the emergence of the foreign policy of the russian federation

MARK WEBBER

The Emergence of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

In a recent state-of-the-discipline article, John Lewis Gaddis highlighted the failure of scholars of International Relations to foresee the end of the Cold War.’ A similar, no less painful, observation has been made of the inability of those engaged in Soviet Studies to anticipate the collapse of the USSR.2 Any attempt to understand the origins of these transformations has, however, been swiftly overshadowed by the urgent need to outline and evaluate their consequences. This paper seeks to make a modest contribution to this task by providing an analysis of Russian foreign policy; a policy whose orientation, and indeed very existence, is predicated on the demise of the Cold War and the end of Soviet power.

Defining Russian Foreign Policy

In analysing the foreign policy of contemporary Russia, a number of definitional issues need first to be clarified. The turbulence of the Soviet Union, particularly in the two years prior to its formal dissolution in late 1991, and the accompanying quest for sovereignty, and latterly independence, by its constituent Union republics was reflected in an increasingly active international profile by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).3 A first question concerns to what extent can this be regarded as “foreign policy. 77” The RSFSR’s relations with its fellow Union republics poses a second question. At what point can these be regarded not as inter-republican relations within a single state (the USSR) but rather as relations between sovereign, independent states? To provide some form of answer to these questions requires a brief foray into general international relations literature.

It is an axiom of the study and conduct of international relations that the activity of foreign policy is the preserve of the state. Within the academic disciplines this holds true of both the more state-centric interpretations of realism and neo- realism and competing paradigms such as those of structuralism and pluralism.4 These do, of course, place differing emphases upon the importance of the state.

I. John Lewis. Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and thr End or the Cold War,” Internatzunal Serurily, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93).

2. Michael Malia, “From Under the Rubble, What?” Problemr of Cimmunirnr, Vol. 41, No. I-2

(January-April 1992). 3. The RSFSR’s Supreme Soviet voted in December, 1991, to adopt the new name of the Russian

Fcdcration (Russia). For the sake of brevity I will use “Russia” when referring to the post-Soviet period.

“RSFSR” will be used Ibr the Soviet period in allusion to Russia’s status as a constiturnt Union rrpub- lit of’ the USSR.

4. These paradigms are derived from Micharl Banks, “The Inter-Paradigm Debate,” in Margot Light

and A.J.R. Groom, eds, International Relations. A Handbook oJCurrent Theory (London: Franccs Pinter, 1985).

Co.\rbivs~~r ANI) POS?‘-CO~ILIUNIS~‘ Su_ucs, VOI.. 26, No. 3, %Tll:MBEK 1993, 243-263

0967-067x/93/03/0243-21 0 1993 The Regents of the University of’ California

244 COMMUKIST fir) POST-COMMU~YIST STUDIES

The pluralist view, for example, regards non-state actors as crucial participants in international affairs. However, while multinational corporations, transnational pressure groups, and institutions such as the United Nations (UN) may be seen as exerting considerable influence, their activities are not conceived as equating to a foreign policy as such. The same is also held to apply to constituent units (LBnder, Union republics, cantons etc.) of federated nations, in reference to whom the term foreign policy is avoided in describing often extensive international activities.” Foreign policy, rather, is defined typically as “the range of actions taken by varying sections of the government of a state in its relations with other bodies similarly acting on the international stage.“b

In this light, a definition of the state would seem appropriate. The discipline of international relations has largely avoided the debates on this concept rife in political science.’ Conceptualizations tend to reflect the nostrums of international law and, to a certain degree, an acceptance of Weberian analysis. The unique charac- teristics of the state are commonly seen to include a population, a clearly delin- eated territory, and a government possessing sovereignty (i.e., a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within its frontiers). These qualities moreover are given an external significance by the authority accorded to the state in representing national interests outside of its borders and in mediating the encroachments of external agencies. Such functions are, in turn, premised upon an acceptance of a particular state both by others and as a subject of international law. Statehood within the international community thus depends crucially upon diplomatic recognition, membership of institutions (above all, the UN) and adherence to bilateral and multilateral treaties.” If the existence of statehood is a prerequisite of the conduct of foreign policy, for it to have practical meaning, an awareness of objectives is essential. While these may not be clearly defined, ranked, or even actively pursued, states can nonetheless be regarded as holding common concerns. Holsti, for example, refers to the promotion of security, welfare, autonomy, and status.”

In light of the above exploration, several dates are of significance in pinpointing the birth of contemporary Russian foreign policy. June, 1990, for example, marked the adoption of a declaration on “State Sovereignty,” conceived as “a natural and necessary condition for the existence of the statehood of Russia.“‘O As detailed

5. Panayotis Soldatos, “An Explanatory Framework for the Study of Federated States as Forcign-

Policy Actors, ” in Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos, eds, Federalim and International Relations. The Role ofSubnationa1 Units (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 35.

6. P.A. Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations (London: Longman, 1971), p. 36 (emphasis

added).

7. This neglect is noted in Fred Halliday, “State and Society in International Relations,” in Micharl

Banks and Martin Shaw, cds, State and .Socieg in International Relations (New York: Harvester Wheatshcaf,

1991), pp. 193-194. 8. Brian Hocking and Michael Smith, World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations (New York:

Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp. 41-48, 59. Antonio Cassesc, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford:

Clarcndon Press, 1988), pp. 78-79. Th c absence of these attributes of internationally-recognized statc-

hood does not necessarily preclude the pursuit of a limited foreign policy, as illustrated by thr case of Taiwan. Its international ostracization is compensated by a range of informal contacts, assertive foreign

economic politics, and a position as a major purchaser of arms on world markets. However, it is clear

that the inability to obtain formal recognition from a large number of states (it enjoyed full diplomatic

relations with just 28 states in late 1990) or to gain entrance to international organizations (its UN

membership was terminated in 1971) clearly circumscribes its conduct of foreign policy.

9. KJ. Holsti, International Politics. A Framework,forAnalytis (6th edition), (London: Prentice-Hall Intcr-

national, 1992), pp. 82-114. IO. Reprinted in C.F. Furtado Jr. and A. Chandler, Perestroika in the Somet Republics. Document.c on the

National Question (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 325-326.

The Emergence of the Foreign Polic?, of the Russian Federation 245

below, the government of the RSFSR thereafter engaged in a range of ostensible

foreign policy activities including the articulation of policy priorities, the creation

of an institutional apparatus, exchanges of visits, and the conclusion of agreements

with foreign states. However, as I shall note, the integrity of Russian “foreign

policy” still remained qualified by virtue of the surrendering of prerogatives to

another state (the USSR), and the absence of formal diplomatic recognition.

A stronger case can be made for August, 1991, the date of the abortive coup in

the USSR. In the four-month period which followed, the USSR entered a period of

dissolution. Efforts promoted by the center to preserve some form of union struc-

ture failed and constituent republics declared their independence.” Moreover, Soviet

foreign policy institutions were subverted by the Union republics, and the RSFSR’s

international activities intensified. However, only with the proclamation of the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) by the RSFSR, Ukraine, and Belarus”

in early December and the formal cessation of the USSR later that month was this

complemented by widespread recognition of Russia as an independent state. The

accordance of recognition upon Russia’s fellow Union republics at this time,

moreover, suggests that inter-republican relations can, at this stage, be legitimately

regarded as part and parcel of the foreign policies of these new states. Moreover,

Russia’s involvement in the CIS could be seen to encroach only partly upon an

independent foreign policy. The Agreement on the Creation of a Commonwealth of

Independent States of 8 December did involve references to the “coordination of

foreign-policy activity” (Article 7) and subsequent agreements reached later that

month obliged Russia to coordinate nuclear defence policies with other CIS

members.‘” Such coordination, however, was conceived as existing alongside indepen-

dent foreign policies and could, in fact, be seen as working to Russia’s advantage by

granting it effective oversight of the activities of its partners in the CIS.14

Plumping for December, 1991, as the key date in the inception of Russian foreign

policy is not, however, to overlook the relevance of the international activity of the.

RSFSR prior to that date. What is important, however, is that so long as the USSR

existed, that republic was not a legitimate foreign policy actor in the eyes of other

states and thus, by extension, international institutions. By definition, foreign policy

requires interaction between states; until effective Russian independence was

obtained (as opposed to proclaimed sovereignty), this remained limited in scope.

The remainder of the paper will proceed from these assumptions. Activities prior

to December, 1991, will be regarded as antecedents of Russian foreign policy proper

as it developed from that date. The period from the abortive coup of August, 1991,

to the formation of the CIS and the dissolution of the USSR in December will be

regarded as transitional. Many of the attributes of foreign policy were built up at

this time and these will be traced, offering as they do important precedents for

later developments.

II. Three of the USSR’s Union republics had done this prior to the coup attempt. The rcmaindcr,

with the cxcrption of Russia, did so in the period August-Drcembcr, 1991. R ussia’s unique stance was

linked to its claim as the legal successor to the USSR (see below).

12. Formerly Byelorussia, it was renamed in September, 1991. 13. Ann Shcchy, “Commonwealth of Indcprndcnt Statrs: An Uneasy Compromise,” RFE/RL Remzrch

Rqmrt, Vol. I, No. 2 (17 January, 1992), pp. 2-3.

14. This was the intcrprctation of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet when ratifying the Minsk Agree- mcnt. It recommended “consultations” rather than coordination in foreign policy in amendments to the

Agreement-Ror~siisku~ya gap_&, Dccembcr 14, 1991.

246 COMMUNIST AXD POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES

The Antecedents of Russian Foreign Policy

On the one hand, Russian foreign policy is new in the sense that it expresses the

external orientation of a state which, prior to December, 1991, was not a recog-

nized subject of international law. On the other, however, its concerns and ratio-

nale are strongly conditioned by not only the recent, but also the distant past.

The current Russian leadership has made no secret of its country’s historical

links with Imperial Russia. In order to emphasize the pedigree of contemporary

Russian statehood, the longevity of pre-revolutionary Russia has been warmly

invoked, with the period between 1917 and 1991 being seen as a subversion of

historical continuity by a totalitarian regime which pursued the falsity of Soviet

rather than Russian interests.‘” While such observations appear primarily

designed to lend a degree of credence to the revival of a purely Russian role in

international affairs, the roots of certain present concerns lie in this earlier

period. The dispute with Japan over the Kurile Islands, for example, is compli-

cated by treaties entered into during the Tsarist period, while Russia’s pater-

nalistic attitude toward Ukraine owes much to a centuries old pattern of

dominance by Moscow.

Following the 1917 revolution, many nations subjugated within Imperial Russia

enjoyed a brief independent existence prior to their defacto reintegration during the

civil war period alongside the RSFSR into what under the 1922 Treaty of Union

would become the USSR. The policies of the RSFSR toward what, in this period,

were formally independent states, tempt the drawing of parallels with contempo-

rary Russian policies regarding the other former Soviet republics.lh This would,

however, be mistaken on a number of counts. Most importantly, unlike the Bolshe-

viks, the current Russian leadership regard relations with its neighbors as based on

mutually recognized independence. The forcible consolidation of contiguous states

in a unified federation (akin to the Union) dominated by Russia is recognized as

neither feasible nor desirable.

The formation of the Union meant the disappearance of an identifiably Russian

foreign policy. This was not altered by the adoption in 1944 of amendments to the

1936 Soviet constitution empowering Union republics to establish separate foreign

offices and enter into direct relations with foreign states. The limited participation

this allowed certain republics in foreign affairs took only the form of a shadow diplo-

macy solely employed in the furtherance of Soviet interests. This was equally true

both of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, who at Soviet insistence became founding

members of the UN, and of the Central Asian republics, who exchanged countless

delegations with Third World countries in order to extol the benefits of the Soviet

model of development. Moreover, in that Soviet and Russian interests were consid-

ered synonymous, and given the manner in which Russian political structures were

subsumed under those of the Union, the notion of specifically Russian Union repub-

lican activities was inconceivable and indeed heretical, thereby denying it even this

limited role.”

The Emergence of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 247

The most immediate antecedent of foreign policy is the contemporary Russian

independent initiatives pursued by the RSFSR following the proclamation of “State

Sovereignty.” The relevance of these developments, however, also needs to be quali-

fied, in that the Russian leadership, certainly up to the events of August, 1991,

remained committed to membership of a reformed Union. Hence, its desire for an

independent foreign policy must be placed within the context, on the one hand, of

the RSFSR’s strategy of redefining its relationship with Moscow and, on the other,

its continued position within a federal state, implying a certain level of restraint in

the international arena and in matters of national security, The Russian declaration

of “State Sovereignty,” for example, by limiting reference to foreign policy to a single

clause on the right to “plenipotentiary representation” abroad and omitting defence

entirely, effectively accepted Union responsibilities in these areas by default. The

draft Russian constitution published in November, 1990, while going considerably

further in its references to Russia’s right to conduct its own foreign policyLx remained

qualified given Russia’s involvement in negotiations on a new Union Treaty. The

latter, which received Russian acceptance (along with that of eight other Union

republics) in July, 199 1, aflirmed the right of “Sovereign Republics” making up the

new Union to engage in direct relations with foreign states, but only insofar as these

did not violate unspecified “common interests” of the constituent republics or breach

the “international commitments” of the Union. Moreover, articles 5 and 6 concern-

ing the jurisdiction of the USSR and the republics endorsed the primacy of the Union

in defence matters and granted it the right of “coordinating” the “foreign political

(and). . . economic activities” of the constituent republics.ly

Similarly, while the RSFSR insisted upon the right to prevent the extra-territor-

ial deployment of conscripts and to be informed of Soviet troop movements within

its borders, a regard for the prerogatives of the Union was retained. Thus, resolu-

tions of the Russian Congress of Peoples Deputies and Supreme Soviet pertaining

to the demarcation of Union and republican responsibilities passed during mid-1990

allowed for the jurisdiction of the Union Ministry of Defence in the RSFSR and

limited the mandate of a proposed Russian Minister of Defence to coordinating

activities with the center.“’ Moreover, a cautious attitude was adopted in relation

to the issue of the possible formation of independent armed forces. While the draft

Russian constitution contained allusions to this, the remarks of the Russian leader-

ship were categoric in ruling out their imminent formation. Indeed unified defence

was seen as the most effective guarantee of the Union republics’ security and the

best safeguard against the dangers of nuclear destabilization2’ The only exception

to this was the outburst of Russian leader Boris Yeltsin in response to the use of

Soviet Interior Ministry troops in the Baltic states in January, 1991,” remarks soon

19. li-errs on I/E VrGon o/‘Souerezq S~ec (London: Novosti, 1991). Admittedly, the ambiguities if’ not

outright contradictions in the treaty allo\\ one to read it as granting the Union republics far wider

prrrogativcs. Howcwr, at a minimum, a sharing of powers was rnvisagcd, which ruled out complete freedom or action in rorrign policy and drl’cncr matters. (The signing of’ the treat) by the RSFSR and

a small number of other republics, due on August ‘20, 1991, \vas prc-rmptcd by the attempted coup

launched on the 19th).

20. British Broadcasting C:ompany, Sunur~a~ q[/IlMfBroadcas~\ (hcrcaf’tcr SM’B), SU/O802 B/3-4, Junr

28, 1990; SU/O802 Cl/l, June 28, 1990. 21, See, I;)r rxamplc, Russian Premier Ivan Silayrv, “A Strong Russia Will Makr For A Strong Union,”

In&rnaliuncrlil/jair.s (Moscow), No. 7 (Iulv 1991), p. 8. 22. At a p&s conl’crrncc in rnid;T&&y, 1991; Yrltsin suggrstcd that “WC won’t bc ablr to protect our

sovereignty without a Russian army.” Set Ig&ia, January 15, 1991, and The G uardian, January 1.5, 199 I.

248 COMMUNIST ANI) POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES

after disavowed.‘” In foreign economic policy the RSFSR was less cautious. During 1990-1991, a Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and a Bank of Foreign Trade were established, thus partly challenging the prerogatives of the Union in these areas.24 Finally, the republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also revitalized, symbolized by the appointment in October, 1990, of Andrei Kozyrev as Foreign Minister.

Prior to August, 1991, some qualified success was apparent in the cultivation of international ties. Declarations of friendship and cooperation were made with Poland (October, 1990), Mongolia (February, 1991), and Czechoslovakia (May, 1991), and a number of agreements were reached with the federal units of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Germany. These, however, served only to illustrate the RSFSR’s lowly international status. Friendship declarations were, in effect, a poor substitute for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, while international relations at the sub-federal level could only be seen as a second-level of international activity. Indeed, it was precisely the RSFSR’s continuing status as a federal unit rather than an independent state recognized in international law which hampered its foreign policy activity. Not only was a juridical basis lacking, but potentially important partners such as the US, Germany, Britain, and the European Community were reluctant to embark upon meaningful ties for fear of complicat- ing relations with Moscow, particularly as these pertained to matters such as economic assistance and disarmament. Hence, the frosty reception Yeltsin experi- enced in meetings with Western leaders during this period.‘g

Notwithstanding these qualifications, certain clues as to the direction of Russian foreign policy can be seen in the period from 1990 to August, 1991. In the first place, while the cultivation of international partners was limited, the targets of activity reveal something of Russian priorities. In this connection, Yeltsin’s appeals for partnership with the European Community and economic cooperation with the US reveal an overriding concern with alleviating domestic economic diffculties.Zb Deputy RSFSR Foreign Minister, A. Fedorov, interviewed in *July, 1991, went even further, suggesting that foreign policy be oriented primarily toward “ensuring foreign economic assistance,” with priority given to the countries of Europe, North America, and South East Asia. 2i More specific pronouncements at this time concerned inter alia a commitment to reductions in defence expenditure and the non-proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons,2” an inability to provide foreign economic assistance,2” support of limitations on the arms trade,“” and opposition to the stationing of troops in foreign countries.”

23. Soviet Weekly, February 14, 1991. 24. This was brlttrcsscd by the “Law on Ensuring the Economic Foundations of’ RSFSR Sovereignty,”

which zn&r alia asscrtcd that Union, Union-Republican, and inter-Republican economic transactions involving rcsourccs and stocks in Russia wcrc to bc considcrcd invalid without the consent or the RSFSR. See SWB, SU/O914 B/8-9, Novcmbcr 6, 1990.

25. See Steve Crawshaw, Goodbye lo the USSR. The Collape c~~&uiel Pmwr (London: Bloomsbury, 1992), pp. 175-l 76.

26. h’uuos~i De&m and Di,6lomacy C&da& (Hcrcafier DDU), April 16, 1991, p. 23; Zzue&a, July 31, 1991. 27. SWB, SU/I II7 Al/2, July 18, 1991. S cc also thr comments of Kozyrev in SWB, SU/O895 B/6,

Octobrr 15, 1990. 28. Speech of Yeltsin at NW York University, SWB, SU/I 106 Al/l, June 24, 1991. 29. DDC:, April 16, 1991, p. 29. 30. DDC, March 12, 1991, p. 13. 31. SWB, SW0967 Al/2, January 1 I, 1991. (This statcmrnt was made in the context of the cxpcri-

cncc of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and opposition to the dcploymcnt of’ Soviet forces in the Gull:)


Aspects of Russia’s future policy toward fellow former Union republics were also

anticipated in the year prior to the August coup. Again, however, certain qualifi-

cations are in order. The patchwork of bilateral inter-republican ties the RSFSR

sedulously cultivated during 1991 were at this stage envisaged as supplementing,

not replacing, a refurbished union. j2 Moreover, the series of agreements signed with

fellow republics could only partially be considered as approximating the status of

diplomatic intercourse between independent, sovereign states. Treaties between the

RSFSR and a number of republics on inter-state relations, for example, while often

involving bilateral recognition of independent sovereign statehood”” held little

meaning in the wider international community where acceptance of the republics’

independent status remained blocked by continued acceptance of the USSR as a

subject of international law.

These qualifications aside, inter-republican relations were significant in that

themes which would develop with some force from the latter part of 1991 were, at

this stage, already in evidence. In particular, ethnic minorities became an issue of

attention. Cooperative efforts were made with the Georgian leadership, for

example, to assist a resolution of the conflict in South Ossetia. Inter-state treaties,

moreover, typically included guarantees of minority rights. That these were not

beyond dispute was most evident in the case of Lithuania, where negotiations on

the framing of a treaty were drawn out over a twelve-month period. Security

matters were also invoked, most notably in relations with the Ukraine. The inter-

state treaty of November, 1990, according to an Izvestia report, involved joint recog-

nition of the need for a “system of collective security.“34

The framework of the RSFSR’s international activity changed irrevocably after the

failed coup of August, 1991. From the chaos of the political upheaval of the ensuing

four months a more discernible and legally-based Russian foreign policy was fully

established. One of the ironies of the coup was that the process of disintegration it

sought to staunch was actually accelerated by its failure. The loss of credibility of

the center (the CPSU, the KGB, the command of the Soviet armed forces, and the

Presidency) in the eyes of the republics as a consequence of the August events,

doomed the Union Treaty, provisionally agreed in July, to oblivion. The subsequent

efforts undertaken by a severely weakened Gorbachev and certain republican leaders,

including that of the RSFSR, to frame a new Union agreement were premised on

an entirely different basis, marking a transition from a federal to a confederal

conception of a future union, thereby foreseeing considerably greater scope for its

members in the conduct of independent foreign policies.“” The Law on Bodies of

State Power passed by the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies in early September,

for example, was interpreted by Yeltsin as allowing each Union republic “the right

to conduct its own independent foreign policy,“3fi while the version of a new Union

Treaty provisionally agreed upon by seven of the republics in November explicitly

32. As late as July, 1991, rollowing the conclusion of bilateral agreements with Kyrgyatan, Yeltsin

commrntrd that such cooperation was to bc seen within the framework or a “renewed union.” Izoestia,

July 22, 199 1. 33. For a rcprescntativc example, see the treaty bctwecn the RSFSR and the Lithuanian Republic of

July, 1991, in Diplomaticha& uertnik, No. 3 (February 29%March 15, 1992), pp. 17-21.

34. Izu&a, Novcmbcr 19, 1990. 35. On the distinction between a federal state and a conrcderation of states SW J.B. Brierly, The Las’

oJA’dionr (6th cditiun) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 128. 36. SM’B, SU/I I72 B/9, September 9, 1991.

250 COMMLXIST AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES

acknowledged the status of each as “fully-fledged subjects of international law.“si Moreover, institutional reforms, inaugurated in 1989 with the formation of a Council of Foreign Ministers of the USSR and the republics, were extended in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to allow the republics a greater say in the formulation of policy and to permit them a degree of diplomatic representation in embassies and Soviet delegations. Disputes over the demarcation of responsibilities, however, were not dispelled and were coupled with demands by the Russian leaders for a root and branch re-organization of the Soviet Foreign Ministry involving a shift in its mission from pursuing Union prerogatives to coordinating republican policies on the international stage.“” This tussle was ultimately resolved in favor of the republics. Last minute efforts at re-organizing the Soviet Foreign Ministry into a new Ministry of External Relations and the return of Eduard Shevardnadze in late November to the position of Soviet Foreign Minister were overshadowed by the accelerated demise of Soviet government structures as republics took control of ministries’” and economic resources, and in some cases undermined the last preserve of the Union by either resolving to set up independent armed forces (Ukraine), or placing local Soviet troops and their assets under republican jurisdiction (Moldova).4”

This process of disintegration was matched by an increasingly beleaguered Soviet foreign policy and the RSFSR’s increasingly confident international profile. Indeed, Russian initiatives were often at the expense of the Union as in the case of the floating of its own disarmament proposals in response to those of Gorbachev in October.41 Bilateral relations with important partners also began to shift toward the republic. In regard to Japan, the issue of the disputed Kurile Islands, for example, was effectively hijacked. The basis for this had been laid previously in Yeltsin’s claim that jurisdiction over these territories was a matter for the Russian government given their location in the RSFSR and that its acquiescence would be required in any bilateral Soviet-Japanese settlement. By November, Soviet jurisdiction in the matter was entirely excluded by Yeltsin viewing the Kuriles as a bilateral Russian-Japanese issue. Q Furthermore, Yeltsin’s visit to Germany in D;ovember witnessed the signing of a joint declaration laying the basis for relations in what was now regarded as the inevitable event of the USSR’s disappearance. This contained not only specific provisions for future cooperation including Russian guarantees to help meet Soviet debt commitments, but also the general stipulation that existing treaties between Germany and the USSR were to be “applied to the relationship between Germany and Russia,” a clause which presupposed Russian responsibility for troop withdrawals from the former Gl)R.l’

Visits at such a high level, hovvever, were accompanied by continuing professions of concern on the part of Western nations at the military threats posed by Soviet dissolution and an unwillingness to extend formal diplomatic recognition as long as

37. h’eza~imqyn ~a&u, Novcmbcr 16, 1991. See also Yeltsin’s c<,tnmcnts in Thp Times, Novcmbcr 15. 1991.

38. See the comments of Kozvrcv in Zzwrlia, October 25, 1991 and November 13, 1991. 39. This culminated in Russia’s usurpation b) Prcsidcntial dccrcc of thr Soviet hlinistry of External

Relations on Dcccmbcr 18, 1991. 40. The breakdown of the Union during thcsc months was further cvidcnccd b) the formal rccogni-

lion of the Baltic states’ indcpcndcnce by the rcronstitutzd Soviet government 111 early Scptcmbcr, 1991, 41. Zzuer&z, October 9 and I I, 199 I. ,+‘2. SW Yeltsin’s “Lcttcr tu the Pcoplc of Russia” in Ror~iiskqv gaze/a, Nmxmbcr 16, 1991. 43. The declaration is rc printed in SIVB, SC/l237 Al/7-9, Novcrnbrr 23, 1991.


the Soviet Union remained in existence. The former was answered with Russian

assurances during this period on the desirability of non-proliferation and “a single

central control” of nuclear weapons.@ The issue of diplomatic recognition,

meanwhile, was partly overcome by the formation of the CIS and finally resolved

on 25 December, 1991, with Gorbachev’s resignation as Soviet President and

Commander-in-Chief, and the formal end of the USSR by decision of the Supreme

Soviet the following day, which paved the way to Russia’s swift and full entry into

the international community.

The common purpose of the Union republics in seeking the dissolution of the

USSR was not matched by complete amicability in relations between them during

this period. Indeed, much of the distrust between the former republics evident in

the post-Soviet period has its immediate roots in actions taken during the terminal

phase of the USSR. A source of considerable anxiety, for example, was the issue of

borders. A statement by Yeltsin’s office in late August that the RSFSR reserved the

right to review its frontiers with contiguous states4” sparked a storm of protest

amongst the political leaderships in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. While this

was diffused by a declaration of inter-ethnic concord in early October, suspicions

lingered over Yeltsin’s self-proclaimed duty to protect the right of minority Russian

populations. A number of republics were also aggrieved at the RSFSR’s assumption

of precedence in undertaking the functions of the disintegrating Union. Its declared

status as legal successor to the Soviet Union’s membership of international organi-

zations and treaty obligations, for example, was contested by Ukraine.4b Similarly,

suggestions that all nuclear weapons be moved to Russian territory were initially

contradicted by Ukrainian and Kazakh statements4’ Significantly, formal agree-

ments and other undertakings pertaining to the disposition and control of nuclear

weapons made during December, while providing for the removal of the bulk of

tactical weapons to Russia by July, 1992, only dealt partially with strategic arms.

Pledges by Ukraine and Belarus to ensure the transfer of such weapons to Russia

by the end of 1994 were not matched by a similar commitment on the part of

Kazakhstan, the fourth former Soviet republic in which strategic missiles were

sited.4K The Russian leadership, for its part, remained suspicious of Ukrainian inten-

tions. The republic’s declaration of independence in late August and its decision in

October to set up its own armed forces appeared particularly noteworthy in light

of the concentration of both strategic and tactical nuclear weaponry and the

estimated 1.2 million Soviet military personnel stationed there. Indeed Russia’s

concern at retaining some form of oversight of this military potential, and preserv-

ing some form of Russian hegemony was material in its adherence to the idea of

4-1. Kozyrc\, rcportcd in SC1/B, SU/l230 Al/X, Novembrr 15, 1991 and SU/12_II Al/2, Novcmbrr 28,

1991.

4.5. Ror.riirkaya gazda, August 27, 1991.

46. The Russian position was soon relined to suggest that it rrprcscnted the “continuer state.” This

suggcstcd that while all former Soviet republics were in some rva: s~ccesscrs to trraty and othrr oblig-

ations rntcrcd into by the former USSR, thr RSFSR would assume primary rcsponsidility for them.

47. The Ctmdion, Scptembcr 30, 1991 and October 29, 1991. 48. Christoph Bluth, “The Commonwealth of Independent States and International Security” (paper

prrscntcd to the confcrcncc of the British International Studies Association, University of Swansca,

Dccrmbrr 1992), p. IO. It is also worth noting that provisions for the transfer of short-rangr nuclear weapons involved only those stationed in Bclarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. In conjunction with those

based in Russia, thcsr did amount to some 91 prr cent of the formrr So&t arsrnal, but still lcli an

cstimatrd 1280 warheads unaccounted for. See William Walkrr, “Nuclrar Weapons and the Former

Soviet Rrpublics,” In&national Q?zirr (London), Vol. 68, No. 2 (Junr 1992), p. 260.

2.52 CO~L~,IUNIST AND POST-CO~,~L~UNIST STUDIES

unified military command and a powerful motivating factor in the initiative to create the CIS, given Ukraine’s obvious reluctance to join the revamped Union promoted by Gorbachev.

The foreign policy of contemporary Russia, as well as having roots in the policies of the RSFSR in its various incarnations between 1917 and 1991 has been, and will continue to be, strongly influenced by the legacy of the USSR. The contemporary Russian leadership, headed by Boris Yeltsin, can neither afford, nor does it desire, to follow the example of the Bolsheviks in 1917, who upon assuming power not only renounced utterly the foreign policies of the predecessor regimes of Imperial Russia and the short-lived Provisional Government, but considered the entire practice of diplomacy redundant. In fact, Russia has followed an entirely opposite course. Its self-proclaimed status as the legal successor of the Soviet Union, binds it to all the international commitments entered into by the former regime, not least in the sphere of nuclear and conventional disarmament and military withdrawal from East-Central Europe. In areas in which no legal obligation pertained, Russia has been faced with the choice of either continuing or forsaking options pursued, but not necessarily completed, in the latter period of Soviet foreign policy. Conse- quently, policies such as the courting and utilization of Western economic assistance and cooperation, the reorientation of relations with the former Warsaw Pact countries, and the abandonment of Third World allies have been of topical concern within the Russian leadership. Moreover, while Russia has not succeeded to the borders of the USSR in their entirety, where frontiers have coincided it has inherited a number of unresolved issues. These include the long-standing issue of force deployments on or near the border with China and the deadlock with Japan over the Kurile Islands.

The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

As outlined above, states share common foreign policy preoccupations defined in terms of the promotion of security, welfare, autonomy, and status. These goals are certainly relevant in a consideration of Russian foreign policy. Their application as a framework of analysis, however, does need to take into consideration a number of points. First, due consideration must be given to the fact that Russia’s relations with the other former Soviet republics are qualitatively distinct, owing to their shared past, geographical immediacy, and, in most cases, common position within the CIS4” This justifies their consideration as a separate concern of Russian foreign policy. Second, consideration must also be given to the domestic context of foreign policy formulation; that is, an acceptance that specific objectives within the broad categories outlined above are often a matter of dispute and are thus shaped in a contested decision-making environment. Hence, where relevant, reference will be made to competing trends of thought amongst important political constituencies in Russia.

Securit_y

Security forms the basis of foreign policy activity in that ultimately it determines the very survival of the state itself. The strategies states employ in enhancing

49. Of the former Soviet republics only the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and Grorgia did not join the CIS.

The Emergence of the Foreign Poliqj of the Russian Federation 253

security can also have profound, often negative, effects. Thus, the Brezhnev leadership’s pursuit of “absolute security” against all possible enemies, coupled with its determination to maintain strategic parity with the US actually undermined security by generating hostility amongst its potential foes, in effect perpetuating a vicious cycle of deteriorating relations accompanied by an increasingly burdensome defence commitment. The paradox of this position was recognized by the Gorbachev leadership in the form of the “new political thinking” with its emphasis on concepts such as “mutual security” and “defence sufficiency.” This, in turn, found practical expression in Moscow’s retreat from East-Central Europe and the Third World, acquiescence to German unification, prolonged negotiations over the disputed border with China, involvement in widespread measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament in the form of the INF, CFE, and START 1 treaties,j” and a more cooperative attitude toward institutions such as the UN. Consequently, by 199 1 many of the traditional security concerns of the USSR had been partly allayed. Fears of Western hostility, destabilization in East-Central Europe, and the reversal of gains in the Third World were essentially overcome either by a recognition that the relinquishing of certain positions would not irreparably damage security but could in fact enhance it, or by the generation of trust and mutual obligations via a network of treaties and involvement in international institutions.

These positions have been extended by Russia, with the differences being those of degree rather than substance, as the detente of the Gorbachev period gave way during 1992 to commitment on the part of the Yeltsin leadership to promote a relationship of entente with the West. In doctrinal terms this has involved the rejection of NATO and the US, specifically, as potential enemies of Russia”’ and the forwarding of the principle of “minimal defence sufficiency” as the basis of the strength, structure, and financing of Russian armed forces.52 More concretely, the partnership with the US has continued the momentum of disarmament built up during the late Soviet period. This has not merely involved Russian acquiescence (as the inheritor of the Soviet nuclear arsenal) to all treaties signed by the Soviet Union (of which START 1 is the most important), but, as in the case of START 2, signed in January, 1993, the sanctioning of further unprecedented measures of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, cooperation has extended into previously unknown areas, involving, on the one hand, American and British financial assistance aimed at increasing the safety of nuclear weapons and, on the other, the mooted joint development of early warning systems and defence against ballistic missile strikes. Changes in the strategic relationship with the US have been complemented by the development of ties with individual NATO members and with other security structures pertaining to Europe.

Membership of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Russia’s interest in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) stand out in this regard, but notable also has been the attention Yeltsin has given to cultivating personal contacts with potentially important Western partners. This has

50. These acronyms stand respectively for Intermediate Nuclear Forces, Conventional Forces in

Europe, and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. 51. See “The Camp David Declaration” and “The Charter of Russian-American Partnership and

Friendship” adopted during Yeltsin’s visits to the US in January-February and June, 1992, in Dip/o-

moticheskii wstnik, No. 4-5 (February 29-March 15, 1992), p. 12 and No. 13-14 (July 15-31, 1992), pp.

7-l I. 52. Yeltsin in ibid, No. 4-5 (February 29-March 15, 1992), p. 49 (emphasis added).

254 COI\IMUP;IST AXD POST-COM~~UNIST STUDIES

involved not only visits to Canada, France, and the UK but also the signing of broad- ranging statements of principles of friendly relations.“”

While improvements in relations with the former Soviet Union’s traditional Western adversaries are thus undeniable, their relevance to Russia’s security situation is a little less obvious. To use Buzan’s terminology, security may be challenged by both “threats” and “vulnerabilities.““4 In the sense of the former, it is a moot point whether the Western alliance was ever a serious direct threat to Moscow in that it bore no territorial demands against the Soviet Union and was not engaged in military subversion either of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe or of the Soviet system itself. Indeed, the acceptance by both parties of the de facto division of Europe and the mutual possession of means of annihilation in the form of nuclear weapons actually resulted in an enhancement of Soviet security on its Western flank. Clearly insecurities did arise which posed the possibility of escalation, but these were often self- inflicted, as in the various confrontations over Germany, the Cuban missile crisis, and the escalation of tension with NATO as a consequence of SS-20 deployments in the late 1970s. Moreover, during the Brezhnev period these had largely given way to the testing of the boundaries of superpower competition in the less strategically critical Third World, where (with the possible exception of the 1973 Middle East war) escalation to the nuclear level was inconceivable. Finally, as noted above, the policy innova- tions of the Gorbachev period lanced many of these sources of East-West conflict and began to curtail the dangers posed by the possession of nuclear weapons.

In this light, Russian security has been enhanced to the degree that an already much reduced potential for East-West nuclear conflict has been further curtailed by the acceleration of disarmament. While sources of disagreement still remain in Russia’s relations with the West over a wide range of issues ranging from its willingness to pursue an active policy of arms sales and alleged infringements of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, these pose no immediate challenge to the central downward shift in strategic and conventional arsenals. In addition, Russia’s new relationship with the West is perhaps equally important in ameliorating many of the threats it faces as a consequence of the dissolution of the USSR and political transformation in East-Central Europe. Its commitment to the CFE agreement (and any possible successor) for example, reflects an awareness that ceilings placed on new states of the former Soviet Union which fall within the geographic scope of the treaty will restrict their military potentia1.j” Similarly the CSCE, the Council of Europe, and the UN have been used as fora in which Russia has defended the rights of settlers in the Baltic states and in the long-term these structures can be conceived as a limited means of providing checks against instability in the CIS itself over matters such as border disputes or peacekeeping operations.‘fi

If insecurities have been reduced in relations with the West, where then do challenges currently stem from? Contested borders in Russia’s far east provide one

53. Yeltsin’s first trip abroad following thr formation of the CIS took him in January-February, 1992, 10 these three countrirs, as well as the US and to UN hcadquartcrs in New York. In addition, during the terminal two months of the USSR Yeltsin visited Germany (noted carlicr) and Italy.

54. Barry Bwan, People, Staler and Fear: The National Securily Problem in Internationtll Relations (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1983), p. 73.

55. Signilicantly the apportioning of crilings among the rtlcvant succcss~r states agreed at the Tashkent summit of the CIS in May, 1992, was assisted by meetings of’ the NACC-SW Douglas L. Clarke, “Implementing the CFE Treaty,” RFEIRL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 23 (June 5, 1992).

56. Scr the remarks of Yeltsin and Kozyrev cited in Suzanne Crow, “Russian Pracckccping: Dcf’cnsc, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?” RFEiRL Research Report, Vol. I, No. 37 (September IX, 1992), p. 39.


potential source of dispute in relations with, on the one hand, China and, on the other, Japan. Only the former, however, is an actual threat to security in that China possesses a military capability which might be used to back territorial claims. Its willingness to go to such lengths, however, is to be doubted. Considerable progress was made toward resolving the issue of the disputed Soviet-Chinese border during the latter Gorbachev period and efforts have continued during the post-Soviet period by Russia and a number of other successor states to both finalize a resolution of this issue and maintain force reductions in border areas.“7 Indeed, the lack of urgency with which China is viewed has been evident in the moderate level of diplomatic interchange between Moscow and Beijing, which stands in contrast to Yeltsin’s personal attention to the West. Not until December, 1992, did the Russian President visit Beijing only to cut short his trip in order to return to Moscow to tackle domestic political difficulties. Moreover, steady progress has been evident in the development of Sino-Russian cooperation. China has emerged as a major purchaser of Russian arms, securing access to advanced fighter aircraft, ground-to- air missiles, and possibly rocket launching technology. Russia and China also arguably now share certain mutual security concerns, such as the volatility of the Central Asian region and the regional role of Japan, over which joint consultations and the sharing of information seem feasible.58

The amelioration of security concerns from the Soviet Union’s traditional adversaries has been replaced by more immediate concerns which have arisen as a consequence of the break-up of the USSR. This has affected Russian security in a number of ways. The first concerns alterations to what has been termed Russia’s “geopo- litical position.“5q The creation of new states on the basis of the former Union republics means Russia is now faced with a multitude of new borders and the consequent problem of the expansion of conflicts in neighboring states (as in the case of the claims of the South Ossetia autonomous area in Georgia to unify with Russia’s North Ossetian Republic). Furthermore, Russia also has to confront the problem of geographical remove from both Europe and Asia. With regard to the former this has necessitated mooted alterations in Russian defence planning as forward military districts now embrace Moscow. hO The latter initially appears less of a problem in that Russia is now buffered by new Central Asian states from problems of instability in, for instance, Afghanistan. However, the political fragility of most of the new states in both Central Asia and the Transcaucasus and, with the possible exception of Kazakhstan, their underdeveloped military potential, mean they themselves have been perceived as sources of destabilization.“’ Furthermore, in that many important military installations of the former Soviet Union were located in non- Russian republics, access to these has become problematic for the emerging Russian

57. In February, 1992, the Russian and Chinese parliaments ratified the April, 1991, Sino-Soviet

agrecmcnt on the castcrn section of their common border. Negotiations on remaining points of dispute

have continued involving Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China. See D$~lornalich&i

cetlnik, No. 15-16 (August 15-31, 1992), p. 60. Force reductions were discussed in a meeting between

the Russian and Chinese Dcfence Ministers in Moscow in August, 1992.

58. Far Eastern Economic Rrview, November 12, 1992, p. 28. 59. Sergei Rakovsky. “New Neighbors, New Problems,” ~Vew Timec International, No. 34 (August 1992),

pp. 19-21. 60. Intrrvicw with Russian Defcncc Minister Pave1 Grachrv in Izues&z, June I, 1992. 61. Russia has expressed ccmcern at the civil conllict in Tajikistan and thr influence of radical Islam

promoted by Afghanistan both there and in othrr Central Asian states. See Diplomatichedii uertnik, No. 12 (Junr 30, 1992), p. 32 and the statement of a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson rcportcd in

“Weekly Roirw,” RFEIRL Rewuch Report, Vol. I, No. 37 (September 18, 1992), p. 72.

256 COMMLJXISI- AXD POST-COMMUKJST STUIXES

armed forces. In response to demands by the Baltic states, for example, the Russian leaders have been obliged to agree in principle to the removal of former Soviet troops from these territorie@ and thus, by extension, the vacation of important military installations, including naval bases, early warning radar defences (based at Skrunda in Latvia) and fighter/bomber airbases. Elsewhere, the navy has lost guaranteed access to ports in the Baltic, Black, Azov, and Caspian seashJ This loss of military capacity has been complemented by the acquisition of part of formerly Soviet forces by Russia’s new neighbors and in a number of cases their creation of national armies. This process has been particularly challenging for Russia in regard to the Ukraine. Not only has that country inherited a large share of the former Soviet defence industry and laid claim to part of the Black Sea Fleet, but under the revised ceilings of the 1990 CFE T reaty has acquired an increased share of the USSR’s treaty allocations.“4

The break-up of the USSR has also created a number of other problems for Russia, the most pressing of which has been that of the large Russian-speaking population resident in new neighboring states, to whom Russia has extended guarantees of protection. Given that this new diaspora numbers some 25 million persons spread throughout all the successor states, the potential for conflict is manifest, involving outright hostilities in the Trans-Dniestr region of Moldova and simmering disputes with the Baltic states (noted above) and with Ukraine over the status of the largely Russian-populated Crimea.

In light of the above, the acknowledgement by leading political figures in Russia that relations with fellow former Soviet states form one of the main priorities of Russian foreign policy is unsurprising. 65 However, relations with the so-called “near abroad” are far more problematic than those in other areas. In relations with Europe and the West generally, Russian foreign policy is constrained, on the one hand (as shall be explored below), by the desire for beneficial economic relations and, on the other, by legal and institutional obligations stemming from Russia’s actual or desired membership in international organizations and its adherence to all bilateral and multilateral treaties signed by the former USSR. In regard to the CIS, however, institutional and coordinating mechanisms are at an early stage of development, while joint agreements have been either contested or ignored and have lacked the means of compulsion, thus leading to severe complications in relations, as evidenced by the strains between Moscow and Kiev. Moreover, relations with the successor states have been complicated further in that during 1992 they have tended to be the focus of the most violent criticism of Russia’s foreign policy from important domestic political constituencies.eh

In response to these complexities Russia has pursued a number of policies. The first has been to obtain a position of military superiority within the CIS. The relocation of tactical and strategic nuclear weaponry, noted above, has clearly been a major priority in this regard, although one that has not been without its problems. As of February, 1993, neither Kazakhstan nor Ukraine had signed the

62. These forces were placed under Russian jurisdiction in January, 1992. 63. Rakovsky, ojxcil., no(e 59, p. 21. 64. The largest beneficiary was Belarus. Russia’s allwzation rcmainrd approximately the same. 65. See the remarks of Kozyrev in “A Transformed Russia in A New World,” In&wxzlional AJbirs

(Moscow), No. 4-5 (April-May 1992), p, 88. 66. See Jeff Chcckrl, “Russian Foreign Policy: Back to the Future?” RFE/RL Research Reporl, Vol. 1,

No. 41 (Ocmber 16, 1992), pp~ 17-18.


Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the latter had had still to complete the process of START 1 ratification .67 Moreover, during 1992 Kazakhstan continued to refrain from giving an unambiguous commitment to remove strategic nuclear weapons on its territory, while Ukraine raised a series of conditions relat- ing to financial compensation and security guarantees which imperilled the prospects of an orderly transfer. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the prospect of Russia acquiring a nuclear monopoly within the CIS region is not to be doubted. Both the maintenance and operation of existing nuclear weapons and the construc- tion of new ones is only feasible with its cooperation. 68 Moreover, bilateral negotiations for the transfer of strategic weapons to Russia have reached a successful conclusion with Belarus. While ongoing talks with the more intransigent CIS nuclear states have been far more problematic, in this Russia has enjoyed the tacit support of the US, which has placed considerable pressure on Ukraine and Kazakhstan to swiftly accede to the NPT and endorse START 1 as conditions for financial assistance and favorable relations.

Russia’s military ascendancy has also been promoted by its assumption of the control of assets, initially the intended prerogative of some form of collective CIS command. Political control of strategic nuclear weapons, for example, was initially delegated to the heads of state of the four CIS nuclear powers, who would decide jointly upon the necessity of launching these weapons. Effective operational command, however, rested in the hands of Russian President Yeltsin and the Commander in Chief of the newly-created CIS Joint Strategic Command, Marshal Shaposhnikov.b” Moreover, the location of command and control facilities in Russia and the blurring of any organizational division between the CIS command, on the one hand, and the Russian government and its Ministry of Defence (created in March, 1992), on the other, made it apparent that defacto control lay in Moscow. A similar situation has also occurred with the armed forces of the former Soviet Union. Agreements reached at the end of December, 1991, to set up joint CIS general purpose and “strategic forces” have since come to nothing. The determination of a number of CIS states, most notably the Ukraine, to set up independent armed forces during early 1992, led Russia in May to establish its own, which would be comprised of the bulk of former Soviet forces.

A second discernible line of Russian policy has been to guard against potential rivals, and in particular Ukraine. Strategies in this regard have involved containing that country within CIS mechanisms and ensuring its denuclearization. While the latter has met with qualified success, the former has broken down, reflecting not only Kiev’s opposition to joint armed forces but also its non-participation in important CIS agreements, notably the Collective Security Accord reached at Tashkent in May. This has, in turn, led to a third track which has involved the cultivation of

67. Russia itself had entered into the NPT by virtue of its adherence to treaty obligations of the

formrr Soviet Union while in November, 1992, the Russian parliament ratified START 1. (The latter

was necessary in that ratilication had not been completed b) thr former Sovirt Union.) Undrr the Lisbon Protocol signed with the USA in May, 1992, the four former Soviet strategic nuclear powers bccamc

signatorirs to START 1 and agreed to “make such arrangcmcnts among themsrlvcs as arc rcquircd to

implement the treaty’s limits and restrictions.” START I’s full implcmcntation would involve rrmoval

of all strategic nuclear wrapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kuakhstan by the end of the century. SW Joachim Krause, “Risks of Nuclear P I’E 1’ ro 1 era ion Following the Dissolution of the Sovirt Union,” Azmen- ,/mli~ik, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Dcccmber 1992), p. 354.

68. Bluth, op. cil., note 48, pp. 11-15. 69. Ibid., p. 8 makes the distinction bctwcen political and operational control.

258 COMMUNIST AIXD POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES

relations with individual states, primarily as a substitute for crumbling CIS provisions. Cases in point include not only the mooted bilateral arrangements on nuclear issues noted above, but also the interim agreement on the status of the Black Sea Fleet concluded with Ukraine in August, 1992. In addition, such relations might also serve the purpose of cultivating regional security (as with bilateral defence coordination with a number of Central Asian states).

A fourth line has been to pursue, albeit inconsistently, more decisive policies in order to safeguard Russian interests and perhaps assuage domestic criticism. The protection of ethnic Russians, for example, enjoys support throughout the political and defence establishment, although differences do exist on whether this should involve the use of military force .711 These competing trends have been reflected in Russia’s initial indifference to the actions of the pro-Russian Fourteenth Army in the Trans-Dniestr region of Moldova but subsequent cooperation w-ith that country, Ukraine, and Romania in finding a political settlement. Similarly, concerning the Baltic states, Russia has vaccilated between, on the one hand, a policy of negotia- tion on military withdrawal (leading, in the case of Lithuania, to an agreement in September, 1992, on a schedule for evacuation) and, on the other, a more confronta- tional stance involving the delay and suspension of Lvithdrawals and the cancellation of economic agreements in protest at alleged discrimination against local Russian-speaking populations.

Promoting favorable external conditions for economic improvement was a core concern of Soviet foreign policy from at least the late 1960s. This was evident in the detente policies pursued by the Brezhnev leadership in the early 197Os, which were geared toward facilitating increased trade and transfers of technology from the West as a means of enhancing the efficiency of the Soviet economy. More obviously, during the Gorbachev period many of the central foreign policy pursuits had an economic rationale. Nuclear and conventional disarmament measures allied to reductions in military expenditure after 1988 were part of a long term goal of reducing the unsustainable demands of a military budget which during the late 1980s accounted for some 17 to 19 per cent of Soviet GNP.” The reorganization of trade and aid relations with clients in East-Central Europe and the Third World and the active soliciting of increased trade, investment, and, latterly, aid, from the advanced Western economies and.Japan, moreover, were aimed at shedding external encumbrances and courting partnership to rescue an economy, which by the early 1990s was experiencing precipitous decline.

This concern with economic objectives has been continued by Russia. In some respects this has been linked to developments in the security sphere, in that Russia’s improving relationship with NATO has permitted projected conventional and strategic arms procurement to f-all considerably during 1992.” This relaxation

71. Dmitri Strinbcr& “The Soviet Dcl’cnw Burdrn: Estimating Hidden Dcfencc Costs,” Sociel S&~P.~, Vol. 44, No. 2 (April 1992), p. 258. (In 1985, the cquivalcnt ligurc l’or the US was 6.6 per CCIIL)

72. “.lfilitary and Security Notes,” RFE/RL Research Repor&, Vol. I, No. 15 (April IO, 1992), p. 43.

The Emergence of. the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 259

has also allowed a continuation of conversion and disarmament measures initiated

in the later Soviet period, which while of little initial economic benefit (owing to

the high cost of reorienting production and of dismantling and destroying nuclear

weapons) offer in the long-term the possibility of significantly reduced defence

outlays. Moreover, Yeltsin’s visits to Western capitals during late 1991 and early

1992 were aimed at seeking economic assistance and facilitating a climate of

improving relations in order, in the judgement of the Russian President, “to enlist

maximum support for efforts toward Russia’s transformation.“” The cultivation of

bilateral relations with individual Western countries (notably US, France, Germany,

and the UK) has subsequently been based on this rationale. In multilateral fora,

the cultivation of necessary Western goodwill has been evident in cooperation in

the security field detailed above, and in specifically economic terms, in acceptance

of International Monetary Fund (IMF) strictures on domestic reforms as a price for

the staged disbursement of a US $24 billion multilateral assistance package adopted

by the G7 in July, 1992. Russia has also assumed major responsibility for the foreign

debt of the USSR, has endeavored to guarantee the longevity of economic cooper-

ation by seeking full membership of the IMF (obtained in April) and the General

Agreement in Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and finally has inaugurated a legislative

framework aimed at liberalizing foreign commercial activity.

While Russia’s attentions have been primarily fixed on Western partners, active

efforts have also been pursued aimed at harnessing possibilities for advantageous

relations in a host of other areas. In some senses this has involved Russia in finish-

ing off a process of restructuring begun during the Gorbachev period, a trend most

visible in the termination of trade subsidies and assistance to former allies such

as Cuba and Vietnam. Russia, like the USSR, has also followed an active policy of

arms sales as a means of acquiring foreign currency and financing conversion.

Long-term relations have thus been maintained with India, while new clients such

as the wealthy Gulf states have also been courted. Russia is also a signatory to the

Declaration on Economic Cooperation in the Black Sea and views Turkey as a

significant potential partner. X To the east, meanwhile, countries of the Asian-

Pacific region have been the objects of attention. The allure of credits, trade, and

investment (notably in Russia’s underdeveloped far eastern regions) has drawn

Russia toward South Korea, as evidenced by Yeltsin’s visit to Seoul in November,

1992.

While Russia has been relatively successful in winning favor for its economic

reforms, the practicalities of constructing cooperative relations are, of course, far

more problematic. During 1992 Russia has been unable to fully service its debts,

requiring repeated negotiations with creditors on rescheduling. Russia’s ability to

successfully meet IMF conditions is also not guaranteed and much of the agreed

G7 package may well prove ephemeral. Moreover, the soliciting of Western goodwill

has fuelled opposition to Yeltsin’s leadership in general and the position of Foreign

Minister Kozyrev in particular. Close attention to the G7 has been criticized for

ignoring the benefits of relations with allegedly more compatible economic partners

in Eastern Europe, China, and the Third World,7s and for allowing Russia to neglect

73. Yeltsin’s speech to thr Russian Suprcrnc Sovicl, in D@/omaliche.rkiz c&nik, No. 4-5 (Fcbruar) 29-March 15, 1992), p. 70.

74. On the economic potential of’ the Black Sea rrgion xc the speech of’ Kosyrcv in ibid., pp. 55-56. 75. Alcxandr Rutskoi (Russian VicePresident), Roniiskaya gaze&z, June 26, 1992; V. Lukin, (Ambas-

sador to Lhr US), ,lie;auirimnya gazeeta, September 10, 1992.

260 COMMUNIST AND POST-COMMUNST STUDIES

economic relations with the successor states .76 Perhaps more seriously, painful domestic economic reforms introduced in 1992 have been widely seen as the result of an acceptance of IMF conditionality and have buttressed opposition to Yeltsin amongst powerful domestic lobbies in the state sector of the economy and the military. j7 Efforts to compensate for such criticism have, in turn, fed back into foreign policy with certain economic implications. Russia’s firm line on the Kurile’s dispute (as evidenced by the cancellation of Yeltsin’s visit to Tokyo in September), for example, limits the opportunities for greater bilateral Japanese-Russian economic relations.

Complex problems have also been faced in economic relations with the successor states. The initial aspiration for the survival of some form of economic community apparent at the birth of the CIS gave way during the course of 1992 to a series of disputes and the dislocation of ties, impeding the development of necessary coordinating structures. The most important mechanism, that of the ruble zone, which potentially offered Russia considerable influence throughout the entire former Soviet Union, has been undermined by the introduction of parallel curren- cies in a number of successor states and the ruble’s replacement in Ukraine. Inter- republican trade has also been interrupted by the erection of arbitrary trade barriers, disputes over payment terms, and the diversion of exports to world markets in search of hard currency earnings. Russia’s response to these developments has been to strengthen bilateral (as opposed to multilateral) ties with individual successor states and to seek unilateral advantages. The beginnings of a reorientating of oil and raw materials exports to outside the ruble zone has also been in evidence, directed at increasing hard currency earnings and staunching what is, in the form of a trade surplus with states within the ruble zone, in effect, a net transfer of resources from Russia.‘”

Autonomy and Status

In the sphere of foreign policy, autonomy refers to the ability of states to formu- late and implement their own policies, while status might include the cultivation of feelings of deference, respect, and even awe amongst other states.‘” With regard to the former, the autonomy of states is, of course, qualified in a number of ways. Restrictions range from adherence to international law and the obligations of membership of institutions and alliance systems, to vulnerability in the face of the movements of the international economy and the limitations of domestic resources. This aside, during much of the Soviet period, the USSR appeared to experience few limits on its behavior. Internal resources in the form of burgeoning military power and what, until the mid-Brezhnev period, was a fairly successful rate of economic growth, coupled with the advantages conferred by a military and economic alliance

76. Ruslan Khasbulatov (Chair of the Russian Suprcmc Soviet) in “A Transformed Russia. .,” op. cd., note 65, p. 83.

77. Of particular note arc thr Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the Civic Union. The

latter is thought to rcprcsent some 40 per crnt of dcputirs in thr l’ull Russian parliament-the Congress of People’s Dcputics. The banned National Salvation Front, which takes an cvcn stronger rcjcctionist

btancc on cooperation with the West, claims support f’rom army oflicrrs.

78. Phil Hanson, “Thr End of the Rublr Zonr?” RFEiRL Research Reporl, Vol. I, No. 30 (July 24, 1992),

p. 46. 79. Holsti, O/J. cil., notr 9, pp. 9&97, 107.


system in the form of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, meant that the Soviet Union was, in fact, a threat to the autonomy of others.

This was complemented by a current in Soviet foreign policy which sought to promote and safeguard status. This resulted not only in a profound dispute with China over the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s role as the leading force of the world communist movement, but, more importantly, led to a constant reaffir- mation of the USSR’s equal rank alongside the US. In that Washington was seen to be taking a leading part in world affairs, Moscow, by virtue of its performance in World War II, its position in Europe, and the attainment of strategic nuclear parity, considered itself as deserving of a similar role. This desire for equality of status found expression not only in the summitry and detente of the Brezhnev period, but also in the claim of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in 1971 that “there is not a single important question today which could be settled without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it,“R0 which underpinned over a decade of competitive expansion in the Third World.

Underlying economic weakness, however, and an unsustainable level of military expenditure led, during the Gorbachev period, to the unravelling of the two props upon which Soviet autonomy and status were based. The consequent failure of perestroika to reverse economic decline, in turn, resulted, as noted above, in greater Soviet involvement in the international economy. This, in turn, was coupled with greater obligations stemming from adherence to international disarmament measures and a reversal of the Soviet Union’s long-standing uncooperativeness toward institutions such as the UN and the CSCE in favor of a more regulated relationship. Moreover, the USSR’s regional and global status was also revised in light of the termination of Soviet hegemony in East-Central Europe and the abandonment of an assertive Third World policy. The “deideologization” of foreign policy, in addition, entailed an end to the notion that the acquisition of prestige was a zero-sum game played with the US and meant the effective abandonment of Moscow’s communist internationalism (and hence, ideological competition with China).

Many of these constraints now also operate upon Russia, particularly in those areas, such as disarmament, where it is bound by the treaty obligations of its predecessor. Moreover, the desultory performance of the Russian economy has limited foreign policy options in ways ranging from an inability to maintain an adequate diplomatic service or extend aid abroad to the necessity of cutting military expenditure and curtailing overseas military missions (naval patrols, basing facilities etc.). It has also introduced a degree of dependence upon other states and international organizations, a trend which (as noted above) in turn invites domestic disapproval.

In response to these limitations (and domestic criticisms), the Russian leadership has sought to guard its autonomy and prestige in areas where this is feasible. A defence of its status has been apparent, for example, in an insistence that Russia is a “great power” by virtue of what Yeltsin has described as the country’s “history, its place in the world, and its material and spiritual potential.“*’ Indeed, both Yeltsin and Kozyrev have gone further in suggesting that Russia’s rejection of the

80. Praoda, April 4, 1971. 81, Yeltsin’s speech to the VIth Congress or Pcoplc’s Dcputics, Diplornalicheskii ueslnik, No. 8 (April 30,

1992), pp. 65.

262 COMMUNIST AXD POST-COMNNIST STUDIES

USSR’s totalitarian and communist past gives the country the added status of being a democratic and “normal” power permitting its full acceptance into the “civilized society” of nations .H:, More practically, the recognition of Russia both by the former Soviet states (with the qualified exception of Ukraine) and the wider international community as the legal successor of the Soviet Unio$’ has conferred upon it ultimate command of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, both of which involve a central role in international affairs and preserve a key relationship with the US.84 In other areas Russia has bluntly rejected what are perceived as overt encroachments of foreign powers, as in the case of Japan’s linkage of bilateral assistance to a settlement of the Kurile question and the imposition by the US of sanctions against Russian firms for engaging in sales of rocket technology to India. Perhaps Russia’s greatest compensation, however, can be found in relations with the former Soviet states, where its freedom of action is far less circumscribed and where it remains a dominant regional power. Its assertive policies toward the Baltics and the Ukraine (and to a lesser degree toward Georgia and Moldova) combined with its leading role in nascent CIS mechanisms, peacekeeping operations, and the preservation of economic linkages arguably serves as a surrogate for its limited influence in the wider world.

Conclusion

Much in Russian foreign policy is at present uncertain. In that policy priorities have been closely associated with Yeltsin and Kozyrev, and subject to much domestic criticism, the departure of these figures from office might signal the initiation of a less accommodating policy toward both the West and the successor states. The more likely scenario of the dismissal or resignation of Kozyrev alone, could be the occasion of a similar trend as Yeltsin, in an attempt to appease domestic criticism and win greater support for economic reform, seeks to pursue a harder line abroad. Significantly, during 1992 the Russian President has shown an ambiguous attitude toward his Foreign Minister, offering support on many occasions, but also openly rebuking him and the Foreign Ministry on others for poor organization and passiv- ity in defending Russian interests .x5 Moreover, possible successors to Kozyrev, such as V. Lukin, Ambassador to the US, have put a similar case, arguing in favor of a less pro-Western policy.8fi The emergence of such a line would complicate progress in matters such as disarmament and debt repayment and could lead to controversy on issues ranging from the Balkans to arms sales. Similarly, a new course toward the successor states, where the scope of Russian action is clearly far greater, might result in several developments, including heightening tension with Ukraine and the Baltics and the complete abandonment of the CIS in favor of selective multilateral and bilateral relations.

82. Yeltsin’s speech tu thr Russian Supreme Soviet in Diplomalicherkii xrlnik, No. 4-5 (February 29-March 15, 1992), p, 70; Kozyrrv’s s pccch to the Council of Europe in ihid. No. 9-10 (May 15-31, 1992), pp. 19-20.

83. British Prime Minister John Major, Ibr example, in a lcttcr to Yeltsin rccognizcd “the continuity of statehood between Russia and the kmcr USSR.” The Independenl, December 24, 1991.

84. Yrltsin has rcf’crrrd to this as one of Russia’s initial foreign policy achicvcments. See L@lo- malicheskii ~er&ik, No. 4-5 (Februq 29-March 15, 1992), p. 4.

85. Izueska, October 27, 1992. 86. Scr note 75.


Yeltsin’s failed assertion of authority over the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies at its seventh full session in December, 1992, has increased the likelihood of such a turn. While the framing of foreign policy is a Presidential prerogative, the parliament is responsible for the endorsement of international treaties and has advocated far less accommodatory policies. This has not only rendered problematic the ratification of recent agreements such as START 2, but has compelled Yeltsin to modify foreign policy, evident in the emergence of a more critical attitude toward US policies on Iraq and Serbia. This does not by any means signal a return to revived East-West hostility, but does suggest that what Kozyrev has described as the “romantic period” of Russia’s relations with the West is drawing to a close.“7

87. Mowm News, No. 43 (1992), p. 3. Th’ IS conclusions is bawd on an asscssmcnt of cvrnts up to the time of writing-March, 1993.

the emergence of the foreign policy of the russian federation

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