the effectiveness of transnational standard initiatives...
TRANSCRIPT
Dissertation
The effectiveness of transnational standard initiatives (TSI) in the apparel
industry: an empirical evaluation
Dr. Claude Meier
Doktorat am Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Abt. IB, UZH
Stv. Institutsleitung und Fachreferent – Institut für Strategisches Management, HWZ
Ablauf
1. Einführung in das Thema der Dissertation
2. Vorstellen des Vorgehens (FoFrage, Theorie, Methode)
3. Resultate/Erkenntnisse
4. Diskussion
Anarchie in Int. Bez.
• Globalized World: Issues with transboundary causes and effects (migration, health, labour)
• No central, overreaching authority (anarchy in international relations)
• New forms of governance are needed: Transnational Standard Initiatives (TSI)
Governance Systeme / Initativen
• Bekannte Gov. Systeme und Initiativen:
– Global Compact (UNGC)
– Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
– ISO-Normen (International Standard Organisation)
Akteure hinter TSIs
• Standard-Initiativen werden von
– Internationalen Organisationen (IGO) (Staat)
– Unternehmen/Branchenverbänden (Business)
– NGOs (Civil Society)
ins Leben gerufen.
• Diese drei gesellschaftlichen Hauptsektoren können in verschiedenen Konstellationen Kooperieren.
Diss.: Das betrachtete Problem
Forschungsproblem
• Empirically-analytically research about how TSIs work in the ‘real world’, mainly in TNCs is quite rare (div. authors)
• Focus on the rules of TSIs and on TNCs and their production sites as the rule-implementing organisations
• Erkenntnisziel: Etwas Verlässliches über die Wirksamkeit solcher TSIs zu erfahren sowie über die die Wirksamkeit beeinflussenden Faktoren
Forschungsfrage
Hauptforschungsfrage
Do TSIs contribute effectively to solutions of issues they are focussed on?
In Präsentation zusätzlich betrachtete Subfrage
What elements of TSIs influence effectiveness and how?
Vorgehen (Design)
• Vergleich zweier transnationaler Standard-Initiativen betreffend Arbeitsrechte im Bereich der Kleiderindustrie:
• Fair Wear Foundation (FWF)
• Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI)
• Grund Fallwahl: Viele Ähnlichkeiten, einige Differenzen (Orientierung an Most Similar Design)
Analyt. FW: Phasen-Modell
(A) Phase-model
• 1. Output: Formal output of decision-making or [TSI]-formation process: Institutional Design.
• 2. Implementation: Is partly predetermined by output but there is also some scope how it is done
Implementing organisation: often companies
• 3. Outcome: Evaluation of change in behaviour of addresses as consequences of implementation of a TSI’s rules (effectiveness).
Phasen-Modell visuell
OUTPUT
Theoretically relevant factors:
- …
- …
Data sources:
Regulatory documents of TSIs,
Interviews with stakeholders and
companies
OUTCOME
Effectiveness of TSIs: Evaluation of
Implementation, i.e. of change in
behaviour of TNC and factory
Point of reference: ILO core-
conventions
Data sources:
Audit reports (BSCI, FWF), Interviews
(Stkhs, companies)
IMPLEMENTATION
Leeway and role of Management
Systems/values of TSI member-
companies and factories as
implementing organisations
Inductively detected
specifying/alternative factors, e.g.:
- Personal relation and
cooperation between buyer and
supplier
- New governmental Laws
- Strikes
- …
Data sources:
Documents from companies
Interviews with stakeholders and
companies
Analyt. FW: Theorie
Analytical framework
• (B) Theoretical approaches
– Explanations what conditions concerning output lead to effectiveness
– Theory-based hypotheses should help explaining why a TSI is effective or not
Analyt. FW: Theorie
Analytical framework
• Global Governance – Global governance initiatives provide rules
(institutional design) in anarchic environment
– Through these rules the anarchic conditions can be mitigated
– The institutional design provides the different stakeholders of an issue orientation (e.g. aims and roles)
– FWF and BSCI both provide sophisticated rules
Analyt. FW: Theorie
Analytical framework
• Hypothesis 1
With their sophisticated rules (inst. design) the TSIs BSCI and FWF contribute to effective solutions of the labour issue
Analyt. FW: Theorie
Analytical framework- Theoretical Approaches
• Stakeholder agency theory
– Principal delegates work to agent
– Intension-gap between agent (TNC) and principal (stakeholders)
– Information asymmetry between p and a
– Control and transparency as governance systems lower information asymmetry and align intensions
Analyt. FW: Theorie
Analytical framework
• Hypothesis 2a A systematic audit system of a TSI is an important
element to align interests between principal (TSIs) and agents (TNC, factories) and thus contributes to effective solutions of an issue
• Hypothesis 2b Requirements of a TSI to be transparent are an
important element to align the interests between principal (TSIs) and agents (TNC, factories) and thus contributes to effective solutions of an issue
Analyt. FW: Theorie
Analytical framework - Theoretical approaches
• Strictness of rules – TSIs are voluntary, not mandatory
– No sanctions, only “naming and shaming”; exc-lusion from membership
– Strictness of rules as substitute for sanctions
– PA-theory (and others) mention that governance structures in the meaning of strength and clearness/preciseness support an effective implementation
Analyt. FW: Theorie
Analytical framework
• Hypotheses 3
Rules of TSIs characterised through strictness are an important element to align the interest of principal (TSIs) and agents (TNCs, factories) and thus contribute to effective solutions of an issue
Analyt. FW: Theorie
Analytical framework - Theoretical approaches
• Stakeholder involvement
– Involvement concerning implementation
– Stakeholders can contribute important resources to a TNC’s activities
– Interaction between implementation-relevant stakeholders is needed (Dialog/Meetings: Verständnis und Ansätze werden ausgetauscht; Pool an Ressourcen vergrössert sich [über Ugs hinaus])
Analyt. FW: Theorie
Analytical framework
• Hypothese 4
The involvement of relevant stakeholders required by the rules of a TSI is an important element contributing to effective solutions of an issue
Hypothesen im visualis. Framework
OUTPUT
Theoretically relevant factors:
- Global Governance (H1)
- Transparency (H2a)
- Audit System (H2b)
- Strictness (H3)
- Stakeholder involvement
(H4)
Data sources:
Regulatory documents of TSIs,
Interviews with stakeholders and
companies
OUTCOME
Effectiveness of TSIs: Evaluation of
Implementation, i.e. of change in
behaviour of TNC and factory
Point of reference: ILO core-
conventions
Data sources:
Audit reports (BSCI, FWF),
Interviews (Stkhs, companies)
IMPLEMENTATION
Leeway and role of Management
Systems/values of TSI member-
companies and factories as
implementing organisations
Inductively detected
specifying/alternative factors, e.g.:
- Personal relation and
cooperation between buyer
and supplier
- New governmental Laws
- Strikes
- …
Data sources:
Documents from companies
Interviews with stakeholders and
companies
Methoden
• Case study • Before-after design • Search for causal paths (process tracing) • Most similar design / Method of difference
• Testing theories (hypotheses) • Inductive detections (specif./find. new elements) • Variables:
• Independent variable corresponds output • Dependent variable corresponds outcome • Intervening variable corresponds implementation
• Cases: BSCI, FWF and member-TNCs of them
Methoden
• Datenquellen:
– Interviews mit TSI- und TNC-Repräsentanten sowie mit relevanten Stakeholdern
– Dokumente von den genannten Akteuren
– Audit Reports von BSCI und FWF
• Datenalyse
– mittels Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS): atlas.ti
Variablen im visualis. Framework
OUTPUT
Independent Variable
Theoretically relevant factors:
- Transparency (H1a)
- Audit System (H1b)
- Strictness (H2)
- Stakeholder involvement
(H3)
Data sources:
Regulatory documents of TSIs,
Interviews with stakeholders and
companies
OUTCOME
Dependent Variable
Effectiveness of TSIs: Evaluation of
Implementation, i.e. of change in
behaviour of TNC and factory
Point of reference: ILO core-
conventions
Data sources:
Audit reports (BSCI, FWF), Interviews
(Stkhs, companies)
IMPLEMENTATION
Intervening Variable
Leeway and role of Management
Systems/values of TSI member-
companies and factories as
implementing organisations
Inductively detected
specifying/alternative factors, e.g.:
- Personal relation and
cooperation between buyer
and supplier
- New governmental Laws
- Strikes
- …
Data sources:
Documents from companies
Interviews with stakeholders and
companies
Resultate
Ordinales Beurteilungssystem:
3 = Konform mit Anforderungen
2 = Teils Konform mit Anforderungen
1 = Nicht-konform mit Anforderungen
Ratio of improvements:
Anzahl tatsächliche Verbesserungen im Verhältnis zu potentiell möglichen Verbesserungen
Resultate FWF Ref.punkte: 7 zentrale ILO-Kategorien + 2 zus. Kat.
Category Ratio of improvements Average score of category
Monitoring labour standards 28.6% 2.2
Code awareness 57.1% 1.74
Employment is freely chosen 16.4% 2.91
Discrimination 23.5% 2.97
Child labour 32.3% 2.55
FoA and RCB 28.6% 1.93
Wages 32.8% 2.44
Working hours 26.2% 1.66
Health and safety 17.0% 2.5
Resultate BSCI Ref.punkte: 7 zentrale ILO-Kategorien + 2 zus. Kat.
Category Ratio of improvements Average score of category
Monitoring labour standards 11% 1.67
Code awareness 0% 1.25
Employment is freely chosen 0% n.s.
Discrimination 33.3% 2.3
Child labour 33.3% 2.5
FoA and RCB 9.1% 1.8
Wages 26.0% 1.83
Working hours 50% 2.29
Health and safety 10.8% 2.62
Erkenntnisse
Hypothesen (a):
• Sophisticated institutionelle Designs: Verbesserungen wurden erzielt (25% kausal basierend auf ARs). Sehr gut: Bewusstseinsbildung, Problem: Freiwilligkeit
• Systematic Audits: Führen zu Verbesserungen, allerdings v.a. bei einfach messbaren Kategorien. Problem: Manipulierbarkeit, inkonsequente Anwendung von Audit-System (kein CAP an Supplier; Qualität Audit Team).
Erkenntnisse
Hypothesen (b):
• Transparenzanforderungen (v.a. „Reporting“) scheint für Effektivität sehr wichtig zu sein, gerade Members betonten dies
• Living Wage (strictness) wegen unklaren Definitionen und Freiwilligkeit schwierig umzusetzen: Mindestlohn = Existenzlohn sollte gelten
• FoA und RCB (strictness) kann durch gezieltes Training tatsächlich gefördert werden: das zeigen ARs von FWF (bei BSCI hat sich weniger verändert) und Interview-Aussagen
Erkenntnisse
Hypothesen (c):
•Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Stakeholdern in allen Phasen und aller Arten sollte weiter verstärkt werden
• Einbezug von Members sinnvoll: Manipulierbarkeit eingeschränkter, wirkt weniger von Aussen aufgedrückt, kooperativer Ansatz lässt mehr erkennen. Bessere Monitoring Systeme gehen meist einher mit verbesserten Issue-Kategorien
• TSIs sollten im Bereich Audits koordinierter Zusammenarbeiten (multiple audits), die Kadenz der Audits aber hoch halten
• Auch sollte die Kooperation zwischen den Membern bezüglich Arbeitsrechten forciert werden
Diskussion
• Was denken Sie?
a) Transparenz: Wenn eine Firma einen CSR-Bericht hat: lesen Sie diesen? Beeinflusst das Ihre (Kauf)handlung?
b) Was für Faktoren spielen Ihrer Meinung nach neben den TSIs ev. auch noch eine Rolle, um die Arbeitsbedingungen zu verbessern?
c) Sehen Sie ev. alternative Wege zu den freiwilligen TSIs für globale Regulierungen?