the elusive peace accord in the chittagong hill tracts of bangladesh and the plight of the...

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The Elusive Peace Accord inthe Chittagong Hill Tracts ofBangladesh and the Plight ofthe Indigenous PeopleDr. Ishtiaq Jamil a & Pranab Kumar Panday ba Department of Administration and OrganizationTheory , University of Bergen , Norwayb Department of Public and SocialAdministration , City University of Hong KongPublished online: 05 Nov 2008.

To cite this article: Dr. Ishtiaq Jamil & Pranab Kumar Panday (2008) The ElusivePeace Accord in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh and the Plight of theIndigenous People, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 46:4, 464-489, DOI:10.1080/14662040802461141

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The Elusive Peace Accordin the Chittagong Hill Tractsof Bangladesh and the Plightof the Indigenous People

ISHTIAQ JAMIL� & PRANAB KUMAR PANDAY��

�Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen, Norway,� �Department of Public and Social Administration, City University of Hong Kong

ABSTRACT The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord, signed in 1997, promised toend a long-standing armed conflict and grant a host of benefits to the indigenouspeople occupying the south-eastern region of Bangladesh. After a decade theaccord has yet to bear fruit; it remains unimplemented and the suffering, misery,subordination, and exploitation of the indigenous people continue. Our studyreveals that the accord has failed to protect the indigenous communities fromharassment and violence inflicted upon them by law enforcement agencies andBangali settlers. Political instability and the lack of a firm political commitmenthave crippled the accord, thus the hopes and aspirations that accompanied ithave withered. This has resulted in serious consequences for the indigenouspeople: intra-group rivalry and conflicts, fragmentation within the communities, adwindling economy and stagnating social and human development due to thepoor healthcare and education sectors. This paper describes the political situationin the Chittagong Hill Tracts before and after the accord was signed, thepolitical and social ills and suffering it promised to resolve, and concludes byoutlining a possible way forward.

Commonwealth & Comparative Politics

Vol. 46, No. 4, 464–489, November 2008

Correspondence Addresses: Dr. Ishtiaq Jamil, Associate Professor, Department of Administration

and Organization Theory, University of Bergen, Norway; Pranab Kumar Panday, PhD candidate,

Department of Public and Social Administration, City University of Hong Kong and Associate

Professor (on study leave), Department of Public Administration, Rajshahi University,

Bangladesh. Email: [email protected]

1466-2043 Print/1743-9094 Online/08/040464–26 # 2008 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/14662040802461141

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Introduction

In 1997 the government of Bangladesh signed a peace treaty, theChittagongHill

Tracts Peace Accord (CHT Peace Accord), with the representative of the indi-

genous people. The accord, also called treaty, although vehemently opposed

by the main opposition party, was considered a milestone in the history of Ban-

gladesh.1 It promised a number of benefits to the south-eastern region and to its

indigenous people – it would end the long-standing armed conflict over the

region’s autonomy and facilitate socio-economic development. Until the treaty

was signed, the indigenous people in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT),2 also collec-

tively known as Jumma, were subjected to misery, harassment and exploitation

by both law enforcement agencies and government-sponsored armed groups of

Bangali (Bengali) settlers. There were frequent serious human rights violations:

murder, rape, torture, imprisonment and deprivation of homes and livelihoods. In

their suffering, the indigenous people organised themselves and rose in armed

struggle, mainly under the banner of Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati

Samiti (PCJSS);3 they demanded regional autonomy in order to live a dignified

and normal life.

Autonomy, it was argued, would protect them from misery and exploitation,

and reduce armed confrontation between the government of Bangladesh and

PCJSS. The CHT Peace Accord4 was signed on 2 December 1997 by these

two parties. Yet even after a decade it seems not to have borne fruit. In order

to analyse the extent to which the accord has been implemented and to see

how it has benefited the indigenous people, this paper (i) describes the situation

of the indigenous people in the CHT before the accord was signed, (ii) analyses

the context in which the accord was signed and the process of its implemen-

tation and (iii) discusses the impact of the accord on the region and how it

has benefited the indigenous people. In sum, the major objective of this paper

is to analyse the ‘before and after’ situation of the peace accord. It concludes

by outlining a possible way forward.

Methodology

This paper is based mainly on secondary data. Two sources in particular have

been explored and reviewed: first, published articles on indigenous people of

the CHT; second, reports from human rights organisations and newspaper

articles. The latter were studied in order to map some of the empirical inci-

dents which give indications of the indigenous people’s lives before and

after the accord. Finally, proceedings from several conferences on the indigen-

ous community have also been reviewed.

Primary data has been used to substantiate secondary data and is mainly

derived from discussions with academics and researchers with first-hand

The Plight of the Indigenous People in Bangladesh 465

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experience of the problems and issues in the CHT. These discussions, mostly

informal, reveal the history and geo-political characteristics of the region,

inter- and intra-ethnic relations and conflicts, and the hopes, aspirations and

frustrations before and after the accord’s signing. The CHT is a remote

region lacking infrastructure. Decades of armed conflict have rendered it

quite unsafe for researchers, development workers and news media,5 and

this has resulted in a lack of research and in-depth analysis on the region.

Conceptual Issues

Indigenous People: Definition

A precise definition or identification of ‘indigenous people’ is difficult to

determine, inasmuch as the culture of each particular indigenous community

is incredibly varied and histories and current circumstances vary from

country to country. In determining a working definition, however, several

characteristics should be taken into consideration. Some noteworthy charac-

teristics would be (i) lineage from population groups in a given area, primarily

before modern nation states or territories were created and before modern

borders were defined; (ii) maintenance of cultural and social identities, and

social, economic, cultural and political institutions separate from mainstream

or dominant societies and cultures; (iii) self-identification and identification by

others as being part of a distinct indigenous cultural group, and the expression

of a desire to preserve that cultural identity; (iv) a linguistic identity different

from that of the dominant society; (v) social, cultural, economic and political

traditions and institutions distinct from the dominant culture; (vi) economic

systems oriented more toward traditional systems of production than those

found in the mainstream culture; (vii) unique ties to traditional habitats and

ancestral territories and to natural resources in those habitats and territories.

In some cases, tribal groups or cultural minorities have in recent centuries

migrated into areas to which they are not indigenous; they nevertheless

have established a presence and continue to maintain a definite and separate

social and cultural identity and related social institutions. In such cases, the

second identifying characteristic would carry greater weight (Retrieved

from http://www.adb.org/documents/Policies/Indigenous_Peoples/ippp-

002.asp).

Indigenous people are also described with reference to their ways of life.

In many cases they live in separated communities or cultural or ethnic group-

ings. Such are located in areas geographically distant from urban centres and

tend to function at the periphery of the political, social, cultural and economic

systems of the dominant or mainstream society. As a working definition, it

may be argued that indigenous people should be regarded as those with a

466 Ishtiaq Jamil & Pranab Kumar Panday

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social or cultural identity distinct from the dominant or mainstream society,

often marginalised by the mainstream society in terms of social and economic

power, and susceptible to being disadvantaged in development programmes

and processes.

Indigenous People in Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Brief Introduction

Before discussing the situation of indigenous people in the CHT, it is essential to

elaborate briefly on the indigenous people in Bangladesh in general. In Bangla

(the Bengali language), indigenous people are frequently identified as Adivasi

(original inhabitant). The indigenous people of Bangladesh are required to be

recognised by this name and not by any disparaging slang. In Bangladesh

there are about 49 different indigenous communities living in the plains and

hill areas (Uddin, 2006: 6).6 Since few ethnographical studies of the indigenous

people of Bangladesh exist, it is difficult to present a precise number. The indi-

genous people comprise approximately 2 per cent of the total population, who

subsist and survive in more or less every part of the country. A government

survey has projected the total number of indigenous people to be 632,216.

Among them, 44 per cent are Buddhist, 24 per cent are Hindu, 13 per cent

are Christian and the remaining 19 per cent are classified as ‘other’. Some,

however, consider this figure to be intentionally kept low in order to demon-

strate the marginality of the indigenous people. It has also been asserted that

the number of indigenous people living on the plains and in the hill tracts

could be more than 2.5 million (Uddin, 2006: 6).

The CHT covers about 10 per cent of the total area of Bangladesh. It is home

to about 13 different indigenous communities7 among which Chakma, Marma

and Tripura constitute about 90 per cent. The Chakma, who make up almost

half of the hill tracts people, are usually Buddhists and have their own

language. Their ancestors migrated from the Arakan Province of Myanmar

long ago. Marma, also known by the disparaging name Mugh, originated

from Arakan. They are also predominantly Buddhist but some are animists.

The Tripura are Hindus. The indigenous people of the Sajek Valley, the

Pankho, the Bom, the Mizo and the Lusai, have become Christians through

the influence of missionaries.8 The Mru, Sak and Khyang are animists. The

Tonchonga and Brong are sub-groups of Chakma and Tripura. Most of the

indigenous people of CHT migrated into the area from the south between

the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Starting from the seventeenth

century, when Bangali settlers arrived on the coast of Chittagong, the indigen-

ous people moved further into the hills. During the British Raj in India, the

indigenous people of the CHT were less distrupted than were the majority

Bangali communities. In 1860 the British established a superintendent of

police in the area, but for revenue collection purposes, three indigenous


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chiefs were recognised as kings. These were from the Khagrachhori,

Bandarbon and Rangamati districts9 of CHT and represented three major indi-

genous CHT groups. The kings tax farmed for the British and for themselves,

and ruled the CHT people on behalf of the British government. The CHT Fron-

tier Police Regulation of 1881 endorsed a police force drawn from the hill

people. The most significant legislation formulated by the British for the

self-rule of the CHT was however the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation of

1900. This demarcated categories of land, notably khas land,10 and purposely

excluded non-hill people from settling in the hill areas.

Pre-Treaty Situation of Indigenous People in CHT:

Beginning of the Conflict

During the period of British India, CHT had the special status of an autono-

mously administered district that was safeguarded by the CHT Regulation

of 1900.11 As intimated above, the regulation barred sale and transfer of

land to non-indigenous people.

After the partition of British India in 1947, such special status and immigra-

tion restrictions were eliminated under an amendment to the Pakistani Consti-

tution in 1963, resulting in the ‘systemic abuse and misappropriation of the

land and resources’ attended by large-scale state-sponsored migration of

Bangali settlers into the CHT – the Jumma cultivators’ livelihoods have

thus deteriorated and the outcome has proved to ‘cruelly crush on [sic] the

identity, culture, religion and aspirations of the hill people’ (Singh, 1996:

129). The scarcity and paucity of cultivable land and the pressure of popu-

lation increase induced large numbers of non-tribal people to migrate to the

CHT (Ramasubramanian, 2005).12 Furthermore, the building of the Kaptai

Hydro-Electric Project (1959–63) during the Pakistan period flooded

54,000 acres – nearly 40 per cent – of the most excellent agricultural land,

and relocated about 100,000 indigenous people, mostly from among the

Chakmas (Ramasubramanian, 2005; Hussain, 1999).13

The emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 witnessed the burgeoning of a hom-

ogenous Bangali nationalism; citizens of Bangladesh were defined as Bengali

(or Bangali in the local language) in the constitution, yet there was no recog-

nition of a separate status or identity for the indigenous people. This engen-

dered ethnic conflict in the CHT. The struggle was spearheaded when the

armed wing (Shanti Bahini, meaning ‘peace force’) of the People’s Solidarity

Association (PCJSS) was established in 1972. As soon as the struggle intensi-

fied, the government began relocating Bengalis in the CHT in order to increase

the number of non-tribals in the area and to shift the demographic pattern and

balance of power. One report suggests that about ‘400,000 Bangalis were sent

to the CHT, both to ease the strain on the land in other parts of Bangladesh and


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to weaken the supremacy of the hill people in CHT’ (Ramasubramanian,

2005). In 1975, when the indigenous people intensified their armed resistance,

the government chose a military solution and reassigned nearly a third of the

Bangladesh army to the CHT. As armed conflict between the security forces

and Shanti Bahini escalated, communal harmony between the tribals and

‘new’ Bangali settlers deteriorated further. Carnage committed by settlers

and the security forces since 1980 has led to a mass exodus of the tribal popu-

lation across the border to Tripura in India (Ramasubramanian, 2005).

Movement towards Autonomy: Formation of Political Organisation

The earliest political organisation among CHT communities was under the

aegis of the Chakma Jubok Samiti (Chakma Youth Association) in 1915, fol-

lowed by the establishment of the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samiti (CHT

Peoples Association) in 1920. In 1966 a student organisation called the

CHT Welfare Association was formed under the leadership of J.B. Larma

and Ananta Bihari Khisa. This gave birth to the Rangamati Communist

Party in 1970 (Dictaan-Bang-oa, 2004: 4). After Bangladesh’s independence,

the PCJSS was formed in 1972, with the aim of achieving regional autonomy

for CHT indigenous people as they themselves envisioned it.14 The Shanti

Bahini (Peace Brigade) was formed as the armed wing of the PCJSS in

1972, with the intention of defending against terrorist attack, rape, torture

and looting by Bangali settlers and armed forces (Singh, 1996: 132). In

1975 conditions were such that General Ziaur Rahman’s administration,15 in

the name of ‘national security’, increased the military presence in the area,

and since then the CHT has been a fully militarised region (Dictaan-

Bang-oa, 2004: 4).

Of the many CHT issues, one major problem is that successive governments

have tried to solve an inherently political and ethnic problem through military

solutions. The problem was initially dealt with through economic develop-

ment programmes, and as a response the then government formed the CHT

Development Board in 1976. Yet these development programmes were run

by the military and geared towards reinforcing its power in the area; the pro-

grammes thus amplified prejudice, alienated the CHT people and increased

their penury. In addition to this, between 1979 and 1984, 400,000 Bangalis

were resettled in the CHT in exchange for land, cash and other incentives

(Roy, 2000).16

Government Initiatives to Resolve the Problem

Since independence, numerous efforts have been initiated by successive

Bangladeshi governments to try to resolve armed clashes in the CHT. A


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committee under the auspices of the Tribal Convention was formed in 1977 in

order to intercede between the government and the PCJSS. This effort was

however disrupted due to internal strictures within the PCJSS and the murder

of President Ziaur Rehman in 1981. A further significant disruption to conflict

resolution was when the government promulgated the Disturbed Area Act in

1980, which gave legal sanction to military carnage in the CHT (Singh,

1996). This act was passed just after the Kalampati (Kaukhali)17 slaughter, in

which some 300 indigenous people were reported to have been killed when

the army opened fire on an assembly discussing the reconstruction of a Buddhist

temple. The Ershad government in 1982 declared the CHT a special economic

zone and offered general amnesty to the PCJSS/SB (1983 and 1985). From

1985 to 1988 a series of dialogues took place between the PCJSS and the gov-

ernment to resolve the CHT crisis (Dictaan-Bang-oa, 2004: 6).18

Although these talks were generally unsuccessful, they sometimes resulted

in limited agreements between the two sides. One such occasion was in 1985,

when the government of General Ershad and a breakaway faction of the

PCJSS headed by Priti Kumar Chakma agreed to the surrender of some 300

fighters, who accepted a rehabilitation plan offered by the government. The

plan was however discarded by J.B. Larma, head of the PCJSS. Further

meetings between General Ershad’s government and a committee represent-

ing elements from the CHT resulted in the establishment of three Hill

District Councils (HDCs), in Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban in

1989, each composed of a two-thirds tribal majority with a tribal chairperson.

The councils – still functioning – have limited administrative and supervisory

authority over a number of government departments including fisheries, agri-

culture, small and cottage industries, public health and primary education

(Ramasubramanian, 2005: 4).

Establishment of HDCs failed to gain the confidence of the majority of the indi-

genous people since it only provided ‘limited autonomy’ (Ramasubramanian,

2005: 4) and did not address crucial issues such as the land question, refugees

and internally displaced people, or the issue of limited administrative jurisdic-

tion. Moreover, the allocation of council seats to a specific group is dispropor-

tionate to the actual number of people in that group, For example, the

Chakmas, while constituting the majority of the total CHT population (over

48 per cent) have 33 per cent of district council seats, while the Marma and

the non-indigenous people (Bangalis) are given 32 and 30 per cent respect-

ively – more than their demographic composition (Dictaan-Bang-oa, 2004:

7). All things considered, the HDCs have largely been marginalised.

A multi-party committee made up of representatives from the Bangladesh

Nationalist Party (BNP), the Awami League (AL) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)

was established by the government in 1992 in order to resolve the CHT

dilemma. In return, the PCJSS agreed to a one-sided ceasefire. Seven


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rounds of talks were allegedly held between the committee and the PCJSS

(1992–96) under the auspices of the BNP-led government, yet without tangi-

ble outcome (Ramasubramanian, 2005: 4).

Following up the dialogue attempts, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (1996–

2001) set up the National Committee on CHT in October 1996, to reinitiate the

peace process. The first meeting between the 12-member committee and the

PCJSS was held in December of that year, followed by other meetings. This

was the last series of negotiations between the government and the PCJSS,

concluding in December 1997 (Dictaan-Bang-oa, 2004: 8). The talks resulted

in the signing of a peace treaty on 2 December 1997 between the National

Committee and the PCJSS, in the presence of Prime Minister Sheikh

Hasina. The signing of the accord was an important achievement for both

the Bangladeshi government and the tribal representatives.

The CHT Peace Accord of 1997 and its Implementation Status

The CHT Accord of 1997 promised (i) land rights to the indigenous people;

(ii) revival of their cultural identities; (iii) rehabilitation of internally displaced

people and refugees who left the country; (iv) withdrawal of military from the

CHT, with the exception of permanent military establishments; (v) self-

government through regional and district councils (Chhakchhuak, 2004).

These measures were a welcome relief from the more than 20 years of hos-

tility and attacks on the Jumma people. Although most of the indigenous com-

munities viewed the accord as a step towards autonomy, voices within the

PCJSS heavily criticised many aspects of it. Particularly scathing was the

view expressed by a faction of its student organisation – the faction later

formed the United Peoples Democratic Front (UPDF) – which described

the accord as a ‘sell-out’. Notwithstanding, the peace accord enhanced the

image of the Bangladesh government in the international arena and earned

then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina the UNESCO Peace Prize in 1999

(Dictaan-Bang-oa, 2004: 8). The accord speaks to four major issues in the

CHT: (i) the devolution of power to the Hill District Councils, Regional Coun-

cils and the CHT Ministry as the units of self-government in the CHT; (ii) the

establishment of a land commission to deal with conflicts over land and natural

resource rights; (iii) recognition of the cultural integrity of the indigenous

peoples and the CHT as a ‘tribal’ area, and, finally, (iv) the withdrawal of

military forces from CHT and the decommissioning and rehabilitation of

the Jana Samhati Samiti (JSS) forces. Although the government has amended

existing laws to provide for the implementation of the peace accord, the

accord faces a number of difficulties that require urgent and continued attention.

As Rupayan Dewan, a leading member of the PCJSS, asserts: ‘I was not happy

with the agreement . . . But we have appreciated the global situation . . . People


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want peace . . . The current administration was open to the idea, so we grabbed

the opportunity’ (cited in Rovillos, 1999: 5).

Although more than a decade has passed since the signing of the CHT Peace

Accord on 2 December 1997, discontent persists in the region because the gov-

ernment has not fully implemented it. The accord ended two decades of bush

war and sought to satisfy the indigenous people by involving them in the local

administration, but their participation in the decision-making process remains

negligible. The hill people are unhappy that the army presence in the region

continues despite the peace accord; moreover, it has virtually divided the indi-

genous people into two groups – one opposing it and the other still hoping it

will be implemented in full. Since the accord was signed, over 500 people

belonging to the two groups have been killed and more than 1,000 injured

in clashes between them. About 1,000 people from the two groups have

been kidnapped. The CHT region also witnessed a rise in extortion by local

gangs backed by the feuding groups (The Daily Star, 1 December 2004). Com-

plaints about the government’s non-implementation are numerous. J. B.

Larma, president of the JSS and current chairperson of the CHT Regional

Council, has repeatedly complained, and in no uncertain terms, about non-

implementation of the accord (Roy, 2003: 3).19 He is on record as having

said the following:

[Though] more than five years have passed after the signing of the

Accord, most of the provisions, especially the main issues of the

Accord, such as, formation of Land Commission for settling the land

disputes, rehabilitation of returnee Jumma refugees and internally dis-

placed Jumma families, withdrawal of temporary camps of security

forces and military administration, preparing voter list only with the per-

manent residents of CHT, effective enforcement of the three [hill district

councils] and the CHT Regional Council Act, rehabilitation of the Ban-

galii settlers outside CHT and etc. have either [been] left unimplemented

or partially implemented. (Larma, 2003, cited in Roy, 2003: 3)

In addition to Larma, many others have articulated discontent with the

process of implementing the accord (Corpuz, 2000). Several critics view it

as disappointing in not having brought total peace and for its delegated

system of self-government that seems to be lacking teeth. Others have ques-

tioned its content and timing, asserting that, as with similar accords, it was

too little, too late and too loud (Samaddar, 1999: 8). In a similar vein, a

well-known CHT analyst expressed foreboding over the success of the

accord, even before a year had passed from the date of its signing. She

claimed it was seeded with insecurity, discontent, inequality and further polar-

isation (Mohsin, 1998: 107, cited in Roy, 2003).


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Bangla-speaking settlers in the region have added another dimension to the

discontent by launching a movement against the accord; it has, they allege,

made them second class citizens. The settlers also opposed the PCJSS

which signed the accord with the previous Awami League government

(1996–2001). Sama Odhikar Andolon (Equal Rights Movement) carried out

several demonstrations demanding cancellation of the accord.20

Although the peace accord led to the formation of the CHT Regional

Council and the Ministry of CHT Affairs, the council lacks powers as envi-

saged in the accord. Initially, the Awami League government implemented

many of its clauses but a change of government slowed the implementation

process. After coming to power in 2001, the BNP chose not to cancel the

accord due to donor pressure,21 but it has moved slowly. Although assuring

the PCJSS of implementation, it has thus far only appointed a chairman for

the Task Force for Rehabilitation of Returnee Refugees and increased the

tenure of the land commission by three years from 2003. People of the hill dis-

tricts believe the partial implementation of the accord has brought them no

benefit. The accord has pitted the PCJSS against the UPDF, an anti-accord

party of the indigenous people. The PCJSS, according to The Daily Star (1

December 2004), was preparing to launch a campaign of agitation demanding

an end to the problem of settlers, army withdrawal, and the introduction of

primary education in mother tongues as guaranteed in the accord. Along

with this, it demanded the appointment of an indigenous person as a full

minister of the Ministry of CHT Affairs, a properly functioning CHT land

commission, activation of the Taskforce for Rehabilitation of Returnee

Refugees, a voters’ list of permanent residents in the CHT, election to the

regional council and Hill District Councils, and appointment of an indigenous

person as head of the CHT Development Board.

Impact of CHT Peace Accord on the Situation of Indigenous

People in CHT

Indigenous CHT communities still find themselves in a difficult situation with

regard to increasing human rights violations. The BNP-led coalition (2001–

06),22 from the very first day of forming its government, violated basic

clauses of the accord. What is more, minority and indigenous peoples, particu-

larly the Hindu community, were under great threat during the tenure of the

BNP government (Talukder, 2005: 2). From what we can glean from available

information, the human rights situation in the CHT is still precarious and

violent. In this section, the impact of the 1997 peace accord on the situation

of indigenous people in CHT will be discussed in relation to the following

issues: (i) using the military as a means for solving the problems; (ii) land

snatching; (iii) rapid growth of the Muslim community; (iv) harassment of


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indigenous leaders; (v) rehabilitation of returnee Jumma refugees and intern-

ally dislodged Jummas; (vi) free rations to plains settlers: an act of racial dis-

crimination; (vii) illegal settler-oriented development.

Use of Military to Solve the Problem

From the very beginning the BNP-led government was more inclined to solve

the CHT’s political problems by military means. Although the accord stated

that all the temporary army camps, Ansars and the Village Defence Force

(VDP) should be withdrawn, no time limit was fixed. Consequently, even

after a decade of the accord’s signing, only 31 out of 500 security forces

camps have been withdrawn. Human rights violations against Jumma

people – killing, torture and rape – are still alleged to be committed by the

army, and now in some areas the army has reopened check-posts to control

the movements of the Jumma people.

On 26 August 2003, Bangladesh army and illegal plains settlers comple-

tely burnt down ten indigenous Jumma villages under Mahalchari

Upazilla (sub-district) under Khagrachari district. Hundreds of indigen-

ous Jumma peoples fled from their villages and were displaced. A nine

month old baby, Kiriton Chakma, was snatched from his grandmother

and strangled to death in front of her. The grandmother was then

raped by Bangladesh army personnel. The illegal plains settlers and

security forces also raped about 10 other Jumma women and girls.

Two parliamentary teams – one from the ruling Bangladesh National

Party and the other from the opposition political party, the Awami

League – visited the affected areas on 8 and 9 September 2003 respect-

ively. The United Nations Development Program also made an assess-

ment of the damages. Yet justice and effective rehabilitation eluded

the victims. (Talukder, 2005: 2)

The army’s ongoing presence has also resulted in serious human rights vio-

lations. On 23 August 2004, Rinku Chakma, a UPDF supporter, was killed in

military custody in Matiranga of Khagrachari district, after being subjected to

serious torture at the Matiranga bazaar in full public view. On 6 August 2004,

five members of UPDF were arrested under false accusations (No. G.R. 167/04)

at Khagrachari23 police station.24 Mithun Chakma and Rupan Chakma,

president and vice president of the Hill Students Council respectively, and

Sonali Chakma, president of the Hill Watch Human Rights Forum, were bru-

tally beaten with firewood. The arrest and torture of ordinary Jummas are com-

monplace occurrences, as reported by the Asian Centre for Human Rights

(ACHR, 2004).


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Even after the restoration of democracy in 1991, the administration and

maintenance of law and order in the CHT are still very much under military

control. The army, entrusted through an administrative order (Operation

Uttoron), still holds supreme jurisdiction over general administration and con-

tinues to conduct military operations throughout the CHT (AITPN, 2004).

Land Snatching

Our lands, forests and territories have been and are still being taken

away without our free, prior and informed consent, to build so-called

‘Reserve Forests’, ‘Protected Areas’, ‘National Parks’, ‘Eco-parks’,

tourism, and even for establishing military bases and training centres.

In 1960, the Kaptai Dam flooded our lands and homes and even today

many of our people remain un-rehabilitated. (Talukder, 2005)

In 1979 the government of Bangladesh undertook a drastic programme to

resettle Bangali Muslims from the plain districts to the CHT, in order to out-

number the Jummas and evict them from their ancestral land. Thousands of

indigenous people were consequently displaced. The government-sponsored

Bangali settlers have been occupying the lands of the Jummas and committing

ethnocide with the direct help of the government. There are several recent

cases of land snatching in the CHT area. One such example was the snatching

by force of 25 acres of Jumma land at Hatimari village under Burighat mouza

in Rangamati district by a group of illegal plains setters under the leadership of

Md. Wahab from Burighat in December 2007. Apart from this case, illegal

plains setters with the help of the army forcibly took a total of 399.22 acres

of land belonging to 133 Jumma individuals and a primary school under

four Unions of Mahalchari police station and Khagracharu Sadar police

station of Kagrachari district during March 2007 to November 2007

(ACHR, 2008). This is one of the tactics adopted by successive governments

to drive the Jummas from their ancestral land and to spread Islam in the region.

We can refer to the government of Bangladesh’s decision to acquire of 9,560

acres of land for the extension of Ruma Garrison in three mouzas of Galenga,

Pamtola and Sengum under Ruma Upazilla in Bandarban district. Out of the

total land to be acquired, 1,569.06 acres belong to the indigenous peoples

and 4,000 acres belong to the Forest Department; 4,315 indigenous people

from 644 families would be displaced as a result of implementation of this

project. It is important to state here that a report of the joint study team of

Bandarban District Administration and the Bangladesh Military pointed out

in 1988 that implementation of such a project would have devastating effect

on the local indigenous people (CHTnews.com, 2008).


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In fact land grabbing continued throughout the CHT area after the accord

was signed:

For instance, the military authority and the government have taken

initiative to acquire 183 acres of land for the expansion of Bandarban

Brigade Headquarters, 56,000 acres of land to establish a new Artillery

Training Centre and a new Air Force Training Centre and 50 acres of

land for the expansion of Longadu Military Zone without any prior

consent, either from the Hill District Councils or from the CHT Regional

Council. (Talukder, 2005)

On 1 January 2005, Bangali Muslim settlers from Maischari Cluster Village

in Khagrachari district, with the help of army, constructed houses on land

owned by indigenous Jummas at Gamaridhala area under Khagrachari

Upazila. Furthermore, since the accord was signed, Bangali Muslim settlers,

aided by security forces, made at least six large-scale communal attacks on

the Jumma people with the intention to occupy land. In these attacks, 1,056

houses were either burnt down or damaged and 12 women were raped

(ACHR, 2004).

At around 11 p.m. on 3 August 2004, about 50 Bangali settlers from

Kalabanya of Aimachara Union, led by Union Parishad (Council)

member Tamir Ali, launched a brutal attack on Barun Kumar Chakma

and his family members from Dhandachara village of Bhushanchara

Union under Barkal Thana in Rangamati hill district. Barun Kumar

Chakma was killed on the spot. [His] wife, Subarna Chakma, and son,

Kampan Chakma, were brought to Rangamati hospital, about 50 miles

away from the victims’ village on 4 August 2004. Subarna Chakma

succumbed to her injuries while Kampan Chakma was referred to the

Chittagong Medical College Hospital. (ACHR, 2004)

The root of the CHT crisis lies in the policies of the government of

Bangladesh, which seeks to establish a homogenous Bangali Muslim

society by destroying the ethnic identity of the indigenous Jumma people.

About 500,000 illegal plains settlers were implanted into the CHTs during

1979–83, attracted by inducements. The CHT accord has not only failed to

address the issue of the implanted illegal settlers – the stream of settlers

has intensified (ACHR, 2004).

More than 100 new illegal plain settler families were settled in the lands

of the indigenous Jumma peoples in Lalchari area under Ramgarh

sub-division in Khagrachari hill district in July 2004. As they started


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building foundations for house construction, on 11 July 2004, indigen-

ous Jummas protested and managed to destroy some foundations of

the houses. Hundreds of illegal plain settlers organised a rally in

Ramgarh on 18 July 2004 to protest the incident, under the banner of

the Parbatya Sama Adhikar Andolan (Hill Equal Rights Movement),

an organization of the Muslim settlers. (ACHR, 2004)

Rapid Growth of the Muslim Community

Once a predominantly non-Bangali Muslim area, the CHT region is fast

becoming a Bangali Muslim area as a result of successive governments’

Bangalisation policies. The incursion of outsider Bangali Muslim settlers

into the CHT region began with the creation of Pakistan, yet the Islamisation

policies of the Bangladesh government have exacerbated the situation.

The statistics in Table 1 show this to be the case:

The Bangali Muslim population, only around 2 per cent of the total popu-

lation of the CHT in 1947, has risen to as much as 49 per cent today; the

Jumma population, in 1941 constituting 98 per cent of the total, has dwindled

to as little as 51 per cent (in 2003). If sustained Islamisation policies continue,

the Jumma people may soon become a minority in their own homeland.

It seems obvious that successive governments in Bangladesh are pursuing a

conscious policy of demographically marginalising the Jumma people,

which in turn may disenfranchise them politically and prevent them being

able to achieve regional autonomy and political influence. If the present pol-

icies continue, the Jumma people will soon find themselves in a situation in

which they will have no other option but to flee from the CHT, embrace

Islam or pursue unconstitutional struggle.

Table 1. Increasing trend of non-ethnic Jumma people in CHT (% distribution)

Year Ethnic Jumma people Bangali Muslim/Hindu

1941 98 21951 91 91961 88 121974 77 331981 59 411991 60 392003� 51 49

Source: �Talukder (2005).


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Harassment of Indigenous People

It has been widely reported that indigenous leaders who advocate autonomy

are often victims of oppression by the security agencies. Amnesty Inter-

national has expressed deep concern regarding the harassment of the indigen-

ous political leaders.

In the Year 2005, four leaders of Bangladesh’s indigenous populations –

three of whom are from the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) – have

become the targets of official harassment and intimidation for demand-

ing the fulfilment of the indigenous peoples’ rights. According to news-

paper reports, Mangal Kumar Chakma, Mrinal Kanti Tripura, Ina Hume

and Albert Mankin are to appear before the parliamentary Standing

Committee on the CHT Affairs Ministry in Dhaka for comments they

made at the United Nation’s Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues

in New York in May 2005. A summons to this effect is reportedly

being prepared by the standing committee. It is believed to have been

prompted by allegations sent to the committee through the Bangladeshi

diplomatic mission in the United States alleging that the statements of

the indigenous leaders contained anti-state references. The committee

has said that if the indigenous leaders did not provide satisfactory

answers, legal action would be taken against them.

Amnesty International has studied the statements of the indigenous

leaders to the above-mentioned UN forum and found nothing outside

the remit of their fundamental rights to express their political views

freely and peacefully.25 The issues they have raised are fully compatible

with the purpose of the UN forum and with the provisions of the CHT

peace accords, which were signed in December 1997 between the Gov-

ernment of Bangladesh and representatives of the CHT tribal people.

Their demands for the implementation of the provisions of the peace

accord amounts to nothing more than a legitimate criticism of the gov-

ernment’s failure to fully abide by its obligations within the ambit of the

Peace Accords. (Amnesty International, 2005)

The standing committee’s plan to summon the indigenous leaders may

amount to a politically motivated measure aimed at suppressing the peaceful

expression of their critical views (Amnesty International, 2005). There are

several such cases of harassment of indigenous leaders. Most often it is

done in order to convey the message that no movement towards autonomy

will be accepted by the government. This type of harassment continued

even after the treaty was signed.


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Rehabilitation of Refugees and General Amnesty

In the treaty, general amnesty to refugees was granted, with a promise for

those who fled to India to return to their homes (Chowdhury, 2002). About

43,000 Jumma refugees have thus far returned to the CHT from India’s

Tripura State after the peace accord was signed. In addition, there have

been about 60,000 indigenous internally displaced people (IDPs) between

1992 and 1997. These include people whose neighbours were massacred

and whose homes were burnt down during military operations. The settlers

confiscated their land and in many instances obtained false official certificates

of ownership. About 40 villages of returnee refugees are still under the occu-

pation by the settlers and over 3,000 families did not get their land back

(AITPN, 2004). According to Chowdhury (2002), ‘almost 50 percent of retur-

nees could not return to their own homesteads and native villages because they

failed to get back their homesteads and lands’. Rather than rehabilitating the

returnee Jumma refugees and Jumma IDPs, the Awami League government

(1996–2001) sought rather to identify the illegal settlers – who had in fact dis-

placed the indigenous Jumma people from their homes in the first place – as

‘internally displaced persons’ and provide them with permanent resident

status.

Free Rations for Plains Settlers but not for the Indigenous Jumma

The government of Bangladesh causes dissatisfaction among returned refu-

gees and internally dislodged Jummas by providing free rations mainly to

illegal settlers under various food security schemes supported by UN agencies

and international donors. Many of these settlers have been entitled to free

rations for the last two decades. New settlers are also provided free rations,

whereas the indigenous Jummas who are uprooted from their homes and

suffer human rights violations and criminal acts are denied this entitlement.

The denial of rations to the indigenous Jummas on the basis of ethnic origin

is tantamount to an act of racial discrimination on the part of the government

of Bangladesh (AITPN, 2004).

The practice of discrimination continues even though it is clearly dis-

allowed by the Constitution of Bangladesh; Article 28 proscribes discrimi-

nation based on ‘religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth’ and permits the

government to take ‘special provision in favour of women or children or for

the advancement of any backward section of citizens’ (Constitution of

Bangladesh, 1991). Based on this, the government’s affirmative action for

‘any backward citizens’ should have been aimed at the indigenous Jummas

who have been displaced from their homes. Instead, the government offers

free food rations only to the plains settlers – who dislodged the indigenous


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Jummas by snatching their land and seriously violating their human rights.

This practice undoubtedly breaches Article 28 of the constitution, but also

Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

of Racial Discrimination, to which Bangladesh is a party.

Settler Favouritism in Development Issues

The CHT Peace Accord urges the government to ‘give preference to the

eligible tribal candidates’ when appointing the chairman of the CHT Devel-

opment Board (CHTDB). The BNP government (2001–06) however

appointed Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan26 as chairman. Under Bhuiyan’s leader-

ship, the CHTDB undertook several development programmes biased

mainly towards settlers. In fact, Bhuiyan reportedly sought to issue orders

to provide free rations only to the settlers. When Mani Swapan Dewan,

Deputy Minister for CHT Affairs, refused to toe the line on the rations

issue, he was stripped of his portfolio although he remained a minister

(AITPN, 2004). This indicates the BNP’s bias towards settlers, first by

appointing a non-Jumma as chairman of the CHTDB and, secondly, by

allowing settler-biased development initiatives in the region.

Why are Indigenous Communities Exploited? An Analysis

The preceding discussion leads us to ask why indigenous communities in the

CHT are being brutalised by the Bangali settlers and security agencies despite

being the majority of the population in the region. One part of the answer

could be that the government has lacked willingness to ensure their full

rights and autonomy, and that this has seriously affected full implementation

of the peace accord, in both word and spirit. Another important factor is the

power struggle between several groups within the indigenous communities.

The smaller indigenous groups feel unrepresented and thus dislike the fact

that Shanti Bahini (the political wing of the indigenous guerrilla movement)

is in charge of implementing the peace agreement. Violent conflict between

two Jumma political parties, the PCJSS and the UPDF, have not helped the

situation either, resulting in the killing, maiming and kidnapping of hundreds

of Jumma. These crimes have been perpetrated by both parties. The refusal of

the PCJSS – its aim is to claim itself sole representative of the Jummas – to

engage in dialogue with the UPDF has excluded any possibility for peace. This

is despite the fact that both UPDF activists and JSS cadres have been victims

of atrocities by the Bangladeshi security forces. Ordinary Jummas are thus left

to fend for themselves (ACHR, 2004).

The current intra-indigenous violence is perhaps alleviating pressure on the

indigenous–settler conflict over political rights and natural resources, and is


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weakening the indigenous people in a number of ways. Since the intra-

indigenous conflict is largely concentrated in Chakma-inhabited areas, it is

mostly the Chakma who are the direct victims of violence, but other ethnic

groups are also affected due to restrictions on travel, pressure on businesspeo-

ple and ordinary people to pay ‘contributions’, and so forth. Indigenous CHT

society is therefore becoming increasingly divided, its economy is dwindling

and its social and human development through healthcare, education and train-

ing are stagnating (Roy, 2003: 23).

Top-down versus Bottom-up Policy Processes: A Treaty without National

Consensus or Wider Political Support

At its inception, the CHT Peace Accord truly reflected an elitist and top-down

implementation process, in contrast to a bottom-up approach. The former is

argued to be more suitable in cases where a policy is meant to eventuate

only a few changes, where there is wide consensus on goals and the means

for achieving them (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Hill & Hupe, 2002). In such

cases, the policy is objectively driven and there is a clear division of respon-

sibilities between various stakeholders. The top-down approach is more

administratively regulated through well coordinated units and follows standar-

dised operating procedures. It is appropriate when decisions are routine and

there are well-documented policy success stories. Meanwhile, the scenario

reverses when changes to be brought about by a policy are large and funda-

mental, and when there is little consensus as to the means for achieving

them. The CHT Peace Accord may be said to belong to this category of

policy decision and implementation. It is a novel venture – a pioneering

effort. Its unique nature and the controversy surrounding it would have been

better served by a bottom-up perspective where national consensus among

the country’s political leadership and citizens would have been required

(Rashiduzzaman, 1998: 653).

Since the accord is unique and without precedent, it needed a well organised

and wider discourse, debate and deliberation in appropriate forums such as the

parliament, in its committees or in diverse civil society forums that could

foster nationwide support. Instead, the accord was shrouded in secrecy

during the year-long negotiations with the Shanti Bahini and thus devoid of

public scrutiny. The process preceding the signing of the treaty reflected

more of an elite-oligarchic affair and no scope remained to judge different

opinions and arguments surrounding the issues. As a result, the power and

strength of appropriate and better arguments were not tested against one

another. It was driven from Dhaka with the party in power at its helm.

Hence the accord and its clauses were never tested against opposing claims

and counterarguments. The treaty failed to build trust among political


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parties at the national level as well as among factional groups in the CHT

region.

Had it succeeded, the accord would have not only been a breakthrough in

establishing lasting peace in the region, but would also have given impetus

to conflict resolution in the conflict-ridden and strife-torn south and south-

east Asian region. Unfortunately, the arrogance of the party in power and

non-cooperation by the major political opposition may now have sealed the

accord’s fate. The Awami League followed a top-down policy formulation

and implementation process; its preferences superseded and completely

ignored the arguments and dissatisfaction of other stakeholders, especially

the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Bangali settlers in the CHT. As a

consequence, the accord has lost its force and ‘the power of the best argument

has not prevailed’ (Eriksen & Weigard, 2004).

The accord was a personal commitment of the Awami League leader Sheikh

Hasina, who was the major driving force behind it. It gave her personal glory

and international recognition and was considered to be a milestone for Awami

League politics. There is no denying that the CHT accord was necessary,

appropriate, and a commendable initiative from the Awami League, but ques-

tions remain as to the process of formulation and decision making. An accord

with such a national character should have been anchored widely in the politi-

cal arena and discussed in parliament; since this did not happen, it did not

receive sufficient political support, especially from the main opposition

party, the BNP, which called it the ‘black pact’ (Rashiduzzaman, 1998:

655). Discourse and deliberation around such an important accord were

missing, and many major political actors were absent from important discus-

sions. It was largely initiated, from the beginning to the end, by the Awami

League while in power from 1996 to 2001. The BNP at the very outset was

against it and claimed that any regional autonomy granted to the CHT was

unconstitutional. Neither was the accord well accepted by the Bangali settlers,

who sided with the BNP, and in the shift of political power to the BNP in 2001

the fate of the accord may be said to have been sealed for a long time.

Politics in Bangladesh are characterised by personal rivalries. Decisions of

national concern, however important they may seem, are usually devoid of

discourse and dialogue and bypass the democratic political process. Partici-

pation by stakeholders is not usually welcomed. Since political manoeuvring

is elitist and reflects the leaders’ personal preferences (especially the leader of

the party in power), any opposition is avoided and even suppressed. The

consequences are violent street protests to demonstrate dissatisfaction with

the politics of ‘the government of the day’. Political parties prefer to put

forward their demands through street demonstrations rather than by presenting

them to the parliament. As a result, few decisions reach a national consensus

and enjoy wider political support; most eventually lose vigour, significance


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and relevance with the shift of political power. Policy implementation is there-

fore unstable, fickle and lacking impact. The same may be said for the CHT

accord. With the change of hands in politics, the objectives and purposes of

the accord remain unimplemented. The sufferers in this case are the indigen-

ous people of the CHT, who continue to be victims of a political game played

at the national level by the major political parties.

Conclusion

For two and half decades, that is, since 1975, the indigenous Jumma people of

the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh have been subjected to serious

human rights abuses and massive harassment. The ‘planned population trans-

fer’ of over half a million Bangali plains settlers has worsened the situation

and created a permanent focus for violence between the indigenous Jummas

and those they deem to be illegal settlers; 70,000 Jummas – about 10 per

cent of the total Jumma population – have been forced to seek shelter in

the Tripura State of India (in 1986, 1989 and 1993). Over 10,000 Jumma

refugees were forcibly repatriated by the government of India to the CHT in

February and July of 1994 and in March through April of 1997. The rest

returned after the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord

(Human Rights Features, HRF/11/99, available online at: http://www.hrdc.

net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF11.htm).

The indigenous people and minorities of Bangladesh struggle for survival.

Despite having an ancient history, the indigenous people do not have a

‘present’ and ‘future’. Their daily lives pass in insecurity, uncertainty and dis-

tress. Although it was expected that the 1997 peace accord would protect them

from exploitation and suffering, it has failed to do so and instead is caught in a

political crossfire between the Awami League, which has used it as a means of

partisan capital, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which has denounced

it. The indigenous communities still face exploitation of various types, includ-

ing killing, rape and arson.

From a certain political perspective, one can, of course, consider any politi-

cal treaty as a failure if it does not achieve any of the objectives set for it. And

indeed, many indigenous people of the CHT do regard the 1997 accord as a

failure insofar as it has not brought stability and peace to the region, or pro-

tected their culture and identity. Then again, some feel the accord received

a serious blow when the Awami League lost political power to the BNP.

Regardless of which factor may be more critical to accounting for the

failure, there seems to be a lack of sincere political will to implement the

accord. According to the JSS, it is not the content of the accord but its non-

implementation that is responsible for the current political stalemate.


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The present political situation in Bangladesh involves a so-called caretaker

government backed by the military. It has embarked upon redressing some of

the wrongdoing of leaders, especially massive corruption and abuse of state

power for personal gain by the previous two political regimes – the Awami

League and the BNP. The implementation of the accord does not seem to

be the top priority of the present government, for it insists that its major

task now is to hold general elections at the end of 2008 and to hand over

power to the popularly elected government. This means the accord’s proper

implementation remains with the future government, likely to take the helm

in early 2009. Whatever may be the concerns of the future government of

Bangladesh, it would do well to consider the following issues in order to

reduce the extent of violence in the CHT and to establish peace in the region:

(1) Political ambition and sincere will on the part of the government is needed

to implement the peace accord to ensure more political and social rights to

the indigenous people. At the same time, it should be anchored in the

mainstream politics so that the accord gets due recognition and respect

from all successive governments. Moreover, the government should

think about withdrawal of military camps which would ensure that the

indigenous people do not face further exploitation and unnecessary har-

assment. The government should also consider an end to moving

Bangali Muslims into the CHT, which would also reduce the level of con-

flict between the two groups.

(2) The indigenous people as citizens of the country deserve rights to self-

determination, an end to their identity crisis and return of their property.

In order to ensure these rights, constitutional amendment is necessary

which would give recognition to the indigenous people. Along with con-

stitutional amendment, the government should consider initiating a reha-

bilitation programme for repatriated Jumna refugees and the internally

displaced indigenous people.

(3) International human rights and criminal justice standards should be

observed while maintaining law and order. This means that no one

should be arrested arbitrarily on account of peaceful political activity or

peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of expression as set out in the

International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.

(4) More inclusion and integration of the indigenous people into the main-

stream Bangladesh society should be sought, while at the same time

recognising and respecting their cultural, linguistic and social diversities

and heritage.

(5) The Norwegian model of Sametinget (Sami Parliament) may provide a

role model for how the CHT Peace Accord could be implemented in prac-

tice. The prelude to establishing the Sametinget was the construction of a


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dam on the Alta-Kautekeino River in the late 1970s, yet the decision to

build the dam was made as early as the 1960s and led to massive protests

from the indigenous Sami people. This is very similar to the building of

the Kaptai Dam in the CHT region in the 1960s, which precipitated the

Jumma–settler conflict. The Sametinget – its first elections were in

1989, i.e. representatives are elected directly by the indigenous Sami

people in Norway – is a political organ which enhances the political pos-

ition of the Sami in an equitable and just manner. It has the power to adju-

dicate upon land use and investment in agricultural projects, the

establishment of new businesses and industrial concerns, environment

protection and development. It enables the Sami to protect and develop

their language, culture, heritage and social life. The Sametinget has

entitled the indigenous people of northern Norway to determine their

own destiny, reality and future, and to preserve pride and honour

through political and cultural autonomy.

Notes

1. Bangladesh came into existence on 16 December 1971, after a nine-month-long bloody

war for independence.

2. Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is the only extensive hill area in south-eastern Bangladesh.

It borders on Myanmar to the south-east, the Indian state of Tripura on the north, Mizoram

to the east and Chittagong district to the west. The CHT covers about 13,184 sq km,

approximately one-tenth of the total area of Bangladesh.

3. Chittagong Hill Tracts People’s Solidarity Organization (PCJSS), is one of the leading

organisations of indigenous people in Bangladesh. Its aim is to fight for regional

autonomy.

4. Under the frame of the Constitution of Bangladesh and having fullest and firm confidence

in the sovereignty and integrity of Bangladesh the National Committee on Chittagong

Hill Tracts (CHT) Affairs, on behalf of the government of the People’s Republic of

Bangladesh, and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), on behalf of

the inhabitants of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, with an objective to elevate political,

social, cultural, educational and financial rights and to expedite socio-economic develop-

ment processes of all citizens in CHT, arrived at an agreement on 2 December 1997,

which is called the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord, 1997.

5. In 1984 tribal insurgents kidnapped two experts from Royal Dutch/Shell. In March 1998,

two Bangladeshi security guards employed by the US energy concern United Meridian

Corporation were kidnapped. On both occasions the victims were released after their

respective companies paid huge ransoms (Rashiduzzaman, 1998: 668).

6. These 49 different indigenous communities include: 1. Garo, 2. Khiang, 3. Mro/Murong,

4. Bom, 5. Chakma, 6. Chak, 7. Pankhu/Pankhua, 8. Lusai, 9. Marma/Mog, 10.

Tripura,11. Tonchonga, 12. Rakhain, 13. Khashia, 14. Monipuri, 15. Kuki, 16. Ushai,

17. Lauua, 18. Khumi, 19. Hajong, 20. Banai, 21. Koch, 22. Dalu, 23. Shantal, 24.

Paharia, 25. Munda, 26. Mahato, 27. Shing, 28. Kharia, 29. Khondo, 30. Gorkha/Gurkha, 31. Pahan, 32. Rajuyar, 33. Mushar, 34. Hodi, 35. Palia, 36. Mikir, 37. Rai,

38. Bedia/Bede, 39. Bonojog, 40. Kol, 41. Rajbongshi, 42. Patro, 43. Muriar, 44. Turi,

45. Mahali, 46. Malo, 47. Khatria Barman, 48. Gondo, 49. Kachhari (Uddin, 2006: 6).


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7. These 13 different Indigenous communities include: 1. Chakma, 2. Marma, 3. Pankho,

4. Khumi, 5. Lusai, 6. Murong, 7. Bonojog, 8. Tanchanya, 9. Khyang, 10. Chak, 11.

Tripura, 12. Mro, and 13. Ryang (Uddin, 2006: 6).

8. Sajek Valley, a place in ‘Baghaichhari’ thana of ‘Rangamati district’, is home to 7,500

out of a total of 100,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Chittagong Hill Tracts

(CHT) while the Pankho, the Bom, the Mizo, and the Lusai are the names of tribes in

the CHT.

9. ‘District’ is the administrative unit of Bangladesh.

10. ‘Khas’ is a Bengali term meaning ‘state owned’.

11. According to the CHT Regulation of 1900, the hill tracts were divided into three ‘revenue

circles’, each headed by a rajah (a king). The three circles, known as the Chakma, the

Mong and the Bohmang, were comprised of representatives from all tribes. An hier-

archical system of authority was established: each circle was divided into mouzas (369

mouzas, each headed by a headman), and each mouza contained a number of villages

(headed by its own karbaris). The headmen of the mouzas had the power to gather

revenue, resolve disagreements and distribute land for agriculture (Gain, 2000: 17).

Despite the fact that the system was set up by the British and gave final authority to a

British-appointed deputy commissioner, it allowed the tribal people to oversee their

own district. In essence, the CHT Regulation of 1900 was an imperialistic tax farming

device (Abedin, 1997: 29), but it designated the CHT as an ‘excluded area’ and left

the tribal people largely to themselves; it also safeguarded minority tribal ethnicity and

inheritance.

12. Prior to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, the population of the area consisted almost

completely of people from 13 different indigenous tribes. Between 1964 and 1971, the

Pakistani government amended Regulation 1 of the CHT Regulation of 1900 to allow

‘migration of non-tribals into the hill tracts and [to] transfer ownership of land and

other resources of CHT to non-tribal people from the plains’ (Ramasubramanian, 2005).

13. The indigenous people received either modest compensation or none whatsoever. Even

the palace of the Chakma king was inundated by the dam.

14. In 1972 a CHT delegation led by M.N. Larma met with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (the

latter was the then prime minister and founder of Bangladesh, mostly known as

‘Bongo Bondhu’) and delivered a four-point manifesto: (i) demand for autonomy of

the CHT with its own legislature; (ii) retention of the CHT Regulation of 1900 in the con-

stitution; (iii) continuation of the offices of the indigenous kings; and (iv) restrictions on

amending the CHT Regulations of 1900 and prohibition of Bengali settlement in the

CHT. The delegation’s demands were discarded, however, and the indigenous people

were admonished to embrace Bengali nationalism and to mix with the majority

culture. This induced them to form PCJSS (Mohsin, 1997: 57–59).

15. President of Bangladesh from 1977 to 1981. He was killed in a coup d’etat.

16. Bengali migration into the CHT began in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, even after

the British left in 1947, settlers comprised less than 10 per cent of the population. By

1991, the settler population rose to almost 50 per cent, resulting in the indigenous

people becoming a near minority on their native soil. Interior migration policies of the

different governments have varied however: while the British government permitted

limited migration into the CHT, the Pakistani government’s approach (1947–71) to

immigration was more hesitant. Successive Bangladeshi administrations have ranged

from clandestine support (early 1970s) to a directly sponsored population transfer pro-

gramme (1979 to 1984) (Roy, 2003: 6).

17. ‘Kalampati’ is the name of a Union Parishad (Local Governing Body) under Rangamati

district in Chittagong Hill Tracts.


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18. Throughout these talks, the PCJSS made five demands: (iv) removal of non-indigenous

people who have moved to the CHT after 1947; (ii) removal of all Bangladeshi armed

forces from the CHT, including the non-indigenous police force; (iii) reinstatement of

the CHT Regulations of 1900 through a constitutional amendment’; (iv) self-government

for the CHT, including a separate legislature, and acknowledgment of Jumma people’s

right to self-determination; (v) deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force

and implementation of these measures under the auspices of the UN (Singh, 1996: 135).

19. J. B. Larma was also a member of the (three-member) CHT Accord Implementation

Committee. The other two members of the committee were D. Talukdar, then MP and

head of the CHT Task Force on Refugees, and A.H. Abdulla, former Chief Whip (con-

venor). This committee ceased to function after the 2001 change in government. The

recent BNP government did not reconstitute this committee.

20. Sama Odhikar Andolon is a platform of the Bangla speaking people backed by a quarter

in the then BNP-led coalition government (2001–06).

21. Nor did the Awami League pressure the BNP government to implement it. When the

accord was signed, the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami vehemently opposed it, calling it a

serious threat to Bangladesh’s independence and sovereignty.

22. The BNP-led coalition government comprised the Jatiya Party (Manju, one faction) and

two hard-core (Jamaat-e-Islami and Islamic Oikya Jote) Islamic fundamentalist parties.

23. Khagrachari is one of the three districts of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHTs) which is situ-

ated in the far northeastern part of Bangladesh. The two others are ‘Rangamati’ and

‘Bandarbans’.

24. These five members were Jotish Chakma, Sadhan Moni Chakma, Rosomoy Chakma,

Borkul Chakma and Bhubon Moni Chakma.

25. According to article 2 of ICCPR, ‘fundamental rights’ means everyone shall have the

right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and

impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in

writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media an individual

chooses (Amnesty International, 2005).

26. Bhuiyan is a parliamentary member of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) from

Khagrachari, CHT with Bangali lineage. On 22 March 2007, the Anti-corruption

Commission (ACC) of Bangladesh filed cases against the former lawmaker for misappro-

priating property http://www.bangladeshnews.com.bd/ 2007/03/23/acc-files-cases-

against-wadud-bhuiyan-lotus-kamal-pankaj/ (accessed 28 February 2008).

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