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The effectiveness of the changes in Aviation Security in the United States of America after 9/11 And the indicators which influence the effectiveness

IntroductionOnTuesday11September,2001,theaviationsecuritysystemintheUnitedStates(US)failed.Nineteenmenhijackedfourtranscontinentalflights,turningtheaircraftintolargeguidedmissiles.Loadedwithalargeamountofjetfuelonboard,theaircraftwereusedforseveralterroristattacks(9/11Commission,2004).Thiscouldhavebeenpreventedifsecurityoperationshadbeenperformedmoreeffectively.Thisfactsheetlooksatthechangesinsecuritysince9/11byanalyzingthepastandcurrentstate.However,themainquestionis:didUSsecurityimproveafter9/11?Thiswillbeanalyzedinlightofthefollowingthreeindicators:thenumberofhijackings,thenumberofairlinebombingsandthepercentageofundercoverinvestigators(mysteryguests)thatpassedthesecuritysystem.

AviationSecuritybefore9/11Security is defined as precautions taken to ensure against danger.Withinaviation, there are two different types of security: soft and hard. Hardsecurityincludesbordercontrolsatthepointofentrytopreventpotentialterroristsenteringcountriesorgainingaccesstopotentialterroristtargets.Soft security is about the interaction between stakeholders’ newinformation communication technology (ICT) systems in order to identifyrisk-posingindividualsandtheirnetwork.(Levi&Wall,2016).HardSecuritySecuritybefore9/11wassupervisedbytheFederalAviationAdministration(FAA),whichwasresponsibleforallsecurityconcernsinUSaviation(Priceet al., 2013). They focused on two different areas in aviation security:screening baggage and screening the people boarding the aircraft (9/11Commission, 2004), along with an air marshal on selected flights (Biles,2013). Baggage couldn’t be loaded without the owner being on board.However, only 5%of baggagewas screened for explosives (Blalock et al.,2005). After bags were checked in, passengers were screened by walk-throughdetectors,andX-raymachinesscreenedtheircarry-onbelongings(9/11 Commission, 2004). However, according to an FAA evaluation atmajor airports in the US, bag and passenger screeners missedapproximately20%ofpotentialdangerousitems(Blalocketal.,2005).

Before9/11,theFAAintroducedtheFederalAirMarshalService.AFederalAirMarshal isa counter-terroristagentonboardacommercialaircraft todetect,deter,anddefeathostileactstargetingtheUS(Allison,2015).Theyoperated on selected flights and mainly focused on internationaldestinations. Marshals were well informed about the security processesinvolved,whichhelpedthemevaluatetheairporttheyfacedonthejobandwhereapotentialthreatcouldappear(Biles,2013).SoftSecurityBefore9/11, limitedcapabilitiesexistedtopre-screenpassengers.Existingcapabilities consisted of a government-generated ‘no-fly’ list and aComputer-AssistedPassengerPre-screeningSystem(CAPPS).CAPPSappliedvariousrule-basedalgorithmstoticketpurchasingcharacteristicstoaccesspassengerrisk.Whilethesetwopre-screeningtoolswereavailablepriorto9/11,theywerelimitedintheirscopeandcapability(Elias,2010).Thefailingsystemon11September,2001Authorities started to take extra precautions after the failed, ineffectivesecurity systems on 9/11. This section describes the failures on thatparticular day that led to this major change in aviation security. Threefailuresoccurredinsoftsecurity.First,CAPPS,whichwascreatedtoidentifypassengerswho shouldbe subjected toextended securitymeasures,onlyrecognized seven of the hijackers. Second, the airlines’ ‘no-fly’ listcontained only twelve names, even though other government terrorist

watch lists contained thousands. Third, there was no communicationbetween the government database and the airlines regarding the ‘no-fly’lists(Elias,2010).In terms of hard security, a walk-through metal detector screened thehijackersandanX-raymachinescreened theirbaggage.Nevertheless, thecheckpoint supervisors didn’t find anything suspicious and let them pass.Theproblemherewasthattheairport,airlinesandgovernmentallhadtheinformation they needed to capture the hijackers, but failed tocommunicate (Elias, 2010). Personnel also misinterpreted the systemsoverseeing travellers that could have been terrorists (9/11 Commission,2004). As a result, the terror attack happened because securitywas notadequateenoughtostopit.AviationSecurityafter9/11After 9/11, changes within the aviation security were made to preventfuture terrorist attacks within the sector. The attacks created anenvironmentinwhichaccidentsimmediatelyledtoneworstrictersecuritymeasures.Themajorchangesaredescribedinthissection.HardSecurityMajor ‘hard’ changes include visible security, fortified cockpit doors,operations on screeners (Blalock et al., 2005) and cooperation betweenairlines and security officials (Kaplan, 2006). After the attacks, thegovernment created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)(Priceetal.,2013),whichtookresponsibilityforairportsecurityinFebruaryof2002(Blalocketal.,2005).Theyalsointroducedalawthatairlinesmusttie baggage to one person on the aircraft and screen this baggage forexplosives. This measure was taken due unaccompanied baggage thatexploded, causing the Lockerbie crash in 1988 (Pan am flight 103). Strictbaggage screening now occurred through four methods: an ExplosiveDetectionSystem(EDS),ExplosiveTraceDetection(ETD)machines,bomb-sniffingdogsandmanualbagsearches.Asaresult,EDSandETDscreen90%

of thebaggage. The remainingbaggage is checkedbybomb sniffingdogsandmanualsearches.Nevertheless,theEDSincorrectlyflagged30%ofthebagsascontainingexplosives,anditwasalsoatime-consumingoperation(Blalock et al., 2005). Operations on screeners were also changed toremove inefficiencies (Blalock et al., (2005). The TSA hired 3 timesmoreemployeesafter9/11.Thisreducedwaitingtimeinsecuritylines(Blalocketal.,2005).Thescreenersalsoreceivedmoretraininginscreenuse,receivedbetterpayandbenefits,andbecamemuchbetteratdetectingdangerousobjectsonscreens(Sweet,2009).Thiscausedtheturnoverofscreenerstoplummetafter9/11(Blalocketal.,2005).After 9/11, cooperationbetweenairlines and security officials changed inmany ways. One of these changes was the Federal Flight Deck Officerprogram, which permits pilots with the right training to carry guns(Peterson, 2016). TSA also placed air marshals on more routes than justinternationalones.However,aftertheTSAtookover,theywerenotnearlyaswell-informedabouttheentireaviationsystemastheyhadbeenbefore9/11,whentheFAAwasresponsible(Biles,2013).SoftSecurityAfter9/11,TSAintroducedatargetforthenewaviationscreeningsystem:intensifyingsecuritymeasurestoidentifyairtravellerswhoposesecurityrisks.TheythereforeintroducedSecure

Figure1:SecureFlight

Flight’’onAugust26,2004.SecureFlightisanext-generationCAPPSsystem(figure1)(Ravich,2005)thatcollectspassengerinformationfromairlines

and the government and sends it to commercial data services. Thesecommercial data services report back to the TSA, letting them knowwhethertheinformationprovidedbythepassengerviatheairlinematchesthe information in the company’s own records. The TSA also runspassengers through a Terrorist Screening Center Database (TSCD). Theresults of this process are then forwarded to security personnel at theairport.(AmericanCivilLibertiesUnion,2014).Indicators influencing the effectiveness of the changedsecuritymeasuresThreeindicatorsmeasuretheeffectivenessofaviationsecurity:thenumberof commercial airline hijackings, the number of commercial airlinebombingsandthepercentageofcaughtmysteryguestsatUSairports.Thenumber of hijackings increased rapidly since 1967. While there were 32worldwidehijackingsfrom1961to1967,therewere290hijackingattemptsduring the following 4 years after 1968 (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011). Thehistory of hijackings shown in Figure 2 illustrates a decline in hijackingsaftertheimplementationof9/11measures.FiftyhijackingswerereportedbetweenJanuary2002andOctober2016.AccordingtotheAviationSafetyNetwork,noneofthesehijackingswereintheUS–securityenhancementsafter9/11partlyledtoadeclineinhijackings.Bombings on board commercial airlines are plotted in Figure 3. An on-boardbombingistheresultoffailureinhardsecurityscreening–securitysystemsarebuilttodetectdangerousgoods.ThebombingstatisticsdonotshowadeclineafterSeptember11,2001.However,noneofthebombingswereonboardanaircraftthatdepartedfromtheUS.Intermsofthethirdindicator,theDepartmentofHomelandSecurityfoundsecurity failures at dozens of the busiest airports in the US. Undercoverinvestigators, mystery guests, smuggled weapons, fake explosives andothercontrabandmadeitthroughsecurity.Thetestconcludedthat95%ofmysteryguestswereabletosuccessfullypasssecurity(Costello&Johnson,2015).

Figure2:AirlineHijackings1942–2016intheWorld(AviationSafetyNetwork,2012)

Figure3:CommercialAirlineBombings1956–2010intheWorld(Aerospaceweb,2012)

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ConclusionAviationsecuritychangedafterSeptember11,2001.Softsecurityhasnowbeen enhanced through the introduction of an advanced version of theexistingCAPPSsystem:SecureFlight.Thetargetofthisnewpre-screeningsystemistointensifymeasurestoidentifytravellersposingpotentialrisk–andterrorists– throughaTSCDbycollectingpassengerdata fromairlinesand the government. The biggest changes in hard security are visiblesecurity, fortified cockpit doors, operations on screeners for luggage andpassengers, and cooperation between airlines and security officials. ThisresearchexaminedwhetheraviationsecurityintheUSimprovedbylookingatthefollowingthree indicators:thenumberofhijackings,thenumberofbombings and the percentage of caught mystery guests. Analysis showsthat neither bombings nor hijackings took place post-9/11 in the US.However, the shocking fact that 95% of mystery guests passed securityraises about the improvement of security effectiveness – the indicatorsmeasured are contradictory.More indicators and research are needed todeterminewhethersecuritymeasuresreallyhaveimprovedintheUS.Thisresearchthereforeraisesaquestion:istheUSwaitingforthenexthorribleevent,oristhesecuritysystemadequate?Glossary• Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-screening (CAPPS): a counter-

terrorismsystemintheUSairtravelindustry.• ExplosiveDetection Systems (EDS): a detection systemused to detect

explosivesinbaggage.• Explosive Trace Detection (ETD): a detection system used to detect

explosivesinbaggage.• Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): the national aviation authority

oftheUnitedStates.• Terrorist Screening Center Database (TSCD): the central terrorist

watchlistandusedbymultipleauthoritiesforscreening.• Transportation Security Administration (TSA): an agency that has

authorityoverthesecurityofthetravellingpublicintheUnitedStates.

References

1.Aerospace web. (2012). Commercial Airline Bombing History. RetrievedOctober2,2016,fromAerospaceweb:http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/planes/q0283.shtml2.Allison,R.(2015).TheFederalAirMarshalService.RetrievedonOctober10,2016,fromTransportationSecurityAdministration:https://www.tsa.gov/news/testimony/2015/09/17/testimony-federal-air-marshal-service3.AmericanCivilLibertiesUnion.(2004).AboutSecureFlight.Retrieved2016,from American Civil Liberties Union: https://www.aclu.org/other/four-biggest-problems-secure-flight-airline-security-program4.Aviation Safety Network. (2012). Airliner Hijackings. Retrieved October 2,2016, from Aviation Safety Network: https://aviation-safety.net/statistics/period/stats.php?cat=H25.Biles W. C. (2013). How 9/11 Changed The Federal Air Marshal System.Business Insider. Retrieved September 29, 2016, from:http://www.businessinsider.com/5-ways-federal-air-marshals-have-changed-since-911-2013-126.Blalock,G.,Kadiyali,V.,Simon,H.D.(2007).TheimpactofPost9/11AirportSecurityMeasuresontheDemandforAirTravel.RetrievedSeptember29,2016,from:JournalofLawandEconomics.7.Costello, T., & Johnson, A. (2015). TSA Chief Out After Agents Fail 95Percent of Airport Breach Tests. Retrieved October 4, 2016, from NBC

News: http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/investigation-breaches-us-airports-allowed-weapons-through-n3678518.Elias,B.(2010).AirportandAviationSecurity.BocaRaton:Taylor&Francis.9.Kaplan, E. (2006). Targets for Terrorists: Post-9/11 Aviation Security.Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved September 28, 2016, from:http://www.cfr.org/border-and-port-security/targets-terrorists-post-911-aviation-security/p1139710.Levi,M.,&Wall,D.S.(2016).Technologies,security,andPrivacyinthepost9/11EuropeanInformationSociety.CardiffUniversity.Cardiff:Wiley.11.Peterson, B. (2016). How Airport Security Has Changed Since 9/11. CNTraveler. Retrieved September 29, 2016, from:http://www.cntraveler.com/story/how-airport-security-has-changed-since-september-1112.Price,C. J., Forrest, S. J. (2013).PracticalAviationSecurity.PredictingandPreventingFutureThreats.Waltham.UnitedStatesofAmerica:ElsevierInc.13.Ravich, T. M. (2005). Airline passenger profiling systems after 9/11:Personal Privacy versus National Security. Washington: TransportationResearchForum.14.Rodrigues,C.,&Cusick,S. (2011).Reviewofattacksoncivilaviation. InC.Rodrigues, & S. Cusick, Commercial Aviation Safety (5th edition ed., pp.271-272).NewYork:McGraw-Hill.15.Sweet, M. K. (2009). Aviation and Airport Security. Terrorism and SafetyConcerns. Boca Raton. United States of America: Taylor & Francis GroupLLC.16.

The9/11Commission.(2004).The9/11CommissionReport:FinalReportofthe National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.NationalCommissiononTerroristAttacksUpontheUnitedStateImagereferences(toptobottom,lefttoright)

1 Frontpage:https://www.flickr.com/photos/wefi_official/14822383593/in/photolist-pfeg3M-9hn8wF-pdcYHG-mLTDrS-faAdgJ-pEWtpp-gJVZGu-gXK2ci-hJ55K6-peekov-q2Qpog-hMKT6r-acxJcL-HuF7r7-oqkeea-h5VMcm-h2qm2s-6H4wPs-fksiMg-p5N58f-e4J9MF-h4uMoX-gJCmZ5-oqF5md-pooeCA-qkn82o-fm3QVd-f4rRBg-rdmh4p-oEb8x9-f7dGHQ-oYKdDQ-eZNGY7-oVivrv-HxkEaD-mbYmAm-fbNGry-iGoURq-Jr8YKj-pNyxKL-qLNdUp-f4YqfS-9gPQW9-orXqZq-f9AcRb-gL3GBs-ozNAeP-a5M1TC-oXkF8z-gPeLNdDutchSummaryDeze fact sheet onderzoekt de huidige effectiviteit van de beveiliging opAmerikaanseluchthavensvanuiteenoverheidsperspectief.Na9/11werdennieuwe beveiligingsprocedures geïmplementeerd om de voorgaandegebreken te elimineren. Op het gebied van ‘soft-security’ werd eenverbeterde versie van het oude en gelimiteerde CAPPS-systeemgeïntroduceerd: Secure Flight. Dit systeem verzameld data uit databasesvandeoverheidenluchtvaartmaatschappijen,waarnaditviacommerciëledatacentra naar een centrale terrorist-screening database (TSCD) wordtverzonden. Dit proces vergroot de kans om potentiele gevaren enterroristenvoortijdig tedetecteren.Ophetgebiedvan ‘hard-security’ zijnnieuwemaatregelengeïntroduceerdna9/11doormiddelvaneennieuwewetmetbetrekkingtotbagage.Ookzijnernieuweafsprakengemaaktoverde hoeveelheid beveiligingspersoneel en de kwaliteit van de systemen.Daarnaastisdebemanningvandeluchtvaartmaatschappijenbetergetraindenbewapend.

Deze fact sheetdoetonderzoeknaardrieverschillende indicatorenomtebepalenofdebeveiliging indeVerenigdeStaten isverbeterdna9/11:dehoeveelheid kapingen,dehoeveelheidaanslagenop luchtvaartactiviteitenen het percentage mystery guests dat de beveiliging weet te passeren.Sinds9/11hebbenergeennieuweaanslagenofkapingenplaatsgevonden.Echterisdehoeveelheidmysteryguestsdiebewapenddoordebeveiligingkomt schokkend: 95%. Kan geconcludeerd worden dat hetbeveiligingssysteem in de Verenigde Staten is verbeterd, of is het eenkwestievantijdtotereenterroristischeincidentgaatplaatsvinden?

ThisisaLuchtvaartfeiten.nl/AviationFacts.eupublication.Authors:AronDriessen,RutgerNiemeijer,MariaNørrelundJohansenEditorialstaff:R.J.deBoerPhDMsc,G.BoostenMSc&G.J.S.VlamingMScCopyingtextsisallowed.Pleasecite:‘AviationFacts.eu(2016),TheeffectivenessofthechangesinaviationsecurityintheUnitedStatesofAmericaafter9/11Factsheet,www.AviationFacts.eu’AviationFacts.euisaninitiativebytheAviationAcademyattheAmsterdamUniversityofAppliedSciences(AUAS).Studentsandteachersshareknowledgewithpoliticiansandthegeneralpublictoensurediscussionsarebasedonfacts.April2017