the downside of gender quotas

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The Downside of Gender Quotas?1 Institutional

Constraints on Women in Mexican State LegislaturesBY PAR ZETTERBERG

ABSTRACT

In recent years, a rich and varied body of literature has developed that focuses onthe way that institutional structures limit womens substantive representation.Claims have been made that some women legislators are more likely to suffer from

institutional constraints than others; those entering legislature via legal genderquotas. Examining two Mexican state legislatures, where only one has adoptedlegal gender quotas, empirical testing gives no support to the hypothesis; quotawomen do not seem to confront more obstacles than other women. No such nega-tive side effect of quota legislation is identified. Two reasons are put forward; first,dependency on particular leaders is not isolated to quota women but is part of theoverall political system. Secondly, the most strident battles occur within politicalparties for positions of power; hence gender quotas are perceived as a threatmainly to male colleagues within the party. Two key aspects are identified thatdeserve closer attention in order to gain a more comprehensive picture of the

relationship between gender quotas and institutional obstacles to womens substan-tive representation: the political agendas raised by quota women and the interplaybetween different quota provisions and candidate selection rules.

IN the literature on womens substantive representation, the emphasishas been mainly on policy output, identifying the actions women take

to act in the interests of [women] in a manner responsive to them.2

Less attention has been paid to the prerequisites necessary for suchoutputs to occur. This analysis looks at the institutional conditionsunder which legislators pursue their job, by scrutinising the socialstructures and (male) practices that are claimed to inhibit women legis-lators from performing their tasks the way they prefer.3 More specifi-cally, it tests empirically the hypothesis that quota womenthosewomen who enter legislative bodies via legal gender quotasare morelikely to suffer from institutional constraints, and thus have a more cir-

cumscribed room for manoeuvre within the legislature, than womenwho are not elected via gender quotas.These constraints have been identified as a downside of quota legis-

lation. As quotas constitute a legal attempt to break male-dominantstructures of politics and increase womens numerical representation,

Parliamentary AffairsVol. 61 No. 3 # The Author [2008]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of theHansard Society for Parliamentary Government; all rights reserved. For permissions,please e-mail: [email protected]: 10.1093/pa/gsn016

Parliamentary AffairsVol. 61 No. 3, 2008, 442460Advance Access Publication 28 March 2008

atUniversidadAutnomaMetropolitanaonSeptember13,2013

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thereby constituting an external shock to the predominantly male pol-itical system, quotas pose a threat to male politicians.4 Being rationalpolitical actors, male party leaderships and parliamentarians are likelyto respond to this challenge in at least two ways, in order to maintainpolitical power also whenever a successful implementation of genderquotas generate a rapid increase in womens numerical representation:First, male leaders will select rather politically inexperienced andpowerless women to maintain control of the political agenda.5 In con-trast to other women legislators, who are expected to have won theirseats thanks to having a strong position in the political party and/or insociety, quota women may be in a less favorable situation from theoutset.6 Secondly, once in parliament male leaders and legislators willtry to prevent quota women from exercising political power by putting

them in less prestigious positions and by neglecting their proposals.7

Although empirical tests are still rather few, some support has beengiven to the hypothesis that quota women are more likely to sufferfrom institutional constraints than other women legislators.8 However,these analyses are almost exclusively based on single case studies in alimited number of countries (mainly India). Nor do they compare theexperiences of women entering legislature via gender quotas with thoseof other women. Therefore, it is not possible to rule out the possibilitythat institutional constraints are universal problems affecting all

women legislators similarly. For this reason, this hypothesis is to betested by comparing the obstacles that quota women and non-quotawomen confront in their legislative work, in two Mexican state legisla-turesZacatecas and Michoaca n de Ocampo (hereafter Michoaca n).The former state has introduced gender quotas into its electoral code,whereas the latter has not done so.9

By scrutinising the possible constraints facing quota women, thisanalysis strives at addressing, at least indirectly, the intriguing questionof whether positive opportunities for womens increased numerical rep-

resentation brought by quotas may be linked to increased restrictionsfor quota women when it comes to carry out reforms of benefit towomen as a group,10 that is, with negative consequences for womenssubstantive representation.11 A focus on working conditions within thelegislature, being an important mediating factor to the passage of legis-lation beneficial to women, increases our understanding of the possibi-lities for quota women who want to pursue an agenda for the benefitof women to be successful in their attempts.12

Three obstacles to women legislators performanceInspired by Goetzs three dimensions of political effectivenessaccess,presence and influenceand by theorists of gendered organisations,three obstacles to women legislators performance in parliament havebeen formulated.13 These are likely to affect women at different stagesin a parliamentary process.14 For all obstacles, it is suggested that those

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quo is maintained despite a numerical advancement of this tradition-ally underrepresented group.21

Tokenism is measured using four indicators, all of them aiming athighlighting the woman representatives lack of independence, orcontrol (see Table 1). The first indicator refers to the way in whichwomen are selected as candidates. It is likely that women who havebeen appointed by the party leadership will have greater levels of obli-gation to those who appointed her, resulting in greater difficulties topursue the political agenda of her electoral campaign, than those whowon their candidacy in direct competition with others at constituencylevel (in primary elections).22 The second and third indicator highlightsthe question of representatives power base, within the political partyor elsewhere in society. A woman representative who has had few or

no previous party assignments, within the party organisation or as arepresentative, and has no leadership experiences from other organis-ations, may lack her own power base and may therefore have limitedroom for manoeuvre within the legislature.23 The final indicator refersto a dependency towards family members; for example that the womanhas been nominated and elected due to being a relative to an importantmale politician in the party leadership, and in order to represent hisinterests in the legislature.24

Marginalisation is measured looking at committee appointments,

which are arguably the most important, and by far the most frequentlyanalysed, leadership positions in the legislature.25 More specifically,the key question is whether the committees that the woman representa-tive were assigned to, radically differed from those she solicited.26

However, we should also take into consideration exactly what commit-tees the woman solicited, and why. There is a possibility that a womansolicits a certain (and among her colleagues less requested) committeemerely for strategic reasons, perceiving that she will have no chance ofhaving the committee she really wanted, or to avoid negative reactions

1. Analytic framework for analysis on obstacles to women legislators political performance

Obstacle Indicator

Tokenism Woman representative was nominated through appointment by partyleadership

Woman representative has had no other party assignments

Woman representative lacks leadership experiences from other

organisation(s)

Woman representative has family ties with male in party leadershipMarginalisation Woman representative is a member of/chairs a committee that she has

not solicited

Invisibilisation Woman representative has experiences of not being listened to in thelegislature



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and treatment in a hostile environment. This might also be a kind ofmarginalisation.

The narrative of women representatives is emphasised when analys-ing invisibilisation, as they are asked about possible experiences ofthese practices. Being self-reported claims, this measure does on theone hand not permit careful examination of the actual veracity of theseclaims. On the other hand, perceiving that one is listened to indecision-making is a key condition for any legislator who wants topursue a particular political agenda and carry through certain reforms.Moreover, male politicians are also interviewed, in order to look forsimilarities and differences in attitudes about legislative work andgender relations in parliament.27

Presenting the Mexican case studyThe empirical focus of the analysis is on state legislatures in Mexico.The reasons for this are several: The Latin American countries areat the core of quota legislation, with Argentina being pioneer countryin quota legislation in 1991 and being the region with the highest shareof countries practicing gender quotas.28 A major advantage of focusingon Mexico is its federal system, each state having its own electoralcode, and consequently, some states having adopted legal genderquotas, whereas others have not done so.29 Therefore, a within-country

comparison is possible. This type of analysis has important advantagesto those on national parliaments; it is possible to compare casessharing key aspects such as electoral as well as party systems, and to agreater extent than in cross-national analyses, also political culture andother cultural or historical factors.30

The two states selected are Zacatecas and Michoaca n, both beingamong the least developed states of the country.31 Their modern politi-cal history has similar features. The hegemony of the Party of theInstitutional Revolution (PRI) was broken by voting a governor from

the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) to power; thisoccurred in Zacatecas in 1998 (and again in 2004) and in Michoaca nin 2001. In terms of womens presence in politics, similar paths werefollowed for a long time. Womens representation developed incremen-tally from a very low share in the early 1990sless than 5% in bothstatesto about 15% in 2001 (see Figure 1).

After 2001, the two states have followed different paths. Zacatecasadopted legal gender quotas in 2003, as parts of an extensive electoralreform package and after two months of protests. The legislation is

very strict; candidate lists having more than 70% of the same sex willnot be accepted for registration. On proportional lists, the top two can-didates may not be of the same sex . In the 2004 elections, the quotalaw had a positive effect on womens representation. The rate ofwomen representatives in the state legislature doubled from the pre-vious election, to an all time high of almost 27% (eight women of 30).

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It is suggested that this rapid and large increase might make the threatto male domination more palpableand possible constraints on quotawomen more visiblethan in cases where a quota reform has only gen-erated small changes. In Michoaca n, on the other hand, the electoralcode only has a (hitherto inoperative) recommendation to the political

parties not to nominate more than 70% of candidates of the samesex.32 Womens representation has, consequently, continued the incre-mental track to a level of 17.5% (seven women of 40) in the 2004 elec-tions (see Figure 1).33

Just under 50 interviews were carried out in a field trip to the twostates in OctoberDecember 2006.34 In Zacatecas, seven of eightwomen representatives were interviewed, and in Michoaca n, interviewswere done with all seven women legislators (for information aboutwomen legislators, see Table 2). A selection of male legislators were

also interviewed;35

in Zacatecas three represented the biggest partyPRD (50% of the seats), and one from PRI (20%), the National ActionParty (PAN) (13.3%) and the Workers Party (PT) (13.3%), respect-ively. Ten interviews were carried out with male legislators inMichoaca n; four from PRD (having 42.5% of the seats), four from PRI(37.5%) and two from PAN (15%). Questions to legislators concernedissues such as their political as well as family background, experiencesof party activities or activism in other organisations, the nominationprocess and focus of their campaigns, emphasis of their parliamentary

work and committee assignments and relations to their fellow-legislators. Additional interviews were carried out with other womenex-legislators, party presidents/vice presidents, presidents of thewomens section of the parties and the director-general of the womensagency of each state, in order to have a fuller picture of the political andparty structure of the states.

Figure 1. Womens representation in state legislatures of Zacatecas and Michoacan,1992 2004 (%)

Source: D. Reynoso and N. DAngelo, Las leyes de cuota y su impacto en la eleccion de

mujeres en Mexico, Poltica y Gobierno, XIII, 2006, 279313. Note, in main source thepercentage for Michoacan in 2004 is wrongly put at 20%.



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TokenismLooking jointly at the indicators of tokenism, the analysis gives nogeneral support to the hypothesis that women entering parliamentthrough gender quotas are more likely than other women legislators tobe controlled by particular leaders or party leaderships. This does notmean that elected women are necessarily free from problems of exter-nal control, the most critical problem being the flexible candidate selec-tion rules. However, flexible (and mostly centralised) nomination rulesas well as emphasis on personal ties appear to be key features of the

Mexican political system, mostly operating similarly across state legisla-tures, be it quota or non-quota systems, affecting the rules of the gamefor all players. To some extent this problem is counterbalanced by thefact that barely any of the elected women, again without discriminationbetween women elected via gender quotas and others, seem to owetheir candidacy to certain family ties.36 Moreover, most of the elected

2. Women representatives in Zacatecas and Michoacan (in November 2006), by politicalparty, electoral procedure and gender quota

Woman legislator Politicalparty

Electoral procedure Entered via genderquota

ZacatecasMartina Rodrguez

Garc a

PRD Prop. repr. Yes, legal quota

Ada Alicia Lugo Da vila PRD Majority vote Yes, legal quota

Ruth Araceli Ros

Moncada

PRD Majority vote Yes, legal quota

Martha Angelica

Zamudio Macas


Sara Guadalupe Buerba

Sauri


Lidia Vazquez Luja n PT Prop. repr. Yes, legal quota

Raquel Zapata Fraire PAN Prop. repr. Yes, legal quotaSonia de la Torre

Barrientos

PAN Majority vote Noa

Michoacan

Minerva Bautista Go mez PRD Prop. repr. Yes, party quotaMara Lucila Arteaga

Garibay

PRD Prop. repr. No

Citlal FernandezGonza lez

PRD Prop. repr. No

Vero nica Garca Reyes PRD Majority vote NoMara Cruz Campos

D as

PRD Majority vote No

Mara del Roco LuquinValdes

PRI Prop. repr. No

Ana Luca MedinaGalindo

PAN Majority vote No

Note: aLegislator competed in primary elections with male competitors.



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women who run a high risk of becoming tokensquota women andnon-quota womenappear to have some kind of power base withinthe party; a majority of the nominated women had leadership experi-ences from the party executive at state level or from the stategovernment.37

The general problem of flexible candidate selection procedures isevident when analysing the ways in which legislators were selected ascandidates; indications of problems of tokenism are visible among bothquota women and non-quota women. As the electoral code in neitherstate has strict rules for candidate selection procedures, the ways inwhich candidates were nominatedand hence the risk of sufferingfrom tokenismdiffer from legislator to legislator. In general, the lesscontrol of party leaderships, and the more transparent the nomination

procedure, the less likely is a woman to suffer from these problems.From a strict candidate selection perspective, most women operating

in a quota system run quite a high risk of becoming tokens.Appointments were frequently, although not always, used by party lea-derships mainly for single member districts. This is perhaps mostevident for PRD, in which all five women candidates (of which fourwon their districts) were handpicked by the party leadership, mainlythe governor.38 However, the problem of handpicking candidates is tosome extent counterbalanced by the nomination of women candidates

that appear to have a power base within the party and/or among theelectorate. For instance, one woman participated in the primary elec-tions to mayor in her municipality, losing closely to a male competitor:Being the runner-up of the primary elections [they saw] that I hadstrong support in the municipality. [Therefore] they asked me to runfor the state legislature.39

The risk of external controls over women representatives is not iso-lated to quota women, nor is it isolated to women representatives. Asimilar pattern exists among male legislators entering the legislature

through single member districts; there are those winning primary elec-tions in competition with others, but also those being handpicked byparty leadership: I was invited by the executive committee. [. . .] Theyknew me [and] they thought that I had the chance to win.40 Forwomen legislators in Michoaca n, the main risk of external controlappears to occur when they sought proportional representation seats,due to the importance of support from party factions and their leadersfor nomination. Some women were approached by male party col-leagues to run for candidacy, the governor included: [The governor]

told us that he needed people he trusts in the state legislature.[Therefore] he was going to ask some of us to run for office as therewere bills he wanted to introduce and things were going to be muchmore difficult without him having staunch supporters [in the legisla-ture]. [. . .] It was as good as a safe way to get to the legislature.41

Other women, not only in Michoaca n but in both states, needed



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back-up from leaders of particular groups in order to register for candi-dacy: The co-ordinators of the group decided to make a list of fourpersons and later restrict it to two. [. . .] It is also a matter of log-rollingat the [party congress] in which you identify how many votes do eachgroup have and for whom will they vote. Therefore they decided not toregister too many people.42 Also in these cases the nominatedwomenand menare likely to have a political power base within theparty. This reduces to some extent the risk of external control. Manyof them, regardless of whether they were quota women or not, hadbeen directors of the womens section (or another section) of the partyexecutive at state level.

On rare occasions, nomination procedures are less likely to generatetokenism; such as primary elections at constituency level in which

those affiliated to the party have the right to vote.43 In these cases, afew dominant leaders do not hold the key to nomination. Basically,two women seem to have been selected this way; one in Zacatecasbeing the only one having entered without the help from gender quotalegislation, and one in Michoaca n. Notably, both are young and rela-tively inexperienced in politics, factors that they claim were to theiradvantage in the electoral competition: I think that [voters] haveappreciated my youth and that I am a new politician. People are fed upwith having the same candidates as always [. . .] and even more when

[the candidates] have done a bad job.44 Thus, their situation was verymuch the reversed to that of most other women, who from a candidateselection perspective ran quite a high risk of becoming tokens, yetcounterbalanced this problem by having some kind of power basewithin the party. A lack of a powerful position within the partyor inother political organisationswas in this case compensated by a moredecentralised and transparent candidate selection procedure.45

Marginalisation

Table 3 summarises the picture of committees solicited, and commit-tees assigned to, women legislators in the two states. Both legislatureshave fairly decentralised systems of committee assignments in whicheach legislator is given the right to solicit one to three committees.46

The committee assignments correspond fairly well to those solicited bywomen legislators. This is most obvious in Michoaca n, in whichalmost all women chair the committee they solicited. In Zacatecashowever, a different picture emerges if only the chairmanships areexamined. However, widening the perspective, looking at memberships

in general, the requested committees do appear to correspond fairlywell to the actual committee assignments. Thus, it could not be con-cluded that quota women suffer more from marginalisation than otherwomen representatives.

Looking at committees that are chaired by women, a number ofquota women as well as non-quota women chair committees that deal



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3. Comparison of committees solicited by women legislators and committee assignments, inZacatecas and Michoacan

ZACATECAS MICHOACANLegislator

(Party)

Committee(s)

solicited

Committee

assignments

Legislator

(Party)

Committee(s)

solicited

Committee

assignmentsMartina

Rodrguez

Garc a

(PRD)

Education Ecologya,

Education,

Human rights

Minerva

Bautista

Go mez

(PRD)

Education Educationa,

Gender

equality,

Societal

communication

Ada Alicia

Lugo

Da vila

(PRD)

Electoral

issues,

Municipal

develop.,

Gender

equality

Law and

ordera, Science

and

technology,

Gender

equality,Legislative

studiesa,b

Mar a

Lucila

Arteaga

Garibay

(PRD)

Interior,

Justice, Human

rights

Interiora,

Justice, Human

rights

Ruth

AraceliR os

Moncada

(PRD)

None in

particular,

accepted

those I was

offered

Constitutional

issuesc,Editorial

issues, Culture

Citlal

FernandezGonza lez

(PRD)

Gender

equalityc, Lawand order,

Constitutional

issues

Gender

equalitya, Lawand order,

Constitutional

issues,Martha

AngelicaZamudio

Mac as(PRD)

(Not

interviewed)

Municipal

develop.a,Culture,

Ecology

Vero nica

Garc aReyes

(PRD)

Justice, Budget,

Any on socialissues

Indigenous

culturea,Justice, Budget

Sara

GuadalupeBuerba

Sauri

(PRD)

Electoral

issues,Municipal

develop., Law

and order

Electoral

issuesa,Agrobusiness,

Industry and

business

Mar a

CruzCampos

D as

(PRD)

Rural

development,Administration

and control

Rural

development,Administration

and controld

Lidia

Va zquezLujan (PT)

Finance,

Genderequality,

Electoral

issues

Finance (#2)a,

Genderequality,

Electoral

issues

Mara del

Roc oLuquin

Valdes

(PRI)

Health Healtha

Genderequality,

Justice

Raquel

ZapataFraire

(PAN)

Education Interiora,

Education,Health

Ana Luca

MedinaGalindo

(PAN)

Human rights,

Genderequality,

Justice

Human rightsa,

Genderequality,

Internal

practicesSonia de la

TorreBarrientos

(PAN)

Vigilance,

Finance,Tourism

Gender

equalitya,Electoral

issues,

Migration

issues

Notes:Underlined words legislator had the committee she solicited; alegislator chaired thecommittee. bShe introduced a bill to have such a committee. cThere is reason to be cautious

about this information, as she might have referred to committeeassignments, and not tothose she solicited. dAfter some time she was appointed co-ordinator of the party

parliamentary group, chairing the board of the legislature.



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with justice issues and parliamentary practices (law-making and elec-tions). Women not entering via gender quotas also appear to beinvolved in committees on social issues (health, education).Committees on economic issues, on the other hand, are rarely chairedby a woman. If preferences were not brought into the analysis, thiswould perhaps be an indication of marginalisation of women, both ofthose entering through gender quotas and others. However, takingcommittees solicited into account, a general picture is that womenlegislators themselves emphasise these issues. Rarely do they requestassignments on committees covering economic issues, be it quotawomen or not.

When it comes to identifying the motives for choosing certain com-mittees, a dominant pattern emerges; women legislators (both quota

women and others), and also male representatives, commonly empha-sise their professional background. This seems to be a key feature alsowhen appointing committee chairmanships. The coordinator of thePRD party group in Zacatecas, who was a key individual in the nego-tiations related to committee assignments, emphasises that [Some] areteachers. . .[these are put in the committee on] education. Others arelawyers. . .[they go to] legislative committees. Others are engi-neers. . .[they are appointed to committees related to] the productivesector. In this manner we were working [with the appointments].47

The strong concentration of lawyers among women legislators, morethan half of them having a university degree in law, is likely to accountfor womens membership of justice committees and of those related tolegislative issues. At least in part, self-selection rather than marginalisa-tion seems to account for a focus on certain issues.48

There is, however, at least one case in which marginalisation pro-blems are likely to occur, namely in the selection of members to thecommittee on gender equality. This committee is requested by quite alimited number of women (see Table 3); yet in both states there are

only women on this committee. Mainly in Michoaca n, both men andwomen suggest that the biggest advantage for being appointed to thecommittee on gender equality is being a woman; As you are the onlywoman. . .we put you on the committee on gender equality.49 Thus,ascriptive rather than professional characteristics were emphasisedwhen selecting members to this committee. This suggests that malelegislators in the two states give generally limited importance to thiscommittee, and that gender equality issues, in their minds, equalwomens issues. Despite this problem, there are further evidence that

marginalisation in general is not a major factor, neither for quotawomen nor others. For instance, one of the quota women, who is ahighly qualified teacher, requested but did not get the chair of the com-mittee on education. If marginalisation were a great problem, shewould most likely be put on a committee of low prestige. However, shewas appointed to one of the most prestigious committees; the Interior



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Committee.50 Another example is a quota woman with a law degreewho did not request a particular committee. She was appointed tochair the rather prestigious committee on constitutional issues.51

One reservation should be made, however. Few women requestedthose committees that were perceived as most prestigious and thereforemost contested among male legislators, for example finance and budgetcommittees. As a consequence, it is not possible from this analysis torule out the possibility that there might be strategies of marginalisationwhenever a significant number of women aspire for such chairs,thereby challenging the positions of their male colleagues.52

InvisibilisationIn general, women legislators feel that they are listened to by male col-

leagues, and therefore are able to influence political decision-making.A majority say that relationships of mutual respect exist between them-selves and their predominantly male colleagues. Various women inter-viewed highlight committee work as a forum for mutual compromise.Thus, these bodies are less described as battle fields and more as nego-tiation tables. Some women also use expressions such as team whenthey talk about their relations to their colleagues on the committees.Importantly, this picture is somewhat more valid for Zacatecas, practi-cing gender quotas, than for Michoaca n. Thus, just as in the cases of

marginalisation and tokenism, the hypothesis gains little support.Women legislators in Zacatecas are generally positive towards their

possibilities to influence in decision-making. Many of them give creditto their male colleagues on the committees.53 There is more of a mixedpicture in Michoaca n. Some women perceive that their opinions havebeen taken into account and that they have excellent relations to theirmale colleagues, feeling very comfortable to work with them.54 Onthe other hand, others have mainly negative experiences. Interestingly,negative experiences are almost exclusively concentrated to those

women who have no female colleagues in the partys parliamentarygroup: To a certain extent I feel that they get bothered when you havea good proposal or when you show them that you are qualified. [ . . .]So they try to ignore you, they do not pay attention to you, they try tominimise your proposals and. . .they forget about you.55 Anotherwoman who also reported acts of invisibilisation has a slightly differentstory. She perceives that her partys parliamentary group of 14 menlistens to her and supports her when she comes up with a proposal.However, she also perceives that she is not part of the discussion;

rather, she is expected to take the nurturing role, stopping the boysfrom fighting: [It feels like] they are discussing only with each other[and] when I am around I become the go-between. [. . .] [I become theconciliator] when they are getting upset.56

These results contradict the hypothesis that legal gender quotas gen-erate relatively big problems of invisibilisation. An explanation for this



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finding is put forward by some of the, mainly ruling party quotawomen from Zacatecas, where the current governor is a woman. Theelection of a woman governor in 2004, former womens rights activistAmalia Garca, appears to have had positive consequences for womenlegislators: The governor has the capacity to convince people. Thatway, bills are passed more easily. [. . .] This is very important [. . .] asshe supports women.57

There are, however, arguments against such an explanation. Mostimportantly, quota women indeed express that they have been invisibi-lilised, and thereby ignored in decision-making with their proposalsneglected. However, this occurs less in the legislature, but more withinpolitical parties.58 The reason for this, according to both male andfemale interviewees, is that the harshest political battles are fought

prior to entering parliament, for positions of power. Gender quotasmodify the rules of the game within political parties, requiring them toinvolve more women in electoral processes. The greater presence ofwomen in party activities creates greater challenges to male dominancein politics. Consequently, it is more likely that males practice invisibili-sation of women within the parties. It is important to note that suchpractices continue to occur within the majority party, despite thepowerful position Amalia Garca holds, having formed and currentlyleading the most important party faction in Zacatecas (New Sun

ForumForo Nuevo Sol). This argument downplays the role thatGarca is likely to play in overcoming invisibilisation problems; notonly within her political party, but also within the legislature.

It is necessary, however, to be cautious when drawing conclusions. Itis not possible to rule out the possibility that invisibilisation problemsare related to political agenda. If this is the case, invisibilisation mightbe a greater problem whenever a larger group of quota women is morecoordinated, more gender conscious and more focused on carryingthrough reforms in the area of gender equality than what have been the

case for quota women in Zacatecas. In its state legislature, womenrepresentatives have had much more heterogeneous political agendas.Moreover, whenever focusing on womens interests, emphasis hasmainly been on supporting women rather than on challenging male pri-vileges in politics and in society.59 This more diverse focus of womenlegislators, and the limited attention paid to gender issues, might onthe one hand be due to their attempts to substantively representwomen in a different manner than to enact laws that are of benefit towomen as a group. By working effectively and showing that women

are qualified to be politically responsible, not only on certain issues butin any kind of area, they could be political role models to women andthereby promote womens political agency.60 On the other hand, thelack of emphasis on gender issues might be for strategic reasons relatedto their future political career,61 or, to put in bluntly, to the fact that



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they are not particularly interested in such issues. The analysis givessome support to both these interpretations.

ConclusionIn this analysis, the focus has shifted from a policy output perspectivefor analyzing womens substantive representation, to the analysis ofparliamentary practices affecting the likelihood of womens substantiverepresentation. More specifically, it empirically tests the claim thatwomen entering parliament through legal gender quotas are morelikely than other women representatives to face institutional constraintsonce elected. No general support has been found for this hypothesis.The results indicate that quota women are no more likely to sufferfrom tokenism, marginalisation or invisibilisation than other women

legislators. Thus, any fears that quota legislation has such a downsideappearat least in this empirical contextto have been exaggerated.Given the close link between institutional constraints and possibilitiesto carry out reforms that are beneficial to women, this analysis suggeststhat quota legislation does not decrease the likelihood of such reforms.In other words, and challenging hypotheses in recent studies, mechan-isms designed to increase womens descriptive representation might notnecessarily be bad for womens substantive representation.62

Two main reasons for this are identified: First, minimally regulated

candidate selection rules appear to be a general problem in theMexican political system, making personal ties and loyalty to dominantgroups and leaders a key feature both in quota and non-quota systems.Therefore, any political player has to struggle to avoid becoming atoken, not only quota women. Secondly, attempting to understand theno effect of gender quotas on marginalisation and invisibilisation, it issuggested that the harshest battles are fought within political parties,for positions of power. If this is so, and given that marginalisation andinvisibilisation are practices of dominance in order to maintain political

power, such strategies are perhaps more visible within political partiesthan in the legislature. As a future political career in Mexican politicsseems to be dependent on ties and loyalty to dominant leaders andgroups, gender quotas are mainly a threat to male party colleagues.Once in parliament, a woman is no longer a challenger to a male col-leagues position in the same way as during the candidate selectionprocess.

These results differ from previous empirical work. Trying tounderstand the differences, it might be argued that other studies have

uncovered particular constraints on quota women due to the lack ofcomparison in these analyses between quota women and other womenlegislators. If this is so, structural constraints of quota women are prob-ably part of a more general pattern of discriminatory practices towardswomen.63 The analysis gives some support to this hypothesis.Constraints on quota women were expected to be relatively palpable in



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Zacatecas, due to the strong numerical effect of quota legislation onwomens numerical representation.

Nevertheless, there are good reasons to be cautious when attemptingto generalise the findings of this study. First, as part of a machistaculture, a rather strict labor division between men and women is likelyin Mexican legislatures, in which women are expected to focus on par-ticular issues (social issues and so forth) and men on others (economy,security and so forth). Quota women in this analysis have not chal-lenged these roles. It might be suggested that the lack of effect ofgender quotas on structural constraints is due to this very fact, and thata more coordinated group of quota women challenging male privilegesin politics and society will have a harder time fighting for their basicrights as legislators. Quota womens experiences within political

parties support this hypothesis, as they suffer from male strategies tomaintain power when challenging male dominance in candidate nomi-nation. Future research should therefore pay close attention to the pol-itical agendas of quota women, in order to have a closer understandingof the relationship between gender quotas and womens substantiverepresentation in general, and the institutional constraints facingwomen legislators in particular.

Second, although no general effect of gender quotas on tokenism isidentified in this particular study, the analysis sheds light on the para-

doxical relationship between gender quotas and candidate selectionprocedures of political parties. The former aims at democratising politi-cal parties by forcing them to be more inclusive in nomination pro-cesses. However, without strict and transparent rules on how to selectwomen candidates, quota legislation provides no solution to the fairlyundemocratic practices of candidate selection. In the worst case theymight provide a fresh mantle of legitimacy to the same old process[introducing] new players to the political arena but [making] them playaccording to old rules.64 Having shown that a number of quota

women were handpicked by party leadership, a question should beasked whether such practices of candidate selection are likely toincrease as a consequence of quota legislation, in general or in particu-lar political contexts. If this is the case, the risk for tokenism undermin-ing quota womens performance in the legislature may be enhancedeverything else being equal.65 Thus, further light should be shed on theinterplay between different quota provisions and nomination pro-cedures, and how these control which women are nominated in thefirst place as well as their possibilities to carry through legislation that

benefit women. Thereby, a more comprehensive picture will be possibleof the relationship between gender quotas and the institutional con-straints setting the limits to women legislators opportunities to sub-stantively represent women.



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1 For helpful comments, I would like to thank participants in the workshop What is going on in politi-

cal representation? The substantive representation of women at the ECPR Joint Sessions of

Workshops in Helsinki, 712 May 2007. A special thanks to the workshop directors Sarah Childs

and Karen Celis. My deepest gratitude is also sent to Per Adman, Christina Alnevall, Li

Bennich-Bjo rkman, Christina Bergqvist, Edme Domnguez R. and Sara Sjo qvist Monaco, for provid-

ing critiques of earlier versions of this article. Last but not least, I thank all interviewees for kindlysharing their experiences and thoughts with me.

2 L. Schwindt-Bayer and W. Mishler, An Integrated Model of Womens Representation, Journal of

Politics, 67, 2005, 40728. This definition of womens substantive representation paraphrases

Pitkins definition of substantive representation: Acting in the interests of the represented in a

manner responsive to them (H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, University of California

Press, 1967, p. 209). Whereas Pitkins definition mainly refers to representative roles, other defi-

nitions includes policy output in the definition: the passage of legislation beneficial to women as a

group (S. Childs and M.L. Krook, Gender and Politics: The State of the Art, Politics, 26, 2006,18

28). Regardless of definition, the point is that focus has been mainly on analysing these policy

outputs.

3 See for example A.M. Goetz, Womens Political Effectiveness: A Conceptual Framework in A.M.

Goetz and S. Hassim (ed.), No Shortcuts to Power. African Women in Politics and Policy Making,Zed Books, 2003.

4 L. Baldez, The Pros and Cons of Gender Quota Laws: What Happens When You Kick Men Out and

Let Women In?, Politics & Gender, 2, 2006, 10209; D. Dahlerup, Introduction in D. Dahlerup

(ed.),Women, Quotas and Politics, Routledge, 2006.

5 L. Baldez, The Pros and Cons of Gender Quota Laws: What Happens When You Kick Men Out and

Let Women In?; D. Dahlerup, Introduction.

6 D. Dahlerup, Introduction.

7 Cf. D. Dahlerup and L. Freidenvall, Quotas as a Fast Track to Equal Representation for Women:

Why Scandinavia is no longer the model, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7, 2005, 2648;

M. Hawkesworth, Congressional Enactments of Race-Gender: Toward a Theory of Raced-Gendered

Institutions, American Political Science Review, 97, 2003, 529-550; R.M. Heath, L Schwindt-Bayer

and M. Taylor-Robinson, Women on the Sidelines: Womens Representation on Committees in LatinAmerican Legislatures,American Journal of Political Science, 49, 2005, 42036.

8 See for example N. Kudva, Engineering Elections: The Experiences of Women in Panchayati Raj in

Karnataka, India, International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society, 16, 2003, 44563; A. Ghosh,

Womens Reservations and Electoral Politics in Urban Local Bodies: An Analysis of Chennai

Municipal Corporation Elections, 2001, Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 10, 2003, 11741. See

however G. Abou-Zeid, The Arab region: womens access to the decision-making process across the

Arab Nation in D. Dahlerup (ed.), Women, Quotas & Politics, Routledge, 2006, for an alternative

conclusion.

9 There are different kinds of legal gender quotas, the two most common arrangements being quotas to

candidate lists and reserved seats (see for example D. Dahlerup (ed.), Women, Quotas and Politics,

Routledge, 2006). In this analysis, attention is paid to the former. It is, however, possible that insti-

tutional constraints on quota women differ across quota systems.

10 There is a huge debate on how to define womens interests, or as expressed here; the benefit of

women as a group (see for example L. Wa ngnerud, Testing the Politics of Presence. Womens

Representation in the Swedish Riksdag, Scandinavian Political Studies, 23, 2000, 6791). In this

paper, no universal answer is suggested. Rather, it suggests that definitions are context-specific,

varying from case to case, depending on claims made by womens organisations and so forth. Thus,

womens interests may be both feminist and non-feminist, or to put it differently, both strategic

and practical (see note 59).

11 K. Beckwith, Numbers and Newness: The Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Women,

Canadian Journal of Political Science, 40, 2007, 27 49.

12 As women legislators (as others) have multiple identities, they are not assumed to necessarily rep-

resent women in the first place. However, it is suggested that if those women who wantto work for

the benefit of women as a group have a hard time fighting for their basic rights as legislators, they

will have greater difficulties in carrying out such reforms (D. Dahlerup, The Story of the Theory ofCritical Mass,Politics & Gender, 2, 2006, 51122).

13 A.M. Goetz, Womens Political Effectiveness: A Conceptual Framework; see also J. Acker,

Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations, Gender & Society, 4, 1990,

13958.



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14 As the ambition is to illuminate the different obstacles that women legislators might confront, there is

no assumption about correlations between the obstacles. However, it is of course possible that one

single legislator might suffer from more than one obstacle at the same time.

15 S. Childs and M.L. Krook, Should Feminists Give Up on Critical Mass? A Contingent Yes, Politics

& Gender, 2, 2006, 52230.

16 D. Dahlerup, Introduction.17 M. Hawkesworth, Congressional Enactments of Race-Gender: Toward a Theory of Raced-Gendered

Institutions. It should be emphasised that these pressures for loyalty are not necessarily restricted to

women politicians. For instance, loyalty in terms of party discipline is crucial for the functioning of

representative democracy in most countries. But more importantly, in clientelist systems personal ties

to dominant leaders are of vital importance also for male politicians (re)nomination (see for example

D. Dahlerup, Introduction). However, the suggested difference is that these men as well as non-

quota women are less dependent on such ties, and also earn their nomination and election thanks to

their strong position within the political party or elsewhere.

18 S. Childs and M.L. Krook, Should Feminists Give Up on Critical Mass? A Contingent Yes.

19 R.M. Heath, L. Schwindt-Bayer and M. Taylor-Robinson, Women on the Sidelines: Womens

Representation on Committees in Latin American Legislatures, p. 420.

20 R. M. Heath, L. Schwindt-Bayer and M. Taylor-Robinson, Women on the Sidelines: WomensRepresentation on Committees in Latin American Legislatures.

21 See for example M. Hawkesworth, Congressional Enactments of Race-Gender: Toward a Theory of

Raced-Gendered Institutions.

22 See for example P. Norris, Legislative Recruitment, in L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi and P. Norris (ed.),

Comparing Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective, Sage, 1996.

23 D. Dahlerup, Introduction.

24 S.M. Rai, F. Bari, N. Mahtab and B. Mohanty, South Asia: gender quotas and the politics of empow-

erment - a comparative study in D. Dahlerup (ed.), Women, Quotas, and Politics, Routledge, 2006.

It could be argued that women who come from political families are more strongly politically socia-

lised and therefore more efficient. If this is so, however, we would expect such women to be inte-

grated in the political party also prior to acceding to political office and thus already have a power

position within the party. Therefore, the indicators of tokenism should be looked at jointly and notseparately.

25 R.M. Heath, L. Schwindt-Bayer and M. Taylor-Robinson, Women on the Sidelines: Womens

Representation on Committees in Latin American Legislatures.

26 See also T. de Barbieri, Genero en el trabajo parlamentario: la legislatura mexicana a fines de siglo

XX, Clacso, 2003. Of course, we cannot expect everyone to have their first preference. Therefore, it

is important to compare quota womens perceptions with those of other women, as well as with their

male colleagues perceptions.

27 See for example S. Childs and M.L. Krook, Gender and Politics: The State of the Art.

28 Quota Project,Global Database of Quotas for Women, http://www.quotaproject.org, downloaded on

March 21, 2006.

29 The 31 state legislatures (and the legislature of The Federal District of Mexico City) have 20 to 75

seats (R. D. Hecock, Electoral Competition, Globalization, and Subnational Education Spending in

Mexico, 1999-2004, American Journal of Political Science, 50, 2006, 95061). All state legislatures

employ a mixed electoral system, using both a first past the post system of single member districts

and proportional representation.

30 R.D. Hecock, Electoral Competition, Globalization, and Subnational Education Spending in Mexico,

1999-2004. A limitation with choosing the Mexican case, however, is the no-reelection principle,

dating back to the Mexican revolution in the early twentieth century. Therefore, there are no legis-

lators who were both in the legislature during the quota reform and immediately after its

implementation.

31 UNDP, Indicadores de Desarrollo Humano y Genero en Mexico, United Nations Development

Program, 2006.

32 Ideally, a comparative case would be to prefer which has no writing at all about gender equality in

parliament. However, such states are rather few in Mexico, and Michoacan is suitable in many other

aspects. The advantages are therefore considered more important than the disadvantages. Moreover,with very few exceptions, the interviewees claimed that the recommendation has had no effect what-

soever on political parties rules for candidate selection. It should, however, be added that two of the

major political parties, PRI and PRD, have introduced so-called party quotas (50% and 30%, respect-

ively). However, in the election to the state legislature of Michoaca n in 2004 only PRD complied

with these rules, and to proportional representation only.



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33 The average rate of women in Mexican state legislatures was 20.4% in 2005 (D. Reynoso and

N. DAngelo, Las leyes de cuota y su impacto en la eleccio n de mujeres en Mexico, Poltica y

Gobierno, XIII, 2006, 279313).

34 By that time, the legislators had served about two-thirds of their three-year term.

35 These were selected with the ambition to interview co-ordinators of the party group by the time of

entering parliament, in order to know more about the process of committee assignments, as well as tohave variation in political party, committee, and age.

36 Cf. N. Kudva, Engineering Elections: The Experiences of Women in Panchayati Raj in Karnataka,

India. Perhaps there is one exception from this pattern, as one of the quota women in Zacatecas is

the sister-in-law of the former governor.

37 A very limited number of women legislators, quota women and others, has a political background in

civil society, prior to involve in party politics. Thus, leadership experiences from other political

organisations are generally scarce.

38 Interviews were done with four of them, of which three openly expressed that it is very unlikely that

they would have been asked, had there been no quota legislation.

39 Interview with Sara Guadalupe Buerba Sauri, Zacatecas, 1 November 2006, authors translation.

40 Interview with Eugenio Torres, Morelia, 6 December 2006, authors translation.

41 Interview with Mara Lucila Arteaga Garabay, Morelia, 27 November 2006, authors translation.42 Interview with Minerva Bautista Go mez, Morelia, 23 November 2006, authors translation.

43 Quite ironically, running for single member districts is rare among Mexican women, relatively pro-

portional seat candidacies. Low self-esteem, very expensive campaigns and discriminatory attitudes

among the constituency are some of the reasons for not doing so (see for example V. Rodrguez,

Women in contemporary Mexican politics, University of Texas Press, 2003).

44 Interview with Sonia de la Torre Barrientos, Zacatecas, 8 November 2006, authors translation. See

also V. Rodrguez,Women in contemporary Mexican politics.

45 See for example P. Norris, Legislative Recruitment.

46 After a discussion within the partys parliamentary group, party coordinators from different parties

negotiate the assignments. They could be appointed either by party leadership, being therefore a

somewhat more centralised system (for example PAN and PRD in Zacatecas, PRI in Michoaca n), or

in election within the partys parliamentary group (for example PRD in Michoaca n). For all parties,in both states, coordinators were men.

47 Interview with Jose Cha vez Sa nchez, Zacatecas, 9 November 2006, authors translation.

48 This is an argument against those claiming that women are socialised to have lower ambitions in

politics.

49 Interview with Mara del Roco Luquin Valdes, Morelia, 28 November 2006, authors translation.

50 Among the most prestigious and heavily negotiated committees are the committees on vigilance,

interior, finance, budget and justice, and to a slightly minor extent, those on education and consti-

tutional issues, as brought up by both male and female interviewees.

51 One woman did not succeed in having any of the committees she solicited. Being a lawyer, this might

on the one hand be another indication of the importance of professional background, as none of the

committees that she solicited were related to her academic career. On the other hand, it might also be

an example of marginalisation. From this analysis, it is difficult to have a closer idea.

52 Unfortunately, the analysis gives no general answer to the question why so few women requested the

most prestigious committees. It might be due to a lack of interest, but also due to an impression that

they were not going to get the assignment.

53 As one of them puts it: I have found some allies who help me to carry through some of my [legisla-

tive] projects. [. . .] The male colleagues in my committee have been especially helpful (interview with

Ada Alicia Lugo Da vila, Zacatecas, 6 November, 2006, authors translation).

54 Interview with Mary Cruz Campos Das, Morelia, 6 December 2006, authors translation.

55 Interview with Ana Luca Medina Galindo, Morelia, 29 November 2006, authors translation.

56 Interview with Mara del Roco Luquin Valdes, Morelia, 28 November 2006, authors translation.

57 Interview with Martina Rodrguez, Zacatecas, 16 November 2006, authors translation.

58 These reports of invisibilisation problems within political parties, are arguments against the thought

that quota women might not want to admit to themselves, or to an interviewer, that they suffer from

male domination. Thus, they are arguments against the thought that the results might be biased.59 Cf. M. Molyneux, Mobilization without emancipation? Womens interests, the state, and revolution

in Nicaragua, Feminist Studies, 11, 1985, 22754, in which she distinguishes between strategic and

practical gender needs/interests. Bills introduced by women in Zacatecas concern e.g. economic

support for single mothers and a law regarding the Womens Agency of Zacatecas (INMUZA).

60 Various of the women interviewed emphasised that efficiency, and showing good results, are import-

ant for women legislators who want to be an example for other women; in any kind of area, and not



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only in gender equality issues. As one of the quota women from the majority party puts it: When

there is a woman governing I want people to say that thats a good government!; not because she is

a woman but because there are reconstructions, services, social welfare. Those are the results [I

want]; good organization of the government, good administration of the public finances (interview

with A da Alicia Lugo Davila, Zacatecas, 6 November 2006, authors translation). See also C. Bacchi,

Arguing for and against quotas: theoretical issues in D. Dahlerup (ed.), Women, Quotas, andPolitics, Routledge, 2006.

61 As noted by a woman of the PRD executive committee in Zacatecas: If you aspire for a seat [...] it is

a disadvantage [to focus on gender equality issues]. [...] Male colleagues support women that are

attached to them, so they could decide what to do through her (interview with Mara Luisa Sosa,

Zacatecas, 21 November 2006, authors translation). If this is the case, it is a bad career strategy in

Mexican politics to focus on issues that benefit women as a group. See also G. Abou-Zeid, The Arab

region: womens access to the decision-making process across the Arab Nation.

62 Cf. K. Beckwith, Numbers and Newness: The Descriptive and Substantive Representation of

Women.

63 See, for example, G. Abou-Zeid, The Arab region: womens access to the decision-making process

across the Arab Nation.

64 L. Baldez, The Pros and Cons of Gender Quota Laws: What Happens When You Kick Men Out andLet Women In?, p. 106.

65 See however L. Baldez, The Pros and Cons of Gender Quota Laws: What Happens When You Kick

Men Out and Let Women In?, who shows that handpicking of candidates decreased at federal level

in Mexico after quotas were introduced, as political parties did not have to meet the quotas in cases

where they had primary elections.



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the downside of gender quotas

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