the economic effects of the aboli2on of serfdom: evidence
TRANSCRIPT
TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom:
EvidencefromtheRussianEmpire
AndreiMarkevich(NES)and
EkaterinaZhuravskaya(PSE-EHESS)
Mo2va2on• The effect of slavery and serfdom on economic efficiency and
growth has been a subject of a long-lasting debate
– Many scholars view both slavery and serfdom as inefficient production systems with distorted incentives and suboptimal resource allocation
• Cairnes 1862, Williams 1944, North and Thomas 1973, Anderson and Gallman 1977, Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, Ogilvie 2013
– However, there is no clear theoretical argument why slave and landowners failed to provide efficient incentives to their workers
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Examples-world• Empiricalexamplesofefficientslavesystemsabound:
– Theaboli2onofslaveryintheUSsawadeclineinoutputperpersonintheSouthandthestagna2onofthesoutherneconomy
– SlavelaborintheUSin1850wasmoreefficientatproducingcoPonthanfreelaborinIndia,China,andEgypt
– Hai2inthe18thcenturywasrichwith90%oflaborcomprisedofslaves,butfreeHai2didnotretainthatprosperity
» the causal interpretation of some of these examples is contested, however (Fogel 1989 vs. Omstead and Rhode 2008 and 2010)
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom” Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Examples-Russia• Russiahasbeentakenbymanyobserversasanexamplethatpropertyinpeoplewasnotacrucialdeterminingfactorofbackwardness– RussiaremainedabackwardagrariansocietyrightuptotheRussianRevolu2ondespitetheaboli2onofserfdomonehalfacenturybefore(Gerschenrkon1965)
– LiPlesystema2cevidenceexistedonthis,however,beforeourpaper
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom” Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Researchques2on
• Whataretheeconomiceffectsoftheaboli2onofserfdom?– Agriculturalproduc2vity– Livingstandardsofpeasants– Industrialdevelopment
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom” Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
SerfdominRussia
• Oneofthekeyins2tu2onsinRussianhistory:1649to1861,i.e.,212years
• Fullusageandtransferownershiprightsoflandlordsovertheirserfs– Propertyoftheirestateswhichbelongedtolandlords– Obliga2ontofulfillandlord’sorders
• Theamountandtypesofobliga2onswereatalmostfulldiscre2onofthelandlord
6AndreiMarkevichandEkaterinaZhuravskaya"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”6/57
Theemancipa2onofserfs
1861:Personalfreedomwasgrantedtoserfs• Freeofchargeandinstantaneously• Landlordslosttherighttosell,buy,lease,punish,orimprisonpeasantsandtochangethelevelofpeasantobliga2ons– Formerserfsbecameagriculturalentrepreneurs
• fullownersoftheirlaborandhumancapitalwithcivilrights
• withfixedlandleaseobliga2onstolandlordsbeforethelandreformtookplace
7Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Macrodynamics
AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 8Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
23
45
67
Aver
age
grai
n ye
ild, R
ussi
an e
mpi
re
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920Year
Agricultural productivity and the 1861 emancipation reform
Didcontemporariesno2ceanything?
1. Intellectualswereunhappyaboutthereform– E.g.,LevTolstoy–however,theymighthavehadwrong
expecta2ons
2. Technocratsno2cedmajorimprovements– Fromthereportofroyalcommissionofagriculture,1873:
“Thesitua+onofpeasantsrecentlyhasimprovedconsiderablybecause,havingreceivedtheirplots,peasantstrytoimprovethelandasmuchaspossible,fer+lizeitandtakecareofit,sothelandproducesmorethaneverbefore.”(p.28)
AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 9Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
InthispaperWeexploitgeographicvaria2onintheprevalenceofserfdominImperialRussiaandover2mevaria2oninemancipa2onofserfsinadiff-in-diffpanelseing:• Documentverylargeandimmediateincreasesinagricultural
produc2vity,industrialdevelopment,andpeasants’livingstandardsasaresultoftheaboli2onofserfdom
• Wealsodisentanglethe2componentsofthereform:emancipa2onvs.landreform– theposi2veeffectsareen2relyduetoemancipa2on
• Explorethemechanism– Peasants’incen2ves
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Previewoftheresults
• Oures2matesimplythattheemancipa2onledtoanincreaseintotalvalueaddedofatleast12%acrossthreesectors(ourpreferredes2mateis29%)– 15.5%increaseingrainyieldinanaverageprovincethatiscomparableto
37yearsofaggregatedevelopment– 48%increaseinindustrialproduc2on
• Acounterfactualscenario:Russiawouldhavebeen40-60%richerby1913haditabolishedserfdom40yearsearlieraswasconsideredbyAlexanderI
• Livingstandards:theheightofdrajeeswas1.35cen2metershigherforcohortsbornajertheemancipa2oncomparedtocohortsbornbefore– comparabletotheincreaseinheightofmalesperdecadeinthe19th
centuryWesternEurope(HaPonandBray2010)
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
RelatedLiterature1. Ins2tu2onsandeconomicdevelopment
– AcemogluandJohnson2005,BanerjeeandIyer2005,Nunn2009,Acemogluetal.2010,Tabellini2010,BruhnandGallego2012,MichalopoulosandPapaioannou,Ogilvie2013,2014
2. Efficiencyofforcedlaboranditseffectsoneconomicdevelopment– Acemogluetal.2012,Nunn2008,Miller2009,Dell2010,Nunnand
Wantchekon2011andBertocchiandDimicio2014
3. DebateontheefficiencyofserfdomintheRussianEmpire1. Gerschenkron(1962,1965),Koval’chenko(1967)2. Moon(1996),Mironov(2010),Dennison(2006,2011)andStanziani(2014a
and2014b)
AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 12Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Hypotheses(1)• Theeffectoftheaboli2onofserfdomoneconomicdevelopmentand
livingstandardsisaprioriambiguous:1. Agriculture:
– Theaboli2onofserfdomcouldleadtobePerincen2vesforformerserfsprovidedthatlandlordsdidnotcrediblycommitnottorevisepeasants’obliga2onsunderserfdom
• Anecdotalevidence:somelandlordswereabletocommit,however,thiswasnotacommonprac2ce(Dennison2011)
• Theemancipa2oninstantaneouslysolvedtheratcheteffectproblembyfixingthelevelofquitrentforallformerserfs
– Serfdomcouldhavehadefficiencyadvantagesoverpost-emancipa2onproduc2onduetoeconomiesofscale,bePeraccesstofinance,andbePeraccesstonewtechnologiesforlandlords
AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 13Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Hypotheses(2)2. Nutri2on:
– Serfswereavaluableinputintoproduc2onforgentry=>incen2vestofeedthemwell
– However,theasymmetryofinforma2onmayhaveledtomalnutri2onofserfsinequilibrium,asgentrywereconcernedthatpeasantswerehidingtheproceedsoftheirproduc2on
– Inaddi2on,peasantsmayhavehadlowerincen2vestofeedchildrenunderserfdom,aspeasants’childrenbelongedtothegentry
3. Industrialdevelopment:– Theratcheteffectproblemalsoappliedtoar2san(industrial)ac2vi2esofserfsastheseac2vi2eswerealsosubjecttoratcheteffect
– Restric2onsonmigra2onwerelijed,butonlypar2allyduetocommunes
AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 14Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Data:outcomesProvince-levelpanelofthe19thcenturyEuropeanRussia:– Agriculturalproduc2vitybyprovincexyear
• yield-to-seedra2oofmaincrops(rye,oat,wheat,barley,buckwheat)• 41snapshotsover2me
– Industrialoutput(in1895rubles)byprovincexyear• 8snapshotsover2me
– Livingstandards:Heightofdrajees• byprovincexbirthcohort(nutri2on)
– 15snapshotsover2me
• bydistrictxbirthcohort(nutri2on)– 10snapshotsover2me
– 46provincesand467districts
AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 15Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Data:sources• Thedatasetiscomprisedfromvariouspublishedandarchivalsources
• Outcomevariables:– governorreportsfortheyearsbefore1883– officialsta2s2csforthelateryears
• Thedistribu2onofruralpopula2onbystatus:1858policedata(Bushen1863)
• Thelandreformprogress:Vilson(1878)
AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 16Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
17
EuropeanprovincesoftheRussianEmpire
20E65E40E 60E25E
55E
30E 50E35E
45E
60N
40N
45N
50N
55N
65N
Arkhangelsk
Perm
Vologda
Don
Orenburg
Vyatka
Olonets
Samara
Astrakhan
Tver
Minsk
Novgorod
Volyn
Kiev
Kazan
Orel
Saratov
Kostroma
Vilno
Tambov
Pskov
Kursk
Kherson
TulaKovno
Voronezh
Penza
VitebskVladimir
Mogilev
Poltava
RyazanSmolensk
Simbirsk
Grodno
Chernigov
Podolsk
Kaluga
Liflyandiya Yaroslavl
Moscow
Tavrida
Kharkov
N-Novgorod
Ekaterinoslav
Saint-Petersburg
Bessarabiya
Kurlyandiya
Estlyandiya
LegendProvinces of the Russian Empire
In the sample
Not in the sample
latutude - longidute
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
TypesofpeasantsinEuropeanRussia• Serfs:43%ofruralpopula2onin1858
– Thelandlordshad(almost)fulldiscre2onovertheamountandtheformofobliga2onsoftheirserfs:theycouldsell,buy,leaseserfs
– 0.1%inArkhangelskprovinceto83%inMogilevprovince
• Statepeasants:40.4%in1858– Formallyfreelandlessindividualslivingandworkingonthelandbelongingtothestate
– Fixedbylawland-leasepaymentstothestate(inaformofquitrent)
• Freepopula/on:12.6%in1858(withorwithoutland2tles)– Cossacks,Colonists,localnon-Russians
• Royalpeasants:4%in1858– Withafixedquitrent,managedbythespecialministry
18Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
GeographyofSerfdom:Serfsin1858asaShareofRuralPopula2on
19
LegendShare of serfs, 1858 (deciles)
0% - 1,7%
1,8% - 7,8%
7,9% - 25,7%
25,8% - 40,3%
40,4% - 44,8%
44,9% - 54,4%
54,5% - 57,2%
57,3% - 61,7%
61,8% - 73,7%
73,8% - 83,3%
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
NeedtocontrolfordistancetoMoscowandlandquality
20
Coef:-0.0005;SE=0.00009;R2=0.36.
Arkhangelsk
Vologda
Olonets
Saint-Petersburg
Novgorod
Pskov
SmolenskVitebsk
Mogilev
KovnoMoscowVladimir N-NovgorodKostromaYaroslavl
Tver
Kaluga
Tula
Ryazan
Orel
TambovKursk
Kazan
Penza
ChernigovPoltava
Kiev Podolsk
Volyn
Bessarabiya
Kherson
EkaterinoslavDon
Samara
Vyatka
Perm
Minsk
GrodnoVilno
Voronezh
Simbirsk
Kharkov
Tavrida
Saratov
Astrakhan0.2
.4.6
.8
0 500 1000 1500Distance to Moscow from the centeroid of the province (km)
Share of serfs Fitted values
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Mainspecifica2on:diff-in-diff
• i–province;t–2meperiod(yearordecade);Y–outcome• ShareSerfs–shareofserfsin1858• PostEmacipa+on–1forpost1861yearsand0otherwise• ψiandϬt–provinceandyearfixedeffects• tδ–province-specificlineartrends• X–landqualityanddistancetoMoscowXPostEmancipa+on• Clustererrortermswithineachprovinceseparatelybeforeand
ajertheemancipa2onof1861
• Similaranalysiswithdistrict-levelpaneldatawithdistrictandyearfixedeffectsandprovince-specificlinertrends
21
19
grain productivity as the grain yield to grain seed ratio – a measure widely used as a proxy for
productivity in Russian agriculture before the late-19th century as well as in medieval European
agriculture.17 Yield to seed ratio for grain was 3.95 in an average province in an average year,
increasing from about 3.5 to 4.5 over the century. Potato was a more labor-intensive crop than
grain, with a higher yield to seed ratio (about 4.4 on average). Animal husbandry had secondary
importance. There was on average one head of cattle per two inhabitants in the empire. The mean
height of a draftee was 164.5 centimeters.18 Tables 1 and A1 also provide summary statistics and
sources for all control variables.
5. Empirical methodology
We use cross-province variation in the shares of different types of peasantry and over-time variation
in the emancipation to estimate the effect of the abolition of serfdom on agricultural productivity,
peasants’ wellbeing, and industrial development. Our main specification is as follows:
Yit = α ShareSerfsi ×PostEmancipationt + Xit’γ + ψi + Ϭt + tδi + εit, (1)
Subscripts i and t index provinces and time periods. Time periods are either years or decades,
depending on data availability for a particular outcome. We consider the following outcomes,
denoted by Y: grain yield (harvest/seed ratio), height of draftees in centimeters, mortality (ratio of
the number of deaths to provincial population) and fertility (ratio of the number of births to
provincial population), log(population), log(industrial employment), and log(industrial output).
ShareSerfs denotes the share of privately owned serfs in a province in 1858. PostEmancipation
denotes a dummy indicating the time after the emancipation of serfs. Our baseline sample excludes
Baltic provinces, and therefore, PostEmancipation dummy switches on in 1861 in all provinces.19
17 There are no data on labor inputs in agriculture in the 19th century. Employment in agriculture is known only for the 1897 population census year. In addition, figures on population with rural legal status are known only for tax census years (1795, 1811, 1816, 1851, and 1858). Arable land data are available for 1800, 1858, 1871, and 1877. There are no data on investments into land. 18 All height data are on soldiers drafted after the 1874 military reform, i.e., collected under the same procedure. Draft occurred at the age of 21, i.e., those who were drafted before 1881 were born during the serfdom period. 19 To study the robustness of our results to inclusion of Baltic provinces, we use the interaction ShareSerfsi PostEmancipationit as our main variable of interest, where PostEmancipationit varies both over time and across provinces. PostEmancipationit switches on in 1819 in three Baltic provinces and in 1861 in all other provinces. ShareSerfsi for Baltic provinces is equal to the share of former serfs in 1858 according to Bushen (1863). Alternatively,
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Theeffectoftheaboli2onofserfdomonagriculturalproduc2vity(OLS)
Grain productivity Share of serfs X Post-emancipation 0.86*** 0.80*** 1.06***
[0.233] [0.289] [0.302] Demeaned log distance to Moscow X
Post-emancipation -1.02** -0.95**
[0.443] [0.439] Demeaned crop suitability X
Post-emancipation 0.044 0.035 [0.046] [0.044]
Share of state peasants X Post-1866, Share of royal peasants X Post-1859
NO NO YES
Province-specific trends NO YES YES
Province and Time fixed effects YES YES YES Observations 1,777 1,756 1,756
R-squared 0.361 0.398 0.399 22
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Pre-trends?The2mingoftheeffect
23Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
-10
12
34
Coef
ficie
nt
40s 50-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 Post 95Time
(relative to years 1795-1829)Grain productivity
1764Na2onaliza2onofmonasteriallandsandtheprevalenceofserfdom
24
• Remainingchallengestoiden2fica2onare:– Measurementerror=>possible– Otherunrelatedtoserfdomfactorsthatchangetrendsin1861inprovinceswith
largenumberofserfs=>unlikely,butnotimpossible,duetodefeatinCrimeanwar
– Spa2alcorrela2on• Therewerenoprivateserfsinformerlymonasteriallandsajer
CatherinetheGreatna2onalizedthemin1764:– astheselandswerenotgrantedtonoblestoavoidconflictwiththechurch
• Usetheshareofmonasterialserfspriorna2onaliza2onasasourceofexogenousvaria2onintheshareofserfsin1858– SimilartoBuggleandNafziger(2015),butunderaweakeriden2fica2on
assump2onofpanelseing
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Formermonasterialserfsandtheprevalenceofserfdomin1858:province-level
25Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
-.4-.2
0.2
.4Sh
are
of s
erfs
in 1
858
-.1 0 .1 .2 .3Share of monasterial serfs before the 1764 nationalization
coef = -1.2560534, (robust) se = .40873615, t = -3.07
Controls: log distance to Moscow and land suitabilityConditional scatter plot and fitted line
Formermonasterialserfsandtheprevalenceofserfdomin1858:district-level
26Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
-.50
.5Sh
are
of s
erfs
in 1
858
by d
istric
t
-.2 0 .2 .4 .6Share of monasterial serfs before the 1764 nationalization by district
coef = -.55964074, (robust) se = .07319432, t = -7.65
Full sampleScatter plot conditional on log distance to Moscow
Isthenumberofmonasterialserfsexcludable?
27Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Nodifferencebetweenmonasterialserfsandprivately-ownedserfsin:• produc2ontechnologiesbefore1764(Zakharova1982)• thequalityofland(andwecontrolforlandquality)• literacyrates
• Hadmonasterialserfsaffecteddevelopmentdirectly,whywouldsuchaneffectberealizedonlyajer1861?
• Iden2fica2onassump2on:thedistribu2onofchurchlandsacenturybeforetheemancipa2onwasorthogonaltothechangesineconomicfundamentalsaroundemancipa2on
Similar-sizees2matewithIV
Instrumental variables estimation Share of serfs X Post-emancipation
Grain productivity
1st stage 2nd stage Share of serfs X Post-emancipation 1.21**
[0.551] Share of nationalized monasterial serfs X
Post-emancipation -1.25*** [0.299]
Demeaned Log distance to Moscow X Post-emancipation
YES
YES
Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation YES YES Province-specific linear trends YES YES
Province and Time fixed effects YES YES Observations 1,756 1,756
R-squared 0.525 F stat 17.45
28Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Conley(1999)correc2onforspa2alcorrela2on–agriculture
AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 29Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
-.08
.15
-.45
.21
-.1
.21
.42
-.06
.07
-.19
.05
-.21
.36
-.01.02
.06
-.04-.03
0.010
-.010
00.01
.01
-.01
-.02
0
.05
-.010
-.04-.03
.03
-.06-.12
.23
-.06
.13
-.03 -.08-.2
.19
-.3
-1.5
-1-.5
0.5
1C
hang
e in
det
rend
ed g
ain
yiel
d, b
efor
e-af
ter 1
861
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4Share of serfs in 1858
DFBeta presented for each observation
Scatter plot conditional on log distance to Moscow and suitabilityChange in grain yield
The change in detrended grain yield b/w pre- and post-emancipation full |DFBeta|<0.3
Share of serfs 0.90*** 0.75*** [0.259] [0.197]
Log distance to Moscow, crop suitability Yes Yes Observations 46 43
Adj R-squared 0.255 0.344
Themagnitudeislarge
• Aleapforwardof37years:
– A15.5%increaseingrainproduc2vityontopoftheoveralldevelopmenttrendforanaverageprovincewith45%ofserfsandwiththemeandistancetoMoscow• comparedtoanaverageincreaseby4percentbydecadeinthe19thcentury
30Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Thelandreform• Mandatorylandbuyoutsbyformerserfsleadingtocommunalland
tenure– PossiblebePerincen2vestoinvestinland,butonlyinhereditarycommunes
– Forre-par22oncommune:lowincen2vestoinvestinland
• Gradualrealiza2onover1862-1881withvaryingspeed– Nego2a2onsonpreciseterms
• price,sizeofplots,theexact2mingofbuyoutsineachestate– immediateobligatorylandbuy-outinwesternprovincesin1863asaresponsetothePolishrebellion
• Usetheshareofserfswhosignedlandbuyoutcontractinagivenyearasameasureoflandreformprogress AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 31
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
OLS:Emancipa2onvs.landreformGrain productivity
Share of serfs X Post-emancipation
1.04** [0.407]
Share of serfs with signed buyout contracts
-0.44* [0.255]
Demeaned Log distance to Moscow and Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation
YES
Share of state peasants X Post 1863, share of royal peasants X Post 1859
NO
Province-specific linear trends YES Time and province fixed effects YES
Observations 1,701 R-squared 0.396
32Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Gentryindebtednessandlandreform
33
• Theprogressoflandreformwascertainlyendogenous
• Oursourceofexogenousvaria2onisasfollows:Indebtedlandlordshadafinancialincen2vetopostponelandreformimplementa2on– thefixed(temporary)quitrentwashigherthantheinteresttheyhadtopay
fortheirdebtstothestate
• Constructasynthe2cinstrumentforlandreformwithlinearschedulesofreformimplementa2on,withspeedvaryingdependingonex-anteindebtedness
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Landreformprogressandthesynthe2cinstrumentin1872
34Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
-.50
.5Sh
are
of p
easa
nts
with
buy
out c
ontra
ct s
igne
d in
187
2
-.05 0 .05Non-indebtedness instrument in 1872
coef = 3.1986224, (robust) se = 1.3878267, t = 2.3
Controls: log distance to Moscow and land suitabilityConditional scatter plot and fitted line
Isgentryindebtednessexcludable?
35
• Theprimaryreasontoobtainloansforgentrywasthestatusconsump2onratherthanproduc2veinvestments
• Loanswereissuedbynon-marketstateins2tu2onswhichgrantedloansforpoli2calratherthaneconomicreasons
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Emancipa2onvs.landreform:IVes2matesShare of
serfs Signed buyout
contract
Grain productivity
1st stage 1st stage 2nd stage Share of serfs X
Post-emancipation 2.78*** [0.706]
Share of serfs with signed buyout contracts
-1.26*** [0.334]
Share of nationalized monasterial serfs X Post-emancipation
-1.28*** -1.33*** [0.305] [0.296]
Interpolation b/w (1-indebtedness) and 1 in the interval 1862-1882 0.09 2.78***
[0.150] [0.231] Province-specific linear trends, FEs, Demeaned Log distance to
Moscow and Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation
YES YES YES
Observations 1,701 1,701 1,701 R-squared 0.531
F, monastierial serfs 17.85 20.28 F, indebtedness instrument 0.421 136.8
36Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Themagnitudeoftheeffectofthelandreform
• Theeffectoftheaboli2onofserfdomonagriculturalproduc2vitywouldhavebeen84%largerwithoutthelandreform
– Afullimplementa2onofthelandreform(fromaffec2ngzerotoaffec2ngallformerserfs)inanaverageprovinceledtoadecreaseingrainproduc2vityby0.57or16.2%fromthemean1858level
– Emancipa2onledtoanincreaseby1.25or35.7%
37Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Landreformhadnega2veeffectonlyinre-par22oncommunes
Grain productivity
OLS Share of serfs X
Post-emancipation 0.80*
[0.416] Share of serfs with signed buyout contracts 0.18
[0.298] Share of serfs with signed buyout contracts
X re-partition commune -0.82** [0.351]
Demeaned Log distance to Moscow and Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation
YES
FEs, Province-specific linear trends YES Observations 1,701
R-squared 0.397 38
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Mechanismbehindposi2veeffectofemancipa2on
• Alargeandimmediateeffectrulesoutmechanisms,realiza2onofwhichtakes2me,suchasinvestmentinlandandhumancapital
• Theelimina2onofratcheteffectwasimmediate– IflandlordscrediblycommiPedtofixedobliga2ons,expectnogainsinproduc2vityajeremancipa2on
– Wemeasureimplicitcontractsunderserfdombywhetherpeasantsandlandlordsagreedonthetermsoftemporarylandleasebeforethelandreform
39Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Amechanism:incen2vesProxiedbyimplicitcontractsunderserfdom
Grain productivity
OLS Share of serfs X
Post-emancipation 1.91*** [0.489]
Share of serfs X Post-emancipation X Implicit contracts
-1.89*** [0.598]
Share of serfs with signed buyout contracts
-0.60** [0.258]
Demeaned Log distance to Moscow, Demeaned Land suitability X Post emancipation YES
Time and province FEs, Province specific linear trends YES Observations 1,648
R-squared 0.415
40Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Amechanism:adjustmentstothechoiceofcropstoseeddependingontheclima2candmarketcondi2ons
41
Share of winter crops seeded in total winter and summer crops seeded during production cycle
Share of serfs X -0.13*** -0.04** -0.15*** Post-emancipation [0.037] [0.019] [0.048]
Temperature (t-1) 0.007** 0.005
[0.004] [0.004] Share of serfs X 0.013*** 0.014**
Post-emancipation X Temperature (t-1) [0.005] [0.005] Share of serfs X Post-emancipation X -0.34*** -0.30**
Rye-to-wheat world price ratio (t-1) [0.121] [0.117] Demeaned ln distance to Moscow X Post-emancipation Yes Yes Yes
Demeaned crop suitability X Post-emancipation Yes Yes Yes Year and province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Province-specific trends Yes Yes Yes Observations 629 592 589
R-squared 0.789 0.770 0.780
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Drajees’height:provinceleveldata(birthcohorts:1853-1860vs.1861-1875)
Draftees’ height
OLS
IV
OLS 2nd stage Share of serfs X Post-emancipation 0.99*** 1.35** 0.98***
[0.354] [0.631] [0.350] Demeaned Log distance to Moscow
and Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation YES YES YES
Share of state peasants X Post 1863, share of royal peasants X Post 1859 NO NO YES
Province-specific linear trends YES YES YES
Province and birth cohorts fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 690 690 690 R-squared 0,761 0.761 0.761
F stat 15,47 42
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Pre-trends?Drajees’height(province-level)
43Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
-10
12
3C
oeffi
cien
t
55-56 57-58 59-60 61-62 63-64 65-66 75Birth cohorts
(relative to cohorts of 1853-1854)Draftees' height by province, cohorts 1853-1866 and 1875
Conley(1999)correc2onforspa2alcorrela2on:heightatprovince-level
AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 44Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
.04
-.32
.37.43
-.12-.15
.12.12
-.22-.2
.01
.07
-.2
.02
-.1
.01.04
-.04
.04
0.01
0
00
0
0
.02
-.02
0
.06
-.06
-.05
0
.08
-.09
.02
-.1
.09
-.09
.2
.42
-.07
.07.12
-.27
-.18
-1-.5
0.5
1C
hang
e in
det
rend
ed h
eigh
t by
prov
ince
, bef
ore-
afte
r 186
1
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4Share of serfs in 1858
DFBeta presented for each observation
Scatter plot conditional on log distance to Moscow and suitabilityChange in draftees' height, by province
The change in detrended height by province b/w pre- and post-emancipation cohorts
full |DFBeta|<0.3 Share of serfs 0.92*** 0.66***
[0.202] [0.147] Log distance to Moscow, crop suitability Yes Yes
Observations 46 42 Adj R-squared 0,354 0,391
Drajees’height:districtleveldata(birthcohorts1853-1860vs.1861-1862):
Draftees’ height
OLS
IV
2nd stage Share of serfs X Post-emancipation 0.35** 0.96***
[0.175] [0.348] Demeaned Log distance to Moscow
and Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation YES YES
Share of state peasants X Post 1863, share of royal peasants X Post 1859 NO NO
Province-specific linear trends YES YES
District and birth cohort fixed effects YES YES Observations 4,670 4,580
R-squared 0,606 0,589 F stat 95,85
45Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Pre-trends?Drajees’height(district-level)
46Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
-.50
.51
Coe
ffici
ent
55-56 57-58 59-60 61-62Birth cohorts
(relative to cohorts of 1853-1854)Draftees' height by district, cohorts 1853-1862
Conley(1999)correc2onforspa2alcorrela2on:heightatdistrictlevel
AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 47Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
.03
-.14
.02
-.07
.03
-.06-.11
-.01.01-.02.04-.01
.08
-.04
-.15-.17
.08
.01.03.01.06.05
-.06
.040
.07
-.06-.08-.07-.05
.07
-.05
.08
.04.04
-.06
.01.02
-.07
0-.02-.01.02-.03
.040
.1
.05.01
-.06-.02-.01
.07
.04.010
.16.12
.01
-.13
-.02
-.07
-.02-.05
.04
.01
-.05
-.01-.04-.01
.04
-.06
.07
-.03
.06.040
.1
.04
.08
0
.19
-.06-.05
.07
-.1
.06.08
.02-.01-.03-.04
.02
-.02-.04
.04
.01
-.03
.02
-.1
-.03
.02.030
.07
-.05-.02
.05.05
0.02.02
-.02
.02
-.05
0.01-.02-.04
.01-.02-.02
.03.01.01.02.02.02.01
-.02-.020-.02
.03
-.03
.09
-.03
.01.01-.01
.03.02.02
-.05
.02
.01-.01-.03
.03
.01.01.01
.09
.02.0300-.0100-.02
.04
-.01-.02-.02-.01
-.04
-.02
.05
.01-.01
.04
.01.01
-.03
-.01-.01-.01-.02-.01-.02
.01.010.01
-.02
00.01.01
-.01-.02
0
.01
-.010000
-.02
0.01
000
-.01
000
.01
00
-.01
-.03
00000
0000
000000000
0
0
0
0
0
00
0
.01
.01
00000
00
-.01
00
0
0
.01
0
.01000.01.010000-.01
.03
-.02
0
0
-.02
0
-.0100
-.03
.03.02.02.01.01
.03
0
-.02-.03
.01
.05
0-.01
.01000-.02
.02
.06
.02
.01.01.01.010.01.02
-.01.01000
-.04
-.01
.02
-.02-.03
.02
-.01
-.04
.01.01
-.020
.03
0
.03
0-.01-.01-.01.01-.01-.01-.01-.01-.03
-.07
.03
.02
.05
.01-.01
-.03
0-.01.01
-.02
.03.02
-.06
0-.01
.06
-.02-.03-.04-.010-.01-.01
.02
.17
.02
-.01-.02-.03-.03-.02-.010-.02
.02-.01-.01-.02-.01-.02-.030
.16
.02
-.020-.010-.01.03
.09
.16
-.06-.04
.01
-.06
.02
-.09-.07
.02
-.05-.08
-.01-.02
-.15
.11
-.01-.03
.09.07
-.08
-.02
-.14
.15
.01
.15
-.02-.06
.07.04
-.04-.05-.04-.03-.06-.01-.03
.03
-.03
.05
-.02-.04
.06.04
-.03-.07
-.15
-.02-.03.02
-.12
-.05
.11
-.02.04.04.05
-.06-.04-.08
.04
-.03-.1-.05
.21
-.05-.09
.06
-.08
0.04
-.04-.07
.14
-.02
.22
-.12
.06-.02.05
-4-2
02
4C
hang
e in
det
rend
ed h
eigh
t by
dist
rict,
befo
re-a
fter 1
861
-.5 0 .5Share of serfs in 1858
DFBeta presented for each observation
Scatter plot conditional on log distance to Moscow and suitabilityChange in draftees' height, by district
The change in detrended height by district b/w pre- and post-emancipation cohorts
full |DFBeta|<0.15 Share of serfs 0.62*** 0.45***
[0.204] [0.136] Log distance to Moscow, crop suitability Yes Yes
Observations 466 457 Adj R-squared 0,043 0,041
Industrialdevelopment
Log industrial output
OLS IV: 2nd stage OLS Share of serfs X Post-emancipation 0.88** 2.27* 1.84***
[0.365] [1.243] [0.334] Demeaned Log distance to Moscow
and Demeaned Land suitability X Post-emancipation
YES YES YES
Share of state peasants X Post 1863, share of royal peasants X Post 1859 NO NO YES
FEs, Region-specific linear trends YES YES YES Observations 341 341 341
R-squared 0.896 0.936 0.899 F-stat 20.45
48Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Pre-trends?Industrialoutput
AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 49Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
-10
12
34
Coef
ficien
t
1849 56,58 82,83 85 1897Time
(relative to the year 1795)Log industrial output
Conley(1999)correc2onforspa2alcorrela2on:industrialoutput
AndreiMarkevich"EconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom" 50Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
.38
-.2
-.46
.04-.03-.11
.24
.03
-.11
.09
-.15
-.03
.06.07.05
-.01-.02
0 0.01.01
.01
-.01
0
00
-.02-.02
-.01
.02
-.02
-.08
-.07
-.04
.31
-.02
.26
-.19
.08.02
-.14
-.09
.3
-.11
0
-10
12
Cha
nge
in lo
g in
dust
rial o
utpu
t, be
fore
-afte
r 186
1
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4Share of serfs in 1858
DFBeta presented for each observation
Scatter plot conditional on log distance to Moscow and suitabilityChange in log industrial output
The change in detrended industrial output b/w pre- and post-
emancipation Sample: full |DFBeta|<0.3
Share of serfs 1.92*** 1.70*** [0.37] [0.37]
Log distance to Moscow, crop suitability Yes Yes Observations 45 41
Adj R-squared 0.29 0.28
Themagnitudeoftheeffectonindustrialdevelopment:LATE
51
• Asubstan2aldifferencebetweenOLSandIVpointes2mates:48%vs.170%– Themostlikelyreasonistheheterogeneouseffectoftheaboli2onofserfdomonindustrialdevelopment
• IVes2matesLATE:theeffectinthoseprovinces,whereintheabsenceofmonasteries,thelandswouldhavebeentransferredintoprivateownership,whichisbiggerthaninprovinceswherethelandswouldhavestayedinstateownershipanyway(intheperipheryofempire)
• Thebigeffectisconsistentwiththeevidenceonsubstan2alleveloflabormigra2onoutofvillagesinthe2ndhalfofthe19thcentury(Nafziger2010)– Mobilitywouldhavebeenevenlargeriftherewerenocommunes
(Gerschenkron1965)
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Sensi2vitytests• Controlsforpoten2ally-confoundingfactors
– Thelengthofrailwaynetworkinaprovinceinayear– Historicaltemperaturebyyearandprovince– Thecourtreform– The1864zemstvoreformandexpenditures
• Controlsforlandreformimplementa2on– TheGreatRussiaprovincesonly– Thelandredistribu2onb/wpeasantsandlandlordsasaresultofthereform:landcuts
• Alterna2vedataonthecomposi2onofruralpopula2onandalterna2vesamples– 1857taxcensusratherthan1858policedata– Sub-samplewithgovernorreportsdataonly,i.e.pre-1883– Sub-sampleexcludingMoscowandSaint-Petersburgprovinces– ExtendedsamplewithBal2cprovinceswhere(abitdifferent)emancipa2onreform
happenedaround1820– WLSbypopula2on
• Placebo:changedthedateoftheaboli2onofserfdom52
Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Anoveralleffectandcounterfactualexercise
53Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”
Agriculture Industry Service
All sectors
scenario: services were not
affected by the emacipation
scenario: services grew as demand (weight.
average of industry and agriculture
GDP per capita in 1820 from Maddison (2007) 688 Sectorial shares in value added in 1860 from Goldsmith (1961) 59.3 5.1 35.6
Value added in 1820 22343 1922 13413 37678 The multiplier effect due to the abolition of serfdom 1.16 1.48 range: 1-1.19 1.12 1.19
Counter-factual estimates of value added in 1820 (mln USD 1990) 25918 2844 range: 13413-15899 42175 44661
Counter-factual estimates of GDP per capita in 1820 770 (112%) 816 (119%)
Counter-factual estimate of GDP per capita in 1913 (scenario: average growth rate in Russia 1820-1913 ) 1660 (112%) 1758 (119%)
Counter-factual estimate of GDP per capita in 1913 (scenario: average growth rate in Russia 1870-1913) 2052 (137%) 2173 (146%)
Counter-factual estimate of GDP per capita in 1913 (scenario: East-European average growth rate 1820-1913) 2220 (149%) 2351 (157%)
Actual GDP per capita in 1913 from Maddison (2007) 1488
Conclusion• Theemancipa2onofserfscausedaverylargeincreaseinthe
agriculturalproduc2vity,industrialoutputandlivingstandards
• Theins2tu2onofserfdomsubstan2allysloweddownRussia’seconomicdevelopmentbecauseofpoorincen2vesforserfs
• SerfdomwasanimportantreasonofdivergenceineconomicdevelopmentbetweenWesternandEasternEurope
54Markevich-Zhuravskaya”TheEconomicEffectsoftheAboli2onofSerfdom”