy.” Tension

between Bordeaux and London was made to order for German propaganda

exploitation: “France fought for England who now insults her in her hour of

misfortune. Germany might have crushed France, but was content to disarm

her and is protecting French honor against the attacks of Great Britain.”202

Then Pétain took his turn on the air.203 He spoke of “sad stupefaction” at the

British statement, adding: “We understand the anguish that dictates it. Mr.

Churchill fears for his country the evils that have been crushing our country

for the last month. The French people, however, cannot countenance without

protest the lessons of a foreign minister. Mr. Churchill is judge of his

country’s interests, not of ours. Even less of our honor.” Pétain at length

recited the woes that had befallen France and made clear the urgency for a

resurrection.

199

As the British ambassador and the Dominion ministers were taking

their leave of the French government,204 an event took place that was to

altere the future course of France: On June 23 Pierre Laval and his ally

Adrien Marquet were admitted into the government as ministers without

portfolio. President Lebrun at first refused to sign the necessary decrees, but

when Pétain insisted he once again gave way. The news was unexpected,

and Weygand furious, Pétain uneasy: “I could not act otherwise,” said

Pétain. “I have had the greatest of difficulties to conquer the repugnance of

the President, who didn’t want to hear about Laval. Laval has realized he

had been at fault not to accept the justice portfolio a week ago. I must get

him into the government, where his intrigues will be less dangerous than

should he create an opposition on the exterior.”

Nothing could have been less reassuring to the British, cognizant of

Laval’s violent hostility toward their country, than this appointment. Laval’s

first act upon joining the government was to point to Churchill’s declaration

of the previous day--he held the text in his hand--nd to demand a break in

relations. A violent scene erupted between him and Baudouin, who felt they

should to the contrary, make every effort to preserve Britain’s understanding

of the French situation. Should Laval have his way, Baudouin warned, he

himself would resign and so would Weygand and Darlan. Pétain, who

witnessed the scene, enjoined Laval to shut up, and the incident for the time

stopped there.205

During the morning Ambassador Biddle visited Baudouin at the

latter’s request. Baudouin genuinely regretted the departure of the British

diplomatic mission and wondered where the growing opposition between

France and England would lead. England must not hurt France or vice versa,

he said. He begged Biddle, as his country’s friend, to help avoid all serious

200

friction between the two former allies.

Later Biddle called on Reynaud, who according to Biddle dissociated

himself from General de Gaulle’s hostile attitude toward the French

government so evident in his radio address and agreed to send Churchill a

message to plead with him not to complicate matters further. 206 Fearing the

worst, as he put it, Reynaud wired Churchill on June 23 pleading “that there

should be no recriminations against the present French Government.” He

argued that “notwithstanding the terms of the armistice, the British

Government would be safeguarded against the enemy obtaining possession

of the French Fleet.” The message was unappreciated. “It was clear from this

message that M. Reynaud could be no more relied on than other members of

the Bordeaux Government,” Churchill commented.207

In London, meanwhile, Churchill had told the British cabinet on June

22 that German terms imposed on France “could be described as being of the

most murderous character, such as would make the French Government the

tool of the enemy in striking down the late ally of France.” The prime

minister added that “in a matter so vital to the safety of the whole British

Empire we could not afford to rely on the word of Admiral Darlan. However

good his intentions might be, he might be forced to resign and his place

taken by another Minister who would not shrink from betraying us.” 208

Churchill showed particular concern about the modern battleships Richelieu

and Jean Bart, which might, if they fell into enemy hands, “alter the whole

course of the war.”

Speaking before the House of Commons on June 25, Churchill said he

would “find it difficult to believe that the destiny of France and the spirit of

France will find no other expression than in the melancholy decisions which

have been taken by the Government at Bordeaux. They have delivered

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themselves over to the enemy and lie wholly in his power.” News of the

armistice terms was received “with grief and amazement,” for “the safety of

Great Britain and the British Empire is powerfully, though not decisively,

affected by what happens to the French Fleet.” German “solemn” assurance

carried no weight: “Ask half a dozen countries what is the value of such

solemn assurances,” Churchill remarked bitterly.

King George expressed much the same concern in a message to

President Lebrun: “I learn with deep anxiety and dismay that your

Government under the cruel pressure of these tragic days contemplate

sending the French fleet to North African ports where it would be

dismantled. This must in effect leave the French fleet where it would be in

evident danger of falling into hostile hands. I need not remind you, M. le

President, should this occur, how great would be the danger involved to our

common cause and I rely on the solemn and explicit word of France already

given to my Government that in no circumstances would your Government

assent to any conditions that involve this consequence.”

Replying with assurances that the fleet would never be delivered to

the enemy, Lebrun expressed the hope that the friendship between France

and England would not be compromised.

Meanwhile, George Bernard Shaw, the famed novelist and playwright,

had come up with a solution of his own:

Dear Prime MinisterWhy not declare war on France and capture her fleet (which would

gladly strike its colors to us) before A. H. [Adolph Hitler] recovers his breath?

Surely that is the logic of the situation?Tactically,209

As could be expected, Churchill’s utterances, especially his reference

202

to the “enslaved” Bordeaux government, did not go down well with the

French. In a radio address of June 23, Pétain spoke of “sad astonishment” at

Churchill’s words of the previous day. “For the present [the French] are

certainly showing greater grandeur in admitting their defeat than in opposing

vain intentions and illusory projects. For the future they know that their

destiny rests with their courage and perseverance.” The censored press

published Pétain’s “reply” to Churchill, omitting any reference to the

severing relations and encouraging de Gaulle’s National Committee.

The Pétain government particularly resented Churchill’s putting in

question the “French government’s constitutional authority.” “The Prime

Minister apparently considers that the present French government does not

faithfully interpret public opinion or does so only in part,” Baudouin stated

on the government’s behalf. “The Prime Minister is mistaken. There is no

Bordeaux government. There is only the government of France, founded

upon the sentiment and the support of the French.” Bordeaux’s efforts to

identify itself with France rested on the uncontested evidence of Pétain’s

immense popularity.

In a final show of courage, La Petite Gironde commented:

Let us not condemn the prime minister without first examining his position. Before judging him we must try to understand him. Great Britain and France began the war together. We integrated our forces and our resources. We promised never to make a separate peace. However, we did, and left Britain alone to fight an adversary that was, yesterday, our common enemy. If we are disturbed by their attitude, we shouldn’t be surprised to find our British friends somewhat angry and bitter. Great Britain intends to continue to fight. She will continue with a determination that nothing will discourage. She will use all her forces, all the forces of her empire. These forces are immense. Nothing useful or durable can be done without the cooperation of France, nor without Britain, and, above all, nothing can be done against her. (June 24)

203

That comment proved to be a lonely exception, for by then the press

had become a mere instrument of government policies, printing only what

the authorities wished to make known and ignoring everything else.

“Whatever the force of the plea of cold necessity, the volte-face of the

French press to those who recall its clarion calls to sacrifice even a fortnight

ago is in a word: revolting,” Biddle wrote. Authorities instructed the press to

emphasize the German preamble to the armistice agreement, in which tribute

was paid to the “heroic French resistance,” and the statement that “Germany

has no intention of giving an ignominious character to the armistice

negotiations with so brave an adversary.” Nor would authorities permit to

mention the armistice terms. Instead, its mission was to reassure the French

people that “with Marshal Pétain heading the government, the honor of

France is safe.” 210

Other clauses in the armistice terms, though not of direct concern to

the Allies, left an enduring stamp on the French collective conscience.

Acceptance of one clause in particular would brand the Pétain regime with

shame for all times--namely, the one stipulating handing German political

refugees over to the Gestapo. Perhaps the regime might have accepted this

clause while at the same time making sure the refugees the Nazis wanted

escaped in time. But such was not the case. The Socialist leaders Breischeid

and de Hilferding, among others, were turned over together with Czech and

Austrian political exiles, some with visas for the United States. All Germans,

Czechs, and Austrians who had joined the Foreign Legion were also

delivered to the Gestapo. Most of them disappeared in the night of Nazi

terror. Later Pétain would turn over to Francisco Franco a number of Spanish

Republicans who had sought refuge in France at the conclusion of the

Spanish Civil War.

204

Another clause concerned French military prisoners. The Germans

held some 500,000 captives by the time the the French requested the

armistice; the number of captured grew to 2 million. Of these, only a handful

returned to their homes once the armistice was signed. The rest were to

remain in Germany until the end of the war. The government kept this clause

well hidden from the people: It was never published.

205

Chapter Seven: The Last Act: Between Resistance and Surrender

We left Charles de Gaulle as he was departing for London in General

Spear’s plane, abandoning a France he would not see again for four years.

But when he did, what triumph! During those years of unending struggle he

spoke and acted for a France that refused to accept defeat, a France

determined to share the prize of victory. His was an exceptional destiny, one

for which he had prepared throughout his life. Winston Churchill called him

l’homme du destin. That is what de Gaulle always felt himself to be.

On June 18, two days after setting foot on British soil, de Gaulle

broadcasted his appeal to France: A battle has been lost, not the war. The

same war instruments that defeated France will one day in greater numbers

bring the dictators to their knees. “As the irrevocable words flew out upon

their way,” de Gaulle wrote in his Memoirs, “I felt within myself a life

coming to an end--the life I had lived within the framework of a solid France

and an indivisible army. At the age of 49 I was entering upon adventure, like

a man thrown by fate outside all terms of reference.”211 Few in France heard

his appeal, but numerous local papers published the text, in part though with

some variations. Thus the text appearing in France at the time varied

somewhat from the “official” version of his radio address. Only the press in

Bordeaux ignored his words completely

On June 19 Le Peit Provençal published a version transmitted by the

BBC: “The French government has asked the enemy at which conditions the

combat could cease. It declared that if conditions were contrary to the honor,

the dignity and the independence of France, the struggle would continue.

Certainly, we have been totally submerged by the enemy’s mechanical, land

and air forces. Infinitely more than their numbers, it was the tanks, the

206

planes, the tactic of the Germans that have caused us to withdraw, but has

the last word been said? Must hope disappear? Is the defeat definitive? No.”

The rest of the text practically mirroed the official version. Another version,

close to the one above, fell into the hands of the Swiss secret service. Also

circulating was the BBC text with a number of passages omitted, published

by a few dailies that together provided the only information on the subject

available in France.212 De Gaulle’s appeal carried no direct mention of

Marshal Pétain and attached no fault to the military. It also omitted any

reference to forming a government-in-exile.

De Gaulle’s attitude apparently pained Philip Pétain. The marshal felt

that his former pupil and protégé lacked gratitude. Pétain had always had

mixed feelings about de Gaulle--all the more reason for his resentment. But

those French, even in government, who placed their hope in the final

triumph of the Anglo-Saxons felt grateful that a French general refused to

accept defeat. “I was happy to know that our country is represented by a

person determined to continue the struggle alongside Great Britain, in my

view our ally still,” wrote François Charles-Roux. He worried, though, about

the appeal’s character of competition with the Bordeaux government.

Charles-Roux probably expressed the sentiment of a vast number of his

compatriots who believed Pétain to have been the shield, and de Gaulle the

sword, of France.

Echoes of the appeal had certainly reached the Germans. As a

probable consequence a tenth paragraph was added to the armistice

agreement: “The French government shall forbid French citizens from taking

up arms against Germany at the service of states with which Germany is

currently at war. Those Frenchmen who will not conform with this

prescription shall be considered by the Germany army as sharp shooters”

207

and executed.

On the day of the broadcast the minister of war instructed his military

attaché in London “to inform General de Gaulle that he is placed at the

disposal of the general commander-in-chief and must return without

delay”213 The military attaché was to report next day immediately if General

de Gaulle received the order enjoining him to return to France. “Reiterate

order.”214 De Gaulle had been informed and the order reiterated, the military

attaché confirmed.

The day after the broadcast the Ministry of the Interior stated in a

communiqué that, no longer a member of the government, de Gaulle was’nt

qualified to address the public. He had been ordered to return to France and

to place himself at his chiefs’ disposal. “His declarations must be considered

null and void.”

Then on June 20 de Gaulle wrote to General Weygand: He was ready

to return to France within 24 hours if in the meantime “capitulation” had not

been signed. De Gaulle urged Weygand to place himself at the head of the

Resistance and assured him of his complete obedience if he did so. The use

of “capitulation” for “armistice” always drove Weygand to distraction. Was

he not the one who had indignantly rejected Premier Reynaud’s order to

capitulate? With mail delivery between England and the continent

suspended, Maxime Weygand never received the letter; he only learned of its

contents some 15 years later. In his Mémoirs written after the war, Weygand

vented his resentment against de Gaulle. “Had he limited himself to maintain

that France ‘had lost a battle but not the war,’” he wrote, “ had he limited

himself to form a legion of Frenchmen determined not to lay low their arms

before Germany was vanquished, his role would have been worthy of praise.

The heart of Frenchmen in the national soil would have beaten at the news

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of his actions.” But of course for Weygand, de Gaulle was at fault for having

divided French loyalties and troubled French consciences at a time when

unity--around Pétain, of course--was more necessary than ever.215

Unsure, de Gaulle must have questioned his position in London, for

again on June 20 the military attaché informed his minister that “General de

Gaulle is ready to execute the order to return but in the absence of [Air

Attaché] Colonel Rozoy the mission cannot send me a French plane nor

obtain a British one. General de Gaulle will request a plane as a personal

favor.”216 History would have taken a different turn had the British complied

with the request. They refused all means of transportation.

De Gaulle had obviously changed his mind, for on June 22 he

delivered a violent attack against Pétain and his government. In Bordeaux,

meanwhile, the minister of war, General Louis Colson, acting upon

Weygand’s instructions withdrew de Gaulle’s appointment to the temporary

rank of general. The next day President of the Republic Albert Lebrun

signed a decree confirming the decision. The minister of war was charged

with executing the decree. On June 23 the French authorities instructed

Ambassador Corbin to tell the British that the government of France

considered it an inimical act to allow a French general to launch an appeal to

the revolt against its decisions. The British were certainly not impressed;

that same day the British cabinet issued a statement of unprecedented

harshness against Bordeaux. The Bordeaux government, Churchill declared

before the cabinet, “had broken their solemn treaty obligations with us and

were now completely under the thumb of Germany.’ Later Churchill recalled

that French resources in enemy hands would be used against the Allies.

There was grave danger that the rot would spread from the top through the

Fleet, the Army and the Air Force, and all the French colonies. The Germans

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would put every form of pressure upon the government to act to our

detriment. They would inevitably be drawn more and more into making

common cause with Germany, and we must expect that soon we should be

the object of the deepest hatred of France.”217 Under the circumstances

Britain could no longer consider the Bordeaux government as representing

an independent country. The next day, in a note to Lord Halifax, Churchill

wrote that “of course” Britain shall “recognize the de Gaulle committee as

the responsible constitutional representative of France.”218

De Gaulle still firmly believed that the French Empire would refuse to

capitulate. On June 24 he sent a telegram to General Noguès: “All here

consider that you should become the great chief of French resistance.” He

sent similar telegrams to General Eugène Mittelhouser, supreme commander

of the East Mediterranean theater of operations, and to General Georges

Catroux, governor general of Indochina: “Entirely with you in determination

to continue the war.” The British, too, as we have seen, had expected a

positive response from the empire, sending two delegates to meet with

Georges Mandel after he had proclaimed his intention of forming a

government dedicated to resistance.

Answering a Pétain speech in defense of his policies, de Gaulle took

to the radio once more on June 26 to lament, “Our fleet, our planes, our

tanks to be delivered intact so that the enemy might use them against our

own allies. The patrie, the government, you yourself reduced to servitude.”

Added de Gaulle: “Ah! to obtain and to accept a similar act of subservience

there was no need of you, Monsieur le Maréchal, there was no need of the

victor of Verdun.”

But the government’s line foreshadowed Vichy: “Whoever refuses to

submit to Pétain’s decision will take on the figure of a rebel. We have a

210

government. We have only one government. It exclusively has the right to

speak on France’s behalf. It only must be heard. Whoever tried to escape its

authority, if he belonged to the army, would be a rebel.”219 As far as

Bordeaux was concerned, de Gaulle was no more than a troublemaker! On

June 30 the French embassy in London notified de Gaulle of the order to

surrender himself at the Saint-Michel prison in Toulouse, there to be tried by

the Conseil de Guerre. This council condemned de Gaulle to four years in

prison. Then, upon an appeal a minima by Weygand, on July 4 the military

tribunal at Clermont-Ferrand condemned de Gaulle to death.220 De Gaulle

had previously been deprived of French nationality. “Obviously,” Pétain

declared, “this judgment in absentia is only for the principle; it has never

been my thought that it should be executed.” If Pétain felt pained because of

de Gaulle’s “lack of gratitude,” he never underestimated his former pupil. To

Weygand, however, de Gaulle proved no more than a rebellious subordinate.

Weygand’s paramount objective was to exculpate the army, to pretend it bore

no responsibility in the defeat. De Gaulle was now stressing the military’s

lack of judgment and foresight, and Weygand found this attitude

inadmissible. Blame the politicians as much as you wish, but leave the army

alone. The generals and admirals who held the primary responsibility for

power in the Pétain government saw to it that that their record appeared

unblemished.

In Bordeaux and throughout unoccupied France June 25 became a day

of national mourning: On this day came the announcement of an armistice

with Germany and Italy. Hostilities had ceased during the night. As a mark

of national sorrow all shops, except food stores, closed. Cafés, theaters, and

cinemas shut their doors and troops remained inside their barracks. Flags

211

flew at half-mast. An impressive service filled the cathedral with members

of government and the diplomatic corps. Civilians, mostly women, appeared

griefstricken. Later that somber morning a minute of silence was observed

before the monument to the war dead. After, Pétain shook hands with a

distraught, sobbing colonel. People appeared stunned, unable to realize the

gravity of their situation. Meanwhile, weary French soldiers herded into

barracks to surrender their arms to the German invaders. That same day

Reynaud, now a simple citizen, denied British reports claiming he would

participate in a London-based French government; he had no intention of

leaving France.221 From the Alpine front came Italian forces led by Crown

Prince Umberto marching into Nice and Savoy.222 The previous evening the

radio had announced the conclusion of an armistice agreement with Italy.

Bordeaux, U.S. ambasaador Biddle reported, took the news with lassitude.

On the streets could be seen no sign of either indignation or excitement.

“This city at least is still groggy,” he wrote. And yet things were changing.

During mass at the cathedral, the bishop lamented that France was

paying dearly for having abandoned the faith. His lament initiated an orgy of

breast beatings that was to last throughout the Vichy years and greatly

endear the new regime to the high Catholic clergy. France has abandoned

God and is being punished for it, he railed. Had France been victorious,

God’s abandonment would have been total. But through defeat God enabled

France to walk the road to redemption. Christian, do not bemoan thy defeat;

welcome it. God has not abandoned France; it is France that has abandoned

God. Lay France, you can die; Christian France, you will survive.

A certain Abbé Benoit, parish priest at Troyes, summed up the clerical

thinking when he wrote: “Do not forget June 1940. Not to dream of a

revenge that will only lead to new massacres and new ruins, without profit

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for anyone, not even for honor, but to remind yourself that final

responsibility rests with the widespread demoralization of consciences, fatal

result of their de-Christianization. Be warned that you will only avoid even

more terrible trials through re-Christianization, that is, by returning to God,

to the Church, to a moral life, which means a return to the faith and religious

practice.”223

A New York Times correspondent met in Bordeaux a lad of 18 who

remarked: “Defeat may be our salvation. Victory as in 1918 would probably

have led to the persistence of past errors.”224 To this theme Pétain returned

again and again: “Since our victory [twenty-two years ago] the spirit of

enjoyment took precedence over the spirit of sacrifice. We thought more of

personal claims than of personal service. Our desire was to avoid effort;

today we face misfortune.”

Among the culprits for the “atheistic” atmosphere leading to disaster,

the school system became a preferred target of the new inquisitors. The

public school taught not Catholic doctrine but the perverse principles of

materialism. Let us recall Weygand’s words: “The wave of materialism

which has submerged France, the spirit of comfort and facility are the deep

causes of our weakness and renunciation. We must return to the cult and the

practice of an ideal summed up in these few words: God, fatherland, family,

labor. The education of our youth must be reformed.”

The press echoed these sentiments. Thus La Petite Gironde on June

24 editorialized: ”We have just written the cruelest, darkest, most equivocal

page in France’s history. The men of yesterday have been crushed. France

must rid herself of her rotten politicians, her lazy and mediocre civil

servants, her fear of effort and her abuse of privileges. She must return to her

roots and rediscover her century-old tradition of submission to authority and

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patriotic self-sacrifice, her heroic and tenacious patience. France has only

one chance, to be noble in her acts and in her intentions. Then France can

survive, no matter what happens.” This widespread vengeful, melancholy

line complemented Pétain’s sermon against the “lies that have caused us so

much harm.” It also served as the prelude to the “national revolution”

designed to reshape France according to the doctrines elaborated by Vichy.

Since Hitler had won the war, and it was but a question of time before

England gave up, France had the advantage: in the hope of getting a better

deal at the peace table, she would program her future in the victor’s imagine.

What could lead a proud country with so glorious a past even to

consider such abasement? Churchill gave an explanation, cruel perhaps for a

man who so much loved France: Many of the “unravished” countries of

Europe “have been poisoned by intrigue before they were struck down by

violence. They have been rotten from within before they were smitten from

without. How else can you explain what has happened to France?--to the

French Army, to the French people, to the leaders of the French people.”225

The millions who abandoned their homes to flee the Germans were

insistently asking who was responsible for their and the country’s

misfortunes. They needed simple, convincing explanations. Politicians had

drawn France into a war for which the country had obviously not prepared:

they bore great responsibility for the disaster. Deputies and the ministers

present at Bordeaux thus soon became the object of popular rancor. For 20

years, it was said, they deceived the people, and instead of preparing the

country to defend itself spiritually and materially. they corrupted every

ideal, abased moral and religious values without which a nation cannot

survive. Jews and freemasons became the object of particularly strident

criticism. Anti-Semitism, in hibernation until then but by now fully

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awakened, paved the way to Vichy’s legislation against the Jews. And

foreigners, once generously welcomed into France, were accused of

corrupting French values. Professional patriots went to war against “alien

doctrines,” urging their extirpation. Anti-British sentiment, too, was in full

bloom. England was France’s traditional enemy (remember Joan of Arc?)?

Hadn’t the British fled the field of battle, leaving French soldiers in the

lurch? British warplanes could have turned the tide but remained absent.

Egotistical, self-seeking, and ungrateful toward France, the British would

soon find themselves in France’s position. British reaction to France’s

misfortunes appeared heartless. The French needed scapegoats, and the

British, like the politicians, became an easy target.

With the signing of the armistice, Pétain saw himself as the sovereign

of the zone over which he ruled. He accepted adulation as his due. He

basked in the praise the French showered on him. He was the father and the

savior. That some of his compatriots might wish to live elsewhere than in

France he did not admit. The new regime would brook no criticism;

opponents became outcasts, soon to be imprisoned and persecuted.

Proceedings were instituted for “plotting against the security of the state in

connection with intrigues of a number of French personalities who have

gone abroad.” A number of these “personalities” who had found refuge in

the United States--journalists, writers, intellectuals, and scientists--were

deprived of their citizenship and their properties seized. These “traitors to

their country,” no longer considered French, would become pariahs.

Deputies fared no better. They found themselves abandoned and

rejected, meeting in a movie house for lack of another place of assembly,

aware that their role as public representatives had come to a brutal end, and

consequently unable to take the decisions the circumstances required.

215

Feeling equally rejected, ministers were unable to assume their

responsibilities. Although some people faulted the inadequacy of French

military doctrine, they believed responsibility for defeat lay principally with

politicians and their lack of vision. A whole political class was on trial, and

Vichy quickly exploited the situation by representing itself as the only

alternative to redeem the country. Once again, Vichy was born at Bordeaux.

Still hoping for a role to play, the French beau monde--aristocrats,

bankers, industrialists, brokers, ambassadors, right-wing journalists,

speculators, and pretty ladies who had once graced the Paris salons and

whose adventures had filled the press--met in Bordeaux, crowding the

choisest restaurants, selecting the best hotels, driving in sumptuous cars,

completely oblivious to the tragedy around them. They arrived to claim their

part of the spoils. The Third Republic had had no use for them, but now they

-- not the socialists, the freemasons, the Jews, the intellectuals, in short all

those who had achieved preeminence under the late regime--would take care

of France and her problems. And they would do so according to their own

vision of France. In Bordeaux, all who would administer France in the years

to come were preparing to take their revenge.226

Meanwhile continued the agony of thousands of refugees, desperate

to return to their homes but unsure what to do. In the heavily censored

dailies of the 25th they gleaned an inkling of the severity of the armistice

terms. Whereas the occupied and unoccupied zones were demarcated

accurately, remaining provisions either appeared as sugar-coated half truths

or were omitted from the press altogether. Played up was permission for the

government to return to Paris if it so desired, but omitted was mention of the

stigma of a government functioning within German occupied territory.227

To flee Bordeaux and its incredible overcrowding, refugees headed

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southward to towns soon snowed under by a frantic humanity. People

seeking passage on ships literally invaded the Atlantic coast, ready to pay

captains with gold, even sacrificing expensive cars now useless to them.

Similar confusion reigned along the Spanish border, where fewer and fewer

refugees were allowed to cross, their Bordeaux-issued visas no longer

recognized by the Portuguese. Rejected at the border, refugees converged on

Bayonne, soon overwhelmed by the afflux. Other coastal cities knew a

similar fate. Only a limited number of refugees, a few thousands out of

millions, including Belgians, Dutch, Yugoslavs, and British, could find a

place in embarkations to North Africa or Great Britain. Families separated,

with parents frantically searching for children lost frequently for several

days. As in all such situations, one witnessed the best and the worst: acts of

heroic dedication by civil servants, doctors, nurses, mayors; but also

violence, raping, and looting. The role of the Fifth Column during this

period has never been clearly established, but certainly it played a

destabilizing role. On the whole, however, during these desperate weeks the

French behaved well, with a sense of solidarity and responsibility.

With the Germans due to enter the city momentarily, the district

military commander urged on the population calm and dignified behavior.

“French people,” his notice read, “preserve your sense of dignity. Do not

assist as curious spectators at the entry of troops on your soil, refrain from

demonstrations of all kind and maintain correct behavior. Keep your

windows closed. France is in mourning.”228

In his last order of the day, Weygand instructed the army to cease

combat. “Your mission is not finished, ” he wrote. “Pure emanation of the

fatherland, you remain its armor. Its moral and material recovery is your task

of tomorrow.” Minister of the Interior Charles Pomaret told the French

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people that tomorrow a new life would begin for their country. The

government’s first task would be to assure work and bread for everyone. And

Foreign Minister Baudouin assured the people that no one can prejudge what

the future peace treaty will contain. He concluded: “France is necessary to

the world; all people concerned about their destiny must wish that France

shall subsist and prosper. History has shown that people were no less

concerned to know France too feeble than to know her too strong.” In the

evening it was Pétain’s turn to take to the air. In a long address he explained

the reasons for the defeat. Our defeat was due to our abandonments, he

declared. The spirit of gratification has destroyed what the spirit of sacrifice

had built. Pétain then invited all French people to join in a new intellectual

and moral order.

As the country prepared for an uncertain future, the rest of the world

tried to measure the consequences. Hitler issued a triumphant proclamation,

thanking God for his benevolence. He spoke of the most glorious victory of

all time. The Italians, instead, felt bitter. The armistice greatly deceived their

expectations. The British turned their hopes toward the French Empire.

Speaking in the afternoon before the House of Commons, Churchill set out

Britain’s position. He found no use or advantage in wasting strength and

time upon hard words and reproaches. “We find it difficult to believe,” he

said, ‘that the destiny of France and the spirit of France will find no other

expression than in the melancholy decisions which have been taken by the

government at Bordeaux.” He reminded Parliament that “the safety of Great

Britain and the British Empire is powerfully, though not decisively, affected

by what happens to the French Fleet.”

The issue of the French fleet remained a pressing concern of the

British cabinet. That Pétain’s assurances concerning French naval forces

218

could be believed or honored was far from certain. In a matter “so vital to

the safety of the whole British Empire,” Churchill said, “we could not afford

to rely on the word of Admiral Darlan,” however good his intention. Hitler’s

assurances, as contained in Article 8 of the armistice agreement, had no

merit. Britain’s concern focused on two modern ships that “might alter the

whole course of the war”: Richelieu and Jean Bart. According to Admiral of

the Fleet sir Dudley Pound, the Richelieu was the “most powerful battleship

afloat in the world today.” At all costs, Churchill said, the ship “must not be

allowed to get loose.” Having learned that the Richelieu had sailed from

Dakar, the War Cabinet authorized the Admiralty to take the best measures

in its power to capture the two ships should they put to sea. It was then that

the War Cabinet had hoped an alternative could be found in Georges

Mandel’s resolve to head a new French government. We know the initiative

had led nowhere.

That same day Britain decided not to allow French ships at Alexandria

to leave harbor and warned the head of the French Naval Mission to London,

Admiral Odend’hal, that if the ships left Egyptian waters, “They would be

fired on.” Darlan protested--as a member of the Pétain government he was

bound to honor the armistice terms, including guarantees the British

considered worthless. “Britain was now faced,” Lord Beaverbrook wrote,

“with the prospect of an unfriendly France.” 229

June 25 proved very trying indeed for the French government. As if

the news from London had not been bad enough, Japan was threatening

French sovereignty over Indochina. General Georges Catroux had yielded to

Japanese demands because he had no means to resist and the United States

would not intervene. Catroux was relieved of his functions, but instead of

returning to France he proceeded to London to join the Free French.

219

On the 26th, German infantry motorized units proceeded to occupy

the Atlantic coast, but not yet Bordeaux, while other German units were

withdrawing from areas now within the unoccupied zone. Meanwhile

London decided that the French coasts would henceforth be blockaded. At

the same time, the Admiralty confirmed Admiral Andrew Cunningham’s

order to prevent French ships from leaving Alexandria, a measure extended

to French ships located in British harbors, notably Plymouth, Southampton,

and Liverpool. Baudouin reminded the British that according to the

armistice agreement all French ships must return to French ports, a decision

London was not quite ready to respect.

Whereas Great Britain concerned itself with the French fleet and

initiatives leading to the drama of Mers-el-Kebir, Germany focused on

negotiations. Berlin believed the war could be brought to a close if only

London were ready to negotiate. The obstacle was, of course, Churchill. The

Reich never underestimated his determination. Perhaps Foreign Secretary

Lord Halifax would be more “understanding” than the prime minister. In a

June 25 note to his foreign secretary, Churchill enquired about contacts with

a Swedish diplomat from which he “derived a strong impression of

defeatism.” At the same time the Swedes were known to have sought the

role of intermediaries. In Madrid the Duke of Alba, Spanish ambassador to

London, assured German ambassador von Stoher that the British favored

peace. And a few days later, on June 28, having read of a proposal from the

papal nuncio in Switzerland to encourage peace negotiations, in another note

to Halifax Churchill wrote: “I hope it will be made clear to the Nuncio that

we do not desire to make any inquiries as to terms of peace with Hitler, and

that all our agents are strictly forbidden to entertain any such suggestions.”

About then Italian ambassador to Berlin Dino Alfieri, after conferring

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with Hitler, Hermann Goering, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and General Alfred

Jodl, invited the U.S. chargé d’affairs Donald R. Heath to meet with him.

Alfieri reportedly said, “Germany and Italy do not desire the destruction of

England, but only a few days are left before this catastrophe occurs.” The

only obstacle to a reasonable arrangement seemed to be Churchill. He

should therefore be induced to resign and a new British cabinet put in place.

“I do not explicitly ask that the United States should exert pressure on

England to induce her to seek peace,” Alfieri is said to have stated, “but if

they refuse to do so they will bear the main responsibility for the prosecution

of the war.” Secretary of State Cordell Hull asked Heath to find out whether

Alfieri’s suggestions were in behalf of Germany and Italy. “The views I have

expressed are effectively those of the Axis governments,” Alfieri apparently

replied, “but I am not authorized to speak officially in their name as I do not

wish to expose them to the accusation of having undertaken peace

initiatives. Given the military situation, it is up to Britain to take such

initiatives.” Hull wished to remain uninvolved. He merely informed British

ambassador Lord Lothian of the conversation.230

Not at all sure Britain could withstand a German invasion,

Washington shared with London concern about the French fleet. Churchill

had raised the specter of a vanquished Britain seeking to better conditions by

sacrificing her own fleet. Where would the United States be then? If the

French and British fleets remained intact, President Roosevelt felt, Hitler

would not win the war. When René Doyal de Saint-Quentin, the French

ambassador, visited Hull to complain about the freezing of French credits in

the United States, Hull turned the conversation to the question of the fleet. 231

“France’s recovery both at home and in the colonies depends primarily on

the disposition of your naval and merchant fleet,” Hull told the ambassador.

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“If France loses control of the fleet, she will come completely and

hopelessly under the domination of Hitler and his economic policies of

totalitarian autarchy. I’ll be frank to say very earnestly and definitely that my

country is greatly interested in France’s not permitting Germany to get

control and possession of the French fleet. It is naturally a matter of very

great importance to us if France hands to Germany a cocked gun to shoot at

us.” Washington felt that “German promises not to use the French fleet for

their own purposes [to be] worth less than an oat.”232

Britain’s decision to detain French naval units at Alexandria and to

forbid the French admiral’s engagement not to prepare for departure without

forewarning his British colleagues pleased Darlan not in the least. In

London, Admiral Odend’hal undertook a series of negotiations with Sir

Dudley Pound to reassure the British they had nothing to fear. The admiral

asked the British to withdraw all blockade measures and to consider

nonoccupied French coasts neutral. Pound remained unconvinced. In a

“struggle to the death,” Pound pointed out, he “could not run the risk of

seeing the French fleet, once interned in ports that were or could be occupied

by the enemy, to be seized by surprise and then utilized against Britain.” By

June 28 Churchill reached a decision of incalculable consequences: The

French fleet must be destroyed!

The Belgian government-in-exile in France also got into the act. On

June 27 came its proclamation: Given the armistice between France and

Germany, the Belgian government’s immediate task was to assure the safe

return of soldiers, officers, civil servants, and refugees. To that effect it had

contacted the occupying power and the authorities that had remained in

Belgium. This initiative, like previous ones by the Belgian government, the

Germans ignored.

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In Bordeaux, meanwhile, ministers made ready for the advent of a

new era. They streamlined the cabinet, expelling former members of

Parliament. The new policy was to be “moral,” as outlined by Weygand in a

memo then circulating, of which we have spoken. The government of the

marshal must be pure and disinterested, he told Baudouin. “We must

dedicate ourselves to France’s recovery despite the modesty of our means,”

he declared.233

What kind of recovery did the Pétain government envisage? Léon

Blum described the situation he found in the free zone a few days later: “It

was a spectacle difficult to describe without trembling. I saw men change,

corrupt themselves under my eyes, as if they had been plunged into a toxic

bath. What acted was fear: fear of the Doriot bands [pro-Nazi right-wingers]

in the street, fear of Weygand’s soldiers at Clermont-Ferrand, fear of the

Germans close by at Moulins. It was a human bog where one could see

rapidly to dissolve all that had been known to certain men of courage and

honesty.”234 Four years later, at his trial, Pétain confessed to Maurice Martin

du Garde: “At the time of the armistice, I received from all over France from

functionaries, workers, bourgeois the invitation to put against a wall Paul

Reynaud, most especially Léon Blum. They were all urging me to have them

face a firing squad.” The atmosphere in France at the end of June 1940 was

indeed perverse.

The Pétain government was then functioning under assumptions that

fortunately proved wrong. The first assumption consisted in believing

Britain would follow France’s example and in the days to come seek an

armistice. This delusion proved short lived. Much more persistent was the

second assumption, namely, that sooner or later England would be beaten,

and rather sooner than later.235

223

With Germans due to occupy the town on June 30th, the time had

come for the government to leave Bordeaux. Military units had crossed it

repeatedly on their way to occupy areas farther south, with German military

police cooperating with French gendarmes in directing traffic. The whole

operation, The New York Times reported, “took place without the slightest

disorder and without a demonstration of any kind.” The atmosphere relaxed,

and people reacted as if they did not quite understand what was happening.

“This correspondent,” Lansing Warren of the Times wrote, “lunched today in

a restaurant with German officials in civilian clothes at a table behind him

and a member of the French Cabinet at a table on the other side. There were

numerous French officers in the restaurant, still wearing their uniforms.

There was little else in the restaurant to indicate any extraordinary situation

in the city.” 236

A convoy of French officials got underway on June 29, traversing a

few kilometers of the occupied zone, with German military police directing

the cortege. This was the bitter government members’ first taste of life under

German occupation. “Nothing could have better given me the feeling of

abandoning a French soil of which we had ceased to be the masters,”

Charles-Roux noted.237

The government’s destination was Clermont-Ferrand, Pierre Laval’s

fief, where he owned a newspaper and other interests. The town soon proved

to have insufficient facilities, and the various ministries had to be distributed

in surrounding watering centers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reached La

Bourboule, where it was to be installed, only to discover the upper limit of

discomfort and incoherence. Personnel were to bivouac in a hotel without

services. A villa provided the seat of the ministry but city hall hosted

ciphers. For the director general to reach his minister would take a 15-

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minute drive. Even worse off than the administrations was the government.

Within hours all knew the situation was hopeless.

Before leaving for a new location, the cabinet met once more to

debate the fate of the Republic. Yves Bouthillier and Paul Baudouin

suggested putting Republican institutions to sleep until peacetime. Pétain

disposed of the emergency powers conferred on Édouard Daladier that

extended the mandate of the Chamber of Deputies to l942. No new elections

would be necessary. Dispersed and unpopular, the assemblies lacked the

means and the will to control the executive. Why not profit from the

situation to put an end to representative democracy? Pétain hesitated unsure

how to proceed, but Laval knew exactly what he wanted and how to get it.

He had already become indispensable to the new regime.238 The time had

come for him to get even with all those who had opposed his policy of

understanding with Italy at the time of the Ethiopian war, to destroy those

who had objected to his pacifism and his antidemocratic instincts. He was

resentful toward the Parliament that in 1936 had voted him out of power.

Laval said in conversation with Bauduoin and Bouthillier, “This parliament

has rejected [he used the expression vomir to vomit] me; it is my turn to

reject it.” Between June 25 and June 28 he convoked a number of deputies to

explain that the parliamentary regime had failed. It had led the country to

defeat and impotence. The task now was to find a government formula that

would reestablish order and authority. Further, to preserve French

independence, the conqueror had to be dealt with tactfully. His aim, Laval

proclaimed, was constitutional reform. The marshal should receive

exceptional constitutional powers, a move that implied an end to the existing

regime. Two weeks later Laval succeeded in carrying out his plan. The

president of the Republic having effaced himself, Laval convinced

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Parliament to confer, by an overwhelming vote, all powers on Marshal

Pétain. On July 10 the Parliament elected in 1936, the same one that had

brought the Popular Front to power, agreed to commit political suicide. What

an ignominious end!

Compelled to move again, the government chose Lyon as its

destination. The project was finally abandoned, though officially because of

inadequate facilities. The government, it was said, did not wish to duplicate

the Clermont-Ferrand experience. A contributing reason, however, was

Pétain’s open hostility toward the city mayor, Édouard Herriot, who as

president of the Chamber of Deputies had expressed himself in no uncertain

terms against the armistice. The large proportion of manual workers among

the population might have represented an added consideration: The

government did not care to find itself in the midst of an urban, potentially

restless, and unpredictable population. The choice finally fell on Vichy,

another watering station, with its numerous hotels clustered together to

provide comfortable and ample accomodations. On July 1 the government

departed Clermont-Ferrand for Vichy.

The Bordeaux interlude had come to a close.

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Conclusion

Poor France! What ruin. What a disaster --military, political, moral.

Why was France, in so critical a moments in history served so poorly by

those who had her charge? Why was she so unprepared for her self- assigned

task? Was it not as defender of democratic values and international morality

that she had opposed Nazi ambitions of world domination? And yet two

weeks in her long, illustrious history --the blink of an eye-- witnessed the

downfall of all France had stood for, of all she had represented to the rest of

the world. France, in Winston Churchill’s severe judgment, had been rotten

to the core, her vitality sapped by the memory of losses suffered during

World War I--of 1.5 million dead--and by an indifference to moral issues

raised by dictatorial ambitions. French people of all classes and all political

convictions had widely welcomed surrender to Hitler at Munich. France was

seeking security, not glory on the battlefield. Pacifism, ably exploited by

Adolph Hitler and Benito Mussolini, eroded her soul. The rationale for

declaring war had not been accepted widely in France. Why declare war?

The country had not been invaded, and Hitler had assured the West that the

conquest of Poland satisfied his territorial ambitions; now he wanted only to

live in peace with France and England. When war did erupt, France proved

unready. The High Command’s mentality had remained unchanged since

World War I: France would be fighting the same old war all over again, it

thought, with the same triumphant conclusion. Not so. The result was the

worst military disaster in France’s history.

Our judgment of the men in military and political power in France at

the time has been severe, perhaps too severe. They were the product of their

time, of the France of those years. Out of touch with reality, they had

227

become prisoners of a prevailing defeatist atmosphere. Most politicians were

the typical product of a parliamentary system that had collapsed under the

weight of events. President of the Republic Albert Lebrun, a man apparently

fearful of his own shadow, failed to provide the leadership the times

required. The first World War II premier, Édouard Daladier, might have been

adequate in peacetime, but not in war, not as the country’s mobilizer for the

supreme sacrifice. His successor, Paul Reynaud, spent the postwar years

coloring himself as the steel-willed leader of a France refusing to surrender

or to renege on her agreement with England. Although he behaved with

dignity during his imprisonment and deportation to Germany, his record as

head of the French government was mixed, to say the least. Pressures

brought to bear upon him proved more than an ordinary human being could

withstand, and the times called for someone extraordinary; at a decisive

moment he caved in. Caught in a suffocating atmosphere of intrigue and

treason, Reynaud gave up the struggle, thus opening the way to Marshal

Pétain. Too old, the presidents of the Parliament and the Senate, Édouard

Herriot and Jules Jeanneney, were bypassed by events and proved

insignificant. The best they could do was to express their “veneration” to

Pétain. Worse, the atmosphere prevailing at Bordeaux interfered with well-

balanced judgment. Fateful decisions were taken by the last government of

the Third Republic while everything around it was crumbling. Its ministers,

dispersed throughout the city were poorly interconnected and, thus isolated,

lacked the means of exerting authority. Shock, shame, poisoned politics,

incompetence, the refusal to face reality, all made a bad situation worse as

Bordeaux witnessed one of the worst chapters of French history--those two

packed weeks of mid-June 1940.

We know the political history of those two weeks through the

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reconstructed memory of participants whose remembrance was decisively

influenced by future events that could not, of course, have been anticipated.

On the basis of documents and reports by foreign diplomats, we can piece

together historytry to reinterpret with a hoped for measure of success. But

we cannot even attempt to know how people felt, their hopes, their fears, the

compromises. We can approach the period politically, not culturally. Beyond

the politicians there stood the country and the citizens that comprised it.

Beyond still there is a collective memory, which we can glimpse but not

penetrate. “The French” is an abstraction that refers to an immense variety of

regional traditions, dialects, trades, and political and cultural orientations.

Are “the French” represented by officers who celebrated the end of the

conflict with champagne and caviar, or by officers who cried in desperation

over the betrayal and the dishonor brought to their country? Who can speak

of the “mood” of the country at a time when all traditional values appeared

to be breaking down?

Unfortunately, we are almost entirely limited to the political side of

the events, because, unlike their cultural counterpart, they are verifiable,

referring as they do to specific conditions at a given period of time. But

when we shift from what was to what might have been, the end result is

mere speculation.

France might have stayed in the war, it was argued, had the

government moved to North Africa. How would the mass of the people have

reacted? It has been argued that this solution might have engendered a sense

of abandonment and betrayal, the people feeling abandoned and angry.

Perhaps so, but how are we to really know? What proof is there that a

substantial number of citizens would not have rejoiced at the knowledge that

France had not bent but had kept fighting? In the domain of popular feelings,

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theories can be advanced, assumptions made, but reality will inevitably

escape us.

Political assumptions, instead, represent a legitimate undertaking. We

can state for certain, for example, that had the government allowed the

whole of France to be occupied by the Germans--a situation that indeed

prevailed from December 1942 to August-September 1944--and had moved

with the fleet to North Africa, France’s position before the world and before

history would have been immeasurably enhanced. Dramatic results might

have followed. Italy might have been neutralized by the combined French

and British fleets and any Axis landings in North Africa prevented. Security

of U.S. convoys carrying arms to Britain, strengthened by the presence of

the French fleet, would have considerably increased. The war might have

been shortened by several months.

By transferring to North Africa, Reynaud and his government would

have played a significant role on the world scene, on condition of disposing

of the fleet. Without the fleet the Reynaud government would have been

powerless. But Pétain, who needed only to be convinced by Pierre Laval and

other “patriots” to establish a competing government somewhere in

unoccupied France, could count on the fleet’s fidelity to his person. The

naval forces would have obeyed Pétain and refused to leave for North

Africa.

This imaginary alternative did not take place. What we know for sure,

instead, is that with Pétain in power, the transition from Bordeaux to Vichy

became inevitable. Vichy followed as the natural consequence of Bordeaux,

and one cannot be understood without the other. Without Pétain there would

have been no Vichy. Pétain was the most directly responsible for a policy

leading to subjection to the Nazis, far more responsible than Pierre Laval

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and François Darlan, who derived their authority from him. With his

incomparable prestige Pétain led France down the road of shame and

dishonor.

The one certainty in people’s minds at the time was the evidence, fully

exploited by Bordeaux, of the country’s defeat. Nine million people had fled

the German advance, only to be overtaken by the enemy. Peasants for the

most part--a majority of the population at the time--they were attached to

their rural traditions, obedient to authority, devotedly Catholic. U.S.

reporters of the French exodus have paid tribute to the courage, the patience,

the dauntless spirit of the people on the road.239 We can assume that their

thoughts centered on homes abandoned: Did they still stand, or had they

been bombed or perhaps ransacked? When can we return? To see an end to

the suffering, the horror, was the overriding wish of that immense mass of

refugees. The spectacle of a once-proud army disintegrating, breaking down

into armed bands, without direction, often abandoned by its officers, added

poignancy to the situation. Said a disheartened soldier: “We’ve been led by

men with the hearts of rabbits.”240 The government’s diatribes about

honoring its word to an ally or abandoning the mainland to move to North

Africa might have appeared to the mass of the refugees as exercises

unconnected with reality. To them, the only reality was getting back home.

No other people except the Belgians, who had converged on France by the

thousands, shared the experiences. Although other countries had been

subjected and enslaved, their people did not have to move. Thus, the French

experience was in a sense unique and infinitely complex.

Paris could be France; Bordeaux could not. The city appeared

somnolent, lazy, almost indifferent. Having hosted hordes of refugees, it

now anxiously wished to be rid of them. A prosperous middle class had little

231

sympathy for strangers upsetting its traditional way of life. It failed to share

the concerns of the displaced masses on the roads of France, that terrified

humanity. The city mayor, Adrien Marquet, a Laval ally, championed the “it

is time to put an end to it all” syndrome. City Hall had become a hub of

conspirators dedicated to rebuilding France according to their own

obscurantist views. The local administration and the police followed in their

mayor’s footsteps. Such a defeatist atmosphere could not foster radical

decision-making by a government isolated and increasingly powerless.

The way opened for a takeover by people out of tune with traditional

French values. In the disaster that befell France they found a long-sought

chance to destroy the hated liberal, anticlerical Republic and to reshape its

institutions according to their own vision. Although welcoming Nazi

Germany’s cooperation in realizing their project, they were not all

necessarily pro-Nazi--some were even anti-German, as Pétain probably was.

But for Germany to become an instrument of their ambitions, Great Britain

had first to be turned into an antagonist. It therefore became necessary for

the government born of defeat to cast off Great Britain as a condition for

adopting Germany. Within two weeks the ally became an adversary and the

enemy became the instrument for pursuit of policies from which France has

not fully recovered to this day.

France’s collapse brought to power an 85-year-old marshal, Philippe

Pétain, who enjoyed playing the role of monarch; a Pierre Laval, sure his

hour had arrived, seeking revenge on those who had obstructed his policies;

a François Darlan, megalomaniacal and unprincipled; the military, embodied

in Maxime Weygand, endeavoring to save whatever could be saved of its

past influence and refusing to assume any responsibility for a military

disaster of historical proportions; a whole political and economic class--

232

conservative, often monarchist, clerical, and anti-Republican -- in the past

kept on the sidelines and now becoming key players in the new regime; and

the ever present “patriots” and “nationalists” preaching understanding for the

dictators’ ideologies and whipping up anti-British and anti-Semitic

sentiment.

Of the nine European countries at war with Hitler France alone came

to terms with the enemy. 241 And whereas Pétain’s accession to power at

Bordeaux had been legal, Vichy was not. Yet the Vichy government

managed to confuse the French with its soporific influence, its pretense of

protecting the people, stymieing at the same time popular acts of revolt.

Caught in a political storm, with confidence only in an old marshal who

could do no wrong, the French people had but one concern: to survive.

Charles de Gaulle wrote in his Memoirs that as the invasion of Europe

neared, 200,000 men and women had joined the Resistance. Out of a total of

40 million inhabitants, that represented .05 percent of the total French

population. After the war some 150,000 French men and women were

investigated for acts of collaboration with the enemy, roughly another .05

percent. In other words, 99 percent of French men and women had been

neither resisters nor collaborators, and this despite tenacious legends about

the people rising as one body to chase out the invader or, at the other

extreme, a people willingly or unwillingly supporting and abetting the

German war effort. Neither legend corresponds to reality; yet Vichy and later

total German occupation have left traces that France will not easily efface.

As Philippe Burrin has shown, in 1942 the pro-Vichy and pro-German

press reached between 1 million and 2 millions readers; 40,000 French wore

the German uniform; at the end of 1943 there were still 40,000-50,000

collaborators; in June 1944 some 25,000 to 30,000 people were actively

233

engaged on the side of the occupier. 242 These figures, relatively modest in

proportion to the total population, do not tell the whole story, however.

Including war prisoners and young people forced to work in the Reich over

400,000 people were working directly for the Germans by 1944 specifically

266,000 toiled in France and 131,400 in Germany--37 percent of the male

population between the ages of 16 and 60. Daily contacts with the ever

present enemy implied adaptation that influenced countless lives. The

population’s simply strove to make the best of a bad situation, even if that

implied compromising one’s conscience. The black market, the intimacies of

a great number of French women with German officers and soldiers, an orgy

of denunciations, probably more extensive in France than elsewhere in

Europe, widespread corruption--these, too, were adaptations to the German

presence. Most French men and women cared little for the Germans, but the

Germans meant to stay, perhaps for a very long time. France had to adapt to

the enemy and did so without too much difficulty. Had the Germans been

less narrow minded and cruel in their treatment of occupied countries,

adaptation might easily have evolved into a warmer relationship. Germans

cared only for domination, however, not friendship. To the Germans

collaboration meant France’s blind obedience to Berlin’s diktats. Such

collaboration was probably less extensive in France than elsewhere,

especially occupied countries with a Germanic background. Only in France,

however, did collaboration become an official government policy.

Both Vichy and Charles de Gaulle welcomed as salutary the end of the

Third Republic, decreed by Pétain shortly after leaving Bordeaux.

Tomorrow’s France must have no resemblance whatever, they both held, to

the regime just deceased. Paul Claudel, the distinguished poet and France’s

ambassador to Washington at the beginning of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s

234

first term, had left for Algiers thinking the war would continue. Shocked at

first at the “horrifying and shameful” armistice conditions, he found comfort

in events at Vichy: “My consolation,” he wrote, “is to witness the end of that

loathsome parliamentary regime which has for years devoured France like a

generalized cancer. The Popular Front, the CGT [General Confederation of

Labor], the parades with clenched firsts, the petitions signed by both

Communists and Catholics, the detestable tyranny of bistros, freemasons,

half castes, schoolteachers; all that is finished. At least let’s hope so.” An

early admirer of Pétain, to whom he dedicated a poem, he too became a

“Gaullist of the first hour.”

Was this harsh generalized sentiment fair? What was worth rejecting

of the Third Republic’s seventy years (1870-1940) was certainly not its

whole existence but the manner of its demise. As it sank into oblivion, the

Third Republic no longer represented a past whose eminence was worth

recalling, an eminence not to be denigrated. Just think of the great writers it

produced--the aging Victor Hugo, Emile Zola, Marcel Proust, Anatole

France, Jules Verne, Pierre Loti, André Gide, Paul Valery to name a few. The

Impressionist painters --Claude Monet, Edgar Degas, Vincent Van Gogh,

Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec, Paul Gaugin, Édouard Manet, Auguste Renoir,

Paul Cézannes--and a number of art schools, as well as two styles of art --

Deco and Nouveau--that deeply influenced an age. Great composers, too,

left their mark: Claude Debussy, Maurice Ravel, Gabriel Fauré, and Eric

Satie. And how to forget that respected American writers had found in post-

World War I Paris a more congenial atmosphere to creativity than the one

left behind in the United States. Great names in American photography also

found inspiration in France, some photographers debuting their career there.

During the trying period of World War I, distinguished statesmen such as

235

Georges Clemenceau and Raymond Poincaré guided France, and great

generals such as Ferdinand Foch, Joseph Joffre, and Philippe Pétain inspired

her.

As The New York Times editorialized: ”Within the framework of the

Third Republic...there lived and flourished a civilization so brilliant, so

humane, so gracious and beautiful, that mankind will be in its debt forever.

The political leaders, good and bad, did not make the France of the Third

Republic years. When free men look back upon this Republic they will

remember, instead, the artists and thinkers, the poets and musicians and

scientists who made France during those years a temple of the Western

spirit.” 243

Efforts to debunk a period that marked French history comprised a

prelude to the de Gaulle myth of a new beginning of “gloire” and

“grandeur.” The postwar governments declared the Vichy period “null and

void,” a simple empty space between two Republican regimes. On August

1945, from City Hall in Paris at last freed of the German yoke, de Gaulle

proclaimed: “Vichy always was and remains null and nonexistent.” De

Gaulle’s successors to the presidency of the Republic, Georges Pompidou

and François Mitterand, endeavored to treat Vichy and collaboration as banal

incidents not worth recalling. Pompidou wrote:

France cannot and must not deny the fact that during 1940-44 she was to a large extent favorable to Marshal Pétain. The crowds that applauded de Gaulle beginning in the summer of 1944 were the same that had applauded Pétain the preceding spring. I remember a remark General de Gaulle made upon his return from Nancy, where he had been enthusiastically greeted on the Place Stanislas. He showed me a photo of the Marshal on the balcony of the same place before an enthusiastic crowd. He said to me: “Make no mistake, the people are the same.” The truth is that in both cases the people demonstrated the same sentiment: hostility before the enemy and confidence in the leader who protected them.244

236

He wrote further: “The true heroes, those who voluntarily and deliberately

took all the risks without hesitating, are quite few, just as rare as the

conscious and resolute traitors.” This view prevailed as successive

government told the French people: Heroes and traitors were but a handful;

they had best be forgotten.

Only in 1997, more than 50 years after the war’s end, when the Shoah

revealed in all its horror the kind of regime with which Vichy collaborated,

had a president of the Republic the courage to recognize France’s role in the

most shameful episodes in its recent history. For the first time France

accepted responsibility for the arrest by the French police of over 10,000

Parisian Jews turned over to the Gestapo for deportation to concentration

camps. For the first time, too, the Catholic Church of France recognized its

responsibility in the Jewish drama by offering apologies for its hierarchy’s

unconditional support for the Pétain regime. Bishops and cardinals, with few

exceptions, had lauded the marshal as God-sent to save France. Their

attitude had contributed to France’s widespread indifference to racial laws

and anti-Semitism. Only early in 1942, when Jews were callously torn from

their homes and herded into freight trains for unknown destinations, did the

French become aware that something inhuman was underfoot. Lower clergy

often committed acts of remarkable courage in shielding Jews, especially

children, from government and Nazi persecutions. If proportionally more

Jews were saved in France than in other occupied countries, the merit rests

with a population that could not tolerate the persecution of innocent men,

women, children treated worse than animals. Humanity outstripped latent

racism and anti-Semitism.

In recent years the French have shown themselves unafraid to

237

confront a shameful past. Youth especially want to know the truth, where the

responsibilities lay. Pious deceptions of the past no longer satisfy them. The

Gaullist notion that the period was characterized by a handful of traitors,

traitors among a mass of heroic French duly punished after the liberation, is

no longer credible, especially among generations born after World War II.

The French people have proved eager to know more about that “nonexistent”

period in their history. The story of Vichy and collaboration, and of the

activities of Vichy exponents, draws attention today through a profusion of

books about that period, whereas previously attention most exclusively

focused on Charles de Gaulle, the Free French, and the exploits of the

Resistance. Certain truths once buried under Gaullist rhetoric have since

emerged. De Gaulle pretended France had won the war--a patent untruth. All

prime ministers serving under de Gaulle had served in government during

the Vichy and occupation periods. Perhaps in an effort to reconcile the

nation, de Gaulle decreed services rendered to the Resistance sufficient to

efface the past. Many French today see things in a different light.

Bordeaux and Vichy have left many French men and women uneasy,

and the impact of that experience remains very much alive. Attitudes that

helped produce that turbulent period in history are now reflected in popular

political movements such as the National Front, supported by several million

voters at election time. Many French people, perhaps a majority, still find

excuses for Pétain, considering he did his best under adverse circumstances.

His need to ask for an armistice remains excused: France had no other

choice. At the postwar Pétain trial the armistice did not figure among the

most serious accusations, much to the chagrin of de Gaulle who always

considered Pétain’s request for terms of armistice and peace the one blot on

France’s honor.

238

239

1Notes

Introduction: The Spawn of Defeat

Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, II, Their Finest Hour, Boston , 1949, 42. Reynaud quite understandably gave a more moderate version of the telephone exchange, but given the state of dejection of the French leaders at the time, Churchill sounds more convincing.2 Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and Claude Huan, Darlan, Paris, 1989, 214-15.3 Churchill papers, 4/44. Ismay was the head of Churchill’s Defense Office.4 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 49.5 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 42.6The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, New York, 1948, I, 767.7 Ibid., 768-69.8 Jean Daridan, Le chemin de la defaite, Paris, 1980, 216-17.9 According to Dominique Leca, La rupture de 1940, Paris, 1978, 149, the ambassador related the message to two Reynaud collaborators, Margerie and Devaux, who then referred to the premier.10 Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, London, 1970, 203-204.11 Général Beaufre, Le drame de 1940, Paris, 1965, 269.12 Ibid., 250.13 Philippe Masson, De la mer et de sa strategie, Paris, 1986, 159.14 Speech to the House of Commons, 18 June.15 Churchill papers, 4/44.16 Philippe Richer, La drôle de guerre des Français, Paris, 1990, 247-56, 262.17 testimony at the Riom inquiry, June 15, 1942.18 As quoted in Orville H. Bullitt, ed.,For the President, Boston, 1972, 422-24.19 Bullitt, For the President, 402.20 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, L’abîme 1939-1945, Paris, 1982, 118-19.21 Pertinax, Les Fossoyeurs, New York, 1943, 221; Duroselle, L’abîme, 104.22 André Maurois, Why France Fell, London, 1941, 68-69.23 Philippe Bourdrel, La Cagoule, Paris, 1970, 242.24 The Churchill War Papers, II, 201.25 Daridan, Le chemin de la defaite, 217. My translation.26 Bullitt, For the President, 450-51.27 Ibid., 481-87.28 NA 740.0011 EW 1939.29 Couteau-Bégarie and Claude Huan, Darlan, Paris, 1989, 218.30 Jules Jeaneney, Journal Politique, Paris, 1972, 55.31 Quoted in Francois Delpla, La ruse nazie, Paris, 1997,234.32 Lettres, notes et carnets,1980, 497.33 Paul Baudouin, Neuf mois au Gouvernement, 50; see also Dominique Leca, La Rupture de 1940, Paris, 1978, 32.34 Jean Lacouture, Charles de Gaulle, I, Paris, 1984, 327.35 Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, I, The Call to Honour, London, 1955, 60-61.36 De Gaulle, War Memoirs, I, 63.37 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 159.38 Ministere des Affaires Etrangers, Papiers 1940, Papiers Dejean, 5.39 Fondation Nationale de Science Politiques, Archives Édouard Daladier, 3 DA 10, sdr a., as quoted in Daridan, Le Chemin de la Defaite, 232.40 André Truchet, L’Armistice de 1940 et l’Afrique du Nord, Paris, 1955, passim. The author provides a number of documents to justify his thesis that France could have continued the war in North Africa.

Chapter One: The Flight41 CNA MG 32 A2, Volume 12, File 22.

42 Fo 371/24 311; C7541/65/17.43 dated June 13th.44 Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs I, The Call to Honor,, London, 1955, 69.45 Le Bulletin des Lettres, Lyon, October 15, 1948.46 The admiral recalled the episode in a letter addressed to Pétain in October 1942. Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and Claude Huan, Darlan, Paris, 1989, 234.47 Général Beaufre, Le drame de 1940, Paris, 1965, 262.48 Cabinet papers, 99/3.49 The Reckoning, 116.50 Philippe Barrès, Charles de Gaulle, Paris, 1944, 77-78. The book had originally been published in New York in 1941.51 Colonel Hollis as quoted in Martin Gilbert, Finest Hour, London, 1983, 527.52Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 181.53 Biddle to Secretary of State, 740.0011 EW 1939.54 The French “were vexed that I and my collegues had not come there [to Cangé] to join them. We should have been very willing to do so, no matter how late we had to fly home. But we were never invited; nor did we know there was to be a French Cabinet meeting.” Churchill, Their Finest Hour,183.55 Churchill papers, 4/155.56 NA 740.0011 EW 1939.57 De Gaulle, War Memoirs, I, 76-77.58 AN Papiers Reynaud, 74 AP 22.59 Letters, note, etc 503.

Chapter Two: Collapse60 Blum Memoires, 45-46, June 9th, 1940.61 June 15.62 Edward Spears, The Fall of France, London, 1954, II, 239.63 Paul Baudouin, Neuf mois au Gouvernment, Paris, 1948, .166.64 Blum in 1946 before the Commission parlamentaire d’enquête, CEP, I, 260.65 September 1940.66 No Ordinary Times, New York, 1995, 103.67 The Nation, July 6.68 Associated Press, March 24, 1995. On March 1995 Portugal dedicated a plaque to its “greatest hero of World War II.” President Mario Soares extolled his sacrifice. In 1967, the government of Israel planted a tree in Sousa Mendes’s honor on Jerusalem’s Avenue of the Righteous.69 Julien Green, La fin d’un monde, Juin 1940, Paris, 1992, 48.70 The Fall of France, II, 253, 260.71 Ibid., p.54.72 Ibid., p.73.73 Doris Kearns Goodwin, No Ordinary Time, 175.74 Arthur Koestler, Scum of the Earth, London, 1991, passim. [First published in 1941.]75 Henri Jaspar, “L’apôtre de la défaite” in Evening Standard, September 27, 1940, as reproduced in Benoist-Mechin, Soixante jours qui ébranlèrent l’occident, Paris, 1956, 347-48.76 J. Gerard-Libois and Jose Gotovitch, L’an 40: La Belgique occupée, Brussels, 1971, passim;. Maurice Schuman, Un certain 18 juin, Paris, 1980, 98.77 Otakar Hajek, D’Agde à Dunkerque ou la part prise par les tchéques à la défense et à la libération de la France.78 Paul Baudouin, Neuf mois au Gouvernement, p.15.79 Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For the President, Boston, 1972, .452-53.80 Daridal, Le chemin de la defaite, 233.81 All quotes in Jean-Louis Crémieux-Bilhac, Les français de l’an 40, Paris, 1990, 599.82 Roosevelt to Churchill, June 14.83 Spears, The Fall of France, II, . 243.84 Campbell to Lord Halifax, FO 371/24 311; C 7541/65/17.85 Pétain trial, July 25, 1945.86 May 25 meeting of War Committee. Document captured by the Germans and published by them.87 Saved were 136,000 British troops, 310 guns, and 15,000 Polish troops.88 Herve Coutau-Bégarie and Caude Huan, Mers el-kebir, Paris, 1949, 170.89 Paul Baudouin, Neuf mois au gouvernement,.170.90 Ciechanowski, La rançon de la victoire, as quoted in Benoist-Mechin, Soixante jours qui ébranlèrent l’Occident, Paris,

1956, II, .211-12.91 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Papiers Reynaud, Volume 6.92 June 16 telegram from Biddle.93 Général de Villelume, Journal d’une défaite, Paris, 1976, 426.94 Our Vichy Gamble, New York, 1947, .35.95 Edward Spears, The Fall of France, II, .259.96 Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs: The Call to Honor, London, l955, 79.

Chapter Three: Dangerous Waters97 For a moving account of the tragedies that accompanied the military defeat see: Henri Amouroux, Le 18 Juin 1940, Paris, 1964, passim. I am indebted to this book for a number of quotes. 98 Spears, The Fall of France, II, 280.99 Jules Jeanneney,Journal Politique, Paris, 1972, 71.100 At his postwar trial, Pétain admitted that he had signed by not written the letter. It was thought at the time that Laval might have been the author. 101 William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, New York, 1945, 35.

102 The text of the proposed joint declaration was as follows:

DECLARATION OF UNION

At this most fateful moment in the history of the modern world, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the French Republic make this declaration of indissoluble union and unyielding resolution in their common defense of justice and freedom against the subjection to a system which reduces mankind to a life of robots and slaves.

The two Governments declare that France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union.

The constitution of the Union will provide for joint organs of defense, foreign, financial, and economic policies.Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain; every British subject will become a

citizen of France.Both countries will share responsibility for the repair of the devastation

of war, wherever it occurs in their territories, and the resources of both shall be equally, and as one, applied to the purpose.During the war there shall be a single War Cabinet, and all the forces of Britain and France, whether on land, sea or

in the air, will be placed under its direction. It will govern from wherever it best can. The two Parliaments will be formally associated. The nations of the British Empire are already forming new armies. France will keep her available forces in the field, on the sea, and in the air. The Union appeals to the United States to fortify the economic resources of the Allies, and to bring her powerful material aid to the common cause.

The Union will concentrate its whole energy against the power of the enemy, no matter where the battle may be.And we shall conquer.

103 John Colville, The Fringes of Power, New York, 1986, 158.104 Ibid., 160.105 According to Coutau-Bégarie and Huan (Mers El-Kebir, 41) the order for the boat to reach Halifax came from the French naval attache in Washington. They provide documents to prove their point.106 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, II, Their Finest Hour, Boston, 1949, 211-12.107 Spears, The Fall of France, II, 300.108 After the war several participants have disputed this conclusion and maintained that had a vote been taken, those supporting Reynaud’s position were in a majority. See in particular Charles Pomaret, Le Dernier Témoin, Paris, 1968, 58-65.109 F. Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois Tragiques aux Affaires Etrangères, Paris, 1949, 50.110 NA 740.00119 EW 1939/344 Confidential file.111 The text was later modified to read “We must attempt to cease.” This is the version that has appeared in the press.112 Philippe Burrin, La France a l’heure Allemande, 1995, 37.113 Philippe Simonnot, “La filière espagnole,” in Le secret de l’armistice, Paris, 1990.114 Spears, The Fall of France, II, 311-13.115 De Gaulle, War Memoirs, I, 86.

Chapter Four: Pétain Crowned116 Daniel Cordier, Jean Moulin, III, Paris, 1993, 978;1107-15.117 Maxime Weygand, Mémoires, III, Rappelé au Service, Paris, 1950, 298-99.118 Charles Pomaret, Le Dernier Témoin, Paris, 1968, 254.

119 Ibid., 148-57.120 L’Italie telle que je l’ai vue, Paris, 1946, 205.121 Ibid., 204.122 Albert Lebrun, Témoignage, Paris, 1945, 87.123 Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, I, 291. Woodward gives a full account of developments on June 17th.124 “General Weygand later spoke to me of this message in terms of great indignation saying he did not admit that anyone should use such language to him,” Ambassador Campbell wrote.125 The message transmitted by the Spanish government to the Germans contained the following passage: “The French governnment requests the Spanish government to forward to Germany the request for a cessation of hostilities and to inform it of the peace conditions proposed by Germany.”Documents in German Foreign Policy, series D, vol. IX, doc. 459. On June 17 Darlan, using the navy code, informed the empire: “The military and civil situation has led the government to ask our enemies for an honorable peace.”126 Édouard Herriot, Episones: 1940-1944, Paris, 1950, 82.127 The note to the Vatican requesting that the Italian Government be informed of the note transmitted through Spain to Germany concludes with these words: ”It [the French Government] also requests that the Italian Government should be informed of its desire to seek the foundation for a durable peace between the two countries.”128 Italian staff report, June 18, 1940, quoted in Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, 49.129 Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, London, 1948, 376.130 Ibid., 373.131 Reymond Aron, De l’armistice à l’insurrection nationale, Paris, 1945.132 June 18 to Seceatary of State, 740.001 EW 1939/269 1 -6/7.133 Dominique Leca, La Rupture de 1940, Paris, 1978, 243-44.134 Pétain’s trial, July 24, 1945.135 June 19, 701.5111/671.136 NA 701.5111/671 The next day, Biddle informed the President: “Reynaud is deeply touched by your personal message and assks me to convey to you an expression of his profound appreciation. He is happy thus to learn that you are aware of his fight to continue resistance.”137 Neuf Mois au Gouvernment, 196.138 Biddle to Secretary of State, June 24. NA 701.5111/673.139 June 28.140Chapter Five: Traitors or Heroes

Jeanneney, Journal politique, 79.141 Lebrun, Témoignage, 88.142 Herriot, Episodes, 85.143 Chautemps, Cahiers secrets, 192-93.144 Robert Aron, Histoire de Vichy: 1940-1944, Paris, 1954, 64.145 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 225-26.146 Maurice Schumann, Un certain 18 juin, Paris, 1980, 128-29.147 Navy Archives: Sec Nav/CHD Confidential corresp. 1940-41 A8-2/EF28 Box 32.148 Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and Claude Huan, eds., lettres et notes de l’Amiral Darlan, Paris, 1992, 188.149 Baudouin, Neuf Mois au Gouvernement, 190.150 Coutau-Bégarie and Huan, Darlan, 267-68. 151 Campbell’s dispatch to Foreign Office, FO 371/24 311.152 National Archives of Canada, MG 32 Volume 12, file 12-27.153 Aron, Histoire de Vichy, 69-71.154 Herriot, Episodes, 103-5.155 Jean Montigny, a Laval ally, gave a version of the encounter that is generally credited to be correct in Toute la Verité sur un Mois Dramatique de notre Histoire, Clermont-Ferrand, 1940, 25-30. See also Édouard Barthe, La Ténébreuse Affaire du “Massilia,” Paris, 1945, passim.156 There are several versions of this debate but they all say substantially the same thing: Jean Montigny, Toute la verité sur un mois dramatique de notre histoire, 25-30; Aron, Histoire de Vichy, 72-73; Lebrun, Temoignage, 91-93. Montigny probably witnessed the scene.157 Baudouin, Neuf mois au gouvernement, 195.158 Telegram from Biddle, June 21.159 Both dispatches dated June 21.

160 See in particular the well documented analysis by André Truchet in L’Armistice de 1940 et l’Afrique du Nord, Paris, 1955.161 Henry Michel La Défaite de la France, Paris, 1980, 121.162 Cautau-Bégarie and Huan, Mers-el-Kebir, 59-62; André Truchet, L’Armistice de 1940 et L’Afrique du Nord, Paris, 1955, passim; Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois Tragiques, 64-72.163 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 221-223.164 December 30, 1941. Churchill, III, 601-2.165 Born of a Jewish father and a Protestant mother, Zay was baptized and raised as a Protestant. His wife and children were also Protestants. He was accused of desertion during a trumped-up trial before a military tribunal and condemned to a life of forced labor. Vichy thus took its revenge against a brilliant young deputy who had served as a minister during the Popular Front and advocated France’s assistance to the Republicans at the time of the Spanish Civil War. See “L’Affaire Jean Zay,” in Pomaret, Le Dernier Témoin, 222-238.166 Pierre Mendes France, Liberté, liberté chérie, Paris, 1977, 59-84.167 This and the following section is based on Christine Rimbaud, L’affaire du Massilia, Paris, 1984, 138-186.168 Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, London, 1953, 282.169 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 220.170 Ibid., 283.171 Ibid.172 Ibid. 221.173 Algeria was considered an integral part of France administered by a governor general; Tunisia and Morocco, being protectorates, depended on the minister of foreign affairs, who administered them through residents general.174 Pierre Mendès France, Liberté, liberté chérie, 57.175 Speech delivered June 27.

176177Chapter Six: A Fleet in Balance178 Conversations between Saint-Quintin and Cordell Hull: “I did not have the impression that he [Hull] considered France guilty of having ceased a resistance that the American High Command deemed useless since May 16 and to which the President, at the end of the month, no longer believed.” French Foreign Ministry, Papiers 1940, Bureau d’etudes J. Chauvel, 202, June 30.179 Mario Rossi, Roosevelt and the French, Westport, 1993, 39.180 The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, III, Salvation, New York, 1960, 92-93.181 Ministere des Relations Exterieures , Archives Diplomatiques, Serie Papiers 1940, No. 26.182 319 bis.183 Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, New York, 1944, pp. 150, 155-56.184 Memo of conversation, June 27.185 The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, I, New York, 1948, 848.186 Ibid., 850.187 An Italian staff report for June 18 makes the same points, but also quotes Hitler as saying: “Furthermore, it seems wise to leave France the hope of regaining her fleet once peace has been made. Once England has been defeated and we come to the making of the peace, we shall see.” See Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, 49.188National Archives of Canada (henceforward NAC), MG 32 A2 volume 12, file 23.189 FO 371/24 311.190 Ibid.191 The account of that hectic June 22 owes much to a memoir by Colin Bain-Marais; NAC MG 32 A2, volume 12, file 23, Departure from France.192National Archives, Washington (henceforward NA), 651.01.193 Telegrams. June 22, 24.194 U.S. Navy Archives, Intelligence Division , Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1 July 1940.195 Charles-Roux, Cinque mois tragiques, 89.196 NAC MG 32 A2, volume 12, file 23.197 Ibid.198 NAC MG 32 A2, Volume 13, File 13.199 NAC MG 32 A2 Volume 12, file 22.200 NAC 32 , volume 12, file 13. In a conversation with the French charge d’affaires on July 15, Vanier expressed an interest in the maintenance of relations between the British Empire and France (Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Campbell, W 8915/596/68).201 NAC MG 26, J13, file T149.202 The Times of London, June 28.

203 June 23.204 Washington felt the time had come for Biddle also to take his leave: “Your designation as representative near the French Government was for the emergency period during the time the French Government was separated from the capital by military ncessity. The President now desires that you proceed to Bilbao or some other points in Spain until such time as you may find it possible to arrange safe transportation to England in order to resume your post near the Polish Government.” Signed: Hull. The next day, June 25, Biddle informed the French foreign minister of the termination of his mission. NA 123 Biddle, Anthony J.D./236.205 Biddle to Secretary of State: “Laval who has just been made Vice President of the Council of Ministers, whom I saw this morning [June 24] at his request could not restrain his idignation against the Churchill government.” NA 740.0011 European War 741.51.206 For the text of the message see Paul Reynaud, Au Coeur de la Melée, Paris, 1961, 888.207 The Churchill War Papers, II, 405. According to Biddle, Reynaud spoke to Churchill on the phone on the 23rd: “Reynaud told me this afternoon [June 24] that at Marshal Pétain’s request he had talked to Churchill on the telephone yesterday afternoon to protest against the radio address in the strongest terms. He had given Churchill, however, renewed pledges which he first obtained from Darlan and Pétain that the French fleet would not fall into German hands. The fact that this appeal for moderation was in effect answered by last night’s announcement of recognition of General de Gaulle’s National Committee as the only sovereign authority of France seems eloquent proof of the value that the British at least attach to the solemn promises.” NA 740.0011 European War 741, 51.208 Cabinet papers, 65/7 and 65/13.209 Colville, The Fringes of Power, 171.210 NA 740.00119 EW 1939/398.

Chapter Seven: The Last Act: Between Resistance and Surrender211 Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, I, London, 1955, 89.212 François Delpla, Churchill et les Français, Paris, 1993, 784-87.213 Telegram No. 10.978D.214 Telegram No. 20/3P.215 Weygand, Memoires, III, Paris 1950, 331-33.216 A titre personnel, Telegram No. 1.100.217 24 June.218 Churchill papers, 20/13.219 La Petite Gironde, June 25.220 De Gaulle, War Memoirs, I, 89-90.221 In a letter dated 6 September 1940 from prison to the marshal, Reynaud confirmed that Pétain had asked him to release a communique to the press to deny a British information concerning his reputed intention of forming a government in London. He ended the letter with these words: “I conclude by giving you the assurance that I preserve for the winner of Verdun the sentiments of admiration and gratitude that all Frenchmen feel toward you.”222 New York Times, June 25.223 As quoted in Jean Vidalenc, L”Exode de Mai-Juin 1940, Paris, 1957, 361. The author gives several other examples of the same tenor.224 June 21.225 broadcast July 14.226 The point has been brilliantly explained by Stanley Hofmann in “Aspects du régime de Vichy,” Revue Française de science politique VI:i (1955).227 To Secretary of State, 740.00119 European War 1939/425.228 New York Times, June 28, 1940 (cable delayed).229 Martin Gilbert, Finest Hour. Winston S. Churchill 1939-1941, London, 1984, 604.230 Benoist-Méchin, Soixante Jours qui Ebranlerent l’Occident, III, Paris, 1956, 25-26.231 June 27.232 Hull, Memoirs, I, 795-96.233 Baudouin, Neuf mois au gouvernement, 217.234 Statement at the Pétain trial, audience of 27 July, 1945.235 Charles-Roux’s testimony at the Pétain trial, 27 july 1945.236 June 30.237 Cinq mois tragiques, 108.238 Fred Kupferman, Laval, Paris, 1987, 227-28.

Conclusion239 The New York Times, June 21.240 Life, July 8, 1940, p.23.241 Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium, besides France.242 Philippe Burrin, La France à l’heure Allemande, Paris, 1995, passim.243 June 23.244 Pour rétablir une vérité, Paris. 1982, 30-31.